#1 MIGUEL R. CORNEJO VS.

ANDRES GABRIEL, provincial governor

of Rizal, and the PROVINCIAL BOARD RIZAL, composed of ANDRES
GABRIEL, PEDRO MAGLASIN AND CATALINO S. CRUZ
FACTS:
 The provincial governor of Rizal have been receiving numerous
complaints against the petitioner, municipal president of Pasay.
 Respondent Gabriel conduct an investigation for the complaints.
 Upon investigation, the respondent prov. Governor came to the conclusion
that agreeable to the power conferred upon provincial governors, the
municipal president.
 Without a hearing, Gabriel, provincial governor, temporarily suspended
the herein petitioner and laid the charges before the provincial board for
investigation.
 The petitioner seeks mandamus to have the respondents temporarily
restrained from going ahead the investigation and return to him his
position. But, it was interposed based on the ground that the court has no
right filed an answer to the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not temporary suspension of the petitioner violated his right to
due process of law considering the petitioners contention that he was deprived
of an office and temporarily suspended without having an opportunity to be
heard in his own defense, and considering further the respondents’ contention
that all they have done is to comply with the requirement of the law (sections
2188-2191 of the Administrative Code) which they are sworn to enforce.

RULING:
NO, there is no violation of right to due process.
As Judge Cooley, the leading American writer on Constitutional Law, has
well said, Due process of law is not necessarily judicial process by means of
which the Government is carried on, and the order of society maintained, is
purely executive or administrative, which is as much due process of law, as is
judicial process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings,
in administrative proceedings it is otherwise since they rest upon different
principles.
The present case is an Administrative case, which is a temporary
suspension of the petitioner being the Municipal President of Pasay. In an
Administrative case, it may be stated, without fear of contradictions that the right
to a notice and hearing are not essential to due process of law. Examples of
specifically or summary proceedings affecting the life, liberty or property of the
individual without any hearing are:
1. Arrest of an offender pending the filing of charges;
2. The restraint of property in tax cases;
3. The granting of preliminary injunctions ex parte; and
4. The suspension of officers or employees by the Governor General of
a Bureau pending an investigation. (Therefore, notice and hearing
are not pre requisites to the suspension of a public officer under a
statute which does not provide for such notice and hearing.)
(NOTE: The petition under the due process of law prohibition, it would be
necessary to consider an office as “property.” It is however, well settled in the
United States that a public office within the sense of Constitutional guarantees
of due process of law is NOT a PROPERY, but a PUBLIC TRUST or
AGENCY. “Decisions are numerous to the effect that public offices are mere
agencies or trust, and not property as such” (Taylor vs. Beckham)…officers
being mere agents and not rulers of the people.
As the Governor was, therefore, by the very letter and spirit of the law,
required to act and act promptly, necessarily upon his own findings of fact, we
are compelled to hold that such official action was, under the circumstances, due
process (Wilson vs. North Carolina [1897]).
Furthermore, in this case as in all other instances, the presumption always
is that the law will be followed and that the investigation and the hearing will be
impartial. “The presumption is just as conclusive of executive action, as to its
correctness and justness, as it in favor of judicial action.” We entertain no doubt
that the provincial governor, fully conscious of the trust reposed in him by law,
will act only in cases where strong reasons exist for exercising the power of
suspension and upon a high consideration of his duty. Thus, the provision of
section 2188 of the Administrative Code are clear and they do not offend the
due process of law clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights and it is our duty to
apply the law without fear and favor.
[G.R. No. 6690. March 29, 1912. ]
SILVESTRA TENORIO Y VILLAMIL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.

Doctrine: A statute authorizing a railroad company to exercise the

power of eminent domain being in derogation of general right, and
conferring upon it exceptional privileges with regard to the property
of others of which it may have need, should be construed strictly in
favor of land owners whose property is affected by its terms; and
before any right to take possession of land under such a statute can
be lawfully exercised its provisions must be "fully and fairly"
complied with

FACTS:
Defendant company took possession of and occupied small
parcel of land without the express consent of Plaintiff and without
having made payment therefore, alleging that the land is a part of
certain lands described in condemnation proceedings instituted in
CFI Pangasinan by virtue of the authority lawfully conferred upon
it.
Plaintiff file for a separate action for damages.

Procedural History:
RTC favored defendant company

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Plaintiff has the right to maintain this
separate action for damages for trespass on his land consudering P's
contention that it was his duty to seek redress in the condemnation
proceedings instituted by Defendant company and D's contention
that in accordance with the provisiond of the law touching
condemnstion proceedings, by virtue of the claims P asserts, she is
not entitled to do so.

HELD:
Yes.

As a general rule, the steps prescribed by the statute must be

followed or the proceedings will be void. Since these statutes are in
derogation of general right and of common-law modes of procedure,
they must be strictly construed in favor of the landowner, and must
be at least substantially or ‘fully and fairly’ complied with.

In this case, in the absence of proof of a substantial compliance

with the provisions of law touching such proceedings, the Plaintiff
was clearly entitled to institute any appropriate action to recover the
damages which she may have suffered as a result of an unauthorized
and unlawful seizure and occupation of her property.

The theory on which the trial judge correctly proceeded was that
Defendant company have unlawfully taken possession of a part of
the tract of land in question, and by its operations thereon rendered
the whole tract worthless to the Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled
to abandon the entire tract, and recover damages for its full value
G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and
propietor, and NATIONAL WORKERS
BROTHERHOOD, petitioners, vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL
LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.

FACTS:
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather
company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged
shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his
employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU)
questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said
employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of the
rival labor union (National Worker’s Brotherhood) were laid off.
NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio
was merely busting NLU.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where
Toribio and NWB won.

Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its

right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.

The Supreme Court agreed with NLU.

The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new
trial.

HELD:
Yes.

The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court. It shall take

cognizance for purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and
settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute. It should be free
from rigidity of certain procedural requirements but it doesn’t mean
that they should ignore the fundamental requirements of due process
in trials.

Thus, the Supreme Court pointed that administrative bodies,

like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the Rules of Court must
also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process.
For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by
observing the following:
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to
present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the
rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the
obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to
support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
 (4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a
finding or conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial.”
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The administrative body or any of its judges,
therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration
of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The administrative body should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties
to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

In this case, the records show that the newly discovered

evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they attached to
their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at
the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they
could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence
in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents
and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their
admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of
the judgment rendered.

By and large, after considerable discussions, SC have come to

the conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if
the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the
documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may
be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created
the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new.

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not

entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result.
Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is
hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded
to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen
the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise
proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove
Facts:

On December 27, 1991, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, Roberto S.

Benedicto, and Hector T. Rivera were indicted for violation of
Section 10 of Circular No. 960 in relation to Section 34 of the
Central Bank Act (Republic Act No. 265, as amended) in five
Informations filed with the RTC Manila. That same day, nine
additional Informations charging Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto with
the same offense (dollar-salting), but involving different accounts,
were filed with the Manila RTC.

Circular No. 960 prohibited natural and juridical persons from

maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad without prior
authorization from the Central Bank. It also required all residents of
the Philippines who habitually earned or received foreign currencies
from invisibles, either locally or abroad, to report such earnings or
receipts to the Central Bank. Violations of the Circular were
punishable as a criminal offense under Section 34 of the Central
Bank Act.

On January 3, 1992, eleven more Informations accusing Mrs.

Marcos and Benedicto of the same offense, again in relation to
different accounts, were filed with the same court (Criminal Cases
Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969). That same day, the Central Bank
issued Circular No. 1318 which revised the rules governing non-
trade foreign exchange transactions. It took effect on January 20,
1992.

On August 24, 1992, the Central Bank came out with Circular
No. 1353 which amended Circular No. 1318 by deleting the
requirement of prior Central Bank approval for foreign exchange-
funded expenditures obtained from the banking system.

Both of the aforementioned circulars, however, contained a

saving clause, excepting from their coverage pending criminal
actions involving violations of Circular No. 960 and/or Circular No.
1318.

Mrs. Marcos, Benedicto and Rivera pleaded not guilty to the

charges. Petitioners moved to quash all the Informations filed
against them on the following grounds: lack of jurisdiction, forum
shopping, extinction of criminal liability with the repeal of Circular
No. 960, prescription, exemption from the Central Bank's reporting
requirement, and the grant of absolute immunity as a result of a
compromise agreement entered into with the government.

The RTC denied petitioners' motion to quash. On petitions for

certiorari, the Court of Appeals sustained the RTC, except with
respect to Criminal Case No. 91-101884 which dismissed. Hence,
the instant petition.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the preliminary investigation conducted violates
the petitioners' rights to due process

Petitioners' contention : Petitioners contend that the preliminary

investigation by the Department of Justice was invalid and in
violation of their rights to due process. Petitioners argue that
government's ban on their travel effectively prevented them from
returning home and personally appearing at the preliminary
investigation. Benedicto and Rivera further point out that the joint
preliminary investigation by the Department of Justice, resulted to
the charges in one set of cases before the Sandiganbayan for
violations of Republic Act No. 3019 and another set before the RTC
for violation of Circular No. 960.

2. Whether or not the offense under Circular No. 960 is repealed by

subsequent Circulars.

Petitioners contend that they are being prosecuted for acts

punishable under laws that have already been repealed. They point
to the express repeal of Central Bank Circular No. 960 by Circular
Nos. 1318 and 1353 as well as the express repeal of Republic Act
No. 265 by Republic Act No. 7653. Petitioners, relying on Article
22 of the Revised Penal Code, contend that repeal has the effect of
extinguishing the right to prosecute or punish the offense committed
under the old laws
3. Whether or not simultaneous repeal and reenactment of penal
provision extinguishes criminal liability incurred under the repealed
provision.

Petitioners insist that the repeal of Republic Act No. 265,

particularly Section 34, by Republic Act No. 7653, removed the
applicability of any penal sanction for violations of any non-trade
foreign exchange transactions previously penalized by Circular No.
960. Petitioners posit that a comparison of the two provisions shows
that Section 36 of RA 7653 neither retained nor reinstated Section
34 of RA 265.

4. Whether or not Section 36 of RA 7653 is an ex post facto law

Petitioners point out that Section 36 of RA 7653, in reenacting
Section 34 of the old Central Act, increased the penalty for
violations of rules and regulations issued by the Monetary Board.
Such increase in the penalty would give RA 7653 an ex post facto
application, violating the Bill of Rights.

Held:
1. No.

Preliminary investigation is not part of the due process

guaranteed by the Constitution. It is an inquiry to determine whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof. Instead, the right to a preliminary investigation is personal.
It is afforded to the accused by statute, and can be waived, either
expressly or by implication. The waiver extends to any irregularity
in the preliminary investigation, where one was conducted.

In this case, petitioners have expressly waived their right to

question any supposed irregularity in the preliminary investigation
or to ask for a new preliminary investigation. Petitioners admit
posting bail immediately following their return to the country,
entered their respective pleas to the charges, and filed various
motions and pleadings. By so doing, without simultaneously
demanding a proper preliminary investigation, they have waived
any and all irregularities in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation.
Thus, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to quash
the informations on the ground of want of or improperly conducted
preliminary investigation. The absence of a preliminary
investigation is not a ground to quash the information.
2. No.

As a rule, an absolute repeal of a penal law has the effect of

depriving a court of its authority to punish a person charged with
violation of the old law prior to its repeal. This is because an
unqualified repeal of a penal law constitutes a legislative act of
rendering legal what had been previously declared as illegal, such
that the offense no longer exists and it is as if the person who
committed it never did so. There are, however, exceptions to the
rule. One is the inclusion of a saving clause in the repealing statute
that provides that the repeal shall have no effect on pending actions.
Another exception is where the repealing act reenacts the former
statute and punishes the act previously penalized under the old law.
In such instance, the act committed before the reenactment
continues to be an offense in the statute books and pending cases are
not affected, regardless of whether the new penalty to be imposed is
more favorable to the accused.

In this case, it must be noted that despite the repeal of Circular

No. 960, Circular No. 1353 retained the same reportorial
requirement for residents receiving earnings or profits from non-
trade foreign exchange transactions. Second, even the most cursory
glance at the repealing circulars, Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 shows
that both contain a saving clause, expressly providing that the repeal
of Circular No. 960 shall have no effect on pending actions for
violation of the latter Circular.

A saving clause operates to except from the effect of the

repealing law what would otherwise be lost under the new law. In
the present case, the respective saving clauses of Circular Nos. 1318
and 1353 clearly manifest the intent to reserve the right of the State
to prosecute and punish offenses for violations of the repealed
Circular No. 960, where the cases are either pending or under
investigation.

3. No

A comparison of the old Central Bank Act and the new Bangko
Sentral's charter repealing the former show that both the repealed
law and the repealing statute contain a penal clause which sought to
penalize in general, violations of the law as well as orders,
instructions, rules, or regulations issued by the Monetary Board. In
the case of the Bangko Sentral, the scope of the penal clause was
expanded to include violations of "other pertinent banking laws
enforced or implemented by the Bangko Sentral."

In the instant case, the acts of petitioners sought to be penalized

are violations of rules and regulations issued by the Monetary
Board. These acts are proscribed and penalized in the penal clause
of the repealed law and this proviso for proscription and penalty was
reenacted in the repealing law. We find, therefore, that while Section
34 of RA 265 was repealed, it was nonetheless, simultaneously
reenacted in Section 36 of RA 7653.

Where a clause or provision or a statute is simultaneously

repealed and reenacted, there is no effect, upon the rights and
liabilities which have accrued under the original statute, since the
reenactment, in effect "neutralizes" the repeal and continues the law
in force without interruption. The rule applies to penal laws and
statutes with penal provisions. Thus, the repeal of a penal law or
provision, under which a person is charged with violation thereof
and its simultaneous reenactment penalizing the same act done by
him under the old law, will neither preclude the accused's
prosecution nor deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear and try
his case. The act penalized before the reenactment continues to
remain an offense and pending cases are unaffected.
Therefore, the repeal of RA 265 by RA 7653 did not extinguish the
criminal liability of petitioners for transgressions of Circular No.
960 and cannot, under the circumstances of this case, be made a
basis for quashing the indictments against petitioners.

4. No.
An ex post facto law is one which:

(1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the

law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an
act;
(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when
committed;
(3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed;
(4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes
conviction upon less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense;
(5) assuming to regulate civil rights, and remedies only, in
effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something
which when done was lawful; and
(6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation
of amnesty.
 The test whether a penal law runs afoul of the ex post facto
clause of the Constitution is: Does the law sought to be applied
retroactively take "from an accused any right that was regarded at
the time of the adoption of the constitution as vital for the protection
of life and liberty and which he enjoyed at the time of the
commission of the offense charged against him?

The crucial words in the test are "vital for the protection of life
and liberty. In this case the Court find, however, the test inapplicable
to the penal clause of Republic Act No. 7653. Penal laws and laws
which, while not penal in nature, nonetheless have provisions
defining offenses and prescribing penalties for their violation
operate prospectively. Penal laws cannot be given retroactive effect,
except when they are favorable to the accused. Nowhere in RA
7653, and in particular Section 36, is there any indication that the
increased penalties provided therein were intended to operate
retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this case.
 Gloria Aguirre v. DOJ G.R. No. 170723
March 3, 2008 Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS:
 Pedro and Lourdes Aguirre are the adoptive parents of Larry
 In a psychiatry report by Dr. Pascual, Larry was deemed to have a mild
mental deficiency because an abortion was attempted when he was young.
o At age 3-4, he can only crawl on his tummy like a frog
o He did not utter his first word until he was 3; he did not speak in
sentences until he was 6
 In the same Psychiatry report, Lourdes Aguirre, was said to be suffering
from Bipolar Mood Disorder (from statement of Michelina Aguirre –
Olondriz) and was found to physically maltreat Larry
 Pedro Aguirre wanted him vasectomized when he was 24.
 Based on the strength of the psychiatry report, Dr. Agatep deemed Pedro’s
written consent (parents, guardians or individuals with parental authority
over the patient) sufficient to proceed with the surgery.
 A bilateral vasectomy was performed on Larry.
 Gloria Aguirre, respondents’ eldest child, filed a criminal complaint
against the Pedro Aguirre, Dr. Pascual, Dr. Agatep, and one of her sisters
(Michelina Aguirre-Olondriz) (11 June 2002) for:
o Mutilation
o Falsification of the psychiatry report because consent was not given
by Larry to the Vasectomy nor was he consulted on said operation
and that her mother was diagnosed of suffering from Bipolar Mood
Disorder without being personally interviewed
 Assistant City Prosecutor found no probable cause to hold respondents
liable for the complaint of falsification and mutilation (8 January 2003).
o NO FALSIFICATION – The psychiatry report is precisely to
determine whether Larry is mentally sound to give consent. The
psychiatry report also didn’t allege that Dr. Pascual personally
diagnosed Lourdes Aguirre. She can be wrong in her diagnosis but
she didn’t lie about anything.
o NO MUTILATION – The vasectomy operation did not deprive Larry
of his reproductive organ. The operation is reversible and therefore
cannot be the permanent damage contemplated under Art. 262, RPC
  DOJ Secretary dismissed Gloria’s appeal-petition for review(appealed: 18
February 2003, resolution-dismissal: 11 February 2004).
 Petitioner Gloria Aguirres Motion for Reconsideration was denied with
finality by the DOJ in another Resolution dated 12 November 2004.
 CA also dismissed Gloria’s petition for certiorari- petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 (resolution-dismissal: 21 July
2005).
 Petitioner Gloria Aguirres motion for reconsideration was denied by the
appellate court in a Resolution dated 5 December 2005.
 Petitioner filed a petition under Rule 45 in SC
ISSUES:
Whether or not CA and DOJ commit grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing petitioners’s complaint
Petitioner’s contention:
the Court of Appeals and the DOJ failed to appreciate several important facts:
1) that bilateral vasectomy conducted on petitioners brother, Larry Aguirre,
was admitted;
2) that the procedure caused the perpetual destruction of Larrys reproductive
organs of generation or conception;
3) that the bilateral vasectomy was intentional and deliberate to deprive Larry
forever of his reproductive organ and his capacity to procreate; and
4) that respondents, in conspiracy with one another, made not only one but
two (2) untruthful statements, and not mere inaccuracies when they made it
appear in the psychiatry report that a) Larrys consent was obtained or at the
very least that the latter was informed of the intended vasectomy; and b)
that Lourdes Aguirre was likewise interviewed and evaluated.

Respondents’ contention:
1.) there was no sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case
for the crimes complained
HELD:
No, CA ad DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
petitioner’s complaint.

 Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the
 facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was
guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. The term does not mean
actual and positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely
based on opinion and reasonable belief; that is, the belief that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. A finding of
probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a
pronouncement of guilt.
 The determination of whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the
prosecution in court of an accused is consigned and entrusted to the DOJ.
And by the nature of his office, a public prosecutor is under no compulsion
to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he
has evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand
points to a different conclusion.

Note (from Nochura):

c) A preliminary investigation is essentially an inquiry to determine whether
(1) a crime has been committed, and (2) whether there is probable cause that
the accused is guilty thereof. The public prosecutor determines during the
preliminary investigation whether probable cause exists; thus the decision
whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint depends on the sound
discretion of the prosecutor. Courts will not interfere with the conduct of
preliminary investigation or reinvestigation or in the determination of what
constitutes sufficient probable cause for the filing of the corresponding
information against the offender [Baviera v. Paglinawan, G.R. No. 168580,
February 8, 2007]. In Sanrio Company v. Lim, G.R. No. 168380, February 8,
2008, the Supreme Court reiterated the policy of non-interference with executive
discretion in the determination of probable cause. It held that a public
prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of preliminary
investigation.

i) The possible exception to this rule of non-interference, as held in Aguirre

v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 170723, March 3, 2008, is where there is an
unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the public prosecutor. Such grave abuse of discretion
will then justify judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive.
 This Court has consistently adhered to the policy of non-interference in the
conduct of preliminary investigations, and to leave to the investigating
prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of what
constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing
of an information against the supposed offender.
 But this is not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on
the part of the prosecutor. It is entirely possible that the investigating
prosecutor may erroneously exercise the discretion lodged in him by law.
This, however, does not render his act amenable to correction and
annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, absent any showing
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
 NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
 No falsification
o Acts complained of do not fall under any of the 8 enumerated acts in
Art. 171 RPC
o The reason for having Larry psychiatrically evaluated was precisely
to ascertain whether or not he can validly consent with impunity to
the proposed vasectomy,
o That Larry’s consent to be vasectomized was not obtained by the
psychiatrist was of no moment, because nowhere is it stated in said
report that such assent was obtained.
o The fact that Dra. Pascual cited finding, which is not of her own
personal knowledge in her report does not mean that she committed
falsification in the process. Her sources may be wrong and may affect
the veracity of her report, but for as long as she has not alleged therein
that she personally diagnosed Lourdes Aguirre, which allegation
would not then be true, she cannot be charged of falsification.
 No Mutilation
o Though undeniably, vasectomy denies a man his power of
reproduction, such procedure does not deprive him, either totally or
partially, of some essential organ for reproduction.
Case#6 GR No. 182573 2014-04-23
RAY SHU, Petitioner, vs.
JAIME DEE, ENRIQUETO MAGPANTAY, RAMON MIRANDA,
LARRY MACILLAN, AND EDWIN SO, Respondents

Facts:
 Petitioner, president of the 3A Apparel Corporation, filed a complaint
before the NBI charging the respondents of falsification of two deeds of
real estate mortgage submitted to Metrobank.

 Both deeds of real estate mortgage were allegedly signed by the petitioner,
one in his own name while the other was on behalf of the corporation.

 According to the petitioner, the respondents were employees of

Metrobank.

 After investigation, the NBI filed a complaint with the City Prosecutor of
Makati charging the respondents of the crime of forgery and falsification
of public documents.

 The respondents argued in their counter-affidavits that they were denied

their right to due process during the NBI investigation because the
agency never required them and Metrobank to submit the standard sample
signatures of the petitioner for comparison.

 The findings contained in the questioned documents report only covered

the sample signatures unilaterally submitted by the petitioner as compared
with the signatures appearing on the two deeds of real estate mortgage.

 An examination of the signatures of the petitioner which appear in several

documents in Metrobank’s possession revealed that his signatures in the
questioned deeds are genuine.

Procedural History:
Ruling of the City Prosecutor:
  found no probable cause against the respondents and, consequently,
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
 pieces of evidence presented before the city prosecutor, which were not
made available to the NBI and which the petitioner does not dispute, prove
that the same person executed the questioned deeds.
 Petitioner appealed the city prosecutor’ resolution to the Secretary of
Justice.

Ruling of the Secretary of Justice:

 reversed the city prosecutor’s findings.
 city prosecutor failed to consider the evidentiary value of the findings of
the NBI questioned documents experts.
 file a petition for certiorari with the CA (Rule 65)

CA:
 granted the petition and annulled the assailed resolution of the
Secretary of Justice
 respondents were denied their right to due process in the proceedings
before the NBI and the Secretary of Justice
 before the NBI, the respondents were not furnished a copy of the complaint
and were not likewise required to file their answer or to present
countervailing evidence
 before the Secretary of Justice, the respondents were not furnished with the
petition for review that the petitioner filed. They were not even required to
file their answer nor to comment

Issue:
Whether or not Respondents were denied of their right to due process.

Petitioner’s Contention:
 Respondents already had active participation in the proceedings before the
Secretary of Justice through the filing of a motion for reconsideration

Respondent’s Contention:
  They were prevented from participating in the proceedings before the NBI
and the Secretary of Justice, resulting in the denial of their right to due
process.

Ruling:
No, Respondents were not denied of their right to due process.

Main Ruling:

In P/Insp. Ariel S. Artillero v. Orlando Casimiro, et al., the Court ruled that
the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. What the law
prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but its absolute absence and lack
of opportunity to be heard. Sufficient compliance with the requirements of due
process exists when a party is given a chance to be heard through his motion for
reconsideration.

In the present case, the Court did not find it disputed that the respondents
filed with the Secretary of Justice a motion for reconsideration of her resolution.
Therefore, any initial defect in due process, if any, was cured by the remedy the
respondents availed of.

With regards to NBI:

In Cabarrus Jr. v. Bernas, it was held that the functions of the NBI are
merely investigatory and informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-
judicial powers and is incapable of granting any relief to any party. It cannot
even determine probable cause. The NBI is an investigative agency whose
findings are merely recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon
its own initiative or as public welfare may require in accordance with its
mandate. It also renders assistance when requested in the investigation or
detection of crimes in order to prosecute the persons responsible.

In this case, since the NBI’s findings were merely recommendatory, the
Court found that no denial of the respondents’ due process right could have taken
place; the NBI’s findings were still subject to the prosecutor’s and the Secretary
of Justice’s actions for purposes of finding the existence of probable cause.
Further Info:
The respondents were not likewise denied their right to due process when
the NBI issued the questioned documents report. The Court noted that this report
merely stated that the signatures appearing on the two deeds and in the
petitioner’s submitted sample signatures were not written by one and the same
person. Notably, there was no categorical finding in the questioned documents
report that the respondents falsified the documents. This report, too, was
procured during the conduct of the NBI’s investigation at the petitioner’s request
for assistance in the investigation of the alleged crime of falsification. The report
is inconclusive and does not prevent the respondents from securing a separate
documents examination by handwriting experts based on their own evidence.

On its own, the NBI’s questioned documents report does not directly point
to the respondents’ involvement in the crime charged. Its significance is that,
taken together with the other pieces of evidence submitted by the parties during
the preliminary investigation, these evidence could be sufficient for purposes of
finding probable cause – the action that the Secretary of Justice undertook in the
present case.

In the issue that Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion:

It is well-settled that in order to arrive at a finding of probable cause, the
elements of the crime charged should be present. In determining these elements
for purposes of preliminary investigation, only facts sufficient to support a prima
facie case against the respondent are required, not absolute certainty. Thus,
probable cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on more
than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction
(Villanueva et al. v. Caparas).
G.R. Nos. 212140-41 January 21, 2015
SENATOR ESTRADA vs OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

Facts:

On 25 November 2013, the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a copy

of the complaint filed by the NBI and Atty. Baligod for Plunder. And on 3
December 2013, the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada another
complaint for the crime of plunder.

Eighteen of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed their

counter-affidavits between 9 December 2013 and 14 March 2014. Sen.
Estrada filed his request to be furnished with copies of counter
affidavits of the other respondents, affidavits of new witnesses and
other filings. Sen. Estrada’s request was made "pursuant to the right of a
respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which
he may not have been furnished’ and to ‘have access to the evidence on
record’ based on section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.

The Ombudsman issued an assailed order denying the motion of Estrada in

response to his request stating that under the Rules on Criminal Procedure
and Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, he is not entitled
to be furnished of the copy of all the filings of the respondents. The rights
of respondent Estrada in the conduct of the preliminary investigation
depend on the rights granted to him by law and these cannot be based on
whatever rights he believes that he is entitled to or those that may be derived
from the phrase "due process of law."

On March 28, 2014, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution which found
probable cause to indict Estrada and his co-respondents with one count of
plunder and 11 counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019.
Sen. Estrada filed a motion for reconsideration of the joint resolution dated
28 March 2014 and dated 7 April 2014. He prayed for the issuance of a new
resolution dismissing the charges against him.

Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s 27 March

2014 Order denying his request, Sen. Estrada filed the present Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 and sought to annul and set aside the 27 March
2014 Order.

Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and
violated his right to constitutional due process.

Ruling:
No.

There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish

a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.

Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman provides:

Section 4(c) – a respondent “shall have access to the evidence on record”
However, it should be construed in relation to
Section 4(a) - "the investigating officer shall require the complainant or
supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to substantiate the complaint."
The "supporting witnesses" are the witnesses of the complainant, and do not
refer to the co-respondents.
Section 4(b) - "the investigating officer shall issue an order attaching thereto
a copy of the affidavits and all other supporting documents, directing the
respondent to submit his counter-affidavit.” The affidavits referred to in
Section 4(b) are the affidavits mentioned in Section 4(a)
as well as to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides
Section 3(b), Rule 112 - "[t]he respondent shall have the right to examine
the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been
furnished and to copy them at his expense." A respondent’s right to examine
refers only to "the evidence submitted by the complainant."
What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for
the Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and
the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit the
counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent.
(Thus, whether under Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
or under Rule II of the Ombudsman’s Rules of Procedure, there is no
requirement whatsoever that the affidavits executed by the co-respondents
should be furnished to a respondent.)
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the accused in a
preliminary investigation has no right to cross-examine the witnesses
which the complainant may present.

Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the
respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to
examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the
fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their
witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right
to examine or cross-examine.

It should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is

only for the determination of probable cause, and "probable cause merely
implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner.
A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial
where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the
right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence."
Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to
those granted by procedural law.

(A person under preliminary investigation, as Sen. Estrada is in the present

case when he filed his Request, is not yet an accused person, and hence
cannot demand the full exercise of the rights of an accused person.)
In this case, he fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is a
compulsory requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation for
the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his
co-respondents. Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen. Estrada’s claim. He also
acquires no right to cross examine the witnesses which the complainant may
present in such investigation.

Thus, no grave abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to the

Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order which denied
Sen. Estrada’s Request.

Note: Justice Velasco’s dissent relies on the ruling in Office of the

Ombudsman v. Reyes (Reyes case), an administrative case, in which a
different set of rules of procedure and standards apply. Sen. Estrada’s
Petition, in contrast, involves the preliminary investigation stage in a
criminal case. Rule III on the Procedure in Administrative Cases of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman applies in the Reyes
case, while Rule II on the Procedure in Criminal Cases of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman applies in Sen. Estrada’s
Petition. In both cases, the Rules of Court apply in a suppletory character or
by analogy.
09. Namil vs Comelec, G.R. No. 150540. October 28, 2003

Facts:

The Commissioner-in-Charge for Region XII, Mehol K.

Sadain, conducted an investigation on the matter of having two (2)
sets of winning candidates as members of the Sangguniang Bayan
for Palimbang:

 The Petitioners who were proclaimed on May 20, 2001, who

took oath and assumed office; and
 The Private respondents who were proclaimed on May 21,
2001.

After investigation and through memoranda submitted by the Law

Department, the Regional Election Registrar and the Provincial
Election Supervisor, it was found out that:

 The Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation

(COCVP) proclaiming the petitioners as winning
candidates is falsified and fictitious, hence, null and void;
and

 The COCVP proclaiming the private respondents as winning

candidates is the authentic certificate.

The Comelec then issued Resolution No. 4615 proclaiming the

private respondents as the winning candidates.

Issue:
 Whether or not, Resolution No. 4615 is valid.

Considering the petitioners’ contention that:

 It is null and void since it was issued without according
them due notice and hearing, contrary to the enshrined
principle of due process;
 The Comelec simply approved the recommendation of
Commissioner Sadain; and
 The petitioners were kept in the dark, learned about the
controversy only when they were notified of the assailed
resolution of the public respondent.

Considering further the respondent’s contention that:

 The petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration
of the assailed decision before instituting this action with
this Court; hence, the petition is premature.
 That the twin requirement of notice and hearing in
annulment of proclamation is not applicable when the
proclamation is null and void.

Ruling:

No, Resolution No. 4615 is not valid.

In Bince, Jr. vs Comelec, it was held that the Petitioner cannot

be deprived of his office without due process of law. Although
public office is not property under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights
of the Constitution, and one cannot acquire a vested right to
public office, it is, nevertheless, a protected right.
 In Farias vs. Comelec, it was held that the COMELEC is
without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend
the effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing.”

In Caruncho III vs. Comelec, it was held that due process in

quasi-judicial proceedings before the COMELEC requires due
notice and hearing. The proclamation of a winning candidate cannot
be annulled if he has not been notified of any motion to set aside his
proclamation.

In this case, Comelec nullified the proclamation of the

petitioners and ousted them from their office as members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang, based solely on the
recommendations of its law department and of Commissioner
Sadain, and on the memoranda of its officers. The petitioners were
not accorded a chance to be heard before the Comelec issued the
assailed resolution. The petitioners’ proclamation enjoys the
presumption of regularity and validity since no contest or protest
was even filed assailing the same.

Additional Notes:

Sec. 242 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that, “the

Commissions exclusive jurisdiction of all pre-proclamation
controversies. The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
all pre-proclamation controversies. It may motu proprio or upon
written petition, and after due notice and hearing, order the partial
or total suspension of the proclamation of any candidate-elect or
annul partially or totally any proclamation, if one has been made,
as the evidence shall warrant in accordance with the succeeding
section.”
The phrase motu proprio does not refer to the annulment of
proclamation but to the manner of initiating the proceedings to
annul a proclamation made by the board of canvassers.

The law provides two ways by which annulment proceedings may be

initiated:
1. It may be at the own initiative of the COMELEC (motu
proprio) or
2. by written petition.

In either case, notice and hearing is required. This is clear from the
language of the law.
10. Jalosjos vs Comelec, G.R. No. 205033, June 18, 2013

Facts:

COMELEC En Banc issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 on

January 15, 2013, resolving "to CANCEL and DENY due course the
Certificate of Candidacy filed by Romeo G. Jalosjos as Mayor of
Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections" due to
his perpetual absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply with
the voter registration requirement.

Additional facts:

 Petitioner was convicted by final judgment of two (2) counts of

statutory rape and six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness.
 he was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua
and reclusion temporal for each count, respectively, which carried the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification (Article 41,
RPC)
 President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued an order commuting his
prison term to sixteen (16) years, three (3) months and three (3) days
 After serving the same, he was issued a Certificate of Discharge from
Prison
 Petitioner, Romeo Jalosjos, after serving his sentence, applied to
register as a voter in Zamboanga City. However, because of his
previous conviction, his application was denied by the Election
Registration Board (ERB).
 MTCC confirmed by the RTC, denied his Petition for Inclusion in the
Permanent List of Voters on account of his perpetual absolute
disqualification which in effect, deprived him of the right to vote in
any election.

Issue:
 Whether or not, Comelec violated petitioner’s right to due process
when it issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613.

Ruling:

No, the Comelec did not violate petitioner’s right to due process.

In Aratea v. COMELEC, the Court similarly pronounced that the

disqualification of a convict to run for public office, as affirmed by final
judgment of a competent court, is part of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relating to the conduct of elections.

In Villaroza vs. Comelec, the Court held that ‘administrative’

connotes, or pertains, to ‘administration, especially management, as by
managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the execution,
application, or conduct of persons or things. It does not entail an
opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a
decision or resolution thereon.

While a ‘quasi-judicial function’ is a term which applies to the action,

discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required
to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and
draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to
exercise discretion of a judicial nature.

IN THIS CASE, it is clear that the COMELEC En Banc did not exercise its
quasi-judicial functions when it issued Resolution No. 9613 as it did not
assume jurisdiction over any pending petition or resolve any election case
before it or any of its divisions. Rather, it merely performed its duty to
enforce and administer election laws in cancelling petitioner’s CoC on the
basis of his perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact of which had already
been established by his final conviction.
14. Orap vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. L-50508-11, October 11,
1985

Facts:

Petitioner, a presiding judge of the Municipal Court of

Mangatarem, Pangasinan, filed a motion to quash the
“informations” on the ground that the TanodBayan who signed the
same had no authority to do so and that, the Sandiganbayan did not
acquire jurisdiction over the offenses charged. After due hearing, the
respondent court denied petitioner's motion to quash. Petitioner
verbally moved for the reconsideration of the order but the relief
sought was denied.

Issue:

Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case,

considering the petitioner’s contention that the Tanodbayan has no
power to conduct preliminary investigations, file informations and
prosecute criminal cases against judges and their appurtenant
judicial staff.

Ruling:

Yes, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case.

PD No. 1607 (Tanodbayan decree), provides that “the

Tanodbayan functions not only as an ombudsman, but as prosecutor
as well.”
In this case, the Tanodbayan as ombudsman, his investigatory
powers are limited to complaints initiated against officers and
personnel of administrative agencies, as defined in Section 9(a) of
the law. Insofar as administrative complaints are concerned, the
courts, judges and their appurtenant judicial staff are outside the
Tanodbayan's investigatory power. However, a Tanodbayan may
also act as prosecutor in criminal cases. As petitioner is charged
here with criminal cases (violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), which are within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as defined under Section 4 of P.D. 1606, the said
court validly acquired jurisdiction over the informations in question.

Note: procedural due process requirements in judicial, criminal,

and civil proceedings:

1. An impartial and disinterested court;

2. Jurisdiction lawfully acquired over the person of the party
or property which is the subject matter of the proceeding;
3. Notice and opportunity to be heard given to the parties to
adduce evidence in their behalf.
Corona v. United Harbor PIlots Association
G.R. No. 111953 | 1997-12-12
Subject: DueProcess, Right to Exercise Profession, License
Facts:
The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) issued an Administrative
Order which provided that that all appointments for harbor pilots
made by the PPA will have to be renewed every year, and that the
existing appointments made will only be valid until December 1991.
Thus, respondents sought to have the implementation of this order
suspended. In the meantime, the PPA issued the guidelines for the
issuance of new appointments. These issuances were thus brought
before the courts by the respondents on the question of their
constitutionality based on violation of their right to exercise their
profession and on due process grounds.
Upon learning of PPA-AO (Administrative Order) 04-92 only after
publication in the newspaper, the United Harbor Pilots Association
of the Philippines:
 questioned said PPA-AO twice before the DOTC, which
Secretary Garcia said twice that only the PPA Board of
Directors [as governing body] has exclusive jurisdiction to
review, recall or annul PPA-AOs,
 appealed to the Office of the President, which first issued a
restraining order to the PPA on the implementation of the PPA-
AO, and after PPA’s answer, then dismissed the appeal/petition
and lifted said order, stating, through Assistant Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona, that the PPA-AO
(i) merely implements PPA Charter, (ii) issuance is an act of
PPA, not of its General Manager, (iii) merely regulates, not
forbids practice of the profession, recognizing that such
exercise is property right, and (iv) sufficiently complied with
 the requirement in the PD to consult only with ‘relevant
Government Agencies’, and
 finally finding affirmative relief with Manila RTC Br. 6. Court,
which ruled that (i) said PPA-AO is null and void (ii) PPA acted
in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion, and (iii)
imposed a permanent restraining order on PPA on its
implementation.
 Assistant Executive Secretary Corona thus filed petition for
review [of the Manila RTC Decision] to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
1. WON PPA-AO 04-92 is violative of the procedural due process
of UHPAP members.
2. WON PPA-AO 04-92 is violative of the substantive due process
of UHPAP members.

Held:
To constitute deprivation of due process of law, there must be (a) a
deprivation, and (b) such deprivation is done without proper
observance of due process.
1. NO. Notice and hearing is not required in the performance of an
administrative body’s function of executive or legislative functions,
such as issuing rules and regulations, but only in the performance of
quasi-judicial functions. Also PPA sufficiently complied with the
PPA Charter requirement that “only ‘relevant government
agencies’” are consulted with, which does not include the UHPAP.
Procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the
law is enforced. The opportunity to be heard is the very essence of
due process. Due process is also satisfied when an opportunity to
seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of is granted,
which was availed by UHPAP four times.
2. YES. Substantive due process is when the law itself, not merely
the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair,
reasonable, and just. Said PPA-AO unduly restricts their right to
enjoy their profession before compulsory retirement by facing an
annual cancellation [both veteran and neophyte Harbor Pilots] of
their license dependent on a “rigid evaluation of performance.”
Pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right.
Any ‘alteration’ of property right must be strictly made in
accordance with the constitutional mandate of due process of law.
Pilotage may only be practiced by duly licensed individuals. A
license is a right or permission granted by some competent authority
to carry on a business or do an act which, without such license,
would be illegal. Pilotage license requires passing 5 examinations,
each followed by actual training. License is granted in the form of
an appontment
Said PPA- AO does not add anything new or substantial a mere
surplusage, thus unecessary, since PPA-AO 03-85 already provides
for a comprehensive order on regulating harbor pilots, matters
merely duplicated in PPA-AO 04-92.
UHPAP also insinuated that the General Manager issued PPA-AO
04-92 with animosity to the UHPAP, however, the General Manager
is presumed to have acted in accordance with law and the best of
professional services. Such animosity, as evidenced by the number
of cases filed, cannot be considered the primordial reason for the
issuance of said PPA-AO.
Petition denied. PPA-AO struck down as violative of substantive
due process.

Additional Notes:
Due Process
  As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental
requirements ofprocedural due process, are essential only when
an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In
the performance of itsexecutive or legislative functions, such as
issuing rules and regulations, anadministrative body need not
comply with the requirements of notice andhearing.
Right to Exercise Profession
 Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by
duly licensed individuals. Licensure is the granting of license
especially to practice a profession. It is also the system of
granting licenses (as for professional practice) in accordance
with established standards.
 Before harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their
profession, they literally have to pass through the proverbial eye
of a needle by taking, not one but five examinations, each
followed by actual training and practice.
 However, pre-evaluation cancellation is constitutionally infirm
and unreasonable, and constitutes as deprivation of property
without due process of law.
License
 A license is a right or permission granted by some competent
authority to carryon a business or do an act which, without such
license, would be illegal.
Case#15 A.M. No. MTJ-93-783 1996-07-29
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, petitioner, vs.
JUDGE FILOMENO PASCUAL, respondent.

Facts:
 A certain Ceferino Tigas wrote a letter, addressed to Hon. Reynaldo Suarez
of the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court, charging
that irregularities and corruption were being committed by the respondent,
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan.

 The letter was referred to the NBI in order that an investigation on the
alleged illegal and corrupt practices of the respondent may be conducted.
NBI agents proceeded to Angat, Bulacan, in order to look for Ceferino
Tigas, the letter writer.

 Tigas, the NBI team realized was a fictitious character. In view of their
failure to find Tigas, they proceeded to the residence of Candido Cruz, an
accused in respondent’s sala.

 In his affidavit, Cruz declared that he was the accused in Criminal Case
No. 2154, charged with the crime of Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge,
after conducting the preliminary investigation of the case, decided that the
crime he committed was only physical injuries and so, respondent judge
assumed jurisdiction over the case. Cruz believed that he was made to
understand by the respondent that, in view of his favorable action, Cruz
was to give to respondent the sum of P2,000.00. Respondent judge is
believed to be a drunkard and, in all probability, would need money to
serve his vice.

 In view of this statement, the NBI agents assigned to the case caused
respondent judge to be entrapped, for which reason, the judge was thought
to have been caught in flagrante delicto.

 NBI Report: Cruz met with Judge Pascual during latter’s daughter’s
graduation. Cruz told Judge Pascual that he had the money but the latter
did not receive the money because according to him there were plenty of
 people around. He then instructed Cruz to see him at his office the
following day. The following day, Cruz proceeded to the office of Judge
Pascual at the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, and thereat
handed to him four (4) pieces of P500.00 bills contained in a white mailing
envelope previously marked and glazed with fluorescent powder.

 In the meantime, the NBI agents stayed outside the court room and after
about 15 minutes, Cruz came out of the room and signaled that Judge
Pascual had already received the marked money. They immediately
entered the room and informed Subject about the entrapment. Subject
denied having received anything from Cruz, but after a thorough search,
the marked money was found inserted between the pages of a blue book on
top of his table.

 Judge Pascual was invited to the Office of the NBI-NCR, Manila wherein
he was subjected to ultra violet light examination. After finding Subject’s
right hand for the presence of fluorescent powder, he was booked,
photographed and fingerprinted in accordance with NBI’s Standard
Operating Procedure (S.O.P.).

 The results of the investigation was referred to the Inquest Prosecutor of

the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Ombudsman, with the
recommendation that he be charged and prosecuted for Bribery as defined
and penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines.

 Judge’s side: The NBI, along with Candido Cruz, proceeded to the
municipal building of Angat, Bulacan, where the accused judge was
holding office. However, they learned that the accused judge was not in his
office but was then attending the graduation rites of his son at the nearby
Colegio de Sta. Monica, and so they decided to move their operation to the
school grounds. The ceremonies had not yet begun. Candido Cruz saw the
accused in one corner of the compound and approached him. He tried to
give the accused an envelope allegedly containing money, but the judge
refused to accept it and angrily drove Candido Cruz away. Rebuffed, the
NBI agents decided to reset their operation the following day.
  The following day, Cruz, as planned, entered the accused judges chambers
and placed an envelope, allegedly containing marked money, right on his
(judges) desk. He thought it was a pleading for filing and he told Candido
Cruz to file it with the office of the clerk of court at the adjacent room. Cruz
replied that it was the money the judge was asking for. Upon hearing the
reply, the accused suddenly erupted in anger, he grabbed the envelope on
the desk and hurled it to Cruz. The envelope fell on the floor, the accused
picked it up and inserted it inside the pocket of Cruzs polo shirt and drove
him out of the chamber.

 NBI agents entered and introduced themselves and told the accused that
the money that Cruz gave him was marked. Accused told them that he did
not receive or accept money from Cruz. But they proceeded to search the
room, the table, its drawers, and every nook and cranny of his room,
including the pockets of the accuseds pants. After scouring the place, the
agents failed to find the envelope with the marked money. And so, one of
the agents called for Candido Cruz who was waiting outside at a waiting
shed fronting the municipal building, and asked him where the envelope
was. Cruz came back to the room and, together with agent Olazo,
approached the cabinet and said heto pala.

 Then, the accused’s humiliating experience began. Thereafter, despite the

strident protestations of the accused, the envelope, which came from the
pocket of Cruz’s polo shirt, was placed on top of the table of the judge,
pictures were taken, and the accused was arrested by the NBI agents.

Procedural History:
 By resolution of the Third Division of Supreme Court, the case was
referred to Executive Judge Natividad G. Dizon for investigation, report
and recommendation.
 the Investigating Judge recommends that appropriate penalty be imposed
upon the respondent.

Issue:
 Whether or not the evidence on record warrants Respondent judge’s
conviction.

Ruling:
No, the evidence on record does not warrant Respondent judge’s
conviction.

In Raquiza vs. Castañeda, Jr., the Court held that the Rules, even in
administrative cases, demand that, if the respondent judge should be disciplined
for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence against him should be
competent and should be derived from direct knowledge. The Judiciary to which
respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its members could be
faulted, it should be only after due investigation and after presentation of
competent evidence, especially since the charge is penal in character.

In this case, the only bases for the Report and Recommendation consist
of: The Complaint, the Answer, the Memorandum of the respondent, and the
transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing of the bribery case of respondent
judge at the Sandiganbayan. The respondent was, therefore, not afforded the
right to open trial wherein respondent can confront the witnesses against him
and present evidence in his defense. Therefore, the above-quoted Report and
Recommendation of the investigating judge had fallen short of the requirements
of due process.

Further information:
The evidence aforesaid admits of irreconcilable inconsistencies in the
testimonies of principal witness, Candido Cruz, and NBI Agent SI Reynaldo
Olazo on several material points.

Even after rigid search of the chambers of respondent, the NBI Agents
failed to find the envelope containing marked money allegedly given by
Candido Cruz to respondent judge.
17. Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465. January 18, 2000

Facts:
The Department of Justice received a request from the Department of
Foreign Affairs for the extradition of respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The
Grand Jury Indictment. The warrant for his arrest, and other supporting
documents for said extradition were attached along with the request. Charges
include:
1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US;
2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax;
3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television;
4. False statement or entries; and
5. Election contribution in name of another.
Based on “Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines
and the Government of the U.S.A”, petitioner designated and authorized a panel
of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case.
Pending evaluation of the afore-stated extradition documents, Mark
Jimenez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of
the official extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given
ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the
requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of
Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine
Government must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings
arising out of a request for extradition.

Issue:
Whether extradition proceeding is civil, criminal or special proceeding in
which notice and hearing is dispensable during the evaluation stage or
preliminary investigation.

Ruling:
Extradition exhibits the criminal or penal aspect of the process.

In Almeda, Sr. vs. Perez, where the Court, citing American jurisprudence,
laid down the test to determine whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the
proceeding is under a statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture
can be included in the criminal case, such proceeding is criminal in nature,
although it may be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from the statute
that the action is meant to be criminal in its nature, it cannot be considered as
civil. If, however, the proceeding does not involve the conviction of the
wrongdoer for the offense charged, the proceeding is civil in nature.

In this case, while the case mentioned above refer to an impending threat
of deprivation of ones property or property right. No less is this true, but even
more so in the case before us, involving as it does the possible deprivation of
liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is
placed second only to life itself and enjoys precedence over property, for while
forfeited property can be returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is
irretrievable and beyond recompense. By comparison, a favorable action in an
extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country,
thus saliently exhibiting the criminal or penal aspect of the process. In this sense,
the evaluation procedure is akin to a preliminary investigation since both
procedures may have the same result the arrest and imprisonment of the
respondent or the person charged. Similar to the evaluation stage of extradition
proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may result in the filing of an
information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the
deprivation of his liberty. Hence, notice and hearing are indispensable.

Notes:
Due process is comprised of two components substantive due process which
requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the
person to his life, liberty, or property, and procedural due process which consists
of the two basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being
heard by an impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993
Ed., pp. 102-106).

True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and
hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative
proceedings as well. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the
proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting
their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right to appear therein and
present their side and to refute the position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil.
Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64).

In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory

proceeding, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court guarantees the
respondents basic due process rights, granting him the right to be furnished a
copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the
right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within ten
days from receipt thereof. Moreover, the respondent shall have the right to
examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.

These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances,

such as:
1. In proceedings where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the
summary abatement of a nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the
preventive suspension of a public servant facing administrative charges
(Section 63, Local Government Code, B. P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of
filthy restaurants or theaters showing obscene movies or like
establishments which are immediate threats to public health and decency,
and the cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal
prosecution;
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the
respondent is not precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing
at a later time without prejudice to the person affected, such as the
summary distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, and
the replacement of a temporary appointee; and
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise
them had not been claimed.

17. Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465. October 17, 2000, On
Resolution
Facts:
On February 3, 2000, the petitioner timely filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration. He assails the decision on the following grounds, among
others:
 I. There is a substantial difference between an evaluation process
antecedent to the filing of an extradition petition in court and a preliminary
investigation.
II. Absence of notice and hearing during the evaluation process will not
result in a denial of fundamental fairness.

Issue:
Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

Ruling:
No, the private respondent is NOT entitled to the due process right to notice
and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

As held by the US Supreme Court in United States v. Galanis, an

extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which
will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the
determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence
will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence,
as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or
innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee especially by one
whose extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation.

In this case, as an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character

and the evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a
preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not
necessarily apply to the former. The extradition proceeding is only at its
evaluation stage, the nature of the right being claimed by the private respondent
is nebulous and the degree of prejudice he will allegedly suffer is weak, we
accord greater weight to the interests espoused by the government thru the
petitioner Secretary of Justice. Private respondents plea for due process
deserves serious consideration involving as it does his primordial right to liberty.
His plea to due process, however, collides with important state interests
which cannot also be ignored for they serve the interest of the greater
majority.
Case#18 G.R. No. 148571 2002-09-24
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented
by the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner, vs.
Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Morales, and Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ
a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondents.

Facts:
 This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of
Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion

 The US Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine

Government Note Verbale No. 0522 requesting the extradition of Mark
B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. The secretary of foreign
affairs transmitted them to the secretary of justice for appropriate action,
pursuant to Section 5 of the Extradition Law.

 Jimenez sought and was granted a TRO by the RTC of Manila. The TRO
prohibited the DOJ from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition.

 The Supreme Court upon Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ,
held that Marc Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This Resolution has become
final and executory.

 The Government of the United States of America, represented by the

Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC, the appropriate Petition for
Extradition. They alleged that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant
issued by the District Court for the Southern District of Florida in
connection with the following charges:
(1) conspiracy to defraud the United States; (2) tax evasion; (3) wire fraud;
(4) false statements; and (5) illegal campaign contributions.
The Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest."
 Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," which
prayed that Govt. of USA’s application for an arrest warrant be set for
hearing.
  The RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing. In
that hearing, the Govt. of USA manifested its reservations on the procedure
adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be
heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. After the hearing, Jimenez
sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be
allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.

 The RTC directed the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail
for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he had
surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was
granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order.

 The Government of the USA filed for a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 seeking to set aside the assailed Orders of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of due process.

Private Respondent’s contention:

 his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings amounts
to a violation of his right to due process.

Ruling:
No, there is no violation of due process.

Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to

fundamental fairness. The doctrine of right to due process and fundamental
fairness does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent
opportunity to be heard is enough (Central Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals).

In this case, private respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard

subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for
Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process and
fundamental fairness.
Further Info:
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, the Court found no arbitrariness, in
the immediate deprivation of his liberty prior to his being heard. That his arrest
and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJs filing
in court the Petition with its supporting documents after a determination that the
extradition request meets the requirements of the law and the relevant treaty; (2)
the extradition judges independent prima facie determination that his arrest will
best serve the ends of justice before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and
(3) his opportunity, once he is under the courts custody, to apply for bail as an
exception to the no-initial-bail rule.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the

extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that
country. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of
taking it, he ran away.

[c]onstitutional liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the due process rights

accorded to individuals must be carefully balanced against exigent and palpable
government interests (Kelso v. US Department of State).

Other Doctrines:
Five Postulates of Extradition
1) Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime
In this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an
expanding ring of international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an
isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to improve our
chances of suppressing crime in our own country.

2) The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused

By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have
reposed its trust in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system
of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of the latter to
grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.

3) The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

 An extradition proceeding is sui generis:
a) It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the
rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. It does not involve the
determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence
will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.
b) An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal
proceedings involve a full-blown trial.
c) In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case
requires proof “beyond reasonable doubt” for conviction while a fugitive may
be ordered extradited “upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case”
d) Unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon
being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an
individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him.

Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through

which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction
with the best claim to try that person. The ultimate purpose of extradition
proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request
complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is
extraditable.

4) Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

We are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our
obligations under the Treaty. Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in
a position to deliver the accused, should it be found proper

5) There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were
willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein
respondent:
a) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his
indictment proceedings there; and
b) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting
state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable
Government of Hong Kong vs. Olalia (2007)
G.R. No. 153675 | 2007-04-19

Facts:

 On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the

then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an
"Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted
Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997.
 Juan Antonio Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court
with three counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as
agent” and seven counts of the offense of “conspiracy to
defraud”, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong.
 Warrants of arrest were issued against him (August 23, 1997
and October 25, 1999.
 An Order of Arrest was issued by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Manila against Muñoz (September 23, 1999) in lieu of
the request received by the Department of Justice (DOJ) from
the Hong Kong Department of Justice for his provisional arrest
(September 13, 1999). On the same day of the issuance of the
warrant, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) arrested
and detained him.
 Upon petition of Muñoz (September 23, 1999), the Court of
Appeals (CA) declared the Order of Arrest void (November 9,
1999).
 DOJ filed a petition for review on certiorari with SC (November
12, 1999) prayoing that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be
reversed. The Supreme Court (SC), however, sustained the
validity of the Order of Arrest against Muñoz (December 18,
2000). This became final and executory on April 10, 2001.
  Meanwhile, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
(HK-SAR) filed with the RTC Manila (presided by respondent
Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) a petition for the extradition of
Muñoz (November 22, 1999).
 In response, Muñoz filed a petition for bail. The same was
denied for the reason that there is no Philippine law granting
bail in extradition cases and that Muñoz is a high “flight risk”
(October 8, 2001). Muñoz filed a motion for reconsideration
(October 30, 2001) which the court granted (December 20,
2001).
 The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, in turn, filed
an urgent motion to vacate (On December 21, 2001) the said
order granting bail but it was denied (On December 21, 2001).
 Petitioner files a petition for Certiorari with SC (through DOJ)
under Rule 65 seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), (1) the Order dated December 20, 2001
allowing Juan Antonio Muñoz, private respondent, to post bail;
and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to
vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no
provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee
considering the petitioner’s (Hong Kong-SAR) that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting Muñoz to bail, that
there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a
potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely
to criminal proceedings and considering further the respondent’s
(Muñoz) contention that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill
of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee and that extradition is
a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.

Held:

No, respondent judge did not acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco is illustrative. In this case, a

Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure the necessary
certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After
noting that the prospective deportee had committed no crime, the
Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who
has committed the most serious crime known to law;" and that while
deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery
used "is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the provisions
relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.

In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of

Immigration, this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom
no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail
pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated,
the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human
Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail.

In this case, bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings,

the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the
"temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential
extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a
fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee
thus bears the onus probandi (burden of proof) of showing that he
or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.

SC DISMISSED the petition and REMANDED to the trial court to

determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis
of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should
order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention;
and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.

Additional Notes:
Extradition

1. Extradition has been characterized as the right of a foreign power,

created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or
convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the
correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding
state. It is not a criminal proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee
is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal,
for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment
may follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly
to treaty obligations between different nations. It is not a trial to
determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it
a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in
character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or
convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which
he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.

2. While extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized

by the following:
(a) It entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential
extradite; and

(b) The means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also

"the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D.
No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the
"immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such
"will best serve the interest of justice. Section 20 allows the
requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional
arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;"
and that release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest
and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received
subsequently."

3. An extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears

all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be
subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to
transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings.
"Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of
extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be
reasonable.

Public International Law

4. The modern trend in public international law is the primacy

placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of
human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may
properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The
vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited
only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of
the past century.
Grant of Bail Available in Extradition Proceedings

5. While the court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to

bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various
international treaties giving recognition and protection to human
rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a re-examination of
the Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.

6. The State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not

necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in
administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine,have
likewise been detained.

7. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, there is no justification

why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise,
considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies
to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in
extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings
where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.

8. The right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this

jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty
obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion
and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the
presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines
should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not
impaired.

9. The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that

the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it
entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s
rights to life, liberty, and due process. An extraditee cannot be
deprived of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain
standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

Standard of proof in extradition proceedings

10. An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of

proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof
beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof
of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in
character, the standard of substantial evidence used in
administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of
extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from
fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in the case of
Government of United States of America v. Purganan, then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that
a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence"
should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to
him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable
doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence.

11. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing

evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders
and processes of the extradition court.
LAO GI v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR# 81798 December 29, 1989

This is a petition for certiorari filed by petitioners wherein they

seek to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and ask that a
new one be rendered setting aside the order of the CID
(Comnmission on Immigration and Deportation) dated September
28, 1982 and directing it to proceed with the reception of the
evidence in support of the charges against the petitioners.

Facts:

September 3, 1958: Secretary of Justice rendered Opinion No. 191:

finding Filomeno Chia, Jr., alias Sia Pieng Hui to be a Filipino
citizen as it appears that his father Filomeno Chia, Sr. is a Filipino
citizen born on November 28, 1899 being the legitimate son of
Inocencio Chia and Maria Layug of Guagua, Pampanga.

October 3, 1980: Minister of Justice rendered Opinion No. 147:

cancelling Opinion No. 191: setting aside the citizenship of
Filomeno Chia, Sr. on the ground that it was founded on fraud and
misrepresentation. A motion for reconsideration of said Opinion
was denied by the Minister of Justice on February 13, 1981.

March 9, 1981: a charge for deportation was filed with the

Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) against Lao Gi
alias Filomeno Chia, Sr., his wife and children.

March 19, 1981: an amended charge was filed with the CID alleging
that said respondents refused to register as aliens having been
required to do so and continued to refuse to register as such. On
August 31, 1981 another amended charge was filed alleging that
Manuel Chia committed acts of undesirability.

September 4, 1981: said respondents filed a motion to dismiss the

amended charges on the ground that the CID has no authority to
reopen a matter long settled under Opinion No. 191. The motion to
dismiss was opposed by the private prosecutor. The CID special
prosecutor also filed an opposition on the ground that the citizenship
may be threshed out as the occasion may demand and that due
process was accorded to respondents. The respondents filed a reply
thereto. The motion to dismiss was denied by the CID and a motion
for reconsideration of said denial was also denied in a resolution
dated December 10, 1981.

February 11, 1982: said respondents then filed with this Court a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order. After
requiring a comment thereon, on April 28, 1982 this court en banc
resolved to dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

Earlier, Manuel Chia was charged with falsification of public

documents in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila in Criminal
Case No. 60172 for alleging that he was a Filipino citizen in the
execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale of certain real property. He
was acquitted by the trial court in an order dated May 5, 1982 on the
ground that Opinion No. 191 of the Secretary of Justice may be
equated as res judicata (finally adjudicated) and that revocation
thereof by Opinion No. 147 cannot be considered just, fair and
reasonable.

Issue:
WON petitioners are entitled to the right to due process even if they
are aliens.

Held:
Yes, petitioners are entitled to the right to due process even if
they are aliens.

The petitioners question the Order of Acting Commissioner

Nituda that they register as aliens as required by the Immigration
Act. While it is not disputed that it is also within the power and
authority of the Commissioner to require an alien to so register, such
a requirement must be predicated on a positive finding that the
person who is so required is an alien. In this case where the very
citizenship of the petitioners is in issue there should be a previous
determination by the CID that they are aliens before the petitioners
may be directed and required to register as aliens.

The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act

by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police
measure against undesirable aliens whose presence in the country
is found to be injurious to the public good and domestic tranquility
of the people.

Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the

nature of a criminal action, however, considering that it is a harsh
and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom
and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due
process should not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of
Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are
applicable to deportation proceedings.
 Under Section 37(c) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940
as amended, it is provided:

c) No alien shall be deported without being informed of the

specific grounds for deportation nor without being given a hearing
under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of
Immigration.
Hence, the charge against an alien must specify the acts or
omissions complained of which must be stated in ordinary and
concise language to enable a person of common understanding to
know on what ground he is intended to be deported and enable the
CID to pronounce a proper judgment.

Petition is hereby granted and the questioned order of the

respondent CID is hereby set aside.
Case#22 G.R. No. L-68288 1986-07-11
DIOSDADO GUZMAN, ULYSSES URBIZTONDO, and
ARIEL RAMACULA, petitioners,
vs. NATIONAL UNIVERSITY and DOMINGO L. JHOCSON
in his capacity as President of National University, respondents.

Facts:
 Petitioners, students of respondent National University, have
come to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as
their school's "continued and persistent refusal to allow them to
enroll."

 In their petition "for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies

with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction", they allege:
1) that NU's avowed reason for its refusal to re-enroll them
in their respective courses is "the latter's participation in
peaceful mass actions within the premises of NU. XXX
3) that "in effect petitioners are subjected to the extreme
penalty of expulsion without cause or if there be any, without
being informed of such cause and without being afforded the
opportunity to defend themselves.

 NU claimed that the failure to enroll of petitioners was due to

their own fault, that Urbiztondo sought to enroll when the
enrollment period has already closed, that Guzman had poor
“academic showing”, that Ramacula continued to lead or
actively participate in activities within university premises
without prior permit, that petitioners are not of good scholastic
standing.

Issue:
 Whether or not the university’s refusal to enroll the petitioners
was a valid disciplinary action.

Ruling:
No, the university’s refusal to enroll the petitioners was not a
valid disciplinary action.
Under the Education Act of 1982, students have the right
among others "to freely choose their field of study subject to
existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to
graduation, except in case of academic deficiency, or violation
of disciplinary regulations."

In this case, Respondent failed to show that it conducted any

sort of proceedings (not necessarily a trial type one) to determine
Guzman et al’s liability or alleged participation in the said mass
actions. Therefore, Petitioners were being denied this right, or
being disciplined, without due process, in violation of the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools which provides that “no penalty
shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as defined in
the Manual and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly
promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been
conducted.”

Therefore, in effect, NU, by barring the enrollment of Guzman

et al imposed sanction upon the students without due investigation
– such act is illegal.

RIGHT OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Educational institutions of course have the power to "adopt

and enforce such rules as may be deemed expedient for ... (its)
government, ... (this being)" incident to the very object of
incorporation, and indispensable to the successful management of
the college." The rules may include those governing student
discipline. Indeed, the maintenance of "good school discipline" is a
duty specifically enjoined on "every private school" by the Manual
of Regulations for Private Schools; and in this connection, the
Manual further provides that- ... The school rules governing
discipline and the corresponding sanctions therefore must be
clearly specified and defined in writing and made known to the
students and/or their parents or guardians. Schools shall have the
authority and prerogative to promulgate such rules and regulations
as they may deem necessary from time to time effective as of the date
of their promulgation unless otherwise specified.
DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT IN DISCIPLINARY
ACTIONS AGAINST STUDENTS
But, to repeat, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions
requires observance of procedural due process. And it bears
stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students
does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed
for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in
student discipline cases may be summary; and cross-examination is
not, 'contrary to petitioners' view, an essential part thereof. There are
minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of
procedural due process; and these are, that

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and

cause of any accusation against them;
(2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them,
with the assistance of counsel, if desired;
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
 (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to
hear and decide the case.

NO PROCEEDINGS CONDUCTED + NO PUBLISHED

RULES => VIOLATION OF DP

Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment

and memorandum is the fact that they had never conducted
proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-
students had indeed led or participated "in activities within the
university premises, conducted without prior permit from
school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes
therein" or perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercion and
intimidation, slander, noise barrage and other acts showing
disdain for and defiance of University authority."

Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case for damages and a

criminal case for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman,
cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant for his expulsion or
debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent is the omission of
respondents to cite this Court to any duly published rule of
theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-
enrollment for poor scholastic standing.
Case#23 G.R. No. 127980 December 19, 2007
DLSU vs CA
Facts:
 Private respondents are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were
expelled by the De La Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint
Benilde (CSB) Joint Discipline Board because of their involvement in an
offensive action causing injuries to petitioners, student members of
Domino Lux Fraternity.
 James Yap was eating his dinner alone in Manang’s Restaurant near La
Salle, when he overheard two men bad-mouthing and apparently angry at
Domino Lux. He ignored the comments of the two. When he arrived at
his boarding house, he mentioned the remarks to his two other brods while
watching television. These two brods had earlier finished eating their
dinner at Manang’s. Then, the three, together with four other persons went
back to Manang’s and confronted the two who were still in the
restaurant. By admission of respondent Bungubung in his testimony, one
of the two was a member of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. There was no
rumble or physical violence then.
 After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of the
fraternity through the intercession of the Student Council. The Tau
Gamma Phi Fraternity was asking for an apology. “Kailangan
ng apology” in the words of respondent Aguilar. But no apology was
made.
 James Yap went out of the campus using the Engineering Gate to buy
candies across Taft Avenue. As he was about to re-cross Taft Avenue, he
heard heavy footsteps at his back. Eight to ten guys were running towards
him. He panicked. He did not know what to do. Then, respondent
Bungubung punched him in the head with something heavy in his hands –
“parang knuckles.” Respondents Reverente and Lee were behind Yap,
punching him. Respondents Bungubung and Valdes who were in front of
him, were also punching him. As he was lying on the street, respondent
Aguilar kicked him. People shouted; guards arrived; and the group of
attackers left. Yap could not recognize the other members of the group
who attacked him. With respect to respondent Papio, Mr. Yap said “hindi
ko nakita ang mukha niya, hindi ko nakita sumuntok siya.” What Mr. Yap
saw was a long haired guy also running with the group.
  The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims,
namely: petitioner James Yap and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and
Michael Perez, are members of the “Domino Lux Fraternity,” while the
alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul
Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of
“Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity,” a rival fraternity.
 The next day, petitioner Yap lodged a complaint with the Discipline Board
of DLSU charging private respondents with “direct assault.” Similar
complaints were also filed by Dennis Pascual and Ericson Cano against
Alvin Lee and private respondents Valdes and Reverente.
 The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to
private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and Reverente
informing them of the complaints and requiring them to answer. Private
respondents filed their respective answers.
 During the proceedings before the Board, private respondents interposed
the common defense of alibi. No full-blown hearing was conducted nor
the students allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them.
 DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution finding private
respondents guilty. They were meted the supreme penalty of automatic
expulsion, pursuant to CHED Order No. 4. The dispositive part of the
resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Board finds
respondents ALVIN AGUILAR (AB-BSM/9152105), JAMES PAUL
BUNGUBUNG (AB-PSM/9234403), ALVIN LEE (EDD/94623250) and
RICHARD V. REVERENTE (AB-MGT/9153837) guilty of having
violated CHED Order No. 4 and thereby orders their automatic expulsion.
In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO (AB-MGT/9251227),
the Board acquits him of the charge.
Procedural History:
RTC, Manila
 private respondents filed a petition for certiorari and injunction under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
 respondent Judge issued a TRO directing DLSU to refrain and desist from
implementing the Resolution and compel petitioner DLSU to admit said
private respondents
CA:
 petitioner DLSU filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for a TRO and/or
writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of respondent
Judge’s Order and writ of preliminary injunction.
 private respondent Aguilar, using CHED Resolution No. 181-96, filed a
motion to dismiss in the CA
 CA issued its questioned resolution granting the motion to dismiss of
private respondent Aguilar
 respondent Judge issued its questioned order granting private respondent
Aguilar’s urgent motion to reiterate preliminary injunction
Issue:
Whether or not private respondents were accorded due process of law.
Respondent’s contention:
 there was no full-blown hearing nor were they allowed to cross-examine
the witnesses against them
Ruling:
Yes, private respondents were accorded due process of law.

In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating

school discipline, [t]here are withal minimum standards which must be met
before to satisfy the demands of procedural due process and these are: that (1)
the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them and with the assistance if counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be
informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce
evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by
the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to
hear and decide the case (Guzman v. National University).

Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the

proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due
process (Bautista v. Court of Appeals). Notice and hearing is the bulwark of
administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights that
must be respected even in administrative proceedings (Globe Telecom, Inc. v.
National Telecommunications Commission). The essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings,
an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of (Valiao v. Court of Appeals). So long as the
party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in
due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due process (Barza v.
Dinglasan, Jr.).

A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential
to due process it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present
supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based (Seastar Marine
Services, Inc. v. Bul-an, Jr.). To be heard does not only mean presentation of
testimonial evidence in court one may also be heard through pleadings and
where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no
denial of due process (Batul v. Bayron).

In this case, Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the

charges against them by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through
petitioner Sales. They were given the opportunity to answer the charges against
them as they, in fact, submitted their respective answers. They were also
informed of the evidence presented against them as they attended all the hearings
before the Board. Moreover, private respondents were given the right to adduce
evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the Discipline Board considered
all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the parties before rendering its
resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.

Furthermore, Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due
process when they were not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against
them. This argument was already rejected in Guzman v. National University
where this Court held that x x x the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires
observance of procedural due process. And it bears stressing that due process in
disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings
similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The
proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and cross examination
is not, x x x an essential part thereof.
25. Admu vs Capulong, G.R. No. 99327 May 27, 1993
Facts:
On February 8, 9, and 10 of 1991, a fraternity in Ateneo Law
School named Aquila Legis conducted its initiation rites upon
neophytes. Unfortunately, one neophyte died as a result thereof and
one was hospitalized due to serious physical injuries. In a resolution
dated March 9, 1991, the Disciplinary Board formed by Ateneo
found seven students guilty of violating Rule 3 of the Rules on
Discipline. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, then president of Ateneo, on the
basis of the findings, ordered the expulsion of the seven students.
However, on May 17, 1991, Judge Ignacio Capulong of the Makati
RTC, upon the students’ petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus, ordered Ateneo to reverse its decision and reinstate the
said students.
Issue (1):
Whether or not the students were denied procedural due
process when ADMU issued an order dismissing such students.
Ruling (1):
No, the students were NOT denied procedural due process.
In Alcuaz vs PSBA, an administrative proceeding conducted to
investigate students' participation in a hazing activity need not be
clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding.
In this case, in view of the death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner
Cynthia del Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified
and required respondent students on February 11, 1991 to submit
within twenty-four hours their written statement on the incident,the
records show that instead of filing a reply, respondent students
requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. While of the
students mentioned in the February 11, 1991 notice duly submitted
written statements, the others failed to do so. Thus, the latter were
granted an extension of up to February 18, 1991 to file their
statements. Granting that they were denied such opportunity, the
same may not be said to detract from the observance of due process,
for disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily
include the right to cross examination.

Issue (2):
Whether ADMU has competence to issue an order dismissing
such students pursuant to its rules.
Ruling (2):
Yes, ADMU has competence to issue an order dismissing such
students pursuant to its rules.
In Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, it was held that
admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon
a school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather
than a right.
In Yap Chin Fah v. Court of Appeals that: "The maintenance
of a morally conducive and orderly educational environment will
be seriously imperiled if, under the circumstances of this case,
Grace Christian is forced to admit petitioner's children and to
reintegrate them to the student body." Thus, the decision of
petitioner university to expel them is but congruent with the gravity
of their misdeeds
In Malabanan v. Ramento.it was held that there must be such a
congruence between the offense committed and the sanction
imposed.
In this case, the Aquila Legis Fraternity conducted hazing
activities; that respondent students were present at the hazing as
auxiliaries, and that as a result of the hazing, Leonardo Villa died
from serious physical injuries, while Bienvenido Marquez was
hospitalized. In light of the vicious acts of respondent students upon
those whom ironically they would claim as "brothers" after the
initiation rites, how can we countenance the imposition of such
nominal penalties as reprimand or even suspension? We, therefore,
affirm petitioners' imposition of the penalty of dismissal upon
respondent students.

Notes:
“Academic Freedom” on the part of the school includes:
a. freedom to determine who may teach;
b. freedom to determine what may be taught;
c. freedom to determine how it shall be taught; and
d. freedom to determine who may be admitted to study.
It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine
of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of
law, as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent
students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their
dismissal from petitioner university.
education must ultimately be religious — not in the sense that
the founders or charter members of the institution are sectarian or
profess a religious ideology. Rather, a religious education, as the
renowned philosopher Alfred North Whitehead said, is "an
education which inculcates duty and reverence."