CASE

DIGEST

How to Write a Case Digest

Posted by Diory Rabajante on Sunday, April 4, 2010 Under: tips
A case digest or a case brief is a written summary of the case. A case sometimes involves several
issues. Digesting the same would help the student in separating one issue from another and
understanding how the Court resolved the issues in the case. The student does not need to discuss
all the issues decided in the case in his case digest. He only needs to focus on the relevant issue
or the issue related to the subject that he is taking. A case digest may also serve as a useful study
aid for class discussions and exams. A student who has a case digest does not need to go back to
the case in order to remember what he has read.

Format of the Case Digest

I. Caption. This includes the title of the case, the date it was decided, and citation. Include also
the petitioner, respondent, and the ponente.

II. Facts. There is no need to include all the facts. Just include those that are relevant to the
subject.

III. Issues. Include only those that are relevant. Issues are usually framed in the form of
questions that are answerable by "yes" or "no," for example, "Is the contract void?" Sometimes,
students frame the question by starting it with the word "whether," for example, "Whether the
contract is void" or "Whether or not the contract is void." The answer to the question has to be
answered in the ruling.

IV. Ruling. This usually starts with a "yes" or a "no." This is the answer to the question/s
involving the issue. After the categorical yes/no answer, the reason for the decision will be
explained.

V. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions. This part is optional, but it would help to include
them because there are professors who ask for separate opinions in recitations.

Sample Case Digest

DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

226 SCRA 572
Petitioner: Roberto Domingo
Respondents: Court of Appeals and Delia Soledad Avera
Ponente: J. Romero

FACTS:
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed the petition entitled
"Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against Roberto Domingo. The
petition, which was filed before Pasig RTC, alleged the following:

• they were married on November 29, 1976;

• unknown to her (Delia), he had a previous marriage with Emerina dela Paz
on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing;

• she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when
Emerina sued them for bigamy;

• since 1979, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and is only able to stay
in the Philippines when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted
by her employer;

• Roberto has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for
support and subsistence;

• Her personal properties amounting to P350,000.00 are under the

possession of Roberto, who disposed some of the said properties without her knowledge
and consent;

• while on her vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another
woman.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the declaration of their marriage, which is
void ab initio, is superfluous and unnecessary. He further suggested that private respondent
should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties alleged to have been
acquired by their union.

RTC and CA dismissed the petitioner's motion for lack of merit.

ISSUES:

• Whether or not a petition for judicial delaration of a void marriage is

necessary. (If in the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purpose of
remarriage.)
 • Whether or not the petition entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
and Separation of Property" is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain
real and personal properties allegedlybelonging to her exclusively.

HELD:

• Yes. The nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another

cannot be accomplishedmerely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one
that their union is defective. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be
reduced to a mockery and would rest on a very shaky foundation.

• On the other hand, the clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment
delaring such marriage void" in Article 40 of the Code denotes that such final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void is not only for purpose of remarriage.

• Yes. The prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be

raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their
properties. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity
of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of
property relations governing them.

Hence, SC denied the instant petition. CA's decision is affirmed.

LATIN MAXIMS
Have a healthy dose of your Latin Legal Maxims

A mensa et thoro - From bed and board.

A vinculo matrimonii - From the bond of matrimony.

Ab extra - From outside.

Ab initio - From the beginning.

Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget - An absolute judgment needs no expositor.

Abundans cautela non nocet - Abundant caution does no harm.

Accessorium non ducit sed sequitur suum principale - An accessory does not draw, but
follows its principal.

Accessorius sequitur - One who is an accessory to the crime cannot be guilty of a more serious
crime than the principal offender.

Acta exteriora iudicant interiora secreta - Outward acts indicate the inward intent.

Actio non accrevit infra sex annos - The action has not accrued within six years.

Actio non datur non damnificato - An action is not given to one who is not injured.

Actio personalis moritur cum persona - A personal action dies with the person.

Actiones legis - Law suits.

Actori incumbit onus probandi - The burden of proof lies on the plaintiff.

Actus nemini facit injuriam - The act of the law does no one wrong.

Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea - The act does not make one guilty unless there be a
criminal intent.

Actus reus - A guilty deed or act.

Ad ea quae frequentius acciduunt jura adaptantur - The laws are adapted to those cases
which occur more frequently.

Ad hoc - For this purpose.

Ad infinitum - Forever, without limit, to infinity.

Ad perpetuam rei memoriam - For a perpetual memorial of the matter.

Ad quaestionem facti non respondent judices; ad quaestionem legis non respondent

juratores - The judges do not answer to a question of fact; the jury do not answer to a question
of Law.

Aedificare in tuo proprio solo non licet quod alteri noceat - It is not lawful to build on one's
own land what may be injurious to another.

Aequitas legem sequitur - Equity follows the law.

Aequitas nunquam contravenit legem - Equity never contradicts the law.

Alibi - At another place, elsewhere.

Alienatio rei praefertur juri accrescendi - Alienation is preferred by law rather than
accumulation.

Aliunde - From elsewhere, or, from a different source

Allegans contraria non est audiendus - One making contradictory statements is not to be
heard.

Allegans suam turpitudinem non est audiendus - One alleging his own infamy is not to be
heard.

Allegatio contra factum non est admittenda - An allegation contrary to a deed is not to be
heard.

Ambiguitas contra stipulatorem est - An ambiguity is most strongly construed against the
party using it.

Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verificatione excluditur - A patent ambiguity is never

helped by averment.

Amicus curiae - A friend of the Court.

Angliae jura in omni casu libertati dant favorem - The laws of England are favorable in every
case to liberty.

Animo furandi - With an intention of stealing.

Animo testandi - With an intention of making a will.

Annus luctus - The year of mourning.

Ante - Before.

Aqua currit et debet currere, ut currere solebat - Water runs and ought to run.

Arbitrium est judicium - An award is a judgment.

Arbor dum crescit; lignum cum crescere nescit - A tree while it grows, wood when it cannot
grow.

Argumentum ab auctoritate fortissimum est in lege - An argument drawn from authority is

the strongest in law.

Argumentum ab impossibilii plurimum valet in lege - An argument from impossibility is very

strong in law.

Argumentum ad hominem - An argument directed a the person.

Argumentum ad ignoratiam - An argument based upon ignorance (i.e. of one's adversary).

Arma in armatos sumere jura sinunt - The laws permit the taking up of arms against the
armed.

Assentio mentium - The meeting of minds, i.e. mutual assent.

Assignatus utitur jure auctoris - An assignee is clothed with rights of his assignor.

Audi alteram partem - Hear the other side.

Aula regis - The King's Court.

Benignior sententia in verbis generalibus seu dubiis est preferenda - The more favorable
construction is to be placed on general or doubtful words.

Bis dat qui cito dat - He gives (pays) twice who pays promptly.
Bona fide - Sincere, in good faith

Bona vacantia - Goods without an owner

Boni judicis est ampliare jurisdictionem - It is the part of a good judge to enlarge his
jurisdiction, i.e. remedial authority.

Boni judicis est judicium sine dilatione mandare executioni - It is the duty of a good judge to
cause execution to issue on a judgment without delay.

Boni judicis lites dirimere est - It is the duty of a good judge to prevent litigation.

Bonus judex secundum aequum et bonum judicat et aequitatem stricto juri praefert - A
good judge decides according to justice and right and prefers equity to strict law.

Breve judiciale non cadit pro defectu formae - A judicial writing does not fail through defect
of form.

Cadit quaestio - The matter admits of no further argument.

Cassetur billa (breve) - Let the writ be quashed.

Casus fortuitus non est spectandus; et nemo tenetur divinare - A fortuitous event is not to be
foreseen and no person is bound to divine it.

Catalla reputantur inter minima in lege - Chattels are considered in law among the minor
things.

Causa proxima, non remota spectatur - The immediate, and not the remote cause is to be
considered.

Caveat emptor - Let the purchaser beware.

Caveat venditor - Let the seller beware.

Cepi corpus et est languidum - I have taken the body and the prisoner is sick.
Cepi corpus et paratum habeo - I have taken the body and have it ready.

Ceteris paribus - Other things being equal.

Consensu - Unanimously or, by general consent.

Consensus ad idem - Agreement as to the same things.

Consuetudo loci observanda est - The custom of the place is to be observed.

Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in lege - A contemporaneous exposition is

best and most powerful in law.

Contra - To the contrary.

Contra bonos mores - Against good morals.

Contra non valentem agere nulla currit praescriptio - No prescription runs against a person
not able to act.

Contractus est quasi actus contra actum - A contract is an act as it were against an act.

Conventio et modus vincunt legem - A contract and agreement overcome the law.

Conventio privatorum non potest publico juri derogare - An agreement of private persons
cannot derogate from public right.

Coram Domino Rege - In the presence of our Lord the King.

Coram non judice - Before one who is not a judge.

Corpus - Body.

Corpus delicti - The body, i.e. the gist of crime.

Corpus humanum non recipit aestimationem - A human body is not susceptible of

appraisement.
Crescente malitia crescere debet et poena - Vice increasing, punishment ought also to
increase.

Crimen omnia ex se nata vitiat - Crime vitiates every thing, which springs from it.

Crimen trahit personam - The crime carries the person.

Cujus est dare, ejus est disponere - He who has a right to give has the right to dispose of the
gift.

Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelam; et ad inferos - He who owns the soil owns it up to
the sky; and to its depth.

Cum duo inter se pugnantia reperiuntur in testamentis ultimum ratum est - When two
things repugnant to each other are found in a will, the last is to be confirmed.

Cursus curiae est lex curiae - The practice of the court is the law of the court.

Custos morum - A guardian of morals.

Damnum sine injuria - damage without legal injury.

De bonis asportatis - Of goods carried away.

De bonis non administratis - Of goods not administered.

De die in diem - From day to day.

De facto - In fact.

De futuro - In the future.

De integro - As regards the whole.

De jure - Rightful, by right.

De minimis lex non curat - The law does not notice trifling matters.

De novo - Starting afresh.

Debile fundamentum fallit opus - Where there is a weak foundation, the work fails.

Debita sequuntur personam debitoria - Debts follow the person of the debtor.

Debitor non praesumitur donare - A debtor is not presumed to make a gift.

Debitum et contractus sunt nullius loci - Debt and contract are of no particular place.

Debitum in praesenti, solvendum in futuro - A present debt is to be discharged in the future.

Delegata potestas non potest delegari - A delegated authority cannot be again delegated.

Derivativa potestas non potest esse major primitiva - The power which is derived cannot be
greater than that from which it is derived.

Deus solus haeredem facere potest, non homo - God alone, not man, can make an heir.

Dies Dominicus non est juridicus - Sunday is not a day in law.

Discretio est discernere per legem quid sit justum - Discretion is to discern through law what
is just.

Doli incapax - Incapable of crime.

Dominium - Ownership.

Domus sua cuique est tutissimum refugium - Every man s house is his safest refuge.

Dona clandestina sunt semper suspiciosa - Clandestine gifts are always suspicious.

Dormiunt leges aliquando, nunquam moriuntur - The laws sometimes sleep, but never die.

Doti lex favet; praemium pudoris est; ideo parcatur - The law favors dower; it is the reward
of chastity, therefore let it be preserved.

Dubitante - Doubting the correctness of the decision.

Duo non possunt in solido unam rem possidere - Two cannot possess one thing each in
entirety.

Ei incumbit probatio qui - The onus of proving a fact rests upon the man.

Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat - The burden of the proof lies upon him who
affirms, not he who denies.

Error, qui non resistitur approbatur - An error not resisted is approved.

Et cetera - Other things of that type.

Ex cathedra - With official authority.

Ex concessis - In view of what has already been accepted/

Ex dolo malo actio non oritur - A right of action cannot arise out of fraud.

Ex facie - On the fact of it.

Ex gratia - Out of kindness, voluntary.

Ex nihilo nil fit - From nothing nothing comes.

Ex nudo pacto actio non oritur - No action arises on a contract without a consideration.

Ex parte - Proceeding brought by one person in the absence of another.

Ex post facto - By reason of a subsequent act.

Ex praecedentibus et consequentibus optima fit interpretatio - The best interpretation is
made from things preceding and following.

Ex turpi causa non oritur actio - No action arises on an immoral contract.

Exceptio probat regulam - An exception proves the rule.

Executio est executio juris secundum judicium - Execution is the fulfillment of the law in
accordance with the judgment.

Executio est finis et fructus legis - An execution is the end and the fruit of the law.

Executio legis non habet injuriam - Execution of the law does no injury.

Extra legem positus est civiliter mortuus - One out of the pale of the law (i.e. an outlaw) is
civilly dead.

Faciendum - Something which is to be done.

Factum - An act or deed.

Facultas probationum non est angustanda - The right of offering proof is not to be narrowed.

Falsa demonstratio non nocet - A false description does not vitiate.

Fatetur facinus qui judicium fugit - He who flees judgment confesses his guilt.

Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas - Happy is he who has been able to understand the
causes of things.

Felonia implicatur in qualibet proditione - Felony is implied in every treason.

Festinatio justitiae est noverca infortunii - The hurrying of justice is the stepmother of
misfortune.
Fictio cedit veritati; fictio juris non est, ubi veritas - Fiction yields to truth. Where truth is,
fiction of law does not exist.

Fides servanda est - Good faith is to be preserved.

Fieri facias (abreviated fi. fa.) - That you cause to be made.

Filiatio non potest probari - Filiation cannot be proved.

Firmior et potentior est operatio legis quam dispositio hominis - The operation of law is
firmer and more powerful than the will of man.

Forma legalis forma essentialis est - Legal form is essential form.

Fortior est custodia legis quam hominis - The custody of the law is stronger than that of man.

Fractionem diei non recipit lex - The law does not regard a fraction of a day.

Fraus est celare fraudem - It is a fraud to conceal a fraud.

Fraus est odiosa et non praesumenda - Fraud is odious and is not to be presumed.

Fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant - Fraud and justice never dwell together.

Fructus naturales - Vegetation which grows naturally without cultivation.

Frustra probatur quod probatum non relevat - That is proved in vain which when proved is
not relevant.

Furor contrahi matrimonium non sinit, quia consensus opus est - Insanity
prevents marriage from being contracted because consent is needed.

Generale nihil certum implicat - A general expression implies nothing certain.

Generalia praecedunt, specialia sequuntur - Things general precede, things special follow.
Generalia specialibus non derogant - Things general do not derogate from things special.

Generalis regula generaliter est intelligenda - A general rule is to be generally understood.

Gravius est divinam quam temporalem laedere majestatem - It is more serious to hurt divine
than temporal majesty.

Habeas corpus - That you have the body.

Habemus optimum testem confitentem reum - We have the best witness, a confessing
defendant.

Haeredem est nomen collectum - Heir is a collective name.

Haeres est nomen juris, filius est nomen naturae - Heir is a term of law, son, one of nature.

Haeres legitimus est quem nuptiae demonstrant - He is the lawful heir whom the marriage
indicates.

Homo vocabulum est naturae; persona juris civilis - Man is a term of nature, person of the
civil law.

Id est (i.e) - That is.

Id quod commune est, nostrum esse dicitur - That which is common is said to be ours.

Idem - The same person or thing.

Idem nihil dicere et insufficienter dicere est - It is the same to say nothing as not to say
enough.
Ignorantia facti excusat, ignorantia juris non excusat - Ignorance of fact excuses, ignorance
of law does not excuse.

Imperium in imperio - A sovereignty within a sovereignty.

Impotentia excusat legem - Impossibility is an excuse in the law.

Impunitas semper ad deteriora invitat - Impunity always leads to greater crimes.

In aequali jure melior est conditio possidentis - When the parties have equal rights, the
condition of the possessor is better.

In alta proditione nullus potest esse acessorius; sed principalis solum modo - In high treason
no one can be an accessory; but a principal only.

In Anglia non est interregnum - In England there is no interregnum.

In camera - In private.

In casu extremae necessitatis omnia sunt communia - In a case of extreme necessity

everything is common.

In criminalibus probationes debent esse luce clariores - In criminal cases the proofs ought to
be cleared than the light.

In curia domini regis, ipse in propria persona jura discernit - In the King s Court, the King
himself in his own person dispenses justice.

In delicto - At fault.

In esse - In existence.

In extenso - At full length.

In fictione legis aequitas existit - A legal fiction is consistent with equity.

In foro conscientiae - In the forum of conscience.

In futoro - In the future.

In jure non remota causa sed proxima spectatur - In law not the remote but the proximate
cause is looked at.

In limine - At the outset, on the threshold.

In loco parentis - In place of the parent.

In mortua manu - In a dead hand.

In novo casu novum remedium apponendum est - In a new case a new remedy is to be
applied.

In omni re nascitur res quae ipsam rem exterminat - In everything is born that which destroys
the thing itself.

In omnibus - In every respect.

In pari delicto potior est conditio possidentis - When the parties are equally in the wrong the
condition of the possessor is better.

In personam - Against the person.

In pleno - In full.

In quo quis delinquit in eo de jure est puniendus - In whatever thing one offends in that he is
to be punished according to law.

In re dubia magis inficiatio quam affirmatio intelligenda - In a doubtful matter the negative is
to be understood rather than the affirmative.

In republica maxime conservanda sunt jura belli - In a State the laws of war are to be
especially observed.

In situ - In its place.

In terrorem - As a warning or deterrent.

In testamentis plenius testatoris intentionem scrutamur - In wills we seek diligently the
intention of the testator.

In traditionibus scriptorum non quod dictum est, sed quod gestum est, inspicitur - In the
delivery of writings (deeds), not what is said but what is done is to be considered.

In verbis, non verba sed res et ratio quaerenda est - In words, not words, but the thing and the
meaning are to be inquired into.

Indicia - Marks, signs.

Injuria non excusat injuriam - A wrong does not excuse a wrong.

Intentio inservire debet legibus, non leges intentioni - Intention ought to be

subservient to the laws, not the laws to the intention.

Inter alia - Amongst other things.

Interest reipublicae res judicatas non rescindi - It is in the interest of the State that things
adjudged be not rescinded.

Interest reipublicae suprema hominum testamenta rata haberi - It is in the interest of the
State that men s last wills be sustained.

Interest reipublicae ut quilibet re sua bene utatur - It is in the interest of the State that every
one use properly his own property.

Interest reipublicase ut sit finis litium - It is in the interest of the State that there be an end to
litigation.

Interim - Temporary, in the meanwhile.

Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus - To interpret and
harmonize laws is the best method of interpretation.

Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat - Such a construction is to be made
that the thing may have effect rather than it should fail.
Interruptio multiplex non tollit praescriptionem semel obtentam - Repeated interruption
does not defeat a prescription once obtained.

Invito beneficium non datur - A benefit is not conferred upon one against his consent.

Ipsissima verba - The very words of a speaker.

Ipso facto - By that very fact.

Ira furor brevis est - Anger is brief insanity.

Iter arma leges silent - In war the laws are silent.

Judex est lex loquens - A judge is the law speaking.

Judex non potest esse testis in propira causa - A judge cannot be witness in his own cause.

Judex non potest injuriam sibi datam punire - A judge cannon punish a wrong done to
himself.

Judex non reddit plus quam quod petens ipse requirit - A judge does not give more than the
plaintiff himself demands.

Judiciis posterioribus fides est adhibenda - Faith must be given to later decisions.

Judicis est judicare secundum allegata et probata - It is the duty of a judge to decide
according to the allegations and the proofs.

Judicium non debet esse illusorium, suum effectum habere debet - A judgment ought not to
be illusory; it ought to have its proper effect.

Juduces non tenentur exprimere causam sententiae suae - Judges are not bound to explain the
reason of their judgment.

Jura naturae sunt immutabilia - The laws of nature are immutable.

Jura publica anteferenda privatis juribus - Public rights are to be preferred to private rights.

Juramentum est indivisibile et non est admittendum in parte verum et in parte falsum - An
oath is indivisible and it is not to be held partly true and partly false.

Jurare est Deum in testem vocare, et est actus divini cultus - To swear is to call God to
witness and is an act of divine worship.
Jus - A right that is recognised in law.

Jus accrescendi praefertur oneribus - The right of survivorship is preferred to incumbrances.

Jus ad rem; jus in re - A right to a thing; a right in a thing.

Jus dicere, non jus dare - To declare the law, not to make the law.

Jus est norma recti; et quicquid est contra normam recti est injuria - The law is a rule of
right; and whatever is contrary to a rule of right is an injury.

Jus naturale - Natural justice.

Jus naturale est quod apud omnes homines eandem habet potentiam - Natural right is that
which has the same force among all men.

Jus scriptum aut non scriptum - The written law or the unwritten law.

Jusjurandum inter alios factum nec nocere nec prodesse debet - An oath made between third
parties ought neither to hurt nor profit.

Justitia est duplec; severe puniens et vere praeveniens - Justice is two-fold; severely
punishing and in reality prohibiting (offences).

Justitia firmatur solium - The throne is established by justice.

Justitia nemini neganda est - Justice is to be denied to no one.

Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant - Subsequent laws repeal prior conflicting ones.

Legibus sumptis desinentibus legibus naturae utendum est - When laws imposed by the State
fail, we must use the laws of nature.

Lex aliquando sequitur aequitatem - The law sometimes follows equity.

Lex citius tolerare vult privatum damnum quam publicum malum - The law would rather
tolerate a private injury than a public evil.

Lex dabit remedium - The law will give a remedy.

Lex dilationes abhorret - The law abhors delays.

Lex est judicum tutissimus ductor - The law is the safest guide for judges.

Lex est sanctio sancta jubens honesta et prohibens contraria - The law is a sacred sanction,
commanding what is right and prohibiting the contrary.

Lex indendit vicinum vicini facta scire - The law presumes that one neighbor knows the acts of
another.

Lex necessitatis est lex temporis i.e. instantis - The law of necessity is the law of time, that is
time present.

Lex neminem cogit ad vana seu impossiblia - The law compels no one to do vain or impossible
things.

Lex nil frustra facit - The law does nothing in vain.

Lex non a rege est violanda - The law must not be violated even by the King.

Lex non deficere potest in justitia exhibenda - The law cannot fail in dispensing justice.

Lex non novit patrem, nec matrem; solam veritatem - The law does not know neither father
nor mother, only the truth.

Lex non oritur ex injuria - The law does not arise from a mere injury.

Lex non requirit verificari quod apparet curiae - The law does not require that to be proved
which is apparent to the Court.

Lex non favet delicatorum votis - The law does not favor the wishes of the dainty.

Lex plus laudatur quando ratione probatur - The law is the more praised when it is supported
by reason.

Lex prospicit not respicit - The law looks forwared, not backward.

Lex punit mendaciam - The law punishes falsehood.

Lex rejicit superflua, pugnatia, incongrua - The law rejects superfluous, contradictory and
incongruous things.

Lex spectat naturae ordinem - The law regards the order of nature.

Lex succurrit ignoranti - The law succors the ignorant.

Lex tutissima cassis, sub clypeo legis nemo decipitur - Law is the safest helmet; under the
shield of the law no one is deceived.
Lex uno ore omnes alloquitur - The law speaks to all through one mouth.

Longa possessio est pacis jus - Long possession is the law of peace.

Longa possessio parit jus possidendi et tollit actionem vero domino - Long possession
produces the right of possession and takes away from the true owner his action.

Magister rerum usus; magistra rerum experientia - Use is the master of things; experience is
the mistress of things.

Major continet in se minus - The greater contains the less.

Majus est delictum se ipsum occidere quam alium - It is a greater crime to kill one s self than
another.

Mala fide - In bad faith.

Mala grammatica non vitiat chartam - Bad grammar does not vitiate a deed.

Mala in se - Bad in themselves.

Mala prohibita - Crimes prohibited.

Malitia supplet aesatem - Malice supplies age.

Malo animo - With evil intent.

Mandamus - We command.

Maximus magister erroris populus est - The people are the greatest master of error.

Melior est conditio possidentis, ubi neuter jus habet - Better is the condition of the possessor
where neither of the two has the right.

Melior testatoris in testamentis spectanda est - In wills the intention of a testator is to be

regarded.

Meliorem conditionem suam facere potest minor deteriorem nequaquam - A minor can
make his position better, never worse.
Mens rea - Guilty state of mind.

Mentiri est contra mentem ire - To lie is to act against the mind.

Merito beneficium legis amittit, qui legem ipsam subvertere intendit - He justly loses the
benefit of the law who seeks to infringe the law.

Minatur innocentibus qui parcit nocentibus - He threatens the innocent who spares the guilty.

Misera est servitus, ubi jus est vagum aut incertum - It is a miserable slavery where the law is
vague or uncertain.

Mors dicitur ultimum supplicium - Death is called the extreme penalty.

Muilta exercitatione facilius quam regulis percipies - You will perceive many things more
easily by experience than by rules.

Nam nemo haeres viventis - For no one is an heir of a living person.

Naturae vis maxima est - The force of nature is the greatest.

Necessitas inducit privilegium quoad jura privata - With respect to private rights necessity
induces privilege.

Necessitas non habet legem - Necessity has no law.

Necessitas publica est major quam privata - Public necessity is greater than private necessity.

Negligentia semper habet infortuniam comitem - Negligence always has misfortune for a
companion.

Nemo admittendus est inhabilitare se ipsum - No one is allowed to incapacitate himself.

Nemo bis punitur pro eodem delicto - No one can be twice punished for the same offence.

Nemo cogitur suam rem vendere, etiam justo pretio - No one is bound to sell his own
property, even for a just price.

Nemo contra factum suum venire potest - No man can contradict his own deed.

Nemo debet esse judex in propria causa - No one can be judge in his own case.

Nemo plus juris transferre ad alium potest quam ipse habet - No one can transfer to another
a larger right than he himself has.

Nemo potest contra recordum verificare per patriam - No one can verify by the country, that
is, through a jury, against the record.

Nemo potest esse tenens et dominus - No one can at the same time be a tenant and a landlord
(of the same tenement).

Nemo potest facere per alium, quod per se non potest - No one can do through another what
he cannot do himself.

Nemo potest mutare consilium suum in alterius injuriam - No one can change his purpose to
the injury of another.

Nemo praesumitur esse immemor suae aeternae salutis et maxime in articulo mortis - No
one is presumed to be forgetful of his eternal welfare, and particularly in the hour of death.

Nemo prohibetur pluribus defensionibus uti - No one is forbidden to make use of several
defences.

Nemo punitur pro alieno delicto - No one is punished for the crime of another.

Nemo se accusare debet, nisi coram Deo - No one should accuse himself except in the presence
of God.

Nemo tenetur accusare se ipsum nisi coram Deo - No one is bound to accuse himself except in
the presence of God.

Nemo tenetur armare adversarium contra se - No one is bound to arm his adversary against
himself.

Nexus - Connection

Nihil quod est inconveniens est licitum - Nothing inconvenient is lawful.

Nil facit error nominis cum de corpore constat - An error of name makes not difference when
it appears from the body of the instrument.

Nisi - Unless

Non compus mentis - Not of sound mind and understanding

Non constat - It is not certain

Non decipitur qui scit se decipi - He is not deceived who knows that he is deceived.
Non definitur in jure quid sit conatus - What an attempt is, is not defined in law.

Non est arctius vinculum inter homines quam jusjurandum - There is no stronger link among
men than an oath.

Non est factum - It is not his deed

Non est informatus - He is not informed.

Non facias malum ut inde veniat bonum - You shall not do evil that good may come of it.

Non jus, sed seisina, facit stipitem - Not right, but seisin makes a stock (from which the
inheritance must descend).

Non refert quid notum sit judici si notum non sit in forma judicii - It matters not what is
known to the judge if it is not known judicially.

Non sequitur - An inconsistent statement, it does not follow

Nullus commodum capere potest ex sua injuria propria - No one can derive an advantage
from his own wrong.

Nullus recedat e curia cancellaria sine remedio - No one should depart from a Court of
Chancery without a remedy.

Omne sacramentum debet esse de certa scientia - Every oath ought to be of certain
knowledge.

Omnia delicta in aperto leviora sunt - All crimes (committed) in the open are (considered)
lighter.

Omnia praesumuntur contra spoliatorem - All things are presumed against a wrongdoer.

Omnis innovatio plus novitate perturbat quam utilitate prodeat - Every innovation disturbs
more by its novelty than it benefits by its utility.

Optima legum interpres est consuetudo - The best interpreter of laws is custom.

Optimus interpres rerum est usus - The best interpreter of things is usage.
P

Pacta privata juri publico non derogare possunt - Private contracts cannot derogate from
public law.

Par delictum - Equal fault.

Pari passu - On an equal footing.

Partus sequitur ventrem - The offspring follows the mother.

Pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant - The father is he whom the marriage points out.

Peccata contra naturam sunt gravissima - Wrongs against nature are the most serious.

Pendente lite nihil innovetur - During litigation nothing should be changed.

Per curiam - In the opinion of the court.

Per minas - By means of menaces or threats.

Per quod - By reason of which.

Post mortem - After death.

Prima facie - On the face of it.

Prima impressionis - On first impression.

Pro hac vice - For this occasion.

Pro rata - In proportion.

Pro tanto - So far, to that extent.

Pro tempore - For the time being.

Publici juris - Of public right.

Quaeitur - The question is raised.

Quantum - How much, an amount.

Qui facit per alium, facit per se - He who acts through another acts himself.

Qui haeret in litera, haeret in cortice - He who stices to the letter, sticks to the bark.

Qui in utero est, pro jam nato habetur, quoties de ejus commodo quaeritur - He who is in
the womb is considered as already born as far as his benefit is considered.

Qui non habet potestatem alienandi, habet necessitatem retinendi - He who has not the
power of alienating is under the necessity of retaining.

Qui non habet, ille non dat - He who has not, does not give.

Qui non improbat, approbat - He who does not disapprove, approves.

Qui non obstat quod obstare potest facere videtur - He who does not prevent what he is able
to prevent, is considered as committing the thing.

Qui non prohibet quod prohibere potest assentire videtur - He who does not prohibit when
he is able to prohibit, is in fault.

Qui peccat ebrius, luat sobrius - He who does wrong when drunk must be punished when
sober.

Qui potest et debet vetare et non vetat jubet - He who is able and ought to forbit and does not,
commands.

Qui prior est tempore potior est jure - He who is prior in time is stronger in right.

Qui sentit commodum, debet et sentire onus - He who derives a benefit ought also to bear a
burden.

Qui tacet consentire videtur - He who is silent appears to consent.

Quid pro quo - Consideration. something for something.

Quidcquid plantatur solo, solo cedit - Whatever is planted in or affixed to the soil, belongs to
the soil.

Quod ab initio non valet, in tractu temporis non convalescit - What is not valid in the
beginning does not become valid by time.

Quod constat curiae opere testium non indiget - What appears to the Court needs not the help
of witnesses.

Quod necessarie intelligitur, id non deest - What is necessarily understood is not wanting.
Quod necessitas cogit, defendit - What necessity forces it justifies.

Quod non apparet, non est - What does not appear, is not.

Quod non habet principium non habet finem - What has no beginning has no end.

Quod per me non possum, nec per alium - What I cannot do through myself, I cannot do
through another.

Quod prius est verius est; et quod prius est tempore potius est jure - What is first is more
true; and what is prior in time is stronger in law.

Quod vanum et inutile est, lex non requirit - The law does not require what is vain and
useless.

Quoties in verbis nulla est ambiguitas, ibi nulla expositio contra verba expressa fienda est -
When there is no ambiguity in words, then no exposition contrary to the expressed words is to be
made.

Ratio est legis anima, mutata legis ratione mutatur et lex - Reason is the soul of the law;
when the reason of the law changes the law also is changed.

Re - In the matter of.

Reprobata pecunia leberat solventem - Money refused releases the debtor.

Res - Matter, affair, thing, circumstance.

Res gestae - Things done.

Res integra - A matter untouched (by decision).

Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet - Things done between strangers ought not to affect
a third person, who is a stranger to the transaction.

Res judicata accipitur pro veritate - A thing adjudged is accepted for the truth.

Res nulis - Nobody s property.

Respondeat superior - Let the principal answer.

Rex est major singulis, minor universis - The King is greater than individuals, less than all the
people.
Rex non debet judicare sed secundum legem - The King ought not to judge but according to
the law.

Rex non potest peccare - The King can do no wrong.

Rex nunquma moritur - The King never dies.

Rex quod injustum est facere non potest - The King cannot do what is unjust.

Salus populi est suprema lex - The safety of the people is the supreme law.

Sciens - Knowingly.

Scienter - Knowingly.

Scire facias - That you cause to know.

Scribere est agere - To write is to act.

Se defendendo - In self defence.

Secus - The legal position is different, it is otherwise.

Semper praesumitur pro legitimatione puerorum - Everything is presumed in favor of the

legitimacy of children.

Semper pro matriomonio praesumitur - It is always presumed in favor of marriage.

Sententia interlocutoria revocari potest, definitiva non potest - An interlocutory order can be
revoked, a final order cannot be.

Servitia personalia sequuntur personam - Personal services follow the person.

Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas - So use your own as not to injure another s property.
Simplex commendatio non obligat - A simple recommendation does not bind.

Stare decisis - To stand by decisions (precedents).

Stet - Do not delete, let it stand.

Sub modo - Within limits.

Sub nomine - Under the name of.

Sub silentio - In silence.

Sublata causa, tollitur effectus - The cause being removed, the effect ceases.

Sublato fundamento, cadit opus - The foundation being removed, the structure falls.

Subsequens matrimonium tollit peccatum praecedens - A subsequent marriage removes the

preceding wrong.

Suggestio falsi - The suggestion of something which is untrue.

Sui generis - Unique.

Summa ratio est quae pro religione facit - The highest reason is that which makes for religion,
i.e. religion dictates.

Suppressio veri - The suppression of the truth.

Suppressio veri expressio falsi - A suppression of truth is equivalent to an expression of

falsehood.

Talis qualis - Such as it is.

Terra firma - Solid ground.

Testamenta latissimam interpretationem habere debent - Testaments ought to have the
broadest interpretation.

Traditio loqui chartam facit - Delivery makes a deed speak.

Transit terra cum onere - The land passes with its burden.

Ubi eadem ratio ibi idem jus, et de similibus idem est judicium - When there is the same
reason, then the law is the same, and the same judgment should be rendered as to similar things.

Ubi jus ibi remedium est - Where there is a right there is a remedy.

Ubi non est principalis, non potest esse accessorius - Where there is no principal, there can be
no accessory.

Ubi nullum matrimonium, ibi nulla dos es - Where there is no marriage, there is no dower.

Ultima voluntas testatoris est perimplenda secundum veram intentionem suam - The last
will of a testator is to be fulfilled according to his true intentio.

Ut poena ad paucos, metus ad omnes, perveniat - That punishment may come to a few, the
fear of it should affect all.

Utile per inutile non vitiatur - What is useful is not vitiated by the useless.

Verba chartarum fortius accipiuntur contra preferentem - The words of deeds are accepted
more strongly against the person offering them.

Verba debent intelligi cum effectu - Words ought to be understood with effect.

Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire - Words ought to serve the intention, not the
reverse.

Verbatim - Word by word, exactly.

Vi et armis - With the force and arms.

Via antiqua via est tuta - The old way is the safe way.

Vice versa - The other way around.

Vide - See.

Vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt - The laws serve the vigilant, not those who
sleep.

Vir et uxor consentur in lege una persona - A husband and wife are regarded in law as one
person.

Visitationem commendamus - We recommend a visitation.

Volens - Willing.

Volenti non fit injuria - An injury is not done to one consenting to it.

Voluntas in delictis non exitus spectatur - In offences the intent and not the result is looked at.

Voluntas reputatur pro facto - The will is taken for the deed.
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT C ASE DIGESTS
Case Digests for Philippine Law Students
DEC 21 2011 OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS
MARIN V. ADIL – G.R. NO. 47986

Facts:

The Armadas were expecting to inherit some lots from their uncle. Marin had hereditary
rights in the estates of her parents. A deed of exchange was executed wherein it was
stipulated that both parties acknowledge that the exchange operates to their individual
and mutual benefit and advantage, for the reason that the property being ceded,
transferred, conveyed and unclaimed by one party to the other is situated in the place
where either is a resident resulting in better administration of the properties. But the
expected land was adjudicated to Soledad, sister of Marin. So, the Armadas and other
heirs sued Soledad for claiming to be the sole heir of their uncle, but ended in a
compromise where the Armadas were awarded two lots. Marin waived, renounced and
quitclaimed her share in her parents’ estate in favour of her another sister Aurora. She
cannot anymore fulfil her obligations in her signed deed of exchange with the Armadas.
The Armadas filed a rescisorry action against Marin.

Issue:
Did Armadas’ action prescribe?

Held:

No. The action to declare contracts void and inexistent does not prescribe. It is evident
from the deed of exchange that the intention of the parties relative to the lots cannot be
definitely ascertained. This circumstance renders the exchange void.

DEC 21 2011 OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

RONGAVILLA V. CA – G.R. NO. 83974

Facts:

The Dela Cruz sisters were the aunts of Dolores Rongavilla. They borrowed P2,000
from the Rongavillas to have their rooftop repaired. Later, petitioners went back to their
aunts to have them sign a contract. Taking advantage of their lack of education, the
sisters were made to believe that such document, typewritten in English, was just for the
acknowledgment of their debt. After four years, petitioners asked their aunts to vacate
the land subject to litigation claiming that she and her husband were the new owners.
After verifying with the Registry of Deeds, the aunts were surprised that what they have
signed was actually a deed of sale. Their land title was cancelled and the ownership
was transferred to their nephews. The land was mortgaged with the Cavite
Development Bank.

Issue:
Was the deed of sale void?
Held:
Yes. While petitioners claimed they were regularly paying taxes on the land in question,
they had no second thoughts stating at the trial and on appeal that they had resorted to
doctoring the price stated in the disputed Deed of Sale, allegedly to save on taxes.
While it is true that public documents are presumed genuine and regular under the
Rules of Court, this presumption is a rebuttable presumption which may be overcome
by clear, strong and convincing evidence.

DEC 21 2011 OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

CRISTOBAL V. GOMEZ – G.R. NO. 27014

Facts:

Epifanio sold a property with pacto de retro to Yangco. It was stipulated that the
property is redeemable within five years. When the period expired, Yangco extended it.
In order to redeem, Epifanio asked Banas for a loan. Banas agreed, with the condition
that Marcelino and Telesfora be responsible for the loan. The two entered into a private
partnership in participation which stipulated that the property shall be returned to
Epifanio as soon as the capital employed have been covered. Epifanio died. He left
Paulina and their children. Marcelino acquired exclusive rights over the property when
Telesfora conveyed her interest to him. Marcelino sold the property to Banas, with pacto
de retro, redeemable within five years. He redeemed it from Banas. Marcelino submitted
a notarial document wherein Epifanio certifies that Marcelino had requested him to draw
up a notarial act showing the properties which Marcelino was known to be the true
owner. Marcelino relies upon this instrument as proving title in him, contending that
Epifanio and his successors are estopped from claiming said lot.

Issue:

Are the heirs of Epifanio estopped from claiming the property?

Held:

No. Estoppel may not be invoked by a person party to the collusion, by reason that he
could not have been misled. The document executed by Epifanio was merely laying the
basis of a scheme to defeat Yangco’s rights under his contract of purchase of 1891, or
to defeat Epifanio’s other creditors.

DEC 21 2011 OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

DBP V. CA – G.R. NO. 28774

Facts:

DBP bought 91,188.30 square meters of land, consisting of 159 lots, in the proposed
Diliman Estate Subdivision of the PHHC. However, the sale of the lots to DBP, Lots 2
and 4, which form part of said 159 lots, were still sold by PHHC to the spouses
Nicandro, for which 2 deeds of sale were issued to them by PHHC. Upon learning of
PHHC’s previous transaction with DBP, the spouses filed a complaint against DBP and
the PHHC to rescind the sale of Lots 2 and 4 by PHHC in favor of DBP. The CFI held
that the sale of Lots 2 and 4, to DBP is null and void, for being in violation of Section 13
of the DBP Charter.

Issue:
Do the spouses possess the legal personality to question the legality of the sale?

Held:

Yes. The spouses stand to be prejudiced by reason of their payment in full of the
purchase price for the same lots which had been sold to DBP by virtue of the
transaction in question.The general rule is that the action for the annulment of contracts
can only be maintained by those who are bound either principally or subsidiarily by
virtue thereof. However, a person who is not obliged principally or subsidiarily in a
contract may exercise an action for nullity of the contract if he is prejudiced in his rights
with respect to one of the contracting parties, and can show the detriment which could
positively result to him from the contract in which he had no intervention.

DEC 21 2011 OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

GOLDENROD V CA – G.R. NO. 126812

Facts:

Barretto owned parcels of land which were mortgaged to UCPB. Barretto failed to pay;
the properties were foreclosed. Goldenrod made an offer to Barretto that it would buy
the properties and pay off the remaining balance of Barretto’s loan with UCPB. It paid
Barretto 1 million pesos as part of the purchase price. The remaining balance would be
paid once Barretto had consolidated the titles. On the date that Goldenrod was
supposed to pay, Goldenrod asked for an extension. UCPB agreed. When the
extension date arrived, Goldenrod asked for another extension. UCPB refused. Barretto
successfully consolidated the titles. Goldenrod informed Barretto that it would not be
able to push through with their agreement. It asked Barretto to return the 1 million
pesos. Barretto did not give in to Goldenrod’s rescission. Instead, it sold the property
that was part of their agreement to Asiaworld.

Issue:

Should Goldenrod be paid back the 1 million pesos?

Held:

Yes. Rescission creates the obligation to return the things which were the object of the
contract together with the fruits and interest. Barretto is obliged to pay Goldenrod back
because 1) Goldenrod decided to rescind the sale; 2) the transaction was called off and;
3) the property was sold to a third person. By virtue of the extrajudicial rescission of the
contract to sell by Goldenrod, without opposition from Barretto, who in turn sold it to a
third person, Barretto had the obligation to return the 1 million pesos plus legal interest
from the date it received the notice of rescission.

DEC 21 2011 OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

CABALIW V. SADORRA – G.R. NO. 25650
Facts:

Cabaliw was the second wife of Benigno. During their marriage, they bought 2 parcels
of land. They had a daughter Soledad. Benigno abandoned his wife Cabaliw, thus the
latter filed an action in court for support. The Court ordered Benigno to pay her P75 a
month. However, Benigno did not pay and instead sold their property to his son-in-law
Soterro. The transaction was done without Isidora’s consent. Prior to the sale, Soterro
already knew that there was a judgment rendered against his father-in-law but
proceeded to buy the property anyway. When Cabaliw found out, she instituted an
action along with her daughter to recover the properties.

Issue:

Is there a presumption of fraud?

Held:

Yes. Alienations by onerous title are presumed fraudulent when made by persons
against whome some judgment has been rendered or some writ of attachment has been
issued. Benigno was ordered by the Court to pay Cabaliw support and he failed to do
so. Instead, he sold his properties to his son-in-law. The close relationship between
Benigno and Soterro is a badge of fraud. Soterro knew about the judgment against
Benigno but proceeded to purchase the properties anyway. He cannot be said to be a
purchaser in good faith. The presumption of fraud is not overcome by the fact that the
transactions were all made in the nature of public instruments between Soterro and
Benigno. The properties sold were conjugal properties. These cannot be sold without
Cabaliw’s consent.

DEC 20 2011 OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

MUNICIPALITY OF CAVITE V. ROJAS – G.R. NO. 9069

Facts:

The municipal council of Cavite by Resolution No. 10, leased to Rojas some 70 or 80
square meters of Plaza Soledad, on condition that she pay rent quarterly in advance
according to the schedule fixed in Ordinance No. 43, series of 1903 and that she
obligate herself to vacate said land within 60 days subsequent to notification to that
effect. Upon such notification, however, she refused to vacate the land, forcing the
municipality to file a complaint before the CFI to order her to vacate the land. After a
hearing of the case, the CFI dismissed the complaint.

Issues:
(1) Is the contract valid?
(2) If in the negative, what are the obligations of the parties?

Held:
• No. Article 1271 of the Old Civil Code, prescribes that everything
which is not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a contract, and
plazas and streets are outside of this commerce. Communal things that cannot
be sold because they are by their very nature outside of commerce are those for
public use, such as the plazas, streets, common lands, rivers, fountains, etc.
• Rojas must restore and deliver possession of the land described in
the complaint to the municipality of Cavite, which in its turn must restore to her all
the sums it may have received from her in the nature of rentals just as soon as
she restores the land improperly leased.

DEC 20 2011 OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, TRANSPORTATION LAW

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. V. MARGARINE-VERKAUFS-UNION GMBH –
G.R. NO. L-31087 – 93 SCRA 257

Facts:

MARGARINE-VERKAUFS-UNION, a corporation not engaged in business in the

Philippines, was the consignee of copra in bulk shipped from Cebu on board EASTERN
SHIPPING LINES’s vessel for discharge at Hamburg, Germany. Petitioner’s bill of
lading for the cargo provided that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the Flag
of the Ship carrying the goods. In case of average, same shall be adjusted according to
York-Antwerp Rules. While the vessel was off Gibraltar, a fire broke out aboard the and
caused water damage to the copra. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES rejected
MARGARINE-VERKAUFS-UNION GmbH ‘s claim for payment.

Issue:
Should Article 848 of the Code of Commerce govern this case despite the bill of lading
which expressly contained for the application of the York-Antwerp Rules which provide
for MARGARINE-VERKAUFS-UNION GmbH’s fun recovery of the damage loss?

Held:
No. We hold that the lower court correctly ruled the cited codal article to be not
applicable in this particular case for the reason that the bill of lading contains an
agreement to the contrary. There is a clear and irreconcilable inconsistency between
the York-Antwerp Rules expressly adopted by the parties as their contract under the bill
of lading which sustains Eastern’s claim and the codal article cited by Margarine which
would bar the same.
A contract of adhesion as embodied in the printed bill of lading issued for the shipment
to which the consignee merely adhered, having no choice in the matter, and
consequently, any ambiguity must be construed against the author.

DEC 20 2011 CORPORATION LAW

PNB V. RITRATTO – G.R. NO. 142616 – 362 SCRA 216

Facts:

PNB-IFL, a subsidiary company of PNB extended credit to Ritratto and secured by the
real estate mortgages on four parcels of land. Since there was default, PNB-IFL thru
PNB, foreclosed the property and were subject to public auction. Ritratto Group filed a
complaint for injunction. PNB filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of failure to state
a cause of action and the absence of any privity between respondents and petitioner.

Issue:

Is PNB privy to the loan contracts entered into by respondent & PNB-IFL being that
PNB-IFL is owned by PNB?

Held:

No. The contract questioned is one entered into between Ritratto and PNB-IFL. PNB
was admittedly an agent of the latter who acted as an agent with limited authority and
specific duties under a special power of attorney incorporated in the real estate
mortgage.

The mere fact that a corporation owns all of the stocks of another corporation, taken
alone is not sufficient to justify their being treated as one entity. If used to perform
legitimate functions, a subsidiary’s separate existence may be respected, and the
liability of the parent corporation as well as the subsidiary will be confined to those
arising in their respective business. The courts may, in the exercise of judicial
discretion, step in to prevent the abuses of separate entity privilege and pierce the veil
of corporate entity.

DEC 08 2011 LOCAL GOVERNMENT

ALVAREZ V. GUINGONA – G.R. NO. 118303 – 252 SCRA 695

Facts:

On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled “An Act Converting the Municipality of
Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago,”
was filed in the House of Representatives. Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817,
Senate Bill No. 1243, was filed in the Senate. On March 22, 1994, the House of
Representatives, upon being apprised of the action of the Senate, approved the
amendments proposed by the Senate.

Issue:

Does the passing of SB No. 1243, the Senate’s own version of HB No. 8817, into
Republic Act No. 7720 be said to have originated in the House of Representatives as
required?

Held:

Yes. Although a bill of local application should originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, the claim of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No.
1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No.
8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the
Senate.
The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the
House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application
should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act
thereupon until it receives the House bill.

OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, TRANSPORTATION LAW

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. V. MARGARINE-VERKAUFS-UNION GMBH –
G.R. NO. L-31087 – 93 SCRA 257

Facts:

MARGARINE-VERKAUFS-UNION, a corporation not engaged in business in the

Philippines, was the consignee of copra in bulk shipped from Cebu on board EASTERN
SHIPPING LINES’s vessel for discharge at Hamburg, Germany. Petitioner’s bill of
lading for the cargo provided that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the Flag
of the Ship carrying the goods. In case of average, same shall be adjusted according to
York-Antwerp Rules. While the vessel was off Gibraltar, a fire broke out aboard the and
caused water damage to the copra. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES rejected
MARGARINE-VERKAUFS-UNION GmbH ‘s claim for payment.

Issue:

Should Article 848 of the Code of Commerce govern this case despite the bill of lading
which expressly contained for the application of the York-Antwerp Rules which provide
for MARGARINE-VERKAUFS-UNION GmbH’s fun recovery of the damage loss?

Held:

No. We hold that the lower court correctly ruled the cited codal article to be not
applicable in this particular case for the reason that the bill of lading contains an
agreement to the contrary. There is a clear and irreconcilable inconsistency between
the York-Antwerp Rules expressly adopted by the parties as their contract under the bill
of lading which sustains Eastern’s claim and the codal article cited by Margarine which
would bar the same.
A contract of adhesion as embodied in the printed bill of lading issued for the shipment
to which the consignee merely adhered, having no choice in the matter, and
consequently, any ambiguity must be construed against the author.

Thursday, October 31, 2013

PHILCONSA vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994

Facts:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was
passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed
conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously
submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify
projects in the “pork barrels” allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets.

Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the
Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval.

On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have
become Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled “AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE
OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO
DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES” (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential
Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain
conditions, as follows:

• Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that “this debt reduction scheme
cannot be validly done through the 1994 GAA.” And that “appropriations for payment of
public debt, whether foreign or domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the
Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26,
Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative Code of 1987.

• Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation,
operation and maintenance of revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities
and Colleges (SUC’s),

• Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road

maintenance.
 • Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance
with the Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675).

• The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the
modernization of the AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on the “Use of Fund,” which
requires the prior approval of the Congress for the release of the corresponding
modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provision No. 3 on the “Specific
Prohibition” which states that the said Modernization Fund “shall not be used for
payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150
armored personnel carriers”

• New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to
augment pension and gratuity funds.

• Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman,

COA, and CHR, the Congress.

Issue:

Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of
1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d)
Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units
(CAFGU’S) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s) are constitutional; whether or not
the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service and the automatic
appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional

Held:

The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process.
There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden
shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the
Constitution.

The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No.
1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As
held by the court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in
the appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when the
President vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other government
agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a
revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege
before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to the “one-fund
policy” (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and
Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and Management’s
Procurement Service).

The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is
unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can
be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other
hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended — 70% by administrative and 30% by
contract.

The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly
comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is
an “appropriate” provision. Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item
on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President
without also vetoing the said item.

The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the “use of Fund” for the AFP modernization
program that the President must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its
approval, is an exercise of the “congressional or legislative veto.” However the case at bench is
not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto as provided in
Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds.
Therefore, being “inappropriate” provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly
vetoed.

Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for payment
of the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP,
is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of
contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself. The veto of
said special provision is therefore valid.

The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension
fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is
violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution.

Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in the
challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President
the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at
once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for
such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in another law considering that it
abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the
CAFGU’s to be amended.

On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to appropriations to the
Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to
complain when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will
issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper or
inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take
“necessary and proper steps” to carry into execution the law. These steps are the ones to be
embodied in the guidelines.

PHILCONSA v. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ G.R. No. L-23326 December 18, 1965

Facts:

Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of RA 3836 insofar
as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators
and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress). The provision on
retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of
the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI,
Section 14 of the Constitution. The same provision constitutes “selfish class legislation” because
it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives
them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service, which is not
refundable in case of reinstatement or re election of the retiree, while all other officers and
employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are
given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which, in
any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the
highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the
legislator to further increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution.

The Solicitor General counter-argued alleging that the grant of retirement or pension benefits
under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner does not constitute
“forbidden compensation” within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine
Constitution. The law in question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of
commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely “in the nature of a
basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member” and, therefore, is not an indirect
scheme to increase their salary.
Issue:

whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution which reads as
follows:

The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided
by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including
per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and
from their respective districts in the case of Members of the House of Representative and to and
from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress.
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all
the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until
otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.

Held:
Yes. When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the
Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a
special proviso which reads as follows: “No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected
subsequent to approval of such increase.” In other words, under the original constitutional
provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members,
no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the
Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.

The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term
compensation “other emoluments”. This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to
whether the retirement benefit as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of
the term “other emoluments.”

Emolument is defined as the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as
compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and
perquisites.

It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part
of compensation for services of one possessing any office.
Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22,
1963. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI,
Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is therefore unconstitutional.

GAUDENCIO RAYO vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN G.R. No. L-55273-
83 December 19, 1981

FACTS:

At the height of the infamous typhoon "Kading", the respondent opened simultaneously all the
three floodgates of the Angat Dam which resulted in a sudden, precipitate and simultaneous
opening of said floodgates several towns in Bulacan were inundated. The petitioners filed for
damages against the respondent corporation.

Petitioners opposed the prayer of the respondents forn dismissal of the case and contended that
the respondent corporation is merely performing a propriety functions and that under its own
organic act, it can sue and be sued in court.

ISSUE:

W/N the respondent performs governmental functions with respect to the management and
operation of the Angat Dam.

W/N the power of the respondent to sue and be sued under its organic charter includes the power
to be sued for tort.

HELD:

The government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue
and be sued in any court under its charter.
As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and
separate from that of the government. Moreover, the charter provision that it can sue and be sued
in any court.

REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA vs. JAMES VINZON [G.R. No. 154705. June 26, 2003]

FACTS:
Petitioner Vinzon entered into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent. The maintenance
agreement includes the following specific equipments: air conditioning units, generator sets,
electrical facilities, water heaters and water motor pumps. The agreement shall be effective for 4
years.

The new Minister Counsellor allegedly found respondent's work and services unsatisfactory and
not in compliance with the standards set in the Agreement. The respondent terminated the
agreement with the respondent. The latter claim that it was unlawful and arbitrary. Respondent
filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign state, has
sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as party-defendant in the Philippines.

ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in sustaining the trial court's decision that petitioners have waived
their immunity from suit by using as its basis the provision in the Maintenance Agreement.

HELD: The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be
construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act juri imperii or juri gestionis. Such act
is only the start of the inquiry. There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission
is an act juri imperii. The state may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the
premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy. The Republic of Indonesia is acting in
pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with the respondent. The
maintenance agreement was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its
governmental functions. It cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.

Tuesday, October 29, 2013

VICTORIA AMIGABLE vs. NICOLAS CUENCA G.R. No. L-26400 February 29, 1972

FACTS: Victoria Amigable is the is the registered owner of a lot which, without prior
expropriation proceedings or negotiated sale, was used by the government. Amigable's counsel
wrote the President of the Philippines requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had
been expropriated by the government.
Amigable later filed a case against Cuenca, the Commissioner of Public Highways, for recovery
of ownership and possession of the said lot. She also sought payment for comlensatory damages,
moral damages and attorney's fees.

The defendant said that the case was premature, barred by prescription, and the government did
not give its consent to be sued.

ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue the government.

HELD: Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use
without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party
may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit.

The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to
a citizen. The only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it
could and should have done years ago. To determine just compensation of the land, the basis
should be the price or value at the time of the taking.

RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]

NATURE OF THE CASE:

Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as unconstitutional
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals
Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:

SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or local,
running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for
President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.

FACTS:

The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No.
9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being
in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one
subject which should be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.

They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with
the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair
election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on
elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent
capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the
title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.

The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code,
leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:

SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By
the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is
holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of
candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or
election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the
limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their
offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.

The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities
attended its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null
and void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its
approval” is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence,
which require publication of the law before it becomes effective.

Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law;
hence, should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo
v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional
mandate on the “Accountability of Public Officers:”
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not
considering those members of the House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14,
2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their respective certificates of
candidacy.

ISSUES:

W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.

W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution.

W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval” is
a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require
publication of the law before it becomes effective.

HELD:

To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that –

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical
construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means
necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth.
The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.

The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: “An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.”
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive
enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its
contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title
is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content.

The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a
limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the
other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media
for election propaganda, does not violate the “one subject-one title” rule. This Court has held that
an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing
for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.

The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or
discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found
cause with Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure,
some sectors of society and in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad
policy as it would encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the
Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the
government. It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative
determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound
economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short,
the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner
are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not
suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance. Congress is not precluded from
repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of
the provision and by its pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable
purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the
election process is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of election laws – the fair,
honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress – is achieved.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The
former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an
office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the
other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an
appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are
entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Finally, the “Effectivity” clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it “shall
take effect immediately upon its approval,” is defective. However, the same does not render the
entire law invalid. In Tañada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule:
... the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other
date without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that
the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended….

Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Tañada, Rep. Act No. 9006,
notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.

In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional
law is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a
statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the
validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to
determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power. No
such transgression has been shown in this case.

PESIGAN vs. ANGELES, G.R. No. L-64279, April 30, 1984

FACTS:
Petitioners Anselmo and Marcelino Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in a 10-wheeler truck
in April 1982, 26 carabaos and a calf, from Camarines Sur to Batangas. Despite the health
certificate, permit to transport, and certificate of inspection issued to them by the provincial
veterinarian, provincial commander and constabulary command, respectively, while petitioners
were negotiating the town of Basud, Camarines Norte, the carabaos were confiscated by private
respondents, Police Station Commander Lt. Zanarosa, and provincial veterinarian Dr.
Miranda. The confiscation was based on Executive Order 626-A which prohibited the transport
of carabaos from one province to another. Pursuant to EO 626-A, Dr Miranda distributed the
carabaos to 25 farmers of Basud. Petitioners filed for recovery of the carabaos and damages,
against private respondent Judge Angeles who heard the case in Daet and later transferred to
Caloocan City, and dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 626-A be enforced before its publication in the Official Gazette.

HELD:

Said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as
already noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official
Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in
article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code.

The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations
which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.

SPOUSES MAKADAYA SADIK and USODAN SADIK vs. JUDGE ABDALLAH CASAR,
G.R. No. MTJ-95-1053, January 2, 1997
SADIK vs. CASAR
G.R. No. MTJ-95-1053, January 2, 1997

FACTS:

On February 14, 1985, one Lekiya Paito filed an application for life insurance with the Great
Pacific Life Assurance Corporation (Grepalife) in Cotabato City. The application was approved
and Policy No. 0503033 was issued in her name for the amount of P30,000.00 with an accidental
death benefit rider. Named as beneficiaries were her daughters, Linang Minalang and Makadaya
Sadik. She paid the initial premium of P410.00.

On October 12, 1985, Lekiya Paito died. The beneficiaries and/or through their representatives
sought for and obtained the assistance of respondent, who was then a trial attorney of the Bureau
of Forest Development, Cotabato City, to pursue the approval of their claim for payment of the
insurance benefits with Grepalife.

On November 17, 1989, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs and
against the defendant ordering the latter to pay to the former the sum of P30,000.00 as “benefit
due them under Insurance Policy No. 503033.” The court denied plaintiffs” claim for double
indemnity of P60,000.00 under the accidental death rider. At this time, respondent was already
the presiding Judge of the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kolambugan-Maigo.

Upon receipt of the decision, respondent as counsel for plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to the
Court of Appeals even as defendant likewise filed an appeal. Respondent represented the
plaintiffs in the appeal. After the dismissal of its petition by the Supreme Court, Grepalife filed a
Manifestation dated 6 July 1993 with the Regional Trial Court, Br. 13, Cotabato City declaring
its willingness to pay the judgment award and depositing with said court RCBC check No. 62837
in the amount of P30,000.00 payable to the plaintiffs.

Respondent collected the check from the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Br, 13,
Cotabato City and thereafter cashed it. Respondent did not deliver the said money judgment to
the plaintiffs. On January 26, 1995, complainants filed their administrative complaint.

ISSUE: W/N Respondent Judge is guilty and must be dismissed from service

HELD:

Respondent’s act of collecting the judgment award of P30,000.00 from the Clerk of Court of
RTC, Cotabato City and his refusal to turn over the amount to his client, complainant Makadaya
Sadik and her sister, is an act of misappropriation amounting to gross misconduct and/or
dishonesty. His defense that he has the right to retain the entire P30,000.00 as attorney’s lien in
unacceptable. For he has no right to retain the judgment award allegedly to secure payment of
litigation expenses and attorney’s fees. He had no authority to practice law while in government
service. In continuing to handle the case of herein complainants against Grepalife after he joined
the government and without first securing proper authority is no less constitutive of abuse of
authority. Furthermore, he violated Rule 5.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which prohibits a
judge to engage in the private practice of law.

He likewise violated the Attorney’s Oath in agreeing to file Civil Case No. 2747 for the purpose
of claiming the insurance proceeds from Grepalife despite his having been informed that the
insurance policy of Lekiya Paito was fraudulently applied for. Agreeing to handle the claim said
to have arisen from a fraudulent act against the insurer certainly speaks of a moral flaw in his
character. xxx But scam or not we are convinced that the complainant Makadaya Sadik is not an
impostor. She denied that she is the step-daughter of Lekiya Paito. She insisted she is the
youngest daughter and she named all her brothers and sisters. And it was respondent who
presented her in Civil Case No. 2747 as Makadaya Sadik daughter of Lekiya Sadik and one of
the beneficiaries of the latter’s insurance policy.
Indeed, to be effective in his role, a judge must be a man of exceptional integrity and honesty.
The special urgency for requiring these qualities in a judge is not hard to understand for the
judge acts directly upon the property, liberty, even life, of his countrymen. Hence, being in a
position of such grave responsibility in the administration of justice, a judge must conduct
himself in a manner befitting the dignity of such exalted office. Respondent judge, however, not
only failed in this respect but proved himself repeatedly unworthy of his post.

This Court notes that respondent had been previously fined P5,000.00 and sternly warned for
knowingly issuing an order without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, he
has four other administrative cases docketed against him involving various charges such as gross
ignorance of the law, gross incompetence, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions and
falsification of public documents.

Respondent judge’s seeming propensity to transgress the very law he is sworn to uphold makes
him unfit to discharge the functions of a judge. Judicial office demands the best possible men
and this Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who undermine its efforts towards
effective and efficient administration of justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of the public.

DEC 20 2011 CORPORATION LAW

PNB V. RITRATTO – G.R. NO. 142616 – 362 SCRA 216

Facts:

PNB-IFL, a subsidiary company of PNB extended credit to Ritratto and secured by the
real estate mortgages on four parcels of land. Since there was default, PNB-IFL thru
PNB, foreclosed the property and were subject to public auction. Ritratto Group filed a
complaint for injunction. PNB filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of failure to state
a cause of action and the absence of any privity between respondents and petitioner.

Issue:
Is PNB privy to the loan contracts entered into by respondent & PNB-IFL being that
PNB-IFL is owned by PNB?

Held:
No. The contract questioned is one entered into between Ritratto and PNB-IFL. PNB
was admittedly an agent of the latter who acted as an agent with limited authority and
specific duties under a special power of attorney incorporated in the real estate
mortgage.
The mere fact that a corporation owns all of the stocks of another corporation, taken
alone is not sufficient to justify their being treated as one entity. If used to perform
legitimate functions, a subsidiary’s separate existence may be respected, and the
liability of the parent corporation as well as the subsidiary will be confined to those
arising in their respective business. The courts may, in the exercise of judicial
discretion, step in to prevent the abuses of separate entity privilege and pierce the veil
of corporate entity.

DEC 08 2011 LOCAL GOVERNMENT

ALVAREZ V. GUINGONA – G.R. NO. 118303 – 252 SCRA 695

Facts:

On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled “An Act Converting the Municipality of
Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago,”
was filed in the House of Representatives. Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817,
Senate Bill No. 1243, was filed in the Senate. On March 22, 1994, the House of
Representatives, upon being apprised of the action of the Senate, approved the
amendments proposed by the Senate.

Issue:
Does the passing of SB No. 1243, the Senate’s own version of HB No. 8817, into
Republic Act No. 7720 be said to have originated in the House of Representatives as
required?

Held:
Yes. Although a bill of local application should originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, the claim of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No.
1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No.
8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the
Senate.

The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the
House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application
should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act
thereupon until it receives the House bill.
Top of Form

DEC 21 2011 BY LLOYDMENDOZAOBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

RONGAVILLA V. CA – G.R. NO. 83974

Facts:

The Dela Cruz sisters were the aunts of Dolores Rongavilla. They borrowed P2,000
from the Rongavillas to have their rooftop repaired. Later, petitioners went back to their
aunts to have them sign a contract. Taking advantage of their lack of education, the
sisters were made to believe that such document, typewritten in English, was just for the
acknowledgment of their debt. After four years, petitioners asked their aunts to vacate
the land subject to litigation claiming that she and her husband were the new owners.
After verifying with the Registry of Deeds, the aunts were surprised that what they have
signed was actually a deed of sale. Their land title was cancelled and the ownership
was transferred to their nephews. The land was mortgaged with the Cavite
Development Bank.

Issue: Was the deed of sale void?

Held:

Yes. While petitioners claimed they were regularly paying taxes on the land in question,
they had no second thoughts stating at the trial and on appeal that they had resorted to
doctoring the price stated in the disputed Deed of Sale, allegedly to save on taxes.
While it is true that public documents are presumed genuine and regular under the
Rules of Court, this presumption is a rebuttable presumption which may be overcome
by clear, strong and convincing evidence.

DEC 21 2011 BY LLOYDMENDOZAOBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

CRISTOBAL V. GOMEZ – G.R. NO. 27014

Facts:

Epifanio sold a property with pacto de retro to Yangco. It was stipulated that the
property is redeemable within five years. When the period expired, Yangco extended it.
In order to redeem, Epifanio asked Banas for a loan. Banas agreed, with the condition
that Marcelino and Telesfora be responsible for the loan. The two entered into a private
partnership in participation which stipulated that the property shall be returned to
Epifanio as soon as the capital employed have been covered. Epifanio died. He left
Paulina and their children. Marcelino acquired exclusive rights over the property when
Telesfora conveyed her interest to him. Marcelino sold the property to Banas, with pacto
de retro, redeemable within five years. He redeemed it from Banas. Marcelino submitted
a notarial document wherein Epifanio certifies that Marcelino had requested him to draw
up a notarial act showing the properties which Marcelino was known to be the true
owner. Marcelino relies upon this instrument as proving title in him, contending that
Epifanio and his successors are estopped from claiming said lot.

Issue:
Are the heirs of Epifanio estopped from claiming the property?

Held:
No. Estoppel may not be invoked by a person party to the collusion, by reason
that he could not have been misled. The document executed by Epifanio was
merely laying the basis of a scheme to defeat Yangco’s rights under his contract
of purchase of 1891, or to defeat Epifanio’s other creditors.

DEC 21 2011 BY LLOYDMENDOZAOBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

DBP V. CA – G.R. NO. 28774

Facts:

DBP bought 91,188.30 square meters of land, consisting of 159 lots, in the proposed
Diliman Estate Subdivision of the PHHC. However, the sale of the lots to DBP, Lots 2
and 4, which form part of said 159 lots, were still sold by PHHC to the spouses
Nicandro, for which 2 deeds of sale were issued to them by PHHC. Upon learning of
PHHC’s previous transaction with DBP, the spouses filed a complaint against DBP and
the PHHC to rescind the sale of Lots 2 and 4 by PHHC in favor of DBP. The CFI held
that the sale of Lots 2 and 4, to DBP is null and void, for being in violation of Section 13
of the DBP Charter.

Issue:

Do the spouses possess the legal personality to question the legality of the sale?

Held:

Yes. The spouses stand to be prejudiced by reason of their payment in full of the
purchase price for the same lots which had been sold to DBP by virtue of the
transaction in question.The general rule is that the action for the annulment of contracts
can only be maintained by those who are bound either principally or subsidiarily by
virtue thereof. However, a person who is not obliged principally or subsidiarily in a
contract may exercise an action for nullity of the contract if he is prejudiced in his rights
with respect to one of the contracting parties, and can show the detriment which could
positively result to him from the contract in which he had no intervention.

DEC 21 2011 BY LLOYDMENDOZA OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

GOLDENROD V CA – G.R. NO. 126812

Facts:
Barretto owned parcels of land which were mortgaged to UCPB. Barretto failed to pay;
the properties were foreclosed. Goldenrod made an offer to Barretto that it would buy
the properties and pay off the remaining balance of Barretto’s loan with UCPB. It paid
Barretto 1 million pesos as part of the purchase price. The remaining balance would be
paid once Barretto had consolidated the titles. On the date that Goldenrod was
supposed to pay, Goldenrod asked for an extension. UCPB agreed. When the
extension date arrived, Goldenrod asked for another extension. UCPB refused. Barretto
successfully consolidated the titles. Goldenrod informed Barretto that it would not be
able to push through with their agreement. It asked Barretto to return the 1 million
pesos. Barretto did not give in to Goldenrod’s rescission. Instead, it sold the property
that was part of their agreement to Asiaworld.

Issue:
Should Goldenrod be paid back the 1 million pesos?

Held:

Yes. Rescission creates the obligation to return the things which were the object of the
contract together with the fruits and interest. Barretto is obliged to pay Goldenrod back
because 1) Goldenrod decided to rescind the sale; 2) the transaction was called off and;
3) the property was sold to a third person. By virtue of the extrajudicial rescission of the
contract to sell by Goldenrod, without opposition from Barretto, who in turn sold it to a
third person, Barretto had the obligation to return the 1 million pesos plus legal interest
from the date it received the notice of rescission.

Case Digests on Philippine Supreme Court Decisions

This blog is intended to provide law students, bar reviewers and even lawyers a summary
of cases decided by the Supreme Court.

Tuesday, March 28, 2017

Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina

G.R. No. 165223. January 11, 2016

Doctrines:

The fact that the charge against the respondent was subsequently declared to lack factual and
legal bases did not, ipso facto, render the preventive suspension without legal basis.

Gloria vs. CA has clarified that the preventive suspension of civil service employees charged
with dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect of duty is authorized by the Civil
Service Law, and cannot be considered unjustified even if the charges are ultimately dismissed
so as to justify the payment of salaries to the employee concerned.

Facts:
For review is the decision promulgated on April 29, 2004, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
nullified the Memorandum dated September 8, 2003 by which the petitioner, in his capacity as
the President of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), had charged the respondent,
an Attorney V in the Litigation Department of the Legal Service Group of the GSIS, with grave
misconduct and preventively suspended him for 60 days.

In his affidavit, Elino F. Caretero pointed to the respondent as the person who had handed to him
on August 26, 2003 the letter entitled Is It True supposedly written by one R. Ibasco containing
"scurrilous and libellous statements" against petitioner. Considering that Ibasco denied
authorship of the letter, the finger of suspicion came to point at the respondent, who was
consequently administratively investigated for grave misconduct. After the investigation, the
Investigation Unit transmitted its Memorandum dated September 1, 2003 to the respondent to
require him to explain the circulation and publication of the letter, and to show cause why no
administrative sanction should be imposed on him for doing so. In response, he denied the
imputed act.

Thereafter, the petitioner issued Memorandum dated September 8, 2003 to formally charge the
respondent with grave misconduct, and to preventively suspend him for 60 days effective upon
receipt.

The respondent sought the dismissal of the charge on the ground of its being baseless; and
requested the conduct of a formal investigation by an impartial body. The respondent also
instituted in the CA a special civil action for certiorari to challenge the legality of the
Memorandum dated September 8, 2003.

On April 29, 2004, the CA promulgated its assailed decision annulling the petitioner's
Memorandum dated September 8, 2003.

Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

The petitioner argues that it was in his power as the President and General Manager of the GSIS
to impose disciplinary action on the respondent, pursuant to Section 47 of the Administrative
Code of 1987; that the characterization of the respondent's act as grave misconduct was not
arbitrary because the latter had intentionally passed on or caused the circulation of the malicious
letter, thereby transgressing "some established and definite rule of action" that sufficiently
established a prima facie case for an administrative charge; that the respondent had thereby
violated his solemn duty to defend and assist the petitioner in disregard of his "legal, moral or
social duty" to stop or at discourage the publication or circulation of the letter. He submits that
the respondent's preventive suspension was done in accordance with the Civil Service Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases, and upon an evaluation of the evidence on record.
Issues:

• Whether the petitioner Garcia, in the exercise of his authority, had

sufficient basis to formally charge the respondent with grave misconduct and impose
preventive suspension as a consequence.

• Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedy (DEAR) is

applicable.

Rulings:

• To resolve this issue, we need to ascertain if the respondent's act of

handing over the letter to Caretero constituted grave misconduct. The CA concluded that
the act of the respondent of handing over the letter to Caretero did not constitute grave
misconduct because the act did not show or indicate the elements of corruption, or the
clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule.

The Court concurs with the CA.

Misconduct in office, by uniform legal definition, is such misconduct that affects his
performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects his character as a private
individual. To warrant removal from office, it must have direct relation to and be connected with
the performance of official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional
neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office. Moreover, it is “a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence
by a public officer.” It becomes grave if it “involves any of the additional elements of corruption,
willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be established by
substantial evidence.”

The record contains nothing to show that the respondent's act constituted misconduct. The
passing of the letter to Caretero did not equate to any "transgression" or "unlawful behavior,"
for it was an innocuous act that did not breach any standard, norm or rule pertinent to his
office. Neither could it be regarded as "circulation" of the letter inasmuch as the letter was
handed only to a single individual who just happened to be curious about the paper the
respondent was then holding in his hands. The handing of the letter occurred in ostensibly
innocent circumstances on board the elevator in which other employees or passengers were on
board. If the motive of the respondent was to pass the letter in order to publicize its contents, he
should have made more copies of the letter. But that was not so, considering that Caretero
categorically affirmed in his affidavit about asking the respondent what he had wanted to do with
the letter, to wit: Do you want me to photocopy the document Sir?, but the respondent had simply
replied: HINDI NA SA IYO NA LANG YAN. It is plain, then, that intent to cause the widespread
dissemination of the letter in order to libel the petitioner could not be justifiably inferred.

To be sure, the respondent's act could not be classified as pertaining to or having a direct
connection to the performance of his official duties as a litigation lawyer of the GSIS. The
connection was essential to a finding of misconduct, for without the connection the conduct
would not be sanctioned as an administrative offense.

The fact that the charge against the respondent was subsequently declared to lack factual and
legal bases did not, ipso facto, render the preventive suspension without legal basis. The formal
charge against the respondent was for grave misconduct, an administrative offense that justifies
the imposition of the preventive suspension of the respondent. Gloria has clarified that the
preventive suspension of civil service employees charged with dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct, or neglect of duty is authorized by the Civil Service Law, and cannot be considered
unjustified even if the charges are ultimately dismissed so as to justify the payment of salaries to
the employee concerned. Considering that the respondent's preventive suspension had legal
basis, he was not entitled to backwages.

2. Anent the petitioner's insistence that the respondent did not exhaust his administrative
remedies, Section 21 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides
the option either of filing a motion for reconsideration against the preventive suspension order by
the disciplining authority, or of elevating the preventive suspension order by appeal to the Civil
Service Commission within 15 days from the receipt thereof.

We find and hold that the respondent was not strictly bound by the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies. His failure to file the motion for reconsideration did not justify the
immediate dismissal of the petition for certiorari, for we have recognized certain exceptional
circumstances that excused his non-filing of the motion for reconsideration. Among the
exceptional circumstances are the following, namely: when the issue involved is purely a legal
question.

Considering that the matter brought to the CA - whether the act complained against justified the
filing of the formal charge for grave misconduct and the imposition of preventive suspension
pending investigation — was a purely legal question due to the factual antecedents of the case
not being in dispute. Hence, the respondent had no need to exhaust the available administrative
remedy of filing the motion for reconsideration.

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition for review on

certiorari;AFFIRMS the assailed decision promulgated on April 29, 2004 and the resolution
promulgated on September 6, 2004 insofar as the Court of Appeals dismissed the formal charge
for grave misconduct against respondent Mario I. Molina, but REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the decision and the resolution insofar as they nullified the respondent's preventive
suspension and awarded backwages to him corresponding to the period of his preventive
suspension; and MAKES NO PRONOUNCEMENT on costs of suit.

Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) Vs. Heirs of Gavina Ijordan, et al.
G.R. No. 173140. January 11, 2016

BERSAMIN, J.:

Doctrine:
A sale of jointly owned real property by a co-owner without the express authority of the others is
unenforceable against the latter, but valid and enforceable against the seller.

Facts:
On October 14, 1957, Julian Cuizon (Julian) executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and
Sale (Deed) covering Lot No. 4539 (subject lot) situated in Ibo, Municipality of Opon (now
Lapu-Lapu City) in favor of the Civil Aeronautics Administration ((CAA), the predecessor-in-
interest of petitioner Manila Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA).

In 1980, the respondents caused the judicial reconstitution of the original certificate of title
covering the subject lot. Consequently, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-2431 of the
Register of Deeds of Cebu was reconstituted for Lot No. 4539 in the names of the respondents'
predecessors-in-interest, namely, Gavina Ijordan, and Julian, Francisca, Damasina, Marciana,
Pastor, Angela, Mansueto, Bonifacia, Basilio, Moises and Florencio, all surnamed Cuison. The
respondents' ownership of the subject lot was evidenced by OCT No. RO-2431. They asserted
that they had not sold their shares in the subject lot, and had not authorized Julian to sell their
shares to MCIAA's predecessor-in-interest.

The failure of the respondents to surrender the owner's copy of OCT No. RO-2431 prompted
MCIAA to sue them for the cancellation of title in the RTC, alleging in its complaint that the
certificate of title conferred no right in favor of the respondents because the lot had already been
sold to the Government in 1957; that the subject lot had then been declared for taxation purposes
under Tax Declaration No. 00387 in the name of the BAT; and that by virtue of the Deed, the
respondents came under the legal obligation to surrender the certificate of title for cancellation to
enable the issuance of a new one in its name.
After MCIAA's presentation of evidence, the respondents moved to dismiss the complaint upon
the Demurrer to Evidence dated February 3, 1997, contending that the Deed and Tax Declaration
No. 00387 had no probative value to support MCIAA's cause of action and its prayer for relief.
They cited Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provided that "when the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself." They argued that what MCIAA submitted was a mere photocopy of the Deed;
that even assuming that the Deed was a true reproduction of the original, the sale was
unenforceable against them because it was only Julian who had executed the same without
obtaining their consent or authority as his co-heirs; and that the tax declaration had no probative
value by virtue of its having been derived from the unenforceable sale.

In its order dated September 2, 1997, the RTC dismissed MCIAA's complaint insofar as it
pertained to the shares of the respondents in Lot No. 4539 but recognized the sale as to the 1/22
share of Julian.

The CA affirmed the orders of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

Issues:

• Whether the subject lot was validly conveyed in its entirety to the
petitioner.
• Whether respondents are guilty of estoppel by laches.
• Whether MCIAA possessed the subject lot by virtue of acquisitve
prescription.

Rulings:

1. No, the CA and the RTC concluded that the Deed was void as far as the respondents' shares in
the subject lot were concerned, but valid as to Julian's share. Their conclusion was based on the
absence of the authority from his co-heirs in favor of Julian to convey their shares in the subject
lot. We have no reason to overturn the affirmance of the CA on the issue of the respondents' co-
ownership with Julian. Hence, the conveyance by Julian of the entire property pursuant to the
Deed did not bind the respondents for lack of their consent and authority in his favor. As such,
the Deed had no legal effect as to their shares in the property. Article 1317 of the Civil Code
provides that no person could contract in the name of another without being authorized by the
latter, or unless he had by law a right to represent him; the contract entered into in the name of
another by one who has no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his
powers, is unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose
behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting party.

But the conveyance by Julian through the Deed had full force and effect with respect to his share
of 1/22 of the entire property consisting of 546 square meters by virtue of its being a voluntary
disposition of property on his part. As ruled in Torres v. Lapinid:

x x x even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share
but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. This is because the sale or
other disposition of a co-owner affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what
would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common.

2. No. MCIAA's assertion of estoppel or ratification to bar the respondents' contrary claim of
ownership of their shares in the subject lot is bereft of substance. The doctrine of estoppel
applied only to those who were parties to the contract and their privies or successors-in-interest.
Moreover, the respondents could not be held to ratify the contract that was declared to be null
and void with respect to their share, for there was nothing for them to ratify. Verily, the Deed,
being null and void, had no adverse effect on the rights of the respondents in the subject lot.

3. No. MCIAA's contention on acquisitive prescription in its favor must fail. Aside from the
absence of the satisfactory showing of MCIAA's supposed possession of the subject lot, no
acquisitive prescription could arise in view of the indefeasibility of the respondents' Torrens title.
Under the Torrens System, no adverse possession could deprive the registered owners of their
title by prescription. The real purpose of the Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop
any question as to its legality forever. Thus, once title is registered, the owner may rest secure,
without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the mirador su casa to
avoid the possibility of losing his land.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the
decision promulgated on February 22, 2006.

Monday, March 27, 2017

Pedro Ladines vs. People of the Philippines and Edwin De Ramon

G.R. No. 167333. January 11, 2016
BERSAMIN, J.:

Doctrine:
To impose the highest within a period of the imposable penalty without specifying the
justification for doing so is an error on the part of the trial court that should be corrected on
appeal. In default of such justification, the penalty to be imposed is the lowest of the period.

Facts:
While Prosecution witnesses Philip de Ramon and Mario Lasala, along with victim Erwin de
Ramon (Erwin), were watching the dance held during the June 12, 1993 Grand Alumni
Homecoming of the Bulabog Elementary School in Sorsogon, Sorsogon, the petitioner and Licup
appeared and passed by them. The petitioner suddenly and without warning approached and
stabbed Erwin below the navel with a machete. The petitioner then left after delivering the blow.
At that juncture, Licup also mounted his attack against Erwin but the latter evaded the blow by
stepping back. Erwin pulled out the machete from his body and wielded it against Licup, whom
he hit in the chest. Licup pursued but could not catch up with Erwin because they both eventually
fell down. Erwin was rushed to the hospital where he succumbed.

Dr. Myrna Listanco, who performed the post-mortem examination on the cadaver of Erwin,
attested that the victim had sustained two stab wounds on the body, one in the chest and the other
in the abdomen. She opined that one or two assailants had probably inflicted the injuries with the
use of two distinct weapons; and that the chest wound could have been caused by a sharp
instrument, like a sharpened screwdriver, while the abdominal injury could have been from a
sharp bladed instrument like a knife.

In his defense, the petitioner tendered alibi and denial. He recounted that at the time in question,
he was in the Bulabog Elementary School compound along with his wife and their minor child;
that they did not enter the dance hall because there was trouble that had caused the people to
scamper; that they had then gone home; that he had learned about the stabbing incident involving
Erwin on their way home from Barangay Tanod Virgilio de Ramon who informed him that
Licup and Erwin had stabbed each other; and that Prosecution witnesses Philip and Lasala
harbored ill-will towards him by reason of his having lodged a complaint in the barangay against
them for stealing coconuts from his property.

The petitioner presented Angeles Jasareno and Arnulfo Palencia to corroborate his denial.
Jasareno and Palencia testified that at the time in question they were in the Bulabog Elementary
School, together with the petitioner, the latter's wife and their minor daughter; that while they
were watching the dance, a quarrel had transpired but they did not know who had been involved.
On August 12, 1993, an information was filed in the RTC charging the petitioner and one
Herman Licup with homicide.

On February 10, 2003, the RTC pronounced the petitioner guilty as charged, decreeing:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Pedro Ladines guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, sans any mitigating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, accused Pedro Ladines is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of from Ten
(10) years and One (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of
reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity without
subsidiary imprisonment [in] case of insolvency and [to] pay the costs.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction. Petitioner filed an appeal insisting that the CA
committed reversible error in affirming his conviction despite the admission of Licup
immediately after the incident that he had stabbed the victim; and that the res gestae statement of
Licup constituted newly-discovered evidence that created a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's
guilt.

Issues:
• Whether the res gestae statement of Licup constitutes newly-
discovered evidence that would create a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's
guilt.
• Whether the RTC imposed the proper penalty.
• Whether the lower court's limitation of the civil liability to civil
indemnity of only P50,000.00 is correct.

Rulings:

1. No, the res gestae statement of Licup did not constitute newly-discovered evidence that
created a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt. We point out that the concept of newly-
discovered evidence is applicable only when a litigant seeks a new trial or the re-opening of the
case in the trial court. Seldom is the concept appropriate on appeal, particularly one before the
Court.
Furthermore, the Court has issued guidelines designed to balance the need of persons charged
with crimes to afford to them the fullest opportunity to establish their defenses, on the one hand,
and the public interest in ensuring a smooth, efficient and fair administration of criminal justice,
on the other. The first guideline is to restrict the concept of newly-discovered evidence to only
such evidence that can satisfy the following requisites, namely: (1) the evidence was discovered
after trial; (2) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with
the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably
change the judgment if admitted. (Emphasis is mine).

We agree with the State that the proposed evidence of the petitioner was not newly-discovered
because the first two requisites were not present. The petitioner, by his exercise of reasonable
diligence, could have sooner discovered and easily produced the proposed evidence during the
trial by obtaining a certified copy of the police blotter that contained the alleged res gestae
declaration of Licup and the relevant documents and testimonies of other key witnesses to
substantiate his denial of criminal responsibility.

2. We declare that the lower courts could not impose 17 years and four months of the medium
period of reclusion temporal, which was the ceiling of the medium period of reclusion temporal,
as the maximum of the indeterminate penalty without specifying the justification for so
imposing. They thereby ignored that although Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, which has
set the rules "for the application of penalties which contain three periods," requires under its first
rule that the courts should impose the penalty prescribed by law in the medium period should
there be neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, its seventh rule expressly demands
that "[w]ithin the limits of each period, the courts shall determine the extent of the penalty
according to the number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and. the
greater or lesser extent of the evil produced by the crime." By not specifying the justification for
imposing the ceiling of the period of the imposable penalty, the fixing of the indeterminate
sentence became arbitrary, or whimsical, or capricious. In the absence of the specification, the
maximum of the indeterminate sentence for the petitioner should be the lowest of the medium
period of reclusion temporal, which is 14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal.

3. The limitation was a plain error that we must correct. Moral damages and civil indemnity are
always granted in homicide, it being assumed by the law that the loss of human life absolutely
brings moral and spiritual losses as well as a definite loss. Moral damages and civil indemnity
require neither pleading nor evidence simply because death through crime always occasions
moral sufferings on the part of the victim's heirs. The civil indemnity and moral damages are
fixed at P75,000.00 each because homicide was a gross crime.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on October 22, 2004 subject to
the MODIFICATION that: (a) the INDETERMINATE SENTENCE of petitioner PEDRO
LADINES is 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, eight months and
one day of the medium period of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and (b) the petitioner shall
pay to the heirs of the victim Erwin de Ramon: (1) civil indemnity and moral damages of
P75,000.00 each; (2) temperate damages of P25,000.00; (c) interest of 6% per annum on all
items of the civil liability computed from the date of the finality of this judgment until they are
fully paid; and (d) the costs of suit.

Monday, March 20, 2017

Lagahit vs. Pacific Concord Case Digest
Jennifer C. Lagahit vs. Pacific Concord Container Lines/Monete Cuenca
G.R. No. 177680. January 13, 2016

BERSAMIN, J.:

Doctrines Involved:
Every resignation presupposes the existence of the employer-employee relationship; hence, there
can be no valid resignation after the fact of termination of the employment simply because the
employee had no employer-employee relationship to relinquish.

There are two classes of employees vested with trust and confidence. To the first class belong the
managerial employees or those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management
policies and to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees
or effectively recommend such managerial actions. The second class includes those who in the
normal and routine exercise of their functions regularly handle significant amounts of money or
property.

Facts:
Respondent Pacific Concord Container Lines (Pacific Concord), a domestic corporation engaged
in cargo forwarding, hired the petitioner as an Account Executive/Marketing Assistant. In
January 2002, Pacific Concord promoted her as a sales manager with the monthly salary rate of
P25,000.00, and provided her with a brand new Toyota Altis plus gasoline allowance. On
November 8, 2002, she reported for work at 9:00 a.m. and left the company premises at around
10:30 a.m. to make client calls. At 1:14 p.m. of that day, she received the following text message
from respondent Monette Cuenca, to wit:

TODAY U R OFFICIALY NT CONNECTED WITH US.

Sender: MONETTE
+639173215330
Sent: 8-Nov-2002
13:14:01

Cuenca also sent a text message to Roy Lagahit, the petitioner's husband, as follows:

IBALIK KARON DAYON ANG AUTO OG PALIHUG LANG KO OG KUHA SA NYONG

BUTANG OG DI NAKO MO STORY A NI JENIFER. IL WAIT

Sender: MONETTE
+639173215330
Sent: 8-Nov-2002
12:50:54

The petitioner immediately tried to contact Cuenca, but the latter refused to take her calls. On the
same day, the petitioner learned from clients and friends that the respondents had disseminated
notices, flyers and memos informing all clients of Pacific Concord that she was no longer
connected with the company as of November 8, 2002. Pacific Concord also caused the
publication of the notice to the public in the Sunstar Daily issue of December 15, 2002.

On November 13, 2002, the petitioner sent a letter to Pacific Concord contending that she was
deprived of the due process that would have given her the chance to formally present her side.
Despite this, she have accepted her fate and asked Cuenca to arrange and expedite settlement of
all benefits due to her under the law.

On November 26, 2002, the petitioner filed her complaint for constructive dismissal in the
Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in'Cebu City.

In their position paper, the respondents denied having terminated the petitioner despite the fact
that there were valid grounds to do so. They insisted that the petitioner had betrayed the trust and
confidence reposed in her when she: (a) used the company-issued vehicle for her own personal
interest; (b) failed to achieve her sales quota, and to enhance and develop the Sales Department;
(c) enticed her marketing assistant, Jo Ann Otrera, to resign and join her in transferring to
another forwarding company; (d) applied for other employment during office hours and using
company resources; (e) solicited and offered the services of Seajet International, Inc. during her
employment with Pacific Concord; (f) received a personal commission from Wesport Line, Inc.
for container shipments; and (g) illegally manipulated and diverted several containers to Seajet
International.
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on June 9, 2003, declaring that the respondents were not
able to prove that the petitioner had committed acts constituting betrayal of trust; that they had
not informed her prior to her dismissal of the offenses she had supposedly committed; and that
owing to the illegality of the dismissal, they were liable for backwages and separation pay.

Ruling of the NLRC

On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter finding that the respondents are
guilty of illegally dismissing the complainant from her employment, but MODIFYING his award
for separation pay computed at one (1) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at
least six (6) months being considered one (1) year from the complainant's first day of
employment in February 2000 UNTIL THE FINALITY OF THIS DECISION; and backwages
starting November 8, 2002 UNTIL THE FINALITY OF THIS DECISION.

Decision of the CA
On May 10, 2006, the CA promulgated its decision granting the respondents' petition for
certiorari, and annulling the decision of the NLRC. It pronounced that there were sufficient
justifications to terminate the petitioner's services for disloyalty and willful breach of trust.

Issues:
• Whether Lagahit resigned from her employment.
• Whether Lagahit breached her employer's trust.

Rulings of the Court:

1. Lagahit did not resign from her employment.

In cases of unlawful dismissal, the employer bears the burden of proving that the termination was
for a valid or authorized cause, but before the employer is expected to discharge its burden of
proving that the dismissal was legal, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence
the fact of her dismissal from employment. In this case, the petitioner proved the overt acts
committed by the respondents in abruptly terminating her employment through the text messages
sent by Cuenca to the petitioner and her husband, as well as the notices distributed to the clients
and published in the Sun Star. It is notable that the respondents did not deny or controvert her
evidence on the matter. Thereby, she showed Pacific Concord's resolve to terminate her
employment effective November 8, 2002.
On the other hand, the respondents' insistence that the petitioner had resigned was bereft of
factual support. As a rule, the employer who interposes the resignation of the employee as a
defense should prove that the employee voluntarily resigned. A valid resignation is the voluntary
act of an employee who finds herself in a situation where she believes that personal reasons
cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service and that she has no other choice but
to disassociate herself from employment. The resignation must be unconditional and with a clear
intention to relinquish the position.

The facts and circumstances before and after the petitioner's severance from her employment on
November 8, 2002 did not show her resolute intention to relinquish her job. Indeed, it would be
unfounded to infer the intention to relinquish from her November 13, 2002 letter, which, to us,
was not a resignation letter due to the absence therefrom of anything evincing her desire to sever
the employer-employee relationship. The letter instead presented her as a defenseless employee
unjustly terminated for unknown reasons who had been made the subject of notices and flyers
informing the public of her unexpected termination. It also depicted her as an employee meekly
accepting her unexpected fate and requesting the payment of her backwages and accrued benefits
just to be done with the employer.

For sure, to conclude that the petitioner resigned because of her letter of November 13, 2002 is
absurd in light of the respondents having insisted that she had been terminated from her
employment earlier on November 8, 2002. In that regard, every resignation presupposes the
existence of the employer-employee relationship; hence, there can be no valid resignation after
the fact of termination of the employment simply because the employee had no employer-
employee relationship to relinquish.

2. Lagahit did not breach her employer's trust; her dismissal was, therefore, illegal.

Article 282(c) of the Labor Code authorizes an employer to dismiss an employee for committing
fraud, or for willful breach of the trust reposed by the employer. However, loss of confidence is
never intended to provide the employer with a blank check for terminating its employee. For this
to be a valid ground for the termination of the employee, the employer must establish that: (1)
the employee must be holding a position of trust and confidence; and (2) the act complained
against would justify the loss of trust and confidence.

There are two classes of employees vested with trust and confidence. To the first class belong the
managerial employees or those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management
policies and to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees
or effectively recommend such managerial actions. The second class includes those who in the
normal and routine exercise of their functions regularly handle significant amounts of money or
property. Cashiers, auditors, and property custodians are some of the employees in the second
class.
Petitioner's position as sales manager did not immediately make the petitioner a managerial
employee. The actual work that she performed, not her job title, determined whether she was a
managerial employee vested with trust and confidence. Her employment as sales manager was
directly related with the sales of cargo forwarding services of Pacific Concord, and had nothing
to do with the implementation of the management's rules and policies. As such, the position of
sales manager came under the second class of employees vested with trust and confidence.
Therein was the flaw in the CA's assailed decision. Although the mere existence of the basis for
believing that the managerial employee breached the trust reposed by the employer would
normally suffice to justify a dismissal, we should desist from applying this norm against the
petitioner who was not a managerial employee.

At any rate, the employer must present clear and convincing proof of an actual breach of duty
committed by the employee by establishing the facts and incidents upon which the loss of
confidence in the employee may fairly be made to rest. The required amount of evidence for
doing so is substantial proof. With these guidelines in mind, we cannot hold that the evidence
submitted by the respondents (consisting of the three affidavits) sufficiently established the
disloyalty of the petitioner. The affidavits did not show how she had betrayed her employer's
trust. Specifically, the affidavit of Russell B. Noel only stated that she and her husband Roy had
met over lunch with Garcia Imports and a certain Wilbur of Sea-Jet International Forwarder in
the first week of November 2002. To conclude that such lunch caused Pacific Concord to lose its
trust in the petitioner would be arbitrary.

In her affidavit, Jo Ann Otrera declared that the petitioner had called other forwarding companies
to inquire about any vacant positions, and that the petitioner had enticed her to transfer to another
company. However, such declarations did not provide the sufficient basis to warrant the
respondents' loss of confidence in the petitioner.

Considering that the petitioner's duties related to the sales of forwarding services offered by
Pacific Concord, her calling other forwarding companies to inquire for vacant positions did not
breach the trust reposed in her as sales manager. Such act, being at worst a simple act of
indiscretion, did not constitute the betrayal of trust that merited the extreme penalty of dismissal
from employment. We remind that dismissal is a penalty of last resort, to be meted only after
having appreciated and evaluated all the relevant circumstances with the goal of ensuring that the
ground for dismissal was not only serious but true.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on

certiorari; REVERSESand SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on May 10, 2006 by the
Court of Appeals; REINSTATES the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
rendered on December 15, 2004 subject to the MODIFICATION that the total monetary awards
shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision until full
satisfaction; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.
Fernando Medical Enterprises, Inc. vs. Wesleyan University Philippines, Inc.
G.R. No. 207970. January 20, 2016

BERSAMIN, J.:

Doctrine:
The trial court may render a judgment on the pleadings upon motion of the claiming party when
the defending party's answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations
of the adverse party's pleading. For that purpose, only the pleadings of the parties in the action
are considered. It is error for the trial court to deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings
because the defending party's pleading in another case supposedly tendered an issue of fact.

Facts:

From January 9, 2006 until February 2, 2007, the petitioner, a domestic corporation dealing with
medical equipment and supplies, delivered to and installed medical equipment and supplies at the
respondent's hospital. According to the petitioner, the respondent paid only P67,3 57,683.23 of
its total obligation of P123,901,650.00, leaving unpaid the sum of P54,654,195.54.

However, on February 11, 2009, the petitioner and the respondent entered into an agreement
whereby the former agreed to reduce its claim to only P50,400,000.00, and allowed the latter to
pay the adjusted obligation on installment basis within 36 months.

In the letter dated May 27, 2009, the respondent notified the petitioner that its new
administration had reviewed their contracts and had found the contracts defective and rescissible
due to economic prejudice or lesion; and that it was consequently declining to recognize the
February 11, 2009 agreement because of the lack of approval by its Board of Trustees and for
having been signed by Maglaya whose term of office had expired.

On June 24, 2009, the petitioner sent a demand letter to the respondent. Due to the respondent's
failure to pay as demanded, the petitioner filed its complaint for sum of money in the RTC.

The respondent moved to dismiss the complaint upon the following grounds, namely: (a) lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; (b) improper venue; (c) litis pendentia; and (d)
forum shopping. In support of the ground of litis pendentia, it stated that it had earlier filed a
complaint for the rescission of the four contracts and of the February 11, 2009 agreement in the
RTC in Cabanatuan City; and that the resolution of that case would be determinative of the
petitioner's action for collection.
After the RTC denied the motion to dismiss on July 19, 2009, the respondent filed its answer. On
September 28, 2011, the petitioner filed its Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, stating
that the respondent had admitted the material allegations of its complaint and thus did not tender
any issue as to such allegations. The respondent opposed the Motion for Judgment Based on the
Pleadings, arguing that it had specifically denied the material allegations in the complaint.

Judgment of the RTC

At the hearing, the court issued an Order denying the Motion for Judgment Based on the
Pleadings considering that the allegations stated on the Motion are evidentiary in nature. The
Court, instead of acting on the same, sets the case for pre-trial, considering that with the Answer
and the Reply, issues have been joined.

Judgment of the CA

On July 2, 2013, the CA promulgated its decision. Although observing that the respondent had
admitted the contracts as well as the February 11, 2009 agreement, the CA ruled that a judgment
on the pleadings would be improper because the outstanding balance due to the petitioner
remained to be an issue in the face of the allegations of the respondent in its complaint for
rescission in the RTC in Cabanatuan City.

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in going outside of the respondent's answer by relying on the
allegations contained in the latter's complaint for rescission.

Ruling of the SC:

Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in going outside of the respondent's answer by relying on the
allegations contained in the latter's complaint for rescission. In order to resolve the petitioner's
Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, the trial court could rely only on the answer of the
respondent filed in Civil Case No. 09-122116. Under Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court,
the answer was the sole basis for ascertaining whether the complaint's material allegations were
admitted or properly denied. As such, the respondent's averment of payment of the total of
P78,401,650.00 to the petitioner made in its complaint for rescission had no relevance to the
resolution of the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings. The CA thus wrongly held that a
factual issue on the total liability of the respondent remained to be settled through trial on the
merits. It should have openly wondered why the respondent's answer in Civil Case No. 09-
122116 did not allege the supposed payment of the P78,401,650.00, if the payment was true, if
only to buttress the specific denial of its alleged liability. The omission exposed the respondent's
denial of liability as insincere.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on July 2,
2013; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, in Manila to resume its proceedings in
Civil Case No. 09-122116 entitled Fernando Medical Enterprises, Inc. v. Wesleyan University-
Philippines, and to forthwith act on and grant the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings
by rendering the proper judgment on the pleadings; and ORDERS the respondent to pay the
costs of suit.

Saturday, January 28, 2017

Case Doctrines in Legal Ethics (part III)
CASE DOCTRINES IN LEGAL ETHICS (part III)
Prepared by Glenn Rey Anino

Soriano vs. Reyes, 489 SCRA 328 , May 04, 2006

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Disbarment; Affidavits of Desistance; The affidavit of withdrawal of the
disbarment case by a complainant does not automatically exonerate the respondent lawyer;
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance.—As we have previously ruled, the affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case
executed by a complainant does not automatically exonerate the respondent. A case of
suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the
charge of negligence has been duly proved. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary
proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where
the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving
courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney
is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the
person who called the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a
party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the
proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may
be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.
Accordingly, notwithstanding the motion to withdraw evidence and testimony, the disbarment
proceeding should proceed.

Same; Same; Same; Pre-Trials; A lawyer’s failure to file a pretrial brief constitutes inexcusable
negligence; Since pre-trial is a serious business of the court, preparation of the lawyers and
parties for the pre-trial in both questions of fact and of law cannot be overemphasized as an
essential requirement for a pre-trial conference.—Respondent’s failure to file the pre-trial brief
constitutes inexcusable negligence. The importance of filing a pre-trial brief cannot be gainsaid.
For one, the lawyers are compelled to prepare their cases in advance. They eliminate haphazard
preparation. Since pre-trial is a serious business of the court, preparation of the lawyers and
parties for the pre-trial in both questions of fact and of law cannot be overemphasized as an
essential requirement for a pre-trial conference. They enable both parties to view the
documentary evidence of the other even before they are presented in court. They enable the
parties to know the testimonies of each other’s witnesses. Pre-trial briefs also apprise the courts
of the additional points the parties are willing to stipulate upon, or the additional points which
could be inquired into for the purpose of additional stipulations. They also apprise the court of
the respective demands of the parties, thus, enabling the court to discuss more intelligently an
amicable settlement between or among the parties. The failure to submit a pre-trial brief could
very well, then, be fatal to the case of the client as in fact it is a ground for dismissal of the case.
For this reason, respondent’s failure to submit the pre-trial brief to the court within the given
period constitutes negligence which entails disciplinary action. Not only is it a dereliction of duty
to his client but to the court as well.

Same; Same; Same; A lawyer is expected to be familiar with the rudiments of law and procedure
and anyone who acquires his service is entitled to, not just competent service, but also whole-
hearted devotion to his client’s cause.—A lawyer is expected to be familiar with the rudiments of
law and procedure and anyone who acquires his service is entitled to, not just competent service,
but also wholehearted devotion to his client’s cause. It is the duty of a lawyer to serve his client
with competence and diligence and he should exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds
of law, the interest of his client. A lawyer should never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
otherwise his negligence in fulfilling his duty will render him liable for disciplinary action.

Same; Same; Same; There is always a need for the client to receive from the lawyer periodic and
full updates on developments affecting the case—the lawyer should apprise the client on the
mode and manner that the lawyer is utilizing to defend the client’s interests.—Respondent also
lacked candor in dealing with his clients as he omitted to apprise complainants of the status of
the two cases and even assured the complainants that he was diligently attending to said cases. In
Garcia v. Atty. Manuel, 395 SCRA 386 (2003), this Court found therein respondent lawyer in
bad faith for failing to inform his client of the status of the case. In said decision, the court has
adamantly stressed that the lawyer-client relationship is highly fiduciary. There is always a need
for the client to receive from the lawyer periodic and full updates on developments affecting the
case. The lawyer should apprise the client on the mode and manner that the lawyer is utilizing to
defend the client’s interests. In failing to inform his clients of the status of their cases, respondent
failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess
and exercise in such manners of professional employment.
Same; Same; Same; Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such,
the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution for only the most imperative
reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar; The appropriate penalty on an errant
lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.—
Time and again we have stated that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction,
and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution for only the most
imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of
the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should
not be decreed where any punishment less severe—such as a reprimand, suspension, or fine—
would accomplish the end desired. The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the
exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. The penalties for a lawyer’s
failure to file the required brief or pleading range from reprimand, warning with fine, suspension
and in grave cases, disbarment. In one case, the penalty for a lawyer’s failure to file a pre-trial
brief and other pleadings such as position papers leading to the dismissal of the case, is
suspension of six months. Therefore, we find the penalty of disbarment as recommended by the
IBP to be unduly harsh and we deem it appropriate to impose the penalty of one (1) year
suspension, taking into account that this appears to be his first offense. [Soriano vs. Reyes, 489
SCRA 328(2006)]

Somosot vs. Lara, 577 SCRA 158 , January 30, 2009

Attorneys; A counsel must reveal how he contacted his client during pendency of adverse party’s
request for admission and answer to interrogatories.—The respondent failed to precisely allege
in his submissions how he tried to contact the defendant on or about the time the interrogatories
and request for admission were pending. It appears that he really had not; by his own admission,
his attempt to contact the complainant came in December 2001 and only to inform her of his
government appointment and to collect his billings. It was only after the discovery of the closure
of the defendant’s office did the respondent try to contact the complainant and her husband by
cellular phone, but they could not be reached.
Same; A client must never be left in the dark even if he has not paid counsel’s billing.—The
interrogatories/admission issue happened in August 2001, which tells us that the respondent at
about that time was already very sensitive about his billing issue against his client as he had not
been paid from May to August 2001. Assuming the non-payment to be true, such failure should
not be a reason not to inform the client of an important development, or worse, to withhold vital
information from her. As the court held in Luisito Balatbat v. Atty. Edgardo Arias, 521 SCRA 1
(2007), a client must never be left in the dark for to do so would destroy the trust, faith and
confidence reposed in the retained lawyer in particular and the legal profession in general.

Same; Effect of counsel’s failure to react on trial court’s adverse ruling.—We feel it safe to
assume that the respondent did not move at all to question the trial court’s rulings; nowhere in
the records, both from the complainant’s and the respondent’s end, is there any allegation that
the respondent sought to review the trial court’s rulings. What intrigues us is that the respondent
could have reacted to the trial court’s ruling on the interrogatories/request for admission; he was
aware of the recourses open to him under the ruling in Briboneria v. Court of Appeals, 216
SCRA 607 (1992), that he cited in his objection to the interrogatories and request for admission.

Same; Effect of filing unconsented notice of withdrawal without stating specific valid reasons
therefor.—On the matter of the respondent’s withdrawal from the case, the respondent might
have had valid reasons to withdraw and terminate his relationship with his client. As the
respondent now states, he could withdraw under paragraphs (e) and (f) of the Code of
Professional Responsibility—i.e., deliberate failure of the client to pay the fees for the services,
or failure to comply with the retainer agreement, or appointment or election to public office.
However, he does not appear to have cited these reasons before the trial court. Instead, he merely
filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance, citing his client’s unknown location and failure to
communicate as reasons for his client’s lack of express consent to his withdrawal. It is
undisputed that the trial court denied the respondent’s notice of withdrawal; thus, he remained as
counsel of record burdened with all the responsibilities that his representation carried.

Same; Effect of failure to appeal adverse decision of trial court.—The respondent never bothered
to refuse this very damaging allegation; neither in his Position Paper before the IBP nor in the
Comment filed with us did he offer an explanation. Thus, it appears that the respondent could not
have really taken any instructions from his client on how to handle the trial court’s adverse
decision. He simply took it upon himself to decide not to appeal the trial court’s decision and the
denial of his motion for reconsideration.

Same; Attorney’s Fees; Non-payment of attorney’s fee and appointment as government

consultant mitigating circumstances and mishandled case.—What lightens the impact of the
respondent’s mishandling of the case is the complainant’s own failings as a client. The non-
payment of fees is a factor that we cannot simply disregard. As a rule, law practice is not a pro
bono proposition and a lawyer’s sensitivity and concern for unpaid fees are understandable;
lawyers incur expenses in running their practice and generally depend, too, on their law practice
income for their living expenses. Likewise, the respondent’s appointment as a consultant should
be considered although it is a matter that none of the parties have fully examined.

Same; Client has a duty to inform her counsel of change of address and contact her lawyer.—
More than these reasons and as Commissioner Limpingco correctly noted, the complainant never
made any effort to contact the respondent to follow up the status of her case, expecting instead
the respondent to take full and complete initiative in this regard. While the respondent, as
counsel, has the obligation to inform his client of the material developments in the case,
particularly of the aspects of the case that would require the client’s instructions or participation,
this obligation is balanced by a complementary duty on the part of a party-litigant to remain in
contact with his lawyer in order to be informed of the progress of the case.
Same; Lawyer cannot be disbarred if his client is guilty of contributory faults.—In these lights,
we hold that while the respondent is liable for a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects
his standing and character as an officer of the Court and as a member of the Bar, this liability
ought to be tempered by the mitigating circumstances we pointed out above. We therefore cannot
impose disbarment as penalty. Given the mitigating circumstances and the extent of their effects
on the respondent’s culpability, we hold that a three-month suspension from the practice of law
is the penalty that is more in keeping with the damage the complainant suffered and the interests
that the public, the bar and the administration of justice have to protect. [Somosot vs. Lara, 577
SCRA 158(2009)]

Pena vs. Aparicio, 525 SCRA 444 , June 25, 2007

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Disbarment; Pleadings and Practice; Forum Shopping; Certification
against Forum Shopping; Administrative Circular No. 04-94, made effective on 1 April 1994,
expanded the certification requirement to include cases filed in courts and quasi-judicial
agencies below the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.—The requirement of a certification
against forum shopping was originally required by Circular No. 28-91, dated 8 February 1994,
issued by this Court for every petition filed with the Court or the Court of Appeals.
Administrative Circular No. 04-94, made effective on 1 April 1994, expanded the certification
requirement to include cases filed in courts and quasi-judicial agencies below this Court and the
Court of Appeals. Ultimately, the Court adopted paragraphs (1) and (2) of Administrative
Circular No. 04-94 to become Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Said rule
states that a violation thereof would constitute contempt of court and be cause for the summary
dismissal of both petitions without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the
counsel of the party concerned. The Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of
Governors took against complainant his failure to attach the certification against forum shopping
to his complaint and consequently dismissed his complaint. This Court, however, disagrees and,
accordingly, grants the petition. However, a remand of the case to the IBP would unduly prolong
its adjudication.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In view of the nature of disbarment proceedings, the
certification against forum shopping to be attached to the complaint, if one is required at all in
such proceedings, must refer to another administrative case for disciplinary proceedings against
the same respondent.—In view of the nature of disbarment proceedings, the certification against
forum shopping to be attached to the complaint, if one is required at all in such proceedings,
must refer to another administrative case for disciplinary proceedings against the same
respondent, because such other proceedings or “action” is one that necessarily involves “the
same issues” as the one posed in the disbarment complaint to which the certification is
supposedly to be attached.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It would seem that the scenario sought to be avoided,
i.e., the filing of multiple suits and the possibility of conflicting decisions, rarely happens in
disbarment complaints.—It is in this light that we take a further look at the necessity of attaching
a certification against forum shopping to a disbarment complaint. It would seem that the scenario
sought to be avoided,i.e., the filing of multiple suits and the possibility of conflicting decisions,
rarely happens in disbarment complaints considering that said proceedings are either “taken by
the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the
verified complaint of any person.” Thus, if the complainant in a disbarment case fails to attach a
certification against forum shopping, the pendency of another disciplinary action against the
same respondent may still be ascertained with ease. We have previously held that the rule
requiring a certification of forum shopping to accompany every initiatory pleading, “should not
be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate
objective or the goal of all rules of procedure—which is to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible.”

Same; Same; Same; A lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice, and to
that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate—and his conduct ought to and must always
be scrupulously observant of law and ethics; Under this Rule 19.01, a lawyer should not file or
threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his
client designed to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own
cases against the lawyer’s client.—The intrinsic merit of complainant’s case against respondent
justifies the grant of the present petition. Respondent does not deny authorship of the threatening
letter to complainant, even spiritedly contesting the charge that the letter is unethical. Canon 19
of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall represent his client with
zeal within the bounds of the law,” reminding legal practitioners that a lawyer’s duty is not to his
client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate;
and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. In
particular, Rule 19.01 commands that a “lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to
attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten
to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.” Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or
baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage
to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyer’s client.

Same; Same; Same; Demand Letters; Blackmail; Extortion; Words and Phrases; The act of a
lawyer in sending a demand letter threatening someone that should the latter fail to pay the
amounts he and his client propose as settlement, he would file and claim bigger amounts
including moral damages, as well as multiple charges such as tax evasion, falsification of
documents, and cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws, is not only
unethical for violating Canon 19, but also amounts to blackmail; Blackmail is the extortion of
money from a person by threats of accusation or exposure or opposition in the public prints,
obtaining of value from a person as a condition of refraining from making an accusation against
him, or disclosing some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice.—In the case at bar,
respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule proscribe. Through his letter, he threatened
complainant that should the latter fail to pay the amounts they propose as settlement, he would
file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages, as well as multiple charges such as tax
evasion, falsification of documents, and cancellation of business license to operate due to
violations of laws. The threats are not only unethical for violating Canon 19, but they also
amount to blackmail. Blackmail is “the extortion of money from a person by threats of
accusation or exposure or opposition in the public prints,…obtaining of value from a person as a
condition of refraining from making an accusation against him, or disclosing some secret
calculated to operate to his prejudice.” In common parlance and in general acceptation, it is
equivalent to and synonymous with extortion, the exaction of money either for the performance
of a duty, the prevention of an injury, or the exercise of an influence. Not infrequently, it is
extorted by threats, or by operating on the fears or the credulity, or by promises to conceal or
offers to expose the weaknesses, the follies, or the crime of the victim.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is quite obvious that the respondent lawyer’s threat to
file the cases against complainant was designed to secure some leverage to compel the latter to
give in to his client’s demands, not respondent’s intention to point out complainant’s violations
of the law as he so gallantly claims; The writing of demand letters is a standard practice and
tradition in this jurisdiction, however, the letter in this case contains more than just a simple
demand to pay—it even contains a threat to file retaliatory charges against complainant which
have nothing to do with his client’s claim for separation pay.—Respondent does not find
anything wrong with what he wrote, dismissing the same as merely an act of pointing out
massive violations of the law by the other party, and, with boldness, asserting that “a lawyer is
under obligation to tell the truth, to report to the government commission of offenses punishable
by the State.” He further asserts that the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and
tradition and that our laws allow and encourage the settlement of disputes. Respondent’s
assertions, however, are misleading, for it is quite obvious that respondent’s threat to file the
cases against complainant was designed to secure some leverage to compel the latter to give in to
his client’s demands. It was not respondent’s intention to point out complainant’s violations of
the law as he so gallantly claims. Far from it, the letter even contains an implied promise to
“keep silent” about the said violations if payment of the claim is made on the date indicated.
Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in this jurisdiction. It is
usually done by a lawyer pursuant to the principalagent relationship that he has with his client,
the principal. Thus, in the performance of his role as agent, the lawyer may be tasked to enforce
his client’s claim and to take all the steps necessary to collect it, such as writing a letter of
demand requiring payment within a specified period. However, the letter in this case contains
more than just a simple demand to pay. It even contains a threat to file retaliatory charges against
complainant which have nothing to do with his client’s claim for separation pay. The letter was
obviously designed to secure leverage to compel complainant to yield to their claims. Indeed,
letters of this nature are definitely proscribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The privileged nature of a demand letter is removed
when a lawyer uses it to blackmail someone and extort from the latter compliance with the
demands of his client.—Respondent cannot claim the sanctuary provided by the privileged
communication rule under which a private communication executed in the performance of a
legal duty is not actionable. The privileged nature of the letter was removed when respondent
used it to blackmail complainant and extort from the latter compliance with the demands of his
client. [Pena vs. Aparicio, 525 SCRA 444(2007)]
Solidon vs. Macalalad, 613 SCRA 472 , February 24, 2010

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Quantum of Proof; Administrative Cases; In administrative cases

against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence which the
complainant has the burden to discharge.—In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum
of proof required is preponderance of evidence which the complainant has the burden to
discharge. We fully considered the evidence presented and we are fully satisfied that the
complainant’s evidence, as outlined above, fully satisfies the required quantum of proof in
proving Atty. Macalalad’s negligence.

Same; Same; Negligence; The mere failure of the lawyer to perform the obligations due to the
client is considered per se a violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.—Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides for
the rule on negligence and states: Rule 18.03—A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. This Court
has consistently held, in construing this Rule, that the mere failure of the lawyer to perform the
obligations due to the client is considered per se a violation.

Same; Same; Same; The circumstance that the client was also at fault does not exonerate a
lawyer from liability for his negligence in handling a case.—The circumstance that the client was
also at fault does not exonerate a lawyer from liability for his negligence in handling a case. In
Canoy, we accordingly declared that the lawyer cannot shift the blame to his client for failing to
follow up on his case because it was the lawyer’s duty to inform his client of the status of the
case. Our rulings in Macarilay v. Seriña, 458 SCRA 12 (2005) in Heirs of Ballesteros v. Apiag,
471 SCRA 111 (2005) and in Villaflores v. Limos, 538 SCRA 140 (2007) were of the same
tenor. In Villaflores, we opined that even if the client has been equally at fault for the lack of
communication, the main responsibility remains with the lawyer to inquire and know the best
means to acquire the required information. We held that as between the client and his lawyer, the
latter has more control in handling the case.

Same; Same; Same; A lawyer so engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility of
protecting the latter’s interest with utmost diligence.—All these rulings drive home the fiduciary
nature of a lawyer’s duty to his client once an engagement for legal services is accepted. A
lawyer so engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility of protecting the latter’s interest
with utmost diligence. The lawyer bears the duty to serve his client with competence and
diligence, and to exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interest of his
or her client. Accordingly, competence, not only in the knowledge of law, but also in the
management of the cases by giving these cases appropriate attention and due preparation, is
expected from a lawyer. [Solidon vs. Macalalad, 613 SCRA 472(2010)]
Ramos vs. Ngaseo, 445 SCRA 529 , December 09, 2004

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code prohibiting lawyers from acquiring
either by purchase or assignment the property or rights involved which are the object of the
litigation in which they intervene by virtue of their profession applies only if the sale or
assignment of the property takes place during the pendency of the litigation involving the client’s
property.—Under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited from acquiring either
by purchase or assignment the property or rights involved which are the object of the litigation in
which they intervene by virtue of their profession. The prohibition on purchase is all embracing
to include not only sales to private individuals but also public or judicial sales. The rationale
advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows the transactions in view of the
fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar control
exercised by these persons. It is founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an
attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich
himself at the expense of his client. However, the said prohibition applies only if the sale or
assignment of the property takes place during the pendency of the litigation involving the client’s
property. Consequently, where the property is acquired after the termination of the case, no
violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.

Same; Same; Mere demand for delivery of the litigated property does not cause the transfer of
ownership, hence, not a prohibited transaction within the contemplation of Article 1491.—In the
instant case, there was no actual acquisition of the property in litigation since the respondent only
made a written demand for its delivery which the complainant refused to comply. Mere demand
for delivery of the litigated property does not cause the transfer of ownership, hence, not a
prohibited transaction within the contemplation of Article 1491. Even assuming arguendo that
such demand for delivery is unethical, respondent’s act does not fall within the purview of
Article 1491. The letter of demand dated January 29, 2003 was made long after the judgment in
Civil Case No. SCC-2128 became final and executory on January 18, 2002.

Same; Same; Disbarment; The power to disbar or suspend must be exercised with great
caution—only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of
the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment or suspension be
imposed as a penalty.—We note that the report of the IBP Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP
Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2003-47, does not clearly specify which acts of
the respondent constitute gross misconduct or what provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility have been violated. We find the recommended penalty of suspension for 6 months
too harsh and not proportionate to the offense committed by the respondent. The power to disbar
or suspend must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member
of the bar will disbarment or suspension be imposed as a penalty. All considered, a reprimand is
deemed sufficient and reasonable.
Hilado vs. David, 84 Phil. 569 , September 21, 1949

1.ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; RELATION OF ATTORNEY AND CLIBNT, WHEN EXISTS.—"To

constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have employed the
attorney professionally on any previous occasion * * *. It is not necessary that any retainer
should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted
did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect
to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional
capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily
permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded
as established * * *."

2.ID. ; ATTORNEY Is INHIBITED TO ACT ON BEHALF OF BOTH PARTIES.—There is no law

or provision in the Rules of Court prohibiting attorneys in express terms from acting on behalf of
both parties to a controversy whose interests are opposed to each other, but such prohibition is
necessarily implied in the injunctions as provided in section 26 (e), Rule 123 and section 19 (e)
of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court.

3.ID. ; INFORMATION PROFESSIONALLY OBTAINED BY ATTORNEY FROM CLIENT Is

SACRED.—Information so received is sacred to the employment to which it pertains, and to
permit it to be used in the interest of another, or, worse still, in the interest of the adverse party, is
to strike at the element of confidence which lies at the basis of, and affords the essential security
in, the relation of attorney and client.

4.ID.; ID.—The mere relation of attorney and client ought to preclude the attorney from
accepting the opposite party's retainer in the same litigation regardless of what information was
received by him from his first client.

5.ID.; RELATION OF ATTORNEY AND CLIENT Is FOUNDED ON PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC

PoLiCY.—The relation of attorney and client is fbunded on principles of public policy, on good
taste. The question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the
attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves
attorneys, like Ceasar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the chent's confidence, but also to avoid
the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice

6.ID ; RETAINING FEE, WHAT Is.—"A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or
counsel to insure and secure his future services, and induce him to act for the client. It is mtended
to remunerate counsel for being deprived, by being retained by one party, of the opportunity of
rendering services to the other and of receiving pay from him, and the payment of such fee, in
the absence of an express understanding to the contrary, is neither made nor received in payment
of the services contemplated; its payment has no relation to the obligation of the client to pay his
attorney for the services which he has retained him to perform."

7.ID. ; INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM CLIENT BY A MEMBER OF THE FIRM.—An

information obtained from a client by a member or assistant of a law firm is information
imparted to the firm.

8.ID. ; PROPESSIONAL CONFIDENCE, EXPIRATION OF.—Prof essional confidence once

reposed can never be divested by expiration of professional employment.

9.ID.; COURTS; JURISDICTION, EXTENT OF SUMMARY.—The courts have summary

jurisdiction to protect the rights of the parties and the public from any conduct of attorneys
prejudicial to the administration of justice. The summary jurisdiction of the courts over attorneys
is not confined to requiring them to pay over money collected by them but embraces authority to
compel them to do whatever specific acts may be incumbent upon them in their capacity of
attorneys to perform. The courts, from the general principles of equity and policy, will always
look into the dealings between attorneys and clients and guard the latter from any undue
consequences resulting from a situation in which they may stand unequal. The courts act on the
same principle whether the undertaking is to appear, or, for that matter, not to appear, to answer
declaration.

10.ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; AS OFFICERS OF THE COURTS.—Attorneys are officers of the

court where they practice, forming a part of the machinery of the law for the administration of
justice and as such subject to the disciplinary authority of the court and to its orders and
directions with respect to their relations to the court as well as to their clients. [Hilado vs. David,
84 Phil. 569(1949)]

Bun Siong Yao vs. Aurelio, 485 SCRA 553 , March 30, 2006

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed on him.—It is essential to note that the relationship between an attorney and his client is
a fiduciary one. Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.
The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made to
him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents. This obligation to
preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their relationship. The
protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the
litigation, nor is it affected by the party’s ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or
by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.
Same; Same; Forum Shopping; Respondent’s act of filing multiple suits on similar causes of
action in different venues constitutes forum shopping. He has inevitably utilized information he
has obtained from his dealings with complainant and complainant’s companies for his own
end.—Notwithstanding the veracity of his allegations, respondent’s act of filing multiple suits on
similar causes of action in different venues constitutes forum shopping, as correctly found by the
investigating commissioner. This highlights his motives rather than his cause of action.
Respondent took advantage of his being a lawyer in order to get back at the complainant. In
doing so, he has inevitably utilized information he has obtained from his dealings with
complainant and complainant’s companies for his own end.

Same; Same; Lawyers cannot be allowed to exploit their profession for the purpose of exacting
vengeance or as a tool for instigating hostility against any person—most especially against a
client or former client.—Lawyers must conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their
clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. Lawyers
cannot be allowed to exploit their profession for the purpose of exacting vengeance or as a tool
for instigating hostility against any person—most especially against a client or former client.

Genato vs. Silapan, 406 SCRA 75 , July 14, 2003

Administrative Law; Attorneys; Lawyer-client Relationship; An attorney is not permitted to

disclose communications made to him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter
consents.—Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.
The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made to
him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents. This obligation to
preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their relationship. The
protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the
litigation, nor is it affected by the party’s ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or
by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.

Same; Same; Same; The privilege against disclosure of confidential communications or

information is limited only to communications which are legitimately and properly within the
scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer; It does not extend to those made in contemplation of a
crime or perpetration of a fraud.—It must be stressed, however, that the privilege against
disclosure of confidential communications or information is limited only to communications
which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It does
not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud. If the unlawful
purpose is avowed, as in this case, the complainant’s alleged intention to bribe government
officials in relation to his case, the communication is not covered by the privilege as the client
does not consult the lawyer professionally. It is not within the profession of a lawyer to advise a
client as to how he may commit a crime as a lawyer is not a gun for hire. Thus, the attorney-
client privilege does not attach, there being no professional employment in the strict sense.

Same; Same; Same; A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients,
with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach.—Be that as it may, respondent’s explanation
that it was necessary for him to make the disclosures in his pleadings fails to satisfy us. The
disclosures were not indispensable to protect his rights as they were not pertinent to the
foreclosure case. It was improper for the respondent to use it against the complainant in the
foreclosure case as it was not the subject matter of litigation therein and respondent’s
professional competence and legal advice were not being attacked in said case. A lawyer must
conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is
beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients should be characterized by the highest degree
of good faith and fairness. [Genato vs. Silapan, 406 SCRA 75(2003)]

Junio vs. Grupo, 372 SCRA 525 , December 18, 2001

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers
from borrowing money from their clients unless the latter’s interests are protected by the nature
of the case or by independent advice; A lawyer is bound to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty
in all his dealings and transactions with his client.—Respondent’s liability is thus not for
misappropriation or embezzlement but for violation of Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which forbids lawyers from borrowing money from their clients unless the latter’s
interests are protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. In this case,
respondent’s liability is compounded by the fact that not only did he not give any security for the
payment of the amount loaned to him but that he has also refused to pay the said amount. His
claim that he could not pay the loan “because circumstances . . . did not allow it” and that,
because of the passage of time, “he somehow forgot about his obligation” only underscores his
blatant disregard of his obligation which reflects on his honesty and candor. A lawyer is bound to
observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.

Same; Same; Attorney-Client Relationship; If a person, in respect to his business affairs or

troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to
obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces
in such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established.—
Respondent claims that complainant is a close personal friend and that in helping redeem the
property of complainant’s parents, he did not act as a lawyer but as a friend, hence there is no
client-attorney relationship between them. This contention has no merit. As explained in Hilado
v. David, To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have
employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion . . . It is not necessary that any
retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney
consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a person,
in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his
professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the
attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional
employment must be regarded as established [Junio vs. Grupo, 372 SCRA 525(2001)]

Uy vs. Gonzales, 426 SCRA 422, March 30, 2004

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Disbarment; A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any
sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant—disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance.—Preliminarily, we agree with Commissioner Villanueva-Maala that the manifestation
of complainant Uy expressing his desire to dismiss the administrative complaint he filed against
respondent, has no persuasive bearing in the present case. Sec. 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court states that: . . . . No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the
desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same. This is because: A proceeding for suspension or disbarment
is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is
a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of
persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as
an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the
evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the
desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.

Same; Same; Same; Attorney-Client Relationships; Words and Phrases; Practice of law
embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, as well as legal
principles, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience.—
Practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, as
well as legal principles, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience. While it is true that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court, complainant failed to prove any of the circumstances enumerated above that would
warrant the disbarment or suspension of herein respondent.

Same; Same; Same; Same; As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a
lawyer voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation of a person, who in respect to a
business or trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view of obtaining professional advice or
assistance; There is no attorney-client relationship between a lawyer and another person where
the preparation and the proposed filing of a petition was only incidental to their personal
transaction.—As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer voluntarily
permits or acquiesces with the consultation of a person, who in respect to a business or trouble of
any kind, consults a lawyer with a view of obtaining professional advice or assistance. It is not
essential that the client should have employed the attorney on any previous occasion or that any
retainer should have been paid, promised or charged for, neither is it material that the attorney
consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had, for as long
as the advice and assistance of the attorney is sought and received, in matters pertinent to his
profession. Considering the attendant peculiar circumstances, said rule cannot apply to the
present case. Evidently, the facts alleged in the complaint for “Estafa Through Falsification of
Public Documents” filed by respondent against complainant were obtained by respondent due to
his personal dealings with complainant. Respondent volunteered his service to hasten the
issuance of the certificate of title of the land he has redeemed from complainant. Respondent’s
immediate objective was to secure the title of the property that complainant had earlier bought
from his son. Clearly, there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent and
complainant. The preparation and the proposed filing of the petition was only incidental to their
personal transaction.

Same; Same; Same; Violation of Confidentiality; There is no violation of the duty of a lawyer to
preserve the confidence and secrets of another where the facts alleged in a complaint for estafa
filed by the lawyer against such person were not obtained by the lawyer in his professional
capacity but as a redemptioner of a property originally owned by his deceased son, and to hold
otherwise would be precluding any lawyer from instituting a case against anyone to protect his
personal or proprietary interests.—The alleged “secrets” of complainant were not specified by
him in his affidavit-complaint. Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant were
not obtained by respondent in his professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a property
originally owned by his deceased son and therefore, when respondent filed the complaint for
estafa against herein complainant, which necessarily involved alleging facts that would constitute
estafa, respondent was not, in any way, violating Canon 21. There is no way we can equate the
filing of the affidavit-complaint against herein complainant to a misconduct that is wanting in
moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or that renders him unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court. To hold otherwise would be precluding any lawyer from
instituting a case against anyone to protect his personal or proprietary interests. [Uy vs.
Gonzales, 426 SCRA 422(2004)]

Intestate Estate of the Deceased Luis C. Domingo, Sr. vs. Aquino, 38 SCRA 472 , April 29,
1971

Remedial law; Change of counsel; Court should be informed.—Atty. Unson continued on record
in the appellate court as counsel for the estate as appellant therein and did not file therein any
withdrawal as counsel and neither did the petitioner inform said court of any change of counsel
or of party-administrator, as required by Rule 138, section 26 of the Rules of Court. More so, no
appearance of any new counsel for the estate was ever filed with the appellate court.
Same; Completeness of service by registered mail.—Service by registered mail of the appellate
court’s decision upon the petitioner’s counsel of record was deemed completed and effected
upon the addressee’s failure to claim his mail on the fifth day after the first notice of the
postmaster. This has ever since been the prevailing rule in the interests of public policy and
sound administration of justice, as most recently affirmed in Fojas vs. Navarro, L-26365, April
30, 1970, citing a long line of applicable precedents.

Same; Counsel of estate, not of administrator.—The party in the subject case was the intestate
estate of the deceased Luis C. Domingo, Sr. and that Atty. Unson represented the estate as
counsel in the said case. The fact that his services were engaged by Luis Domingo, Jr., in his
(Luis’) official capacity as administrator, did not make him the personal counsel of Luis. Thus,
notwithstanding Luis’ removal as administrator, Atty. Unson continued to represent the estate as
counsel in the appellate court. He continued to be authorized to represent the estate as its
counsel, until the new administrator should terminate his services which she never did.

Same; Court’s admonition to counsel; Cooperation of litigants and their attorneys needed.—The
cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so that needless clogging of the court
dockets with unmeritorious cases may be avoided. There must be more faithful adherence to
Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court which provided that “the signature of an attorney
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not
interposed for delay” and expressly admonishes that “for a willful violation of this rule, an
attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action.” [Intestate Estate of the Deceased Luis C.
Domingo, Sr. vs. Aquino, 38 SCRA 472(1971)]

Montano vs. Integrated Bar of the Philippines, 358 SCRA 1 , May 21, 2001

Administrative Law; Attorneys; Code of Professional Responsibility; A lawyer shall withdraw

his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances; A lawyer
shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial
action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.—We find Atty. Dealca’s conduct
unbecoming of a member of the legal profession. Under Canon 22 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice
appropriate in the circumstances. Although he may withdraw his services when the client
deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services, under the circumstances of the present case,
Atty. Dealca’s withdrawal was unjustified as complainant did not deliberately fail to pay him the
attorney’s fees. In fact, complainant exerted honest efforts to fulfill his obligation. Respondent’s
contemptuous conduct does not speak well of a member of the bar considering that the amount
owing to him was only P3,500.00. Rule 20.4 of Canon 20, mandates that a lawyer shall avoid
controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to
prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Sadly, for not so large a sum owed to him by complainant,
respondent lawyer failed to act in accordance with the demands of the Code.

Same; Same; Same; Disbarment; Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will
disbarment be imposed as a penalty.—The Court, however, does not agree with complainant’s
contention that the maximum penalty of disbarment should be imposed on respondent lawyer.
The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member
of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty. It should never be decreed where a lesser
penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired. In the present case,
reprimand is deemed sufficient.

Venterez vs. Cosme, 535 SCRA 378 , October 10, 2007

Administrative Law; Attorneys; Code of Professional Responsibility; Among the fundamental

rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to
carry it to its termination that is until the case becomes final and executory.—No lawyer is
obliged to advocate for every person who may wish to become his client, but once he agrees to
take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that
an attorney who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination, that is,
until the case becomes final and executory. A lawyer is not at liberty to abandon his client and
withdraw his services without reasonable cause and only upon notice appropriate in the
circumstances. Any dereliction of duty by a counsel affects the client. This means that his client
is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law and
he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.

Same; Same; Same; The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for
sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted; A lawyer’s right to withdraw from a case
before its final adjudication arises only from the client’s written consent or from a good cause.—
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client
relation at any time with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the
relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. Among the
fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action
impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without
reasonable cause. A lawyer’s right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises
only from the client’s written consent or from a good cause.

Same; Same; Same; A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding with
the written consent of his client filed in court and with a copy thereof served upon the adverse
party.—A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding with the written
consent of his client filed in court and with a copy thereof served upon the adverse party. Should
the client refuse to give his consent, the lawyer must file an application with the court. The court,
on notice to the client and adverse party, shall determine whether the lawyer ought to be allowed
to retire. The application for withdrawal must be based on a good cause.

Same; Same; Same; The lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for withdrawal will be
granted by the court.—Assuming, nevertheless, that respondent was justified in withdrawing his
services, he, however, cannot just do so and leave complainants in the cold, unprotected. The
lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for withdrawal will be granted by the court. Until
his withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer remains counsel of record who is expected
by his clients, as well as by the court, to do what the interests of his clients require. He must still
appear before the court to protect the interest of his clients by availing himself of the proper
remedy, for the attorney-client relations are not terminated formally until there is a withdrawal of
record.

Same; Same; Same; Respondent reminded that the practice of law is a special privilege bestowed
only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally.—All told, we rule
and so hold that on account of respondent’s failure to protect the interest of complainants,
respondent indeed violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which states that “a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.” Respondent is reminded that the practice of law is
a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and
morally. This Court has been exacting in its expectations for the members of the Bar to always
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission
which might lessen the trust and confidence of the public. [Venterez vs. Cosme, 535 SCRA
378(2007)]

In Re: Atty. David Briones, 363 SCRA 1 , August 15, 2001

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Pleadings and Practice; Speedy Disposition of Cases; The failure of the
counsel to submit the required brief within the reglementary period is an offense that entails
disciplinary action; The accused in a criminal case has the right to a swift and just disposition of
his case, and lawyers are obliged to protect, not defeat, such right.—The failure of the counsel to
submit the required brief within the reglementary period is an offense that entails disciplinary
action. The pernicious effect of Atty. Briones’ omission cannot be gainsaid. His failure to file an
appellant’s brief in G.R. No. 130965 has caused the appeal to remain inactive for more than a
year, to the prejudice of his client, the accused himself, who continues to languish in jail pending
the resolution of his case. The accused in a criminal case has the right to a swift and just
disposition of his case. Lawyers are obliged to protect, not defeat, such right.

Same; Same; Same; A member of the Bar is expected to exercise due diligence in the practice of
his profession; Cessation of his law practice is not an excuse for a lawyer in not filing the
required brief.—We have considered the explanation of Atty. Briones for his failure to comply
with the Court’s directive and we find the same unsatisfactory. Such omission can be attributed
to pure negligence on the part of Atty. Briones which we deem inexcusable. He cannot deny that
his office received a copy of the Court’s resolution ordering him to submit an appellant’s brief.
The registry return card shows that the notice to file appellant’s brief was received by the
addressee on August 6, 1998. To exonerate himself from liability, Atty. Briones claims that his
secretary did not forward to him the mail matters received in his office. He, however, cannot
pass the blame to his secretary as he is personally responsible for his own communications. As a
member of the Bar, he is expected to exercise due diligence in the practice of his profession. He
should not have passively waited for his secretary to inform him about the letters and
communications received in his law office, especially those coming from the courts. He should
have taken the initiative to check with her if there are important matters requiring his action or
attention. Neither is the cessation of his law practice an excuse for his failure to file the required
brief. Even if it were true that Atty. Briones has stopped practicing law, he still could not ignore
the directives coming from the Court. It does not appear from the records of G.R. No. 130965
that Atty. Briones has withdrawn his appearance. Unless he has withdrawn his appearance in the
case, the Court would still consider him as counsel for the accused-appellant and he is expected
to comply with all its orders and directives.

Same; Same; Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and
competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.—It
should be stressed that every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and
competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. A
lawyer’s fidelity to the cause of his client requires him to be ever mindful of the responsibilities
that should be expected of him. He is mandated to exert his best efforts to protect within the
bounds of the law the interest of his client. The Code of Professional Responsibility dictates that
a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence and he should never neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him. [In Re: Atty. David Briones, 363 SCRA 1(2001)]

Nevada vs. Casuga, 668 SCRA 441 , March 20, 2012

Attorneys; Legal Ethics; A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand.—With regard to the jewelry and watch entrusted to him, Casuga alleged that
Nevada pawned them and thereafter instructed Casuga’s wife to redeem them with the latter’s
money. He added that Nevada then instructed his wife to sell the valuables and use the proceeds
to reimburse herself for the redemption price. Again, however, Casuga’s allegations are
unsupported by a single shred of evidence. Pawnshop receipts would have provided the best
evidence under the circumstances. But they were not presented, too. Moreover, Casuga’s
admission that the valuables are indeed in his possession, without any adequate reason, supports
Nevada’s version of the story. Casuga’s failure to return such property or remit the proceeds of
the sale is a blatant violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code).
The Code’s Canon 16 and Rule 16.3 state: CANON 16—A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys
and properties of his client that may come into his profession. Rule 16.03—A lawyer shall
deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a
lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees
and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the
same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the
Rules of Court.

Same; Same; Respondent’s act of notarizing a deed to which he is a party is a plain violation of
Rule IV, Section 3(a) of the Notarial Rules, and it likewise partakes of malpractice of law and
misconduct.—None of the requirements contained in Rule IV, Sec. 1(c), as would justify a notary
signing in behalf of a contracting party, was complied with in this case. Moreover, Casuga’s act
of affixing his signature above the printed name “Edwin T. Nevada,” without any qualification,
veritably made him a party to the contract of lease in question. Thus, his act of notarizing a deed
to which he is a party is a plain violation of the aforequoted Rule IV, Sec. 3(a) of the Notarial
Rules, for which he can be disciplinarily sanctioned provided under Rule XI, Sec. 1(b)(10) of the
Notarial Rules, which provides: SECTION 1. Revocation and Administrative Sanctions.—x x x
(b) In addition, the Executive Judge may revoke the commission of, or impose appropriate
administrative sanctions upon, any notary public who: (10) knowingly performs or fails to
perform any other act prohibited or mandated by these Rules; Aside from being a violation of the
Notarial Rules, Casuga’s aforementioned act partakes of malpractice of law and misconduct
punishable under the ensuing Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Same; Notary Public; A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who
signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to
attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein.—In Dela Cruz v. Zabala, 442
SCRA 407 (2004), the Court adjudged the respondent notary public guilty of gross negligence
for failing to require the parties to be physically present before him. In revoking the erring
notary’s commission, the Court, in Dela Cruz, stressed the significance of notarization and
proceeded to define the heavy burden that goes when a lawyer is commissioned as a notary
public. The Court wrote: x x x A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons
who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before
him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. These acts of the affiants
cannot be delegated because what are stated therein are facts they have personal knowledge of
and are personally sworn to. Otherwise, their representative’s names should appear in the said
documents as the ones who executed the same. [Nevada vs. Casuga, 668 SCRA 441(2012)]

Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 37,
Appealing for Judicial Clemency, 533 SCRA 534 , September 19, 2007

Administrative Law; Judges; Court has come down hard and wielded the rod of discipline
against members of the judiciary who have fallen short of the exacting standards of judicial
conduct.—Concerned with safeguarding the integrity of the judiciary, this Court has come down
hard and wielded the rod of discipline against members of the judiciary who have fallen short of
the exacting standards of judicial conduct. This is because a judge is the visible representation of
the law and of justice. He must comport himself in a manner that his conduct must be free of a
whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to the performance of his official duties but also as to
his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. His character must be able to withstand
the most searching public scrutiny because the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a
judge are essential to the preservation of the people’s faith in the judicial system.

Same; Same; Clemency; Proof of reformation and a showing of potential and promise are
indispensable.—Clemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced
with the preservation of public confidence in the courts. The Court will grant it only if there is a
showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a showing of potential and promise are
indispensable.

Same; Same; Same; Guidelines in Resolving Requests for Judicial Clemency.—In the exercise of
its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts and all personnel thereof,
the Court lays down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency: 1.
There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with
proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same
or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation. 2. Sufficient
time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reformation. 3.
The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of
him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself. 4. There must be a
showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to
legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant
skills), as well as potential for public service. 5. There must be other relevant factors and
circumstances that may justify clemency.

Same; Same; Same; Judge Diaz’s 12 years of service in the judiciary may be taken as proof of
his dedication to the institution.—In this case, Judge Diaz expressed sincere repentance for his
past malfeasance. He humbly accepted the verdict of this Court in Alvarez. Three years have
elapsed since the promulgation of Alvarez. It is sufficient to ensure that he has learned his lesson
and that he has reformed. His 12 years of service in the judiciary may be taken as proof of his
dedication to the institution. Thus, the Court may now open the door of further opportunities in
the judiciary for him. [Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City, Br. 37, Appealing for Judicial Clemency, 533 SCRA 534(2007)]

Re: Petition for Judicial Clemency of Judge Irma Zita V. Masamayor, 667 SCRA 467 ,
March 06, 2012
judicial post or as Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman.—Section 5, Rule 4 of the Rules of the
JBC provides: “SEC. 5. Disqualification.—The following are disqualified from being nominated
for appointment to any judicial post or as Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman: 1. Those with
pending criminal or regular administrative cases; 2. Those with pending criminal cases in foreign
courts or tribunals; and 3. Those who have been convicted in any criminal case; or in an
administrative case, where the penalty imposed is at least a fine of more than P10,000, unless he
has been granted judicial clemency.”

Same; Judicial Clemency; Guidelines in Resolving Requests for Judicial Clemency.—In A.M.
No. 07-7-17-SC (Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency), 533 SCRA 539 (2007), the Court laid down the
following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, thus: “1. There must be proof of
remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to certifications or
testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or
judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity.
A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will
give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation. 2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from
the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform; 3. The age of the person asking for
clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use
by giving him a chance to redeem himself. 4. There must be a showing of promise (such as
intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the
development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential
for public service. 5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify
clemency.” [Re: Petition for Judicial Clemency of Judge Irma Zita V. Masamayor, 667 SCRA
467(2012)]

Contreras vs. Solis, 260 SCRA 572 , August 21, 1996

Courts; Judges; Extortion; The intention of a judge in meeting with complainant and in giving
him advise is, to say the least, far from the behavior of a member of judiciary, who should, at all
times, avoid the slightest hint of anomaly and corruption.—Our minds can not sit easy with
regard to the charge of extortion. Respondent admitted having met complainant in the early
morning of August 1, 1994, for the purpose of informing complainant that he could participate in
the habeas corpus proceeding. During said meeting, respondent also admitted having told
complainant of the “potency” of Mamangon’s motion for reconsideration and the amount of
money which complainant would spend to hire a good lawyer to represent him in the proceeding.
Respondent’s seemingly benign conduct of advising complainant on matters pending before
respondent puzzle our minds since we are not told of any special circumstance which would
justify respondent’s special interest over complainant’s concern. Respondent, however, gives no
other reason for meeting and advising complainant that could dispel ill thoughts in reference to
respondent’s motives. Any person with a reasonable mind would deduce that respondent’s
actuation meant something much more than what he explicitly suggested, for what could be
respondent’s reason, in mentioning the “potency” of Mamangon’s motion for reconsideration
and the amount of money which complainant might spend in resisting the same, than to insinuate
that complainant could save on expenses and be certain of the result by spending the same
amount for the judge. Certainly, it is simply naïve to say that a proposal to that effect could be
done only through the use of direct words expressing respondent’s intention to be willing and
able to decide the case in complainant’s favor for a consideration. Respondent’s pretended
innocence over the perceived meaning of his insinuation is unpersuasive considering his long
years in the practice of law. Thus, the intention of respondent in meeting with complain-ant and
in giving him advice is, to say the least, far from the behavior of a member of judiciary, who
should, at all times, avoid the slightest hint of anomaly and corruption.

Same; Same; Verily, the duty of a judge is not only to administer justice but also to conduct
himself in a manner that would avoid any suspicion of irregularity.—Verily, the duty of a judge
is not only to administer justice but also to conduct himself in a manner that would avoid any
suspicion of irregularity. He has the avowed duty of promoting confidence in the judicial system.

Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Criminal Proceedings; An accused against whom the information has
been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction may no longer be detained.—Clear as the basis may be, its
application is, however, erroneous. Even assuming that Mamangon was lawfully imprisoned at
the outset, at the time he filed his motion for reconsideration, the decision of Judge Macapagal
declaring his court to be without jurisdiction had already become final and considering that no
information had been re-filed, the detention of Mamangon was untenable and illegal. An accused
against whom the information has been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction may no longer be
detained; the information under which the accused is being held for trial loses its force and
effect. There is simply nothing to hold the accused answerable for. Section 14 of Rule 102 of the
Revised Rules of Court speaks of a person lawfully imprisoned.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Habeas Corpus; When the court where the criminal case was filed is
without jurisdiction, the authority of the court to hold the accused in confinement pending trial is
a valid subject of a petition for habeas corpus.—The accused Mamangon was no longer lawfully
imprisoned at the time the motion for reconsideration was filed. Thus, respondent should not
have applied Section 12 of Rule 114 but instead reversed his former decision by granting the
petition and ordering the release of the accused without requiring him to post bail. When the
court where the criminal case was filed is without jurisdiction, the authority of the court to the
accused in confinement pending trial is a valid subject of a petition for habeas corpus.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When the petitioner is held upon a judicial order, the writ of
habeas corpus will lie where the order is void where the court issuing it had no jurisdiction, but
this remedy should not be secured before a court of equal rank in order to avoid undue
interference upon the functions of another branch unless the former court has declared itself to
be without jurisdiction.— Where the petitioner is held upon a judicial order, the writ will lie
where the order is void because the court issuing it had no jurisdiction over the crime charged or
over the person accused where the latter had challenged on time, the jurisdiction of the court
over his person (Francisco, p. 665, Rules of Court in the Philippines Vol. V-B; citing the case of
Banayo vs. President of San Pablo, 2 Phil. 413; Collins vs. Wolfe, 4 Phil. 534; Malinao, et al. vs.
Peterson, No. L-16464, July 26, 1960). But this remedy should not be secured before a court of
equal rank in order to avoid undue interference upon the functions of another branch unless the
former court has declared itself to be without jurisdiction, as in the instant case.

Same; Same; In order to discipline a judge, it must clearly be shown that the judgment or order
is unjust as being contrary to law and that the judge rendered it with conscious and deliberate
intent to do injustice.—The erroneous application of the rule by respondent nevertheless cannot
be the sole basis for disciplining him. As we have ruled in the past, in order to discipline a judge,
it must clearly be shown that the judgment or order is unjust as being contrary to law and that the
judge rendered it with conscious and deliberate intent to do injustice (Re Climaco, 55 SCRA
107). Judges cannot be subjected to liability—civil, criminal or administrative—for any of their
official acts, no matter how erroneous, so long as they act in good faith. It is only when they act
fraudulently or corruptly, or with gross ignorance may they be held criminally or
administratively responsible (Valdez vs. Valera, 81 SCRA 246). Considering the circumstances
of the case at bar, we cannot hold respondent liable for his erroneous action. An erroneous
decision or order is presumed to have been issued in good faith in the absence of proof to the
contrary.

Same; Same; While the decision of a judge may be erroneous, its malicious intent, however, may
not be presumed in the absence of any evidence to prove the same.—Complainant herein alleged
that the order of respondent judge releasing the accused on bail was maliciously motivated for
having been issued several days after the attempted extortion. We find the decision of respondent
erroneous but its malicious intent, however, may not be presumed in the absence of any evidence
to prove the same. It might be suggested that, respondent’s ill motives may be presumed
considering his actuation prior to the issuance of the questioned erroneous order. We are,
however, unable to find a clear and definite connection between an attempt at extortion and the
subsequent erroneous orders. It would be unjust to presume wrong intentions considering that
respondent’s questioned orders are not totally unjustifiable. [Contreras vs. Solis, 260 SCRA
572(1996)]

Romero vs. Valle, Jr., 147 SCRA 197 , January 09, 1987

Legal and Judicial Ethics; Both bench and bar to encourage respect for courts.—It is the duty of
both counsel and judge to maintain, not to destroy, the high esteem and regard for courts. Any
act on the part of one or the other that tends to undermine the people’s respect for, and
confidence in, the administration of justice, is to be avoided. And this, even if both have to
restrain pride from taking the better part of their system. To be expected then of petitioner and
respondent is a sense of shared responsibility, a crucial factor in the administration of justice.

Same; Same; Relation between counsel and judge based on mutual respect—The relations
between counsel and judge should be based on mutual respect and on a deep appreciation by one
of the duties of another. Thus, counsel is expected to observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts of justice and judicial officers. Although allowed some latitude of remarks or comment in
the furtherance of causes, he upholds, his arguments, written or oral, should be gracious to both
court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may properly be addressed by one
gentleman to another. Certainly and most especially in our culture, raising one’s voice is a sign
of disrespect, improper to one whose “investiture into the legal profession places upon his
shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful
behavior towards the courts.

Contempt; Powers of judicial officers to declare, lawyers in contempt based on preservative

principle.—Judicial officers are given contempt powers in order that without being arbitrary,
unreasonable or unjust, they may endeavor to hold counsel to a proper appreciation of their
duties to the court. Respondent judge could very well have cited complainant in contempt of
court instead of indulging in tantrums by banging his gavel in a very forceful manner and
unceremoniously walking out of the courtroom.

Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 , September 12, 1986

Same; Public Officers; Judges; Loyalty of those in the public service must be to the Constitution
and the people.—The notion nurtured under the past regime that those appointed to public office
owe their primary allegiance to the appointing authority and are accountable to him alone and
not to the people or the Constitution must be discarded. The function of the appointing authority
with the mandate of the people, under our system of government, is to fill the public posts. While
the appointee may acknowledge with gratitude the opportunity thus given of rendering public
service, the appointing authority becomes functus officio and the primary loyalty of the
appointed must be rendered to the Constitution and the sovereign people in accordance with his
sacred oath of office. To paraphrase the late Chief Justice Earl Warren of the United States
Supreme Court, the Justices and Judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve
no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their
oath of office, guided only by the Constitution and their own conscience and honor. [Galman vs.
Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43(1986)]

Lorenzo vs. Marquez, 162 SCRA 546 , June 27, 1988

Judges; Appointment; It is the privilege of the respondent as presiding judge of his court to
recommend the employee with whom he will work; He cannot be held administratively liable if
he did not choose to have complainant reappointed.—On the first charge of harassment, the
respondent explained that he did not recommend the reappointment of complainant Mercedita G.
Lorenzo because she was inefficient. Such reluctance of the respondent must be because she was
a protegee of the respondent’s predecessor, former Judge Jose Parentela, Jr., who reportedly
exposed the illegal issuance of the subpoena to Obosa by the respondent. Nevertheless, it is the
privilege of the respondent as presiding judge of his court to recommend the employee with
whom he will work. If he did not choose to have said complainant reappointed, he cannot
thereby be held administratively liable.

Same; Rule on inhibition of judges.—No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which
he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in
which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he
has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of
all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. A judge may, in the exercise
of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other
than those mentioned above.

Same; Same; Rule is explicit that the judge must secure the written consent of all the parties not
a mere verbal consent much less a tacit acquiescence; Failure of respondent to observe the
elementary rules of conduct betrays his unusual personal interest in the case.—From the
foregoing provision of the rules, a judge cannot sit in any case in which he was a counsel without
the written consent of all the parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. The
respondent alleged that since there was no objection from any of the parties, he proceeded to
preside over the case and to decide it. This is a clear violation of the law. The rule is explicit that
he must secure the written consent of all the parties, not a mere verbal consent much less a tacit
acquiescence. More than this, said written consent must be signed by them and entered upon the
record. The failure of the respondent to observe these elementary rules of conduct betrays his
unusual personal interest in the case which prevailed over and above his sworn duty to
administer the law impartially and without any fear or favor.

Same; Respondent guilty of the charge against him.—No doubt the respondent is guilty of the
charge against him. There was no reason for him to require the appearance of Obosa in his court,
even for a conference. The criminal case pending before him was not yet ready for trial as the
accused was at large. If truly respondent was impelled with the desire to locate the whereabouts
of accused Salamat so that he could be arrested, all that he could have done was to have a
policeman or court employee go to Muntinlupa for the purpose, or he himself could have done
so.

Same; Same; His undue interest to bring out Obosa from his confinement allegedly to appear
before him is obvious.—Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, a subpoena shall be
signed by the clerk of court or by the judge, if the court has no clerk, under the seal of the court.
The respondent had a clerk of court, Miss Gloria Lorenzo, and yet he himself issued and signed
the subpoena. His undue interest to bring out Obosa from his confinement allegedly to appear
before him is obvious.
Same; Same; Respondent committed grave and serious misconduct in the performance of his
duty.—The respondent committed grave and serious misconduct in the performance of his duty.
He demonstrated his unfitness to be a judge as in fact by his behavior he has placed the judiciary
in disrepute. He abused the great powers of his office so that he should not stay a moment longer
as a member of the judiciary. [Lorenzo vs. Marquez, 162 SCRA 546(1988)]

Salud vs. Alumbres, 404 SCRA 411 , June 20, 2003

Court; Judges; Code of Judicial Conduct; Delay in Disposition of Cases; Failure to comply with
the mandate of the Constitution and of the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes serious
misconduct which is detrimental to the honor and integrity of a judicial office.—It is not disputed
that, it took respondent judge over 16 months to render his decision in Civil Case No. LP-96-300
after it was submitted for decision. The Constitution mandates lower court judges to decide a
case within ninety (90) days from its submission. Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct
mandates judges to administer justice without delay and directs every judge to dispose of the
court’s business promptly within the period prescribed by the law and the rules. We have
emphasized strict observance of this duty in order to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the twin
problems of congestion and delay that have long plagued our courts. It is an oft-repeated maxim
that justice delayed is often justice denied. Thus, any delay in the administration of justice, no
matter how brief, may result in depriving the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his
case. Delay ultimately affects the image of the judiciary. Failure to comply with the mandate of
the Constitution and of the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes serious misconduct, which is
detrimental to the honor and integrity of a judicial office. Inability to decide a case despite the
ample time prescribed is inexcusable, constitutes gross inefficiency, and warrants administrative
sanction of the defaulting judge.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Delay in the rendition of judgments diminishes the people’s faith in
our judicial system, and lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute.—Delay in the rendition
of judgments diminishes the people’s faith in our judicial system, and lowers its standards and
brings it into disrepute. In the event that judges cannot comply with the deadlines prescribed by
law, they should apply for extensions of time to avoid administrative sanctions. The Court allows
a certain degree of latitude to judges and grants them reasonable extensions of time to resolve
cases upon proper application by the judges concerned and on meritorious grounds. At the very
least, respondent judge should have requested for an extension of time to render judgment once
he knew that he could not comply with the prescribed 90-day period to render a judgment. In so
doing, he would have been able to apprise litigants as to the status of the case and the reason for
the delay, if any. It would have shown his mindfulness of the deadlines.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Undue delay in rendering a decision constitutes a less serious charge
under Section 4, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended.—Undue delay in rendering a
decision constitutes a less serious charge under Section 4, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as
amended. If found guilty thereof, the judge shall be suspended from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one (1) month or more than three (3) months; or imposed a fine of
more than P10,000, but not exceeding P20,000, pursuant to Section 10, Rule 140.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Even after a judge has retired from the service, he may still be held
administratively accountable for lapses and offenses committed during his incumbency. Although
he may no longer be dismissed or suspended, fines may still be meted out to be deducted from his
retirement benefits.—Except for the mitigating circumstance, we are in agreement with the OCA
recommendations in this case. The record shows that this is not the first time that respondent has
been called to account by this Court. In 1992, he was fined for gross partiality to a party. In
1996, he was admonished for delay in the disposition of a case. In 1999, he was reprimanded.
Although respondent has retired on June 3, 2001, the recommendation of the OCA that a fine be
imposed on him is still in order. Worth stressing, even after a judge has retired from the service,
he may still be held administratively accountable for lapses and offenses committed during his
incumbency. Although he may no longer be dismissed or suspended, fines may still be meted out
to be deducted from his retirement benefits. [Salud vs. Alumbres, 404 SCRA 411(2003)]

Alfonso vs. Juanson, 228 SCRA 239 , December 07, 1993

Judges; Proof of prior immoral conduct cannot be used as basis for administrative discipline
against a judge if he is not charged for immorality prior to his appointment.—Respondent is not
charged for immorality committed before his appointment. Accordingly, proof of prior immoral
conduct cannot be a basis for his administrative discipline in this case. The respondent may have
undergone moral reformation after his appointment, or his appointment could have completely
transformed him upon the solemn realization that a public office is a public trust and public
officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives. (Section 1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution). It would be unreasonable and unfair to presume
that since he had wandered from the path of moral righteousness, he could never retrace his steps
and walk proud and tall again in that path. No man is beyond information and redemption. A
lawyer who aspires for the exalted position of a magistrate knows, or ought to know, that he
must pay a high price for that honor—his private and official conduct must at all times be free
from the appearance of impropriety. (Jugueta vs. Boncaros, 60 SCRA 27 [1974]). And the
lawyer who is thereafter appointed thereto must perforce be presumed to have solemnly bound
himself to a way of conduct free from any hint or suspicion of impropriety.

Same; Judge’s official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety.—In short, the
respondent suddenly became indiscreet; he encumbered to the sweet memories of the past and he
was unable to disappoint Sol who asked for his legal advice on a matter which involved her
employment. Such indiscretions indubitably cast upon his conduct an appearance of impropriety.
He thus violated Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which mandates that “[a] judge’s
official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior,
not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life,
should be beyond reproach,” and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that
“[a] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.”

Same; Violation of rule regarding official court session hours amounts to neglect of duty.—It is,
therefore, clear that on 17 July 1992 the respondent had left his office during office hours and,
considering the distance between Mandaluyong and his office at the City Hall of Manila and the
usual traffic condition, it was impossible for him to have reached his office—if at all he did
proceed to it—in time for the commencement of the official session hours in the afternoon, i.e.,
2:00 p.m. (Paragraph 5, Interim and Transitional Rules and Guidelines Relative to the
Implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981). Thus, for purely personal reasons,
he violated the rule regarding official session hours. Such violation amounted to neglect of duty.

Same; Immorality not confined to sexual matters.—Besides, immorality—for which the

respondent is charged—is not based alone on illicit sexual intercourse. It is settled that:
“immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conducts inconsistent with
rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is wilful,
flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members
of the community, and as an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.”
(Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth ed., 1990, 751). [Alfonso vs. Juanson, 228 SCRA 239(1993)]

Castillo vs. Calanog, Jr., 199 SCRA 75 , July 12, 1991

Judicial Ethics; Judges; Administrative case for immorality; Effect of affidavit of desistance.—
Generally, the Court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of desistance, especially when
executed as an afterthought, as in the case at bar. As held in People v. Obina: It would be a
dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before the courts of justice simply
because the witnesses who had given them later on changed their mind for one reason or another;
for such rule would make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of truth at the
mercy of unscrupulous witness.

Same; Same; Same; Evidence.—It is of no import that the evidence on record is not sufficient to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the facts of concubinage having indeed existed and been
committed. This is not a criminal case for concubinage but an administrative matter that invokes
the power of supervision of this Court over the members of the judiciary.

Same; Same; Same.—The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be
free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but
also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of
morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in
order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave
with propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained, a judge’s official life can not
simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus: Being the subject of constant
public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. A judge should personify judicial integrity and
exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of
official duties and in private life should be above suspicion. [Castillo vs. Calanog, Jr., 199 SCRA
75(1991)]

In re VICENTE SOTTO, for contempt of court., 82 Phil. 595 , January 21, 1949

CONTEMPT; POWER TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT is INHERENT IN ALL COURTS OF

SUPERIOR JURISDICTION.—That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of
superior jurisdiction independently of any special’ expression of statute, is a doctrine or principle
uniformly accepted and applied by the courts of last resort in the United States, which is
applicable in this .jurisdiction since our Constitution and courts of justice are patterned after
those of that country.

2.ID.; CRITICISM OR COMMENT ON DECISIONS OF SUPREME COURT, ExTENT AND

SCOPE OF.—Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or
unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated;
because if well founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if
committed; but if it is not well taken and obviously erroneous it should, in no way, influence the
court in reversing or modifying its decision.

3.ID.; ID.—To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately “so many blunders and injustices,” that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of
one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one
in whose favor the decision was rendered, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of
the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this court, and consequently to lower or
degrade the administration of justice.

4.ID. ; ID.—The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to
which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their
rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and
integrity of the members of this court and believe that they can not expect justice therefrom, they
might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos would be
the result.

5.ID.; ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; DUTIES TOWARD THE SUPREME COURT.—As a member

of the bar and an officer of the courts, Attorney V.S., like any other, is in duty bound to uphold
the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has
taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the
courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting
on a very shaky foundation.

6.ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS;

MAINTENANCE OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY.—The constitional guaranty of
freedom of speech and the press must be protected to its fullest extent, but license or abuse of
liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As
important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the
citizen, is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary.

7.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate
and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press and the
courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold the principles of the
Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its prerogative and the latter its
jurisdiction. The right of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized and care taken at
all times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary, in order to dispose of
judicial business unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of
verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, this Court will not hesitate to
exercise its undoubted power to punish for contempt. This Court must be permitted to proceed
with the disposition of its business in an orderly manner free from outside interference
obstructive of the constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial
court, and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to
preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal.

In re Aguas, 1 Phil., 1 , August 08, 1901

CONTEMPT or COURT; TREATMENT OF WITNESS.—An attorney may rightfully protest

against personal violence to a witness at the hands of the court, and such protest, if respectful, is
not contempt of court.
2.ID.; FINDINGS OF FACT.—A finding that an attorney's attitude toward the court was
"menacing" is a mere conclusion and will not support a judgment of contempt. [In re Aguas, 1
Phil., 1(1901)]

Aparicio vs. Andal, 175 SCRA 569 , July 25, 1989

Judges; Inhibition of Judges; The rule on inhibition of judges is under paragraph 1, Section 1,
Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court.—Rule 137, Section 1 of the new Rules of Court
provides: Section 1. Disqualification of Judges—No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case
in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise,
or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he
has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of
all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. A judge may, in the exercise
of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case for just or valid reasons other
than those mentioned above.

Same; Same; Same; Denial of the Motion for inhibition done in the valid and judicious exercise
of the function and duty of the judge.—It must be observed that the Motion for Inhibition, as
correctly stated by Judge Andal in his orders denying the same, cited no valid ground, which fact
was confirmed by the prosecuting fiscal and the counsel for the accused in the criminal cases and
the defendants in the civil cases. There is, therefore, no doubt that the denial of the said motion
was not whimsical or capricious nor was the said denial intended to spite the petitioner, as the
petitioner would want this Court to believe, but was done in the valid and judicious exercise of
his function and duty as judge.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Court agrees that the state of hostility being pressed by the petitioner
is purely imaginary.—We agree with the Solicitor General that the state of hostility being
pressed by the petitioner is purely imaginary. Indeed the petitioner had not presented any
evidence to support his conclusion that the filing of the petition for certiorari docketed as UDK
8748 and UDK 8822 and the administrative cases adverted to, caused the displeasure of Judge
Andal as to affect his impartiality in trying petitioner’s cases. In fact, such allegations were
refuted by Judge Andal when he categorically stated that he does not normally resent the filing of
certiorari cases before this Court where he is impleaded as a mere nominal party, after all, when
still a practitioner he too filed certiorari cases. Moreover, as a judge, he knows he has neither the
reason nor luxury of time to entertain such a feeling, preoccupied as he is with the many cases
assigned to him.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Analysis of the assailed orders belies petitioner’s charge of bias or
prejudice and hostilities.—A circumspective analysis of the assailed orders belies the petitioner’s
charge of bias or prejudice and hostility, as all of the said orders appear to have been issued in
accordance with law and nowhere was there a showing of any outward manifestation of the
supposed state of hostility between Judge Andal and petitioner as to warrant the inhibition or
disqualification of the former. And having denied the Motion for Inhibition, Judge Andal acted
within his jurisdiction when he continued to take cognizance of all the cases pending before him,
there being no writ of injunction or a restraining order issued, enjoining him to cease and desist
from acting on the said cases.
Same; Same; Same; Mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari commenced in relation
to a case pending before the lower Court will not interrupt the course of the latter; Mere filing of
an administrative case against respondent judge not a ground for disqualifying him from hearing
the case.—The Court has held that mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari
commenced in relation to a case pending before the lower court, does not interrupt the course of
the latter when there is no writ of injunction restraining it. Likewise, “the mere filing of an
administrative case against respondent judge is not a ground for disqualifying him from hearing
the case, for if on every occasion the party apparently aggrieved would be allowed to either stop
the proceedings in order to await the final decision on the desired disqualification, or demand the
immediate inhibition of the judge on the basis alone of his being so charged, many cases would
have to be kept pending or perhaps there would not be enough judges to handle all the cases
pending in all the courts. The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly
indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased
or partial, and on this regard the petitioner failed.

Same; Same; Damages; Acts of Judge Andal in denying the motion for inhibition and in
thereafter proceeding with the trial were done in a regular manner and considered as his official
acts thus he is not answerable for damages.—In Aberca v. Ver, we postulated thus: “The purpose
of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedom
enshrined in the constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred rights
with impunity.” Under said article judges are excluded from liability, provided their acts or
omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code and other penal statute. As we have
earlier stated, the acts of Judge Andal in denying the motion for inhibition and in thereafter
proceeding with the trial of the different criminal and civil cases pending before his court were
done in a regular manner and were considered as his official acts, thus, he is not answerable for
damages.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioner reminded of his basic duty with the Court and its judicial
officers.—An important point that should not be overlooked in this case is petitioner’s audacious
propensity of filing certiorari and administrative cases against the respondent judge based on
flimsy and unfounded charges he can conceive. Thus, it behooves us to remind the petitioner of
his basic duty “to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers;” to conduct himself with “all good fidelity to the courts;” to maintain towards the courts
a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for
the maintenance of its supreme importance; that his duty to render respectful civility, without
fawning, to the courts is indeed essential to the orderly administration of justice. Thus, he should
be courteous, fair, and circumspect, not petulant, combative, or bellicose in his dealings with the
courts; and finally, that the use of disrespectful, intemperate, manifestly baseless, and malicious
statements by an attorney in his pleading or motion is not only a violation of the lawyer’s oath
and a transgression of the canons of professional ethics, but also constitutes direct contempt of
court for which a lawyer may be disciplined. [Aparicio vs. Andal, 175 SCRA 569(1989)]

Gandionco vs. Peñaranda, 155 SCRA 725 , November 27, 1987

Same; Disqualification of judges; Divergence of opinion as to applicable laws and jurisprudence
between a judge and party’s counsel not a ground for disqualification.—Petitioner’s contention
is without merit. Divergence of opinions between a judge hearing a case and a party’s counsel, as
to applicable laws and jurisprudence, is not a sufficient ground to disqualify the judge from
hearing the case, on the ground of bias and manifest partiality. This is more so, in this case,
where we find the judge’s disposition of petitioner’s motions to be sound and well-taken.
[Gandionco vs. Peñaranda, 155 SCRA 725(1987)]

Talens-Dabon vs. Arceo, 259 SCRA 354 , July 25, 1996

Courts; Judges; People who run the judiciary, particularly judges and justices, must not only be
proficient in both the substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they
must possess the highest integrity, probity and unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their
public and private lives.—The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able
to administer justice but also upon the perception and confidence of the community that the
people who run the system have done justice. At times, the strict manner by which we apply the
law may, in fact, do justice but may not necessarily create confidence among the people that
justice, indeed, is served. Hence, in order to create such confidence, the people who run the
judiciary, particularly judges and justices, must not only be proficient in both the substantive and
procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must possess the highest integrity,
probity, and unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and private lives. Only then
can the people be reassured that the wheels of justice in this country run with fairness and equity,
thus creating confidence in the judicial system.

Same; Same; A judge should not only possess proficiency in law, but should likewise possess
moral integrity for the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright man.—The Court has
adhered and set forth the exacting standards of morality and decency which every member of the
judiciary must observe (Sicat vs. Alcantara, 161 SCRA 284 [1988]). A magistrate is judged not
only by his official acts but also by his private morals, to the extent that such private morals are
externalized (Junio vs. Rivera, 225 SCRA 688 [1993]). He should not only possess proficiency
in law but should likewise possess moral integrity for the people look up to him as a virtuous and
upright man.

Same; Same; Respondent judge has failed to behave in a manner that will promote confidence in
the judiciary.—Respondent has failed to measure up to these exacting standards. He has behaved
in a manner unbecoming of a judge and as model of moral uprightness. He has betrayed the
people’s high expectations and diminished the esteem in which they hold the judiciary in
general. We need not repeat the narration of lewd and lustful acts committed by respondent judge
in order to conclude that he is indeed unworthy to remain in office. The audacity under which the
same were committed and the seeming impunity with which they were perpetrated shock our
sense of morality. All roads lead us to the conclusion that respondent judge has failed to behave
in a manner that will promote confidence in the judiciary. His actuations, if condoned, would
damage the integrity of the judiciary, fomenting distrust in the system. Hence, his acts deserve no
less than the severest form of disciplinary sanction of dismissal from the service.

Same; Same; Respondent judge took advantage of his position and power in order to carry out
his lustful and lascivious desires. Instead of he being in loco parentis over his subordinate
employees, respondent was the one who preyed on them, taking advantage of his superior
position.—The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact that complainant is one of his
subordinates over whom he exercises control and supervision, he being the executive judge. He
took advantage of his position and power in order to carry out his lustful and lascivious desires.
Instead of he being in loco parentis over his subordinate employees, respondent was the one who
preyed on them, taking advantage of his superior position.

Same; Same; Respondent judge had violated the Code of Judicial Conduct which requires every
judge to be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence and to avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all activities and to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.—Respondent may indeed be a legally competent
person as evidenced by his published law books (translations from English to Tagalog) and his
legal studies abroad, but he has demonstrated himself to be wanting of moral integrity. He has
violated the Code of Judicial Conduct which requires every judge to be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence and to avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary. Having tarnished the image of the Judiciary, respondent, the Court holds without
any hesitation, must be meted out the severest form of disciplinary sanction—dismissal from the
service.

Liwanag vs. Lustre, 306 SCRA 55 , April 21, 1999

Courts; Judges; Administrative Law; As a rule, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary
in deciding administrative cases—only substantial evidence is required.—As a rule, proof
beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary in deciding administrative cases. Only substantial
evidence is required, as clearly provided for under Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence:
“Sec. 5. Substantial evidence.—In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a
fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.”

Same; Same; Immorality; Evidence; Photographs; By their very nature, acts of sexual congress
are not proper subjects of photographs.—It is true that the pictures do not show respondent and
complainant actually engaging in any form of sexual congress. However, this is understandable
since by their very nature, such acts are not proper subjects of photographs. Often, as in this case,
what is available to us is only the narration of the parties involved.
Same; Same; Same; Serious Misconduct; The Court cannot countenance any act or omission, on
the part of the officials at every level in the administration of justice, which erodes rather than
enhances the public’s faith and trust in the judiciary.—The Court cannot countenance any act or
omission, on the part of the officials at every level in the administration of justice, which erodes
rather than enhances the public’s faith and trust in the judiciary. Respondent’s disgraceful
conduct surely merits sanctions even if he has already retired as of November 1, 1998. For the
serious misconduct of respondent, the penalty provided for in Rule 140, Section 10, of the Rules
of Court, by way of fine in the maximum amount should be imposed.

People vs. Maceda, 188 SCRA 532 , August 13, 1990

Same; Same; Same; Contempt; Nature of; Purpose of.—Besides, contempt of court presupposes
a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence, a defiance of the court. And, while
courts are inherently empowered to punish for contempt to the end that they may enforce their
authority. preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity, and insure the effectiveness of the
administration of justice, nevertheless, such power should be exercised on the preservative and
not on the vindictive principle, for the power to punish for contempt, being drastic and
extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice.

Same; Same; Judge; Rule that a judge is left to decide for himself whether he will desist, for just
and valid reasons, from sitting in a case.—In the case at bar, the reason relied upon for the
inhibition or disqualification of respondent Judge, i.e. manifest partiality to private respondent, is
not based on any of the grounds enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 which
per se disqualifies a judge from sitting in a case, but on the second paragraph thereof. The settled
rule is that the judge is left to decide for himself whether he will desist, for just or valid reasons,
from sitting in a case, Respondent Judge has not as yet decided whether or not he will inhibit
himself from further hearing Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 in the face of the prosecution's
motion to disqualify or inhibit him. It would be premature for the Court at this stage to rule on
the matter.

Javier vs. De Guzman, 192 SCRA 434 , December 19, 1990

Judges; Respondent judge took advantage of his position as Regional Trial Judge of Makati by
filing the collection case against complainants in said court.—As to the second charge—that
Respondent took advantage of his position as Makati Regional Trial Court Judge by filing the
collection case against Complainants in said Court—we quote with approval Justice de la
Fuente's observations thereon: "x x x The civil case was filed by respondent with the Makati
RTC on September 8, 1988; and respondent admits that he was 'detailed indefinitely to Branch
142 of the same Court on June 30, 1988 and assumed office thereat on July 5, 1988.' Instead of
filing the suit in Quezon City where the Javiers reside or in Manila where respondent resides,
respondent—taking advantage of what he calls the waiver of venue stipulation in the
Memorandum of Agreement (which states that 'in case of litigation, venue shall be in any court
in Metro Manila, at the option of the Third Party,' i.e., the respondent)—chose to file the case in
Makati. "True, considering the abovecited stipulation, it might be said that respondent was acting
in the legal exercise of the option granted to him in the Agreement. Nonetheless, the undersigned
submits that in thus acting, respondent had fallen short of what is expected of him as a Judge and
officer of the court among whose duties it is to see to it that public confidence in the honor,
dignity, integrity and independence of the judiciary is not eroded, pursuant to Canons 3 and 25 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics, supra. It is reasonably to be expected, considering the peculiar
Filipino psyche, personality and culture—of which a Judge like respondent is presumably
aware—that the public, particularly respondent's adversary in this case, would naturally be
apprehensive that respondent might exert influence to favor himself, to the detriment of his said
adversary. And so it turned out, this was precisely the substance of complainant's second charge.
Indeed, instead of promoting public confidence in the dignity, honor, integrity and independence
of the Judiciary, as every Judge is urged to do by the Canons just cited, respondent's aforesaid
behavior produced the opposite result."

Same; Respondent judge was found guilty on three (3) counts of irresponsible, improper and
dishonorable conduct, and was severely censured.—All told, traces of animosity and harassment
on the part of Respondent Judge are all too evident, in sharp contrast to what a Judge should
be—the embodiment of what is judicious, proper and fair. Wherefore, finding Respondent Judge,
Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr. guilty on three (3) counts of irresponsible, improper and
dishonorable conduct in disregard of the Code of Judicial Ethics, he is hereby SEVERELY
CENSURED, with a stern warning that a repetition of the said acts or similar acts in the future
shall receive graver sanctions.

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Floro, Jr., 486 SCRA 66 , March 31, 2006

Judicial Ethics; Judges; Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain
terms that “a judge should not seek publicity for personal vainglory”—a parallel proscription
for lawyers is found in Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that:
“a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services.”—Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain terms that
“a judge should not seek publicity for personal vainglory.” A parallel proscription, this time for
lawyers in general, is found in Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: “a lawyer
shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.” This means
that lawyers and judges alike, being limited by the exacting standards of their profession, cannot
debase the same by acting as if ordinary merchants hawking their wares. As succinctly put by a
leading authority in legal and judicial ethics, “(i)f lawyers are prohibited from x x x using or
permitting the use of any undignified or self-laudatory statement regarding their qualifications or
legal services (Rule 3.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), with more reasons should judges
be prohibited from seeking publicity for vanity or self-glorification. Judges are not actors or
actresses or politicians, who thrive by publicity.”

Same; Same; In Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 233 SCRA 378, 408 (1993), the Supreme Court
explained that the use of an ordinary and simple professional card by lawyers is permitted—by
including therein the honors he received from his law school with a claim of being a bar
topnotcher, Judge Floro breached the norms of simplicity and modesty required of judges.—In
Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., we explained that the use of an ordinary and simple professional card
by lawyers is permitted and that the card “may contain only a statement of his name, the name of
the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law
practiced.” In herein case, Judge Floro’s calling cards cannot be considered as simple and
ordinary. By including therein the honors he received from his law school with a claim of being a
bar topnotcher, Judge Floro breached the norms of simplicity and modesty required of judges.

Same; Same; Misconduct; The Supreme Court found the act of Judge Floro in circulating calling
cards containing self-laudatory statements constitutive of simple misconduct in violation of
Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.—We find the act of Judge Floro in
circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements constitutive of simple misconduct
in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it appears that Judge Floro
was not motivated by any corrupt motive but, from what we can see from the evidence, a
persistent and unquenchable thirst for recognition. Concededly, the need for recognition is an all
too human flaw and judges do not cease to be human upon donning the judicial robe.
Considering, however, the proscription against judges seeking publicity for personal vainglory,
they are held to a higher standard as they must act within the confines of the code they swore to
observe.

Same; Same; Judges should not use the courtroom as platform for announcing their
qualifications especially to an audience of lawyers and litigants who very well might interpret
such publicity as a sign of insecurity.—As to the charge that Judge Floro, through his branch
clerk of court, had been announcing in open court his qualifications, we find that this is likewise
violative of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it smacks of unnecessary
publicity. Judges should not use the courtroom as platform for announcing their qualifications
especially to an audience of lawyers and litigants who very well might interpret such publicity as
a sign of insecurity. Verily, the public looks upon judges as the bastion of justice—confident,
competent and true. And to discover that this is not so, as the judge appears so unsure of his
capabilities that he has to court the litigants and their lawyers’ approval, definitely erodes public
confidence in the judiciary.
Civil Procedure; Judgments; No judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical
existence until and unless it is set down in writing, signed and promulgated.—As to the argument
of Judge Floro that his Orders for the release of an accused on recognizance need not be in
writing as these are duly reflected in the transcript of stenographic notes, we refer to Echaus v.
Court of Appeals wherein we held that “no judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has
juridical existence until and unless it is set down in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e.,
delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and
implementation.” Obviously, then, Judge Floro was remiss in his duties as judge when he did not
reduce into writing his orders for the release on recognizance of the accused in Criminal Cases
No. 20384, 20371, 202426 and 20442 entitled, “People v. Luisito Beltran,” “People v. Emma
Alvarez, et al.,” “People v. Rowena Camino,” and “People v. John Richie Villaluz.” From his
explanation that such written orders are not necessary, we can surmise that Judge Floro’s failure
was not due to inadvertence or negligence on his part but to ignorance of a procedural rule.

Same; Same; Judge Floro committed three fundamental errors in handling probation cases.—
We perceive three
fundamental errors in Judge Floro’s handling of probation cases. First, he ordered the release on
recognizance of the accused without the presence of the prosecutor thus depriving the latter of
any opportunity to oppose said release. Second, Judge Floro ordered the release without first
requiring the probation officer to render a case study and investigation report on the accused.
Finally, the order granting the release of the accused on recognizance was not reduced into
writing.

Judicial Ethics; Judges; Gross Ignorance of the Law; Judge Floro’s insistence that orders made
in open court need not be reduced in writing constitutes gross ignorance of the law.—Judge
Floro’s insistence that orders made in open court need not be reduced in writing constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. Likewise, his failure to follow the basic rules on probation, constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.

Same; Same; One of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to understand the law fully and
uphold it conscientiously.—One of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to understand the
law fully and uphold it conscientiously. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his
office to know and simply apply it for anything less is constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.
True, not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith,
does not warrant administrative sanctions. To hold otherwise “would be nothing short of
harassing judges to take the fantastic and impossible oath of rendering infallible judgments.”
This rule, however, admits of an exception as “good faith in situations of fallible discretion
inheres only within the parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues are
so simple and the applicable legal principle evident and as to be beyond permissible margins of
error.” Thus, even if a judge acted in good faith but his ignorance is so gross, he should be held
administratively liable.
Same; Same; Like Caesar’s wife a judge must not only be pure but above suspicion—his
language, both written and spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be
misconstrued.—Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: “A judge should so behave at
all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.” This
means that a judge whose duty is to apply the law and dispense justice “should not only be
impartial, independent and honest but should be believed and perceived to be impartial,
independent and honest” as well. Like Caesar’s wife, a judge must not only be pure but above
suspicion. Judge Floro, by broadcasting to his staff and the PAO lawyer that he is pro-accused,
opened himself up to suspicion regarding his impartiality. Prudence and judicial restraint dictate
that a judge should reserve personal views and predilections to himself so as not to stir up
suspicions of bias and unfairness. Irresponsible speech or improper conduct of a judge erodes
public confidence in the judiciary. “His language, both written and spoken, must be guarded and
measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued.”

Same; Same; Jurisprudence imposes upon the Judge the duty to suspend the proceedings if it is
found that the accused, even with the aid of counsel, cannot make a proper defense.—SEC. 12.
Suspension of arraignment.—The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time thereof: (a) The
accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him
unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case,
the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.
The above-cited rule does not require that the suspension be made pursuant to a motion filed by
the accused unlike Section 11(a), Rule 116 of the present 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure
which decrees that the suspension be made “upon motion by the proper party.” Thus, it was well
within the discretion of Judge Floro to order the suspension of the arraignment motu proprio
based on his own assessment of the situation. In fact, jurisprudence imposes upon the Judge the
duty to suspend the proceedings if it is found that the accused, even with the aid of counsel,
cannot make a proper defense.

Same; Same; Practice of Law; No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of
the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as member of the bar or give
professional advice to client.—Well ensconced is the rule that judges are prohibited from
engaging in the private practice of law. Section 35, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court unequivocally
states that: “No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the
Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as member of the bar or give professional
advice to client.” Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, on the other hand,
provides that: “A judge shall not engage in the private practice of law.”

Same; Same; Respondent judge is guilty of unbecoming conduct for signing a pleading wherein
he indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City and for appending
to the pleading a copy of his oath with a picture of his oath-taking.—Be that as it may, though
Judge Floro might not be guilty of unauthorized practice of law as defined, he is guilty of
unbecoming conduct for signing a pleading wherein he indicated that he is the presiding judge of
RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City and for appending to the pleading a copy of his oath with a
picture of his oath-taking. The only logical explanation we can reach for such acts is that Judge
Floro was obviously trying to influence or put pressure on a fellow judge by emphasizing that he
himself is a judge and is thus in the right. Verily, Canon 2, Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct mandates that a “judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of
litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency.” By doing what he
did, Judge Floro, to say the least, put a fellow judge in a very awkward position.

Same; Same; Psychic Phenomena; Psychic Phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no place
in a judiciary duty bound to apply only positive law and, in its absence, equitable rules and
principles in resolving controversies.—Psychic phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no
place in a judiciary duty bound to apply only positive law and, in its absence, equitable rules and
principles in resolving controversies. Thus, Judge Floro’s reference to psychic phenomena in the
decision he rendered in the case of People v. Francisco, Jr.sticks out like a sore thumb. In said
decision, Judge Floro discredited the testimony of the prosecution’s principal witness by
concluding that the testimony was a “fairytale” or a “fantastic story.” He then went to state that
“psychic phenomena” was destined to cooperate with the stenographer who transcribed the
testimony of the witness.

Same; Same; The Supreme Court’s power to suspend a judge, is inherent in its power of
administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.—The Supreme Court’s
power to suspend a judge, however, is inherent in its power of administrative supervision over all
courts and the personnel thereof. This power—consistent with the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts—is hemmed in only by the
Constitution which prescribes that an adjective law cannot, among other things, diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights.

Same; Same; Suspension; The Supreme Court may preventively suspend a judge until such time
that a final decision is reached in the administrative case against him or her.—The rule now is
that a Judge can be preventively suspended not only for the entire period of his investigation
which would be 90 days (unless extended by the Supreme Court) but also for the 30 days that it
would take the investigating judge or justice to come up with his report. Moreover, the Court
may preventively suspend a judge until such time that a final decision is reached in the
administrative case against him or her. This is because—[U]nlike ordinary civil service officials
and employees, judges who are charged with a serious offense warranting preventive suspension
are not automatically reinstated upon expiration of the ninety (90)-day period, as mandated
above. The Court may preventively suspend a judge until a final decision is reached in the
administrative case especially where there is a strong likelihood of his guilt or complicity in the
offense charged. Indeed, the measure is intended to shield the public from any further damage or
wrongdoing that may be caused by the continued assumption of office by the erring judge. It is
also intended to protect the courts’ image as temples of justice where litigants are heard, rights
and conflicts settled and justice solemnly dispensed. This is a necessary consequence that a judge
must bear for the privilege of occupying an exalted position. Among civil servants, a judge is
indeed in a class all its own. After all, in the vast government bureaucracy, judges are beacon
lights looked upon as the embodiment of all what is right, just and proper, the ultimate weapons
against justice and oppression. [Office of the Court Administrator vs. Floro, Jr., 486 SCRA
66(2006)]
Aquino vs. Luntok, 184 SCRA 177 , April 05, 1990

Same: Same; Same; Judicial Ethics; Judges to dispose of the court’s business promptly and
decide cases within the required periods.—Consequently, there being no other sufficient ground
to dissolve the injunction in controversy, the grant of the writ must be upheld but without
prejudice to the consequences of the conduct of respondent judge. The circumstances under
which the writ was granted after a protracted delay, punctuated by dubious orders issued in the
interim, certainly cannot be countenanced lest such conduct be replicated in circumvention of the
rules. Specifically, respondent judge failed to observe Rule 3.01 of Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, which calls for a judge to be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence, and Rule 3.05 which admonishes all judges to dispose of the court’s business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Definitely, this Court cannot gloss over
the challenged actuations of respondent judge which are amply reflected in the records of this
case. [Aquino vs. Luntok, 184 SCRA 177(1990)]

Umale vs. Villaluz, 51 SCRA 84 , May 25, 1973

Judicial Ethics; When judge may inhibit himself from trying a case.—Undoubtedly, personal
knowledge of the case pending before him is not one of the causes for the disqualification of a
judge under the first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court which
took effect on January 1, 1964. But paragraph 2 of said Section 1 of Rule 137 authorizes the
judge, "in the exercise of his sound discretion, to disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for
just or valid reason other than those mentioned" in paragraph 1.

Same.—Before the rule was amended in 1964, a judge could not voluntarily inhibit himself on
grounds of extreme delicacy, or prejudice or bias or hostility, not even when he would be
violating Sections 3, 26 and 30 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics because he is a paid professor of
law in the college owned by one of the litigants. Neither was a judge disqualified from trying a
prosecution for perjury of an accused, who was ordered investigated and prosecuted as a perjured
witness by said judge; not even if the judge himself took great interest and an active part in the
filing of the criminal case to the extent of appointing the fiscal when the regular provincial fiscal
refused to file the proper information. But in 1961, We enunciated the rule that a judge can
inhibit himself from trying a case on the ground that the opinion he expressed in a letter
addressed by him as counsel might in some way or another influence his decision in the case at
bar and expressed his fear of not being able to render a truly impartial judgment. In 1962, We
also rule that a judge may voluntarily inhibit himself by reason of his being related to a counsel
within the 4th civil degree (now expressly included as a ground in par. 1 of Rule 137); because
Rule 126 (the old rule) "does not include nor preclude cases and circumstances for voluntary
inhibition which depends upon the discretion of the officers concerned." (citing del Castillo vs.
Javellona, L-16742, Sept. 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 147, 151). And in 1967, We affirmed that a judge
may voluntarily disqualify himself on grounds other than those mentioned in par. 1 of Section 1
of Rule 137, as amended, such as bias or prejudice engendered by the judge having "lost respect
in the manner the prosecutor was handling the case xxx"; or when the lawyer for a litigant is his
former associate.

Same; Judge should make a careful self- examination whether to disqualify himself or not in a
case before him.—When a judge might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or
prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state
of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way
that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect on
the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge
had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. (Citing Pimentel vs. Salanga, L-
27934, Sept. 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 160, 167).

Same; Nature of Judicial Office; Due Process; Judge must be impartial and disinterested.—A
judge, sitting on a case must at all times be fully free, disinterested, impartial and independent.
Elementary due process requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge
has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely
free from suspicion as to his fairness and as to his integrity.

Same; A criminal circuit judge who inhibits himself from trying a case may transfer the case to
the regular courts of first instance where he holds court.— Having thus voluntarily inhibited
himself from trying the criminal case in which herein petitioner is the complainant, the
respondent Judge has the discretion likewise to transfer the case to the regular courts of first
instance sitting in Pasig, Rizal where he holds court, since the regular Court of First Instance has
concurrent jurisdiction with the Circuit Criminal Court over this case for robbery (Sec. 1, R.A.
5179). This transfer is all the more justified because there is no other judge sitting in the Circuit
Criminal Court of Rizal or in the 7th Judicial District which comprises the provinces of Rizal,
Cavite and Palawan, as well as the cities of Quezon, Caloocan, Pasay, Cavite. Tagaytay, and
Trece Martires as there is only one circuit criminal court for each of the 16 judicial districts of
the court. Furthermore, under Section 3 of R.A. 5179, the "provisions of all laws and the Rules
of Court relative to the judges of the Courts of First Instance and the trial, disposition and appeal
of criminal cases therein shall be applicable to the circuit judges and the cases cognizable by
them insofar as they are not inconsistent with" its provisions. The Judiciary Act and the Rules of
Court do not prohibit the raffling or re-raffling among the Judges in the same station and in the
same Judicial District of a case where the Judge to whom it was originally raffled or assigned is
disqualified or voluntarily inhibiting himself for valid and just causes.
In Re: Rodolfo U. Manzano, 166 SCRA 246, October 05, 1988

Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Administrative functions, defined; Case at bar.—An

examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended reveals that Provincial/City Committees
on Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those
involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail
conditions. Among the functions of the Committee are—Receive complaints against any
apprehending officer, jail warden, fiscal or judge who may be found to have committed abuses in
the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action;
Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the proper
administration of criminal justice. It is evident that such Provincial/ City Committees on Justice
perform administrative functions. Administrative functions are those which involve the
regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as
are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence (Nasipit
Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc. vs. Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29 September 1978,
Black’s Law Dictionary).

Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Separation of Powers; Members of the Supreme Court and other
Courts shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions.—Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions (Sections 12, Art. VIII, Constitution). Considering that membership of
Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges
administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny
his request. Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of
Garcia vs. Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth: While the doctrine of separation of powers
is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government
precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required
to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle.
Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is
to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation.
He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is
indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be
confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than the
maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less.”

Same; Same; Same; Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC

judges should render assistance to said committees which may be reasonably incidental to the
fulfillment of their judicial duties.—This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should
adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Provincial/City
Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government.
Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such
structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of
Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said Committees
to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only when such assistance may
be reasonably incidental to the fullfilment of their judicial duties. [In Re: Rodolfo U. Manzano,
166 SCRA 246(1988)]

People vs. Ibasan, Sr., 129 SCRA 695 , June 22, 1984

Criminal Procedure; It is quite unusual that one of the accused was allowed to leave the country
while standing charged with the serious crime of homicide and to be arraigned ahead of his co-
accused pending investigation for murder.—At the outset, it is important to note the very
peculiar facts which had given rise to the first issue. First of all, we find quite unusual that the
accused Alejandro Ibasan, Jr., alias “Intsik” was allowed to leave the country while standing
charged with the serious crime of homicide. His claim of innocence did not preclude the
possibility of his jumping bail while abroad and not returning to answer the charges against him.
The accused was allowed to be arraigned earlier than his co-accused even as the circumstances
of murder were being reinvestigated.

Same; Trial judge erred in allowing an accused to be arraigned for homicide while fiscal
investigating possibility of amending information to murder.—Second, it was error for the court
to allow the advance arraignment of Intsik for homicide when the prosecution was still re-
investigating the case to determine the possibility of amending the information to murder. Intsik
should have been arraigned for murder and afterwards could have been convicted either of
homicide or murder as may be proven, the former being an offense necessarily included in the
crime charged.

Same; Evidence; Trial judge’s questions to the witnesses were clarificatory and did constitute
undue interference.—Coming now to the appellants’ second assignment of error, we find the
same to be without merit. It is not denied that the court had at certain points conducted its own
questioning during the proceedings. The records, however, show that the court’s questions did
not amount to interference as to make the case for the prosecution and deprive the accused of
their defense. The questions of the judge addressed to the witnesses and the accused were merely
to clarify certain points and confirm certain statements. The number of times that a judge
intervenes is not necessarily an indication of bias. It cannot be taken against a judge if the
clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths which tend to destroy the
theory of one party.

Criminal Procedure; Evidence; Judges; A judge should not allow personal prejudices to
influence his refusal of defense request to call additional witnesses. No reversible error,
however, appears as defense had other witnesses.—The emotional outburst of the presiding
judge is rather unfortunate. Even if a judge sincerely believes that a counsel is deliberately
exasperating or inciting him through the introduction of witnesses publicly known to be personal
ly anathema to the judge and not because their testimony may prove or disprove matters in issue,
the judge should avoid any unseemly display of shortness of temper or other unbecoming
behaviour. A judge should not allow himself to be led by counsel or witnesses into showing that
he can be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his official
functions (Austria v. Masaquel, 20 SCRA 1247). It is precisely during such trying moments that
a judge should be studiously careful about his conduct and in the measures he takes to uphold the
court’s authority and dignity. However, the actuations of the trial judge showing some
impatience against the appellants did not preclude them from adequately presenting their case.
We have examined the records carefully and we find that the appealed decision was not based on
any matters improperly elicited by the trial Judge during his examination of the witnesses nor has
it been affected by the quoted remarks. Appellants were given all the opportunity to present their
evidence.

Same; Same; Same; Refusal of judge to subpoena defense witness not reversible error as said
witnesses could voluntarily testify without compulsory process.—Neither did the initial refusal of
the trial judge to subpoena the two supposed witnesses prevent their being presented in court if
they were really willing to testify for the defense. There are remedies available to parties for such
situations. In fact, the records show that, later, the trial judge was amenable to their being present
in court as witnesses and it was the defense which found no more need for the testimony.
Same; Judge’s statement to speed up trial, so innocent can be freed gave no false hopes on
defense.—The statement shows no bias nor intention to give false hopes to either party. The
judge merely expressed the need for a speedy trial. The statement should not be relied upon as a
suggestion that the case for the defendants was stronger than the case for the prosecution.

Same; Judges; Judges should be sparing in intervening at the examination of witnesses.—The

second assignment of error has no merit but nonetheless we take this opportunity to remind
members of the bench that judges’ undue interference, impatience, or participation in the
examination of witnesses or a severe attitude on the court’s part towards the witnesses, especially
those who are excited or terrified by the unusual circumstances of a trial may tend to prevent the
proper presentation of the cause or ascertainment of the truth in respect thereto. (People v.
Catindihan, 97 SCRA 196). Thus, a judge should exercise more care and patience in conducting
a case, his right to intervene to be used sparingly, if at all. He must bear in mind that witnesses
may be easily intimidated by an overly inquisitive judge considering the unusual circumstances
which they find themselves in, especially when testifying in criminal cases. [People vs. Ibasan,
Sr., 129 SCRA 695(1984)]

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Lansang, 186 SCRA 646 , June 19, 1990
Judges; Resignation of judges is a prerogative of the President, not the Supreme Court. Erring
judge, with several irregularities found against him considered retired with all benefits and
gratuities forfeited.—Considering all the allegations, issues and arguments raised in the
complaint and in the Comment and the resignation letter of respondent Judge dated January 26,
1990, the Court finds Judge Virgilio S. Lansang GUILTY of the charges complained of. His
actuations, practices and conduct are unbecoming of a judicial officer; his acts of commission
and omission having been committed through admitted negligence on his part, failure to report to
the Supreme Court or to the Court Administrator, his grievances against his own Clerk of Court
against whom he never filed any formal complaints regarding the latter’s alleged irregularities;
his apparent acceptance of the accuracy of the reports submitted by his Clerk of Court; and
unmitigated failure to ask for administrative remedies from the Supreme Court and Court
Administrator and the existence up to now of 182 pending cases which according to the Court
Administrator had been submitted for decision, and not merely pending trial. The Court likewise
Resolved not to accept such resignation (acceptance of resignations from the judiciary being a
prerogative of the President of the Philippines), but instead to consider him RETIRED, with all
benefits and gratuities forfeited. [Office of the Court Administrator vs. Lansang, 186 SCRA
646(1990)]

Longboan vs. Polig, 186 SCRA 557 , June 14, 1990

Judges; Failure to reply to show-cause resolution of Supreme Court a serious misconduct.—

After a careful perusal of the records of the instant administrative case coupled with painstaking
deliberations, we are convinced that the respondent judge’s continued silence as to the status of
Civil Case No. 641 despite repeated written queries from one of the parties, his failure to reply to
the tracers of the Office of the Court Administrator, and his willful disobedience and disregard to
our show-cause resolutions constituted grave and serious misconduct affecting his fitness and the
worthiness of the honor and integrity attached to his office.

Same; Loss of court records is chargeable against a judge.—In the instant case, respondent
judge even impeded the speedy disposition of cases by his successor on account of missing
records of cases. This fact reflects an inefficient and disorderly system in the recording of cases
assigned to his sala. Although blame can also be conveniently laid on the court personnel’s
mismanagement of the records of cases, proper and efficient court management is as much the
judge’s responsibility for the Court personnel are not the guardians of a Judge’s responsibilities.
(See Sec. of Justice v. Legaspi, 107 SCRA 233 [1981])

Same; Loss of eight court records a grave misconduct.—With respect to the inventoried four (4)
criminal cases without prisoners and four (4) civil cases missing, we find no justification for the
failure to present them to the Deputy Court Administrator when required and their absence from
the place where court records are stored. A judge is expected to ensure that the records of cases
assigned to his sala are intact. There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events.
The loss of not one but eight records is indicative of gross misconduct and inexcusable
negligence unbecoming of a judge. For true professionalism in the bench to exist, judges whose
acts demoralize the ethical standards of a judicial office and whose acts demonstrate unfitness
and unworthiness of the prestige and prerequisites attached to said office must be weeded out.

Same; Failure to decide a case within 90 days constitute gross inefficiency.—Lastly, the report
on the physical inventory of the records of the cases in RTC, Branch 14, Lagawe, Ifugao, which
was respondent judge’s last assignment before his suspension revealed that a total of 35 cases
submitted for decision have remained unresolved beyond the 90-day reglementary period. We
have consistently held that failure to decide a case within the required period is not excusable
and constitutes gross inefficiency. (Ubarra v. Tecson, 134 SCRA 4 [1985]; De Leon v. Castro,
104 SCRA 241 [1981]; and In re: Judge Jose F. Madara, 104 SCRA 245 [1981]).

Same; Penalty on Judge for grave misconduct and inefficiency.—ACCORDINGLY, the COURT
RESOLVED to DISMISS RESPONDENT JUDGE from the service with forfeiture of all his
accrued retirement benefits, leave and other privileges, if any, and with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations. [Longboan vs. Polig, 186 SCRA 557(1990)]

People vs. Salas, 143 SCRA 163 , July 29, 1986

Same; Same; Interpretation, Too literal reading of the law, not advisable; Judges, not bound by
the language of the law but must discover the reason and rhyme for its enactment.—We
admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its
purpose and defeat the intention of its authors That intention is usually found not in “the letter
that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth,” which is not really that evanescent or elusive. As
judges, we must look beyond and not be bound by the language of the law, seeking to discover,
by our own lights, the reason and the rhyme for its enactment. That we may properly apply it
according to its ends, we need and must use not only learning but also vision. [People vs. Salas,
143 SCRA 163(1986)]

Enriquez vs. Caminade, 485 SCRA 98 , March 21, 2006

Judicial Ethics; Judges; Gross Ignorance of the Law; Lack of conversance with legal principles
sufficiently basic and elementary constitutes gross ignorance of the law.—This Court has
consistently held that lack of conversance with legal principles sufficiently basic and elementary
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. As an advocate of justice and a visible representation of
the law, a judge is expected to be proficient in the interpretation of our laws.

Same; Same; Same; Diligence in keeping up-to-date with the decisions of the Supreme Court is a
commendable virtue of judges and, of course, members of the bar.—Diligence in keeping up-to-
date with the decisions of this Court is a commendable virtue of judges and, of course, members
of the bar. Comprehending the Court’s decisions is a different matter, however, for it is in this
area where one’s competence may be tested and proven.

Same; Same; Same; The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires
judges to be embodiments of judicial competence and diligence.—The New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to be embodiments of judicial competence
and diligence. Those who accept this exalted position owe the public and this Court the ability to
be proficient in the law and the duty to maintain professional competence at all times. Indeed,
competence is a mark of a good judge. This exalted position entails a lot of responsibilities,
foremost of which is proficiency in the law. One cannot seek refuge in a mere cursory
knowledge of statutes and procedural rules. Respondent judge fell short of these standards when
he failed in his duties to follow elementary law and to keep abreast with prevailing
jurisprudence. Service in the judiciary involves continuous study and research from beginning to
end.

Same; Same; Same; Judges are expected to be personifications of justice and the rule of law and,
as such, to have more than just a modicum acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules.—
Exacting as these standards may be, judges are expected to be personifications of justice and the
rule of law and, as such, to have more than just a modicum acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules. Essential to every one of them is faithfulness to the laws and maintenance of
professional competence. Judges are not common individuals whose gross errors “men forgive
and time forgets.” For when they display an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, they erode the
confidence of the public in the competence of our courts. Such lack is gross ignorance of the law.
Verily, failure to follow basic legal commands and rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law,
of which no one is excused, and surely not a judge. [Enriquez vs. Caminade, 485 SCRA
98(2006)]

Sangguniang Bayan of Batac, Ilocos Norte vs. Albano, 260 SCRA 561 , August 21, 1996

Same; Same; Same; It is mandatory for the investigating judge to transmit to the provincial or
city prosecutor his resolution dismissing or admitting the complaint, together with the entire
records of the case.—Respondent judge’s failure to transmit the resolution and records of the
cases disregards the clear mandate of Section 5 of Rule 112. Under this provision, it is
mandatory for the investigating judge to transmit to the provincial or city prosecutor his
resolution dismissing or admitting the complaint, together with the entire records of the case.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Preliminary Investigation,” Explained.—A
preliminary investigation is conducted to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It is an
executive, not a judicial function. It falls under the authority of the prosecutor who is given by
law the power to direct and control all criminal actions. However, since there are not enough
fiscals and prosecutors to investigate the crimes committed in all the municipalities all over the
country, the government was constrained to assign this function to judges of Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

Same; Same; Same; When a municipal judge conducts preliminary investigation, he performs a
non-judicial function as an exception to his usual duties and his findings, therefore, are subject
to review by the provincial or city prosecutor whose findings, in turn, may be reviewed by the
Secretary of Justice in appropriate cases.—Thus, when a municipal judge conducts preliminary
investigation, he performs a non-judicial function as an exception to his usual duties. His
findings, therefore, are subject to review by the provincial or city prosecutor whose findings, in
turn, may be reviewed by the Secretary of Justice in appropriate cases. Hence, the investigating
judge, after conducting a preliminary investigation, must perform his ministerial duty to transmit
within ten (10) days the resolution of the case together with the entire records to the provincial or
city prosecutor.

Same; Same; Same; Even if the investigating judge finds no sufficient ground to issue a warrant
of arrest, he is still duty-bound to transmit the records to the provincial or city prosecutor.—It is
true that the determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest is a judicial function which is beyond the reviewing power of the prosecutor. However,
distinction should be made between a preliminary inquiry for the determination of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and a preliminary investigation to ascertain whether
or not a person should be held for trial. The first is a judicial function while the second is an
executive function. Even if the investigating judge finds no sufficient ground to issue a warrant
of arrest, he is still duty-bound to transmit the records to the provincial or city prosecutor. The
prosecutor’s reviewing power shall affect only his conclusion as to whether or not a criminal
complaint or information should be filed against the respondent, but not his conclusion as to the
propriety of issuing a warrant of arrest.

Romero vs. Valle, Jr., 147 SCRA 197 , January 09, 1987

Legal and Judicial Ethics; Both bench and bar to encourage respect for courts.—It is the duty of
both counsel and judge to maintain, not to destroy, the high esteem and regard for courts. Any
act on the part of one or the other that tends to undermine the people’s respect for, and
confidence in, the administration of justice, is to be avoided. And this, even if both have to
restrain pride from taking the better part of their system. To be expected then of petitioner and
respondent is a sense of shared responsibility, a crucial factor in the administration of justice.

Same; Same; Relation between counsel and judge based on mutual respect—The relations
between counsel and judge should be based on mutual respect and on a deep appreciation by one
of the duties of another. Thus, counsel is expected to observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts of justice and judicial officers. Although allowed some latitude of remarks or comment in
the furtherance of causes, he upholds, his arguments, written or oral, should be gracious to both
court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may properly be addressed by one
gentleman to another. Certainly and most especially in our culture, raising one’s voice is a sign
of disrespect, improper to one whose “investiture into the legal profession places upon his
shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful
behavior towards the courts.

Contempt; Powers of judicial officers to declare, lawyers in contempt based on preservative

principle.—Judicial officers are given contempt powers in order that without being arbitrary,
unreasonable or unjust, they may endeavor to hold counsel to a proper appreciation of their
duties to the court. Respondent judge could very well have cited complainant in contempt of
court instead of indulging in tantrums by banging his gavel in a very forceful manner and
unceremoniously walking out of the courtroom.

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Go, 534 SCRA 156 , September 27, 2007

Courts; Court Personnel; Sheriffs; Simple Neglect of Duty; For the infraction of failing to file
the returns on time, respondent Sheriff is guilty of simple neglect of duty and should be meted the
penalty of fine in the amount of P5,000.00.—In the instant case, Sheriff Mordeno failed to file the
returns on time; in fact, the returns were filed only on January 15, 2007 or after the judicial audit
was conducted. For this infraction, Sheriff Mordeno is guilty of simple neglect of duty and
should be meted the penalty of fine in the amount of P5,000.00.

Same; Same; Clerks of Court; Manifest Negligence; Respondent Clerk of Court is guilty of
manifest negligence for failing to take further action on the “summonses” and warrants issued,
to supervise her subordinates particularly on the service of writs of execution, the stitching of all
case records and the issuance of subpoenas in criminal cases—as Clerk of Court, her duties
include conducting periodic docket inventory and ensuring that the records of each case are
accounted for.—As regards Clerk of Court Rosales, we find her guilty of manifest negligence for
failing to take further action on the “summonses” and warrants issued, to supervise her
subordinates particularly on the service of writs of execution, the stitching of all case records and
the issuance of subpoenas in criminal cases. As Clerk of Court, her duties include conducting
periodic docket inventory and ensuring that the records of each case are accounted for. It is
likewise her duty to initiate and cause the search of missing records. Her failure to perform her
duties constitutes manifest negligence which cannot be countenanced. It is incumbent upon the
Clerk of Court to ensure an orderly and efficient record management in the court and to
supervise the personnel under her office to function effectively. Under the circumstances, Clerk
of Court Rosales should be meted the penalty of fine in the amount of P5,000.00.

Same; Judges; Speedy Disposition of Cases; Gross Inefficiency; Inability to decide a case within
the required period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency.—Inability to decide a
case within the required period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency. The Court has
constantly reminded judges to decide cases promptly. Delay not only results in undermining the
people’s faith in the judiciary from whom the prompt hearing of their supplications is anticipated
and expected; it also reinforces in the mind of the litigants the impression that the wheels of
justice grind ever so slowly, and worse, it invites suspicion of ulterior motives on the part of the
judge. Failure to decide cases on time constitutes inefficiency that merits administrative sanction.

Same; Same; Disrespect; A resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere
request, and should be complied with promptly and completely—failure to comply accordingly
betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but also disrespect for the Court’s lawful
order and directive.—We also note that Judge Go failed to comply with the Resolution of this
Court dated January 27, 2007. His request for an extension of time to file comment was merely
“relayed” by Clerk of Court Rosales. Even after his request was granted, Judge Go failed to file a
comment. Instead, he sent a 3-liner letter curtly informing this Court that he is denying all the
allegations in the judicial audit report and demanding a formal hearing. A resolution of the
Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere request, and should be complied with promptly
and completely. Such failure to comply accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in
character, but also disrespect for the Court’s lawful order and directive. For displaying a manifest
indifference to the Resolution of this Court, Judge Go should be fined in the amount of
P10,000.00.

Same; Same; Office Hours; Being judge does not excuse one from complying with the eight-hour
service requirement every working day—just like any ordinary government employee, judges are
required to render at least eight-hours of service; Judges are reminded that circulars
prescribing hours of work are not just empty pronouncements—they are there for the purpose of
promoting efficiency and speed in the administration of justice, and require prompt and faithful
compliance by all concerned.—Judge Go likewise failed to satisfactorily rebut the audit findings
that he leaves the court premises immediately after presiding over the hearings in the morning
and would return only the following day. Judge Go erroneously believed that being a judge
excuses him from complying with the eight-hour service requirement every working day. Just
like any ordinary government employee, judges are required to render at least eight-hours of
service. Circular No. 13 provides the following guidelines for all trial courts: 1. Punctuality and
strict observance of office hours.—Punctuality in the holding of scheduled hearings is an
imperative. Trial judges should strictly observe the requirement of at least eight hours of service
a day, five hours of which should be devoted to trial, specifically from 8:30 a.m. to 12:00 noon
and from 2:00 to 4:30 p.m. as required by par. 5 of the Interim Rules issued by the Supreme
Court on January 11, 1988, pursuant to Sec. 16 of BP 129. Judges are duty bound to comply with
the required working hours to insure the maximum efficiency of the trial courts for a speedy
administration of justice. Daily trials at a minimum of five hours per working day of the week
will enable the judge to calendar as many cases as possible and to dispose with regular dispatch
the increasing number of litigations pending with the court. All other matters needing the
attention of the judge are to be attended to outside of this five-hour schedule of trial. Judges are
reminded that circulars prescribing hours of work are not just empty pronouncements. They are
there for the purpose of promoting efficiency and speed in the administration of justice, and
require prompt and faithful compliance by all concerned. [Office of the Court Administrator vs.
Go, 534 SCRA 156(2007)]

Office of the Court Administrative vs. Indar, 669 SCRA 24 , April 10, 2012

Administrative Law; Judges; As the visible representation of the law tasked with dispensing
justice, a judge should conduct himself at all times in a manner that would merit the respect and
confidence of the people.—Public office is a public trust. This constitutional principle requires a
judge, like any other public servant and more so because of his exalted position in the Judiciary,
to exhibit at all times the highest degree of honesty and integrity. As the visible representation of
the law tasked with dispensing justice, a judge should conduct himself at all times in a manner
that would merit the respect and confidence of the people.

Same; Misconduct; “Simple Misconduct” and “Grave Misconduct,” Distinguished.—In Office

of the Court Administrator v. Lopez, 639 SCRA 633 (2011), the Court explained the difference
between simple misconduct and grave misconduct, thus: The Court defines misconduct as “a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.” The misconduct is grave if it involves any of
the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established
rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of
established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct.

Same; Dishonesty; Words and Phrases; Dishonesty is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or
defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle;
lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.—The Court
defines dishonesty as: x x x a “disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness;
lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.” In this case, Judge Indar issued
Decisions on numerous annulment of marriage cases when in fact he did not conduct any judicial
proceedings on the cases. Not even the filing of the petitions occurred. Judge Indar made it
appear in his Decisions that the annulment cases complied with the stringent requirements of the
Rules of Court and the strict statutory and jurisprudential conditions for voiding marriages, when
quite the contrary is true, violating Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that
a judge “perform official duties honestly.”
Administrative Cases; Judges; Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials
who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of
members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have
been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.—This administrative case
against Judge Indar shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a
member of the Bar, in accordance with AM. No. 02-9-02-SC. This Resolution entitled “Re:
Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals
and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are
Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of
the Philippine Bar,” provides: Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals
and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who are
lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members
of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the
Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been
traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers. In any of the foregoing
instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action against the
respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent
may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also
be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment
in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution. [Office of the Court
Administrative vs. Indar, 669 SCRA 24(2012)]
http://aninolex.blogspot.com/

People of the Philippines vs. Ramon Chua-Uy (2000)

June 30, 2015 markerwins Remedial Lawevidence, hearsay, Rules of Court
G.R. No. 128046 March 7, 2000

Facts: Accused-appellant Chua Uy was convicted of drug pushing and possession in three
separate cases filed against him for violation of Sections 15 and 16 of Article III, R.A. No. 6425,
as amended. Accused was arrested during a buy-bust operation for the illegal sale of 5.8564
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu,” and possession of 401 grams of the same
drug.

After obtaining a tip from an informant regarding the accused illegal activity a team from the
Anti-Narcotics Division planned an entrapment operation where one of the police officers will
act as a poseur-buyer. The sale was consummated and the police yielded more packets of shabu
from the attaché case of the appellant. Appellant was arrested and brought to the police station.
Subsequent search in his house yielded more packets of the illegal substance. The appellant’s
version tells that on that same evening, he just got home from tending to his garments business
and was carrying a large amount of money, P132,000 to be exact from his collections for the
sales of the day. He said that he saw a white Toyota car outside his residence, the same being
offered to him for sale. He allegedly refused but agreed to test-drive the said car. It was then that
he was allegedly stopped by the police and was ordered to give up his attaché case and forcible
taken to the police station. It was there that he was accused that said case contained the illegal
substance.
The trial court gave credence to the prosecution’s evidence and testimony of witnesses despite
the non-presentation of the NBI forensics chemist who tested and confirmed that substance
found in the accused possession is indeed shabu. The accused interposed the defense of frame-up
and alleged that the evidence was merely ‘planted.’

Issue: Whether or not the evidence is hearsay and should not have been admitted?

Held: It may at once be noted that neither accused nor his counsel made express admission that
the contents of the plastic bags to “be marked” as Exhibits contain methamphetamine
hydrochloride. Based on the joint order, it is clear that accused and his counsel merely agreed to
the marking of the exhibits, and the clause “thereby dispensing with the testimony of forensic
Chemist Bravo. The admission cannot be used in evidence against him because the Joint Order
was not signed. Nevertheless, RAMON cannot take advantage of the absence of his and his
counsel’s signatures on the pre-trial order. When the prosecution formally offered in evidence
what it had marked in evidence during the pre-trial, Chua Uy did not object to the admission of
Bravo’s Preliminary Report.

In addition to the foregoing admission by the accused of the prosecution’s exhibits, he likewise
never raised in issue before the trial court the non-presentation of Forensic Chemist Bravo. He
cannot now raise it for the first time on appeal. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so
state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first
time on appeal.

The familiar rule in this jurisdiction is that the inadmissibility of certain documents upon the
ground of hearsay if not urged before the court below cannot, for the first time, be raised on
appeal. Finally, as to the reports of Forensic Chemist Bravo, it must be stressed that as an NBI
Forensic Chemist, Bravo is a public officer, and his report carries the presumption of regularity
in the performance of his function and duty.

In Criminal Case No. 16199-MN, the prosecution’s evidence more than proved beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements necessary in every prosecution for the illegal sale of shabu, to
wit: (1) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and
the receipt of the marked money successfully consummated the “buy-bust” transaction between
the entrapping officers and the accused. What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of
prohibited drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti. There is also no doubt that the charge of illegal
possession of shabu in Criminal Case No. 16200-MN was proven beyond reasonable doubt since
accused knowingly carried with him more than 400 grams of shabu without legal authority at the
time he was caught during the buy-bust operation. Decision of CA affirmed in toto.

On Validity of the Buy Bust

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted for the
purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan; it is a
procedure or operation sanctioned by law and which has consistently proved itself to be an
effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, and unless there is a clear and convincing
evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were
not properly performing their duty, their testimony on the operation deserved full faith and
credit.18 As has been repeatedly held, credence shall be given to the narration of the incident by
the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to the contrary; moreover in
the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against appellant, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over appellant’s self-serving and
uncorroborated claim of having been framed.

The defense of frame-up in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence because of the
presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular performance of their official
duties. Moreover, the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been viewed by the court with
disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most
prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses yields no basis to overturn the trial court’s findings
on their credibility. As correctly noted by the trial court, there is no evidence of any improper
motive on the part of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. RAMON has not
even tried to suggest any ulterior motive.

The court is convinced that an honest- to- goodness entrapment operation was conducted by the
team composed of the local Anti-Narcotics Unit’s Chief himself who led it.

RAMON’s negative testimony must necessarily fail. An affirmative testimony is far stronger
than a negative testimony, especially when it comes from the mouth of credible witness.
2006 Criminal Law Case Digests
EVANGELINE LADONGA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 141066. February 17, 2005

Facts:

In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga became Alfredo Oculam’s regular
customers in his pawnshop business. Sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a
P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No.
284743, post dated to July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico; sometime in the last week of April 1990
and during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of
P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to July 26, 1990 issued by
Adronico; between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in the amount
of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by
Adronico; the three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason “CLOSED ACCOUNT”;
when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, he filed a
criminal complaint against them. While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced
because there was no sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed
that the checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam
should not encash the checks when they mature; and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the
checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof. The RTC rendered a joint decision
finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner
brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of
petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner who was not the drawer or issuer of the three checks that
bounced but her co-accused husband under the latter’s account could be held liable for violations
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 as conspirator.

Held: The conviction must be set aside. Article 8 of the RPC provides that “a conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it.” To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused
must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. The
overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of
the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to
execute or implement the criminal plan. In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that
petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Apparently, the only
semblance of overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first
check was issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the
criminal design. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and
conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene
of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or
agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any
active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common
design and purpose

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANTONIO MENDOZA Y BUTONES

G.R. No. 152589 & 152758. January 31, 2005

Facts: Before us is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by herein accused-appellant of our
Decision dated 24 October 2003 in G.R. No. 152589 and No. 152758. In said decision, we
modified the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca, Quezon, in Crim.
Case No. 6636-G finding accused-appellant guilty of rape under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code and instead, we adjudged him guilty only of attempted rape. We, however,
upheld the ruling of the court a quo with regard to Crim. Case No. 6637-G finding accused-
appellant guilty of incestuous rape of a minor under Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by Republic Act No. 8353 and for this, we sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the
ultimate penalty of death.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness.

Held: After a thorough review and evaluation of the records of this case, we find no sufficient
basis to modify our earlier decision convicting accused-appellant of attempted rape in Crim.
Case No. 6636-G.There is an attempt to commit rape when the offender commences its
commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. Upon the other hand, Article 366 of the Revised Penal Code states: “(a)ny person
who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon the other person of either sex, under any of the
circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional.” As
explained by an eminent author of criminal law, rape and acts of lasciviousness have the same
nature. There is, however, a fundamental difference between the two. In rape, there is the intent
to lie with a woman whereas this element is absent in acts of lasciviousness. In this case, the
series of appalling events which took place on the night of 18 March 1998 inside the humble
home of private complainant and of accused-appellant, establish beyond doubt that the latter
intended to ravish his very own flesh and blood. As vividly narrated by private complainant
before the trial court, accused-appellant, taking advantage of the cover of darkness and of the
absence of his wife, removed her (private complainant’s) clothing and thereafter placed himself
on top of her. Accused-appellant, who was similarly naked as private complainant, then
proceeded to kiss the latter and he likewise touched her breasts until finally, he rendered private
complainant unconscious by boxing her in the stomach. These dastardly acts of accused-
appellant constitute “the first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the
commission of the offense after the preparations are made.” Far from being mere obscenity or
lewdness, they are indisputably overt acts executed in order to consummate the crime of rape
against the person of private complainant.
SALVADOR D. FLOR VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 139987. March 31, 2005

Facts: Information for libel was filed before the RTC, Branch 20, Naga City, against the
petitioner and Ramos who were then the managing editor and correspondent, respectively, of the
Bicol Forum, a local weekly newspaper circulated in the Bicol Region. It states: On or about the
18th day up to the 24th day of August, 1986, in the Bicol Region comprised by the Provinces of
Albay, Catanduanes, Sorsogon, Masbate, Camarines Sur, and Camarines Norte, and the Cities of
Iriga and Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court under R.A. No.
4363, and B.P. Blg. 129, the above-named accused who are the news correspondent and the
managing editor, respectively, of the local weekly newspaper Bicol Forum, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without justifiable motive and with malicious intent of
impeaching, discrediting and destroying the honor, integrity, good name and reputation of the
complainant as Minister of the Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization and
concurrently Governor of the Province of Camarines Sur, and to expose him to public hatred,
ridicule and contempt, write, edit, publish and circulate an issue of the local weekly newspaper
BICOL FORUM throughout the Bicol Region, with banner headline and front page news item
read by the public throughout the Bicol Region “VILLAFUERTE’S DENIAL CONVINCES NO
ONE”. The trial court found the petitioner guilty. The Court of Appeals likewise upheld the
decision of the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the questioned news item is libelous.

Held: No. Libel is defined as “a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to
cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural person or juridical person, or to blacken
the memory of one who is dead.” The law recognizes two kinds of privileged matters. First are
those which are classified as absolutely privileged which enjoy immunity from libel suits
regardless of the existence of malice in fact. The other kind of privileged matters are the
qualifiedly or conditionally privileged communications which, unlike the first classification, may
be susceptible to a finding of libel provided the prosecution establishes the presence of malice in
fact. The exceptions provided for in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code fall into this category.
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of
public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case
of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in
public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with
the balm of a clear conscience. Rising superior to any official, or set of officials, to the Chief
Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary – to any or all the agencies of Government – public
opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy.
NORMA A. ABDULLA versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 150129 April 6, 2005

Facts: Convicted by the Sandiganbayan in its Crim. Case No. 23261 of the crime of illegal use
of public funds defined and penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, or more
commonly known as technical malversation, appellant Norma A. Abdulla is now before this
Court on petition for review under Rule 45. Along with Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis,
appellant was charged under an Information which pertinently reads: That on or about
November, 1989 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Jolo, Sulu, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused: NORMA A. ABDULLA and
NENITA P. AGUIL, both public officers, being then the President and cashier, respectively, of
the Sulu State College, and as such by reason of their positions and duties are accountable for
public funds under their administration, while in the performance of their functions, conspiring
and confederating with MAHMUD I. DARKIS, also a public officer, being then the
Administrative Officer V of the said school, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, without lawful authority, apply for the payment of wages of casuals, the amount of
FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00), Philippine Currency, which amount was
appropriated for the payment of the salary differentials of secondary school teachers of the said
school, to the damage and prejudice of public service .Appellant’s co-accused, Nenita Aguil and
Mahmud Darkis, were both acquitted. Only appellant was found guilty and sentenced by the
Sandiganbayan in its decision. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended
appellant’s sentence by deleting the temporary special disqualification imposed upon her. Still
dissatisfied, appellant, now before this Court, persistently pleas innocence of the crime charged.

Issue:
• Whether or not there was unlawful intent on the appellant’s part.
• Whether or not the essential elements of the crime of technical
malversation is present.

Held: The Court must have to part ways with the Sandiganbayan in its reliance on Section 5 (b)
of Rule 131 as basis for its imputation of criminal intent upon appellant. The presumption of
criminal intent will not automatically apply to all charges of technical malversation because
disbursement of public funds for public use is per se not an unlawful act. Here, appellant cannot
be said to have committed an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the Sulu State College
to its employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such employees were entitled to under
existing civil service laws. There is no dispute that the money was spent for a public purpose –
payment of the wages of laborers working on various projects in the municipality. It is pertinent
to note the high priority which laborers’ wages enjoy as claims against the employers’ funds and
resources. Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of evidence of the
prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. Absent this required quantum of evidence
would mean exoneration for accused-appellant. The Sandiganbayan’s improper reliance on Sec.
5(b) of Rule 131 does not save the day for the prosecution’s deficiency in proving the existence
of criminal intent nor could it ever tilt the scale from the constitutional presumption of innocence
to that of guilt. In the absence of criminal intent, this Court has no basis to affirm appellant’s
conviction. 2. The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary differentials of
secondary school teachers of the Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third element of the crime
of technical malversation which requires that the public fund used should have been appropriated
by law, is therefore absent. The authorization given by the Department of Budget and
Management for the use of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) allotment for payment of
salary differentials of 34 secondary school teachers is not an ordinance or law contemplated in
Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the forty
thousand pesos (P40,000.00) released by the DBM for salary differentials, for the payment of the
terminal leave benefits of other school teachers of the Sulu State College, cannot be held guilty
of technical malversation in the absence, as here, of any provision in RA 6688 specifically
appropriating said amount for payment of salary differentials only. In fine, the third and fourth
elements of the crime defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code are lacking in this case.
Acquittal is thus in order.

ENRIQUE “TOTOY” RIVERA Y DE GUZMAN VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 138553. June 30, 2005

Facts: On May 6, 1993, in the Regional Trial Court at La Trinidad, Benguet an information for
direct assault was filed against petitioner, allegedly committed, as follows: That on or about the
20th day of March, 1993, at Tomay, Shilan, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, employ force and seriously resist one
Lt. EDWARD M. LEYGO, knowing him to be a policeman, by then and there challenging the
latter to a fistfight and thereafter grappling and hitting the said policeman on his face, thus
injuring him in the process while the latter was actually engaged in the performance of his
official duties. The trial court convicted petitioner of the crime of direct assault. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of conviction
rendered by the trial court.

Held: Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by any
person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the
attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition;
and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force,
or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the
performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance. Unquestionably, petitioner’s
case falls under the second mode, which is the more common form of assault and is aggravated
when: (a) the assault is committed with a weapon; or (b) when the offender is a public officer or
employee; or (c) when the offender lays hand upon a person in authority. In any event, this Court
has said time and again that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is
best undertaken by the trial court, what with reality that it has the opportunity to observe the
witnesses first-hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude while testifying. Its
findings on such matters, absent, as here, of any arbitrariness or oversight of facts or
circumstances of weight and substance, are final and conclusive upon this Court and will not to
be disturbed on appeal.

FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE- ESSENTIAL REQUISITES FOR COMPLETE SELF-

DEFENSE

CONRADO CASITAS VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No.152358, February 5, 2004

Facts: Early in the morning of August 25, 1994, Romeo C. Boringot was awakened by his wife
Aida, the latter having heard somebody shouting invectives at her husband, viz: “You ought to
be killed, you devil.” So Romeo stood up and peeped to see who was outside. When he did not
see anybody, he proceeded towards the road.

Upon passing by a coconut tree, he was suddenly hacked at the back with bolo which was more
that 1 foot long. He looked back at his assailant and he recognized him to be appellant Conrado
whom he knew since the 1970’s and whose face he clearly saw as light from the moon
illuminated the place. Appellant went on hacking him, hitting him in different parts of the body,
including ears and the head. While hitting him, appellant was shouting invectives at him.
Appellant also hit him with a guitar causing Romeo to sustain an injury on his forehead. All in
all, he sustained 11 wounds. Petitioner invoked self-defense. The trial court rejected petitioner’s
plea of self-defense and convicted him of frustrated homicide.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner acted in self-defense.

Held: The petitioner was burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, the confluence
of the three essential requisites for complete self-defense: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; (b) reasonable means used by the person defending himself to repel or prevent the
unlawful to repel or prevent the unlawful aggression; (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself. By invoking self-defense, the petitioner thereby submitted
having deliberately caused the victim’s injuries. The burden of proof is shifted to him to prove
with clear and convincing all the requisites of his affirmative defense. He must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not the weakness of that of the disbelieved after the petitioner
admitted inflicting the mortal injuries on the victim. In this case, the petitioner failed to prove his
affirmative defense.
The number, nature and location of the victim’s wounds belie the petitioner’s claim that the said
wounds or the victim were inflicted as they duel with each other.
Witness for the petitioner testified that the wounds sustained by petitioner could not have been
caused by bolo. Petitioner never surrendered voluntarily to the police and admitted that he had
injured the victim. This would have bolstered his claim that he hacked the victim to defend
himself. The petitioner did not do so.
BIGAMY; ELEMENTS, EFFECT OF DECLARATION OF NULLITY OFSECOND
MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY; PENALTY

VERONICO TENEBRO VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004

Facts: Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two
were wed by a judge at Lapu-Lapu City. The two lived together continuously and without
interruption until the later part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been
previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on Nov. 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a
photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage,
petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was
going to cohabit with Villareyes.

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda
Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the
latter was indeed married to the petitioner. Villareyes confirmed in handwritten letter that indeed
Tenebro was her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. During trial, Tenebro admitted
having married to Villareyes and produced two children. However, he denied that he and
Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place.
He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his
office in connection with his work as a seaman. The trial court found him guilty of bigamy.

Issues:
• Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of the crime of bigamy.
• What is the effect of declaration of nullity of the second marriage of the
petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity?

Held:
• Yes, petitioner is guilty of the crime of bigamy. Under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of bigamy are: (1) that the offender has
been legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case
his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according
to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the
second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The
prosecution sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, proved the existence of the
marriage between petitioner and Villareyes.

• A second or subsequent marriage contracted during subsistence of

petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null
 and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or
incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the
avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the RPC
criminalizes “any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings”. A plain
reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of
contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ABDILA

SILONGAN, ET. AL.

G.R. No. 137182, Apirl 24, 2003

Facts: On March 16, 1996, businessman Alexander Saldaña went to Sultan Kudarat with three
other men to meet a certain Macapagal Silongan alias Commander Lambada. They arrived in the
morning and were able to talk to Macapagal concerning the gold nuggets that purportedly being
sold by the latter. The business transaction was postponed and continued in the afternoon due to
the death of Macapagal’s relative and that he has to pick his brother in Cotabato City.

Then at around 8:30 PM, as they headed to the highway, Macapagal ordered the driver to stop.
Suddenly, 15 armed men appeared. Alexander and his three companions were ordered to go out
of the vehicle, they were tied up, and blindfolded. Macapagal and Teddy were also tied and
blindfolded, but nothing more was done to them. Alexander identified all the abductors including
the brothers of Macapagal.

The four victims were taken to the mountain hideout in Maguindanao. The kidnappers demanded
P15, 000,000 from Alexander’s wife for his release, but the amount was reduced to twelve
million. The victims were then transferred from one place to another. They made Alexander
write a letter to his wife for his ransom. But on several occasions, a person named Mayangkang
himself would write to Alexander’s wife. The two other victims managed to escape but
Alexander was released after payment of ransom. The trial court convicted Macapagal and his
companions of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Serious Illegal Detention.

Issue: Whether it is necessary that there is actual payment of ransom in the crime of Kidnapping.

Held: No, it is necessary that there is actual payment of ransom in the crime of Kidnapping. For
the crime to be committed, at least one overt act of demanding ransom must be made. It is not
necessary that there be actual payment of ransom because what the law requires is merely the
existence of the purpose of demanding ransom. In this case, the records are replete with instances
when the kidnappers demanded ransom from the victim. At the mountain hideout where
Alexander was first taken, he was made a letter to his wife asking her to pay ransom of twelve
million. Also Mayangkang himself wrote more letters to his family threatened the family to kill
Alexander if the ransom was not paid.

ESTAFA; TRUST RECEIPTS LAW EDWARD ONG VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 119858, April 29, 2003

Facts: Petitioner Edward Ong, representing ARMAGRI International Corporation (ARMAGRI),

executed two trust receipts acknowledging receipt from the Solid Bank Corp. of goods valued at
P 2,532,500 and P 2, 050,000. In addition, he bounded himself to any increase or decrease of
interest rate in case Central Bank floated rates and to pay any additional penalty until the trust
receipts are fully paid.

When the trust receipts became due and demandable, ARMAGRI failed to pay or deliver the
goods to the Bank despite several demand letters. The trial court convicted Ong of two counts of
estafa for violation of the Trust Receipts Law.

Issue: Whether the appellant is guilty of two counts estafa for violation of the Trust Receipts
Law.

Held: Yes, he is guilty for failure by the entrustee to account for the goods received in trust
constitutes estafa. The Trust Receipts Law is violated whenever the entrustee fails to: (1) turn
over the proceeds of the sale of goods, or (2) return the goods covered by the trust receipts if the
good are not sold. The mere failure to account or return gives rise to the crime which is malum
prohibitum. There is no requirement to prove intent to defraud.

The Bank released the goods to ARMAGRI upon execution of the trust receipts and as part of
the loan transactions of ARMAGRI. The Bank had a right to demand from ARMAGRI payment
or at least a return of the goods. ARMAGRI failed tom pay or return the goods despite repeated
demands by the Bank.
It is well-settled doctrine long before the enactment of the Trust Receipts Law, that the failure to
account, upon demand, for funds or property held in trust is evidence of conversion or
misappropriation. Under the law, mere failure by the entrustee to account for the goods received
in trust constitutes estafa. The Trust Receipts Law punishes dishonesty and abuse of confidence
in the handling of money or goods to prejudice the public order. The mere failure to deliver
proceeds of the sale or the goods if not sold constitutes a criminal offense that causes prejudice
not only to the creditor, but also to the public interest. Evidently, the Bank suffered prejudice for
neither money nor the goods were turned over the Bank.
PARRICIDE; ELEMENTS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PO3 ARMANDO
DALAG
G.R. No. 129895, April 30, 2003

Facts: Armando Dalag, a member of the Philippine National Police, was lawfully married to
Leah Nolido Dalag. They had three children. Their marriage was far from idyllic. Their
covertures were marred by violent quarrels, with Leah always at the losing end. Each time the
couple had a quarrel, she sustained contusions, bruises and lumps on different parts of her body.

On August 15, 1996, Armando was drinking when Leah admonished him not to do so. Leah was
then banged on the wall by Armando. Then he pushed and kicked Leah on the left side of her
body which caused her to fall on the ground. Even as Leah was already lying prostrate, Armando
continued to beat her up, punching her on the different parts of her body. Leah then fled to the
house of Felia Horilla but Armando ran after her and herded her back to their house. Leah fell
again to the ground and lost her consciousness. The trial court convicted Armando of parricide.

Issue: Whether the trial court correctly convicted the accused.

Held: Yes, the trial court correctly concluded that the injuries sustained by Leah that caused her
death were the consequence of the appellant’s deliberate and intentional acts.

The crime of parricide is defined by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code thus: Any person
who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his
ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
The prosecution is mandated to prove the following essential elements: (1) a person is killed; (2)
the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate
spouse of the accused. The prescribed penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua to death. The
key element in parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and
the deceased would be the marriage certificate.

STATUTORY RAPE; INFORMATION; TIME NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENJAMIN HILET
G.R. No. 146685-86, April 30, 2003

Facts: Sometime in 1998, ten-year old Richelle Cosada was told by appellant Benjamin Hilet,
the common law husband of her mother not to go to school and watch the house. At about 10
AM, while her mother was out selling fish, Richelle saw appellant sharpening his bolo. Moments
later, appellant dragged her towards the room and raped her. She kept the afternoon of March 17,
1999. Richelle finally confided to her mother. The latter asked their neighbor to report the
incident to the police. The trial court convicted the appellant guilty of two counts of statutory
rape.

Issue: Whether time is an essential element of statutory rape.

Held: No, time is not an essential element of statutory rape. An information is valid as long as it
distinctly states the elements of the offense and the acts or omission constitutive thereof. The
exact date of the commission of a crime is not an essential element of rape. Thus, in a
prosecution of rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of rape,
not the time of its commission.
It is not necessary to state the precise time when the offense was committed except when time is
a material ingredient of the offense. In statutory rape, time is not an essential element. What is
important is the information alleges that the victim is a minor under twelve years of age and the
accused had carnal knowledge of her, even if no force or intimidation was used or she was not
otherwise deprived of reason.

STATUTORY RAPE; INFORMATION; TIME IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LOZADA

Facts: Reynaldo Diaz, a tricycle driver, went to a coffee shop to meet Ronnie Sanchez and this
Sanchez disclosed to Diaz his plan to rob Rosita Sy. Thereafter Belleza Lozada arrived. They
planned to wait Rosita Sy as she would normally leave her drugstore between 10:30 and 11 PM.
They have also planned to kill Rosita Sy, upon realizing that Sy would be killed, Diaz excused
himself on the pretext that he would get a weapon but he delayed himself and the plan was not
implemented that night because of the delay. They have agreed to pursue it the next day. Diaz
deliberately stayed away from their meeting place the next day. The following day, he learned
over the radio that a lifeless body of Rosita was found in a remote area.

Issue: Whether or not all elements of a Robbery with Homicide are present to constitute a
penalty of death.

Held: The SC ruled that all the elements were present. The taking with animo lurid or personal
property belonging to another person by means of violence against or intimidation of person or
using force upon thing constitutes robbery, and the complex crime of robbery with homicide
arises when by reason or on the occasion of robbery, someone is killed. All these elements have
satisfactorily been shown by the prosecution.

“BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME”AS A VIABLE PLEA WITHIN THE CONCEPT

OF SELF-DEFENSE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARIVIC GENOSA

G.R. No. 135981. September 29, 2000

Facts: On or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of
Isabel, province of Leyte, accused Marivic Genosa, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and
wound BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the
accused had provided herself for the purpose, inflicting several wounds which caused his death.

The lower court found the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of parricide and sentenced the accused with the penalty of DEATH.

On appeal, the appellant alleged that despite the evidence on record of repeated and severe
beatings she had suffered at the hands of her husband, the lower court failed to appreciate her
self-defense theory. She claimed that under the surrounding circumstances, her act of killing her
husband was equivalent to self-defense.

Issue: Whether or not the “battered woman syndrome” as a viable plea within the concept of
self-defense is applicable in this case.
Held: No. The court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the
battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the
cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between
the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the
killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an
imminent harm, from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to
save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable—not
necessarily immediate and actual—grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence
perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy
the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of
these elements were duly established.

RAPE; “TOUCHING” WHEN APPLIED TO RAPE CASES

PEOPLE OF TH PHILIPPINES vs. LEVI SUMARAGO
G.R. No. 140873-77, February 6, 2004

Facts: The spouses Vivencio and Teodora Brigole had four children. Two of them were girls and
named- Norelyn and Doneza. Teodora left Vivencio and kept custody of their fpur children.
Then, Teodora and Levi started living together as husband and wife.

Sometime in 1995, Norelyn, who was barely ten years old, was gathering firewood with the
appellant Levi in his farm. While they were nearing a guava tree, the appellant suddenly boxed
her on the stomach. Norelyn lost consciousness. She had her clothes when she woke up. She had
a terrible headache and felt pain in her vagina. She also had a bruise in the middle portion of her
right leg. The appellant warned not to tell her mother about it, otherwise he would kill her.

The sexual assaults were repeated several times so she decided to tell her sister and eventually
her mother. The trial court found the accused guilty of the crime rape and sentenced him to
death.

Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime charged.

Held: Yes, the accused is guilty of the crime charged. For the accused to held guilty of
consummated rape, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that: 1) there had been
carnal knowledge of the victim by the accused; 20 the accused achieves the act through force or
intimidation upon the victim because the latter is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious.
Carnal knowledge of the victim by the accused may be proved either by direct evidence or by
circumstantial evidence that rape had been committed and that the accused is the perpetrator
thereof. A finding of guilt of the accused for rape may be based solely on the victim’s testimony
if such testimony meets the test of credibility. Corroborating testimony frequently unavailable in
rape cases is not indispensable to warrant a conviction of the accused for the crime. This Court
has ruled that when a woman states that she has been raped, she says in effect all that would
necessary to show rape did take place. However, the testimony of the victim must be scrutinized
with extreme caution. The prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits.

The credibility of Norelyn and the probative weight of her testimony cannot be assailed simply
because her admission that it took the appellant only short time to insert his penis into her vagina
and to satiate his lust. The mere entry of his penis into the labia of the pudendum, even if only
for a short while, is enough insofar as the consummation of the crime of rape is concerned, the
brevity of time that the appellant inserted penis into the victim’s vagina is of no particular
importance.

FRANCISCO M. ALONSO vs. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC. G.R. No. 130876 January 31,
2002
G.R. No. 130876 January 31, 2002
FRANCISCO M. ALONSO, substituted by his heirs, petitioners,
vs.
CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., respondent.
PARDO, J.:

FACTS: The case is an appeal via certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming in
toto that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Cebu City, declaring that the title to the contested
Lot No. 727, Banilad Friar Lands Estate, Cebu City, was validly re-constituted in the name of the
Cebu Country Club, Inc. and ordering petitioners to pay attorney’s fees of P400,000.00, and
litigation expenses of P51,000.00, and costs.

Petitioner Francisco M. Alonso, who died pendente lite and substituted by his legal heirs, a
lawyer by profession, the only son and sole heir of the late Tomas N. Alonso and Asuncion
Medalle, who died on June 16, 1962 and August 18, 1963, respectively. Cebu Country Club, Inc.
is a non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine Laws the
purpose of which is to cater to the recreation and leisure of its members.

Sometime in 1992, petitioner discovered documents and records — Friar Lands Sale Certificate
Register/Installment Record Certificate No. 734, Sales Certificate No. 734 and Assignment of
Sales Certificate — showing that his father acquired Lot No. 727 of the Banilad Friar Lands
Estate from the Government of the Philippine Islands in or about the year 1911 in accordance
with the Friar Lands Act (Act No. 1120). The documents show that one Leoncio Alburo, the
original vendee of Lot No. 727, assigned his sales certificate to petitioner’s father on December
18, 1911, who completed the required installment payments thereon under Act No. 1120 and was
consequently issued Patent No. 14353 on March 24, 1926. On March 27, 1926, the Director of
Lands, acting for and in behalf of the government, executed a final deed of sale in favor of
petitioner’s father Tomas N. Alonso. It appears, however, that the deed was not registered with
the Register of Deeds because of lack of technical requirements, among them the approval of the
deed of sale by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as required by law.

Upon investigation of the status of the land, petitioner found out from the office of the Registrar
of Deeds of Cebu City that title to Lot No. 727 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate had been
"administratively reconstituted from the owner’s duplicate" on July 26, 1948 under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-1310 (T-11351) in the name of United Service Country Club,
Inc., predecessor of Cebu Country Club, Inc. On March 8, 1960, upon order of the Court of First
Instance, the name of the registered owner in TCT No. RT-1310 (T-11531) was changed to Cebu
Country Club, Inc. Moreover, the TCT provides that the reconstituted title was a transfer from
TCT No. 1021.

In the firm belief that petitioner’s father is still the rightful owner of Lot No. 727 of the Banilad
Friar Lands Estate since there are no records showing that he ever sold or conveyed the disputed
property to anyone, on July 7, 1992, petitioner made a formal demand upon Cebu Country Club,
Inc. to restore to him the ownership and possession of said lot within fifteen (15) days from
receipt thereof. Cebu Country Club, Inc., however, denied petitioner’s claim and refused to
deliver possession to him.

Left with no other recourse, on September 25, 1992, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Cebu City, a complaint for declaration of nullity and non-existence of deed/title,
cancellation of certificates of title and recovery of property against defendant Cebu Country
Club, Inc. He alleged that the Cebu Country Club, Inc. fraudulently and illegally managed to
secure in its name the administrative reconstitution of TCT No. RT-13 10 (T-11351) despite the
absence of any transaction of specific land dealing that would show how Lot No. 727 had come
to pass to Cebu Country Club, Inc.; that TCT No. 11351 which is the source title of TCT No.
RT-1310 (T-11351) does not pertain to Lot No. 727; that the reconstituted title which was issued
on July 26, 1948, did not contain the technical description of the registered land which was
inserted only on March 8, 1960, twenty-eight (28) years after the issuance of TCT No. RT-1310
(T-11351), hence, Cebu Country Club, Inc.’s title is null and void. Petitioner thus prayed for the
cancellation of TCT No. RT-1310 (T-11351) and the issuance of another title in his name as the
sole heir of Tomas Alonso, for Cebu Country Club, Inc. to deliver possession of the property to
petitioner, and render an accounting of the fruits and income of the land. Petitioner likewise
prayed for the sum of P100, 000.00 by way of attorney’s fees plus P500.00 per hearing as
appearance fee, and P10, 000.00 as reasonable litigation expenses.

On November 5, 1992, Cebu Country Club, Inc. filed with the trial court its answer with
counterclaim. It alleged that petitioner had no cause of action against Cebu Country Club, Inc.
since the same had prescribed and was barred by laches, Cebu Country Club, Inc. having been in
possession of the land since 1935 until the present in the concept of an owner, openly, publicly,
peacefully, exclusively, adversely, continuously, paying regularly the real estate taxes thereon;
that Cebu Country Club, Inc. acquired the lot in good faith and for value; that it caused the
administrative reconstitution of Lot No. 727 in 1948 from the owner’s duplicate, the original of
TCT No. 11351 having been lost or destroyed during the war, pursuant to Republic Act No. 26,
its implementing Circular, GLRO Circular No. 178 and Circular No. 6 of the General Land
Registration Office; that unlike Cebu Country Club, Inc., petitioner’s father never had any
registered title under the Land Registration Act No. 496 nor did he pay the necessary taxes on
Lot No. 727 during his lifetime; that petitioner’s father knew that the United Service Country
Club, Inc., predecessor of Cebu Country Club, Inc. was occupying Lot No. 727 as owner; that
petitioner’s father never reconstituted his alleged title to Lot No. 727 but did so over Lot No. 810
of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, a lot adjacent to the disputed property, in 1946; that petitioner
himself lived in Cebu City, a few kilometers away from the land in litigation; that petitioner’s
father or petitioner himself, both of whom are lawyers and the former a congressman as well, for
more than sixty (60) years, never made any demand on Cebu Country Club, Inc. for the recovery
of the property knowing fully well that said land was owned and utilized by Cebu Country Club,
Inc. as its main golf course. By way of counterclaim, Cebu Country Club, Inc. prayed for the
award of attorney’s fees in the amount of P900,000.00 and litigation expenses of P100,000.00,
moral damages of P500,000.00 and exemplary damages of P2,000,000.00.

Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff: declaring the
contested property or Lot 727 as legally belonging to the defendant; directing the plaintiff to pay
attorney'’ fee of P400, 000.00; and litigation expenses of P51, 000.00; and finally, with costs
against the plaintiff.

After proceedings on appeal, on March 31, 1997, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s
decision.

On April 30, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration; however, on October 2, 1997,
the Court of Appeals denied the motion. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:

1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the validity of TCT No. RT-1310 (T-11351).

2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining respondent’s claim of ownership over Lot
No. 727;

3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the present action is barred by prescription
and/or by laches;

4. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not applying the doctrine of stare decisis;

5. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial court’s award for damages in the
form of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

1. Reconstitution was based on the owner’s duplicate of the title, hence, there was no need for
the covering deed of sale or other modes of conveyance. Cebu Country Club, Inc. was admittedly
in possession of the land since long before the Second World War, or since 1931. In fact, the
original title (TCT No. 11351) was issued to the United Service Country Club, Inc. on November
19, 1931 as a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1021. More importantly, Cebu
Country Club, Inc. paid the realty taxes on the land even before the war, and tax declarations
covering the property showed the number of the TCT of the land. Cebu Country Club, Inc.
produced receipts showing real estate tax payments since 1949. On the other hand, petitioner
failed to produce a single receipt of real estate tax payment ever made by his father since the
sales patent was issued to his father on March 24, 1926. Worse, admittedly petitioner could not
show any torrens title ever issued to Tomas N. Alonso, because, as said, the deed of sale
executed on March 27, 1926 by the Director of Lands was not approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and could not be registered. "Under the law, it is the act of
registration of the deed of conveyance that serves as the operative act to convey the land
registered under the Torrens system.

The act of registration creates constructive notice to the whole world of the fact of such
conveyance." On this point, petitioner alleges that Cebu Country Club, Inc. obtained its title by
fraud in connivance with personnel of the Register of Deeds in 1941 or in 1948, when the title
was administratively reconstituted. Imputations of fraud must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. Petitioner failed to adduce evidence of fraud. In an action for re-conveyance based on
fraud, he who charges fraud must prove such fraud in obtaining a title. "In this jurisdiction, fraud
is never presumed." The strongest suspicion cannot sway judgment or overcome the presumption
of regularity. "The sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without
rudder or compass." Worse, the imputation of fraud was so tardily brought, some forty-four (44)
years or sixty-one (61) years after its supposed occurrence, that is, from the administrative
reconstitution of title on July 26, 1948, or from the issuance of the original title on November 19,
1931, that verification is rendered extremely difficult, if not impossible, especially due to the
supervening event of the second world war during which practically all public records were lost
or destroyed, or no longer available.

Petitioners next question the lack of technical description inscribed in the reconstituted title in
Cebu Country Club, Inc.’s name. This is not a bar to reconstitution of the title nor will it affect
the validity of the reconstituted title. A registered owner is given two (2) years to file a plan of
such land with the Chief of the General Land Registration Office. The two-year period is
directory, not jurisdictional. In other words, the failure to submit the technical description within
two (2) years would not invalidate the title. At most, the failure to file such technical description
within the two-year period would bar a transfer of the title to a third party in a voluntary
transaction.

2. Admittedly, neither petitioners nor their predecessor had any title to the land in question. The
most that petitioners could claim was that the Director of Lands issued a sales patent in the name
of Tomas N. Alonso. The sales patent, however, and even the corresponding deed of sale were
not registered with the Register of Deeds and no title was ever issued in the name of the latter.
This is because there were basic requirements not complied with, the most important of which
was that the deed of sale executed by the Director of Lands was not approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. Hence, the deed of sale was void. "Approval by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Commerce is indispensable for the validity of the sale." Moreover, Cebu
Country Club, Inc. was in possession of the land since 1931, and had been paying the real estate
taxes thereon based on tax declarations in its name with the title number indicated thereon. Tax
receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are strong evidence of ownership.
This Court has ruled that although tax declarations or realty tax payments are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner
for no one in his right mind will be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or
constructive possession.

Notwithstanding this fatal defect, the Court of Appeals ruled that "there was substantial
compliance with the requirement of Act No. 1120 to validly convey title to said lot to Tomas N.
Alonso."

On this point, the Court of Appeals erred.

Under Act No. 1120, which governs the administration and disposition of friar lands, the
purchase by an actual and bona fide settler or occupant of any portion of friar land shall be
"agreed upon between the purchaser and the Director of Lands, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (mutatis mutandis)."

In his Memorandum filed on May 25, 2001, the Solicitor General submitted to this Court
certified copies of Sale Certificate No. 734, in favor of Leoncio Alburo, and Assignment of Sale
Certificate No. 734, in favor of Tomas N. Alonso. Conspicuously, both instruments do not bear
the signature of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of the Interior. They also do not bear the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

Only recently, in Jesus P. Liao v. Court of Appeals, the Court has ruled categorically that
approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce of the sale of friar lands is indispensable
for its validity, hence, the absence of such approval made the sale null and void ab-initio.
Necessarily, there can be no valid titles issued on the basis of such sale or assignment.
Consequently, petitioner Francisco’s father did not have any registerable title to the land in
question. Having none, he could not transmit anything to his sole heir, petitioner Francisco
Alonso or the latter’s heirs.

Consequently, we rule that neither Tomas N. Alonso nor his son Francisco M. Alonso or the
latter’s heirs are the lawful owners of Lot No. 727 in dispute. Neither has the respondent Cebu
Country Club, Inc. been able to establish a clear title over the contested estate. The reconstitution
of a title is simply the re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and
condition. It does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or
destroyed title. A reconstituted title, like the original certificate of title, by itself does not vest
ownership of the land or estate covered thereby.

3. An action for re-conveyance is a legal remedy granted to a landowner whose property has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s name, but then the action must be filed
within ten years from the issuance of the title since such issuance operates as a constructive
notice." In addition, the action is barred by laches because of the long delay before the filing of
the case. Petitioner Francisco’s action in the court below was basically one of re-conveyance. It
was filed on September 25, 1992, sixty-one (61) years after the title was issued on November 19,
1931, and forty-four (44) years after its reconstitution on July 26, 1948.

4. Petitioners assert that as the Court of Appeals annulled Cebu Country Club, Inc.’s title in the
Cabrera-Ingles case, so too must the title in this case be declared void. In the first place, there is
no identity of parties; secondly, neither the titles to nor the parcels of land involved are the same.
Consequently, the doctrine of res-judicata does not apply. Momentarily casting aside the doctrine
of res-judicata, there is an important moiety in the Cabrera-Ingles case. There, the Director of
Lands, after the administrative reconstitution of the title, issued a directive to the Register of
Deeds to register the lot in question in favor of Graciano Ingles. This superseded the
administrative reconstitution, rendering allegations of fraud irrelevant. Here, the Director of
Lands did not issue a directive to register the land in favor of Tomas N. Alonso. And worse, the
sales patent and corresponding deed of sale executed in 1926 are now stale.

5. An award of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation is proper under the circumstances
provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, one of which is when the court deems it just and
equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered and when the civil
action or proceeding is clearly unfounded and where defendant acted in gross and evident bad
faith.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review. However, we SET ASIDE the decision of the
Court of Appeals and that of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, Branch 08. IN LIEU
THEREOF, we DISMISS the complaint and counterclaim of the parties in Civil Case No. CEB
12926 of the trial court. We declare that Lot No. 727 D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate
covered by Original Certificate of Title Nos. 251, 232, and 253 legally belongs to the
Government of the Philippines.
Saturday, August 21, 2010
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES GR No.
174689 October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 174689
October 22, 2007
CORONA, J.:

When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female.
(Genesis 5:1-2)

Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from
inside the bamboo. “Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!,” the voices said. She
pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came
two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man
“Malakas” (Strong) and the woman “Maganda” (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and
Maganda)

When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the
changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex?
May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate
to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?

FACTS:

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the
change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, alleging
that he is a male transsexual, that is, “anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female”
and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a man’s
body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a
“woman” culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in
Bangkok, Thailand. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be
married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from “Rommel Jacinto”
to “Mely,” and his sex from “male” to “female.”

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, stating that granting the
petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity; that with his
sexual re-assignment, petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now
possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not
his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him. Likewise, the court believes that
no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition.
On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the
petitioner and her fiancé and the realization of their dreams.
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of
entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. On February 23, 2006, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Republic, and set aside the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the change of petitioner’s name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed
under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA
9048.

HELD:

A PERSON’S FIRST NAME CANNOT BE CHANGED ON THE GROUND OF SEX

REASSIGNMENT

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides: No person can
change his name or surname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section
1 of RA 9048 provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is
now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of
the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name)
and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until
and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. It
likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first
name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner
and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He
intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into
through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.
RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather
than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only
create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause
or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege,
any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name
was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the
local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy
because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also
filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila
where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and
official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.

NO LAW ALLOWS THE CHANGE OF ENTRY IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE AS TO SEX

ON THE GROUND OF SEX REASSIGNMENT

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court
must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: No entry in
the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as
clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now
be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect,
RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such
errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register.

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a “clerical or typographical error” is: “Clerical or
typographical error” refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in
writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and
innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to
the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to
other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change
of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner.

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the
conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.

To correct simply means “to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from” while to
change means “to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something
that serves as a substitute.” The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries
therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction
is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as
births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations,
annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or
recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of
name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the
legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the
laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407.
Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.

“Status” refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of
capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family
membership.

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters
as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations,
and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce,
and sometimes even succession.
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s
legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides: All
other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.

But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects.
This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child,
shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be
exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than
thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either
parent of the newborn child.

In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and
hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or,
in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where
the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed
at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that
there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at
the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning
in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words “sex,” “male” and “female” as used in
the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should
therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to
the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as “the sum of peculiarities of structure and
function that distinguish a male from a female” or “the distinction between male and female.”
Female is “the sex that produces ova or bears young” and male is “the sex that has organs to
produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova.” Thus, the words “male” and “female” in everyday
understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore,
“words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed
to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary.” Since the statutory
language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it
cannot be argued that the term “sex” as used then is something alterable through surgery or
something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category
“female.”

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the
civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or
change of the entries in his birth certificate.

NEITHER MAY ENTRIES IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE AS TO FIRST NAME OR

SEX BE CHANGED ON THE GROUND OF EQUITY

The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of
justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice
to anyone. This is wrong.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first
step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred
social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One of
its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a
female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter
the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who
has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are
various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of
survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These
laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if
petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that “[n]o judge or court shall decline to
render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law.” However, it is
not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or
interpret the law, not to make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what
guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for
legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are
statute-based.

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction
or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked,
what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to
confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and
sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in
turn governing the conferment of that privilege.

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be
recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to
fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law
exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government,
Congress.

Petitioner pleads that “[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and
[the] realization of their dreams.” No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are
people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized
parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the
remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Sunday, September 19, 2010
ISIDRO CARIÑO vs. COMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991
ISIDRO CARIÑO vs. COMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991

FACTS:

Some 800 public school teachers undertook “mass concerted actions” to protest the alleged
failure of public authorities to act upon their grievances. The “mass actions” consisted in staying
away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable
assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an order to return to work within
24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the
Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90
days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was
consequently formed to hear the charges.

When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers
staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary
Carino decreed dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran,
Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of
violation of the right of the striking teachers’ to due process of law. The case was eventually
elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to
Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass
actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and
consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.

While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it
earlier, upholding the Sec. Carino’s act of issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR
continued hearing its case and held that the “striking teachers” “were denied due process of
law;…they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative
charges;” there had been violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission is
empowered to investigate.”

ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved

HELD: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and
that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this
country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence
and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review
as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

Power to Investigate

The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all
forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on
its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such
rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under
its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It
may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance
of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be
required by its findings.

But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even
quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or
the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.

“Investigate” vs. “Adjudicate”

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into,
research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely:
inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to
conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to
learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or
resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient
inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care
and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal
inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d
Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts
concerning a certain matter or matters."

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide,

determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights
and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on:
settle judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or
with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . .
. ."

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To
determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To
pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial
determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate,"
cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in
Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so
even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in
question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had
been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits"
the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers
constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying
on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions,
and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute
infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or
are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts
done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said
acts or omissions.

Who has Power to Adjudicate?

These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of Education, being within the scope
of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the
appellate jurisdiction of the CSC.

Manner of Appeal

Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of
Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence;
whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the
respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed
"human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed
upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education
himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service
Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.

ANTONIO LEJANO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES/PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB ET. AL, G.R. No. 176864. Dec. 14, 2010
GR No. 176389
ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 176864

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN,
HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO
BIONG, Appellants.
December 14, 2010

Facts:

On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and xxx,
seven, were brutally slain at their home in Parañaque City. Following an intense investigation,
the police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial
court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real
perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public whose interests were aroused by the
gripping details of what everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre.

Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it had
solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed
that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony
Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez,
Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused
police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's
testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public prosecutors filed an information for rape with
homicide against Webb, et al.

The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, presided over by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried
only seven of the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large.
The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating her
testimony. These included the medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the
security guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of the Webb’s household,
police officer Biong’s former girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellita’s husband.

Webb’s alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was then across the ocean in the
United States of America. He presented the testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary and
object evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad
reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony.

But impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it, the trial
court found a credible witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and
frank testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations.

On January 4, 2000, after four years of arduous hearings, the trial court rendered judgment,
finding all the accused guilty as charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez,
Estrada, and Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate prison
term of eleven years, four months, and one day to twelve years. The trial court also awarded
damages to Lauro Vizconde.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, modifying the penalty
imposed on Biong to six years minimum and twelve years maximum and increasing the award of
damages to Lauro Vizconde.

The appellate court did not agree that the accused were tried by publicity or that the trial judge
was biased. It found sufficient evidence of conspiracy that rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian,
Fernandez, and Estrada equally guilty with those who had a part in raping and killing Carmela
and in executing her mother and sister.

On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a Resolution
granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from
Carmela’s cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping of the NBI.

The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence to give the
accused and the prosecution access to scientific evidence that they might want to avail
themselves of, leading to a correct decision in the case.

Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the
specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows, however,
that the specimen was not among the object evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in
the case.

This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the
government’s failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial of his right to due
process.

Controlling Issues:

1. Whether or not Alfaro’s testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying Webb,
Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as the persons who
committed it, is entitled to belief; and

2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaro’s
testimony that he led the others in committing the crime.

Other Issues:

1. Whether or not the Court should acquit him outright, given the government’s failure to
produce the semen specimen that the NBI found on Carmela’s cadaver, thus depriving him of
evidence that would prove his innocence; and

2. Whether or not Webb, acting in conspiracy with Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada,
Rodriguez, Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed Carmela and put to death her mother and sister.

Held:

The Right to Acquittal Due to Loss of DNA Evidence

Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland, that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of
violation of his right to due process given the State’s failure to produce on order of the Court
either by negligence or willful suppression the semen specimen taken from Carmela.

When Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist, the
country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had
as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence.

Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the
motion for DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up
the matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime.

Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webb’s application for DNA testing, he allowed the
proceeding to move on when he had on at least two occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals or
the Supreme Court to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and the other
accused.

They raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as an error committed by the
trial court in rendering its decision in the case. None of the accused filed a motion with the
appeals court to have the DNA test done pending adjudication of their appeal. This, even when
the Supreme Court had in the meantime passed the rules allowing such test. Considering the
accused’s lack of interest in having such test done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable
notice that it would be required to produce the semen specimen at some future time.

Suspicious Details

Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI since November or December 1994 as an "asset."
She supplied her handlers with information against drug pushers and other criminal elements.
Some of this information led to the capture of notorious drug pushers like Christopher Cruz
Santos and Orlando Bacquir. Alfaro’s tip led to the arrest of the leader of the "Martilyo gang"
that killed a police officer. Because of her talent, the task force gave her "very special treatment"
and she became its "darling," allowed the privilege of spending nights in one of the rooms at the
NBI offices.

When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her about it and she was
piqued. One day, she unexpectedly told Sacaguing that she knew someone who had the real story
behind the Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing showed interest. Alfaro promised to bring that
someone to the NBI to tell his story. When this did not happen and Sacaguing continued to press
her, she told him that she might as well assume the role of her informant.

Webb’s U.S. Alibi

Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi through (a) the travel preparations; (b)
the two immigration checks; (c) details of US sojourn; (d) the second immigration check; and (e)
alibi versus positive identification; and (f) a documented alibi.

To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence that (a) he
was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy of travel
documents like the passport as well as the domestic and foreign records of departures and
arrivals from airports. They claim that it would not have been impossible for Webb to secretly
return to the Philippines after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back
to the U.S., and openly return to the Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel between the
U.S. and the Philippines, said the lower courts took only about twelve to fourteen hours.

Effect of Webb’s alibi to others

Webb’s documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to him,
but also with respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if
the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaro’s
testimony will not hold together. Webb’s participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story. Without it,
the evidence against the others must necessarily fall.

Conclusion

In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts about
the innocence of the accused since an open mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but
whether it entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious
mistake to send an innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to one’s inner being,
like a piece of meat lodged immovable between teeth.

Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the testimony of an
NBI asset who proposed to her handlers that she take the role of the witness to the Vizconde
massacre that she could not produce?

The Supreme Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December 15, 2005 and
Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and
ACQUITS accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian,
Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which
they were charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
They are ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless they are confined for another
lawful cause.

Tuesday, January 10, 2012

SPOUSES MAKADAYA SADIK and USODAN SADIK vs. JUDGE ABDALLAH CASAR,
G.R. No. MTJ-95-1053, January 2, 1997
SADIK vs. CASAR
G.R. No. MTJ-95-1053, January 2, 1997

FACTS:
On February 14, 1985, one Lekiya Paito filed an application for life insurance with the Great
Pacific Life Assurance Corporation (Grepalife) in Cotabato City. The application was approved
and Policy No. 0503033 was issued in her name for the amount of P30,000.00 with an accidental
death benefit rider. Named as beneficiaries were her daughters, Linang Minalang and Makadaya
Sadik. She paid the initial premium of P410.00.

On October 12, 1985, Lekiya Paito died. The beneficiaries and/or through their representatives
sought for and obtained the assistance of respondent, who was then a trial attorney of the Bureau
of Forest Development, Cotabato City, to pursue the approval of their claim for payment of the
insurance benefits with Grepalife.
On November 17, 1989, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs and
against the defendant ordering the latter to pay to the former the sum of P30,000.00 as “benefit
due them under Insurance Policy No. 503033.” The court denied plaintiffs” claim for double
indemnity of P60,000.00 under the accidental death rider. At this time, respondent was already
the presiding Judge of the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kolambugan-Maigo.

Upon receipt of the decision, respondent as counsel for plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to the
Court of Appeals even as defendant likewise filed an appeal. Respondent represented the
plaintiffs in the appeal. After the dismissal of its petition by the Supreme Court, Grepalife filed a
Manifestation dated 6 July 1993 with the Regional Trial Court, Br. 13, Cotabato City declaring
its willingness to pay the judgment award and depositing with said court RCBC check No. 62837
in the amount of P30,000.00 payable to the plaintiffs.

Respondent collected the check from the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Br, 13,
Cotabato City and thereafter cashed it. Respondent did not deliver the said money judgment to
the plaintiffs. On January 26, 1995, complainants filed their administrative complaint.

ISSUE: W/N Respondent Judge is guilty and must be dismissed from service

HELD:
Respondent’s act of collecting the judgment award of P30,000.00 from the Clerk of Court of
RTC, Cotabato City and his refusal to turn over the amount to his client, complainant Makadaya
Sadik and her sister, is an act of misappropriation amounting to gross misconduct and/or
dishonesty. His defense that he has the right to retain the entire P30,000.00 as attorney’s lien in
unacceptable. For he has no right to retain the judgment award allegedly to secure payment of
litigation expenses and attorney’s fees. He had no authority to practice law while in government
service. In continuing to handle the case of herein complainants against Grepalife after he joined
the government and without first securing proper authority is no less constitutive of abuse of
authority. Furthermore, he violated Rule 5.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which prohibits a
judge to engage in the private practice of law.

He likewise violated the Attorney’s Oath in agreeing to file Civil Case No. 2747 for the purpose
of claiming the insurance proceeds from Grepalife despite his having been informed that the
insurance policy of Lekiya Paito was fraudulently applied for. Agreeing to handle the claim said
to have arisen from a fraudulent act against the insurer certainly speaks of a moral flaw in his
character. xxx But scam or not we are convinced that the complainant Makadaya Sadik is not an
impostor. She denied that she is the step-daughter of Lekiya Paito. She insisted she is the
youngest daughter and she named all her brothers and sisters. And it was respondent who
presented her in Civil Case No. 2747 as Makadaya Sadik daughter of Lekiya Sadik and one of
the beneficiaries of the latter’s insurance policy.
Indeed, to be effective in his role, a judge must be a man of exceptional integrity and honesty.
The special urgency for requiring these qualities in a judge is not hard to understand for the
judge acts directly upon the property, liberty, even life, of his countrymen. Hence, being in a
position of such grave responsibility in the administration of justice, a judge must conduct
himself in a manner befitting the dignity of such exalted office.
Respondent judge, however, not only failed in this respect but proved himself repeatedly
unworthy of his post.

This Court notes that respondent had been previously fined P5,000.00 and sternly warned for
knowingly issuing an order without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, he
has four other administrative cases docketed against him involving various charges such as gross
ignorance of the law, gross incompetence, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions and
falsification of public documents.
Respondent judge’s seeming propensity to transgress the very law he is sworn to uphold makes
him unfit to discharge the functions of a judge. Judicial office demands the best possible men
and this Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who undermine its efforts towards
effective and efficient administration of justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of the public.

Sunday, September 26, 2010

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, G. R. No. 154380 October
5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,
G. R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Regional Trial
Court of Molave, Zamboaga del Sur, Branch 23, granting respondent’s petition for authority to
remarry invoking par. 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were married in Lam-an,
Ozamis City and were blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S.
bringing along their son and after a few years she was naturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son – who was living with his wife in
the States – that his wife had remarried after obtaining her divorce decree. Thereafter, he filed a
petition for authority to remarry with the trial court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family
Code.

Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur granted
the petition of the respondent and allowed him to remarry.
The Solicitor General’s motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of that, petitioner filed
this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Herein
petitioner raised the issue of the applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant case.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER THE ARTICLE 26 OF

THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Held:

Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent evidence showing
his allegations that his naturalized American wife had obtained a divorce decree and had
remarried. Therefore, the Petition of the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The Decision
and Resolution of the RTC Br. 32 of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur is hereby SET ASIDE.

“Art. 26 (2) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under the Philippine laws.”

Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at
the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the
wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her
capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U. S. A.
Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does not apply to the instant case.

However, the legislative intent must be taken into consideration and rule of reason must be
applied. The Supreme Court ruled that par. 2 of Art. 26 should be construed and interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of then becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be sanction
absurdity and injustice. Were the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal
import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it
should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter
of the law. A stature may therefore be extended to case not within the literal meaning of its
terms, so long as they come within its spirits or intent.

Tuesday, April 10, 2012

RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]
NATURE OF THE CASE:
Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as unconstitutional
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals
Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:

SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or local,
running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for
President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.

FACTS:

The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No.
9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being
in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one
subject which should be expressed in its title.

According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.

They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with
the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair
election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on
elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent
capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the
title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.

The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code,
leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:

SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By
the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is
holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of
candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or
election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the
limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their
offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.

The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities
attended its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null
and void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its
approval” is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence,
which require publication of the law before it becomes effective.

Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law;
hence, should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo
v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional
mandate on the “Accountability of Public Officers:”

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not
considering those members of the House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14,
2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their respective certificates of
candidacy.

ISSUES:

W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.

W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution.

W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval” is
a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require
publication of the law before it becomes effective.
HELD:

To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that –
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical
construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means
necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth.
The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: “An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.”

The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive
enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its
contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title
is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content.

The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a
limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the
other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media
for election propaganda, does not violate the “one subject-one title” rule. This Court has held that
an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing
for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.

The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or
discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found
cause with Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure,
some sectors of society and in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad
policy as it would encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the
Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the
government. It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative
determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound
economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short,
the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner
are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not
suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance. Congress is not precluded from
repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of
the provision and by its pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable
purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the
election process is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of election laws – the fair,
honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress – is achieved.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The
former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an
office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the
other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an
appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are
entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Finally, the “Effectivity” clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it “shall
take effect immediately upon its approval,” is defective. However, the same does not render the
entire law invalid. In Tañada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule:

... the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other
date without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that
the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended….

Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Tañada, Rep. Act No. 9006,
notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.

In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional
law is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a
statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the
validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to
determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power. No
such transgression has been shown in this case.
MONDAY, JANUARY 22, 2007
2006 Civil Law Case Digests
PERSONS PRESUMPTIVE DEATH
Republic of the Philippines VS. Bermudez – Lorino
G.R. No. 160258. January 19, 2005

Facts: Gloria Bermudez and Francisco Lorino were married in June 1987. The wife was unaware
that her husband was a habitual drinker with violent attitude and character and had the propensity
to go out with his friends to the point of being unable to work. In 1991 she left him and returned
to her parents together with her three children. She went abroad to work for her support her
children.

From the time she left him, she had no communication with him or his relatives.
In 2000, nine years after leaving her husband, Gloria filed a verified petition with the RTC under
the rules on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law. The lower court issued an order
for the publication of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation.

In November 7, 2001, the RTC granted the summary petition. Although the judgment was final
and executors under the provisions of Act. 247 of the Family Code, the OSG for the Republic of
the Philippines filed a notice of appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the factual and legal bases for a judicial declaration of presumptive death
under Art 41 of the Family Code were duly established.

Held: Art. 238 of the Family Code under Title XI Summary Judicial Proceeding in the Family
Law, sets the tenor for cases scoured by these rules, to wit:
Art238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all
cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceeding. Such cases shall be decided
in an expedition’s manner with out regards technical rules.

The judge of the RTC fully complied with the above-cited provision by expeditiously rending
judgment within ninety (90) days after the formal offer of evidence by the petitioner.

CO- OWNERSHIP
Buenaventura VS. CA
G.R. Nos. 127358 and G.R. Nos. 127449
March 31, 2005

Facts: Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated.
The RTC in its decision, declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent
null and violation ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property;
ordered petitioner a regular support in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject
to modification as the necessity arises, and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his
mother.
Petitioner appealed before the CA. While the appeal was pending, the CA, upon respondent’s
motion issued a resolution increasing the support pendants like to P20, 000.

The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision.
Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.

Held: Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the
provisions of article 50 in relation to articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the
dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case maybe, do
not apply. Rather the general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio,
the property regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-
ownership.

Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the RTC
and the CA, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by
the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been
included or involved in said distribution.

ADOPTION; ILLEGITIMATE CHILD IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF

STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

Facts: Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie
Astorga Garcia. He averred that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been
using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be
her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name be changedto Garcia, her mother’s
surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig” his surname.
The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant to article 189 of the Family
Code, the minor shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for classification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie be
allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower court
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence
allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.

Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle
name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Held: One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adapter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 of
Article V of RA 8557.

Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to
bear the surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the
members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the
initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.

JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY

Cojuangco vs Palma
A.C. No. 2474 June 30, 2005

Facts: On June 22, 1982, respondent Atty. Leo J. Palma, despite his subsisting marriage, wed
Maria Luisa Cojuangco, the daughter of complainant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. Thus, the latter
filed on November 1982, a complaint disbarment against respondent. Palma moved to dismiss
the complaint.
On March 2, 1983, the court referred the case to OSG for investigation and recommendation.
The Assistant Solicitor General heard the testimonies of the complainant and his witness in the
presence of respondent’s counsel.
On March 19, 1984 respondent filed with the OSG an urgent motion to suspend proceedings on
the ground that the final actions of his civil case for the declaration of nullity of marriage
between him and his wife Lisa, poses a prejudicial question to the disbarment proceeding, but it
was denied.
The OSG transferred the disbarment case to the IBP, the latter found respondent guilty of gross
immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer, hence, was suspended from the practice of
law for a period of three years.
In his motion for reconsideration, respondent alleged that he acted under a “firm factual and legal
conviction in declaring before the Hong Kong Marriage Registry that he is a bachelor because
his first marriage is void even if there is judicial declaration of nullity.

Issue: Whether or not a subsequent void marriage still needs a judicial declaration of nullity for
the purpose of remarriage.
Held: Respondents arguments that he was of the “firm factual and legal conviction when he
declared before the HIC authorities that he was a bachelor since his first marriage is void and
does not need judicial declaration of nullity” cannot exonerate him. In Terre vs Terre, the same
defense was raised by respondent lawyer whose disbarment was also sought. We held:

“xxx respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an
argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this court which holds that purposes of
determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and void an initio is essential. Even if we were
to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the
same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his frist
marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his
second marriage must be regarded as bigamous and criminal.

MARITAL CONSENT
Pelayo vs. Perez
G.R. No. 141323

Facts: David Pelayo through a Deed of Absolute Sale executed a deed of sale and transferred to
Melki Perez two parcel of agricultural lands. Loreza Pelayo and another one whose signature is
eligible witnesses such execution of deed.
Loreza signed only on the third page in the space provided for witnesses, as such, Perez
application was denied.

Perez asked Loreza to sign on the first and should pages of the deed of sale but she refused. He
then filed a complaint for specific performance against the Pelayo spouses.

The spouses moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground for lack of marital consent as
provided by art166 of the Civil Code.

Issue: Whether or not the deed of sale was null and viol for lack of marital consent.

Held: Under Art 173, in relation to Art166, both of the NCC, W/C was still in effect on January
11, 1988 when the deed in question was executed, the lack of marital consent to the disposition
of conjugal property does not make the contract viol of initio but Merely violable. Said
provisions of law provide:
Art 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compass mentis or a spedthriff, or is under civil
interdiction or is confined in a lepresarium, the husband connot alienate or encumber any real
property not the Longugal property w/o the wife’s consent. It she refuses nreasonable to give her
consent, the court may compel her to grant the same.
Art 173. The wife may during the marriage and w/in 10 years the transaction questioned, ask the
court for the annulment of any contract of the husband w/c tends to defraud her or impair interest
in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right she her heir, after
the dissolution of the marriage may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the
husband.

MARITAL CONSENT
BRAVO ET AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Spouses Mauricio and Simons owned two parcel of land. It contain a large residential
dwelling or smaller house and other improvements.
They had three children – Roland, Cesar and Lily, Cesar died. Lily married David and had a son,
David Jr,, Senia, Benjamin and their half-sister, Ofelia.
Simona executed a General Power of Attorney (GPA) on June 17, 1966, appointing her husband
as her attorney-in-fact. He subsequently mortgaged the land to the PNB and DBP.

On October 25, 1970, Mauricio executed a Deed of Sale with assumption of Real Estate
Mortgage transferring the properties to Roland, Ofelia and Elizabeth. It was conditioned on the
payment of P1,000 and on the assumption of the vendees of the PNB and DBP mortgages over
the properties.
The deed of sale was notarized but was not annotated on TCT, neither was it presented to DBP
and PNB. The mortgage loans and receipts for loan payment issued by the two banks continued
to be in Mauricio’s name even after his death November 1973. Simona passed away in 1977.

Issue: Whether or not the deed of sale was void for lack of marital consent.

Held: Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is
under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber
any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. If she refuses
unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same.
This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal partnerships before the effective
date of this Code.

Article 166 expressly applies only to properties acquired by the conjugal partnership after the
effectivity of the Civil Code of the Philippines ("Civil Code"). The Civil Code came into force
on 30 August 1950.1161 Although there is no dispute that the Properties were conjugal
properties of Mauricio and Simona, the records do not show, and the parties did not stipulate,
when the Properties were acquired.1171 Under Article 1413 of the old Spanish Civil Code, the
husband could alienate conjugal partnership property for valuable consideration without the
wife's consent.1181

Even under the present Civil Code, however, the Deed of Sale is not void. It is well-settled that
contracts alienating conjugal real property without the wife's consent are merely voidable under
the Civil Code - that is, binding on the parties unless annulled by a competent court - and not
void ab initial
Article 166 must be read in conjunction with Article 173 of the Civil Code ("Article 173"). The
latter prescribes certain conditions before a sale of conjugal property can be annulled for lack of
the wife's consent, as follows:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without
her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to
defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to
exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of
property fraudulently alienated by the husband. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Code, only the wife can ask to annul a contract that disposes of conjugal real
property without her consent. The wife must file the action for annulment during the marriage
and within ten years from the questioned transaction. Article 173 is explicit on the remedies
available if the wife fails to exercise this right within the specified period. In such case, the wife
or her heir; can only demand the value of the property provided they prove that the husband
fraudulently alienated the property. Fraud is never presumed, but must be established by clear
and convincing evidence.

ILLEGITIMATE CHILD’S SURNAME

ALBA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 164041, July 29, 2005

Facts: Private respondent Rosendo C. Herrera filed a petition for cancellation of the following
entries in the birth certificate of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr, “ to wit: (1) the surname “Herrera” as
appended to the name of the said child; (2) the reference to private respondent as the father of
Rosendo Alba Herrera Jr.; and (3) the alleged marriage of private respondent to all child’s
mother, Armi A. Alba He averred that such challenged entries are false.

Private respondent contended that he married only once, as evidenced by certification from NSO
and Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong.
The RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance the hearing was set. On the
scheduled hearing the counsel from the OSG appeared but filed no opposition, Armi was not
present.

The court a quo rendered a decision ordering the correction of the entries in the Certification of
Live Birth of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr.
Armi filed a petition for the annulment of the judgment, contending that she came to know of the
decision of the RTC where the school where her son was enrolled, was furnished by private
respondent with a copy of a court order directing the change of petitioner’s surname from
Herrera to Alba. Armi contended that she and private respondent cohabited and after their
separation, he continued to give support to their son.

Private respondent denied paternity of petitioner minor and his purported cohabitation with
Armi.

Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child shall use the surname of their mother.

Held: Under Art. 176 of the Family Code as amended by RA No. 9255, w/c took effect on
March 19, 2004, illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother , unless their father
recognizes their filiation, in w/c case they may bear the father’s surname. In Wang vs. Cebu
Civil Registrar it was held that an illegitimate child whose filiations is not recognized by the
father bears only a given name and his mother’s surname. The name of the unrecognized
illegitimate child identifies him as such. It is only when said child is recognized that he may use
his father’s surname, reflecting his status us an acknowledged illegitimate held.

CHILD CUSTODY
PABLO-GUALBERTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. Nos. 154994 and 156254 June 28, 2005

Facts: Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost
4 year old son, Rafaello, whom her wife took away w/ her from their conjugal home and his
school when she left him.
The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite, since the wife failed to appear
despite notice. A house helper of the spouses testified that the mother does not care for the child
as she very often goes out of the house and even saw her slapping the child. Another witness
testified that after surveillance he found out that the wife is having lesbian relations.

The judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous order, and this time awarded the
custody of the child to the mother. Finding that the reason stated by Crisanto not to be a
compelling reason as provided in Art 213 of the Family Code.

Issue: Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the mother.

Held: Article 213 of the Family Code provided: “Art 213. In case of separation of parents
parental authority shall be exercised by the parent des granted by the court. The court shall take
into account all relevant consideration, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age,
unless the parent chosen is unfit.”
No child under seven yrs of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise,”

This Court has held that when the parents separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision
governs the custody of their child. Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil
Code, w/c reads: “Art 363.

In all question on the care, custody, education and property pf children, the latter welfare shall be
paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the
court finds compelling reason for such measure.”

ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

DEBEL VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004

Facts: David Debel met Sharon Corpuz while he was working in the advertising business of his
father. The acquaintance led to courtship and romantic relations, culminating into marriage
before the City Court of Pasay on September 28, 1966. On May 20, 1967, the civil marriage was
ratified in a church wedding. The union produced four children. The petitioner avers that during
the marriage Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had an
illicit affair with several men and then later to a Jordanian national named Ibrahim. Sharon was
once confined for psychiatric treatment but she didn’t stop her illicit relationship with the
Jordanian national whom she married and whom she had two children. Ibrahim left Sharon so
she returned back to the petitioner who had accepted her back. However on December 9, 1995,
Sharon abandoned the petitioner and joined Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. After
giving up all hope for reconciliation, petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the
declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. The RTC
granted the nullity of the marriage. It was appealed in the CA which set aside the decision of
RTC and ordered dismissal of the case. Hence, the instant petition was filed to the Supreme
Court.

Issue: Whether or not private respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment fall
within the term of psychological incapacity.

Held: In this case private respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment can
hardly qualify as mental or psychological illness to such extent that she could not have known
the obligation she was assuming. It appears that private respondent’s promiscuity did not exist
prior to or at the inception of the marriage; in fact, the record disclosed that there was a blissful
marital union. It must be shown that the acts are a manifestation of a disordered personality
which makes respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marital state,
not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.
ACTION FOR RECOGNITION OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN WHO ARE MINORS
AT THE TIME OF THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE MAY BE BROUGHT
FOR A PERIOD OF 4 YEARS FROM ATTAINING MAJORITY AGE; SPURIOUS
CHILDREN

BERNABE VS. ALEJO

G.R. No. 140500. January 21, 2002

Facts: The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary Carolina Alejo
and was named Adrian Bernabe who was born on September 18, 1981. After Ernesto Bernabe
and Rosalina, his legal wife died, the only heir left is Erestina. Carolina, in behalf of Adrian,
filed a complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal
Bernabe and be given a share of his father’s estate.

Issue: Whether or not Adrian Bernabe may be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son.

Held: Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought
within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the
former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new code
a chance to dispute the claim, considering that “illegitimate children” are usually begotten and
raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence.

OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION vs. TROY FRANCIS L. MONASTERIO
G.R. No. 151037. June 23, 2005

Facts: SMC entered into an Exclusive Warehouse Agreement with SMB Warehousing Services,
represented by its manager, Troy Francis L. Monasterio. SMB undertook to provide land,
physical structures, equipment and personnel for storage, warehousing and related services such
as, but not limited to, segregation of empty bottles, stock handling, and receiving SMC products
for its route operations. From September 1993 to September 1997 and May 1995 to November
1997, aside from rendering service as warehouseman, Monasterio was given the additional task
of cashiering in SMC’s Sorsogon and Camarines Norte sales offices for which he was promised
a separate fee. But it was only on December 1, 1997, that petitioner SMC started paying
respondent P11,400 per month for his cashiering services. Monasterio demanded P82,959.32 for
warehousing fees, P11,400 for cashiering fees for the month of September, 1998, as well as
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees in the amount of P500,000 and P300,000, respectively.
SMC filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue The RTC denied the motion.
Issue: Did the RTC of Naga City err in denying the motion to dismiss filed by SMC alleging
improper venue?

Held: Exclusive venue stipulation embodied in a contract restricts or confines parties thereto
when the suit relates to breach of the said contract. But where the exclusivity clause does not
make it necessarily all encompassing, such that even those not related to the enforcement of the
contract should be subject to the exclusive venue, the stipulation designating exclusive venues
should be strictly confined to the specific undertaking or agreement. Otherwise, the basic
principles of freedom to contract might work to the great disadvantage of a weak party-suitor
who ought to be allowed free access to courts of justice.

GF EQUITY, INC. vs. ARTURO VALENZONA

G.R. No. 156841. June 30, 2005

Facts: GF Equity hired Valenzona as Head Coach of the Alaska basketball team in the
Philippine Basketball Association under a Contract of Employment where GF Equity would pay
Valenzona the sum of P35,000.00 monthly. While the employment period agreed upon was for
two years commencing, the last sentence of paragraph 3 of the contract carried the following
condition: 3. x x x If at any time during the contract, the COACH, in the sole opinion of the
CORPORATION, fails to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach the team, the
CORPORATION may terminate this contract. The caveat notwithstanding, Valenzona still
acceded to the terms of the contract. Thereafter, Valenzona was terminated as coach of the
Alaska team. Valenzona demanded from GF Equity payment of compensation arising from the
arbitrary and unilateral termination of his employment. GF Equity, however, refused the claim.
Valenzona thus filed before the RTC Manila a complaint against GF Equity for breach of
contract with damages. The trial court, upholding the validity of the assailed provision of the
contract, dismissed the complaint.

Issue: Whether the questioned last sentence of paragraph 3 is violative of the principle of
mutuality of contracts.

Held: Mutuality is one of the characteristics of a contract, its validity or performance or

compliance of which cannot be left to the will of only one of the parties. The ultimate purpose of
the mutuality principle is thus to nullify a contract containing a condition which makes its
fulfillment or pre-termination dependent exclusively upon the uncontrolled will of one of the
contracting parties. In the case at bar, the contract incorporates in paragraph 3 the right of GF
Equity to pre-terminate the contract. The assailed condition clearly transgresses the principle of
mutuality of contracts. GF Equity was given an unbridled prerogative to pre-terminate the
contract irrespective of the soundness, fairness or reasonableness, or even lack of basis of its
opinion. The assailed stipulation being violative of the mutuality principle underlying Article
1308 of the Civil Code, it is null and void.

NORKIS FREE & INDEPENDENT WORKERS UNION vs. NORKIS TRADING

COMPANY, INC.
G.R. No. 157098 June 30, 2005

Facts: On January 27, 1998, a Memorandum of Agreement was forged between the parties
wherein petitioner shall grant a salary increase to all regular and permanent employees Ten pesos
per day increase effective August 1, 1997; Ten pesos per day increase effective August 1, 1998.
On March 10, 1998, the RTWPB of Region VII issued Wage Order ROVII-06 which established
the minimum wage of P165.00, by mandating a wage increase of five (P5.00) pesos per day
beginning April 1, 1998, thereby raising the daily minimum wage to P160.00 and another
increase of five (P5.00) pesos per day beginning October 1, 1998, thereby raising the daily
minimum wage to P165.00 per day. In accordance with the Wage Order and Section 2, Article
XII of the CBA, petitioner demanded an across-the-board increase. Respondent, however,
refused to implement the Wage Order, insisting that since it has been paying its workers the new
minimum wage of P165.00 even before the issuance of the Wage Order, it cannot be made to
comply with said Wage Order.

Issue: Whether respondent violated the CBA in its refusal to grant its employees an across-the-
board increase as a result of the passage of Wage Order No. ROVII-06.

Held: The employees are not entitled to the claimed salary increase, simply because they are not
within the coverage of the Wage Order, as they were already receiving salaries greater than the
minimum wage fixed by the Order. Concededly, there is an increase necessarily resulting from
raising the minimum wage level, but not across-the-board. Indeed, a “double burden” cannot be
imposed upon an employer except by clear provision of law. It would be unjust, therefore, to
interpret Wage Order No. ROVII-06 to mean that respondent should grant an across-the-board
increase. Such interpretation of the Order is not sustained by its text.

CONCEPCION R. AINZA, substituted by her legal heirs, DR. NATIVIDAD A.

TULIAO, CORAZON A. JALECO and LILIA A. OLAYON vs. SPOUSES ANTONIO
PADUA and EUGENIA PADUA
G.R. No. 165420. June 30, 2005

Facts: Spouses Eugenia and Antonio Padua owned a 216.40 sq. m. lot with an unfinished
residential house Thereafter, Concepcion Ainza bought one-half of an undivided portion of the
property from her daughter, Eugenia and the latter’s husband, Antonio, for P100,000.00. No
Deed of Absolute Sale was executed to evidence the transaction, but cash payment was received
by the respondents, and ownership was transferred to Concepcion through physical delivery to
Natividad Tuliao. However, respondents caused the subdivision of the property into three
portions and registered it in their names in violation of the restrictions annotated at the back of
the title. Antonio claimed that his wife, Eugenia, admitted that Concepcion offered to buy 1/3 of
the property who gave her small amounts over several years which totaled P100,000.00 by 1987
and for which she signed a receipt.

Issue: Whether there was a valid contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion.

Held: There was a perfected contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion. The records
show that Eugenia offered to sell a portion of the property to Concepcion, who accepted the offer
and agreed to pay P100,000.00 as consideration. The contract of sale was consummated when
both parties fully complied with their respective obligations. Eugenia delivered the property to
Concepcion, who in turn, paid Eugenia the price of P100,000.00, as evidenced by the receipt.
The verbal contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion did not violate the provisions of the
Statute of Frauds. When a verbal contract has been completed, executed or partially
consummated, as in this case, its enforceability will not be barred by the Statute of Frauds, which
applies only to an executory agreement. However, the sale of the conjugal property by Eugenia
without the consent of her husband is voidable. It is undisputed that the subject property was
conjugal and sold by Eugenia in April 1987 or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988. Thus, the contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion being an oral
contract, the action to annul the same must be commenced within six years from the time the
right of action accrued. It is binding unless annulled. Antonio failed to exercise his right to ask
for the annulment within the prescribed period, hence, he is now barred from questioning the
validity of the sale between his wife and Concepcion.

OLIVERIO LAPERAL& FILIPINAS GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB INC. vs. SOLID
HOMES, INC.
G.R. No. 130913. June 21, 2005

Facts: Filipinas Golf Sales and Development Corporation, predecessor-in-interest of Filipinas

Golf and Country Club, Inc., represented by its then President, Oliverio Laperal, entered into a
Development and Management Agreement with respondent Solid Homes, Inc., a registered
subdivision developer, involving several parcels of land owned by Laperal and FGSDC. Under
the terms and conditions of the aforementioned Agreement and the Supplement, respondent
undertook to convert at its own expense the land subject of the agreement into a first-class
residential subdivision, in consideration of which respondent will get 45% of the lot titles of the
saleable area in the entire project. The aforementioned Agreement was cancelled by the parties,
and, in lieu thereof, two contracts identically denominated Revised Development and
Management Agreement were entered into by respondent with the two successors-in-interest of
FGSDC. Unlike the original agreement, both Revised Agreements omitted the obligation of
petitioners Laperal and FGCCI to make available to respondent Solid Homes, Inc. the owner’s
duplicate copies of the titles covering the subject parcels of land. It appears, however, that even
as the Revised Agreements already provided for the non-surrender of the owner’s duplicate
copies of the titles, respondent persisted in its request for the delivery thereof .Then, petitioners
served on respondent notices of rescission of the Revised Agreements with a demand to vacate
the subject properties and yield possession thereof to them.

Issue: Whether the termination of the Revised Agreement and Addendum, because of the
contractual breach committed by respondent solid homes, carried with it the effect provided
under Article 1385 of the New Civil Code.

Held: Mutual restitution is required in cases involving rescission under Article 1191. Since
Article 1385 of the Civil Code expressly and clearly states that “rescission creates the obligation
to return the things which were the object of the contract, together with their fruits, and the price
with its interest,” the Court finds no justification to sustain petitioners’ position that said Article
1385 does not apply to rescission under Article 1191.As a consequence of the resolution by
petitioners, rights to the lot should be restored to private respondent or the same should be
replaced by another acceptable lot. Applying the clear language of the law and the consistent
jurisprudence on the matter, therefore, the Court rules that rescission under Article 1191 in the
present case, carries with it the corresponding obligation of restitution.

MONDRAGON LEISURE AND RESORTS CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

ASIAN BANK CORPORATION, FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, and
UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK
G.R. No. 154188 June 15, 2005

Facts: Mondragon International Philippines, Inc., Mondragon Securities Corporation and herein
petitioner entered into a lease agreement with the Clark Development Corporation for the
development of what is now known as the Mimosa Leisure Estate.To help finance the project,
petitioner, entered into an Omnibus Loan and Security Agreement with respondent banks for a
syndicated term loan in the aggregate principal amount of US$20M. Under the agreement, the
proceeds of the loan were to be released through advances evidenced by promissory notes to be
executed by petitioner in favor of each lender-bank, and to be paid within a six-year period from
the date of initial advance inclusive of a one year and two quarters grace period. Petitioner,
which had regularly paid the monthly interests due on the promissory notes until October 1998,
thereafter failed to make payments. Consequently, written notices of default, acceleration of
payment and demand letters were sent by the lenders to the petitioner. Then, respondents filed a
complaint for the foreclosure of leasehold rights against petitioner. Petitioner moved for the
dismissal of the complaint but was denied.

Issue: Whether or not respondents have a cause of action against the petitioner?

Held: Under the foregoing provisions of the Agreement, petitioner may be validly declared in
default for failure to pay the interest. As a consequence of default, the unpaid amount shall earn
default interest, and the respondent-banks have four alternative remedies without prejudice to the
application of the provisions on collaterals and any other steps or action which may be adopted
by the majority lender. The four remedies are alternative, with the right of choice given to the
lenders, in this case the respondents. Under Article 1201 of the Civil Code, the choice shall
produce no effect except from the time it has been communicated. In the present case, we find
that written notices were sent to the petitioner by the respondents. The notices clearly indicate
respondents’ choice of remedy: to accelerate all payments payable under the loan agreement It
should be noted that the agreement also provides that the choice of remedy is without prejudice
to the action on the collaterals. Thus, respondents could properly file an action for foreclosure of
the leasehold rights to obtain payment for the amount demanded.

SPS. FELIPE AND LETICIA CANNU vs. SPS. GIL AND FERNANDINA GALANG AND
NATIONAL HOME MORTGAGE FINANCE CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 139523. May 26, 2005

Facts: Gil and Fernandina Galang obtained a loan from Fortune Savings & Loan Association for
P173, 800.00 to purchase a house and lot located at Pulang Lupa, Las Piñas, To secure payment,
a real estate mortgage was constituted on the said house and lot in favor of Fortune Savings &
Loan Association. In early 1990, NHMFC purchased the mortgage loan of respondents-spouses
from Fortune Savings & Loan Association for P173, 800.00. Petitioner Leticia Cannu agreed to
buy the property for P120, 000.00 and to assume the balance of the mortgage obligations with
the NHMFC and with CERF Realty. Of the P120, 000. 00, several payments were made leaving
a balance of P45, 000.00. A Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage Obligation was made
and entered into by and between spouses Fernandina and Gil Galang and spouses Leticia and
Felipe Cannu over the house and lot. Petitioners immediately took possession and occupied the
house and lot. Despite requests from Adelina R. Timbang and Fernandina Galang to pay the
balance of P45,000.00 or in the alternative to vacate the property in question, petitioners refused
to do so.

Issues:

1) Whether or not the breach of the obligation is substantial.

2) Whether or not there was substantial compliance with the obligation to pay the monthly
amortization with NHMFC.

3) Whether or not respondents-spouses Galang demanded from petitioners a strict and/or faithful
compliance of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. 4. Whether or not the action for
rescission is subsidiary.
Held:
• Rescission may be had only for such breaches that are substantial and
fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in making the agreement. The question
of whether a breach of contract is substantial depends upon the attending circumstances
and not merely on the percentage of the amount not paid. In the case at bar, we find
petitioners’ failure to pay the remaining balance of P45,000.00 to be substantial. Taken
together with the fact that the last payment made was on 28 November 1991, eighteen
months before the respondent Fernandina Galang paid the outstanding balance of the
mortgage loan with NHMFC, the intention of petitioners to renege on their obligation is
utterly clear.

• The petitioners were not religious in paying the amortization with the
NHMFC. As admitted by them, in the span of three years from 1990 to 1993, their
payments covered only thirty months. This, indeed, constitutes another breach or
violation of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. On top of this, there was no
formal assumption of the mortgage obligation with NHMFC because of the lack of
approval by the NHMFC on account of petitioners’ non-submission of requirements in
order to be considered as assignees/successors-in-interest over the property covered by
the mortgage obligation.

• There is sufficient evidence showing that demands were made from

petitioners to comply with their obligation. Adelina R. Timbang, attorney-in-fact of
respondents-spouses, per instruction of respondent Fernandina Galang, made constant
follow-ups after the last payment made on 28 November 1991, but petitioners did not
pay. Sometime in March 1993, due to the fact that full payment has not been paid and
that the monthly amortizations with the NHMFC have not been fully updated, she made
her intentions clear with petitioner Leticia Cannu that she will rescind or annul the Deed
of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. 4. The subsidiary character of the action for
rescission applies to contracts enumerated in Articles 1381 of the Civil Code. The
contract involved in the case before us is not one of those mentioned therein. The
provision that applies in the case at bar is Article 1191.As a consequence of the rescission
or, more accurately, resolution of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, it is the
duty of the court to require the parties to surrender whatever they may have received
from the other. The parties should be restored to their original situation.

ROMAGO ELECTRIC CO., INC. vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SOLEDAD

C. CAC, JOEPHIL BIEN, RENATO CUNANAN and DELFIN INCIONG
G.R. No. 130721. May 26, 2005
Facts:

The National Power Corporation entered into an agreement with ROMAGO ELECTRIC CO.,
INC. for the erection and installation of NPC’s 69 KV 3-Phase Transmission Lines for
P2,657,856.40. Subsequently, ROMAGO subcontracted the project to BICC Construction, an
unregistered loose partnership composed of Soledad Cac, Delfin Inciong, Joephil Bien and
Renato Cunanan, for P1,614,387.99. When the project was completed, there was an outstanding
balance due to BICC Construction from ROMAGO, part of which was the former’s share in the
CPA amounting to 70% of the NPC-ROMAGO contract or P175,545.05. Mrs. Soledad Cac,
wrote NPC to hold its payment to ROMAGO of the aforementioned CPA amounting to
P250,778.65. Payment was nonetheless released to ROMAGO by virtue of a sworn affidavit
executed that “there does not exist any lien or encumbrances against” the said NPC-ROMAGO
contract. It appears that Mariano Cac, authorized representative and husband of Soledad Cac,
was paid the amount of P38,712.70 “in full payment of accounts including retention of various
works at NPC-Isabela” under defendant’s Cash Disbursement Voucher No. 23162 dated 03
October 1983.When BICC’s demands for payment were ignored by ROMAGO, the partners,
thru Mrs. Soledad Cac as lone plaintiff, filed a complaint for collection of sum of money with
damages.

Issues:

• Whether or not the private respondents are entitled to the CPA accorded to
the petitioner by NPC.
• Whether or not the particulars of petitioner’s cash disbursement voucher
no. 23162 signed by private respondent’s authorized representative / agent
acknowledging receipt of said amount did not extinguish, relieve, release any and all
claims including contract price adjustment which private respondents may have against
petitioner on the subcontract.

Held:

1. Contrary to the petitioner’s asseverations that the CPA was not intended to be made applicable
to the Romago-BICC subcontract, it must be remembered that the petitioner and the private
respondents expressly agreed what documents were going to be incorporated in the principal
subcontract. We agree with the appellate court that the qualifying phrase “obligations and
responsibilities” contained in the Romago-BICC subcontract was applicable only to the NPC-
Romago contract. What is more, the CPA is not found in the NPC-Romago contract, but in the
NPC's “Plans and Specifications” which was expressly included as part of the “Contract
Documents”.

2. Said pleading expressly states that “…the CPA is not included in the computation.” This is
precisely because the petitioner believes that the private respondents are not entitled to the CPA,
hence, “there is no basis for including it.” Said CPA not being part of the subcontract price of
P1,614,387.99, the release mentioned in the cash voucher cannot, therefore, be construed as a
release of the CPA.

FELIPE O. MAGBANUA, CARLOS DE LA CRUZ, REMY ARNAIZ, BILLY ARNAIZ,

ROLLY ARNAIZ, DOMINGO SALARDA, JULIO CAHILIG and NICANOR LABUEN,
vs. RIZALINO UY
G.R. No. 161003. May 6, 2005

Facts: As a final consequence of the final and executory decision of the Supreme Court which
affirmed with modification the decision of the NLRC, hearings were conducted to determine the
amount of wage differentials due the eight petitioners. The petitioners filed a Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Execution. Rizalino Uy filed a Manifestation requesting that the cases be
terminated and closed, stating that the judgment award as computed had been complied with to
the satisfaction of petitioners. Said Manifestation was also signed by the eight petitioners.
Together with the manifestation is a Joint Affidavit dated May 5, 1997 of petitioners, attesting to
the receipt of payment from respondent and waiving all other benefits due them in connection
with their complaint. On October 20, 1997, six of the eight petitioners filed a Manifestation
requesting that the cases be considered closed and terminated as they are already satisfied of
what they have received from respondent. Together with said Manifestation is a Joint Affidavit
in the local dialect, of the six petitioners attesting that they have no more collectible amount from
respondent and if there is any, they are abandoning and waiving the same.

Issues:
• Whether or not the final and executory judgment of the Supreme Court
could be subject to compromise settlement;
• Whether or not the petitioners’ affidavit waiving their awards in the labor
case executed without the assistance of their counsel and labor arbiter is valid.

Held:
• There is no justification to disallow a compromise agreement, solely
because it was entered into after final judgment. The validity of the agreement is
determined by compliance with the requisites and principles of contracts, not by when it
was entered into. Petitioners voluntarily entered into the compromise agreement.
Circumstances also reveal that respondent has already complied with its obligation
pursuant to the compromise agreement. Having already benefited from the agreement,
estoppel bars petitioners from challenging it.

• The presence or the absence of counsel when a waiver is executed does

not determine its validity. There is no law requiring the presence of a counsel to validate
a waiver. The test is whether it was executed voluntarily, freely and intelligently; and
 whether the consideration for it was credible and reasonable. Where there is clear proof
that a waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or a gullible person, the law must step in
to annul such transaction. In the present case, petitioners failed to present any evidence to
show that their consent had been vitiated.

SPOUSES DANILO and CRISTINA DECENA, vs. SPOUSES PEDRO and VALERIA
PIQUERO
G.R. No. 155736. March 31, 2005

Facts: Spouses Danilo and Cristina Decena were the owners of a house and lot in Parañaque
City. The petitioners and the respondents, the Spouses Pedro and Valeria Piquero, executed a
Memorandum of Agreement in which the former sold the property to the latter for P940,250.00
payable in six (6) installments via postdated checks. The vendees forthwith took possession of
the property. It appears in the MOA that the petitioners obliged themselves to transfer the
property to the respondents upon the execution of the MOA with the condition that if two of the
postdated checks would be dishonored by the drawee bank, the latter would be obliged to
reconvey the property to the petitioners. On May 17, 1999, the petitioners, then residents of
Malolos, Bulacan, filed a Complaint against the respondents with the RTC Malolos, Bulacan, for
the annulment of the sale/MOA, recovery of possession and damages. The petitioners alleged
therein that, they did not transfer the property to and in the names of the respondents as vendees
because the first two checks drawn and issued by them in payment for the purchase price of the
property were dishonored by the drawee bank, and were not replaced with cash despite demands
therefor.

Issue: Whether or not venue was properly laid by the petitioners in the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan.

Held: After due consideration of the foregoing, we find and so rule that Section 5(c), Rule 2 of
the Rules of Court does not apply. This is so because the petitioners, as plaintiffs in the court a
quo, had only one cause of action against the respondents, namely, the breach of the MOA upon
the latter’s refusal to pay the first two installments in payment of the property as agreed upon,
and turn over to the petitioners the possession of the real property, as well as the house
constructed thereon occupied by the respondents. The claim for damages for reasonable
compensation for the respondents’ use and occupation of the property, in the interim, as well as
moral and exemplary damages suffered by the petitioners on account of the aforestated breach of
contract of the respondents are merely incidental to the main cause of action, and are not
independent or separate causes of action. The action of the petitioners for the rescission of the
MOA on account of the respondents’ breach thereof and the latter’s failure to return the premises
subject of the complaint to the petitioners, and the respondents’ eviction therefrom is a real
action. As such, the action should have been filed in the proper court where the property is
located, namely, in Parañaque City, conformably with Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
Since the petitioners, who were residents of Malolos, Bulacan, filed their complaint in the said
RTC, venue was improperly laid; hence, the trial court acted conformably with Section 1(c),
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court when it ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
LIABILITY FOR PRICE ESCALATION FOR LABOR AND MATERIAL COST H.L.
CARLOS CONSTRUCTION, INC. VS. MARINA PROPERTIES CORPORATION, ET
AL. G.R No. 147614, January 29, 2004

Facts: Marina Properties Corporation entered into a contract with H.L. Carlos Construction, Inc.
to construct a condominium complex for a total consideration of P35.58 million within a period
of 365 days from receipt of notice to proceed. The original completion date of the project was
May 16, 1989, but it was extended to October 31, 1989 with a grace period until November 30,
1989. On December 15, 1989, HLC instituted a case for sum of money, among others, for costs
of labor escalation, change orders and material price escalation. The Construction Contract
contains the provision that no cost escalation shall be allowed except on the labor component of
the work. HLC argues that it is entitled to price escalation for both labor and material because
MPC was delayed for paying its obligations. MPC, on the other hand, avers that HLC was
delayed in finishing its project; hence, it is not entitled to price increases.

Issue: Whether or not MPC is liable for price escalation.

Held: MPC is liable for price escalation, but only for the labor component. The Construction
Contract contains the provision that no cost escalation shall be allowed except on the labor
component of the work. Since the contract allows escalation only of the labor component, the
implication is that material cost escalations are barred. There appears to be no provision, either in
the original or in the amended contract that would justify billing of increased cost of material.
HLC attempts to pass off material cost escalation as a form of damages suffered by it as a natural
consequence of the delay in the payment of billings. However, the contentious billing itself
contains no claim for material cost escalation.

STAGES OF CONTRACT; WITHDRAWAL OF OFFER BEFORE ACCEPTANCE

INSURANCE LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD. VS. ASSET BUILDERS
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 147410, February 5, 2004

Facts: Insular Life Insurance Company, Limited invited companies to participate in the bidding
of the proposed Insular Life building. The Instruction to Bidders prepared by Insular Life
expressly required a formal acceptance and a period within which such acceptance was to be
made known to the winner. Asset Builders Corporation submitted a bid proposal secured by bid
bonds valid for 60 days. Under its proposal form, Asset Builders bound and obliged itself to
enter into a contract with Insular Life within 10 days from the notice of the award, with good and
sufficient securities. The project was awarded to the Asset Builders and a notice to proceed with
the construction was sent by Insular Life to the former. However, Asset Builders project. Neither
did it execute any construction agreement. It informed Insular Life that it will not proceed with
the project.
Issue: Whether or not there is a perfected contract between Insular Life and Asset Builders.

Held: There was indeed no acceptance of the offer by Asset Builders. Such failure to comply
with the condition imposed for the perfection of the contract resulted in the failure of the
contract. There are three distinct stages of a contract- preparation or negotiation, perfection or
consummation. Negotiation begins when the prospective contracting parties manifest their
interest in the contract and ends at the moment of their agreement. Perfection occurs when they
agree upon the essential elements thereof. The last stage is the consummation where they fulfill
the terms agreed upon culminating in the extinguishment of the contract.

CONTACTS ARE PERFECTED BY MERE CONSENT; EFFECTS OF PERFECTION

OF CONTRACTS METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS.
JANCOM ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION
GR No. 147465, January 30, 2002

Facts: A build-Operate-Transfer Contract for the waste-to energy project was signed between
JANCOM and the Philippine Government. The BOT Contract was submitted to President Ramos
for approval but was then too close to the end of his term that his term expired without him
signing the contract. He, however, endorsed the same to incoming President Estrada. With the
change in administration came changes in policy and economic environment, thus the BOT
contract was not pursued and implemented. JANCOM appealed to the President for
reconsideration and despite the pendency of the appeal, MMDA caused the publication of an
invitation to pre-qualify and submit proposals for solid waste management.

Issue: Whether or not there is a valid and binding contract between the Republic of the
Philippines and JANCOM.

Held: There is a valid and binding contract between JANCOM and the Republic of the
Philippines. Under Articles 1305 of the Civil Code, “A contract is a meeting of the minds
between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or
to render some service.” Art. 1315 of the Civil Code provides that a contract is perfected by mere
consent. Consent, on the other hand, is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance
upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract (Art. 1319, Civil Code). In the
case at bar, the signing and execution of the contract by the parties clearly show that, as between
the parties, there was a concurrence of offer and acceptance with respect to the material details of
the contract, thereby giving rise to the perfection of the absence of President’s signature is
untenable. Significantly, the contract itself provides that the signature of the President is
necessary only for its effectivity, not its perfection.

There being a perfected contract, MMDA cannot revoke or renounce the same without the
consent of the other. From the moment of perfection, the parties are bound not only to the
fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which,
according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. (Art. 1315) It is a
general principle of law that no one may be permitted to change hid mind or disavow and go
back upon his own acts, or to proceed contrary thereto, to the prejudice of the other party.

PENALTY CLAUSE LIGUTAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 147465, February 12, 2002

Facts: Ligutan and dela Llana obtained a loan from Security Bank and Trust Co. They executed
a promissory note binding themselves jointly and severally to pay the sum borrowed with an
interest of 15.89% per annum upon maturity and to pay a penalty of 5% every month on the
outstanding principal and interest in case of default. In addition, they agreed to pay 10% of the
total amount due by way of attorney’s fees if the matter were indorsed to a lawyer for collection
or if a suit were instituted to enforce payment. Ligutan and dela Llana failed to settle the debt. A
complaint for recovery of the amount due was filed with the RTC. The court held, among others,
the borrowers were liable for a 3% per month penalty (instead of 5%) and 10% of the total
amount of the indebtedness for attorney’s fee, in addition to the principal loan.

Issue: Whether the court is correct in holding the borrowers liable for the penalty.

Held: A penalty clause, expressly recognized by law, is an accessory undertaking to assume

greater liability on the part of an obligor in case of breach of an obligation. It functions to
strengthen the coercive force of the obligation and to provide for what could be the stipulated
indemnity without the necessity of proof on the existence and on the measure of damages caused
by the breach. Although the court may not at liberty ignore the freedom of the parties to agree on
such terms and conditions as they see fit, a stipulated penalty, nevertheless may be equitably
reduced by the courts if iniquitous or unconscionable or if the principal obligation has been
partly or irregularly complied with. The reduction is justified by the facts that the borrowers were
able to partly comply with their obligations.

SIMULATED CONTRACTS CRUZ VS. BANCOM FINANCE CORPORATION

G.R. No. 147788 March 19, 2002

Facts: Norma Sulit was introduced by Candelaria Sanchez to Edilberto and Simplicio Cruz and
offered to purchase the parcel of land owned by the Cruz brothers. The asking-price for the land
was P700, 000, but Sulit had only P25,000 which Edilberto accepted as earnest money with the
agreement that title would pass to Sulit on the payment of the balance. Sulit failed to pay the
balance. Capitalizing on the close relationship of Sanchez with the brothers, Sulit succeeded in
having the brothers execute a document of sale in favor of Sanchez who would then obtain a
bank loan in her name using the said land as collateral. On the same day, Sanchez executed
another Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Sulit. Sulit assumed all the obligations of Sanchez to
the original owners of the land in a Special Agreement. Unknown to the brothers, Sulit managed
to obtain a loan from Bancom secured by a mortgage over the land. Because Sulit failed to pay
the purchase price stipulated in the Special Agreement, the brothers filed a complaint for
reconveyance. Sulit also defaulted in her payment to the Bank and her mortgage was foreclosed.
At the auction sale, Bancom was declared the highest bidder.

Issue: Whether or not the Deeds of Sale were valid and binding.

Held: Simulation takes place when the parties do not really want the contract they have executed
to produce the legal effects expressed by its wordings. Art. 1345 states that “simulation of a
contract may be absolute or relative.” The former takes place when the parties conceal their true
agreement” while Art. 1346 states that “an absolutely simulated contract is void. A relative
stimulation, when it does not prejudice a third person and is not intended for any purpose
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or pubic policy binds the parties to their
agreement.” The Deeds of Sale were executed merely to facilitate the use of the property as
collateral to secure a loan from a bank. Although the Deed of Sale between the brothers and
Sanchez stipulated a consideration, there was actually no exchange of money. Moreover, the
failure of Sulit to take possession of the property sold to her was a clear badge of simulation that
rendered the whole transaction void and without force and effect.

NOVATION PILIPINAS BANK VS. ONG

387 SCRA 97, August 8, 2002

Facts: On April 1991, Baliwag Mahogany Corporation (BMC), through its president, respondent
Alfredo T. Ong, applied for a domestic commercial letter credit with petitioner Pilipinas Bank
(the bank) to finance the purchase of “Air Dried, Dark Lauan” sawn lumber.

The bank approved the application and issued a Letter of Credit. To secure payment of the
amount, BMC, through respondent Ong, executed two (2) trust receipts providing that it shall
turn over the proceeds of the goods to the bank, if sold, or return the goods, if unsold, upon
maturity on July 28, 1991 and August 4, 1981.

On due dates, BMC failed to comply with the trust receipt agreement. On November 22, 1991, it
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a Petition for Rehabilitation and for a
Declaration in a State of Suspension of Payments. On January 8, 1992, the SEC issued an order
creating a Management Committee wherein the bank is represented.

On October 13, 1992, BMC and a consortium of 14 of its creditor banks entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) rescheduling the payment of BMC’s existing debts.

On November 27, 1992, the SEC rendered a Decision approving the Rehabilitation Plan of BMC
as contained in the MOA and declaring it in a state of suspension of payments.
However, BMC and respondent Ong defaulted in the payment of the obligations under the
rescheduled payment scheme provided in the MOA. On April 1994, the bank filed a complaint
charging respondents Ong and Leoncia Lim (as president and treasurer of BMC) with violation
of the Trust Receipts Law (PD 115). The bank alleged that both respondents failed to pay their
obligation under the trust receipt despite demand.

The Court of Appeals renders its decision holding that the execution of the MOA constitutes
novation which places petitioner bank in estoppel to insist on the original trust relation and
constitutes a bar to the filing of any criminal information for violation of the trust receipts law.
The Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

Hence this Petition.

Issue: Whether or not the MOA was a novation of the trust agreement between the parties.

Held: Petition is DENIED, MOA novates the trust agreement.

Mere failure to deliver the proceeds of the sale of the goods, if not sold, constitutes violation of
PD 115. However, what is being punished by the law is the dishonesty and abuse of confidence
in the handling of money or goods to the prejudice of another regardless of whether the latter is
the owner. It bears emphasis that when the petitioner bank made a demand upon a BMC on
February 11, 1994 to comply with its obligations under the trust receipts, the latter was already
under the control of the Management Committee created by SEC. The Management Committee
took custody of all BMC’s assets and liabilities, including the red lauan lumber subject of trust
receipts, and authorized their use in the ordinary course of business operations. Clearly, it was
the Management Committee which could settle BMC’s obligations.

In Quinto vs. People, this Court held that there are two ways which could indicate the presence
of novation, thereby producing the effect of extinguishing an obligation by another which
substitutes the same. The first is when novation has been stated and declared in unequivocal
terms. The second is when the old and the new obligations are incompatible on every point. The
test of incompatibility is whether or not the two obligations can stand together. If they cannot,
they are incompatible and the latter obligation novates the first. The incompatibility must take
place in any of the essential elements of the obligation, such as its object, cause or principal
conditions.

Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the MOA did not only reschedule BMC’s debts, but more
importantly, it provided principal conditions, which are incompatible with the trust agreement.
The execution of the MOA extinguished respondent’s obligation under the trust receipts.
Respondent’s liability, if any, would only be civil in nature since the trust receipts were
transformed into mere loan documents after the execution of the MOA.

CONDITIONAL OBLIGATION; WHERE THE VENDEE DOES NOT COMPLY WITH

HIS OBLIGATION TO PAY THE BALANCE OF THE PURCHASE PRICE, THE
VENDOR’S OBLIGATION TO EXECUTE A DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE WILL NOT
ARISE.

CORINTHIAN REALTY, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

349 SCRA 260, December 26, 2002

Facts: Private respondents and petitioner entered into a Deed of Conditional Sale (the deed) of a
parcel of land. Under the deed, the remaining balance will be paid by the vendee to the vendors
within the period of ninety (90) days from the execution of the deed; and if for no justifiable
reason, the vendee fails and/ or refuses to comply with this obligation, the vendors, without prior
notice to the vendee, shall forfeit the earnest money, but as soon as the vendee complies with his
obligations under the contract, then the vendors shall immediately execute the absolute deed of
sale.

CONTRACTS
TANONGON VS. SAMSON
382 SCRA 130, May 9, 2002

Facts:

Cayco Marine Service (CAYCO) is engaged in the business of hauling oil. It is operated by
Illuminada Cayco Olizon (Olizon). Resondents Felicidad Samson, Casiano Osin, Alberto Belbes
and Luisito Venus were among the employees of CAYCO and/or Olizon.

On MARCH 9, 1994, respondents filed a complaint against CAYCO and Olixzon for illegal
dismissal, underpayment of wages, non-payment of holiday pay, rest day pay and leave pay. The
labor arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, it was reversed by the NLRC.

On June 25, 1997, the NLRC Research and Investigation Unit submitted to the labor arbiter the
judgment award for each respondent.
On June 24, 1997, a writ of execution was issued directing the NLRC sheriff to collect from
CAYCO and Olizon the responding award due for each respondent
On August 8, 1997, after the notice of levy/sale on execution of personal property was issued,
CAYCO nad Olizon’s motor tanker was seized, to be sold at public auction on August 19, 1997.

On August 15, 1997, petitioner Doretea Tanongon, filed a third party claim before the labor
arbiter, alleging that she was the owner of the subject motor tanker, having acquired the same
from Olizon on July 29, 1997, and in consideration.
On October 15, 1997, the labor arbiter issued an order dismissing the third party claim for lack of
merit. On appeal, the NLRC reversed that of the labor arbiter thereby lifting the levy and
restrained execution.

The Court of Appeals debunked the claim that the petitioner was a buyer in good faith on the
ground that purchasers could not close their eyes to facts that should put reasonable persons on
guard. The records show that the sale was hastily concluded; the tanker and the necessary
documents were immediately delivered to the new owner to the new owner. These facts
confirmed respondent’s suspicion that Olizon had intended to overcome the enforcement of the
Writ of Execution.

Hence this Petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Dorotea Tanongon is a buyer in good faith and for value.

Held: Petition is DENIED; Petitioner Dorotea Tanongon is not a purchaser in good faith and for
value.

There is sufficient basis to affirm the CA finding that petitioner was a buyer in abs faith. The
writ of Execution was issued by the labor arbiter on July 24, 1997. And the sale of the levied
tanker was made only on July 29, 1997. The CA correctly ruled that the act of Olizon was a
“cavalier attempt to evade payment of the judgment debt.” She obviously got word of the
issuance of these antecedents, petitioner bought the tanker barely ten days before it was levied
upon on August 8, 1997.

Purchaser in good faith or an innocent purchaser for value is one who buys properly and pays a
full and fair price for it at the time of the purchase or before any notice of some other person’s
claim on or interest in it.
Petitioner should have inquired whether Olizon had other unsettled obligations and
encumbrances that could burden the subject property. Any person engaged in business would be
wary of buying from a company that is closing shop, because it may be dissipating its assets to
defraud its creditors.

PROPERTY

ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF POSSESSION; REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE TERESITA V.

IDOLOR VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES GUMERSINDO DE GUZMAN
and ILUMINADA DE GUZMAN and HON. JOSE G. PINEDA, Presiding Judge of
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 220, Quezon City
G.R. No. 161028. January 31, 2005

Facts: Petitioner Teresita V. Idolor obtained a loan from respondent-spouses Gumersindo and
Iluminada De Guzman secured by a real estate mortgage over a property covered by TCT No.
25659. Upon default by petitioner in the payment of her obligation, respondent instituted extra-
judicial foreclosure proceedings against the real estate mortgage.During the auction sale,
respondents emerged as the highest bidder and were issued a Certificate of Sale.

On June 25, 1998, petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of the Certificate of Sale with
prayer for the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC issued a writ of
preliminary injunction, however, the Court of Appeals annulled the same on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion. The ownership over the subject property having been consolidated in their
name, respondent-spouses De Guzman moved for the issuance of a writ of possession with the
Regional Trial Court where the case for the annulment of the Certificate of Sale was
pending.[5] On May 27, 2002, the trial court denied the motion, ruling that the “the lifting of the
writ of preliminary injunction does not ipso facto entitle defendant De Guzman to the issuance of
a writ of possession over the property in question. It only allows the defendant Sheriff to issue a
final deed of sale and confirmation sale and the defendant De Guzman to consolidate the
ownership/title over the subject property in his name.”

In a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, the appellate court found that the trial
court gravely abused its discretion in denying the motion for the issuance of the “writ of
possession to the mortgagee or the winning bidder is a ministerial function of the court and that
the pendency of an action questioning the validity of a mortgage cannot bar the issuance of the
writ of possession after title to the property has been consolidated in the mortgagee.”[7] Hence, it
reversed and set aside the May 27, 2002 order of the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the mortgage, by mere motion, not by petition, may apply for a Writ of
Possession in the same case for annulment of the Certificate of Sale of which he is a defendant.

Held: A writ of possession is an order whereby the sheriff is commanded to place a person in
possession of a real or personal property. It may be issued under the following instances: (1) land
registration proceedings under Sec. 17 of Act 496; (2) judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is
in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had
intervened; and (3) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Sec. 7 of Act 3135
as amended by Act 4118, to which the present case falls.

Under the provision cited above, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale may apply for a writ of
possession during the redemption period by filing for that purpose an ex parte motion under oath,
in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in the case of a property with torrens
title. Upon the filing of such motion and the approval of the corresponding bond, the court is
expressly directed to issue the writ.
Upon the expiration of the redemption period, the right of the purchaser to the possession of the
foreclosed property becomes absolute. The basis of this right to possession is the purchaser’s
ownership of the property. Mere filing of an ex parte motion for the issuance of the writ of
possession would suffice, and the bond required is no longer necessary, since possession
becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as the confirmed owner.

In this case, respondent-spouses acquired an absolute right over the property upon the failure of
petitioner to exercise her right of redemption and upon the consolidation of the title in their
name.

An ex-parte petition for issuance of possessory writ under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is not,
strictly speaking, a “judicial process”. Even if the same may be considered a judicial proceeding
for the enforcement of one’s right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale, it is not an
ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party “sues another for the enforcement or protection of
a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.”[18] It is a non-litigious proceeding and
summary in nature as well. As such, the rigid and technical application of the rules on legal fees
may be relaxed in order to avoid manifest injustice to the respondent This rule is applicable in
the present case. Although respondent- spouses have been declared as the highest bidder and
despite having consolidated the title in their name, they still failed to take possession of the
property through numerous legal maneuverings of the petitioner. A simple ex parte application
for the issuance of a writ of possession has become a litigious and protracted proceeding.

SPOUSES JUAN NUGUID AND ERLINDA T. NUGUID VS. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS AND PEDRO P. PECSON
G.R. No. 151815. February 23, 2005

Facts: Pedro P. Pecson owned a commercial lot on which he built a 4-door 2-storey apartment
building. For failure to pay realty taxes, the lot was sold at public auction to Mamerto
Nepomuceno, who in turn sold it to the spouses Juan and Erlinda Nuguid. Pecson challenged the
validity of the auction sale before the RTC of Quezon City, which upheld the spouses’ title but
declared that the apartment building was not included in the auction sale. This was affirmed in
toto by the Court of Appeals and thereafter by this Court. On June 23, 1993, by virtue of the
Entry of Judgment, the Nuguids became the uncontested owners of the 256-square meter
commercial lot. As a result, the Nuguid spouses moved for delivery of possession of the lot and
the apartment building.

The trial court, relying upon Article 546[1][7] of the Civil Code, ruled that the Spouses Nuguid
were to reimburse Pecson for his construction cost, the spouses Nuguid were entitled to
immediate issuance of a writ of possession over the lot and improvements. The RTC also
directed Pecson to pay the same amount of monthly rentals to the Nuguids as paid by the tenants
occupying the apartment units. Pecson duly moved for reconsideration, the RTC issued a Writ of
Possession,directing the deputy sheriff to put the spouses Nuguid in possession of the subject
property with all the improvements thereon and to eject all the occupants therein.Pecson then
filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the order of payment of construction costs but rendered the issue of possession moot on
appeal.
Frustrated by this turn of events, Pecson filed a petition for review before this Court. On May 26,
1995, the Court handed down the decision remanding to the trial court for it to determine the
current market value of the apartment building on the lot. The value so determined shall be
forthwith paid by Spouses Juan and Erlinda Nuguid] to Pedro Pecson otherwise the petitioner
shall be restored to the possession of the apartment building until payment of the required
indemnity.
On the basis of this Court’s decision, Pecson filed a Motion to Restore Possession and a Motion
to Render Accounting, praying respectively for restoration of his possession over the subject
256-square meter commercial lot and for the spouses Nuguid to be directed to render an
accounting under oath, of the income derived from the subject four-door apartment from
November 22, 1993 until possession of the same was restored to him.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are liable to pay rent over and above the current market
value of the improvement and that such increased award of rentals by the RTC was reasonable
and equitable.

Held: It is not disputed that the construction of the 4-door 2-storey apartment, subject of this
dispute, was undertaken at the time when Pecson was still the owner of the lot. When the
Nuguids became the uncontested owner of the lot, by virtue of entry of judgment of the Court’s
decision, the apartment building was already in existence and occupied by tenants.

Under Article 448, the landowner is given the option, either to appropriate the improvement as
his own upon payment of the proper amount of indemnity or to sell the land to the possessor in
good faith. Relatedly, Article 546 provides that a builder in good faith is entitled to full
reimbursement for all the necessary and useful expenses incurred; it also gives him right of
retention until full reimbursement is made. As we earlier held, since petitioners opted to
appropriate the improvement for themselves as early as June 1993, when they applied for a writ
of execution despite knowledge that the auction sale did not include the apartment building, they
could not benefit from the lot’s improvement, until they reimbursed the improver in full, based
on the current market value of the property.

Despite the Court’s recognition of Pecson’s right of ownership over the apartment building, the
petitioners still insisted on dispossessing Pecson by filing for a Writ of Possession to cover both
the lot and the building. Clearly, this resulted in a violation of respondent’s right of retention.
Worse, petitioners took advantage of the situation to benefit from the highly valued, income-
yielding, four-unit apartment building by collecting rentals thereon, before they paid for the cost
of the apartment building. It was only 4 years later that they finally paid its full value to the
respondent.

Given the circumstances of the instant case where the builder in good faith has been clearly
denied his right of retention for almost half a decade, we find that the increased award of rentals
by the RTC was reasonable and equitable. The petitioners had reaped all the benefits from the
improvement introduced by the respondent during said period, without paying any amount to the
latter as reimbursement for his construction costs and expenses. They should account and pay for
such benefits.

We need not belabor now the appellate court’s recognition of herein respondent’s entitlement to
rentals from the date of the determination of the current market value until its full payment.
Respondent is clearly entitled to payment by virtue of his right of retention over the said
improvement.

HEIRS OF JUAN PANGANIBAN & INES PANGANIBAN, namely: ERLINDA B.

PACURSA, ERNESTO P. BACONGA, EVELYN BACONGA, AMY B. BIHAG,
SIEGFREDO BACONGA, IMELDA B. PACALDO, BACONGA, IMELDA B.
PACALDO, REBECCA B. LI, OFELIA B. OALIVAR, GEMMA BACONGA, MARIE
INES BACONGA, MELANIE BACONGA, and ANITA FUENTES VS. ANGELINA N.
DAYRIT.
G.R. No. 151235, July 28, 2005

Facts: The property subject of controversy is a 2,025-square meter portion of a lot denominated
as Lot 1436, situated at Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City. It constitutes 3/4 of Lot 1436, one of
the 3 lots covered by OCT No. 7864, the other two being Lots 1441 and 1485. Said OCT was
registered in the names of Juan and Ines Panganiban, father and daughter respectively.

Herein petitioners alleged that they are the possessors and owners of Lot 1436 which they
inherited from the late Juan and Ines. They acknowledge that Lot 1436 was the only remaining
lot covered by OCT No. 7864, Lots 1485 and 1441 having been sold in 1949 to Galo Sabanal
and Pablo Dagbay respectively.
The owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. 7864 covering Lot 1436 had been lost but upon petition
with the trial court in 1977 by Erlinda B. Pacursa, one of the heirs of Ines and a petitioner herein,
the trial court granted the petition. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Misamis Oriental
issued an owner’s duplicate certificate of the OCT Erlinda.

Petitioners further alleged that unknown to them, a certain Cristobal Salcedo asserted ownership
over Lot 1436 and believing that it was unregistered, sold a portion of it to respondent. The latter
subsequently discovered that what she had bought was registered land. Unable to annotate the
deed of sale at the back of OCT No. 7864, respondent fraudulently filed a petition for issuance of
the owner’s copy of said title, alleging that the copy issued to Erlinda was lost in the fire that
razed Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City in 1981.

The petition was granted and the Register of Deeds of Misamis Oriental issued the second
owner’s duplicate certificate of OCT to respondent which contained an annotation of a Notice of
Adverse Claim filed by Erlinda. The Notice of Adverse Claim alleged in part that Erlinda is one
of the lawful heirs of Juan and Ines, the registered owners of the property, and as such, she has a
legitimate claim thereto.
Petitioners further alleged that the newly issued owner’s duplicate certificate of OCT to
respondent was prejudicial to their previously issued title which is still in existence. Thus, they
prayed among others that they be declared as the rightful owners of the property in question and
that the duplicate certificate of OCT in their possession be deemed valid and subsisting.

In her answer to the amended complaint, respondent denied all the material allegations but
alleged that Lot 1436 was actually sold sometime in 1947 by the petitioners themselves and their
father, Mauricio Baconga. The sale was purportedly covered by a Deed of Definite Sale. Salcedo
then came into ownership, possession and enjoyment of the property in question and sold a
portion of Lot 1436 with an area of 2,025 square meters, more or less, to respondent. From then
on, the property in question has been in her actual and physical enjoyment. Respondent further
alleged that the complaint was barred by the principles of estoppel and laches by virtue of the
sales executed by petitioners themselves and their father.

After due trial and consideration of the documentary and testimonial evidence adduced by both
parties, the trial court rendered a decision against petitioners and in favor of respondent which
declared defendant as the true and real owner of the lot in question; and thatthe owner’s duplicate
copy of Original Certificate of Title No. 7864 null and void same being obtained by plaintiffs
when they were not owners anymore of Lot 1436; the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT obtained
by defendant as the one valid.

The Regional Trial Court Decision was modified by the CA on appeal by petitioners. The
appellate court held that contrary to the ruling of the trial court, the valid and subsisting duplicate
certificate of OCT No. 7864 was the one issued to Erlinda, not to respondent, considering that
respondent had failed to comply with the mandatory jurisdictional requirements of law for the
reconstitution of title under Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 26.

The CA invoked the doctrine that a trial court does not acquire jurisdiction over a petition for the
issuance of a new owner’s duplicate certificate of title if the original is in fact not lost.
Nonetheless, the CA affirmed in all other respects the ruling of the trial court, including the
critical holding that respondent was the owner of the subject property. The decision of the trial
court is modified so as to order the cancellation of the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. 7864
issued to defendant Angelina Dayrit and declaring the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. 7864
to be still valid for all intents and purposes.

Issues:

• Who between petitioners and respondent is the rightful owner of

the property in dispute.
• Whether petitioners’ right to recover the property is barred by
laches assuming they are the rightful owners thereof as they claim.
 • Which owner’s duplicate certificate of title is valid and subsisting,
the one in petitioners’ possession or the one issued to respondent.

Held: The resolution of the foregoing issues hinges on the question of What appears on the face
of the title is controlling in questions of ownership since the certificate of title is an absolute and
indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein.
The CA correctly ruled that the duplicate certificate of title in petitioners’ possession is valid and
subsisting. This Court had already ruled in Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals that if a certificate of
title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is
void and the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction over the petition for
issuance of a new title. Since the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. 7864 earlier issued to
Erlinda is still in existence, the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over respondent’s petition
for reconstitution of title. The duplicate certificate of title subsequently issued to respondent is
therefore void and of no effect.
The registered owners of OCT No. 7864 on the face of the valid and subsisting duplicate
certificate of title are still Juan and Ines, petitioners’ predecessors in interest. Per Section 46 of
the Land Registration Act, no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner
shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. This rule taken in conjunction with the
indefeasibility of a Torrens title leads to the conclusion that the rightful owners of the property in
dispute are petitioners.

These premises considered, it was error on the part of the trial court to rule that respondent was
the owner of the subject property and for the CA to have affirmed such holding. We rule instead
that the successors-in-interest of Juan and Ines are the legal owners of the subject property,
namely petitioners herein.

Petitioners’ ownership of the property having been established, the question now is whether they
are entitled to its possession. On this point, the Court rules in the negative. Petitioners are no
longer entitled to recover possession of the property by virtue of the equitable defense of laches.
Thus, petitioners’ argument that laches is not applicable to them has no merit. By laches is
meant: …the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The defense of laches is an
equitable one and does not concern itself with the character of the defendant’s title but only with
whether or not by reason of plaintiff’s long inaction or inexcusable neglect, he should be barred
from asserting his claim at all, because to allow him to do so would be inequitable and unjust to
defendant.

In our jurisdiction, it is an enshrined rule that even a registered owner of property may be barred
from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches. In this case, both the lower court and
the appellate court found that contrary to respondent’s claim of possession, it was Salcedo,
respondent’s predecessor-in-interest who had been in actual possession of the property. Salcedo
was the owner and the one in possession of the land until 1978 when respondent became the
possessor thereof based from the ocular inspection by the lower court.

It was only 45 years from the time Salcedo took possession of the property that petitioners made
an attempt to claim it as their own. Petitioners declared the property for tax purposes, registered
their adverse claim to respondent’s title, and filed the instant case all in 1992. These actuations of
petitioners point to the fact that for forty-five (45) years, they did nothing to assert their right of
ownership and possession over the subject property. Given the circumstances in the case at bar,
the application of the equitable defense of laches is more than justified.

All the four (4) elements of laches prescribed by this Court in the case of Go Chi Gun, et al. v.
Co Cho, et al.[42] and reiterated in the cases of Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia, Miguel v. Catalino
and Claverias v. Quingco are present in the case at bar, to wit:

(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the
situation of which complaint is made for which the complaint seeks a remedy;

(2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice,
of the defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;

(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert
the right on which he bases his suit; and

(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the
suit is not held to be barred.

RUBEN S. SIA VS. HEIRS OF JOSE P. MARIANO (Helen S. Mariano, Jose M.S.
Mariano, Danilo D.S. Mariano, Ma. Sofia C.S. Mariano, Ma. Leonor S. Mariano),
TESTATE ESTATE OF IRENE P. MARIANO, and ERLINDA MARIANO-
VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 143606. June 29, 2005

Facts: Spouses Macario and Irene P. Mariano during their lifetime owned the following six
parcels of land covered by five titles: Lot 15-A (TCT No. 1962), Lot 15-B (TCT No. 1963), Lot
15-C (TCT No. 1964), Lots 545 and 2348 (TCT No. 259)[2] and Lot 612 (TCT No. 219). On
December 1, 1972, Macario died and the surviving heirs, spouse Irene and children, Jose and
Erlinda, were issued new titles in their names. On December 9, 1974, Irene married Rolando S.
Relucio Four months later, Irene executed a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the six parcels of
land in favor of Raul Santos, Rolando’s first cousin, for a total consideration of P150,000.00.
On June 7, 1979, Irene sold Lot 612 to Greta Tinga de los Reyes. On March 10, 1982, Irene
executed another Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Raul covering Lots 545 and 2348. On
October 2, 1987, the three remaining lots were transferred in the name of Raul. Previously, on
November 24, 1986, Lot 15-C was levied upon in favor of Francisco Bautista in Civil Case No.
R-570 before Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur. On December 9, 1988, it
was sold at public auction to Ruben Sia.

On June 26, 1988, Irene died. Three weeks later, Jose and Erlinda filed a complaint against
Rolando, Raul and the Register of Deeds of Naga City before the RTC of Naga City for
annulment of sale with damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 88-1506. They sought the
annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale on grounds of forgery and simulated sale, the
reconveyance of the properties, and damages.

When Jose died on December 2, 1989 he was substituted by his surviving heirs, likewise, when
Rolando died, he was substituted by his surviving heirs. Meanwhile, on August 9, 1990, Lot 15-
A was transferred to Amado Sanao under a Deed of Sale with Real Estate Mortgage. Heirs of
Jose and the Testate Estate of Irene filed a complaint for annulment of title and deed with
damages. Such Civil Case was consolidated for joint trial with former Civil Case and a Joint
Judgment was rendered by the trial court dismissing the complaints and counterclaims and
upholding the validity of the Deeds of Absolute Sale executed by Irene in favor of Raul.

On appeal, the CA held that: only four lots are subject of the case; despite the execution of the
two Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of Raul, Irene continued to possess, exercise management
and control over the subject properties. Irene constructed a building on Lots 545 and 2348; such
acts of dominion demonstrate that the two Deeds of Absolute Sale executed by Irene in favor of
Raul are simulated or fictitious contracts. Accordingly, TCT issued in the name of Raul Santos
and Amado Sanao are ordered cancelled. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Raul. The
Heirs of Jose and Erlinda M. Mariano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration/Clarification.
Thus, the assailed Resolution, and Motion for Reconsideration filed separately by Raul Santos
and as well as the Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification filed by Heirs of Jose P. Mariano and
Erlinda were denied, while the Supplemental Motion to Restore Possession and Administration
to Plaintiffs-Appellants was granted. Finally, plaintiffs-appellants are declared to have the right
to redeem Lot 15-C from Ruben Sia.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in having declared in its resolution that
plaintiffs-appellants have the right to redeem Lot 15-C from herein petitioner.

Held: Three undisputed facts are prominent in the present petition which have great bearing in
the disposition thereof: (1) petitioner is neither a party before the trial court nor in the CA; (2)
Lot 15-C is not a subject matter of the case; and (3) our decision in G.R. Nos. 94617 and 95281,
wherein herein respondent Erlinda Villanueva and petitioner Sia are parties, had expressly
declared that respondents have the right to redeem the lot covered by TCT No. 17745 which
refers to Lot 15-C.
There is no question that Lot 15-C is not one of the parcels of land involved in the appeal before
the CA. In its decision, it specifically mentioned only Lot 15-A, Lot 15-B, Lot 545 and Lot 2348
as the lots subject of the case. Thus, this fact and the fact that petitioner is not a party to the case,
militate against the propriety of declaring in the assailed Resolution that respondents have the
right to redeem Lot 15-C.

Finally, there is no longer any actual case or controversy between the parties insofar as the issue
of redemption of Lot 15-C is concerned. This is settled by the decision of this Court which orders
the Provincial Sheriff of Camarines Sur to accept payment of redemption money for the property
levied in Civil Case No. R-570 from petitioner Erlinda Mariano, to execute and deliver to
Erlinda Mariano a duly accomplished certificate of redemption of said property. The Definite
Deed of Sale and writ of execution issued in favor of Ruben Sia are nullified.

MODE OF ACQUIRING OWNERSIP; PRESCRIPTION; A POSSESSOR IN THE

CONCEPT OF OWNER SOLEDAD CALICDAN, ETC. VS. SILVERIO CENDANA,
ETC.
G.R. No.155080, February 5, 2004

Facts: On August 25, 1947, Fermina, widow of Sixto Calicdan, who died intestate, executed a
deed of donation intervivos whereby she conveyed a 750-square meter of unregistered land
located in Mangaldan, Pangasinan formerly owned by Sixto to respondent Silverio Cendana who
immediately entered into possession of the land. Sometime in 1949, Cendana constructed a two-
storey residential house thereon where he resided until his death in 1998.

On June 19, 1992, petitioner Soledad, daughter of Fermina, through her legal guardian,
Guadalupe Castillo, filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages
against the respondent alleging that; 1) the donation was void; 2) the respondent took advantage
of her incompetence in acquiring the land; and 3) she merely tolerated respondent’s possession
of the land as well as the construction of his house thereon.

In his answer with Motion to dismiss, respondent contended that; 1)the land was donated to him
by Fermina in 1947; 2) he had been publicly, peacefully, continuously and adversely in
possession of the land for a period of 45 years; and 3) the complaint was barred by prior
judgment in the special proceedings.
In its decision dated November 12, 1996, the trial court ordered Silverio Cendana to vacate the
land and surrender ownersip and possession of the same to petitioner. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision and declared that the donation was valid and that the
petitioner lost her ownership of the property by prescription.
Issue: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed on August 25, 1947 was void.

Held: Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownersip and other real right over immovable
property. It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and uner conditions laid down by law,
namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted
and adverse. The good failth of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person
from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. For
purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the
property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other
real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.

In this case at bar, as it demands that the possession be in good faith and with just title and there
is no evidence on record to prove respondent’s good faith, nevertheless, his adverse possession
of the land for more than 45 years aptly shows he has met the requirements for extraordinary
acquisitive prescription to set in.

DONATION MORTIS CAUSA OR INTER VIVOS MA. ESTELA MAGLASANG VS.

THE HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN
G.R. No.131953, June 5, 2002

Facts: Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, Nicolas Cabatingan, a “Deed of
Conditional Donation Inter Vivos for House and Lot”. Four other deeds of donation were
subsequently executed by Conchita Cabatingan bestowing parcels of land upon Estela
Maglasang, Nicolas Cabatingan and Merly Cabatingan. These deeds of donation contain similar
provisions, which state that the donation, will become effective upon the death of the donor;
provided, however, that in the event that the donee should die before the donor, the present
donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded and of no further force and effect.

Later, Conchita Cabatingan died.

Issue: Whether or not the donations were inter vivos or mortis causa.

Held: In a donation mortis causa, the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the
donor is still alive. In determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following
characteristics must be taken into account:
1.) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership and control of the
property while alive;
2.) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
the revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properties conveyed; and
3.) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

The disputed donations are donations mortis causa. In the present case, the nature of the
donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any clear
provision that intends to pass propriety rights to donee prior to Cabatingan’s dearh. Cabatingan
did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to the donee during her lifetime.

SALES

SALE BY A CO-OWNER; CO-OWNERSHIP AGUIRRE ET, AL. VS. COURT OF

APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 122249. January 29, 2004

Facts: Leocadio Medrano and his first wife Emilia owned a piece of land. After the death of
Emilia, Leocadio married his second wife Miguela. When Leocadio died, all his heirs agreed that
Sixto Medrano, a child of the first marriage, should manage and administer the said property.
After Sixto died, his heirs learned that he had executed an Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property
in which he falsely stated that he was only heirs of Leocadio. Sixto, then living, was able to sell
the property to Maria Bacong a portion of the property, and another portion to Tiburcio Balitaan.

Maria Bacong later sold the said portion to Rosendo Bacong. Petitioners, all heirs of Leocadio
who were affected by the sale demanded reconveyance of the portions sold by Sixto but the 3
vendees refused. So, petitioners sued them seeking the nullity of the documents and partition.
The vendees contended that they acquired the property under the valid deed of sale and
petitioners ‘cause of action was bared by laches and prescription. Tiburcio also contended that he
is an innocent purchaser for value.

Issue: Whether there was a valid sale made by a co-owner ( Sixto) without the consent of the
other co-owners.

Held: A sale by a co-owner of the whole property as his will affect only his own share but not
those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale ( Art. 493, NCC). It clearly provides
that the sale or other disposition affects only the seller’s share pro indiviso, and the transferee
gets only what corresponds to his grantor’s share in the partition of the property owned in
common. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by
one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owner is NOT NULL AND VOID; only the
rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the
property. The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the
recovery of possession of the things owned in common from the third person who substituted the
co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as
if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it. (
Mainit v. Bandoy). It is clear therefore that the deed of sale executed by Sixto in favor of
Tiburcio Balitaan is valid conveyance only insofar as the share of Sixto in the co-ownership is
concerned.

As we have enunciated in Salvador v. CA (1995), to wit: this Court has held that the possession
of a co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall not be regarded as adverse to the other co-owners
but in fact beneficial to all of them. Acts which may be considered adverse to strangers may not
be considered adverse in so far as co-owners are concerned. A mere silent possession by a co-
owner, his receipts of rentals, fruits or profits from the property, the erection of buildings and
fences and planting of trees thereon, and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of
exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and convincing evidence that he exercised
such acts of possession which unequivocally constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of
the other co-owners.

Thus, in order that a co-owner’s possession may be deemed adverse to the cetui que trust or the
other co-owners, the following elements must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts
of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cetui que trust or the other co-owners; (2) that such
positive acts of repudiation have been known to the cestui que trust or the other co-owners; and
(3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing. Tested against these guidelines, the
respondents failed to present competent evidence that the acts of Sixto adversely and clearly
repudiate the existing co-ownership among the heirs of Leocadio Medrano.

Respondent’s reliance on the tax declaration in the name of Sixto Medrano is unworthy of credit
since we have held on several occasions that tax declarations by themselves do not conclusively
prove title to land. Further, respondents failed to show that the Affidavit executed by Sixto to the
effect that he is the sole owner of the subject property was known or made known to the other
co-heirs of Leocadio Medrano.

RESCISION OF “CONTRACT TO BUY” ANAMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

GR. No. 128609. January 29, 2004

Facts: The property was previously owned by Douglas Anama’s parents, who mortgaged it to
Philippine Savings Bank and later was foreclosed. Douglas and the PSBank entered into an
agreement denominated as a Contract to Buy whereby the bank agreed to sell to Douglas the said
land with all the improvements thereon. The Contract to Buy provides that Anama shall purchase
the property of a certain amount and shall pay to the PSBank; it also provides that (1) Anama
shall apply with the bank for a loan, the proceeds of which answer for the balance of the
purchase price; (2) should the petitioner fail to comply with any of the terms of contract, all
amounts paid are forfeited in favor of PSBank, the latter having the option either to demand full
payment of total price or to rescind the contract.

Anama was able to pay the first and second installments; however, he failed to pay the third
installment when it became due. There were several transactions between them to settle the
amount due. But later, the bank executed an Affidavit of Cancellation rescinding the contract,
and forfeited the payments made by Anama which were applied as rentals of the use of the
property. Anama was then advised to vacate the property despite his opposition to the rescission
of the Contract to Buy. The bank sold the property to spouses Co, in whose favor TCT was
issued. Anama then filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale, Cancellation of TCT,
and Specific Performance with Damages.

Issue: Whether the rescission of the Contract to Buy was valid.

Held: Since Anama failed to pay the third installment, PSBank was entitled to rescind the
Contract to Buy. The contract provides the Bank two options in the event that petitioner fails to
pay any of the installments. This was either (1) to rescind the contract outright and forfeit all
amounts paid by the petitioner, or (2) to demand the satisfaction of the contract and insist on the
full payment of the total price. After petitioner repeatedly failed to pay the third installment, the
Bank chose to exercise the first option.

The Contract to Buy is actually a contract to sell whereby the vendor reserves ownership of the
property and is not to pass until full payment. Such payment is a positive suspensive condition,
the failure of which is not a breach but simply an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor
to convey title from acquiring binding force. Since ownership of the subject property was not
pass to petitioner until fill payment of the purchase price, his failure to pay on the date stipulated,
or in the extension granted, prevented the obligation for the Bank to pass title of the property to
Anama. The bank could validly sell the property to the spouses Co, the right of the bank to sell
the property being unequivocal.

IMPOSTION OF 12% ANNUAL INTEREST RATE ALMEDA VS. CARIÑO ET AL.

GR. No. 152143. January 13, 2003

Facts: Ponciano L. Almeda (vendee) and Avelino Cariño (vendor), predecessors-in-interest of

petitioners and respondents, entered into two agreements to sell, one covering eight titled
properties, and the other, three untitled properties. The agreed price of the eight titled properties
was P 1,743,800.00, twenty percent (20%) of which was to be paid upon the signing and
execution of the agreement and the balance to be paid in four equal semi-annual installments,
beginning six (6) months from the signing thereof, with the balance earning twelve percent
(12%) interest per annum. On the other hand, the purchase price of the three untitled properties
was P1,208,580.00, fifteen percent (15%) of which was to be paid upon the signing and
execution of the agreement, and the balance, bearing a twelve percent (12%) annual interest from
the signing thereof, to be paid as follows: fifteen percent (15%) of the purchase price plus
interest to be paid upon the issuance of titles to the lots, and the balance plus interests to be paid
in semi-annual installments starting form the date of issuance of the respective certificates of title
to the lots involved, which must not be later than March 30, 1982.

Later, Cariño and Almeda executed an amendment to their agreements to sell (a) extending the
deadline for the production of the titles to the untitled properties, (b) providing for a partial
payment of P300,000.00 for the titled properties, (c) requiring Cariño to render an accounting of
the proceeds of the sugar cane crop on the properties subject of the sale up to the 1982 harvest
season, and (d) obliging Cariño to pay Almeda the sum of P10,000.00 a month in case of the
failure of the former to produce the certificates of title to the untitled properties by June 30,
1982.

Almeda asked Cariño for the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale over the eight titled
properties although they had not been fully paid. Cariño granted the request and executed the
Deed of Sale over the eight titled lots in favor of Almeda. The latter executed an undertaking to
pay Cariño the balance of the purchase price. Deeds of Sale for two of the three untitled lots
were also executed.

Cariño made demands for the full and final payment of the balance due him in the amount of
P477,589.47 and the interest thereon. Despite demand letters sent to Almeda, the balance was not
paid. Hence, Cariño filed before the RTC a complaint against Almeda. Cariño prayed that
Almeda be ordered to pay him the balance, the legal interests thereon from demand to full
payment, fifteen percent (15%) of all the amounts due, including interests as attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses, moral, exemplary, and nominal damages and the costs of the suit.

The RTC found the claim of Cariño to be well founded and gave judgment in his favor. The CA
subsequently affirmed the lower court’s decision.
The Almedas claim that the imposition of a 12% annual interest is erroneous because it is
contrary to law and jurisprudence. According to them, the applicable rate is 6% since the case
does not involve a loan or forbearance of money, as provided for under Central Bank Circular
No. 416.

Issue: Whether or not the contention of Almeda is meritorious.

Held: This contention is without merit. Art. 2209, NCC provides: If the obligation consists in the
payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there
being no stipulation to contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the
absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per annum.
The contracts to sell of the parties stipulated that the balance of the purchase price shall earn an
interest rate of 12% per annum upon signing of the contract. Such stipulations have the force of
law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith. The interest in
this case should be allowed to run from March 9, 1993, respondents’ extrajudicial demand for
payment of the remaining balance plus interest having begun on said date.

In addition, in accordance with our decision in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
when the judgment of the court awarding the sum of money becomes final and executory, a 12%
interest per annum shall also be imposed from such finality until satisfaction thereof, this interim
period by deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.

EQUITABLE MORTGAGE HILADO VS. HEIRS OF RAFAEL MEDALLA

377 SCRA 257. February 15, 2002

Facts: Gorgonio Macainan was the owner of the several properties. After his death, his estate
was divided among his heirs, including his children by his first wife, a contract ( Anita, Rosita &
Berbonio) As Berbonio had predeceased Gorgonio, her children ( Rafael, Lourdes&Teresita
surnamed Medalla) succeeded to her inheritance. Respondents herein are the heirs of Rafael
Medalla.

Rafael Medalla executed a Deed of Absolute Sale purporting to sell his share in the inheritance
to Gorgonio Hilado. Later, he executed another”Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Hilado over
his share in another inherited property. Over the next 2 years, Hilado and Medalla executed 3
more contracts concerning the sold properties;”(1) “ Memorandum of Agreement,”(2) “Deed of
Resale,” whereby Hilado resold to Medalla two of the 5 hectares a lot, and (3)”Agreement.”

Anita Macainan (his aunt) tried to redeem the first property that was sold from Hilado but she
failed, so she filed a suit against Rafael and Hilado for Legal redemption before the RTC. So,
Rafael filed a cross-claim against Hilado, alleging that the first deed of sale was in fact an
equitable mortgage to secure a loan from Hilado. The latter denied that the agreement between
them was a loan but a Deed of Sale, reflecting their true agreement.

Issue: Whether the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Medalla and Hilado is in fact an equitable
mortgage.

Held: Under Art. 1602 in relation to Art. 1604, NCC, a contract purporting to be an absolute sale
is presumed to be an equitable mortgage--- (1) when the price of a sale….is unusually
inadequate; (2) when the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise;(3) when after the
expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending the period of the redemption
or granting a new period is executed;(4) when the purchaser retains for himself a part of the
purchase price;(5) when the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;(6) in any
other case where it may be fairly inferred that theh real intention of the parties is that the
presence of any of these circumstances is sufficient for a contract to be presumed as an equitable
mortgage.

In view of the conclusions we have reached, it is unnecessary to pass upon Hilado’s contention
that respondents are bound by the terms of the “Deed of Sale” in question as the law between the
parties. It will suffice to say that even if a document appears on its face to be a sale, the owner of
the property may prove that the contract is really a loan with a mortgage that the document does
not express the true intent and agreement of the parties.

CONTRACTS OF SALE; ELEMENTS;CONTRACT WHERE CONSENT IS VITIATED

IS VOIDABLE;ANNULMENT AND RESTITUTION OF THE PROPERTY AND ITS
FRUITS TO THE RESPONDENT IS JUST AND PROPER. KATIPUNAN VS.
KATIPUNAN, JR.
3537 SCRA 199. January 30, 2002

Facts: Respondent Braulio Katipunan Jr. is the registered owner of a lot and a five-door
apartment constructed thereon, which were occupied by lessees. Respondent assisted by his
brother petitioner Miguel entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale with brothers Edardo Balguma
and Leopoldo Balguma, Jr. ( co-petitioners), represented by their lawyer-father involving the
subject property for a consideration of P187,000.00. So, the title was registered in the names of
the Balguma brothers and they started collecting rentals thereon.

Later, Braulio filed a complaint for annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale, contending that his
brother Miguel, Atty. Balguma and Inocencio Valdez ( one of the petitioners) convinced him to
work abroad. Through insidious words and machinations, they made him sign a document
purportedly a contract of employment, which document turned out to be a Deed of Absolute
Sale. He further alleged that he did not receive the consideration stated in the contract. He
claimed that there was evident bad faith and conspiracy in taking advantage of his ignorance, he
being only a third grader.

The RTC dismissed the complaint because Braulio failed to prove his cause of action since he
admitted that he obtained loans from the Balgumas, he signed the Deed of Absolute Sale, and he
acknowledged selling the property and stopped collecting the rentals. But when the case was
elevated, the decision of RTC was reversed and it was held that Braulio was incompetent, has
very low I.Q., illiterate and has a slow comprehension. The CA based its decision on Arts.1332
and 1390 of NCC and Sec. 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, concerning the incompetence of a
party in contract.

Issue: Whether there was a valid contract of sale between the parties.

Held: The Supreme Court found the petition devoid of merit. There was a vitiated consent on the
part of the respondent as he signed the Deed of Absolute Sale without the remotest idea of what
it was and received no consideration thereof. The contract entered into by the parties being
voidable contract, was correctly annulled on appeal.

A contract of sale is born from the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is
the object of the contract and upon the price. This meeting of minds speaks of the intent of the
parties in entering the contract respecting the subject matter and the consideration thereof. Thus,
the elements of a contract of a sale are consent, object, and price in money or its equivalent.
Under Art. 1330 of NCC, consent may be vitiated by any of the following: mistake, violence,
intimidation, undue influence, and fraud. The presence of any of these vices renders the contract
voidable.

A contract where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent or where consent is vitiated by
mistake, fraud, or intimidation is not void ab initio but only voidable and is binding upon the
parties unless annulled proper court action. The effect of annulment is to restore the parties to the
status quo ante insofar as legally and equitably possible---this much is dictated by Art. 1398
provides that when the defect of the contract consists in the incapacity of one of the parties, the
incapacitated person is not obliged to make any restitution, except when he has been benefited by
the things or price received by him. Thus, since the Deed of Absolute Sale between respondent
and Balguma brothers is voidable and hereby annulled, then the restitution of the property and its
fruits to respondent is just and proper.

SALE BY AN AGENT;SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY PINEDA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

367 SCRA 222. February 6,2002

Facts: Nelson and Mercedez Bañez are the original owners of a parcel of land together with its
improvements located at White Plains, Q.C.(Q.C. Property) while Alejandria Pineda is the owner
of a house located at Los Angeles, California (California Property), the two parties executed an
“Agreement to Exchange Real Properties.” In the agreement, they agreed to: 1) exchange their
respective properties, 2) Pineda to pay an earnest money of $ 12,000 on February 1983, and 3) to
consummate the exchange of properties not later than June 1983. It was agreed also that both
should undertake to clear the mortgages over their respective properties.

The Bañez were allowed to occupy or lease to a tenant the California property, and Pineda was
authorized to occupy the Q.C. property. Pursuant to the agreement, Pineda paid the earnest
money of $12,000, but the latter failed to clear the mortgages over her California property. Later,
unknown to the Bañezes, Pineda and spouses Duque executed an “Agreement to Sell” over the
Q.C. property whereby Pineda sold the property to the spouse Duque for 1.6 M.

The record shows that pursuant to the agreement to sell, there were payments that occupying
their Q.C. property. The latter were interested in the property so the Bañezes did not insist on the
return of said property. So, there were negotiations for the purchase of the property that was held
between them, but the same failed which resulted in the Bañezes’ demanding for the Duques to
vacate the property and later filed a case before the court.
Issue: Whether the Duques validly acquired the Q.C. property.

Held: Pineda’s sale of the property to Duques was not authorized by the real owners of the land
Bañez. The Civil Code provides that in a sale of a parcel of land or any interest therein made
through an agent, a special power of attorney is essential. This authority must be in writing;
otherwise the sale shall be void. In his testimony, Duque confirmed that at the time he purchased
the property from Pineda, the latter had no special power of attorney to sell the property.
A special power of attorney is necessary to enter into any contract by which the ownership of an
immovable is transmitted or acquired for a valuable consideration. Without an authority in
writing, Pineda could not validly sell the subject property to Duque. Hence, any sale in favor of
Duque is void.
As the consent of the real owner of the property was not obtained, no contract was perfected
(Art. 1318 of the Civil Code)

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS JURISDICTION

MATEO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 128392 April 29, 2005

Facts: Casimiro Development Corporation (CDC) alleged that it was the owner of a parcel of
registered land since it acquired the same from the previous owner, China Banking Corporation
(CBC). After the sale CDC advised the petitioners that it was the new owner and that they had
failed to pay the rentals due to it and to its predecessors-in-interest. The petitioners refused to
pay and vacate the premises despite demands to settle their obligations and notice to vacate were
served upon them. This prompted CDC to file a complaint for Unlawful Detainer against the
petitioners before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC). The petitioners maintained that since the
land was classified as agricultural as evidenced by a Tax Declaration Certificate, it is the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) that has jurisdiction over the
case. It should be noted that the land is covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of
CDC’s predecessor-in-interest CBC.

Issue: Whether or not jurisdiction over the subject matter lies with the DARAB or with the
Metropolitan Trial Court.

Held: For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over the case, there must be a tenancy relationship
between the parties. One of the indispensable elements in order for a tenancy agreement to take
hold over a dispute is that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. It
must be noted that the petitioners failed to adequately prove ownership of the land. They merely
showed tax declarations. As against a transfer certificate of title, tax declarations or receipts are
not adequate proofs of ownership. Hence, it is the MeTC that has jurisdiction over the subject
matter there being no proof of tenancy relationship.
RECONVEYANCE
HEIRS OF POMPOSA SALUDARES VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 128254. January 16, 2004

Facts: The heirs and their father, Juan Dator executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of the
share of Pomposa in the Tanza estate with the eastern portion thereof going to Juan and the
western half to the children. Juan remained in possession of his share until his death. Isabel Dator
applied for a free patent over the entire Tanza estate in behalf of the heirs thus it was awarded.
Private respondents filed an action for reconveyance against petitioner heirs. They alleged that
they were the owners in fee simple and they were in possession of the land, and Isabel Dator
obtained free patent in favor of the heirs by means of fraud and misrepresentation. Petitioners
alleged that they and their predecessors in interest had been in actual, continuous, adverse and
public possession of the land in the concept of owners since time immemorial, and the title to the
lot was issued to them after faithful compliance with the requirements for the issuance of a free
patent.

Issues:

1) Whether or not the reconveyance is still available notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the
Torrens Title.

2) Whether or not the heirs have been in open and continuous possession of the disputed lot.

Held:

1) The registered owner may still be compelled to reconvey the registered property to its true
owner. Reconveyance does not set aside or re-subject to review the findings of fact of the Bureau
of Lands. Thus, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought is the
transfer of the property or its title, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another person’s name, to its rightful or legal owner or to the one with a better right.

2) The heirs convincingly established their open and continuous occupation of the entire Tanza
estate. The farm was under the administration of Beata and Isabel Dator who took over its
management after Petra Dator died; heir’s tenant Miguel Dahilig had been consistently tending
the land since 1947 and was the one who planted the various crops and trees on the lot.
EXTRINSIC FRAUD REXLON REALTY GROUP, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 128412. March 15, 2002

Facts: Respondent Alex David was the registered owner of two parcel of land. Petitioner Rexlon
Realty Group, Inc. (Rexlon) entered into an agreement with respondent for the purchase of the
two parcels of land as evidenced by an “absolute deed of sale.” Respondent filed with the
Regional Trial Court a petition for the issuance of the owner’s duplicate copies which were
allegedly lost; petition granted by the court. Rexlon then filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for annulment of the decision of the trial court on the ground that David allegedly
employed fraud and deception in securing the replacement owner’s duplicate copies.

Issue: Whether or not such misrepresentation or fraud of respondent David can be characterized
as an extrinsic fraud as to merit the annulment of the trial court’s decision.

Held: Extrinsic fraud contemplates a situation where a litigant commits acts outside the trial of
the case; the effect of which prevents a party from having a trial, a real contest, or from
presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining to the
judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was produced so that there is not a fair submission
of the controversy. It is well settled that the use of forged instrument or prejudiced testimonials
during trial is not an extrinsic fraud, because such evidence does not preclude the participation of
any party in the proceedings. While a perjured testimony may prevent a fair and just
determination of a case, it does not bar the adverse party from rebutting or opposing the use of
such evidence. Furthermore, it should be stressed that extrinsic fraud pertains to an act
committed outside of the trial. The alleged fraud in this case was perpetrated during the trial.

PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT RUN AGAINST THE STATE PAGKATIPUNAN VS.

COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 129682. March 21, 2002

Facts: On June 15, 1967, the Court of First Instance of Gumaca, Quezon promulgated a decision
confirming petitioner’s title to properties located in San Narciso, Quezon. Almost eighteen (18)
years later, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the Intermediate Appellate Court an action
to declare the proceedings in the LRC case null and void and to cancel the original certificate of
title and to confirm the subject land as part of the public domain. The Republic claimed that the
subject land was classified as timberland; hence, inalienable and not subject to registration. On
the other hand, petitioners raised the special defense of indefeasibility of title and res judicata.
Issues:

• Whether or not prescription runs against the state.

• Whether or not occupation will ripen into ownership.

Held:

1) Prescription does not run against the state. The lengthy occupation of the disputed land by
petitioners cannot be counted in their favor, as it remained part of the patrimonial property of the
state which is inalienable and not disposable.

2) Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the
state it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Occupation thereof in the concept of
owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.

A TORRENS TITLE, ONCE REGISTERED, SERVES AS NOTICE TO THE WHOLE WORLD

ALVARICO VS. SOLA
G.R. No. 138953. June 6, 2002

Facts: Fermina Lopez executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication and Transfer of Rights over lot 5 in
favor of Amelita Sola, who agreed to assume all the obligations, duties and conditions imposed
which was approved by the Bureau of Lands. Castorio Alvarico filed a civil case for
reconveyance against Amelita. He claimed that Fermina donated the land to him and
immediately thereafter, he took possession of the same. He averred that the donations to him had
the effect of withdrawing the earlier transfer to Amelita. Amelita maintained that the donation to
petitioner was void because Fermina was no longer the owner of the property when it was
allegedly donated to petitioner, the property having been transferred earlier to her. She added that
the donation was void because of lack of approval from the Bureau of Lands and that she had
validly acquired the land as Fermina’s rightful heir.

Issue: Who between the petitioner and respondent has a better claim to the land?

Held: The execution of public documents, as in the case of Affidavits of Adjudication is entitled
to the presumption of regularity, hence convincing evidence is required to assail and controvert
them. A Torrens title, once registered, serves as notice to the whole world. All persons must take
notice and no one can plead ignorance of its registration. Clearly then, petitioner has no standing
at all to question the validity of Amelita’s title. It follows that he cannot recover the property
because he has not shown that he is the rightful owner thereof.

OPEN, CONTINUOUS, AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE LAND

DEL ROSARIO VS. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 148338. June 6, 2002

Facts: Petitioner filed an application for registration of a parcel of land. The clerk of court
transmitted to the Land Registration Authority (LRA) the duplicate copy of petitioner’s
application for registration, the original tracing cloth plan, and the other documents submitted by
petitioner in support of his application. During the initial hearing, no oppositor appeared except
for the provincial prosecutor who appeared on behalf of the Solicitor General in representation of
the Republic of the Philippines. The trial court granted the application. Respondent appealed for
failure of petitioner to submit in evidence the original tracing cloth plan and to establish that he
and his predecessors in interest had been in open, continuous, and notorious possession of the
land.

Issues:

1) Whether or not the submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan is a mandatory
requirement.

2) Whether or not petitioners had been in open, continuous, and notorious possession of the land.

Held:
1) The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan duly approved by the Bureau of
Lands in cases for application of original registration of land is mandatory requirement. The
reason for the rule is to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a
parcel of land or portion thereof already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall
the possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration.

2) A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute
possession under claim of ownership for him. Possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to
give rise to a presumptive grant from the state. The possession of the land however long the
period thereof may have extended never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the
Statute of Limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the state unless the
occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under the claim of ownership for the
required number of years.
REDEMPTION PERIOD OF THE PROPERTY
RECAÑA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 123850. January 5, 2001

Facts: Lot 6 of Block 2 of the Tondo Foreshore Land of the Land Tenure Administration was
sold to Macario Arboleda, petitioner-spouses’ predecessor in interest. The land was covered by
an original certificate in the name of Arboleda. The city treasurer of Manila auctioned the lot at a
public auction sale due to tax delinquency. Spouses Cirilo and Miguela Montejo sold the
property to petitioner-spouses who refunded the amount equivalent to the delinquent taxes and
other expenses entailed. Private respondents, the other children and heirs of Macarion Arboleda
filed for declaration of co-ownership and partition against petitioner. They asserted that the
repurchase by the petitioner of the lot redounded to their benefit as co-heirs and now as co-
owners. Petitioners contended that Section 4 of R.A. 1597, the law governing the subdivision of
the Tondo Foreshore Lands from which the subject property emanated does not apply to the
attendant facts in this case. Instead they instead that it was Section 78 of P.D. 464 which was
applicable.

Issue: Which of the two laws, Section 4 of R.A. 1597 or Section 78 of P.D. 464, should apply in
so far as the redemption period of the subject property is concerned?

Held: A special statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a
subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and applications, unless the intent to repeal or
alter is manifest although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases
embraced in the special law. Repeal of laws should be made clear and express. The failure to add
a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law unless there
is an irreconcilable or repugnancy between Section 4 of R.A. 1597 and Section 78 of P.D. 464.
The former law is of special and exclusive application to lots acquired from the Tondo Foreshore
Land only. The latter is a law or decree of general application. Petitioner’s repurchase of the
subject lot within the five-year redemption period of Section 4 of R.A. 1597 is within the
purview of redemption by a co-owner which inures to the benefit of all the other co-owners of
the property.

INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE

NAZARENO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 138842. October 18, 2000
Facts: Petitioners and respondent Romeo Nazareno are three of the five children of spouses
Maximino and Aurea Nazareno, who during their marriage had acquired properties. After the
death of Maximino, Sr., Romeo filed for intestate proceedings and he was thereafter appointed
administrator of his father’s estate. Romeo discovered a deed o f sale selling petitioner Natividad
six lots including Lot-3b occupied by Romeo but which was sold to petitioner Maximino, Jr.
Maximino, Jr. filed an action for recovery of possession which was favored by the court. Romeo
in turn filed an annulment of the sales on the ground of lack of consideration in that the transfer
was merely to avoid inheritance tax and that Natividad was only to hold the said lots in trust for
her siblings. Petitioners on the other hand filed a third party complaint against Romeo and his
wife Eliza seeking the annulment of the transfer to Romeo of Lot 3 which is granted by the trial
court except as to Lots 3, 13-b, 13 and 14 which had passed on to third persons.

Issue: Whether or not a person dealing with a registered land may rely on the certificate of title.

Held: The sale of Lots 13 and 14 to Ros-Alva Marketing will have to be upheld for Ros-Alva
Marketing is an innocent purchaser for value which relied on the title of Natividad. The rule is
settled that “every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefore and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the
certificate to determine the condition of the property.”

TORTS AND DAMAGES

YHT Realty Corp, et al vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 126780. February 17, 2005

Facts: MAURICE McLaughlin is an Australian national who comes to the Philippines for
business. During his trips he stays in Tropicana, a hotel recommended to him by Brunhilda Tan.
McLaughlin deposited cash and jewelry to the safety deposit box of the Hotel. The safety deposit
box cannot be opened unless the key of the guest and that of the management are present. Lainez
and Payam are employees of Tropicana who is charged with the custody of the keys. Thereafter,
McLaughlin found out that some of the money and jewelry he deposited were missing. Lainez
and Payam admitted that they assisted Tan to open his deposit box. Tan admitted that she stole
McLaughlin’s keys. Tan executed a promissory note to cover the amount of the stolen money
and jewelry. McLaughlin wanted to make the management liable.

Issue: Whether or not a hotel may evade liability for the loss of items left with it for safekeeping
by its guests, by having these guests execute written waivers holding the establishment or its
employees free from blame for such loss in light of Article 2003 of the Civil Code which voids
such waivers.

Held: The issue of whether the “Undertaking For The Use of Safety Deposit Box” executed by
McLoughlin is tainted with nullity presents a legal question appropriate for resolution in this
petition. Notably, both the trial court and the appellate court found the same to be null and void.
We find no reason to reverse their common conclusion. Article 2003 is controlling, thus:
Art. 2003. The hotel-keeper cannot free himself from responsibility by posting notices to the
effect that he is not liable for the articles brought by the guest. Any stipulation between the hotel-
keeper and the guest whereby the responsibility of the former as set forth in Articles 1998 to
2001[37] is suppressed or diminished shall be void.

Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code as an expression of public policy precisely
to apply to situations such as that presented in this case. The hotel business like the common
carrier’s business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound
to provide not only lodging for hotel guests and security to their persons and belongings. The
twin duty constitutes the essence of the business. The law in turn does not allow such duty to the
public to be negated or diluted by any contrary stipulation in so-called “undertakings” that
ordinarily appear in prepared forms imposed by hotel keepers on guests for their signature.

Nikko Hotel Manila Garden & Ruby Lim vs. Reyes

G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005

Facts: Robeto Reyes known as “Amay Bisaya” saw in a hotel lobby his friend Dr. Violeta Filart
who he said to have invite him the party of the hotel’s outgoing manager. So Reyes carried the
fruit basket of Filart to the penthuse where the party is. However, Ruby Lim, the coordinator of
the party asked him to leave since it is an exclusive party and he is not one of those invited.
Reyes did not leave the party as was instructed but created a scene, thereby he was escorted out.
He sued the hotel and Ruby Lim for damages.

Issue: Whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. “Amay
Bisaya,” to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby becomes
liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that Ruby Lim did not act abusively in asking Roberto Reyes in
leaving the party to which he is not invited. In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of
Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that
she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for
twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr.
Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the
lower court was correct in observing that –Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to
plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the party was made such that they nearly kissed
each other, the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no
intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiff’s reaction to the request that
must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them, had plaintiff simply left
the party as requested; there was no need for the police to take him out.
Article 19 involves a legal wrong committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. The
object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the
exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. Its elements are the
following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole
intent of prejudicing or injuring another. When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is
proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a
violation of law which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask
Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements:
(1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order,
or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure. Under the above mentioned articles the
act must be intentional. Absent such intention and as the Court observed the conduct of Lim of
asking Reyes to leave was in an exemplary manner, there can be no damages to be awarded. Any
damage suffered by Reyes must be borne by him alone.

Quezon City Government vs. Dacara

G R No. 150304 June 15, 2005

Facts: Dacara Jr.’s car turned turtle upon hitting a rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings
found at Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then being repaired by the Quezon City
government. As a result, Dacarra (sic), Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle
suffered extensive damage. Thus his father Fulgencio Dacara Senior (Fulgencio) filed a calim for
damages against the Local Government. The LGU contended that the fault is with the driver,
since the LGU have out up warning signs. The trial court ruled that the LGU is liable.

Issue: Whether or not the Quezon City Government is liable for moral and exemplary damges
due to the injuries suffered by Dacara Jr.

Held: To award moral damages, a court must be satisfied with proof of the following requisites:
(1) an injury -- whether physical mental, or psychological -- clearly sustained by the claimant;
(2) a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) a wrongful act or omission of the
defendant as the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of
damages predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219. In the present case, the Complaint
alleged that respondent’s son Fulgencio Jr. sustained physical injuries. The son testified that he
suffered a deep cut on his left arm when the car overturned after hitting a pile of earth that had
been left in the open without any warning device whatsoever. It is apparent from the Decisions
of the trial and the appellate courts, however, that no other evidence (such as a medical
certificate or proof of medical expenses) was presented to prove Fulgencio Jr.’s bare assertion of
physical injury. Thus, there was no credible proof that would justify an award of moral damages
based on Article 2219(2) of the Civil Code. Moreover, the Decisions are conspicuously silent
with respect to the claim of respondent that his moral sufferings were due to the negligence of
petitioners. The Decision of the trial court, which summarizes the testimony of respondent’s four
witnesses, makes no mention of any statement regarding moral suffering, such as mental
anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, social humiliation and the like. well-settled is
the rule that moral damages cannot be awarded -- whether in a civilor a criminal case, in the
absence of proof of physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, or similar injury. The award of
moral damages must be solidly anchored on a definite showing that respondent actually
experienced emotional and mental sufferings. Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be
substantiated by clear and convincing proof.

Article 2231 of the Civil Code mandates that in cases of quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may
be recovered if the defendant acted with gross negligence. Gross negligence means such utter
want of care as to raise a presumption that the persons at fault must have been conscious of the
probable consequences of their carelessness, and that they must have nevertheless been
indifferent (or worse) to the danger of injury to the person or property of others. The negligence
must amount to a reckless disregard for the safety of persons or property. Such a circumstance
obtains in the instant case. A finding of gross negligence can be discerned from the Decisions of
both the CA and the trial court. We quote from the RTC Decision: “Sad to state that the City
Government through its instrumentalities have failed to show the modicum of responsibility,
much less, care expected of them (sic) by the constituents of this City. It is even more deplorable
that it was a case of a street digging in a side street which caused the accident in the so-called
‘premier city.’ Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed
by way of example or correction for the public good. The award of these damages is meant to be
a deterrent to socially deleterious actions. Public policy requires such imposition to suppress
wanton acts of an offender. It must be emphasized that local governments and their employees
should be responsible not only for the maintenance of roads and streets, but also for the safety of
the public. Thus, they must secure construction areas with adequate precautionary measures.

SUCCESSION

AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY VS. LAURENCIO AYING

G.R. No. 144773. May 16, 2005

Facts: The disputed property is Lot No. 4399 with an area of 34,325 square meters located at
Dapdap, Lapu-Lapu City. Crisanta Maloloy-on petitioned for the issuance of a cadastral decree
in her favor over said parcel of land. After her death in 1930, the Cadastral Court issued a
Decision directing the issuance of a decree in the name of Crisanta Maloloy-on’s eight children,
namely: Juan, Celedonio, Emiliano, Francisco, Simeon, Bernabe, Roberta and Fausta, all
surnamed Aying. The certificate of title was, however, lost during the war. The siblings extra-
judicially sold the lot however, three siblings, namely, Roberta, Emiliano and Simeon Aying did
not participate in the extra-judicial partition. After the partition the lot was sold. 29 years after,
the Roberta, Emiliano and Simen filed a case for the ejectment of the present occupants.

Issue: Whether or not respondents’ cause of action is imprescriptible

Held: The facts on record show that petitioner acquired the entire parcel of land with the
mistaken belief that all the heirs have executed the subject document. Thus, the trial court is
correct that the provision of law applicable to this case is Article 1456 of the Civil Code which
states: ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by
force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the
property comes. The rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription ownership over property
entrusted to him until and unless he repudiates the trust, applies to express trusts and resulting
implied trusts. However, in constructive implied trusts, prescription may supervene even if the
trustee does not repudiate the relationship. Necessarily, repudiation of said trust is not a
condition precedent to the running of the prescriptive period. An action for reconveyance based
on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long
line of decisions of this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule.
Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.
With regard to petitioner’s argument that the provision of Article 1104 of the Civil Code, stating
that a partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded,
should be applied, suffice it to say that the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of
Absolute Sale is not being rescinded. In fact, its validity had been upheld but only as to the
parties who participated in the execution of the same. As discussed above, what was conveyed to
petitioner was ownership over the shares of the heirs who executed the subject document. Thus,
the law, particularly, Article 1456 of the Civil Code, imposed the obligation upon petitioner to
act as a trustee for the benefit of respondent heirs of Emiliano and Simeon Aying who, having
brought their action within the prescriptive period, are now entitled to the reconveyance of their
share in the land in dispute.

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA, BELINDA CAPONONG-NOBLE,

petitioner, vs. ALIPIO ABAJA and NOEL ABELLAR
G.R. No. 147145. January 31, 2005

Facts: This is a case of the probate of the will of Alipio Abada. Thereafter, the probate of the
will of Paula Toray was also filed with the court. The oppositors in the will of Abada nand Toray
are their nephews and nieces. The ground for opposition is that decedent left no will or if there is
a will it was executed not in consonance with the law. Belinda Caponong-Noble was assigned as
the administratix of the estate of Abada by the trial court. Thereafter, Abellar was appointed
administratix of Toray’s property. The RTC ruled only on , whether the will of Abada has an
attestation clause as required by law. The RTC-Kabankalan further held that the failure of the
oppositors to raise any other matter forecloses all other issues. Unsatisfied with the decision
Caponong-Noble appealed.

Issue:
Whether or not the will of Abada has an attestation clause, and if so, whether the attestation
clause complies with the requirements of the applicable laws.

Held:

The Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the RTC-Kabankalan in admitting to probate the
will of Abada. Abada executed his will on 4 June 1932. The laws in force at that time are the
Civil Code of 1889 or the Old Civil Code, and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedurewhich
governed the execution of wills before the enactment of the New Civil Code. The matter in
dispute in the present case is the attestation clause in the will of Abada. Section 618 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645 governs the form of the attestation clause of
Abada’s will.

There is no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the testator knew the language or
dialect used in the will. This is a matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde. Caponong-
Noble further argues that Alipio, in his testimony, has failed, among others, to show that Abada
knew or understood the contents of the will and the Spanish language used in the will. However,
Alipio testified that Abada used to gather Spanish-speaking people in their place. In these
gatherings, Abada and his companions would talk in the Spanish language. This sufficiently
proves that Abada speaks the Spanish language. An attestation clause is made for the purpose of
preserving, in permanent form, a record of the facts attending the execution of the will, so that in
case of failure of the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be
proved. (Thompson on Wills, 2d ed., sec. 132.)

A will, therefore, should not be rejected where its attestation clause serves the purpose of the
law. We rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of Abada’s will. Abada’s will clearly
shows four signatures: that of Abada and of three other persons. It is reasonable to conclude that
there are three witnesses to the will. The question on the number of the witnesses is answered by
an examination of the will itself and without the need for presentation of evidence aliunde. The
Court explained the extent and limits of the rule on liberal construction. Precision of language in
the drafting of an attestation clause is desirable. However, it is not imperative that a parrot-like
copy of the words of the statute be made. It is sufficient if from the language employed it can
reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law expects of it.

PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD TO RECOVER PROPERTY OBTAINED BY FRAUD

GIVING RISE TO AN IMPLIED TRUST; PROBATE FOR WILL SPOUSES RICARDO
PASCUAL AND CONSOLACION SISON VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND REMEDIOS
EGUENIO GINO
G.R. No. 115925. August 15, 2003
Facts: Petitioner Sison and respondent Eugenio-Gino are the niece and granddaughter ,
respectively of the late Canuto Sison. Canuto and 11 other individuals including his sister
Catalina and his brother Victoriano were co-owners of a property known as Lot 2 covered by an
original certificate of title.
On September 26, 1956, Canuto and Consolacion executed a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan
under which, Canuto sold his share in Lot 2 in favor of Consolacion.

On October 23, 1968, the surviving children of Canuto, namely Felicidad and Beatriz, executed a
joint affidavit affirming the Kasulatan in favor of Consolacion, which the latter registered with
the Office of the Register of Deeds.

On February 4, 1988, Remedios filed a complaint against Consolacion and her spouse, Ricardo
Pascual for annulment of transfer of certificate of title because the former claimed that she is the
owner of the lots since Catalina devised the land to her in Catalina’s last will. Remedies also
added that the lots were obtained through fraudulent means since the area covered by the TCT is
twice the size of Canuto.

Petitioner sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioners claim that
the basis of the action is fraud and the action should have been filed within four years from the
registration of Consolacion’s title on October 28, 1968 and not some 19 years later on February
4, 1988. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss holding that the reckoning of the
prescriptive period for filing complaint is evidentiary in nature and must await the presentation
of the parties’ evidence during the trial.

Issue: Whether or not the action for annulment or cancellation of transfer of certificate of title by
Remedios has prescribed.

Held: The four-year prescriptive period relied upon by the trial court applies only if the fraud
does not give rise to an implied trust and the action is to annul a voidable contract under Article
1390 of the Civil Code. In such a case, the four-year prescriptive period begins to run from the
time of the discovery of the mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
It is now well-settled that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by fraud or
mistake, giving rise to an implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code is ten years pursuant
to Article 1144. this ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from the date the adverse party
repudiates the implied trust which repudiation takes place when the adverse party registers the
land.
Remedies filed her complaint on February 4, 1988 or more than 19 years after Consolacion
registered her title over the lot on October 28, 1968. Unquestionably, Remedios filed the
complaint late thus warranting its dismissal.

Remedies anchors her right in filing the suit on her being a devisee of Catalina’s last will.
However, since the probate court has not admitted Catalina’s last will, Remedios has not
acquired any right under the last will. Remedies is thus without any cause of action either to seek
reconveyance of Lot 2 or to enforce an implied trust over these lots.

It was inappropriate to order the reconveyance of the subject lots to Remedios in her capacity as
executrix of Catalina’s last will because she sued petitioners not in such capacity but as the
alleged owner of the disputed lots.

SUCCESSION; PARTITION INTER VIVOS MAY BE DONE FOR AS LONG AS

LEGITIMATES ARE NOT PRECLUDED; LEGITIME OF COMPULSORY HEIRS IS
DETERMINED AFTER COLLATION; PROPERTY CERTIFICATE NOT SUBJECT
TO COLLATERAL ATTACK SPOUSES FLORENTINO ZARAGOZA AND ERLINDA
ENRIQUEZ-ZARAGOZA VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 106401. September 29, 2000

Facts: Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain parcels of land. He had four
children namely: Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino and Alberta, all surnamed Zaragoza. On December
9, 1964, he died without a will and was survived by his four children.

On December 28, 1981, private respondent Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan filed a complaint with the
Court of First Instance against petitioner-spouses Florentino and Erlinda for delivery of her
inheritance share and for payment of damages. She claims that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen and the youngest child of the late Flavio. She further alleged that her father in his lifetime
partitioned the properties among his four children. The shares of her brothers and sister were
given to them in advance by way of deed of sale, but without valid consideration, while her share
was not conveyed by way of deed of sale then.

Petitioners denied knowledge of an alleged distribution by way of deeds of sale to them by their
father. They denied knowledge of the alleged intention of their father to convey the cited lots to
Alberta, much more, the reason for his failure to do so because she became an American citizen.
They denied that there was partitioning of the estate of their father during his lifetime.

The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment adjudicating Lot 471 in the name of Flavio
Zaragoza Cano to Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan as appertaining her share in his estate.

Issues:

• Whether the partition inter vivos by Flavio Zaragoza Cano of his

properties is valid.
 • Whether the validity of the deed of sale and consequently, the transfer
certificate of title over the lot registered in the name of petitioners can be a valid subject
matter of the entire proceeding for the delivery of inheritance share.

Held: Both the trial court and the public respondent found that during the lifetime of Flavio, he
already partitioned and distributed his properties among his three children, excepting private
respondent through deeds of sale. A deed of sale was not executed in favor of private respondent
because she had become an American citizen and the Constitution prohibited a sale in her favor.
It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done for as long as
legitimes are not prejudiced. Unfortunately, collation cannot be done in this case where the
original petition for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other compulsory
heirs. The petition must therefore be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new
proceeding where all the indispensable parties are present for the rightful determination of their
respective legitime and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos.

Private respondent, in submitting her petition for the delivery of inheritance share, was in effect
questioning the validity of the deed of sale in favor of petitioner and consequently, the transfer of
certificate of title issued in the latter’s name. although the trial court, as an obiter, made a finding
of validity of the conveyance of the said lot, since according to it, private respondent did not
question the genuineness of the signature of the deceased, nevertheless, when the case was
elevated to the Court of Appeals, the latter declared the sale to be fictitious because of finding of
marked differences in the signature of Flavio in the deed of sale vis-à-vis signatures found in
earlier documents. Could this be done? The petition is a collateral attack. A certificate of title
shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law.

CREDIT TRANSACTIONS

FIRST FIL-SIN LENDING CORPORATION VS. GLORIA PADILLO

G.R. No. 160533. January 12, 2005

Facts: Respondent Gloria D. Padillo obtained a P500,000.00 loan from petitioner First Fil-Sin
Lending Corp. and subsequently obtained another P500,000.00 loan from the same. In both
instances, respondent executed a promissory note and disclosure statement. For the first loan,
respondent made 13 monthly interest payments of P22,500.00 each before she settled the
P500,000.00 outstanding principal obligation. As regards the second loan, respondent made 11
monthly interest payments of P25,000.00 each before paying the principal loan of P500,000.00.
In sum, respondent paid a total of P792,500.00 for the first loan and P775,000.00 for the second
loan. Thereafter, respondent filed an action for sum of money against petitioner alleging that she
only agreed to pay interest at the rates of 4.5% and 5% per annum, respectively, for the two
loans, and not 4.5% and 5% per month. The trial court dismissed respondent’s complaint. On
appeal, the appellate court ruled that, based on the disclosure statements executed by respondent,
the interest rates should be imposed on a monthly basis but only for the 3-month term of the
loan. Thereafter, the legal interest rate will apply. The court also found the penalty charges
pegged at 1% per day of delay highly unconscionable as it would translate to 365% per annum.
Thus, it was reduced to 1% per month or 12% per annum.

Petitioner maintains that the interest rates are to be imposed on a monthly and not on a per
annum basis. However, it insists that the 4.5% and 5% monthly interest shall be imposed until
the outstanding obligations have been fully paid.

As to the penalty charges, petitioner argues that the 12% per annum penalty imposed by the
Court of Appeals in lieu of the 1% per day as agreed upon by the parties violates their freedom to
stipulate terms and conditions as they may deem proper.

Respondent avers that the interest on the loans is per annum as expressly stated in the promissory
notes and disclosure statements. The provision as to annual interest rate is clear and requires no
room for interpretation. Respondent asserts that any ambiguity in the promissory notes and
disclosure statements should not favor petitioner since the loan documents were prepared by the
latter.

Issue: Whether or not the applicable interest should be the legal interest of twelve percent (12%)
per annum despite the clear agreement of the parties on another applicable rate.

Held: Perusal of the promissory notes and the disclosure statements pertinent to the loan
obligations of respondent clearly and unambiguously provide for interest rates of 4.5% per
annum and 5% per annum, respectively. Nowhere was it stated that the interest rates shall be
applied on a monthly basis. Thus, when the terms of the agreement are clear and explicit that
they do not justify an attempt to read into it any alleged intention of the parties, the terms are to
be understood literally just as they appear on the face of the contract. It is only in instances when
the language of a contract is ambiguous or obscure that courts ought to apply certain established
rules of construction in order to ascertain the supposed intent of the parties.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 126908. January 16, 2003

Facts: Spouses Mateo and Carlita Cruz owned a parcel of land. They obtained a loan from the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the amount of Php70,000 and constituted a real estate
mortgage using their parcel of land to secure said loan. Subsequently, Mateo Cruz obtained an
agricultural crop loan from PNB in the amount of Php156,000 which was also secured by a real
estate mortgage. After Land Bank remitted to PNB Php359, 500 in bonds, Php174.43 in cash and
transferred Php25,500 in bonds, PNB issued a Deed of Release of Real Estate Mortgage in favor
of the Spouses Cruz. Consequently, PNB released all titles to them. Later Spouses Cruz loaned
again from PNB and secured it with another real estate mortgage. Spouses Antonio and Soledad
So Hu paid for the release of the mortgaged property since they were interested in it. Thus a
Deed of Absolute Sale was entered into by Spouses So Hu and Spouses Cruz, conveying the
property to the former. PNB conducted a public auction sale covering the property in question
under the contention that Spouses Cruz failed to pay their loan. Since it was the sole and highest
bidder, it now claimed the property. When PNB found Spouses So Hu In possession of the
property, they were asked to vacate the property.

Issue: Is the extra judicial foreclosure of the third mortgage valid?

Held: It is manifested in records that Spouses So Hu had already paid the principal obligation
secured by the third mortgage. A contract of mortgage is an accessory contract which derives its
existence from the principal contract. Thus, if the principal ceases to be it also ceases. In this
case, with the extinguishment of the loan, the mortgage is also extinguished.
Note that the loan secured by the mortgage was already paid prior to the foreclosure. Thus, the
property can no longer be validly foreclosed since it would be a foreclosure that satisfies an
extinguished obligation.

RAMIREZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 133841. August 15, 2003

Facts: On December 29, 1965, private respondent spouses Loreto Claravall and Victoria
Claravall executed a deed of sale in favor of spouses Francisco and Carolina Ramirez covering a
parcel of land including the improvements thereon with an option to repurchase within a period
of two years. At the expiration of the two-year period, the Claravalls failed to redeem the
property, prompting them to file a complaint against the spouses Ramirez to compel the latter to
sell the property back to them. The Supreme Court found that the Deed of Absolute sale with
option to repurchase was one of equitable mortgage.
Following the death of Francisco Ramirez, the spouses Claravall filed a complaint for accounting
and damages against the Intestate Estate of Francisco Ramirez alleging among others that the
spouses Ramirez acted fraudulently and in bad faith in refusing and obstructing the redemption
of the property by the private respondents from January 2, 1968 to December 31, 1993 during
which petitioners were receiving rentals from the tenants of the property which must be
accounted for and returned to private respondents.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners were entitled to the fruits of the property as prior to the
redemption thereof, they were the registered owners and not private respondents.

Held: The declaration by the Supreme Court in the first case that the deed of sale with option to
repurchase entered into by the spouses Ramirez and private respondents was an equitable
mortgage necessarily takes the deed out of the ambit of the law on sales and puts into operation
the law on mortgage.

It is a well-established doctrine that the mortgagor’s default does not operate to vest the
mortgagee the ownership of the encumbered property and the act of the mortgagee in registering
the mortgaged property in his own name upon the mortgagor’s failure to redeem the property
amounts to pactum commissorium, a forfeiture clause declared by the Court as contrary to good
morals and public policy and, therefore, void. Before perfect title over a mortgaged property may
thus be secured by the mortgagee, he must, in case of non-payment of the debt, foreclose the
mortgage first and thereafter purchase the mortgaged property at the foreclosure sale.

CONTRACT OF LOAN; REAL CONTRACT; RECIPROCAL OBLIGATION BPI

INVESTMENT CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS
377 SCRA 177. February 15, 2002

Facts: Frank Roa obtained a loan Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC), the
predecessor of BPIIC, for the construction of a house on his lot in Muntinlupa. Said house and
lot were mortgaged to AIDC to secure the loan. In 1980, Roa sold the house and lot to
respondents ALS Management and Development Corporation (ALS) and Antonio Litonjua. As
paty of the purchase price, ALS and Litonjua assumed the balance of the Roa’s indebtedness
with AIDC. Thereafter, AIDC granted the respondents a new loan of P500 000 to be applied to
Roa’s debt and such loan to be secured by the property, at an interest rate of 20% per annum and
service fee of 1% per annum on the outstanding principal balance payable within ten years. On
March 31, 1981, respondents executed a mortgage deed containing the above stipulations with
the provision that payments of monthly amortization shall commence on May 1, 1981. On
September 13, 1982, BPIIC released to respondents P&146.87 purporting to be what was left of
the latter5’s loan after fully paying the loan of Roa.

On June 1984, BPIIC instituted foreclosure proceedings against the respondents because of their
failure to pay the mortgage indebtedness. However, respondents filed a civil case against BPIIC
opposing the foreclosure proceedings. In the said case, BPIIC claims that a contract of loan is a
consensual contract and a contract of loan is perfected at the time the contract of mortgage is
executed conformably with the ruling in Bonnevie vs. CA (125 SCRA 122). In the present case,
the loan contract was perfected on March 31, 1981, the date when the mortgage deed was
executed; hence, the amortization and interests on the loan should be computed from the said
date. On the other hand, respondents argue that based on Article 1934 of the NCC, a simple loan
was perfected upon the delivery of the contract, hence a real contract. In this case, it was only on
September 13, 1982 that the loan contract was perfected, the date when the full loan was released
to the respondents. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the respondents, which was
subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue: Whether or not a contract of loan is a consensual contract or real contract.

Held: A contract of loan is not a consensual contract but a real contract. It is perfected only upon
the delivery of the object of the contract. Petitioner misapplied the Bonnevie case. The contract
in Bonnevie declared by this Court as a perfected consensual contract falls under the first clause
of Art. 1934 of the NCC. It is an accepted promise to deliver something by way of a simple loan.

Also, a contract of loan involves a reciprocal obligation wherein the obligation of each party is
the consideration for that of the other. In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if
the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent
upon him; only when a party has performed his part if the contract can he demand that the other
party also fulfill his own obligation an if the latter fails, default sets in. Consequently, petitioner
could not demand for the payment of the monthly amortization after September 134, 1982 for it
was only then when it complied with its obligation under the loan contract. Therefore, in
computing the amount due, the starting date is October 13, 1982 not May 1981.

MORTGAGE; BANKING INSTITUTION BENJAMIN NAVARRO VS. SECOND

LAGUNA DEV’T. BANK
G.R. No. 129428. February 27, 2003

Facts: Spouse Catalino and Consuelo Navarro owned a certain registered land and sold 5/6 of
the said lot to their five children. By virtue of the sale, petitioners Benjamin and Rosita Navarro
are listed as co-owners of the property. Without the knowledge and consent of the petitioners, the
other owners of the property executed a falsified deed of absolute sale wherein they made it
appear that the entire lot was sold to spouses Donalito Velasco and Esther Navarro. Thus a new
TCT was issued in the name of the spouses Velasco. Subsequently, spouses Velasco mortgaged
the property to respondent Laguna Development Bank to secure payment of a loan. Thereafter,
the bank had the mortgaged foreclosed. On two occasions, petitioners wrote the bank, offering to
redeem the property which petitioner failed to do and led to the consolidation of the ownership
over the property in favor of the respondent bank. Petitioners filed a complaint praying, inter
alia, the annulment of the mortgage. They alleged that the sale of the lot with respect to their 1/6
share is void ab initio considering the signatures appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale were
falsified and as such the mortgage contract involving their share executed by spouses alleging
that the respondent spouses were purchasers in bad faith because they knew of the pending
litigation concerning the property.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent bank acted in bad faith when it accepted said mortgage the
property subject of a falsified Deed of Sale and when it subsequently sold property to respondent
spouses Guzman.
Held: Respondent did not act in bad faith. This Court stressed that a mortgagee-bank is expected
to exercise greater care and prudence before entering into a mortgage contract, even those
involving registered land. The ascertainment of the status or the consdition of a property offered
to it as a security for a loan must be a standard and indispensable part of its operation.

In entering into a mortgage contract with spouses Velasco, there was no indication that
respondent bank acted in bad faith. Spouses Velasco presented to the bank their TCT showing
they were then the absolute owners thereof. Indeed there was no circumstances or indications
that aroused respondent bank’s suspicion that the title was defective. Moreover, it is a settled
jurisprudence that whoever alleges bad faith in any transaction must substantiate his allegation,
since, it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns and that private
transactions are entered into in good faith. Clearly, petitioners are wanting in this respect. In this
connection, it bears reiterating that in their two letters to respondent bank earlier mentioned,
petitioners did not state that spouses Velasco falsified their signatures appearing in the Deed of
Absolute Sale. Nor did they question the validity of the mortgage and its foreclosure. Indeed,
those letters could have led the bank to believe that petitioners recognize the validity of the Deed
of Absolute Sale and the mortgage as well as its subsequent foreclosure.

MORTGAGE; BANKING INSTITUTION CRUZ VS. BANCOM FINANCE

CORPORATION
379 SCRA 490. March 19, 2002

Facts: Petitioners Edilberto and Simplicio Cruz were registered owners of a parcel of
agricultural land. They sold the land for P700,000 to Norma Sulit who gave P25, 000 as earnest
money. However, Sulit failed to pay the balance price; consequently, the petitioners did not
transfer the title of the land to Sulit. But capitalizing on the close relationship of one Candelaria
Sanchez with the petitioners, Sulit succeeded in having the petitioners execute a document of
sale of the land in favor of Sanchez and on the same day, Sanchez executed another deed of
absolute sale over the said land in favor of Sulit. As a result, Sulit was able to effect the transfer
of the title in her name. In a special agreement, Sulit assumed Sanchez’s obligation to pay the
petitioners within six months. Unknown to the petitioners, Sulit managed to obtain a loan from
respondent Bancom secured by a mortgage over the land.

On account of Sulit’s failure to pay the amount stipulated, petitioners filed a complaint for
reconveyance of the land. Bancom intervened in the case and claimed priority as mortgagee in
good faith. Meanwhile, Sulit defaulted in her payment to Bancom and her mortgage was
foreclosed. Petitioners argue that respondent was not a mortgagee in good faith because at the
time it registered the real estate mortgage over the subject matter, their adverse claim and notice
of lis pendens had already been annotated in the title. On the other hand, respondent maintains
that petitioners were the ones in bad faith because they already had knowledge of the existence
of the mortgage over the property when they caused the annotations. Respondent further claims
that, being an innocent mortgagee, it should not be required to conduct an exhaustive
investigation on the mortgagor’s title before it could extend a loan.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Bancom is a mortgagee in good faith.

Held: First, as a general rule, every person dealing with a registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title and is no longer required to look behind the certificate in
order to determine the actual owner. This rule, however, is subject to the right of a person
deprived of the land through fraud to bring an action for rconveyance, provided the rights of
innocent purchaser for value and in good faith are not prejudiced. An innocent purchaser for
value includes an innocent lessee, mortgage or any other encumbrancer for value. Respondent,
however, is not an ordinary mortgagee; it is a mortgagee bank. As such, unlike private
individuals, it is expected to exercise greater care and prudence in its dealings, including those
involving registered lands. The ascertainment of the status for a loan must be a standard and
indispensable part of its operations. Respondent was clearly wanting in the observance of the
necessary precautions to ascertain flaws in the title of Sulit. It should have not simply relied on
the face of the certificate of title as its ancillary function of investing funds required a greater
degree of diligence. The rule that persons dealing with registered lands can rely solely on the
certificate of title does not apply to banks.

Second, respondent was already aware that there was an adverse claim and notice of lis pendens
annotated on the certificate of title when it registered the mortgage. Although, registration is not
the operative act for a mortgage to be binding between parties, to third persons, it is
indispensable. Thus, petitioners being third parties to the unregistered mortgage were not bound
by it.

Case Digest - Civil Law

People us Veneracion 249 SCRA 247
GR No – 119987-88 Oct. 12, 1995

FACTS:
On August 2, 1994, the lifeless body of Angel Alquiza, 7 years old, was found floating along Del
Pan St., near the corner of Lavesares st., Binondo Manila. Abundio Lagunday a.k.a. Jr. Jeofrey of
no fixed address and Lagarto of Tondo Manila were later charged with the crime of Rape with
Homicide. Subsequently, Cordero, Manlangit, Baltazar and Yaon were accused of the same
crime of Rape with Homicide.

On January 31, 1995 finding the defendants Henry Lagarto and Ernesto Cordero guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced with “reclusion perpetua
with all the accessories provided by law”. The City Prosecutor of Manila filed a motion for
Reconsideration on February 8, 1995 praying that the decision be “modified in that the penalty of
death be imposed” against the respondents Lagarto and Cordero. On February 10, 1995, the
judge issued an order denying the same for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of
jurisdiction when he failed and/or refused to impose the mandatory penalty of death under RA #
7659, after finding the accused guilty of the crime Rape with Homicide.

RULING:

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of the justice system. If judges under the guise of
religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which
they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A
government of laws, not of men, excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those
acting under its authority.

In the case of bench, since the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime for which
respondent judge found the accused guilty, of he was bound by its provisions. After an
adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose “the proper penalty and civil liability provided for
the law on the accused. This is a case in which a judge, fully aware of the appropriate provisions
of the law refuses to impose a penalty to which he disagrees”.

The instant petition is Granted. The case is hereby Remanded to the RTC for the imposition of
the penalty of death upon private respondents in consonance with respondent judge’s findings
that the private respondents had committed the crime of Rape with Homicide under Art 335 of
the RPC, as amended by section 11 of RA # 7659, subject to automatic review by this court of
the decision imposing the death penalty

ASJ Corporation and Antonio San Juan vs Spouses Efren and Maura Evangelista
March 16, 2016
G.R. No. 158086 Feb. 14, 2008

FACTS
This case is a petition for review on certiorari on the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan Branch 9 in Civil Case No. 745-M-
93.
Respondents Efren and Maura Evangelista are owners of R.M. Sy Chicks, a business engaged in
selling chicks and egg by-products. For hatching and incubation of eggs, they availed the
services of ASJ Corp., owned by San Juan and his family.

After years of doing business with the ASJ Corp., the respondents delayed payments for the
services of ASJ Corp, prompting owner San Juan to refuse the release of the hatched egg. The
respondents tendered Php 15,000 to San Juan for partial payment which San Juan accepted but
he still insisted on the full settlement of respondents’ accounts before releasing the chicks and
by-products. He also threated the respondents that he would impound their vehicle and detain
them at the hatchery compound if they should come back unprepared to fully settle their
accounts with him.

The parties tried to settle amicably before police authorities but failed. The respondents then
filed with the RTC an action for damages based on the retention of the chicks and by-products by
the petitioners.

The RTC held ASJ Corp. and San Juan solidarily liable for the actual and moral damages and
attorney’s fees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and added exemplary
damages. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner’s retention of the chicks and by-products on account of
respondents’ failure to pay the corresponding fees justified.

HELD
Yes. The retention has legal basis, although the threats had none. Under Article 1248 of the Civil
Code, the creditor cannot be compelled to accept partial payments from the debtor, unless there
is an express stipulation to that effect. It was the respondents who violated the reciprocity in
contracts, hence, the petitioners have the right of retention. This case is a case on non-
performance of reciprocal obligation.
Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same cause, wherein each party is a debtor
and a creditor of the other such that the performance of one is conditioned upon the simultaneous
fulfillment of the other.

Since respondents are guilty of delay in the performance of their obligations, they are liable to
pay petitioners actual damages.
The petition was partly granted. The respondents were ordered to pay petitioners for actual
damages. The actual, exemplary and moral damages laid down by the Court of Appeals were
retained.

Thursday, August 19, 2010

FRANCISCO M. ALONSO vs. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC. G.R. No. 130876 January 31,
2002
G.R. No. 130876 January 31, 2002
FRANCISCO M. ALONSO, substituted by his heirs, petitioners,
vs.
CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., respondent.
PARDO, J.:

FACTS: The case is an appeal via certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming in
toto that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Cebu City, declaring that the title to the contested
Lot No. 727, Banilad Friar Lands Estate, Cebu City, was validly re-constituted in the name of the
Cebu Country Club, Inc. and ordering petitioners to pay attorney’s fees of P400,000.00, and
litigation expenses of P51,000.00, and costs.

Petitioner Francisco M. Alonso, who died pendente lite and substituted by his legal heirs, a
lawyer by profession, the only son and sole heir of the late Tomas N. Alonso and Asuncion
Medalle, who died on June 16, 1962 and August 18, 1963, respectively. Cebu Country Club, Inc.
is a non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine Laws the
purpose of which is to cater to the recreation and leisure of its members.

Sometime in 1992, petitioner discovered documents and records — Friar Lands Sale Certificate
Register/Installment Record Certificate No. 734, Sales Certificate No. 734 and Assignment of
Sales Certificate — showing that his father acquired Lot No. 727 of the Banilad Friar Lands
Estate from the Government of the Philippine Islands in or about the year 1911 in accordance
with the Friar Lands Act (Act No. 1120). The documents show that one Leoncio Alburo, the
original vendee of Lot No. 727, assigned his sales certificate to petitioner’s father on December
18, 1911, who completed the required installment payments thereon under Act No. 1120 and was
consequently issued Patent No. 14353 on March 24, 1926. On March 27, 1926, the Director of
Lands, acting for and in behalf of the government, executed a final deed of sale in favor of
petitioner’s father Tomas N. Alonso. It appears, however, that the deed was not registered with
the Register of Deeds because of lack of technical requirements, among them the approval of the
deed of sale by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as required by law.

Upon investigation of the status of the land, petitioner found out from the office of the Registrar
of Deeds of Cebu City that title to Lot No. 727 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate had been
"administratively reconstituted from the owner’s duplicate" on July 26, 1948 under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-1310 (T-11351) in the name of United Service Country Club,
Inc., predecessor of Cebu Country Club, Inc. On March 8, 1960, upon order of the Court of First
Instance, the name of the registered owner in TCT No. RT-1310 (T-11531) was changed to Cebu
Country Club, Inc. Moreover, the TCT provides that the reconstituted title was a transfer from
TCT No. 1021.

In the firm belief that petitioner’s father is still the rightful owner of Lot No. 727 of the Banilad
Friar Lands Estate since there are no records showing that he ever sold or conveyed the disputed
property to anyone, on July 7, 1992, petitioner made a formal demand upon Cebu Country Club,
Inc. to restore to him the ownership and possession of said lot within fifteen (15) days from
receipt thereof. Cebu Country Club, Inc., however, denied petitioner’s claim and refused to
deliver possession to him.

Left with no other recourse, on September 25, 1992, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Cebu City, a complaint for declaration of nullity and non-existence of deed/title,
cancellation of certificates of title and recovery of property against defendant Cebu Country
Club, Inc. He alleged that the Cebu Country Club, Inc. fraudulently and illegally managed to
secure in its name the administrative reconstitution of TCT No. RT-13 10 (T-11351) despite the
absence of any transaction of specific land dealing that would show how Lot No. 727 had come
to pass to Cebu Country Club, Inc.; that TCT No. 11351 which is the source title of TCT No.
RT-1310 (T-11351) does not pertain to Lot No. 727; that the reconstituted title which was issued
on July 26, 1948, did not contain the technical description of the registered land which was
inserted only on March 8, 1960, twenty-eight (28) years after the issuance of TCT No. RT-1310
(T-11351), hence, Cebu Country Club, Inc.’s title is null and void. Petitioner thus prayed for the
cancellation of TCT No. RT-1310 (T-11351) and the issuance of another title in his name as the
sole heir of Tomas Alonso, for Cebu Country Club, Inc. to deliver possession of the property to
petitioner, and render an accounting of the fruits and income of the land. Petitioner likewise
prayed for the sum of P100, 000.00 by way of attorney’s fees plus P500.00 per hearing as
appearance fee, and P10, 000.00 as reasonable litigation expenses.

On November 5, 1992, Cebu Country Club, Inc. filed with the trial court its answer with
counterclaim. It alleged that petitioner had no cause of action against Cebu Country Club, Inc.
since the same had prescribed and was barred by laches, Cebu Country Club, Inc. having been in
possession of the land since 1935 until the present in the concept of an owner, openly, publicly,
peacefully, exclusively, adversely, continuously, paying regularly the real estate taxes thereon;
that Cebu Country Club, Inc. acquired the lot in good faith and for value; that it caused the
administrative reconstitution of Lot No. 727 in 1948 from the owner’s duplicate, the original of
TCT No. 11351 having been lost or destroyed during the war, pursuant to Republic Act No. 26,
its implementing Circular, GLRO Circular No. 178 and Circular No. 6 of the General Land
Registration Office; that unlike Cebu Country Club, Inc., petitioner’s father never had any
registered title under the Land Registration Act No. 496 nor did he pay the necessary taxes on
Lot No. 727 during his lifetime; that petitioner’s father knew that the United Service Country
Club, Inc., predecessor of Cebu Country Club, Inc. was occupying Lot No. 727 as owner; that
petitioner’s father never reconstituted his alleged title to Lot No. 727 but did so over Lot No. 810
of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, a lot adjacent to the disputed property, in 1946; that petitioner
himself lived in Cebu City, a few kilometers away from the land in litigation; that petitioner’s
father or petitioner himself, both of whom are lawyers and the former a congressman as well, for
more than sixty (60) years, never made any demand on Cebu Country Club, Inc. for the recovery
of the property knowing fully well that said land was owned and utilized by Cebu Country Club,
Inc. as its main golf course. By way of counterclaim, Cebu Country Club, Inc. prayed for the
award of attorney’s fees in the amount of P900,000.00 and litigation expenses of P100,000.00,
moral damages of P500,000.00 and exemplary damages of P2,000,000.00.

Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff: declaring the
contested property or Lot 727 as legally belonging to the defendant; directing the plaintiff to pay
attorney'’ fee of P400, 000.00; and litigation expenses of P51, 000.00; and finally, with costs
against the plaintiff.

After proceedings on appeal, on March 31, 1997, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s
decision.

On April 30, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration; however, on October 2, 1997,
the Court of Appeals denied the motion. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the validity of TCT No. RT-1310 (T-11351).

2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining respondent’s claim of ownership over Lot
No. 727;

3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the present action is barred by prescription
and/or by laches;

4. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not applying the doctrine of stare decisis;

5. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial court’s award for damages in the
form of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

HELD:

1. Reconstitution was based on the owner’s duplicate of the title, hence, there was no need for
the covering deed of sale or other modes of conveyance. Cebu Country Club, Inc. was admittedly
in possession of the land since long before the Second World War, or since 1931. In fact, the
original title (TCT No. 11351) was issued to the United Service Country Club, Inc. on November
19, 1931 as a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1021. More importantly, Cebu
Country Club, Inc. paid the realty taxes on the land even before the war, and tax declarations
covering the property showed the number of the TCT of the land. Cebu Country Club, Inc.
produced receipts showing real estate tax payments since 1949. On the other hand, petitioner
failed to produce a single receipt of real estate tax payment ever made by his father since the
sales patent was issued to his father on March 24, 1926.

Worse, admittedly petitioner could not show any torrens title ever issued to Tomas N. Alonso,
because, as said, the deed of sale executed on March 27, 1926 by the Director of Lands was not
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and could not be registered.
"Under the law, it is the act of registration of the deed of conveyance that serves as the operative
act to convey the land registered under the Torrens system. The act of registration creates
constructive notice to the whole world of the fact of such conveyance." On this point, petitioner
alleges that Cebu Country Club, Inc. obtained its title by fraud in connivance with personnel of
the Register of Deeds in 1941 or in 1948, when the title was administratively reconstituted.
Imputations of fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner failed to
adduce evidence of fraud.

In an action for re-conveyance based on fraud, he who charges fraud must prove such fraud in
obtaining a title. "In this jurisdiction, fraud is never presumed." The strongest suspicion cannot
sway judgment or overcome the presumption of regularity. "The sea of suspicion has no shore,
and the court that embarks upon it is without rudder or compass." Worse, the imputation of fraud
was so tardily brought, some forty-four (44) years or sixty-one (61) years after its supposed
occurrence, that is, from the administrative reconstitution of title on July 26, 1948, or from the
issuance of the original title on November 19, 1931, that verification is rendered extremely
difficult, if not impossible, especially due to the supervening event of the second world war
during which practically all public records were lost or destroyed, or no longer available.

Petitioners next question the lack of technical description inscribed in the reconstituted title in
Cebu Country Club, Inc.’s name. This is not a bar to reconstitution of the title nor will it affect
the validity of the reconstituted title. A registered owner is given two (2) years to file a plan of
such land with the Chief of the General Land Registration Office. The two-year period is
directory, not jurisdictional. In other words, the failure to submit the technical description within
two (2) years would not invalidate the title. At most, the failure to file such technical description
within the two-year period would bar a transfer of the title to a third party in a voluntary
transaction.

2. Admittedly, neither petitioners nor their predecessor had any title to the land in question. The
most that petitioners could claim was that the Director of Lands issued a sales patent in the name
of Tomas N. Alonso. The sales patent, however, and even the corresponding deed of sale were
not registered with the Register of Deeds and no title was ever issued in the name of the latter.
This is because there were basic requirements not complied with, the most important of which
was that the deed of sale executed by the Director of Lands was not approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Hence, the deed of sale was void. "Approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is
indispensable for the validity of the sale." Moreover, Cebu Country Club, Inc. was in possession
of the land since 1931, and had been paying the real estate taxes thereon based on tax
declarations in its name with the title number indicated thereon. Tax receipts and declarations of
ownership for taxation purposes are strong evidence of ownership. This Court has ruled that
although tax declarations or realty tax payments are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right
mind will be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession.

Notwithstanding this fatal defect, the Court of Appeals ruled that "there was substantial
compliance with the requirement of Act No. 1120 to validly convey title to said lot to Tomas N.
Alonso."

On this point, the Court of Appeals erred.

Under Act No. 1120, which governs the administration and disposition of friar lands, the
purchase by an actual and bona fide settler or occupant of any portion of friar land shall be
"agreed upon between the purchaser and the Director of Lands, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (mutatis mutandis)."

In his Memorandum filed on May 25, 2001, the Solicitor General submitted to this Court
certified copies of Sale Certificate No. 734, in favor of Leoncio Alburo, and Assignment of Sale
Certificate No. 734, in favor of Tomas N. Alonso. Conspicuously, both instruments do not bear
the signature of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of the Interior. They also do not bear the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

Only recently, in Jesus P. Liao v. Court of Appeals, the Court has ruled categorically that
approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce of the sale of friar lands is indispensable
for its validity, hence, the absence of such approval made the sale null and void ab-initio.
Necessarily, there can be no valid titles issued on the basis of such sale or assignment.
Consequently, petitioner Francisco’s father did not have any registerable title to the land in
question. Having none, he could not transmit anything to his sole heir, petitioner Francisco
Alonso or the latter’s heirs.

Consequently, we rule that neither Tomas N. Alonso nor his son Francisco M. Alonso or the
latter’s heirs are the lawful owners of Lot No. 727 in dispute. Neither has the respondent Cebu
Country Club, Inc. been able to establish a clear title over the contested estate. The reconstitution
of a title is simply the re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and
condition. It does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or
destroyed title. A reconstituted title, like the original certificate of title, by itself does not vest
ownership of the land or estate covered thereby.

3. An action for re-conveyance is a legal remedy granted to a landowner whose property has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s name, but then the action must be filed
within ten years from the issuance of the title since such issuance operates as a constructive
notice." In addition, the action is barred by laches because of the long delay before the filing of
the case. Petitioner Francisco’s action in the court below was basically one of re-conveyance. It
was filed on September 25, 1992, sixty-one (61) years after the title was issued on November 19,
1931, and forty-four (44) years after its reconstitution on July 26, 1948.

4. Petitioners assert that as the Court of Appeals annulled Cebu Country Club, Inc.’s title in the
Cabrera-Ingles case, so too must the title in this case be declared void. In the first place, there is
no identity of parties; secondly, neither the titles to nor the parcels of land involved are the same.
Consequently, the doctrine of res-judicata does not apply. Momentarily casting aside the doctrine
of res-judicata, there is an important moiety in the Cabrera-Ingles case. There, the Director of
Lands, after the administrative reconstitution of the title, issued a directive to the Register of
Deeds to register the lot in question in favor of Graciano Ingles. This superseded the
administrative reconstitution, rendering allegations of fraud irrelevant. Here, the Director of
Lands did not issue a directive to register the land in favor of Tomas N. Alonso. And worse, the
sales patent and corresponding deed of sale executed in 1926 are now stale.

5. An award of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation is proper under the circumstances
provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, one of which is when the court deems it just and
equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered and when the civil
action or proceeding is clearly unfounded and where defendant acted in gross and evident bad
faith.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review. However, we SET ASIDE the decision of the
Court of Appeals and that of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, Branch 08. IN LIEU
THEREOF, we DISMISS the complaint and counterclaim of the parties in Civil Case No. CEB
12926 of the trial court. We declare that Lot No. 727 D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate
covered by Original Certificate of Title Nos. 251, 232, and 253 legally belongs to the
Government of the Philippines.

Monday, December 20, 2010

MARIO FL. CRESPO, vs. HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987
Crespo vs. Mogul
G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987

Doctrine: It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a
criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the
criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or
unfounded prosecution by private persons.

GANCAYCO, J.:

FACTS:

1. On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial
Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of
Lucena City.

2. When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the
ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the
resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information.

3. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied
the motion. A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977
but the arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the
matter to the appellate court.

4. A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was
filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals. In an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of
Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until
further orders of the Court.

5. In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be
given due course.

6. On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and
perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the
accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for
review.

7. On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the
petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the
fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused.
8. A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated
April 10, 1978 with the trial court, attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary
Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an
opposition thereto.

9. On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment, stating that “the
motion’s trust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not
before it but on that adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only
disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes the Court’s independence and
integrity.”

10. The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for
the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of
Appeals.

11. On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals against the
threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further orders from the Court. In a decision of
October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of
January 23, 1979.

12. A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution
of February 19, 1980.

13. Hence this petition for review of said decision. Petitioner and private respondent filed their
respective briefs while the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that
the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be reversed and that respondent Judge be
ordered to dismiss the information.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court, acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the
Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for
review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits?

RULING: YES.

The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before
it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to
dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant
or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused
or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the records of the investigation.

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice
should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the
action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The
matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Tuesday, April 10, 2012

RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]

NATURE OF THE CASE:

Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as unconstitutional
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals
Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:

SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or local,
running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for
President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.

FACTS:

The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No.
9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being
in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one
subject which should be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.

They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with
the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair
election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on
elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent
capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the
title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.

The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code,
leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:

SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By
the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is
holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of
candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or
election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the
limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their
offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.

The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities
attended its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null
and void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its
approval” is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence,
which require publication of the law before it becomes effective.

Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law;
hence, should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo
v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional
mandate on the “Accountability of Public Officers:”
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not
considering those members of the House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14,
2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their respective certificates of
candidacy.

ISSUES:
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution.
W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval” is
a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require
publication of the law before it becomes effective.

HELD:
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that –
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical
construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means
necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth.
The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: “An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.”
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive
enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its
contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title
is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content.
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a
limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the
other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media
for election propaganda, does not violate the “one subject-one title” rule. This Court has held that
an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing
for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.
The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or
discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found
cause with Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure,
some sectors of society and in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad
policy as it would encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the
Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the
government. It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative
determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound
economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short,
the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner
are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not
suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance. Congress is not precluded from
repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of
the provision and by its pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable
purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the
election process is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of election laws – the fair,
honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress – is achieved.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The
former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an
office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the
other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an
appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are
entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Finally, the “Effectivity” clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it “shall
take effect immediately upon its approval,” is defective. However, the same does not render the
entire law invalid. In Tañada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule:
... the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other
date without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that
the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended….
Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Tañada, Rep. Act No. 9006,
notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional
law is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a
statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the
validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to
determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power. No
such transgression has been shown in this case.
Wednesday, September 8, 2010
Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance, G.R. No. L-31635, August 31, 1971
Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance, G.R. No. L-31635, August 31, 1971

FACTS:
Petitioners as plaintiffs in a complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, dated April
13, 1966, sought the payment of just compensation for a registered lot, containing an area of
1045 square meters, alleging that in 1927 the National Government through its authorized
representatives took physical and material possession of it and used it for the widening of the
Gorordo Avenue, a national road, Cebu City, without paying just compensation and without any
agreement, either written or verbal.
There was an allegation of repeated demands for the payment of its price or return of its
possession, but defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General refused to
restore its possession. It was further alleged that on August 25, 1965, the appraisal committee of
the City of Cebu approved Resolution No. 90, appraising the reasonable and just price of Lot No.
647-B at P50.00 per square meter or a total price of P52,250.00. Thereafter, the complaint was
amended on June 30, 1966 in the sense that the remedy prayed for was in the alternative, either
the restoration of possession or the payment of the just compensation.
In the answer filed by defendants, now respondents, through the then Solicitor General, now
Associate Justice, Antonio P. Barredo, the principal defense relied upon was that the suit in
reality was one against the government and therefore should be dismissed, no consent having
been shown. Then on July 11, 1969, the parties submitted a stipulation of facts to this effect:
"That the plaintiffs are the registered owners of Lot 647-B of the Banilad estate described in the
Survey plan RS-600 GLRO Record No. 5988 and more particularly described in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-5963 containing an area of 1,045 square meters; That the National
Government in 1927 took possession of Lot 647-B Banilad estate, and used the same for the
widening of Gorordo Avenue; That the Appraisal Committee of Cebu City approved Resolution
No. 90, Series of 1965 fixing the price of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00 per square meter; That Lot
No. 647-B is still in the possession of the National Government the same being utilized as part of
the Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City, and that the National Government has not as yet paid the value
of the land which is being utilized for public use."

The lower court dismissed the complaint on January 30, 1969 stating that the case is undoubtedly
against the National Government and there is now showing that the Government has not
consented to be sued in this case. The petitioners appealed by certiorari to review the decision
and contended that they are entitled for just compensation under the Art III, Sec. 1 (2) of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the decision of the CFI of Cebu to dismiss the complaint by reason Government
immunity from suit correct?

HELD:
NO. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot be an instrument for perpetrating
an injustice on a citizen. If there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would
not be in sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely there was a failure on what
the law requires and the petitioners has the right to demand from the Government what is due to
them. The Supreme Court decided that the lower court’s decision of dismissing the complaint is
reversed and the case remanded to the lower court for proceedings in accordance with law.

Saturday, August 21, 2010

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES GR No.

174689 October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 174689
October 22, 2007
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female.
(Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from
inside the bamboo. “Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!,” the voices said. She
pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came
two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man
“Malakas” (Strong) and the woman “Maganda” (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and
Maganda)

When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the
changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex?
May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate
to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?

FACTS:

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the
change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, alleging
that he is a male transsexual, that is, “anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female”
and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a man’s
body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a
“woman” culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in
Bangkok, Thailand. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be
married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from “Rommel Jacinto”
to “Mely,” and his sex from “male” to “female.”
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, stating that granting the
petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity; that with his
sexual re-assignment, petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now
possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not
his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him. Likewise, the court believes that
no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition.
On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the
petitioner and her fiancé and the realization of their dreams.
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of
entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. On February 23, 2006, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Republic, and set aside the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the change of petitioner’s name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed
under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA
9048.

HELD: A PERSON’S FIRST NAME CANNOT BE CHANGED ON THE GROUND OF SEX

REASSIGNMENT
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides: No person can
change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section
1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is
now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of
the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name)
and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until
and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. It
likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first
name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner
and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He
intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into
through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.
RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather
than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only
create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause
or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege,
any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name
was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the
local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy
because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also
filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila
where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and
official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.

NO LAW ALLOWS THE CHANGE OF ENTRY IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE AS TO

SEX ON THE GROUND OF SEX REASSIGNMENT

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court
must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: No entry in
the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as
clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now
be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect,
RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such
errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register.

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a “clerical or typographical error” is: “Clerical or
typographical error” refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in
writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and
innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to
the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to
other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change
of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner.
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the
conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means “to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from” while to
change means “to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something
that serves as a substitute.” The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries
therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction
is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as
births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations,
annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or
recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of
name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the
legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the
laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407.
Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
“Status” refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of
capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family
membership.
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters
as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations,
and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce,
and sometimes even succession.
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s
legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides: All
other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects.
This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child,
shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be
exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than
thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either
parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and
hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or,
in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where
the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed
at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that
there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at
the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning
in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words “sex,” “male” and “female” as used in
the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should
therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to
the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as “the sum of peculiarities of structure and
function that distinguish a male from a female” or “the distinction between male and female.”
Female is “the sex that produces ova or bears young” and male is “the sex that has organs to
produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova.” Thus, the words “male” and “female” in everyday
understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore,
“words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed
to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary.” Since the statutory
language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it
cannot be argued that the term “sex” as used then is something alterable through surgery or
something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category
“female.”
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the
civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or
change of the entries in his birth certificate.

NEITHER MAY ENTRIES IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE AS TO FIRST NAME OR

SEX BE CHANGED ON THE GROUND OF EQUITY
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of
justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice
to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first
step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred
social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One of
its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a
female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter
the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who
has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are
various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of
survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These
laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if
petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that “[n]o judge or court shall decline to
render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law.” However, it is
not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or
interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what
guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for
legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are
statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction
or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked,
what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to
confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and
sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in
turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be
recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to
fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law
exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government,
Congress.
Petitioner pleads that “[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and
[the] realization of their dreams.” No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are
people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized
parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the
remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
 SATURDAY, JANUARY 27, 2007
2006 Remedial Law Case Digests
CIVIL PROCEDURE

MIGUELITO LIMACO, ET AL. VS. SHONAN GAKUEN CHILDREN'S HOUSE

PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. 158245. June 30, 2005

Facts: Petitioners are the registered owners of three parcels of agricultural land. They entered
into a Contract of Sale with respondent and agreed that "in the event that the parties herein are
unable to effect the transfer and sale of the said properties in whole or in part in favor of the
vendees, all the paid-in amounts shall be applied to another similar property also owned by the
vendors in substitution of the above-described properties."

Pursuant to the contract, respondent corporation paid the down payment however; it refused to
remit any monthly installment due to petitioners' failure to obtain a clearance and/or approval of
the sale of the subject land from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Respondent
demanded that petitioners either solve the problem with the land tenants or substitute the lots
with another acceptable, suitable and untenanted land, pursuant to their agreement.
Petitioners informed respondent that they were ready to finalize the transaction in accordance
with the legal opinion of the DAR. In a letter, respondent informed petitioners that the scheme
proposed in the DAR Opinion was "far from acceptable." Respondent offered to purchase the
property on a direct sale basis. Petitioners did not respond to respondent hence, the latter,
through counsel, requested the return of its down payment. As petitioners did not acquiesce,
respondent filed a complaint for rescission with damages with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati. As a countermove, petitioners filed the instant case for specific performance with the
RTC of Laguna.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia. Petitioners opposed
contending that the instant complaint for specific performance was served on respondent ahead
of the service of the complaint for rescission on petitioners. Later, however, respondent withdrew
its motion to dismiss in view of the order of the RTC of Makati dismissing the complaint for
rescission. In its Answer with Counterclaim, respondent alleged by way of affirmative defense
that "specific performance is not possible because the respondent had already bought another
property which is untenanted, devoid of any legal complications and now converted from
agricultural to non-agricultural purpose in accordance with DAR Administrative Order.

Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint considering respondent's special

defense that specific performance was no longer possible. They prayed that their complaint and
respondent's counterclaim be ordered withdrawn or dismissed, arguing that respondent's
counterclaim would have no leg to stand on as it was compulsory in nature.
Issue: Whether respondent's counterclaim should be dismissed.

Held: There are two ways by which an action may be dismissed upon the instance of the
plaintiff. First, dismissal is a matter of right when a notice of dismissal is filed by the plaintiff
before an answer or a motion for summary judgment has been served on him by the defendant.
Second, dismissal is discretionary on the court when the motion for the dismissal of the action is
filed by the plaintiff at any stage of the proceedings other than before service of an answer or a
motion for summary judgment. While the dismissal in the first mode takes effect upon the mere
notice of plaintiff without need of a judicial order, the second mode requires the authority of the
court before dismissal of the case may be effected. This is so because in the dismissal of an
action, the effect of the dismissal upon the rights of the defendant should always be taken into
consideration.

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that petitioners filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint after
respondent already filed its answer with counterclaim. In fact, the reason for their motion for
withdrawal was the special defense of respondent in its answer that substitution was no longer
possible as it already bought another property in lieu of the subject lots under the contract. It is,
therefore, inexplicable how petitioners could argue that their complaint was successfully
withdrawn upon the mere filing of a Motion to Withdraw Complaint when they themselves
alleged in this petition that "private respondent objected to the withdrawal and the Trial Court
sustained the objection."

LUCIANO ELLO and GAUDIOSA ELLO, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.
G.R. No. 141255. June 21, 2005

Facts: Respondent Springfield Development Corporation is the owner and actual possessor of a
lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-92571, while respondent Constantino
Jaraula is the owner and actual possessor of a covered by TCT No. T-63088, both situated at
Cagayan de Oro City. The two lots adjoin each other and were originally parts of a 12-hectare lot
which has been developed by respondents as the Mega Heights Subdivision. Sometime in 1996,
petitioner spouses Luciano and Gaudiosa Ello and their hired personnel surreptitiously and
stealthily occupied respondents’ lots, built a make-shift shed under the trees, and fenced the area
they occupied. Respondents then demanded that petitioners and their hired personnel vacate the
area but they refused. Instead, they threatened and prevented respondents from developing their
lots into a subdivision. Thus, respondent Springfield Development Corporation and Constantino
G. Jaraula, filed a complaint against them for forcible entry with application for preliminary
mandatory injunction.

Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed outright
petitioners’ petition for review on the sole technical ground that it does not contain the affidavit
of service as required by Section 11 in relation to Section 13, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Held: Sections 3 and 5, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, prescribe two
modes of filing and service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments and other papers.
These are: (a) by personal delivery, governed by Section 6 of the same Rule; and (b) by mail,
under Section 7 thereof.

However, Section 11 of Rule 13 requires that “whenever practicable,” the filing of pleadings and
other papers in court, as well as the service of said papers on the adverse party or his counsel,
must be done “personally.” But if such filing and service were through a different mode, the
party concerned must submit a “written explanation” why they were not done personally.

There is no question that petitioners violated Section 11 of Rule 13 by failing to append the
affidavit of service to their petition for review filed with the Court of Appeals. Petitioners, upon
receipt of the Court of Appeals’ challenged Resolution dismissing outright their petition due to
such omission, promptly filed a motion for reconsideration, readily acknowledging their
procedural lapse and attaching therewith the required affidavit of service. Rules of procedure
must be faithfully followed except only when for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to
relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed
procedure.

EXECUTION OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENT; DELAY BY ONE PARTY

JUSTIFIES EXECUTION

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY VS. ALA INDUSTRIES

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 147349. February 13, 2004

Facts: The contract for the structural repair and waterproofing of the IPT and ICT building of the
NAIA airport was awarded, after a public bidding, to respondent ALA. Respondent made the
necessary repair and waterproofing.
After submission of its progress billings to the petitioner, respondent received partial payments.
Progress billing remained unpaid despite repeated demands by the respondent. Meanwhile
petitioner unilaterally rescinded the contract on the ground that respondent failed to complete the
project within the agreed completion date.

Respondent objected to the rescission made by the petitioner and reiterated its claims. The trial
court directed the parties to proceed to arbitration. Both parties executed a compromise
agreement and jointly filed in court a motion for judgment based on the compromise agreement.
The Court a quo rendered judgment approving the compromise agreement.

For petitioner’s failure to pay within the period stipulated, respondent filed a motion for
execution to enforce its claim. Petitioner filed a comment and attributed the delays to its being a
government agency. The trial court denied the respondent’s motion. Reversing the trial court, the
CA ordered it to issue a writ of execution to enforce respondent’s claim. The appellate court
ratiocinated that a judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise agreement was
immediately executory, and that a delay was not substantial compliance therewith.

Issues:
1) Whether or not decision based on compromise agreement is final and executory.

2) Whether or not delay by one party on a compromise justifies execution.

Held:
1) A compromise once approved by final orders of the court has the force of res judicata between
the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery. Hence, a decision
on a compromise agreement is final and executory. Such agreement has the force of law and is
conclusive between the parties. It transcends its identity as a mere contract binding only upon the
parties thereto, as it becomes a judgment that is subject to execution in accordance with the
Rules. Judges therefore have the ministerial and mandatory duty to implement and enforce it.

2. The failure to pay on the date stipulated was clearly a violation of the Agreement. Thus, non-
fulfillment of the terms of the compromise justified execution. It is the height of absurdity for
petitioner to attribute to a fortuitous event its delayed payment. Petitioner’s explanation is clearly
a gratuitous assertion that borders callousness.

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; ISSUANCE OF TRO EX-PARTE;

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; DUE PROCESS; PRESUMPTION OF COLD
NEUTRALITY OF A JUDGE

BAILINANG MAROHOMBSAR VS. JUDGE SANTOS ADIONG

G.R. No. RTJ-02-1674. January 22, 2004

Facts: Complainant Marohombsar was the defendant in the civil case for injunction. The case
was filed by Yasmira Pangadapun questioning the legality of Marohombsar’s appointment as
Provincial Social Welfare Officer of the DSWD-ARMM. Prior to his appointment, Pangadapun
used to occupy said position.
Upon the filing of the said complaint, respondent judge issued a TRO and set the hearing on the
application for the issuance of the preliminary injunction. Summons, together with a copy of the
complaint and a notice, was also served on both parties. Marohombsar filed an ex parte urgent
motion to dissolve the TRO. Pangadapun was given the time to comment. Respondent judge
issued an order stating that a preliminary conference had been held and that both parties had
waived the raffle of the case and reset the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of
injunction. The judge gave another time to file her comment again.

During the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, none of
the lawyers appeared. Hence, respondent judge considered it submitted for resolution and issued
the preliminary injunction. Hence, this complaint for gross ignorance of law, abuse of discretion
and conduct unbecoming a judge.

Issues:
1) Whether or not TRO ex parte is allowed in the instant case.

2) Whether or not trial-type hearing is essential to due process.

3) Whether or not respondent judge erred in ordering the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction.

Held:
1) A TRO is generally granted without notice to the opposite party and is intended only as a
restraint on him until the propriety of granting a temporary injunction can be determined. It goes
no further than to preserve the status quo until that determination. Respondent judge was
justified in issuing the TRO ex parte due to his assessment of the urgency of the relief sought.

2) In applications for preliminary injunction, the dual requirement of prior notice and hearing
before injunction may issue has been relaxed to the point that not all petitions for preliminary
injunction need undergo a trial-type hearing, it being doctrinal that a formal or trial-type hearing
is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process. The essence of due process is that
a party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present any evidence he may have
in support of his defense. It is a rule that a party cannot claim that he has been denied due
process when he was given the opportunity to present his position.

3) As a matter of public policy, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous, provided he acts in good faith and
without malice. Respondent judge, or any other member of the bench for that matter, is presumed
to have acted regularly and in the manner that preserves the ideal of the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge implicit in the guarantee of due process.

SERVICE OF SUMMONS, SUBSTITUTED SERVICE; SEVICE BY PUBLICATION;

ACTIONS IN REM; ACTIONS QUASI IN REM
SPOUSES PATRICK AND RAFAELA JOSE VS. SPOUSES HELEN AND ROMEO
BOYON
G.R. No. 147369. October 23, 2003

Facts: Petitioners lodged a complaint for specific performance against respondents to compel
them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale. The
RTC issued a summons to respondents. As per return of the summons, substituted service was
resorted to by the process server allegedly because efforts to serve personally to re respondents
failed. Meanwhile, petitioners filed before the RTC an ex parte motion for leave of court to effect
summons by publication and the judge issued an order granting the same. The respondents were
declared in default and as a consequence of the declaration of default, petitioners were allowed to
submit their evidence ex parte.

Helen Boyon, who was then in United Sates, was surprised to learn from her sister of the
resolution issued by the court. Respondents filed an Ad Cautelam motion questioning, among
others, the validity of the service of summons effected by the court a quo. The court issued an
order denying the said motion on the basis of the defaulted respondent supposed loss of standing
in court. Once again, the respondents raised the issue of the jurisdiction of the trial court via a
motion for reconsideration and the same was denied. The petitioners moved for the execution of
the controverted judgment which the judge granted.

Thereafter, respondents filed before the CA a petition for certiorari which held that the trial court
had no authority to issue the questioned resolution and orders.

Issue: Whether or not summons by publication can validly serve in the instant case.

Held: In general, courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the service of
summons, such service may be done personal or substituted service, where the action is in
personam and the defendant is in the Philippines. However, extraterritorial service of summons
or summons by publication applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem. That is, the
action against the thing itself instead of against the defendant’s person if the action is in rem or
an individual is named as defendant and the purpose is to subject the individual’s interest in a
piece of property to the obligation or loan burdening it if quasi in rem.

In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an action for specific performance
directed against respondents. While the suit incidentally involved a piece of land, the ownership
or possession thereof was not put in issue. Moreover, court has consistently declared that an
action for specific performance is an action in personam. Hence, summons by publication cannot
be validly served.

JURISDICTION; RTC
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
386 SCRA 67. August 1, 2002

Facts: Private respondent Manuel Dulawon filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for
breach of contract of lease with damages against petitioner Radio Communications of the
Philippines, Inc. (RCPI). Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction contending that it is the Municipal Trial Court which has jurisdiction as the
complaint is basically one for collection of unpaid rentals.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by private respondent.

Held: RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint. The averments in the complaint reveal that the
suit filed by private respondent was primarily one for specific performance as it was aimed to
enforce their three-year lease contract which would incidentally entitle him to monetary awards
if the court should find that the subject contract of lease was breached. As alleged therein,
petitioner’s failure to pay rentals due for the period from January to March 1997, constituted a
violation of their contract which had the effect of accelerating the payment of monthly rentals for
the years 1997 and 1998. Clearly, the action for specific performance, irrespective of the amount
of the rentals and damages sought to be recovered, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence,
cognizable exclusively by the RTC.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
SPO4 EDUARDO ALONZO VS. JUDGE CRISANTO C. CONCEPCION, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Branch 12, Province of Bulacan
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1879. January 17, 2005
Facts: In a wedding party, SPO4 Eduardo Alonzo, Jun Rances, Zoilo Salamat and Rey Santos
were drinking together at the same table. While waiting to be seated, Pedrito Alonzo was
introduced by SPO4 Alonzo to Rances as his nephew and as the son of ex-Captain Alonzo. SPO4
Alonzo then introduced him to Salamat. Pedrito and his companions took their seats and started
drinking at the table across SPO4 Alonzo’s table. After some time, Pedrito stood up to urinate at
the back of the house. Santos passed a bag to Salamat, and they followed Pedrito. Rances
likewise followed them. A shot rang out. Salamat was seen placing a gun inside the bag as he
hurriedly left. The wedding guests ran after Salamat. They saw him and Rances board a vehicle
being driven by Santos. Pedrito’s uncle, Jose Alonzo, sought the help of SPO4 Alonzo to chase
the culprits. He refused and even disavowed any knowledge as to their identity.

Jose Alonzo filed a complaint for murder against Salamat, Rances, Santos, SPO4 Alonzo and a
certain Isidro Atienza. A preliminary investigation1 was conducted by the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor where Jose Alonzo and his four witnesses testified. Upon review of the records of the
case by the 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, it was recommended that Salamat be charged
with murder as principal, and Santos and Rances as accessories. With regard to SPO4 Alonzo
and Isidro Atienza, the prosecutor found that no sufficient evidence was adduced to establish
their conspiracy with Salamat. Judge Concepcion of the RTC issued an Order directing the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to amend the information, so as to include all the aforenamed
persons as accused in this case, all as principals.

Issue: Whether or not the court has authority to review and reverse the resolution of the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor or to find probable cause against a respondent for the purpose of
amending the Information.

Held: The function of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether there is sufficient

ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. It is through the conduct of a preliminary
investigation that the prosecutor determines the existence of a prima facie case that would
warrant the prosecution of a case. As a rule, courts cannot interfere with the prosecutor's
discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. The reason for placing the criminal
prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded
prosecution by private persons. However, while prosecuting officers have the authority to
prosecute persons shown to be guilty of a crime they have equally the legal duty not to prosecute
when after an investigation, the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case.

In a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the prosecutor who did, or
between the fiscal and the offended party or the accused, that of the prosecutor's should normally
prevail.

MELBA QUINTO VS. DANTE ANDRES and RANDYVER PACHECO

G.R. No. 155791. March 16, 2005

Facts: An Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court that the accused Dante Andres
and Randyver Pacheco, conspiring, confederating, and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and maul Wilson Quinto inside a culvert
where the three were fishing, causing Wilson Quinto to drown and die. The respondents filed a
demurer to evidence which the trial court granted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It
also held that it could not hold the respondents liable for damages because of the absence of
preponderant evidence to prove their liability for Wilson’s death. The petitioner appealed the
order to the Court of Appeals insofar as the civil aspect of the case was concerned. The CA ruled
that the acquittal in this case is not merely based on reasonable doubt but rather on a finding that
the accused-appellees did not commit the criminal acts complained of. Thus, pursuant to the
above rule and settled jurisprudence, any civil action ex delicto cannot prosper. Acquittal in a
criminal action bars the civil action arising therefrom where the judgment of acquittal holds that
the accused did not commit the criminal acts imputed to them.

Issue: Whether or not the extinction of respondent’s criminal liability carries with it the
extinction of their civil liability.

Held: When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.

The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and
others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and
rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. The sole purpose of the civil action is the
restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury
he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused.

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a
final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from where the civil liability may
arise does not exist. In this case, the petitioner failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part
of either respondent to kill the deceased and as held by the the trial court and the CA, the
prosecution failed to adduce preponderant evidence to prove the facts on which the civil liability
of the respondents rest, i.e., that the petitioner has a cause of action against the respondents for
damages.

SEARCH WARRANT; PROBABLE CAUSE; WAIVER OF RIGHT TO QUESTION

LEGALITY OF SEARCH; EVIDENCE IN ILLEGAL SEARCH

PEOPLE VS. BENHUR MAMARIL

G.R. No. 147607. January 22, 2004

Facts: SPO2 Chito Esmenda applied before the RTC for a search warrant authorizing the search
for marijuana at the family residence of appellant Benhur. During the search operation, the
searching team confiscated sachets of suspected marijuana leaves. Police officers took pictures
of the confiscated items and prepared a receipt of the property seized and certified that the house
was properly searched which was signed by the appellant and the barangay officials who
witnessed the search.

After the search, the police officers brought appellant and the confiscated articles to the PNP
station. After weighing the specimens and testing the same, the PNP Crime Laboratory issued a
report finding the specimens to be positive to the test for the presence of marijuana. Moreover,
the person who conducted the examination on the urine sample of appellant affirmed that it was
positive for the same.

Appellant denied that he was residing at his parent’s house since he has been residing at a rented
house and declared that it was his brother and the latter’s family who were residing with his
mother, but on said search operation, his brother and family were out. He testified that he was at
his parent’s house because he visited his mother, that he saw the Receipt of Property Seized for
the first time during the trial and admitted that the signature on the certification that the house
was properly search was his.

Issues:
1) Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing a search warrant.

2) Whether or not the accused-appellant waived his right to question the legality of the search.

3) Whether or not evidence seized pursuant to an illegal search be used as evidence against the
accused.

Held: 1) The issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable cause.
Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. In
determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that: 1) The judge must examine the
complaint and his witnesses personally; 2) the examination must be under oath; 3) the
examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and answers. The
prosecution failed to prove that the judge who issued the warrant put into writing his
examination of the applicant and his witnesses on the form of searching questions and answers
before issuance of the search warrant. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are
not sufficient. Such written examination is necessary in order that the judge may be able to
properly determine the existence and non-existence of probable cause. Therefore, the search
warrant is tainted with illegality by failure of the judge to conform with the essential requisites of
taking the examination in writing and attaching to the record, rendering the search warrant
invalid.

2) At that time the police officers presented the search warrant, appellant could not determine if
the search warrant was issued in accordance with law. It was only during the trial that appellant,
through his counsel, had reason to believe that the search warrant was illegally issued. Moreover,
appellant seasonably objected on constitutional grounds to the admissibility of the evidence
seized pursuant to said warrant during the trial, after the prosecution formally offered its
evidence. Under the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights can reasonably be inferred from
his conduct before or during the trial.

3) No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the appellant may be, their seizure cannot
validate an invalid warrant. The requirement mandated by the law that the examination of the
complaint and his witnesses must be under oath and reduced to writing in the form of searching
questions and answers was not complied with, rendering the search warrant invalid.
Consequently, the evidence seized pursuant to illegal search warrant cannot be used in evidence
against appellant in accordance with Section 3 (2) Article III of the Constitution.

JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON; MOTION TO QUASH; ARREST WITHOUT

WARRANT

PEOPLE VS. CRISPIN BILLABER

G.R. No. 114967-68. January 26, 2004

Facts: Private complainant Elizabeth Genteroy was introduced to accused Crispin Billaber by
her friends. The accused told Genteroy that he could help her acquire the necessary papers and
find her a job abroad. Genteroy introduced the accused to Raul Durano. The accused offered
Durano a job as his personal driver in the U.S. Durano and Genteroy paid the accused and asked
for receipt, but the accused said that it was not necessary since they will leave together.

Meanwhile, Genteroy introduced the accused to Tersina Onza and offered a job abroad.
Thereafter, the accused instructed the three private complainants, Genteroy, Durano and Onza to
meet him at the airport on the agreed date, however, the accused failed to show up.

Durano chanced upon the accused at the canteen. A commotion ensued when Durano tried to
stop the accused from leaving. A police officer brought both Durano and the accused to the PNP
station. The prosecution offered in evidence a certificate from the POEA stating that the accused
was not licensed or authorized to recruit workers for employment abroad. The accused denied
receiving money from private complainants and interposed a defense of frame-up and extortion
against Durano.

Issues:
1) Whether or not the trial court erred in not considering that the accused arrested without
warrant.

2) Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

Held:

1) It appears that accused-appellant was brought to the police station, together with the
complainant Durano, not because of the present charges but because of the commotion that
ensued between the two at the canteen. At the police station, Durano and the other complainants
then executed statements charging appellant with illegal recruitment and estafa. As to whether
there was an actual arrest or whether, in the commotion, the appellant committed, was actually
committing, or was attempting to commit an offense, have been rendered moot.

2) Appellant did not allege any irregularity in a motion to quash before entering his plea, and is
therefore deemed to have waived any question of the trial court’s jurisdiction over his person.

UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

PEOPLE VS. NOEL TUDTUD AND DINDO BOLONG
G.R. No. 144037, Sept.ember 26, 2003

Facts: Solier informed the police that Tudtud would come back with new stocks of marijuana.
Policemen saw two men alighted from the bus, helping each other carry a carton/ box, one of
them fitted the description of Tudtud. They approached the two and Tudtud denied that he
carried any drugs. The latter opened the box, beneath dried fish where two bundles, one wrapped
in a plastic bag and another in newspapers. Policemen asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages and
contained what seemed to the police as marijuana leaves. The two did not resist the arrest.
Charged with illegal possession of prohibited drugs, they pleaded not guilty and interposed the
defense that they were framed up. The trial court convicted them with the crime charged and
sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Issue:

Whether or not searches and seizures without warrant may be validly obtained.

Held:
The rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant;
otherwise such “search and seizure” becomes reasonable within the meaning of the constitutional
provision, and any evidence secured thereby will be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in
any proceeding. Except with the following instances even in the absence of a warrant: 1)
Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, 2) Search in evidence in plain view, 3) Search of
a moving vehicle, 4) Consented warrantless search, 5) Customs search, 6) Stop and frisk and 7)
Exigent and emergency circumstances.

The long –standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a degree of consistency, is that, a
reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. Hence, the items seized
were held inadmissible, having been obtained in violation of the accused’s constitutional rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures.

CIVIL ACTION ARISING FROM DELICT; EFFECT OF ACQUITTAL ON THE CIVIL

ASPECT; EFFECT OF GRANT OF DEMURRER ON THE CIVIL ASPECT OF THE
CASE

ANAMER SALAZAR VS. PEOPLE AND J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING CORP.

G.R. No. 151931, September 23, 2003

Facts: Petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased 300 cavans of rice from J.Y. Brothers Marketing. As
payment for these, she gave a check drawn against the Prudential Bank by one Nena Timario.
J.Y. accepted the check upon the petitioner’s assurance that it was good check. Upon
presentment, the check was dishonored because it was drawn under a closed account. Upon
being informed of such dishonor, petitioner replaced the check drawn against the Solid Bank,
which, however, was returned with the word “DAUD” (Drawn against uncollected deposit).

After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of
Court. The trial court rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner of the crime charged but
ordering her to pay, as payment of her purchase. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
on the civil aspect of the decision with a plea that she be allowed to present evidence pursuant to
Rule 33 of the Rules of Court, but the court denied the motion.

Issues:
• Does the acquittal of the accused in the criminal offense prevent a
judgment against her on the civil aspect of the case?
 • Was the denial of the motion for reconsideration proper?

Held:
1) The rule on the Criminal Procedure provides that the extension of the penal action does not
carry with it the extension of the civil action. Hence, the acquittal of the accused does not
prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case where a) the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; b) where the court declared that
the liability of the accused is only civil; c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise
from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted.

2) No, because after an acquittal or grant of the demurrer, the trial shall proceed for the
presentation of evidence on the civil aspect of the case. This is so because when the accused files
a demurrer to evidence, the accused has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil
aspect of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial
court should do is to set the case for continuation of the trail for the petitioner to adduce evidence
on the civil aspect and for the private offended party adduce evidence by way of rebuttal as
provided for in Sec.11, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Otherwise, it
would be a nullity for the reason that the constitutional right of the accused to due process is
thereby violated.

AMENDED RULES ON DEATH PENALTY CASES’ REVIEW PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES VS. MATEO
G.R. No. 147678-87, July 7, 2004

Facts: Appellant Efren Mateo was charged with ten counts of rape by his step-daughter Imelda
Mateo. During the trial, Imelda’s testimonies regarding the rape incident were inconsistent. She
said in one occasion that incident of rape happened inside her bedroom, but other times, she told
the court that it happened in their sala. She also told the court that the appellant would cover her
mouth but when asked again, she said that he did not. Despite the irreconcilable testimony of the
victim, the trial court found the accused guilty of the crime of rape and sentenced him the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. The Solicitor General assails the factual findings of the trial and
recommends an acquittal of the appellant.

Issue: Whether or not this case is directly appeallable to the Supreme Court.

Held: While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases
where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however,
has it proscribed an intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the
penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it
wise and compelling to provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is
elevated to the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to
determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused, and no case in the evaluation of
the facts can ever be overdone. A prior determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly,
the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court of
Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then
render judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain
from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its
final disposition.

Under the Constitution, the power to amend rules of procedure is constitutionally vested in the
Supreme Court – Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
“(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts.”

Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule-making prerogative of
the Supreme Court than the law-making power of Congress. The rule here announced
additionally allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals, a subordinate appellate
court, before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review is such a procedural
matter.

Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more particularly Section 3
and Section 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, Section of Rule 125, and any other rule
insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court in
cases where the penalty imposed is death reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as the
resolution of the Supreme Court en banc, dated 19 September 1995, in “Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court” in cases similarly involving the death penalty, are to be deemed modified
accordingly.

A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC

RE: AMENDMENTS TO THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE TO
GOVERN DEATH PENALTY CASES RESOLUTION

Acting on the recommendation of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court submitting
for this Court’s consideration and approval the Proposed Amendments to the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.

The amendment shall take effect on October 15, 2004 following its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation not later than September 30, 2004
September 28, 2004
_____________________________________
AMENDED RULES TO GOVERN REVIEW OF
DEATH PENALTY CASES
Rule 122, Sections 3 and 10, and Rule 124, Sections 12 and 13, of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, are amended as follows:
RULE 122

Sec. 3. How appeal taken – (a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals
in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be
by notice of appeal filed with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from
and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.

(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.

(c) The appeal in cases whereby the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment or where a lesser penalty is imposed for offenses committed on the
same occasion on the or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more
serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is
imposed, shall be by notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance with paragraph (a) of
this Rule.

(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the Regional Trial Court imposed the death
penalty. The Court of Appeals shall automatically review the judgment as provided in Section 10
of this Rule. (3a)
xxx RULE 124

Sec. 12. Power to receive evidence. – The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and
conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform all acts necessary to resolve the factual issues
raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant
and conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearing in the Court of Appeals must be
continuous and must be completed within three months, unless extended by the Chief Justice.
(12a)

Sec. 13. Certification or appeal of case to the Supreme Court. – (a) Whenever the Court of
Appeals finds that the penalty of death should be imposed, the court shall render judgment but
refrain from making an entry of judgment and forthwith certify the case and elevate its entire
record to the Supreme Court for review.

(b) Where the judgment also imposes a lesser penalty for offenses committed on the same
occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more severe offense for
which the penalty is imposed, and the accused appeals, the appeal shall be included in the case
certified for review to the Supreme Court.

(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser
penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal file with the Court of Appeals. (13a)

EVIDENCE

INOCELIA S. AUTENCIO VS. CITY ADMINISTRATOR, RODEL M. MAÑARA ET

AL.
G.R. No. 152752. January 19, 2005

Facts: City Administrator Rodel M. Mañara lodged a complaint against petitioner Inocelia S.
Autencio with the Office of the City Mayor for dishonesty and misconduct in office. The
complaint alleged that Riza Bravo, an employee of the City Assessor’s Office charged with the
preparation of the payroll of casual employees, changed the September 1996 payroll prepared by
her upon the order of petitioner. After hearing, the Office for Legal Services issued a
resolution/decision, declaring the petitioner guilty of misconduct in office for allowing
irregularities to happen which led to illegal payment of salaries to casuals. However, as regards
to the charge of dishonesty, the same was found wanting due to insufficiency of evidence. A
penalty of forced resignation with forfeiture of retirement benefits except for earned leave
accumulated before the filing of the complaint was imposed. In return, petitioner alleged that she
had waived her right to present her evidence at a formal hearing and agreed to submit the case
for resolution, only because of the manifestation of the complainant and the hearing officer that
she could be held liable only for the lesser offense of simple negligence.

Issue: Was the petitioner deprived of substantial due process?”

Held: Petitioner was afforded due process. On the formal charge against her, she had received
sufficient information which, in fact, enabled her to prepare her defense. She filed her Answer
controverting the charges against her and submitted Affidavits of personnel in the Assessor’s
Office to support her claim of innocence. A pre-hearing conference was conducted by the legal
officer, during which she -- assisted by her counsel -- had participated. Finally, she was able to
appeal the ruling of City Mayor Badoy to the CSC, and then to the CA.

Finally, settled is the rule in our jurisdiction that the findings of fact of an administrative agency
must be respected, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. It is not the task of this
Court to weigh once more the evidence submitted before the administrative body and to
substitute its own judgment for that of the latter in respect of the sufficiency of evidence. In any
event, the Decisions of the CSC and the Court of Appeals finding petitioner guilty of the
administrative charge prepared against her are supported by substantial evidence.
TURADIO C. DOMINGO VS. JOSE C. DOMINGO ET AL.
G.R. No. 150897. April 11, 2005

Facts: Petitioner Turadio Domingo is the oldest of the five children of the late Bruno B.
Domingo, formerly the registered owner of the properties subject of this dispute. Private
respondents Leonora Domingo-Castro, Nuncia Domingo-Balabis, Abella Domingo, and Jose
Domingo are petitioner’s siblings. A family quarrel arose over the validity of the purported sale
of the house and lot by their father to private respondents. Sometime in 1981 petitioner, who by
then was residing on the disputed property, received a notice, declaring him a squatter. Petitioner
learned of the existence of the assailed Deed of Absolute Sale when an ejectment suit was filed
against him. Subsequently, he had the then Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police
(PC-INP, now Philippine National Police or PNP) Crime Laboratory compare the signature of
Bruno on the said deed against specimen signatures of his father.

As a result, the police issued him Questioned Document Report to the effect that the questioned
signature and the standard signatures were written by two different persons Thus; petitioner filed
a complaint for forgery, falsification by notary public, and falsification by private individuals
against his siblings. But after it conducted an examination of the questioned documents, the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) came up with the conclusion that the questioned
signature and the specimen signatures were written by one and the same person, Bruno B.
Domingo. Consequently, petitioner instituted a case for the declaration of the nullity of the Deed
of Sale, reconveyance of the disputed property, and cancellation of TCT.

Issue: Whether or not the court errs when it held that the trial court correctly applied the rules of
evidence in disregarding the conflicting PC-INP and NBI questioned document reports.

Held: Petitioner has shown no reason why the ruling made by the trial court on the credibility of
the respondent’s witnesses below should be disturbed. Findings by the trial court as to the
credibility of witnesses are accorded the greatest respect, and even finality by appellate courts,
since the former is in a better position to observe their demeanor as well as their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial.

Finally, the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale in the present case is a notarized document. Being
a public document, it is prima facie evidence of the facts therein expressed. It has the
presumption of regularity in its favor and to contradict all these, evidence must be clear,
convincing, and more than merely preponderant. Petitioner has failed to show that such
contradictory evidence exists in this case.

SATURDAY, JANUARY 27, 2007

2006 Mercantile Law Case Digests
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW
SIGNATURE OF DECEASED SHOWN; PRIMA FACIE PRESUMED TO BE A PARTY
TO A CHECK FOR VALUE
FELICITO SANSON, ET AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 127745. April 22, 2003

Facts: Felicito Sanson filed a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Juan See.
Sanson claimed that the deceased was indebted to him in the amount of Php 603, 000.00 and to
his sister Caledonia Sanson-Saquin in the amount of Php 320,000.00. also petitioner Eduardo
Montinola and his mother filed separate claims against the estate alleging that the deceased owed
them Php50,000 and Php 150, 000, respectively. During the trial, Caledonia and Felicito Sanson
testified that they had transaction with the deceased evidenced by six checks issued by the
deceased before he died and that after his death, Felicito and Caledonia presented the checks to
the bank for payment but were dishonored due to the closure of the account. The same
transaction happened to Eduardo and Angeles Montionola but when they presented the check to
the bank, it was dishonored. Demand letters were sent to the heirs of the deceased but the checks
remained unsettled.
Issue: Whether or not presumption of consideration may be rebutted even if the heirs did not
present any evidence to controvert it.
Held: When the fact was established by a witness that it was the deceased who signed the checks
and in fact who entered into the transaction, the genuineness of the deceased signature having
been shown, the latter is prima facie presumed to have been a party to the check for value,
following Section 24 of NIL which provides that “every negotiable instrument is deemed prima
facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration; and every person whose signature appears
thereon to have become a party thereto for value.”
Since the prima facie presumption was not rebutted or contradicted by the heirs, it has become
conclusive.

PROMISSORY NOTES; PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION

QUIRINO GONZALES, ET AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 126568. April 30, 2003
Facts: Petitioners applied for credit accommodations with respondent bank, which the bank
approved granting a credit line of Php900,000.00. Petitioner’s obligations were secured by a real
estate mortgage on four parcels of land. Also, petitioners had made certain advances in separate
transactions from the bank in connection with QGLC’s exportation of logs and executed a
promissory note in 1964.

Due to petitioner’s long default in the payment of their obligations under the credit line, the bank
foreclosed the mortgage and sold the properties covered to the highest bidder in the auction.
Respondent bank, alleging non-payment of the balance of QGLC’s obligation after the
proceedings of the foreclosure sale were applied and non-payment of promissory notes despite
repeated demands, filed a complaint for sum of money against petitioners. Petitioners, on the
other hand, asserted that the complaint states no cause of action and assuming that it does, the
same is barred by prescription or void for want of consideration.

Issue: Whether or not the cause of action is barred by prescription.

Held: An action upon a written contract, an obligation created by law, and a judgment must be
brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues.

The finding of the trial court that more than ten years had elapsed since the right to bring an
action on the Bank’s first to sixth causes had arisen is not disputed. The Bank contends,
however, that the notices of foreclosure sale in the foreclosure proceedings of 1965 are
tantamount to formal demands upon petitioners for the payment of their past due loan obligations
with the Bank; hence, said notices of foreclosure sale interrupted the running of the prescriptive
period.

The Bank’s contention has no merit. Prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed
before the court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is
any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.

The law specifically requires a written extrajudicial demand by the creditor which is absent in
the case at bar. The contention that the notices of foreclosure are tantamount to a written
extrajudicial demand cannot be appreciated, the contents of said notices not having been brought
to light.

But even assuming that the notices interrupted the running of the prescriptive period, the
argument would still not lie for the following reasons:
The Bank seeks the recovery of the deficient amount of the obligation after the foreclosure of the
mortgage. Such suit is in the nature of a mortgage action because its purpose is to enforce the
mortgage contract.
A mortgage action prescribes after ten years from the time the right of action accrued.

The law gives the mortgagee the right to claim for the deficiency resulting from the price
obtained in the sale of the property at public auction and the outstanding obligation proceedings.
In the present case, the Bank, as mortgagee, had the right to claim payment of the deficiency
after it had foreclosed the mortgage in 1965. as it filed the complaint only on January 27, 1977,
more than ten years had already elapsed, hence, the action had then prescribed.

HOLDER IN DUE COURSE; PRESUMPTION OF ACQUISITION OF AN

INSTRUMENT FOR A CONSIDERATION

CELY YANG VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 138074. August 15, 2003

Facts: Petitioner Cely Yang agreed with private respondent Prem Chandiramani to procure from
Equitable Banking Corp. and Far east Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) two cashier’s checks
in the amount of P2.087 million each, payable to Fernando david and FEBTC dollar draft in the
amount of US$200,000.00 payable to PCIB FCDU account No. 4195-01165-2. Yang gave the
checks and the draft to Danilo Ranigo to be delivered to Chandiramani. Ranigo was to meet
Chandiramani to turn over the checks and the dollar draft, and the latter would in turn deliver to
the former Phil. Commercial International Bank (PCIB) manager’s check in the sum of P4.2
million and the dollar draft in the same amount to be issued by Hang Seng Bank Ltd. of
HongKong. But Chandiramani did not appear at the rendezvous and Ranigo allegedly lost the
two cashier’s checks and the dollar draft. The loss was then reported to the police. It transpired,
however that the checks and the dollar draft were never lost, for Chandiramani was able to get
hold of them without delivering the exchange consideration consisting of PCIB Manager’s
checks. Two hours after Chandiramani was able to meet Ranigo, the former delivered to David
the two cashier’s checks of Yang and, in exchange, got US $360,000 from David, who in turn
deposited them. Chandiramani also deposited the dollar draft in PCIG FCDU No. 4194-0165-2.

Meanwhile, Yang requested FEBTC and Equitable to stop payment on the instruments she
believed to be lost. Both Banks complied with her request, but upon the representation of PCIB,
FEBTC subsequently lifted the stop payment order on FEBTC Dollar Draft No. 4771, thus,
enabling the holder PCIB FCDU Account No. 4194-0165-2 to received the amount of US $ 200,
000.
Issue:

(1) Whether or not David may be considered a holder in due course.

(2) Whether or not the presumption that every party to an instrument acquired the same for a
consideration is applicable in this case.

Held:

• Every holder of a negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie a holder in

due course. However, this presumption arises only in favor of a person who is a holder as
defined in Section 191 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, meaning a “payee or indorsee
of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof.”

In the present case, it is not disputed that David was the payee of the checks in question.
The weight of authority sustains the view that a payee may be a holder in due course.
Hence, the presumption that he is a prima facie holder in due course applies in his favor.

• The presumption is that every party to an instrument acquired the same for
a consideration. However, said presumption may be rebutted. Hence, what is vital to the
resolution of this issue is whether David took possession of the checks under the
conditions provided for in Section 52 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. All the
requisites provided for in Section 52 must concur in David’s case, otherwise he cannot be
deemed a holder in due course.

Section 24 of the Negotiable Instruments Law creates a presumption that every party to
an instrument acquired the same for a consideration or for value. Thus, the law itself
creates a presumption in David’s favor that he gave valuable consideration for the checks
in question. In alleging otherwise, the petitioner has the onus to prove that David got
hold of the checks absent said consideration. However, petitioner failed to discharge her
burden of proof. The petitioner’s averment that David did not give valuable
consideration when he took possession of the checks is unsupported, devoid of any
concrete proof to sustain it. Note that both the trial court and the appellate court found
that David did not receive the checks gratis, but instead gave Chandiramani US$ 360,000
as consideration for the said instruments.

LIABILITY OF MAKERS OF PROMISSORY NOTE ASTRO ELECTRONIC CORP. &

ROXAS VS. PHIL. EXPORT &FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORP.
G.R. No. 136729. September 23, 2003
Facts: Astro Electronic Corp. (Astro) was granted several loans by Phil. Trust Co. (Phil Trust)
amounting to Php 3,000.00 with interest and secured by three promissory notes. In each note, it
appears that Roxas signed twice as president of Astro and in his personal capacity. Thereafter,
Philippine Export & Foreign Guarantee Corp. (Phil Guarantee), with the consent of Astro,
guaranteed in favor of Phil Trust the payment of 70% of Astro’s loan. Upon the latter’s failure to
pay its loan obligation, despite demands, Phil Guarantee paid 70% of the guaranteed loan. The
Phil Trust and Phil Guarantee subsequently filed against astro and Roxas a complaint for sum of
money. The Regional Trial Court rendered its decision ordering Astro & Roxas to pay jointly
and severally Phil Guarantee the sum of Php 3, 621, 187.52 with interest and cost.
Issue: Whether or not Roxas should be jointly and severally liable with Astro for the sum
awarded by the RTC.
Held: By signing twice, as president of Astro and in his personal capacity, Roxas became a co-
maker of the notes and cannot escape any liability arising from it. Under the NIL, persons who
write their names on the face of the note as makers, promising that they will pay to the order of
the payee or any holder according to its tenor will be liable as such. Roxas is primarily liable as a
joint and several debtor considering that his intention to be liable is manifested by the fact that he
affixed his signature twice in each of the three promissory notes which necessarily would imply
that he is undertaking the obligation in two different capacities, official and personal.

NOVATION; LOANS; SOLIDARY OBLIGATIONS; PROMISSORY NOTE;

ACCOMODATION PARTY
ROMEO GARCIA VS. DIONISIO LLAMAS
G.R. No. 154127. December 8, 2003

Facts: A complaint for sum of money was filed by respondent Dionisio Llamas against
Petitioner Romeo Garcia and Eduardo de Jesus alleging that the two borrowed Php 400, 000
from him. They bound themselves jointly and severally to pay the loan on or before January 23,
1997 with a 15% interest per month. The loan remained unpaid despite repeated demands by
respondent.
Petitioner resisted the complaint alleging that he signed the promissory note merely as an
accommodation party for de Jesus and the latter had already paid the loan by means of a check
and that the issuance of the check and acceptance thereof novated or superseded the note.
The trial court rendered a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the respondent and directed
petitioner to pay jointly and severally respondent the amounts of Php 400, 000 representing the
principal amount plus interest at 15% per month from January 23, 1997 until the same shall have
been fully paid, less the amount of Php 120,000 representing interests already paid.
The Court of Appeals ruled that no novation, express or implied, had taken place when
respondent accepted the check from de Jesus. According to the CA, the check was issued
precisely to pay for the loan that was covered by the promissory note jointly and severally
undertaken by petitioner and de Jesus. Respondent’s acceptance of the check did not serve to
make de Jesus the sole debtor because first, the obligation incurred by him and petitioner was
joint and several; and second, the check which had been intended to extinguish the obligation
bounced upon its presentment.
Issues:
• Whether or not there was novation of the obligation
• Whether or not the defense that petitioner was only an accommodation
party had any basis.

Held:
For novation to take place, the following requisites must concur: (1) There must be a previous
valid obligation; (2) the parties concerned must agree to a new contract; (3) the old contract must
be extinguished; and (4) there must be a valid new contract.
The parties did not unequivocally declare that the old obligation had been extinguished by the
issuance and the acceptance of the check or that the check would take the place of the note.
There is no incompatibility between the promissory note and the check.
Neither could the payment of interests, which in petitioner’s view also constitutes novation,
change the terms and conditions of the obligation. Such payment was already provided for in the
promissory note and, like the check, was totally in accord with the terms thereof.
Also unmeritorious is petitioner’s argument that the obligation was novated by the substitution of
debtors. In order to change the person of the debtor, the old must be expressly released from the
obligation, and the third person or new debtor must assume the former’s place in the relation.
Well-settled is the rule that novation is never presumed. Consequently, that which arises from a
purported change in the person of the debtor must be clear and express. It is thus incumbent on
petitioner to show clearly and unequivocally that novation has indeed taken place. Note also that
for novation to be valid and legal, the law requires that the creditor expressly consent to the
substitution of a new debtor.
In a solidary obligation, the creditor is entitled to demand the satisfaction of the whole obligation
from any or all of the debtors. It is up to the former to determine against whom to enforce
collection. Having made himself jointly and severally liable with de Jesus, petitioner is therefore
liable for the entire obligation.

(2) By its terms, the note was made payable to a specific person rather than bearer to or order—a
requisite for negotiability. Hence, petitioner cannot avail himself of the NIL’s provisions on the
liabilities and defenses of an accommodation party. Besides, a non-negotiable note is merely a
simple contract in writing and evidence of such intangible rights as may have been created by the
assent of the parties. The promissory note is thus covered by the general provisions of the Civil
Code, not by the NIL.
Even granting that the NIL was applicable, still petitioner would be liable for the note. An
accommodation party is liable for the instrument to a holder for value even if, at the time of its
taking, the latter knew the former to be only an accommodation party. The relation between an
accommodation party and the party accommodated is, in effect, one of principal and surety. It is
a settled rule that a surety is bound equally and absolutely with the principal and is deemed an
original promissory debtor from the beginning. The liability is immediate and direct.
BOUNCING CHECKS LAW QUE VS. PEOPLE
154 SCRA 160

Facts: Vicotr Que deliberately issued checks to cover accounts but the checks were dishonored
upon presentment. Que was convicted by the RTC of the crime of violating B.P. Blg. 22 on two
counts which decision was affirmed by the CA. que alleged, among others, that he issued the
checks in question merely to guarantee the payment of the purchases by Powerhouse Supply, Inc.
of which he is the manager.
Issue: Whether dishonored checks issued merely to guarantee payment constitute violation of
B.P. Blg. 22.
Held: It is now well-settled that B.P. Blg. 22. applies even in cases where dishonored checks are
issued merely in form of deposit or a guarantee. The enactment does not make any distinction as
to whether the checks within its contemplation are issued, in payment of an obligation or merely
to guarantee said obligation. Consequently, what are important are the facts that the accused
deliberately issued the checks to cover accounts and that the checks were dishonored upon
presentment regardless of whether or not the accused merely issued the checks as a guarantee. It
is the intention of the framers of B.P. Blg. 22. to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check
malum prohibitum and thus punishable under such law.

INSURANCE

WHITE GOLD MARINE SERVICES, INC. VS. PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY
CORPORATION AND THE STEAMSHIP MUTUAL UNDERWRITING ASSOCIATION
(BERMUDA) LTD.
G.R. No. 154514. July 28, 2005

Facts: White Gold Marine Services, Inc. procured a protection and indemnity coverage for its
vessels from The Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association Limited through Pioneer
Insurance and Surety Corporation. White Gold was issued a Certificate of Entry and Acceptance.
Pioneer also issued receipts evidencing payments for the coverage. When White Gold failed to
fully pay its accounts, Steamship Mutual refused to renew the coverage.
Steamship Mutual thereafter filed a case against White Gold for collection of sum of money to
recover the latter’s unpaid balance. White Gold on the other hand, filed a complaint before the
Insurance Commission claiming that Steamship Mutual violated Sections 186 and 187, while
Pioneer violated Sections 299, to 301 of the Insurance Code.
The Insurance Commission dismissed the complaint. It said that there was no need for Steamship
Mutual to secure a license because it was not engaged in the insurance business. It explained that
Steamship Mutual was a Protection and Indemnity Club. Likewise, Pioneer need not obtain
another license as insurance agent and/or a broker for Steamship Mutual because Steamship
Mutual was not engaged in the insurance business. Moreover, Pioneer was already licensed;
hence, a separate license solely as agent/broker of Steamship Mutual was already superfluous.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Insurance Commissioner. In its decision, the
appellate court distinguished between P & I Clubs vis-à-vis conventional insurance. The
appellate court also held that Pioneer merely acted as a collection agent of Steamship Mutual.

Issues:

• Is Steamship Mutual, a P & I Club, engaged in the insurance business in

the Philippines?

• Does Pioneer need a license as an insurance agent/broker for Steamship

Mutual?

Held:

The test to determine if a contract is an insurance contract or not, depends on the nature of the
promise, the act required to be performed, and the exact nature of the agreement in the light of
the occurrence, contingency, or circumstances under which the performance becomes requisite.
It is not by what it is called.

Basically, an insurance contract is a contract of indemnity. In it, one undertakes for a

consideration to indemnify another against loss, damage or liability arising from an unknown or
contingent event.

In particular, a marine insurance undertakes to indemnify the assured against marine losses, such
as the losses incident to a marine adventure. Section 99 of the Insurance Code enumerates the
coverage of marine insurance.

A P & I Club is “a form of insurance against third party liability, where the third party is anyone
other than the P & I Club and the members. By definition then, Steamship Mutual as a P & I
Club is a mutual insurance association engaged in the marine insurance business.

The records reveal Steamship Mutual is doing business in the country albeit without the requisite
certificate of authority mandated by Section 187 of the Insurance Code. It maintains a resident
agent in the Philippines to solicit insurance and to collect payments in its behalf. We note that
Steamship Mutual even renewed its P & I Club cover until it was cancelled due to non-payment
of the calls. Thus, to continue doing business here, Steamship Mutual or through its agent
Pioneer, must secure a license from the Insurance Commission.
Since a contract of insurance involves public interest, regulation by the State is necessary. Thus,
no insurer or insurance company is allowed to engage in the insurance business without a license
or a certificate of authority from the Insurance Commission.

On the second issue, Pioneer is the resident agent of Steamship Mutual as evidenced by the
certificate of registration issued by the Insurance Commission. It has been licensed to do or
transact insurance business by virtue of the certificate of authority issued by the same agency.
However, a Certification from the Commission states that Pioneer does not have a separate
license to be an agent/broker of Steamship Mutual. Although Pioneer is already licensed as an
insurance company, it needs a separate license to act as insurance agent for Steamship Mutual.

PHILIPPINE CHARTER INSURANCE CORPORATION VS. CHEMOIL

LIGHTERAGE HITE GOLD CORPORATION
G.R. No. 136888. June 29, 2005

Facts:
Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
non-life insurance. Respondent Chemoil Lighterage Corporation is also a domestic corporation
engaged in the transport of goods. On 24 January 1991, Samkyung Chemical Company, Ltd.,
based in South Korea, shipped 62.06 metric tons of the liquid chemical DIOCTYL
PHTHALATE (DOP) on board MT “TACHIBANA” which was valued at US$90,201.57 and
another 436.70 metric tons of DOP valued at US$634,724.89 to the Philippines. The consignee
was Plastic Group Phils., Inc. in Manila. PGP insured the cargo with Philippine Charter
Insurance Corporation against all risks.
The insurance was under Marine Policies No. MRN-30721[5] dated 06 February 1991. Marine
Endorsement No. 2786[7] dated 11 May 1991 was attached and formed part of MRN-30721,
amending the latter’s insured value to P24,667,422.03, and reduced the premium accordingly.
The ocean tanker MT “TACHIBANA” unloaded the cargo to the tanker barge, which shall
transport the same to Del Pan Bridge in Pasig River and haul it by land to PGP’s storage tanks in
Calamba, Laguna. Upon inspection by PGP, the samples taken from the shipment showed
discoloration demonstrating that it was damaged. PGP then sent a letter where it formally made
an insurance claim for the loss it sustained.
Petitioner requested the GIT Insurance Adjusters, Inc. (GIT), to conduct a Quantity and
Condition Survey of the shipment which issued a report stating that DOP samples taken were
discolored. Inspection of cargo tanks showed manhole covers of ballast tanks’ ceilings loosely
secured and that the rubber gaskets of the manhole covers of the ballast tanks re-acted to the
chemical causing shrinkage thus, loosening the covers and cargo ingress. Petitioner paid PGP the
full and final payment for the loss and issued a Subrogation Receipt. Meanwhile, PGP paid the
respondent the as full payment for the latter’s services.

On 15 July 1991, an action for damages was instituted by the petitioner-insurer against
respondent-carrier before the RTC, Br.16, City of Manila. Respondent filed an answer which
admitted that it undertook to transport the shipment, but alleged that before the DOP was loaded
into its barge, the representative of PGP, Adjustment Standard Corporation, inspected it and
found the same clean, dry, and fit for loading, thus accepted the cargo without any protest or
notice. As carrier, no fault and negligence can be attributed against respondent as it exercised
extraordinary diligence in handling the cargo. After due hearing, the trial court rendered a
Decision in favor of plaintiff. On appeal, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision
reversing the trial court. A petition for review on certiorar[ was filed by the petitioner with this
Court.
Issues:
• Whether or not the Notice of Claim was filed within the required period.

• Whether or not the damage to the cargo was due to the fault or negligence
of the respondent.

Held: Article 366 of the Code of Commerce has profound application in the case at bar, which
provides that; “Within twenty-four hours following the receipt of the merchandise a claim may
be made against the carrier on account of damage or average found upon opening the packages,
provided that the indications of the damage or average giving rise to the claim cannot be
ascertained from the exterior of said packages, in which case said claim shall only be admitted at
the time of the receipt of the packages.” After the periods mentioned have elapsed, or after the
transportation charges have been paid, no claim whatsoever shall be admitted against the carrier
with regard to the condition in which the goods transported were delivered.
As to the first issue, the petitioner contends that the notice of contamination was given by PGP
employee, to Ms. Abastillas, at the time of the delivery of the cargo, and therefore, within the
required period. The respondent, however, claims that the supposed notice given by PGP over
the telephone was denied by Ms. Abastillas. The Court of Appeals declared:that a telephone call
made to defendant-company could constitute substantial compliance with the requirement of
notice. However, it must be pointed out that compliance with the period for filing notice is an
essential part of the requirement, i.e.. immediately if the damage is apparent, or otherwise within
twenty-four hours from receipt of the goods, the clear import being that prompt examination of
the goods must be made to ascertain damage if this is not immediately apparent. We have
examined the evidence, and We are unable to find any proof of compliance with the required
period, which is fatal to the accrual of the right of action against the carrier.[27]
Nothing in the trial court’s decision stated that the notice of claim was relayed or filed with the
respondent-carrier immediately or within a period of twenty-four hours from the time the goods
were received. The Court of Appeals made the same finding. Having examined the entire records
of the case, we cannot find a shred of evidence that will precisely and ultimately point to the
conclusion that the notice of claim was timely relayed or filed.
The requirement that a notice of claim should be filed within the period stated by Article 366 of
the Code of Commerce is not an empty or worthless proviso.
The object sought to be attained by the requirement of the submission of claims in pursuance of
this article is to compel the consignee of goods entrusted to a carrier to make prompt demand for
settlement of alleged damages suffered by the goods while in transport, so that the carrier will be
enabled to verify all such claims at the time of delivery or within twenty-four hours thereafter,
and if necessary fix responsibility and secure evidence as to the nature and extent of the alleged
damages to the goods while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the parties.
The filing of a claim with the carrier within the time limitation therefore actually constitutes a
condition precedent to the accrual of a right of action against a carrier for loss of, or damage to,
the goods. The shipper or consignee must allege and prove the fulfillment of the condition. If it
fails to do so, no right of action against the carrier can accrue in favor of the former. The
aforementioned requirement is a reasonable condition precedent; it does not constitute a
limitation of action.[31]
We do not believe so. As discussed at length above, there is no evidence to confirm that the
notice of claim was filed within the period provided for under Article 366 of the Code of
Commerce. Petitioner’s contention proceeds from a false presupposition that the notice of claim
was timely filed.
Considering that we have resolved the first issue in the negative, it is therefore unnecessary to
make a resolution on the second issue.

EXEMPTION SHOULD BE PROVEN IN ORDER TO QUALIFY UNDEREXCEPTION

CLAUSE OF INSURANCE POLICY

COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORP. VS. LIANGA BAY & COMMUNITY

MULTI PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC.
G.R. No.136914, January 25, 2002

Facts: Country Banker’s Insurance Corp. (CBIC) insured the building of respondent Lianga Bay
and Community Multi-Purpose Corp., Inc. against fire, loss, damage, or liability during the
period starting June 20, 1990 for the sum of Php.200,000.00. On July 1, 1989 at about 12:40 in
the morning a fire occurred. The respondent filed the insurance claim but the petition denied the
same on the ground that the building was set on fire by two NPA rebels and that such loss was an
excepted risk under par.6 of the conditions of the insurance policy that the insurance does not
cover any loss or damage occasioned by among others, mutiny, riot, military or any uprising.
Respondent filed an action for recovery of loss, damage or liability against petitioner and the
Trial Court ordered the petition to pay the full value of the insurance.
Issue: Whether or not the insurance corporation is exempted to pay based on the exception
clause in the insurance policy.
Held: The Supreme Court held that the insurance corporation has the burden of proof to show
that the loss comes within the purview of the exception or limitation set-up. But the insurance
corporation cannot use a witness to prove that the fire was caused by the NPA rebels on the basis
that the witness learned this from others. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be
received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. The petitioner, failing to prove the
exception, cannot rely upon on exemption or exception clause in the fire insurance policy. The
petition was granted.
BREACH OF CONTRACT OF INSURANCE
MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., VS. PHIL.NAILS & WIRES CORP.
G.R. No.138084, April 10, 2002

Facts: Respondent Phil. Nails & Wires Corp. insured against all risk its shipment of 10,053.40
metric tons of steel billet with petitioner Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., the shipment delivered
was short by 377.168 metric tons. For this shortage, respondent claimed insurance for
Php.5,250,000.00. Petitioner refused to pay. On July 28, 1993, respondent filed a complaint
against petitioner for the Sum of money with RTC of Pasig. Petitioner moved to dismiss for
failure to state cause of action but it was denied. On November 4, 1994, respondent moved to
declare petitioner in default and the trial court granted and allowed the presentation of evidence
ex parte. Respondent presented its lone witness, Jeanne King. On November 11, 1993, petitioner
filed its answer but was expunged from the record for late filing. The Trial Court rendered a
judgment by default.

Issue: Whether or not there is a cause of action and whether or not King is credible witness.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent’s cause of action is found

SATURDAY, JANUARY 27, 2007

2006 Political Law Case Digests
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE UNILAB, INC. vs. ERNESTO ISIP and/or SHALIMAR
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 163858. June 28, 2005

Facts: UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a place purported to be manufacturing

fake UNILAB products, especially Revicon multivitamins. The agent took some photographs
where the clandestine manufacturing operation was taking place. UNILAB then sought the help
of the NBI, which thereafter filed an application for the issuance of search warrant in the RTC of
Manila. After finding probable cause, the court issued a search warrant directing the police to
seize “finished or unfinished products of UNILAB, particularly REVICON multivitamins.” No
fake Revicon was however found; instead, sealed boxes where seized, which, when opened
contained 60 ml bottles of Disudrin and 200mg tablets of Inoflox, both were brands used by
UNILAB.
NBI prayed that some of the sized items be turned over to the custody of the Bureau of Food and
Drugs (BFAD) for examination. The court granted the motion. The respondents then filed a
motion to quash the search warrant or to suppress evidence, alleging that the seized items are
considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and therefore inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding, which the petitioners opposed alleging that the boxes of Disudrin and Inoflox were
seized under the plain view doctrine. The court, however, granted the motion of the respondents.

Issue: Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin
syrup and Inoflox, were valid under the plain view doctrine.

Held: It is true that things not described in the warrant may be seized under the plain view
doctrine. However, seized things not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain view.
The State must adduce evidence to prove that the elements for the doctrine to apply are present,
namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion
or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer
must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to
the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise
subject to seizure

It was thus incumbent on the NBI and the petitioner to prove that the items were seized on plain
view. It is not enough that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents. However,
the NBI failed to present any of officers who were present when the warrant was enforced to
prove that the the sealed boxes was discovered inadvertently, and that such boxes and their
contents were incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only the
enforcing officers had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof
were incriminating and that they were immediately apparent. There is even no showing that the
NBI agents knew the contents of the sealed boxes before they were opened. In sum then, the
petitioner and the NBI failed to prove that the plain view doctrine applies to the seized items.

Legal Terms

ACCION PAULIANA – an action where the creditor files an action in court for the rescission
of acts or contracts entered into by the debtor designed to defraud the former

ACCION REIVINDICATORIA – an action where the plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel
of land seeks recovery of its possession

ACCION SUBROGATORIA – an action where the creditor whose claimes had not been fully
satisfied, may go after the debtors (third persons) of the defendant-debtor
ANNUITY – is any continuing payment with a fixed total amount

ANTI-CHRESIS – an agreement between the creditor and the debtor where the latter gives the
former the income from the property he/she has pledged in lieu of interest on his/her debt

CARTE BLANCHE – complete freedom to act as one wishes or thinks best

CERTIORARI – a writ or order by whicha higher court reviews a decision of a lower court

CLAIMS – a legal assertion or demand by a person who wants a payment, compensation or

reimbursement for a loss under a contract or an injury caused by negligence

COMMODATUM – a a gratuitous contract involving

a proper loan, that is, loan of a thing where the obligation is to return the goods in exactly the
form in which it was lent

CONSIGNATION – the act of depositing the object of obligation to the court if the creditor
unjustifiably refused to accept the same or not in the position to accept it due to some reason or
circumstances

CREDITOR – an individual or an entity to whom money is due; “pinagkakautangan”

DEBTOR – an individual or an entity that is in debt to another; “may utang”

DEPOSIT – to place for safekeeping or in trust by the depositor, without any reward and which
to be returned when the depositor shall require it

EQUITY – under the context of obligations and contract, equity is the money value of property
on top of claims, liens, or property mortgages; in its broadest definition, equity means fairness

INDEMNITY AGREEMENT – a contract where one party agrees to protect another party
against certain future claims or losses
INTESTATE SUCCESSION – the distribution when a person dies without leaving a valid will
for the spouse and heirs

LEGITIME – a portion of an estate which children or other close relatives can claim against the
decedent’s testament

LETTER OF CREDIT (L/C) – released by a bank in behalf of its client to ensure that correct
and prompt payment will be made to the supplier; when the buyer fails to make payment on the
purchase, the bank will be required to cover the amount of the purchase

LIENS – serves as a security for a debt or performance charge given by the debtor to the
creditor; it is the creditor’s qualified right over a specific property of his debtor

MORTGAGE – a document expressing the owner’s (mortgagor) will to pledge his/her property
title to a lender (mortgagee) as security for a loan according to a promissory note

MOTU PROPIO – a Latin term meaning “on his own impulse” that is used to refer to a
document that is issued and personally signed by the Pope which may contain instructional
or administrative matters of church law or governing bodies, or may be used to grant a special
favor

OBLIGEE – an individual or entity to whom one is under obligation based on a contract or legal
agreement

OBLIGOR – an individual or entity that is bound to another for a certain debt or duty by means
of a contract or legal agreement

ONUS PROBANDI – evidence or burden of proof

PAWNBROKER – a person who lends money at interest on the security of an article pawned

PECUNIARY – anything relating to money; quantified in monetary terms

PENDENTE LITE – a Latin term referring to an order which in effect means “awaiting the
lawsuit or litigation”
PLEDGE – a serious promise, commitment or agreement to do or not do something

PRESTATION – a payment either in money or service; a performance of a duty whether or not

to do something as a fulfillment of an obligation

PROMISSORY NOTE – a signed document containing a written promise to pay a stated sum
to a specified person or the bearer at a specified date or on demand

REMISSION – an act of liberality by virtue of which the obligee, without receiving any price or
equivalent, renounces the enforcement of the obligation, as a result of which it is extinguished in
its entirety or in that part or aspect of the same to which the remission refers

RES JUDICATA – a Latin term for “a matter (already) judged”

SALE – a transfer of property of any kind or of services in exchange for money (or anything of
value) or other terms agreed and considered by both parties

SECURITY – serves as the assurance of a debt payment or a fulfillment of an obligation

STIPULATION POUR AUTRUI – a contract or provision in a contract that confers a benefit

on a third-party a cause of action against the promisor for specific performance

SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM – a writ ordering a person to attend a court and bring relevant
documents

SUBROGATION – the substitution of one person or group by another in respect of a debt or

insurance claim, accompanied by the transfer of any associated rights and duties

TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION – refers to succession from a legally executed testament