On the Principles of Musicology

Author(s): Charles Louis Seeger, Jr.

Source: The Musical Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Apr., 1924), pp. 244-250
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/738271
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 ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MUSICOLOGY
By CHARLES LOUIS SEEGER, JR.
I
MUSICAL AND NON-MUSICAL POINTS OF VIEW

N the logical or deliberatelymethodical treatmentof any

subject,thecharacteroftheworkmayvaryaccordingto the
data, premisses,aim, scope and method. But though it
varies, it must be consistent. Controlof the situationlies in the
logical factorknown as judgment. Its chieftask is the determi-
nation of what matter pertainsto the work and what rules are
applicable to it. Judgmentis partly insight,discernment,intu-
ition, and partly deliberate assumption (1) of a point of view
(point of departure,standpoint,etc.), and (2) of a directionor
orientationof that view.
There exists to-day a large and increasingbody of literature
about music and there is no doubt but that talking and writing
about music occupy at least as much time as the making of it.
Among musicians the aim of talking about music undoubtedly
involves the possibilityof benefitaccruing to the art of music.
Amongphilosophersthe aim, in possibleadditionto this,is chiefly
the furtherextensionand higherorganisationof the universeof
discourse.
But it is by no means apparent that these aims are consistent
withthe methodsadvocated or employedin the actual conductof
affairs. Furthermore,no adequate statement of the premisses
(fundamentalassumptions),no satisfactorydefinitionof its data,
nor of the scope of the undertakinghas ever been made, and no
organised study of music comparable to the study of language,
physics, biology, astronomy,etc., can be said to exist. There
seems to be a certain amount of agreement(1) that music is an
art-a phenomenonof.the physical (external) world, (9) that it
bears certain resemblancesand differencesto certain classes of
language usage that are classifiableas art in the same sense that
music as a whole is so classified,(3) that thereis a "mysterious"
quality in music that allows us to place upon it a value forwhich
we cannot logicallyaccount.
244

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 On the Principles of Musicology 245

These assumptionsare entirelyunsatisfactory, but theystrike,

I believe, the key-noteof much of the best workof moderntimes.
The aim ofthe presentundertakingis to take some stepstowardthe
higherorganisationof the study of music in order that it may
eventuallyrank withthe greatstudiesof our day. To do thisit is
firstnecessaryto showmorein detail the groundsfordissatisfaction
withthe presentsituation.
We cannot,I think,avoid the assumptionthatifany particular
instanceoftalkingor writingabout musicis logicallysound (allow-
ing forreasonable possibilityof error)it may benefitthe conduct
of the art of music. But how are we to judge the logicallysound
in connectionwith talking about music? The musician custom-
arily waives the right to definethe data and the premisses or
fundamentalassumptionsof the undertaking. That is the philos-
opher's business,he says. It is the same with the methods. So
if any faultis to be foundwiththe presentsituationwe mustgo to
philosophyto locate it.
When philosophy-I use the term broadly to include both
scientificand critical work-has turned in modern times to the
organisationof any special field,it has sought not only intrinsic
but also extrinsicmeans for the securingof truthin its results.
I mean by intrinsicmeans the improvingof the technique of
linguisticpresentationof this particularsort by the avoidance of
ofterms,etc. By extrinsicmeans,I
logical fallacies,the definition
designate the checkingup of language by organisedobservation,
and by experimentaland comparativemethods. This is the great
achievementof our times-not our railroads and factories.
Language has thus made greatstridesin manysciences,parts
of whose fields involve musical materials. In physics it has
given us exhaustivestudies of musical sounds-but not of music.
Similarly,in psychology,it has given us numerousstudies of mu-
sical perceptions,memory,imagery,etc.; in physiology,it has
studied the apparatus of sensationand execution;in historyand
paleography,it has re-presented to us manyofthegreatmonuments
of the past; in ethnology,it has given us a knowledgeof the music
of otherraces. In none of these has the pertinencyof the results
to music been clearlyshown,but, rather,oftenwronglyassumed.
Even in aestheticsnot musical resultshave been sought,but rather
a fieldforthe elaborationof ,esthetictheory.
The importantpoint to be noted is that althoughthe workers
in thesefieldsknowwell that theyare not talkingabout music,but
about physics,psychology,physiology,etc., music,in the mindsof
all concerned,presentlyacquires the definitionsthat these studies

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246 The Musical Quarterly
have used forthe phenomenathey deal with,whetheror not these
phenomenaare foundin connectionwithmusic. Good musicians
frequentlyobject to this, but can only fume incoherently-and
presently do the same thing themselves. In yielding to the
philosopher the exclusive control of the grounds, data and
methodsof talkingabout music the musician has lost controlof
the wholesituation,even the aim. Music thusacquirespredicates
and becomes,to a degreenot commonlyrecognised,something else
-such as sound waves, sense data, a type of behaviour,a mani-
festationof the sublimeor the beautiful,arithmeticalrelations,a
social value, etc. The philosopher cannot be expected fully to
grasp the situation here outlined. It is not difficultfor him to
sense the unsoundnessof it, but inasmuchas his personalknowl-
edge of music is notoriouslymeagre and far inferiorto his
knowledgeof language, it is hard for him to locate the fallacy.
Music is to himsense data or the beautiful,etc. He cannot obtain
any knowledgeof an alternativefromthe musician because the
vehicleofcommunicationbetweenthemmustbe languageand, the
premissesand methods having been left to the philosopherand
neglected by the musician, the latter cannot be regarded as a
trustworthysource of informationon account of his inabilityto
expresshimselfeven ifhe have the knowledge. For skill in philo-
sophicaltechniqueis requiredto presenttrustworthy philosophical
knowledge and it goes withoutsayingthat such skillcan hardlybe
imagined as having been developed without first-hand investi-
gation of the premisses and methods involved. Although the
musician'scommandof ordinarylanguage is, as a rule,fargreater
than the philosopher'scommand of any kind of musical tech-
nique, his adventuresin philosophicalrealms are only too often
a mere sciolisticimitationof logical procedure. This naturally
tends to confirmthe presumptionof philosophyto its naive view
of music as a lower class for which the higher class, language,
can legislate. Thus the musician,in so far as he talks and writes
and reads about music,comes to regardit froma non-musicalpoint
of view-in moderation,just as desirablea thingas the regarding
of language froma non-linguisticpoint of view. But it is over-
done. The time spent by most musiciansin talking,readingand
writingabout music amounts close to, when it does not actually
exceed, the time spent in the musical activity itself,that is, in
pure composition,performanceand audition. Even if we were
sure that this linguisticactivity were logically sound we might
be justifiedin urgingits curtailment. But, qua talking,it is very
poor; and the musician is so proud and knows so little about the

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 On the Principles of Musicology 247

limitationsand powers of logical procedurethat he is not even

aware how badly he talks. Thus, upon the vestigesof mediaeval
scholasticismwe spread a varnishof "newspaperscience" and the
philosopher'signoranceof music and the musician's ignoranceof
language dance a strangejig indeed.
From the non-musicalview of music whetherheld by non-
musiciansor borrowedby musiciansI appeal for a musical view
of music. To the musician,musicis music. Music is not some-
thingelse, whetherit be expressedby one word or a host of them.
To the study that attempts to maintain this point of view and
its impliedaim in languageI wishto apply the term"musicology."
Its firsttask is the organisationof musical knowledge. To all
writingand talking about music fromthe non-musicalpoints of
view I wish to apply termsthat will effectively them
differentiate
and theirresultsfromthe attemptto maintaina musical point of
view towardsmusic. The resultsofthe great sciences,in so faras
they touch upon music (or anythingelse), are contributionsto
those subjects. They are true in so far as they are accepted by
the best men in each branch. But untiltheyare revisedin terms
of musical techniquetheycannotbe acceptedas pertinentto music.
The second task of musicologyis the effectingof this revision.
Contributionsfrom non-musical sources capable of adaptation
as musicological data (and dicta) may then be designated, in
harmonywith general academic usage, as physico-musicological,
psycho-musicological,etc., or musico-physical,musico-psycho-
logical. The fields of various sciences continually overlap and
the fixingof "boundaries" is sometimesextremelydifficult-even
impossible. But the boundary of musicology should not be
difficultto fix.
II
MUSICOLOGY AS A STUDY DEMANDING EQUAL SKILL IN LANGUAGE
AND MUSIC.
To be logicallysound and musically acceptable, musicology
should discountenancenot only the extravagantclaim of splendid
isolation by music but also the even more extravagantclaim of
language that it can legislateforeverything. We must especially
state that if all music is an art, then all language is an art also.
Again, to whateverextentmusic is a phenomenonof the physical
worldthento the same extentis language-even ifit is in language
that the situationis presented. We should see ourselvesdealing
with a practical situation demanding the balancing of two co-
existing functions-and their equi-valuing-in a single study. It

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248 The Musical Quarterly
is obvious that such a studywould demand equal degreesof pro-
ficiencyin the techniqueof language and the techniqueof music.
Philosophy would have a right to require a skill adequate for
the employmentof modern scientificand critical methods; and
music would have a rightto require a first-classall around mu-
sicianship. An equal degreeof skillin two arts may be considered
as characterisinga study without its being supposed that any
individualwho engagesin it can attain what must remainforhim
an ideal. Musicologists,as otherhuman beings,must remember
they are fallible,thoughthey may striveto approach perfection
as closely as possible. Any subject is, in a measure, above the
failingsof its adepts. But only in a measure. The imputation
of perfectionor infallibilityto a study is as dangerous as the
presumptionto perfectionby the student,at least as faras deliber-
ate methodicalness is concerned. Arrogance is the mystic's
strength:humility,the logician's. The sense of powerthat comes
withgreat skill in eithermusic or language is a temptationto be
perpetuallyguarded against. It is thereforeincumbentupon him
to take candid account of his relativeskill in language and music
and endeavour by every means to make correctionfor his defi-
ciencies. He should,in spite of the tendencyof the last century
toward over-specialisation,attempt to get in touch with the
movementnow gaininggroundto bindtogetherthespecialbranches
of learningthat have tended,even as music has, toward isolation.
"The end forwhichwe oughtto striveto-dayis an educationwhich
shall enable the workersin any field whatsoeverto understand
betterhow the object of theirown activityis subordinatedto more
general problems." It is with a view not only toward a better
integrationof music and talkingabout music and toward a better
integrationof the art of music and the art of language, that a re-
vised musicologyshould be oriented,but with a view also to the
better integrationof both arts in the social life they so largely
condition.
Of course,historically,we are membersof a groupcharacter-
ised by a degree of linguisticsophisticationfar in excess of our
musical.development. But it should be preciselyto offsetthis
inequalityand the myopiato whicheven the subtlestmanipulation
of the methodsof historiography are subject that we should em-
a
phasise systematic orientation in musicology,corrected,when
necessary, in the light of historicalconsiderations. By a 'syste-
matic' orientationI mean a facingof music as it is-as the crafts-
man and artistfaces it in the actual process of workingin it-at
least to this extent, that one is quite freeof concernas to howit

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 On the Principlesof Musicology 249

came to be as it is. Of course,it has always been only in termsof

systematictreatmentsmade by the use of currentscientificand
critical methodsthat the monumentsof the art of any day have
been studied. But owingto (or shall we say perhapscontributing
to?) the recent decline in composition,modern musicologyhas
reinstateda vast amount of the music of formertimes, without,
however, keeping track of the improvementsin method with
whichto study them or the worksof the presentday, withwhich
it is fairlyout of touch. Thus it has tended to judge the history
of music in termsthat belong to the historyof musicology(that
is, in termsofformersystems),and far frombeing guiltyof "re-
gardingthe past froma modernpoint of view" has come to regard
both the past and the presentfrompointsof view fiftyor so years
old. These points of view, not by any means modern even in
their day, were at least characteristicof their day in that they
were largelyunconsciousof the bias of a linguisticpoint of view.
In most subjects modernscience and criticismhas succeeded in
freeingitselffromthe crudermanifestationsof this bias; but this
has been done firstin a systematicorientationand later in his-
torical work. Indeed, the study of historyhas been transformed
by it. It is not, then, unreasonable to suppose that a similar
procedurewillbe of benefitto musicologyby freeingthe definition
of the musical point of view from as much of the tyrannyof
language as is dependentupon historicalorientation.
It should be a comparativelysimple task to freemusicology
from that much of this tyranny dependent upon systematic
orientation. Modern methods will almost automatically pre-
serve musicalrealityfroman invasionofthe studiesin whichthese
methodsoriginated. In the firstplace, they must, by theirvery
nature, start working from premisses involving only strictly
musical concepts and not fromnon-musical ones involving
aes-
theticprinciples,psychologicalprocesses,physicalor physiological
phenomena. (A strictlymusical concept is one essential and
peculiar to music; for instance, melody.) In the second place,
when it becomes necessaryto introduceconcepts used elsewhere
than in music (such as tone and rhythm)they will so patently
demand redefinitionthat their musical meaning will not be
grasped easily except in close association with strictlymusical
concepts. They will have to be used in theirmusical sense alone.
Later, when,by its intrinsicorganisation,musical knowledgecan
stand upon a commonfootingand deal in commontermswiththe
rest of organised learning, then and not until then may these
concepts as understood by the non-musical studies be admitted,

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250 The Musical Quarterly

togetherwith the bulk of the findingsof these studies, for con-

sideration,revisionand use.
The customary premisses or assumptions in talking and
writingabout musicshouldbe revisedformusicology,somewhatas
follows:
(1) There is an art of music and there is an art
of language;
(2) They may enter into relations with one an-
other;
(3) They are technicallyin some respectshomolo-
gous.
To thisbalanced postulationoffactshouldbe added the postu-
lation of value:
(1) The art of language and the art of music are
technicallypeersboth in and out of relationsentered
into between them (i.e., they are equally directly
used by us; functionwithequal degreesofautonomy)
and are equally importantor valuable;
(2) The lack ofbalance introducedintomusicology
by the choice of instrument(language) may be com-
pensated forby the predominanceof a musicalpoint
of view;
(3) Both on the whole and in whatever partic-
ular respect homologyis hypothesisedit must be
equi-valued in respect to the two terms(i.e., music
fromlanguage as it is like it and until
is as different
the contraryis proveneach resemblancefoundmust
be consideredas offsetby a proportionatedifference
in the same respect).

If, in musicology,we can assure ourselvesof a faircontrolof

the language element,we can do two things,both fullof promise.
In the firstplace, we can establishthe studyof musicin a position
of give and take withthe great studiesof our day, that is, firstas
an independentpursuit and second as a correlativeone. In the
second place, language could, wheneverit seems good, be held in
check and music be allowed the autonomywhichis its rightand
its need, if, as there seems to be strong reason to believe, its
course lies not always consistentlyharmoniouswith the course
of language, or withthe linguisticnotionsof a given day.

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