CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION

GROUP 5
Constitution Defined
• Fundamental law which sets up a form of 
 government and defines and delimits the powers the
reof and those of its officers, reserving to the people themselves plenary sovereignty.

• Written charter enacted and adopted by the people by which a government for them is established.


• Permanent in nature thus it does not only apply to 
 existing conditions but also to future needs.

• Basically it is the fundamental laws for the 
 governance and administration of a nation.

• Absolute and unalterable except by amendments.

• All other laws are expected to conform to it.

Purpose of Constitutional Construction

• Primary task of constitutional construction is to ascertain the intent or purpose of the framers of

 the constitution as expressed in its language.

• Purpose of our Constitution: to protect and enhance the people‘s interests.

J.M. TUASON & CO., INC. v. LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION

FACTS: R.A. 2616 authorized expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City owned by petitioner
and 2 others. Lands were to be divided to lots to be sold. They prayed that it be declared
unconstitutional because violative of equal protection clause since statute applies only to Tatalon
estate.

ISSUE:

HELD: The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution
CO vs HRET

FACTS: The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET declared that respondent Jose
Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purpose
s. On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. A
mong the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of
Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose
Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of
Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on th
e following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the
HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989. Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
CO vs HRET

ISSUE: WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

HELD: It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged in by the
literal meaning of its language. The spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter,
especially where adherence to the latter would result in absurdity and injustice. A Constitutional
provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which i
t is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision which should prevail over the letter thereof.
RULES ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION
Rules on Constitutional Construction

There are three well-settled principles of constitutional construction:

• Verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution should be given their or
dinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.

• Ratio legis est anima, meaning that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers.

• Ut magis valeat quam pereat, meaning that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.
APPLICABILITY OF THE RULES ON STATUTORY CONTRUCTION
SARMIENTO III VS MISON AND CARAGUE

FACTS: Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the
Secretary of the Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Sarmiento assailed the appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed
by CoA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment is valid.

HELD: The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the
framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is
that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. The Court will thus
construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in accordance with how the executive or the legi
slative department may want them construed, but in accordance with what they say and provide.
 NO AMBIGUITY: VERBA LEGIS
Give ordinary meaning to the words
TANO VS SOCRATES

FACTS: On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance
banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to
January 1, 1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan
enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching , gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of
a several species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming from
Palawan waters.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court declare the
said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances deprived
them of the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their
trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE: Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

TANO VS SOCRATES

HELD: It is settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality. It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local
government units) enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative
contradiction.
In short, the conflict with the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. Where doubt exis
ts, even if well-founded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain.
ORDILLO VS COMELEC

FACTS: On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao,
Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to
Republic Act No. 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous
Region.” The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed that the
creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was
overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city above-mentioned.

Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the
Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of the votes cast only in the
Province of Ifugao.
the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act for the
Region. The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one
province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of
more than one constituent unit.
ORDILLO VS COMELEC
ISSUE: The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the only
province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone,
legally and validly constitute such Region.

HELD:
Words used to be given their ordinary meaning.The well-established rule in statutory construction that
the language of the Constitution, as much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in
common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed, must then, be applied in this case.
AMBIGUITY EXIST
1. Rules

A. Ratio Legis Est Anima: Consider Intent of the Framer/Object To Be Accomplished

B. Ut Magis Valeat Quam Pereat: Construe the Constitution As A Whole

C. Self-Executing Rather Than Needs An Implementing Statute

D. Mandatory Rather Than Directory

E. Prospective Rather than Retroactive

A. Ratio legis Est anima

• “Consider intent of the framers/Object to be accomplished”

• The Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished
• by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied.

• In construing constitutional law, the history must be taken into consideration because there are
• certain considerations rooted in the historical background of the environment at the time of it
• adoption. (Legaspi vs Minister of Finance)
Hidalgo vs. Hidalgo

Issue: Whether or not the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of Republic Act No. 3844 is
applicable to share tenants

Held: The Code did not mention tenants, whether leaseholds or share tenants, because it outlaws
share tenancy and envisions the agricultural leasehold system as its replacement, and the agraria
n court’s literal construction would wreak havoc on and defeat the proclaimed and announced
legislative intent and policy of the state of establishing owner-cultivatorship for the farmers who
invariable were all share tenants before the enactment of the Code and whom the Code would now
uplift to the status of the lessees
B. Ut Magis Valeat Quam Pereat

• Construe the Constitution As A Whole”

• Every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to
the general intent of the whole enactment.

• Provisions should not be construed separately from the rest; it should be interpreted as a whole a
nd be harmonized with conflicting provisions so as to give them all force and effect.

• Sections in the constitution with a particular subject should be interpreted together to effectuate
the whole purpose of the Constitution.
Kida vs Senate

Issue: Whether the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections (including the ARMM
elections)

Held: While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and l
ocal elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Constitution.

We find this to be an erroneous approach that violates the basic principle in constitutional
construction ut magis valeat quam pereat: that Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole, and one
mandate should not be given importance over the other except where the primacy of one over the
other is clear.
C. Self executing rather than needs an implementing statute

• “Provisions are complete by themselves and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary
legislation.”

• General Rule: Constitutional provisions are self-executing except when provisions themselves
expressly require legislations to implement them.

• Just because legislation may supplement and add or prescribe a penalty does not render such
• provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation.

• In case of doubt, construe such provision as self-executing rather than non-self executing
Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS

Issue: Whether or not Section 10, Paragraph 2, Article 12 of the the 1987 Constitution is a
self-executing provision

Held: In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self
executing. Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when,
or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
Law making body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the
needed implementing statute.
Intrinsic Aids
Intrinsic Aids

• The term “intrinsic” means internal or within. They are tools that one uses to interpret the
provisions of the law
• They are found within the statute itself.
These are resorted only if there is ambiguity. In resorting to in
trinsic aids, one must go back to the parts of the statute:

• Title of the Statute

• Preamble

• Context

• Punctuation Marks

• Capitalization of Letters

• Headnotes or Epigraphs
Initial Considerations
Observe the language of the law, treat its provisions in connection with ot
her provisions found within the law and ascertain legislative intent through
the following

• Verba legis

• Contextual Treatment

• Legislative Intent
Four corners of the statute

• Title

• Body

• Repealing clause

• Effectivity
Tools
1. Casus Omissus

1. Stare Decisis

2. Distinctions

3. Exceptions

4. General and Special Terms

5. Ejusdem Generis

6. Inclusio Unios

7. Associated Words
Extrinsic Aids

• They are tools in the construction of statute that are found beyond the statute itself

• They are resorted to only upon conclusion that the ambiguity remains upon exhausting all
available intrinsic aids.

• Extrinsic aids resorted to by the courts are history of the enactment of statute; opinions and ruling
s of officials of the government called upon to execute or implement administrative laws;
contemporaneous construction by executive officers; actual proceedings of the legislative body;
individual statements by members of congress; and the author of the law.
Tools

1. Legislative history

2. Contemporaneous Construction

3. Jurisprudence

4. Legal Materials
AGLIPAY vs RUIZ

Facts: In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the i
ssues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third intern
ational Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillme
nt of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Ba
r, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. The petitioner invokes that such issuanc
e and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose – for
the benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not such act is a violation of the Constitution by the respondent in issuing and selli
ng postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.

RULING: No. It is not violative. Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibiti
on of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a p
rofession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in
so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly
appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divin
e Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develo
p the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their poster
ity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby man
ifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of reli
gion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indis
criminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.
No. 4052. — AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND MAKING T
HE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE APP
ROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW DE
SIGNS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature assemble
d and by the authority of the same:
SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated and made immediately availabl
e out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the costs of plates and printi
ng of postage stamps with new designs, and other expenses incident thereto.
SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communication
s, is hereby authorized to dispose of the whole or any portion of the amount herein appropriated in th
e manner indicated and as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government.
.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the disc
retionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous t
o the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the
violation of the Constitution.
It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, ben
efit or support of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postag
e stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
was not inspired by any sectarian denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit o
f the Roman Catholic Church.
Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears
from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's com
plaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and att
ract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event consider
ed of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people"
PERALTA vs COMELEC

Facts: Section 4 of the 1978 Election Code provides that the election period shall be fixed by the Comm
ission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Article XII[C] of the Constitution. The period of campai
gn shall not be more than forty-five days immediately preceding the election, excluding the day before a
nd the day of the election. Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the 45-day campaign period be
cause: (a) it was decreed by the President and not by the Commission on Elections as provided by Sect
ion 6 of Article XII-C and (b) the period should cover at least ninety days (90). They argue that Section 6
of Article XII-C of the Constitution provides that the election period shall commence ninety days before t
he day of election and shall end thirty days thereafter.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the 45-day period is unconstitutional.

RULING: The 45-day campaign period is constitutional. Although the campaign period prescribed in t
he 1978 Election Code for the election of the representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa is le
ss than 90 days and was decreed by the President and not by the COMELEC as provided by Section
6 of Article XII-C of the Constitution, the same does not violate the Constitution because, under Amen
dment 1, the manner of election of members of the interim Batasang Pambansa shall be prescribed a
nd regulated by law, and the incumbent president under amendment No. 5 shall continue to exercise
legislative power until martial law shall have been lifted.
At the outset, it should be considered that Amendment No. 1 provides that the “number of representat
ives from each region and the manner of their election shall be prescribed and regulated by law ” (em
phasis supplied). Under Amendment No. 5, “the incumbent President shall continue to exercise legisl
ative powers until martial law shall have been lifted.” The power conferred by these Amendment upon
the lawmaker necessarily included the authority to prescribe the date and procedure for the holding of
such elections. It should be borne in mind that the forthcoming election for members in the interim Bat
asang Pambansa will be a special election during a regime of martial law. It is, therefore, an election i
n a state of emergency. The exigencies of the situation require that it be governed by special rules.
TOLENTINO vs SECRETARY

Facts: Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the E
xpanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively origi
nate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even
though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did n
ot complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & M
eans Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averr
ed that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it wit
h the text of SB 1630 in that way “the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes t
he text (only the text) of the HB”.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Section 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution.

RULING: No. The phrase “originate exclusively” refers to the revenue bill and not to the revenue law. It is
sufficient that the House of Representatives initiated the passage of the bill which may undergo extensive
changes in the Senate.
SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet the requirement not only of
printing but also of reading the bill on separate days.
The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in theHouse of Representatives as required
by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the reve
nue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives.
To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating i
n the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House billwould be to deny the Sen
ate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the
Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an in
crease of the public debt, private bills and bills of localapplication must come from the House of Repr
esentatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can b
e expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit t
he filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long
as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days
as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. B
ut this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. Thepresidential certification dis
pensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. Tha
t upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and o
f printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.