1. People v. Catantan Sept.

5, 1997

Doctrine

Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as "any attack upon or seizure
of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo,
equipment, or the personal belongings of the complement or passengers,
irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things, committed by any person, including a passenger
or member of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters, shall be
considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished
as hereinafter provided.”

On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal
Code is committed by "any person who, without authority of law, shall, by
means of violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by
law, or compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right or
wrong."

Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave coercion as

penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely
within the purview of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan Jr.
were compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of destination, such
compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing their boat. The testimony
of Eugene, one of the victims, shows that the appellant actually seized the
vessel through force and intimidation.

To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one of grave
coercion would be to ignore the fact that a fishing vessel cruising in
Philippine waters was seized by the accused by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons. As Eugene Pilapil testified, the accused suddenly
approached them and boarded their pumpboat and Catantan aimed his
revolver at them as he ordered complaining witness Eugene Pilapil
to "dapa" or lie down with face downwards, and then struck his face with a
revolver, hitting the lower portion of his left eye, after which, Catantan told
his victims at gun point to take them to Daan Tabogon.

Facts

The Pilapil brothers- Eugene and Juan Jr. were fishing in the sea some 3
kilometers away from the shores of Tabogon, Cebu when accused Catantan
and Ursal boarded the pumpboat of the Pilapils and Catantan leveled his gun
on the Pilapils. With his gun, Catantan struck Eugene on the left cheekbone
and ordered him and Juan Jr. to "dapa." [3] Then Catantan told Ursal to follow
him to the pumpboat of the Pilapils. There they hogtied Eugene, forced him
 to lie down at the bottom of the boat, covered him with a tarpaulin up to his
neck, stepped on him and ordered Juan Jr. to ferry them to Daan Tabogon.

As the pumpboat of the Plapils breaks down, Catantan boarded another

pumboat and ordered the operator Juanito to take them to Mungaz, Cebu.

Issue

Whether accused-appellant committed grave coercion or piracy under PD

532.

2. Soria v. Desierto

Doctrine

The sole bone of contention revolves around the proper application of the
12-18-36 periods. Sundays, holidays and election days are excluded in the
computation of the periods provided in Article 125,[9] hence, the arresting
officers delivered petitioners well within the allowable time.

Facts

Petitioners Rodolfo Soria and Edimar Bista were arrested on May 13, 2001 (a
Sunday and the day before May 14 elections) without a warrant by
respondents for alleged illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. One
police identified Bista to have a standing warrant of arrest for violation of BP
Blg. 6. From the time of Soria’s detention up to the time of his release, 22
hours had already elapsed and Bista was detained for 26 days.

The crimes for which Soria was arrested without warrant are punishable by
correctional penalties or their equivalent, thus, criminal complaints or
information should be filed with the proper judicial authorities within 18
hours of his arrest.

The crimes for which Bista was arrested are punishable by afflictive or
capital penalties, or their equivalent, thus, he could only be detained for 36
hours without criminal complaints or information having been filed with the
proper judicial authorities.

Issues

Whether or not Sundays, holidays and election days are excluded in the
computation of the periods provided in Art. 125.
 Whether or not the accused should be held liable for the crime of Delay in the
delivery of detained persons.

3. Judge Espanol v. Judge Mupas (Administrative Matter)

Doctrine

Respondent should be held administratively liable. Respondents act of

issuing orders dubbed as Detention Pending Investigation of Cases instead of
requiring the accused to execute a written waiver, with the assistance of
counsel, pursuant to Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, fall [sic] short of
the measure of responsibility expected from a judge.
There is no gainsaying that Judge Mupas practice of issuing "Detention
Pending Investigation of the Case" orders in lieu of a written waiver signed
by the accused with the assistance of counsel is, in the words of Justice Vidal,
"a blatant manifestation of ignorance in the legal procedure." It is gross
ignorance of the law, pure and simple.

Facts
Judge Mupas filed an administrative case against Judge Espanol.
However, there was an allegation in the former’s Comment that Judge Mupas
operated the MTC of Dasmarinas, Cavite as a One-Stop Shop where criminal
suspects apprehended without a warrant are ordered detained in the
municipal jail by virtue of an unsigned Detention Pending Investigation of the
Case, in lieu of a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code. Thus, according to Judge Espanol, the apprehended persons were
detained for a long time until Judge Mupas set the case for preliminary
investigation. If the detainee can post bail, Judge Mupas would fix the amount
of bail and require that the premium, usually equivalent to 20% or 30%
thereof, be paid in cash. If the surety bond was secured outside of the MTC,
the bond would be rejected. Hence, the applicants for bail bonds would go to
the RTC of Dasmarias, Cavite to complain and apply for the release of the
detention prisoners.

Issue
Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for
the issuance of “Detention Pending Investigation of the Case” orders in lieu of
a written waiver.

4. Burgos v. Chief of Staff

Doctrine
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant
applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection
with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the
application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification,
stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or
is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad
statement in Col. Abadilla's application is a mere conclusion of law and does
not satisfy the requirements of probable cause.

Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of

probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a
search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done
so.

Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the

statement contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro
U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows
that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and things above-
described were used and are continuously being used for subversive
activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal
organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free
Philippines, and April 6 Movement."

In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; the Constitution
requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his
witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be
justified. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, this Court ruled that "the oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of
the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince
the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and
seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." As
couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent
judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez
case.

Facts

Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises
of “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items
alleged to have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a
writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the
 return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the
articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that
the two warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In
addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real properties.

Issue

Whether or not the two warrants are valid in the case at bar.

5. Beltran v. People

Doctrine

Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed –

[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose
of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory
of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land,
naval, or other armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the
Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.

Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving

crowd action done in furtherance of a political end.
The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the inquest of
Beltran for Rebellion consisted of the affidavits and other documents
attached to the CIDG letters. We have gone over these documents and find
merit in Beltran’s contention that the same are insufficient to show probable
cause to indict him for Rebellion.

The bulk of the documents consists of affidavits, some of which were sworn
before a notary public, executed by members of the military and some
civilians. Except for two affidavits, none of the affidavits mentions Beltran.
However, the allegations in these affidavits are far from the proof needed to
indict Beltran for taking part in an armed public uprising against the
government. What these documents prove, at best, is that Beltran was in
Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas on 20 February 2006 and that 14 years earlier,
he was present during the 1992 CPP Plenum. None of the affidavits stated
that Beltran committed specific acts of promoting, maintaining, or heading a
rebellion. None of the affidavits alleged that Beltran is a leader of a rebellion.
Beltran’s alleged presence during the 1992 CPP Plenum does not
automatically make him a leader of a rebellion.
 Facts

Following the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Presidential

Proclamation No. 1017 declaring a "State of National Emergency," police
officers arrested Beltran.

Issue

Whether or not there is probable cause to indict Beltran for Rebellion.

6. Gonzales v. Abaya

Doctrine

The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that
the charge of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is absorbed
and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup d’etat. Firstly, the doctrine of
absorption of crimes is peculiar to criminal law and generally applies to
crimes punished by the same statute, unlike here where different statutes are
involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction
over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of
jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the
Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to
this case.

Military law is sui generis, applicable only to military personnel because the
military constitutes an armed organization requiring a system of discipline
separate from that of civilians. Military personnel carry high-powered arms
and other lethal weapons not allowed to civilians. History, experience, and
the nature of a military organization dictate that military personnel must be
subjected to a separate disciplinary system not applicable to unarmed
civilians or unarmed government personnel.

Facts

In relation to the Oakwood mutiny where a total of 321 soldiers including

petitioners herein declared their withdrawal of support to the Commander-
in-chief, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo declared a state of rebellion and
ordered the arrest of the said soldiers. In order to avoid a bloody
confrontation, the government sent negotiators to dialogue with the soldiers.
After several hours of negotiation, the government panel succeeded in
convincing them to lay down their arms and defuse the explosives placed
around the premises of the Oakwood Apartments. Eventually, they returned
to their barracks.
 The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and
recommended that the military personnel involved be charged with coup
d'etat defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended. The Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
recommended the filing of the corresponding Information against them.

Issue

Whether the doctrine of absorption of crimes is applicable in the present

case.

7. Gelig v. People

Doctrine

The Information charged Lydia with committing the complex crime of direct
assault with unintentional abortion. Direct assault is defined and penalized
under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code.

Direct assault is an offense against public order that may be committed in

two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising,
shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes
enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by
any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ
force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his
agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on
occasion of such performance.

The case of Lydia falls under the second mode, which is the more common
form of assault. Its elements are:

1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a
serious intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance.

2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.

3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is
engaged in the actual performance of official duties, or [b] that he is
assaulted by reason of the past performance of official duties.

4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in

authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties.

4. That there is no public uprising.

On the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was engaged in the
performance of her official duties, that is, she was busy with paperwork
while supervising and looking after the needs of pupils who are taking their
recess in the classroom to which she was assigned.

Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in

authority expressly mentioned in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.

However, prosecution’s success in proving that Lydia committed the crime of

direct assault does not necessarily mean that the same physical force she
employed on Gemma also resulted in the crime of unintentional
abortion. There is no evidence on record to prove that the slapping and
pushing of Gemma by Lydia that occurred on July 17, 1981 was the
proximate cause of the abortion.

Facts

Lydia and private complainant Gemma B. Micarsos (Gemma), were public

school teachers at the Nailon Elementary School, in Nailon,
Bogo, Cebu. Lydias son, Roseller, was a student of Gemma at the time
material to this case.

On July 17, 1981, Lydia confronted Gemma after learning from Roseller that
Gemma called him a sissy while in class. Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek
and pushed her, thereby causing her to fall and hit a wall divider. As a result
of Lydia’s violent assault, Gemma suffered a contusion. However, Gemma
continued to experience abdominal pains and started bleeding two days after
the incident. On August 28, 1981, she was admitted in the Southern Islands
Hospital and was diagnosed, to her surprise, to have suffered incomplete
abortion.

RTC convicted Lydia for committing the complex crime of direct assault with
unintentional abortion but the CA found her guilty only of the crime of slight
physical injuries.

Issue

Whether or not Lydia is guilty of direct assault with unintentional abortion.

8. People v. Dasig

Doctrine

However, as correctly pointed by appellant, the lower court erroneously

convicted him of Murder with Assault Upon a Person in Authority, instead of
Rebellion

Rebellion absorbs the crime of direct assault when done in furtherance

thereof. The crime of rebellion consists of may acts. It is a vast movement of
men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance
of rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in one single
crime of rebellion. The act of killing a police officer, knowing too well that the
victim is a person in authority is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion
or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a
separate charge.

Facts

At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora noticed eight (8)
persons, one of whom he identified as Edwin Nuñez, acting suspiciously. He
noticed one of them giving instructions to two of the men to approach Pfc.
Manatad. He followed the two, but sensing that they were being followed,
they immediately proceeded to the middle of the road and engaged Pfc.
Catamora to a gun battle. At that instant, Pfc. Catamora heard a series of
shots from the other group and thereafter saw Pfc. Manatad sprawled on the
ground. Being out-numbered and to save his own life, Pat. Catamora sought
refuge at the nearby BIR Office from where he saw two (2) persons take Pfc.
Manatad's gun and again fired at him to make sure that he is dead while the
rest of the group including Nuñes acted as back up. Thereafter, the Nuñes
group commandeered a vehicle and fled from the scene of the shooting.

Issue

Whether or not the killing of a police officer in the case at bar, may be the
basis of a separate charge.

9. People v. Abalos

Doctrine

On the offense committed by appellant, the trial court correctly concluded

that he should be held accountable for the complex crime of direct assault
with murder. There are two modes of committing atentados contra la
autoridad o sus agentes under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. The first
is not a true atentado as it is tantamount to rebellion or sedition, except that
there is no public uprising. On the other hand the second mode is the more
common way of committing assault and is aggravated when there is a
weapon employed in the attack, or the offender is a public officer, or the
offender lays hands upon a person in authority.

Appellant committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are
that there must be an attack, use of force, or serious intimidation or
resistance upon a person in authority or his agent; the assault was made
when the said person was performing his duties or on the occasion of such
performance; and the accused knew that the victim is a person in authority
or his agent, that is, that the accused must have the intention to offend, injure
or assault the offended party as a person in authority or an agent of a person
in authority.

Here, Labine was a duly appointed member of the then INP in Catbalogan,
Samar and, thus, was an agent of a person in authority. There is also no
dispute that he was in the actual performance of his duties when assaulted
by appellant, that is, he was maintaining peace and order during the fiesta.
Appellant himself testified that he personally knew Labine to be a policeman
and, in fact, Labine was then wearing his uniform.These facts should have
sufficiently deterred appellant from attacking him, and his defiant conduct
clearly demonstrates that he really had the criminal intent to assault and
injure an agent of the law.

When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in

authority for that matter, there arises the complex crime of direct assault
with murder or homicide. The killing in the instant case constituted the
felony of murder qualified by alevosia through treacherous means
deliberately adopted. Pfc. Labine was struck from behind while he was being
confronted at the same time by appellant's father. The evidence shows that
appellant deliberately went behind the victim whom he then hit with a piece
of wood which he deliberately got for that purpose.

Facts

While accused Tiburcio Abalos and his father, Police Major Cecilio Abalos,
were having a heated argument, a woman shouted “Police officer, help us!
Somebody’s making trouble here.” The victim, P/Pfc. Labine, then appeared
at the scene and asked Major Abalos, “What is it, sir?” The victim saluted
Abalos when the latter turned around to face him. As Major Abalos leveled
his carbine at Labine, accused hurriedly left and procured a piece of wood,
about two inches thick, three inches wide and three feet long, from a nearby
Ford Fiera vehicle. He then swiftly returned and unceremoniously swung
with that wooden piece at Labine from behind, hitting the policeman at the
 back of the right side of his head. Labine collapsed unconscious in a heap, and
he later expired from the severe skull fracture he sustained from that blow.
The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of direct assault with murder.

Issue

Whether or not appellant should be held accountable for the crime of direct
assault with murder.

10. People v. Umali

Doctrine

We are convinced that the principal and main, though not necessarily the
most serious, crime committed here was not rebellion but rather that of
sedition. The purpose of the raid and the act of the raiders in rising publicly
and taking up arms was not exactly against the Government and for the
purpose of doing the things defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal code
under rebellion. The raiders did not even attack the Presidencia, the seat of
local Government. Rather, the object was to attain by means of force,
intimidation, etc. one object, to wit, to inflict an act of hate or revenge upon
the person or property of a public official, namely, Punzalan was then Mayor
of Tiaong.

Under Article 139 of the same Code this was sufficient to constitute sedition.
As regards the crime of robbery with which appellants were charged and of
which they were convicted, we are also of the opinion that it was not one of
the purposes of the raid, which was mainly to kidnap or kill Punzalan and
destroy his house. The robberies were actually committed by only some of
the raiders, as an afterthought. For these robberies, only those who actually
took part therein are responsible, and not the three appellants herein.

With respect to the crime of multiple frustrated murder, while the assault
upon policeman Pedro Lacorte with a hand grenade causing him injuries
resulting in his blindness in one eye, may be regarded as frustrated murder;
the wounding of Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector should be
considered as mere physical injuries. The crimes committed are, therefore,
those of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and physical
injuries.

Facts

The complex crime of which appellants Narciso Umali, et. al were found
guilty was said to have been committed during the raid staged in the town of
 Tiaong, Quezon, between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening of November 14, 1951,
by armed men. The raid took place resulting in the burning down and
complete destruction of the house of Mayor Marcial Punzalan including its
content valued at P24,023; the house of Valentin Robles valued at P10,000,
and the house of one Mortega, the death of Patrolman Domingo Pisigan and
civilians Vicente Soriano and Leocadio Untalan, and the wounding of
Patrolman Pedro Lacorte and five civilians.

During and after the burning of the houses, some of the raiders engaged in
looting, robbing one house and two Chinese stores; and that the raiders were
finally dispersed and driven from the town by the Philippine Army soldiers
stationed in the town led by Captain Alzate.

Issue

What are the crimes committed in the case at bar?

11. Office of the Provincial Prosecutor v. CA

Doctrine

Nowhere is the political motivation for the commission of the crime indicated
in the affidavit. Merely because it is alleged that private respondents were
members of the CPP/NPA who engaged government troops in a firefight
resulting in the death of a government trooper and the wounding of four
others does not necessarily mean that the killing and wounding of the victims
was made in furtherance of a rebellion. The political motivation for the crime
must be shown in order to justify finding the crime committed to be
rebellion. Otherwise, as in People v. Ompad, although it was shown that the
accused was an NPA commander, he was nonetheless convicted of murder
for the killing of a person suspected of being a government informer.

The burden of proving that the motivation for the crime is political and not
private is on the defense. This is the teaching of another case, in which it was
held:
. . . . In deciding if the crime is rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative
for our courts to ascertain whether or not the act was done in furtherance of
a political end. The political motive of the act should be conclusively
demonstrated.

In such cases the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the

defense, motive, being a state of mind which the accused, better than any
individual, knows. [I]t is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly
proven. Both purpose and overt acts are essential components of the crime.
With either of these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legally does not
exist.
 What the real crime is must await the presentation of evidence at the trial or
at the hearing on the application for bail. Those accused of common crimes
can then show proof that the crime with which they were charged is really
rebellion. They are thus not without any remedy.

Facts

On August 3, 1993, the provincial prosecutor of Zamboanga del Norte filed

with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Dipolog City, an information
charging private respondents and 10 other individuals with murder and
multiple frustrated murder.

The issue in this case is whether, even before the start of trial, the
prosecution can be ordered to change the information which it had filed on
the ground that the evidence presented at the preliminary investigation
shows that the crime committed is not murder with multiple frustrated
murder, but rebellion. The trial court ruled that the power to determine what
crime to charge on the basis of the evidence gathered is the prerogative of
the public prosecutor. TheCA, however, found the prosecutor to have gravely
abused his discretion in charging murder with frustrated murder on the
ground that the evidence adduced at the preliminary investigation shows
that the crime committed was rebellion. Accordingly, it ordered the
prosecutor to substitute the information filed by him. Hence, this petition
brought by the provincial prosecutor of Zamboanga del Norte for a review of
the decision of the CA.

Issue

Whether or not the crime of Rebellion exists in the case at bar.

12. Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan

Doctrine

Ruzol cannot be held guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions as defined and

penalized under Art. 177 of the RPC.

As the aforementioned provision is formulated, there are two ways of

committing this crime: first, by knowingly and falsely representing himself to
be an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the
Philippine Government or of any foreign government; or second, under
pretense of official position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in
authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign
government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so.
The former constitutes the crime of usurpation of authority, while the latter
act constitutes the crime of usurpation of official functions.

In the present case, Ruzol stands accused of usurpation of official functions

for issuing 221 permits to transport salvaged forest products under the
alleged "pretense of official position and without being lawfully entitled to do
so, such authority properly belonging to the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources." The Sandiganbayan ruled that all the elements of the
crime were attendant in the present case because the authority to issue the
subject permits belongs solely to the DENR.

We rule otherwise.

First, it is settled that an accused in a criminal case is presumed innocent

until the contrary is proved and that to overcome the presumption, nothing
but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution.

We note that this case of usurpation against Ruzol rests principally on the
prosecution’s theory that the DENR is the only government instrumentality
that can issue the permits to transport salvaged forest products. The
prosecution asserted that Ruzol usurped the official functions that properly
belong to the DENR. But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is not the
sole government agency vested with the authority to issue permits relevant
to the transportation of salvaged forest products, considering that, pursuant
to the general welfare clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority.

Second, contrary to the findings of the Sandiganbayan, Ruzol acted in good

faith. It bears stressing at this point that in People v. Hilvano, this Court
enunciated that good faith is a defense in criminal prosecutions for
usurpation of official functions.

Facts

Ruzol was the mayor of General Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to 2004. Earlier in
his term, he organized a Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly composed of
civil society groups, public officials and concerned stakeholders with the end
in view of regulating and monitoring the transportation of salvaged forest
products within the vicinity of General Nakar.

Consequently, 221 permits to transport salvaged forest products were issued

to various recipients, of which 43 bore the signature of Ruzol while the
remaining 178 were signed by his co-accused Guillermo T. Sabiduria
(Sabiduria), then municipal administrator of General Nakar.
 On June 2006, on the basis of the issued Permits to Transport, 221
Informations for violation of Art. 177 of the RPC or for Usurpation of
Authority or Official Functions were filed against Ruzol and Sabiduria.

Issue

Whether or not Ruzol is guilty of Usurpation of Authority or Official

functions.

13. Union Bank v. People

Doctrine

Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable
provision; thus, jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the basis of
this article which penalizes one who make[s] an affidavit, upon any material
matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases
in which the law so requires. The constitutive act of the offense is the making
of an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is consummated when the statement
containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized person.

Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is more in

accord with Article 183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

To reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury
committed through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the
RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her
affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury
are executed.

When the crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a

proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the
testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual
testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written
sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the
sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of
the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime
committed. In all cases, determination of venue shall be based on the acts
alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.
 Facts

Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum
Shopping.

The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Banks two (2) complaints for
sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie
and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. Both complaints showed that Tomas
executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Accordingly,
she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely
declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second
complaint that she did not commence any other action or proceeding
involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency.

Issue

Whether or not Article 183 of the RPC is the applicable provision in the
present case.

14. Daan v. Sandiganbayan

Doctrine

Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, for the crime of
Falsification of Public Documents through an untruthful narration of facts to
be established, the following elements must concur: (a) the offender makes
in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender
has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts
narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and (d) the perversion of truth
in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third
person.

On the other hand, Falsification by Private Individuals penalized under

Article 172, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code has the following
elements: (a) the offender is a private individual or a public officer or
employee who did not take advantage of his official position; (b) the
offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated under Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code; and (c) the falsification was committed in a
public or official or commercial document.[

As regards the crime of Malversation of Public Funds defined and penalized

under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, with which petitioner was also
charged, the elements are as follows: (a) the offender is a public officer; (b)
he has custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his
office; (c) the funds or property involved are public funds or property for
which he is accountable; and (d) he has appropriated, taken or
misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment or
negligence permitted, the taking by another person of such funds or
property.

Meanwhile, under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code, Failure to Render
Account by an Accountable Officer, the lesser offense which petitioner seeks
to plead guilty of, the following elements must concur: (a) the offender is a
public officer; (b) the offender must be an accountable officer for public
funds or property; (c) the offender is required by law or regulation to render
accounts to the COA or to a provincial auditor; and (d) the offender fails
to render an account for a period of two months after such accounts should
be rendered.

An offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the

essential elements or ingredients of the former as alleged in the
complaint or information constitute the latter. And vice versa, an offense
may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the
latter.[

In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner are
sufficient to hold petitioner liable for the lesser offenses. Thus, in the charge
for Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner may plead guilty to the
lesser offense of Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not
appear that petitioner took advantage of his official position in allegedly
falsifying the timebook and payroll of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte. In the
same vein, with regard to the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, while
the Informations contain allegations which make out a case
for Malversation against petitioner, nevertheless, absent the element of
conversion, theoretically, petitioner may still be held liable for Failure to
Render Account by an Accountable Officer if it is shown that the failure to
render account was in violation of a law or regulation that requires him to
render such an accounting within the prescribed period.

Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in

this case likewise constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead
guilty to such lesser offenses.

Facts

Daan, together with accused Benedicto E. Kuizon, were charged before

this Court for three counts of malversation of public funds. In addition to
the charge for malversation, the accused were also indicted for three
 counts of falsification of public document by a public officer or
employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of
not guilty and substitute the same with a plea of guilty, if such proposal
is not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of
not guilty to the crime of falsification of public document by a public
officer or employee with a plea of guilty, but to the lesser crime of
falsification of a public document by a private individual.
On the other hand, in the malversation cases, the accused offered to
substitute their plea of not guilty thereto with a plea of guilty, but to the
lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.
Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found as
acceptable the proposal of the accused to plead guilty to the lesser crime
of falsification of public document by a private individual.
Insofar as the malversation cases are concerned, the prosecution was
likewise amenable to the offer of said accused to plead guilty to the
lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.
The Sandiganbayan, however, denied petitioners’ Motion to Plea
Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by the prosecution.

Issue

Whether the accused may plead guilty to the lesser offenses in the present
case.

15. Teodoro Borlongan v. Pena

Doctrine

Petitioners were charged with violation of par. 2, Article 172 of the Revised
Penal Code or Introduction of Falsified Document in a judicial
proceeding. The elements of the offense are as follows:

1. That the offender knew that a document was falsified by another person.
2. That the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any subdivisions
Nos. 1 or 2 of Article 172.
3. That he introduced said document in evidence in any judicial proceeding.

The falsity of the document and the defendants knowledge of its falsity are
essential elements of the offense. The Office of the City Prosecutor filed the
Informations against the petitioners on the basis of the Complaint-Affidavit
of respondent Atty. Pea, attached to which were the documents contained in
the Motion to Dismiss filed by the petitioners in Civil Case No. 754. Also
included as attachments to the complaint were the Answers, Pre-Trial Brief,
the alleged falsified documents, copy of the regular meetings of ISCI during
the election of the Board of Directors and the list of ISCI Stockholders. Based
on these documents and the complaint-affidavit of Atty. Pea, the City
Prosecutor concluded that probable cause for the prosecution of the charges
existed. On the strength of the same documents, the trial court issued the
warrants of arrest.

This Court, however, cannot find these documents sufficient to support the
existence of probable cause. We do not see how it can be concluded that the
documents mentioned by respondent in his complaint-affidavit were
falsified. In his complaint, Atty. Pea stated that Herman Ponce, Julie Abad and
Marilyn Ong, the alleged signatories of the questioned letters, did not actually
affix their signatures therein; and that they were not actually officers or
stockholders of ISCI. He further claimed that Enrique Montillas signature
appearing in another memorandum addressed to respondent was forged.
These averments are mere assertions which are insufficient to warrant the
filing of the complaint or worse the issuance of warrants of arrest.

Facts

Respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea (Atty. Pea) instituted a civil case against
Urban Bank and herein petitioners, before the RTC. Petitioners filed a Motion
to Dismiss arguing that they never appointed the respondent as agent or
counsel. Attached to the motion were the following documents: 1) a Letter
signed by Herman Ponce and Julie Abad on behalf of Isabela Sugar Company,
Inc. the original owner of the subject property; 2) an unsigned Letter
addressed to Corazon Bejasa; 3) a Letter signed by Marilyn G. Ong; and 4) a
Memorandumfrom Enrique Montilla III. Said documents were presented in
an attempt to show that the respondent was appointed as agent by ISCI and
not by Urban Bank or by the petitioners.

In view of the introduction of the above-mentioned documents, Atty. Pea

filed his Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor. He
claimed that said documents were falsified because the alleged signatories
did not actually affix their signatures, and the signatories were neither
stockholders nor officers and employees of ISCI. Worse, petitioners
introduced said documents as evidence before the RTC knowing that they
were falsified.

The City Prosecutor found probable cause for the indictment of petitioners
for 4 counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents, penalized by
the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code.
 Issue

Whether or not probable cause exists for the Introduction of Falsified

Document in a judicial proceeding.

16. Choa v. People

17. People v. Estrada

18. Batulanon v. People
19. Dabu v. Kapunan
20. Dela cruz v. People, July 23, 2014