Rogelio Bagabuyo VS COMELEC
Facts: In 2006, RA 9371 was promulgated by giving each city voter more and greater say, both in
Congress. It was entitled “An Act Providing for the
Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City
of Cagayan De Oro.” This was proposed by Rep. Jaraula
from Cagayan de Oro. It increased Cagayan de Oro’s
legislative district from one to two. In the next election,
Cagayan de Oro’s voters would be classified as belonging
to either the first or the second district, depending on
their place of residence. The constituents of each district
would elect their own representative to Congress as well
as eight members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod. On 13
March 2007, the COMELEC en Banc promulgated
Resolution No. 7837 implementing R.A. No. 9371.
Bagabuyo filed the present petition against the COMELEC
on March 27, 2007 asking for the nullification of R.A. No.
9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds,
the petitioner argued that 1.) Cagayan de Oro City’s
reapportionment under R.A. No. 9371 falls within the
meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of cities under Section
10, Article X of the Constitution; 2.) the creation, division,
merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of
local government units involve a common denominator –
the material change in the political and economic rights of
the local government units directly affected, as well as of
the people therein; 3.) a voter’s sovereign power to
decide on who should be elected as the entire city’s
Congressman was arbitrarily reduced by at least one half
because the questioned law and resolution only allowed
him to vote and be voted for in the district designated by
the COMELEC; 4.) a voter was also arbitrarily denied his
right to elect the Congressman and the members of the
city council for the other legislative district, and 5.)
government funds were illegally disbursed without prior
approval by the sovereign electorate of Cagayan De Oro
City.
Issue: Whether or not R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for
the legislative reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro City, or
does it involve the division and conversion of a local
government unit. Whether or not it violates the equality of
representation doctrine.
Held: Legislative apportionment is defined by Black’s Law
Dictionary as the determination of the number of
representatives which a State, county or other subdivision
may send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats
in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the
drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population
and voting power among the districts. Reapportionment,
on the other hand, is therealignment or change in
legislative districts brought about by changes in population
and mandated by the constitutional requirement of
equality of representation. RA 9371 does not have the
effect of dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro into two
political and corporate units and territories. Rather than
divide the city either territorially or as a corporate entity,
the effect is merely to enhance voter representation by
Congress and in the Sangguniang Panglunsod.
Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12
city council members citywide for its population of
approximately 500,000. By having two legislative districts,
each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro now
effectively has two congressmen, each one representing
250,000 of the city’s population. This easily means better
access to their congressman since each one now services
only 250,000 constituents as against the 500,000. The
fewer constituents represented translate to a greater
voice for each individual city resident in Congress and in
the Sanggunian. The City, for its part, now has twice the
number of congressmen speaking for it and voting in the
halls of Congress. Since the total number of congressmen
in the country has not increased to the point of doubling
its numbers, the presence of two congressman (instead of
one) from the same city cannot but be a quantitative and
proportional improvement in the representation of
Cagayan de Oro City in Congress. Bagabuyo further
contends that RA 9371 violates the equality in
representation doctrine as it appears that one district has
a higher number of voters as compared to the other and
that one is urbanized the other is rural. This is the
clarification; the law clearly provides that the basis for
districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city
or a province, not the number of registered voters therein
Veterans VS COMELEC
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style
party-list election, the Constitution and Republic Act (RA)
No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable
parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined
number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed
twenty percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the party
list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties
garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid
votes cast for the party-list system are “qualified” to have
a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party,
regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is
entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one
“qualifying” and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats
which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed “in
proportion to their total number of votes.”
Because the Comelec violated these legal
parameters, the assailed Resolutions must be struck down
for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The
poll body is mandated to enforce and administer election-
related laws. It has no power to contravene or amend
them. Neither does it have authority to decide the
wisdom, propriety or rationality of the acts of Congress. Its
bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations, methods and
formulas to implement election laws -- not to reject,
ignore, defeat, obstruct or circumvent them. In fine, the
constitutional introduction of the party-list system - a
normal feature of parliamentary democracies - into our
presidential form of government, modified by unique
Filipino statutory parameters, presents new paradigms
and novel questions, which demand innovative legal
solutions convertible into mathematical formulations
which are, in turn, anchored on time-tested jurisprudence.
Facts: Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel
feature into our presidential system of government -- the
party-list method of representation. Under this system,
any national, regional or sectoral party or organization
registered with the Commission on Elections may
participate in the election of party-list representatives
who, upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in the
House of Representatives as regular members.[4] In effect,
a voter is given two (2) votes for the House -- one for a
district congressman and another for a party-list
representative. (Section 5, Article VI)
Held: The first election for party-list
representation was held simultaneously with the national
elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123)
parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On June
26, 1998, the Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13)
party-list representatives from twelve (12) parties and
organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of
the total number of votes cast for the party-list
system. Two of the proclaimed representatives belonged
to Petitioner APEC. After passing upon the results of the
special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25, 1998, the
Comelec en banc further determined that COCOFED
(Philippine Coconut Planters’ Federation, Inc.) was entitled
to one party-list seat for having garnered 186,388 votes,
which were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the total votes
cast for the party-list system. Thus, its first nominee,
Emerito S. Calderon, was proclaimed on September 8,
1998 as the 14th party-list representative.[7]
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People’s Progressive Alliance for
Peace and Good Government Towards Alleviation of
Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a
"Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List
Representatives provided by the Constitution." It alleged
that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of
party-list representatives in the House of Representatives,
as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It
further claimed that the literal application of the two
percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under
RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for
only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of the
52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the
House.
Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling - The
Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the
party-list.” According to petitioners, this percentage is a
ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to be filled up has
been left to Congress. In the exercise of its prerogative,
the legislature enacted RA 7941, by which it prescribed
that a party, organization or coalition participating in the
party-list election must obtain at least two percent of the
total votes cast for the system in order to qualify for a seat
in the House of Representatives.
Petitioners further argue that the constitutional
provision must be construed together with this legislative
requirement. If there is no sufficient number of
participating parties, organizations or coalitions which
could hurdle the two percent vote threshold and thereby
fill up the twenty percent party-list allocation in the House,
then naturally such allocation cannot be filled up
completely. The Comelec cannot be faulted for the
"incompleteness," for ultimately the voters themselves are
the ones who, in the exercise of their right of suffrage,
determine who and how many should represent them. On
the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec, together with
the respondent parties, avers that the twenty percent
allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory, and that
the two percent vote requirement in RA 7941 is
unconstitutional, because its strict application would make
it mathematically impossible to fill up the House party-list
complement.
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally simple
message that Congress was vested with the broad power
to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list
system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets
down only the percentage of the total membership in the
House of Representatives reserved for party-list
representatives.
RA 7941
Under this statute’s policy declaration, the State
shall "promote proportional representation in the election
of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof,
which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that
will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of
the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State
shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party
system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to
compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall
provide the simplest scheme possible.”
“Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The
party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the
House of Representatives including those under the party-
list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5)
major political parties on the basis of party representation
in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth
Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to
participate in the party-list system. In determining the
allocation of seats for the second vote, the following
procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be
ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at
least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-
list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided,
That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to
their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not
more than three (3) seats.”
BANAT VS COMELEC
Facts: In July and August 2007, the COMELEC,
sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial
proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections
which was held in May 2007. In proclaiming the winners
and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the
following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for
legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come
from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987
Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List
System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the
total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled
to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2
seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats
– this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban
Formula from the case ofVeterans Federation Party vs
COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats
even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the
party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned
the proclamation as well as the formula being used.
BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of
RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to
qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of
the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by
the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a
mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat
prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere
ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the
2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it
would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of
party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new
computation.
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-
list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule
(Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of
whether or not major political parties are allowed to
participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections
limited to sectoral parties.
Issues: I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in
apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list
representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat
valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to
participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is
valid.
Held: I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following
manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts,
there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list
representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides
that there shall be not more than 250 members of the
lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from
legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list
representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed
Congress to fix the number of the membership of the
lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative
districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the
May 2007 elections, there were 220 district
representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1
ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list
representatives.
(Current Number of Legislative District Representatives ÷
0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List
Representatives
Hence,
(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is
merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of party-list
representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number
of the members of the lower house. However, it is not
mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is
no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which
garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and
those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified.
Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical
impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold
presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives.”
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list
garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat,
and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering
less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following
rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at
least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-
list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to
the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all
the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to
not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats
shall no longer be included because they have already
been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter.
Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as
“additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under
the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional
seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A.
No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be
used in the second round, particularly, in determining,
first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and
second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not
garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process
filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
(Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party
and multiply it against the remaining number of seats. The
product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the
additional number of seats allotted for the party list – but
the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.)
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to
disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN,
etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that
there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or
from RA 7941 against major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections as the word “party”
was not qualified and that even the framers of the
Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed
major political parties to participate in the party-list
elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing
which represents the marginalized (indirect participation),
Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other
justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the
will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it
is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution –
and the will of the people is that only the marginalized
sections of the country shall participate in the party-list
elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate
in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to
ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-list
system.
Power of the COMELEC
Under the Constitution, the COMELEC is
empowered to register political parties.12 More
specifically, as part of its power to enforce and administer
laws relative to the conduct of an election, the COMELEC
possesses the power to register national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions for purposes
of the party-list system of elections.13 It is the party-list
group’s registration under the party-list system that
confers juridical personality on the party-list group for
election related purposes.14
As a juridical entity, a party-list group can only validly act
through its duly authorized representative/s. In the
exercise of its power to register parties, the COMELEC
necessarily possesses the power to pass upon the question
of who, among the legitimate officers of the party-list
group, are entitled to exercise the rights and privileges
granted to a party-list group under the law. The
COMELEC’s jurisdiction on this point is well settled and is
not here disputed.
With clear jurisdictional authority to resolve the
issue of party leadership and party identity, this Court will
only be justified in interfering with the COMELEC’s action
under Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court if the
petitioners can establish that the COMELEC acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. By
grave abuse of discretion is generally meant the capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It
must be grave, as when it is exercised arbitrarily or
despotically by reason of passion or personal hostility.
Such abuse must be so patent and so gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law.
Dr. Hans Christian Seneris VS COMELEC
Facts: As in the past two elections, the
manifestation to participate bore the signature of Robles
as BUHAY president. On March 29, 2007, Robles signed
and filed a Certificate of Nomination of BUHAY’s nominees
for the 2007 elections containing the following names: (i)
Rene M. Velarde, (ii) Ma. Carissa Coscolluela, (iii) William
Irwin C. Tieng, (iv) Melchor R. Monsod, and (v) Teresita B.
Villarama. Earlier, however, or on March 27, 2007,
petitioner Hans Christian Señeres, holding himself up as
acting president and secretary-general of BUHAY, also filed
a Certificate of Nomination with the COMELEC,
nominating: (i) himself, (ii) Hermenegildo C. Dumlao, (iii)
Antonio R. Bautista, (iv) Victor Pablo C. Trinidad, and (v)
Eduardo C. Solangon, Jr.[7]
Consequently, on April 17, 2007, Señeres filed
with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to
Certificates of Nomination.[8] In it, petitioner Señeres
alleged that he was the acting president and secretary-
general of BUHAY, having assumed that position since
August 17, 2004 when Robles vacated the position.
Pushing the point, Señeres would claim that the
nominations made by Robles were, for lack of authority,
null and void owing to the expiration of the latter’s term as
party president. Furthermore, Señeres asserted that
Robles was, under the Constitution,[9] disqualified from
being an officer of any political party, the latter being the
Acting Administrator of the Light Railway Transport
Authority (LRTA), a government-controlled corporation.
Robles, so Señeres would charge, was into a partisan
political activity which civil service members, like the
former, were enjoined from engaging in.
On May 10, 2007, the National Council of BUHAY
adopted a resolution[10] expelling Señeres as party
member for his act of submitting a Certificate of
Nomination for the party.
Later developments saw Robles filing a petition
praying for the recognition of Jose D. Villanueva as the
new representative of BUHAY in the House of
Representatives for the remaining term until June 30,
2007.[12] Attached to the petition was a copy of the
expelling resolution adverted to. Additionally, Robles also
filed on the same day an “Urgent Motion to Declare Null
and Void the Certificate of Nomination and Certificates of
Acceptance filed by Hans Christian M. Señeres,
Hermenegildo Dumlao, Antonio R. Bautista, Victor Pablo
Trinidad and Eduardo Solangon, Jr.”[13]
On July 9 and July 18, 2007, respectively, the
COMELEC issued two resolutions proclaiming BUHAY as a
winning party-list organization for the May 2007 elections
entitled to three (3) House seats.[14]
This was followed by the issuance on July 19, 2007
by the en banc COMELEC of Resolution E.M. No. 07-043
recognizing and declaring Robles as the president of
BUHAY and, as such, was the one “duly authorized to sign
documents in behalf of the party particularly the
Manifestation to participate in the party-list system of
representation and the Certification of Nomination of its
nominees.”[15] Explaining its action, COMELEC stated that
since no party election was held to replace Robles as party
president, then he was holding the position in a hold-over
capacity.[16]
The COMELEC disposed of the partisan political
activity issue with the terse observation that Señeres’
arguments on the applicability to Robles of the prohibition
on partisan political activity were unconvincing.
Held: Consequently, the first three (3) nominees
in the Certificate of Nomination submitted by Robles then
took their oaths of office before the Chief Justice on July
20, 2007 and have since then exercised their duties and
functions as BUHAY Party-List representatives in the
current Congress.
Without a doubt, at the time Señeres filed this
petition before this Court on July 23, 2007, the right of the
nominees as party-list representatives had been
recognized and declared in the July 19, 2007 Resolution
and the nominees had taken their oath and already
assumed their offices in the House of Representatives. As
such, the proper recourse would have been to file a
petition for quo warranto before the HRET within ten (10)
days from receipt of the July 19, 2007 Resolution and not a
petition for certiorari before this Court.[30]
Since Señeres failed to file a petition for quo
warranto before the HRET within 10 days from receipt of
the July 19, 2007 Resolution declaring the validity of
Robles’ Certificate of Nomination, said Resolution of the
COMELEC has already become final and executory. Thus,
this petition has now become moot and can be dismissed
outright. And even if we entertain the instant special civil
action, still, petitioner’s postulations are bereft of merit.
Philippine Guardian and Brotherhood Inc. VS COMELEC
Facts: For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the
COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2009 Resolution
No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations
from the list of registered national, regional or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list
organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because
it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not
participate in the 2007 elections. Nevertheless, the
COMELEC stated in this Resolution that any national,
regional sectoral party or organizations or coalitions
adversely affected can personally or through its authorized
representative file a verified opposition on October 26,
2009.
PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679,
but likewise sought, through its pleading, the admission ad
cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a party-list
organization under the Party-List System Act. The
COMELEC denied PGBI’s motion/opposition for lack of
merit.
First, the COMELEC observed that PGBI clearly
misunderstood the import of Section 4 of R.A. 7941.[3] The
provision simply means that without the required
manifestation or if a party or organization does not
participate, the exemption from registration does not arise
and the party, organization or coalition must go through
the process again and apply for requalification; a request
for deferment would not exempt PGBI from registering
anew.
Second, the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as MINERO be an unintended gap in the law and as such is a matter
failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not for Congress to address. We cannot and do not address
participate at all in the 2004 elections. matters over which full discretionary authority is given by
Third, PGBI was given an opportunity to be heard or to the Constitution to the legislature; to do so will offend the
seek the reconsideration of the action or ruling principle of separation of powers. If a gap indeed exists,
complained of – the essence of due process; this is clear then the present case should bring this concern to the
from Resolution No. 8679 which expressly gave the legislature’s notice.
adversely affected parties the opportunity to file their On the due process issue, we agree with the
opposition. COMELEC that PGBI’s right to due process was not violated
As regards the alternative relief of application for for PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a
accreditation, the COMELEC found the motion to have reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of
been filed out of time, as August 17, 2009 was the due process, we have consistently held, is simply the
deadline for accreditation provided in Resolution opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative
8646. The motion was obviously filed months after the proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain
deadline. one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
PGBI came to us in its petition for certiorari, the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type
arguing the same positions it raised with the COMELEC hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential.
when it moved to reconsider its delisting.
We initially dismissed the petition in light of our
ruling in Philippine Mines Safety Environment Association,
also known as “MINERO” v. Commission on
Elections(Minero);[4] we said that no grave abuse of
discretion exists in a ruling that correctly applies the
prevailing law and jurisprudence. Applying Section 6(8) of
RA 7941, the Court disqualified MINERO under the
following reasoning:
Since petitioner by its own admission failed to get
2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate at all in the
2004 elections, it necessarily failed to get at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast in the two preceding
elections. COMELEC, therefore, is not duty bound to
certify it.
PGBI subsequently moved to reconsider the
dismissal of its petition. Among other arguments, PGBI
claimed that the dismissal of the petition was contrary to
law, the evidence and existing jurisprudence. Essentially,
PGBI asserts that Section 6(8) of RA 7941 does not apply if
one is to follow the tenor and import of the deliberations
inclusive of the interpellations in Senate Bill No. 1913 on
October 19, 1994.
Held: We find the petition partly impressed with
merit. The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial
precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the
rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That
decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in
subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine
of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined and decided, it should
be deemed settled and closed to further
argument.[11] The doctrine is grounded on the necessity
for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions
We are aware that PGBI’s situation – a party list
group or organization that failed to garner 2% in a prior
election and immediately thereafter did not participate in
the preceding election – is something that is not covered
by Section 6(8) of RA 7941. From this perspective, it may