Professional Documents
Culture Documents
James C, Lindahl
Graduate Program in Philosophy
I would like to thank the following people for their invaluable help
and feedback on this dissertation: Alison W y l i e , B N C ~ Freed, Jim Leach,
Regna Darnell and Dick Liebendorfer. I would also like to thank my
family for their support and my wife, Susan, for her patience and
support.
TABLE OF WlWEWS
Page
Certificate of examination ii
Abstract iii
Acknowledgements v
Table of contents n
i. Translator, Transcriber 4
Li. Translator, Transgressor 9
iii, Translator, Traducer 16
iv. El Original es Infiel a la Tradud6n 20
1
An Italian saying, usually translated into English as 'Translator, traitor."
Evidencewretain its meaning across contexts? Does she stand a chance
of being wunderstoodw?
Alice*s experiene in Wonderland involves an encounter with an
alien way of thinking. As the court is unwilling to compromise its own
f r a m e of reference, its own method of interpretation, the sentence is
already passed before the trial even begins- Alice is not found irrational
but senten& to irrationality as a product of the nature of the
interpretive confrontation. In similar fashion, in the enterprise of cross-
cultural interpretation, the methodological imposition of a particular
interpretive structure, a universal "style of reasoning," or a "proper
f r a m e of reference," for understanding must always pass sentence on
the Other. The subject of interpretation is marginalized before any
evidence is heard, Barbara Johnson observes the s a m e predetermination
of a judgement in M e l v i l l e ' s BiLlg Budd. Captain Vere establishes his role
as a reader before giving his interpretation of the event. Yet, this prior
act of self-definition ensures that the latter is a foregone conclusion.
2
Sherry Ortner reviews the many trends that have eaerged in ethnographic theory during the
last thirty pears in "theory in Anthropologp Since the Sixtiesw (1984).
in common: the presupposition that understanding another culture is
reducible to one methodological model, However different from one
another, each of these theoretical approaches offers a single framework
for understanding that is assumed to transcend contextual and cultural
difference. In short, the question has always been "wH& theoretical
structure best facilitates accurate representation of the Other?" rather
than whether it is plausible to assume that the meanings of the beliefs
and practices of another s ocw
i can be clearly and accurately
understood from an external perspective. It is attention to this latter
question that has generated a whole new set of problems for
anthropoIogists that have transcended disciplinary
Most theoretical approaches generate interpretations that differ on
what specific practices and beliefs mean but not on what "meaningwis.
Underlying any of these approaches is a belief that there is a
methodological strategy independent of the particular application that
makes it possible to determine the meaning of a belief or practice. This
assumes that some specific "meaning" is there to be grasped; it need
only be properly deciphered to establish a true understanding of
another practice or culture. While not all structural analyses require
that the beliefs of the Other adhere to Western formal logic or scientific
empiricism in order to have meaning, they do all rely on Western
semantic frameworks to determine which practices and beliefs are
meaningful and which are meaningless or irrational. It is through
interpretations constrained b y semantic relationships imposed by
3
There has been, recently, a series of Izrgely departrentally independent, although related,
crises within a number of academic disciplines that have focused on the probler of interpretation and
representation. In literary criticisr, the turn has been toward a postrodern or poststructuralist
approach that reveals an unlimited seriosis i n language and postulates a displacement of author's
intentions that gives a free plap to interpretation. In philosophp, attention to the social sciences
has notivated variations of radical relativisr. In anthropology, the center of attention has focused
on writing and the devices bp which the ethnographer creates the Other. This trend [in anthropology)
culninated i n the 1986 publication of Clifford and Marcus' collection, Yriting Crrlture- a work t h a t
raised more than a few eyebrows and started a s t o n of controtersp that spilled out over the borders
that had previouslp defined academic disciplines.
m i l e m n p reasons have been suggested as the underlying motivation f o r these crises co-appearing
i n different foras in different disciplines, I would like, i n this paper, to investigate what I take
to be a comaon pet poorly acknovledged operation upon which a l l depend: translation.
translation that the O t h e r is sentenced to irrationality before any
verdict can be reached concerning their beliefs, In other words, the
imposition of such a theoretical structure "passes sentencen on what can
count as meaningful before the evidence for particular meaning is
considered. In this sense, every cross-cultural judgement is already a
judgement against the Other, It should become clear, in the early
chapters of this thesis, that, in many important respects, traditional
anthropology and, following suit, philosophy of social science, have not
been simply inquisitive but, more importantly, have been amducted as a
kind of inquisition, not unlike the trial of Alice, o r the execution of BilIy
Budd. Given standard methods of interpreting foreign beliefs, the Other
can only appear as "primitiven and "irrationalw in any respects in which
they are found to differ from us and, as such, somehow mistaken (about
the meaning of their own beliefs as well as the correspondence of those
beliefs to an independent reality that only w e understand). The Other
always falls outside the "lawn of reason. Whether explicit or not, every
structural/theoretical approach to interpretation is both an epistemology
as well as a methodology, And, the imposition of our epistemology on
their beliefs constitutes a judgement against them.
In order to understand t h i s "sentence-before-verdict" feature of
cross-cultural representation, it is necessary to come to terms w i t h the
most fundamental aspect of that proje translation, The epistemological
status or rationality of a belief or belief system cannot be assessed
without first coming to terms w i t h just how, or to what degree, meaning
is transferred between languages and cultures.
Translator, Transcriber
4
Theorists and practitioners in both philosophy and anthropology have endorsed sore version
of a WteralistVheory of translation: they understand translation to be, in general terrs, an
isororphic transfer of reaning fror one Iangnage to another that (ideally) should perfectly preserve
seaantic content, an act of rimetically representing the reaning of a staterent in one language with a
statwent in another.
In the section on Quine and Davidson [chapter S), it is clear that even theorists who question
solee of the traditionally assumed features of translation, rake use of exarples that re-enforce such a
theory. Davidson, especially, even while calling the traditional rodel into question, chooses examples
that f i t this model of translation perfectly. For instaace he draws conclusions based on exarples of
the translations of the Geman "s r e g e a t h s "it is raining," and 'Der schnee ist rei8"s Qnow is
w h i t e . ~ t r u c t u r a lsirilarities between the tuo languages rake it appear as i f there is no aabiguitp
whatsoever in such tzanslatioas. AS in this case, it is not so irportant to categorize the position
subjected to criticisa, b u t rather elicit underlying assrtrptions that ray not stand up to practice.
While I rill generally siaply oppose 'translationL (in an evolving sense that it takes throughout
this paper) to 'literal" or "traditionala translation theory, there are any number of sirilar
oppositions that find their rap into the relevant literature. Dichotomies prevalent in the literature
include: exact vs. inexact, direct vs. reconstrPctire, literal vs. interpretive, and positivist vs.
herreneutic, arong others. It i s not so irportant to rake fine distinctions between these oppositions.
I will sirply be trying to trace the ways in which translation distorts or transforms the Other, this
distortion always undermines the positions represented in the f i r s t half of any of these dichotories,
and, as often, calls into pestion the dichotomp itself.
common representation of the activiw of translation. Competing
translations of the same Literary work or set of beliefs often differ
dramatically in the meaning ascribed, so much so that many theorists
have come to question the accuracy of this description of the process.
There are, no doubt, substantial problems translating overtly
theoretical amcepts like %enw or "neutrinoN into ather languages (that
may not have a word that refers to anything similar or a theoretical
context capable of supporting a definition of the concept) yet translation
of some apparently common concepts displays dXficuLty as well. Susan
Bassnett-McGuire suggests an example in which semantic conceptual
relations make translation problematic even while there appears to be a
common referent,
Transistor, Transgressor
Translator, Tradumr
1
In raking this distinction betveen 'translation" and "episteological"issues, I rean to draw attention to a
surreptitious or unconscious transition lade by my of these critics. Often, the question First up for debate is 'how
should ue translate a certain clah lade by the Otber?@htkrthan dueiIing on the intricacies of that question, a
decision is aade, a translation is settled upon, and the debate moves on to d i m s whether that translated staterent
reflects a belief that is rational. Ea the course of this thesis, part of vbat I endeavor to shw is that translation
and episterohgical issues are not separable in this my, and that their hplicit separation contaminates mch of what
is said on the issue* 1aake the distinction, thus, because it is helpful in characterizing the come of these debates,
not becanse i t is helpful in characterizing the p m b h of translation*
often through analysis of highly artificial hypothetical constructs,
philosophers found in this anthropological literature a number of real
examples that m u d ground their investigation of problems encountered
in the attempt to understand what appear to be radically different belief
systems.
The ethnographies of Evans-Pritchard, and a f e w other British
anthropologists, were an important source of examples cited by
philosophers in order to raise a number of questions concerning
translation as well as grounding discussion concerning the possibility of
verifying the exitence of universal standards of rationality. Evans-
Pritchard's account of Zande belief in witchcraft made it appear as if
the Azande could hold contradictory beliefs as well as beliefs w i t h no
obvious empirical justification (or, in the face of what w e might consider
obvious empirical falsification),
The most often discussed example is drawn from Evans-Pritchard's
Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic Among the Azande In the very first
pages of this book, Evans-Pritchard writes that the Azande believe that
witchcraft is inherited (in every case) along gender lines, They also
believe that a post-mortem examination can determine if someone was a
witch. They do not, however, d r a w the connection between an identified
witch and the witch status of his or her descendants, Even when this
oversight is pointed out to them, they do not revise their beliefs
accordingly. The question immediately arises: Are the Azande being
perfectly irrational in this case, or is the attribution of such beliefs
somehow mistaken or distorted, the product of a bad translation?
Otber popular examples discussed in the Literature include the
TuUy River Blacks' apparent lack of awareness of the facts of
physiological paternity, the Yomba claim that they sometimes carry their
head or soul around in a stick to protect it from witchcraft, and the
Nuer's claim that "a twin is a bird." The central question raised by
such examples is whether or when it is justifiable to attribute ignorance
or irrationality to the Other, and/or when to question the accuracy of
the trandation, Again, the ascription of irrationality can only follow the
assumption that the provided translation is accurate* Each of these
beliefs, as translated, provides a proposition that is either non-sense or
obviously conf1lcts with ather attributed beliefs.
The translation of statements of t h i s kind generates a tension
between the desire to translate literally (based on the meanings
particular words or expressions have been determined to have in other
contexts), and the desire to make the Other appear wherent in the
target language. Many philosophers who have addressed the question of
w h a t the preconditions for successful transiation are endorse what is
called the "principle of charity," a methodological principle that requires
that one always translate the Other as rationally (charitably)as
possible. W.V.O. Quine best expresses the intuition behind this principle
in Word and Object: "the common sense behind the maxim is that one's
interhcutor's silLiness, beyond a certain point, is less likely than bad
translation (Quine 196059). A great deal of the debate on transiation
centers around this principle.
The rationality and relativism debates began with the problem of
how to determine whether a particular translation is accurate or
acceptable, Presuppositions about the cognitive conditions that make
translation possible were derived, however, from a mistaken model of
translation and motivated a shift of focus to issues concerning what
could (or should) be considered proper reasoning in general, In 1970,
Brian Wilson's (ed.) collection, Rafibnali'ty, drew together essays that
concentrated on the problem of translation and cross-cultural
understanding, B y the t i m e Hollis and Lukes published Rationality and
Relativism in 1982, this debate had been recast in the framework of an
opposition between realism and relativism in which many of the
contributors to Ratrbndty were intent on justifying the claim that the
Western/scientific style of rationality is the one correct form that grants
epistemological access to the one real world, the standard by which w e
ought to understand a l l other cultures, The realism/relativism debate is
complex; for m y purposes, it is not necessary to discuss (and accept or
reject) scientific realism. Nonetheless, andysis of the way in w h i c h this
debate developed reveals the importan- of coming to terms with the
problem that generated the debate. M y concern is w i t h w h a t seems to
have been lost in transition: the original problem of the cross-cultural
transfer of meaning, or hinslahbn-
But ideas cannot be torn out of their context in that way; the
relation between idea and context is an internal one. The idea gets
its sense from the role it plays in the system. It is nonsensical to
take several systems of ideas, find an element of each which can
be expressed in the same verbal form, and then claim to have
discovered an idea which is mmmon to all the systems. This would
be like observing that both the Aristotelian and Galilean systems
of mechanics use a notion of force, and concluding that they
therefore make use of the same notion. (Winch. 1958:107)
2
Robert [nin suggests that the primry point of disagreaent betoeen Uinch and Evans-Pritchard is precisely
over the question 'of uhether or not it is possible to have a context-independent notion of reality from which the
rationality of beliefs can be judged' (Ulin 1984:23). W e both agree that the role of the ethnographer is to
understand the Other they understand theaselves, ham-Pritcbard places Western science in a privileged position for
the parposes of assessrent. 'This additional m e by Evans-Pritchard (and, as dl, Alasdair Hachtyre, an outspoken
critic of Winch's theory) is made possible only according to a philosophy of language/ translation that Winch does not
endorse. This concern vith relativism was Likely, to a great extent, influenced by a debate lore closely tied to
philosophy of science, started by T h m Knhn, over the incamamability of scientific paradigm. Winch's theory
problmatizes translation betveen cnltnres in a way rhich bears close affinities to h ' s uatransIatabiZity betwen
incmensurate paradigms. Since that debate was gore explicitly a realist/rdativist debate, i t is likely that those
similarities greatly affected the direction of this debate even tho& Knbn is only sporadically wntioned. While no one
in this debate is advocating notranslatability, sirilarities betveen W t u r e s h d 'paradigsWie comparison. These
shilarities iay be infortunate for their oversbadwing of irportant dirferences. Scientific 'paradigms,"e natiral
belief systas, are theoretical structures intended not only to be consistent and cmplete, but also provide refutations
of other ways of looking at the world. W e the realim/relativis debate right be frmdarental to uuderstandiug
scientific theories, according to $ analysis, the issue of scientific realism is beside the point when i t comes to the
issue of cross-cultural translation.
Within anthropology, questions about the cognitive status of the
belief systems of other cultures long predate the rationality debates in
philosophy. Anthropologists were already intensely interested in
questions about the possibility of cross-cultural belief comparison by
the turn of the century. The issue that concerned them is how to
characterize a mode of thought that seems substantially different from
Western scientific thought, especially beliefs about the world that seem
patenay fake or are not particuIarIy effective in t e r m s of predicting
and wntroUing natural events. For instance, are beLiefs described as
"religiousw or wmysticalw simple propositions about an independent
physical world (and so inadequate by comparison with Western science),
or do such beliefs provide different kinds of explanations or serve
different functions? In Western anthropology and philosophy, the
cultural Other is defined in t e r m s of an us/them distinction that
generally contains within it a civilized/primitive, scientific/traditional
distinction and the implied superioriw of the former in each of these
dichotomies, Many anthropologists in the sixties responded to the
presuppositions embedded in these dichotomy-filled, representational
frameworks that are taken to provide a foundation for understanding
and reinforce belief in the unamditional superiority of the Western mind
by &ways portraying the Other as a somewhat muddle-headed primitive
that certainly would have invented the microwave oven if he or she
were s m a r t enough, An unconditional appeal to the standards of Westerh
scientific culture for the purposes of cross-cultural interpretation
amounts to insisting that members of different cultures have identical
purposes in forming beliefs about the world.
Robin Horton addresses this very topic in one of the central essays
in the RatiunaZity collection, "African Traditional Thought and Western
Science? Here, Rorton endorses a "continuity thesis" according to which
it should be possible to identify more similarities than differences
between Western scientific and African traditional thought, Horton
argues that bath modes of thought serve to explain and control events
in roughly the same way- In any belief system, explanations of what is
not easily observable is achieved by analogy w i t h what is. Different
beiief systems are constructed by appeal to different stocks of analogies
and this accounts for the differences between cultures. Horton provides
a (somewhat provisional) sociological explanation for why African
d t u r e s generally appeal to a personal idiom in constructing
explanations and Westerners appeal to an impersonal or materialistic
idiom? In the end, however. he argues that the purpose is the same
whether the representations of reality are constructed by appeal tc~
atoms and mo1ecules or gods and ghosts- The differences lie, not in the
goals of belief systems, but in the theoretical resources appealed to in
constructing explanations, Dichotomies such as intellectual/emotionaI,
rational/mythical, reality oriented/fantasy oriented, causally
oriented/supernaturally oriented, em pir ical/non-empirical,
abstract/concrete, and analytical/non-analytical are all shown to be
inappropriate once a continuity in the goals underlying alI modes of
thought is established (Horton l967:152).
In spite of this continuity of purpose, however, Horton is unwilling
to see all styles of reasoning as functionally equivalent. There is a clear
sense, according to Horton, in which scientific thought proves itself
superior to other styles not primarily because of its specific content,
but rather because it typifies a certain attitude or approach to the
problems of understanding reality that other styles of reasoning lack, It
is the method of scientific thought that allows it to produce the right
kinds of theories, Horton justifies this assessment by borrowing Karl
Popper's distinction between "openn and "closedwstyles of reasoning,
3
In Bortoa's essay, there i s a partial atterpt to historiche all modes of thoryht , including Yestem
scientific thought. Zn "Tradition and Kodernity kvisited,' he goes to great lengths to provide a cdtural/historical
contextualization of the style of reasoning characteristic of the Yest. Be suggests that, in the social sciences,
theoretical change is generally motivated by roral, aesthetic and emotional considerations. In the natural sciences, the
motivation for t h e o r w and theory #bification derives less frm evidence than Cram features of the scientific and
academic camuuity. In both cases, the lorn that theorg takes is less motivated by any confrontation with an independent
reality than by the strnctnre of inter-school warfare (ffirton 1982:246). Theoretical interest in identifyin#
inconsistencies rag be mre a prodnct of acadeaic theory capetition than of reality correspondence. This observation,
by historicieing Western thought, serves to reenforce the continuity thesis by showing the ways in which our ~ d e of
s
thought are better explained sociologicalIy than by @palto sore correspondence uith an independent, objective
reality.
using it to differentiate societies according to the degree to which they
&ow for their members to consider alternative ways of thinking about
the world around t h e m . Horton further justifies this distinction by
appeal to Evans-Pritchard's work, drawing attention to his claim that
the Azande cannot see their mistakes because they have only one idiom
with which to understand reality and can appeal to no other- O n Evans-
Pritchard's account, the Azande are a perfect example of a Wosed
society.R B y contrast, Horton argues that modern W e s t e r n society offers
a great number of alternative ways of understanding the world and is
characterized b y an essential skepticism toward any one of them. What
distinguishes the scientist from the "traditional"thinker is not so much
a superior conceptual scheme as a willingness to adopt what Popper
characterizes as a "critical attitude." Traditional or primitive societies
are, thus, understood to be trapped w i t h i n an uncritical and
unreflective mode of thought or trapped within the confines of a
particular language!
Horton's work d r e w substantial c r i t i c i s m in the years foiIowing its
publication, W h i l e partially undermining a popular style of cognitive
anthropology that represents the Other as cognitively inferior, critics
drew attention to the ways in which his distinctions and categories
nevertheless place the Other in a conceptual past and characterize them
in static terms.' B y the time Hollis and Lukes published Rationali* aad
Relatimkm, Horton, in his follow-up essay "Tradition and Modernity
Revisited," had significantly modified his account. Here, he rejects the
open/closed distinction and attempts to substantiate the continuity
thesis by elaborating his theory of the role of analogy in constructing
beliefs. H e suggests that there are two levels of theory evident in any
society: primary and secondary theory. The former deals only with
4
Cn a vonderfally telling mtaphor, Norton asks the question of a closed society, 'Uho is going to jap Ira
the cosaic palm-tree wben there is no hope of another perch to ming to?# (Norton 1967:163)
5
Both of these effects, characteristic of this style of representation, will be addressed in more detail in
chapter six. Edward Said and Johannes Fabian investigate the devices by uhich the Other is made a static, oppositional
entity placed in the past. M e k t o n aclmouledges that his critics b e identified a problem with his account, he is
still of the opinion that practices in Africa tribes can be best explained $ paralleling thea with "Id world'
Enropean thought. It is adogies of this sort that sustain the idea that the Other is "prhitive."
observable, middle-sized objects, doing Little more than IabeLing and
locating them in time and space. B y contrast, secondary theory fills in
the world picture with unobservable entities and causal stories about
tbe relations between objects, encompassing all explanation beyond the
descriptive claims of primary theory. It is, then, at the level of
secondary theory that the differences between "scientificw and
"traditional" cultures are manifested,
According to Horton, primary theory is common to all cultures. Its
very content (as opposed to simply its form or structure) is cross-
culturally constant, Secondary theory can, and often does, differ
dramatically between cultures- Horton's account of primary theory places
it prior to secondary theory logically, historically, evolutionally, and
developmentally. Horton suggests that, every culture has an historical
period where thought is exclusively characterized as primary theory
corresponding to the origins of "co-operative manual technologyw.And,
each indivlidual goes through a developmental stage where (possibly
innate) primary theory provides a foundational structure for the later
development of secondary theory, In other words, in every sphere of
development, from personal to cultural, there is an evoluf5on of theory
from a common foundation. The sense in which he maintains an
evolutionist thesis is clear by his characterizing of traditional African
thought as developmentally paraLlel to "Old world'' European thought
(Horton 1982:205-6). N o doubt, his continued reference to the thought of
the Other as "traditionalw maintains this "old world" foIk, non-scientific,
unevolved association that pla- the O t h e r in the past. A cognitive
inferiority of kind is replaced by a cognitive inferiority of development
or evolution-
An important aspect of Horton's theory is the attempt to overcome
the condescending attitude of the West toward the Rest. If this is so,
however, w h y should Horton maintab an evolutionary distinction when it
seems that his primary purpose is to subvert this very bias in
traditional anthropology? Horton's answer to this question depends
crucially on his theory of cross-cultural understanding. His continuity
thesis offers an iaterpretive bridge between the anthropologist and
members of other cultures. The Other is rendered comprehensible by
representing their belief system as an aLready understood excerpt from
our own past, To the extent that they are Like us (or our ancestors),
they are possible to comprehend, The pan-cuIturaL continuity endorsed
by Horton is not an empirical thesis but postulated as a pre-condition of
cross-cultural understanding. As a result, however, the characterization
of other cultures as ntraditionaln or "primitive" is neither accident nor
circumstance, but rather the outcome of applying such a m o d e l of
interpretation, If the Other is represented as "like us," continuous, in
essential respects, with ourselves or our culture, then every difference
must appear as a deformity or a defect in their thought system. Since
our own mode of thought is implicitly considered the historical apex of
cognition, no deviation from that style of reasoning could survive
comparison without being viewed as "primitive." The continuity thesis
necessarily relegates the belief system of the Other to a cognitive,
evolutionary past,
Despite Horton's implication that, according to this theory, the
representation of another culture may be regarded as unproblematic, he
later addresses further issues central to understanding cross-cultural
representation in his essay "Tradition and Modernity Revisited,", Here,
Horton considers the role of translation in anthropology and expresses
awareness of a crucial difficulty.
Bridgehead Theories
6
flollis argues, sirilar to Eorton, f r a a priori considerations concerning what principles ast hold if
translation is to be possible. His account is referred to as a 'fixed bridgehead theory' since the contents are
presumably determinable prior to any crass-linguistic encounter. Lulres, on the other hand, suggests that i t is an
sspirical matter what sorts of beliefs and inferential rules qnatify as a bridfe and so refers to his account as a
'I loa t ing bridgehead theory. "Nonetheheless, their speculations on the content of the bridge are strikingly shilar and,
more importantly, are jnstified by appeal to the same theory of translation.
7
I sag 'akin" to t k hemeneutic circle since Hollis' solution to entering it is not properly 'heneneutic."
Wereas the project i n heneneotics is to provide an interpretation given the necessary existence of the circle, Bollis'
project is to elininate the circle altogether. That is, according to EoUis, the circle is ody a p ~ b l wfor those d o
do not accept the bridgehead argunent. Once one adopts a bridgehead position, the circle disappears. lhderstaoding this
circle as properly 'hementic' vould seriously weaken KoLLis' justification for the existence of a bridgehead.
8
Given that entering the situation with no preconceived ideas about structure and basic content is a no-
. L that one has no choice but to d e the €ollovinga priori
starter, Bollis suggests, as a ~ ~ 1 0 g i c apaint,
assnmptions :
Hollis also introduces three d e s of logic that rnst be ass& as coron if any other lode of thought is to be
called 'reasoning' (a condition that it be traslatable):
1. Identity [ p p )
2. Non-contradiction -(pL-p)
3. Inference (rodns ponens) [p&(p>q)]q (Bollis 196?b:232)
In "he Problas About RationaIitg"LLnkes, Likeuise, lists the criteria that mst be adhered to if stmething is to
qualify as a Iagua#e at alJ. These include notions of truth, reference and logic that are nearly identical to Hollis'
six constituents of the bridgehead (Lakes 1970:ZOi-210). As such, it is not entirely clear in what sense Lnkes'
bridgehead is a "floating" ow. The difference is tbat, for Lakes, vhat constitutes the bridge is presmably an
empirical matter whereas, for HolZis, it is established a priori. J h a so, according to each, the translator enters the
field with the same assmptions. M e s differs in tbat he holds that vhat is as@ is revisable ia Light of evidence
and experience.
a necessary condition for translation? "some beliefs are universal among
mankindw;there must exist "a massive central core of human -43
which has no historyu [Hollis 1982:75).
WhiIe Steven Lukes agrees with Hollis concerning the need for a
bridgehead, his justification differs from H O W in important respects.
Lukes argues that the necessary condition for translation is an
empirical, "floatingu bridgehead rather than an a priori, fixed
bridgehead, on the grounds that the latter may incline one to ascribe
true b e l i e f s where they are not due. According to Lukes, there m a y be
cases i n which a member of another culture violates basic rules of logic
but these are easily explicable given other previously translated beliefs.
In such cases, it would be better to construe the particular belief as a
violation of common principles of rationality rather than as rational yet
inexplicable. One ought to assume that others reason roughly as w e do
and then go on to determine which beliefs are fahe and which true. In
other words, one ought to maximize intelligibility rather than truth. 10
Hollis justifies his commitment to an a priori bridgehead thesis on the
grounds that, if one had to discover the bridge constituents empirically,
there could be no way into the interpretive circle (Hollis 1967a:214)-
Despite these minor differences, Hollis and Lukes both arrive at the
conclusion that some common bridge must necessarily exist. Lukes*
4
The argument f r a the rethodological to the episteological point becoles souud uith the addition of a single
prearise. Hollis lists the conditions that wst obtain if one is to translate another language. He then adds the preaise
that translation does in fact take place. This, in effect, changes the statns of this a m n core frm a
nethodologicallp useful assumption to a necessarily existing condition.
a) if translation is to take pIace, there must be a c m n core
b j translation takes place
therefore, there is this c a o n core
The argment wrks only by not calling into question exactly vhat is actmplished in the act of transiating another
langoage. Hollis assumes that translation is the ismorphic transfer of meaning between languages. It is this asmaption
that I will call into question in subsequent chapters. Postdating a c a o n central core guarantees isaarphic transfer
over this lhited subset of language. Yet, if translation is not just this, tltere is no need for this core. In a sense,
Bollis rerely assmes vhat he sets out to prove.
10
Lnkes suggests that Crandy's VrincipIe of W t y ' is a better operating principle lor the project of
translation than is the 'principle of charity'hbich BoUs endorses. The latter begins uith the assoption that mst of
the interlocutor's c l a h are tme, the foner begins by asslning that the interlocutor is basically like onrsehes (or
that most of their claim are intelligible). A mre detailed analysis of these positions MU be dealt with in chapter
five.
bridge differs in that his emphasis on m a x i m i z i n g intelligibility rather
than truth allows him to maintain that the constituents of the bridge are
revisable in light of ongoing investigation. Lukes states:
In spite of the fact that both Hollis and Lukes purport to establish
grounds for the tdstence of a bridgehead as a necessary condition for
doing anthropology, neither presents much evidence or analysis for what
this bridgehead might contain." Other proponents of bridgehead
theories refer to a very few studies that claim to find evidence for the
existence of perceptual uniformities across cultures, Primary among such
attempts are Ekrh and Kay's studies of basic colour t e r m s in which
they claim to verify the existence of "natural categories" of colour.12
These studies, while for years cited as the strongest evidence against
linguistic relativity, do not, in fact, establish any claims concerning the
meanings of colour t e r m s and likely do more to refute than substantiate
the existence of a conceptual or linguistic bridge.13
Despite their inability to identify any specific concepts that are
universal across cultures, Horton, Hollis, and Lukes aU hold that there
are extra-linguistic (and, so, trans-linguistic) standards of truth or
ll
Bollis refuses to identify the content of the bridjje, stating, 'Vithont specifying the core, I carmot make
this paper cogent. But neither can I rake i t short. So I sirpIy enter a plea For metaphysicsn (Hollis 1982:84). Lnkes
cites a number of studies purporting to identify cross-dtmalIy constant perceptual abilities. Such ctmnalities, it
they in fact exist, are, however, irrelevant to the issue of translation. I address this issue at greater length in
chapter loat.
12
Dan Sperber, for instance, places even greater evidential weight on this and sirilar studies. (Sperber
1982: %I)
13
1 retm to this debate in chapter four. Carl Shpson's 'Colour Perception: Cross Wtnral W s t i c
Translation and Relativia" (1991) is a goad, in depth, andysis of the debates surrounding these studies.
verification. According to each of them, a systematic distinction can be
made between beliefs that are grounded on objective criteria (and so
universal) and those not (and so relative). In order to differentiate the
types of explanations one might give for beliefs held b y members of
another culture, Lukes distinguishes a number of ways in which w e
might understand the word "rational," These. h e separates into two
primary categories: wrational(l)criteriaw are those that are universally
applicable to a limited set of beliefs in any ontext; "rationaL(2) criteriaw
are those that are context dependent, possibly diverge widely between
cultures, and are to be discovered empirically (Lukes 1970:208), Lukes
emphasizes the importance of criteria of truth, understood as context or
language mependent. This is dear in his claim that false beliefs cannot
be rational(1) but can, at best, only be shown to be rational(2) (Lukes
1970:211). Hollis does not, like Lukes, distinguish two kinds of rationality
but does similarly distinguish b e t w e e n rational (coherent)and true
(correspondent).I4
Both Hollis and Lukes invoke a coherence theory of truth and
argue that this is all that a bridgehead theory requires (Hollis 1967935).
Yet they both appeal to extra-linguistic criteria in order to justify their
analyses of foreign beliefs. There is a clear sense in which Lukes*
) ~ used only to characterize beliefs that satisfy a
category " r a t i ~ n a l ( l is
correspondence or verification theory of truth (the first type: objective,
universal) whereas "rational(2)" criteria apply to all beliefs that fail
such criteria but satisfy a coherence theory (type two, above). For
HoIlis as well, there is a clear sense in w h i c h the criteria he identifies
14
A large part of the debate between Barnes/BIoor and Kollis/Lnlres is over the '@valence postuIateQr
'symmetry of explanation,Vefined by Barnes and Bloor:
Oar equivalence postdate is that a l l beliefs are on par with one another with respect to the canses of their
.
credibility.. the incidence of all beliefs without exception calls for eapirical investigation and m s t be
accounted lor by finding the specific, Iocd c a e s of this credibility. (Barnes and Bloor 1982:23)
The distinctions made by Hollis (trae/rational) and Lnkes (rationality(l)/rationality(2]) endorse the asymetry of
explanation or non-eqaivalence postulate. True beliefs receive one type of explanation (nsaally lerely that they are
true) whereas false beliefs require another type of explanation (historical or sociological). According to 3arnes and
Bloor, all beliefs require sociological explanations since our very distinction betveen true and false beliefs requires
a sociological explanation.
as constituting the bridgehead presuppose a correspondence o r
verification theory of t r u t h . 1 5 In speaking of the Zande, Hollis suggests
that their beliefs about witchcraft can be seen as rational (coherent)
even though they are empirically fake (fail to correspond to reality).
Rational(1) (empirically verifiable) beliefs and rational(2) (false but
coherent) beliefs each require different types of explanation (contra the
Barnes and Blwr "symmetry thesisw).
In the case of the Nuer claim about kwoth ("a twin is a bird"),
Hollis suggests that the only w a y to ascribe such a belief is by
providing an account of "good reasonsw that connects this abstract claim
to empirically identifiable (and empirically verifiable) beliefs. Ritual
beliefs must be linked to, and explained in terms of, everyday
observation sentences, or they must remain untranslatable.16 The
empiricist strain in H o b ' account becomes even more apparent when he
draws an analogy between the project of translating another language
and an atheist's attempt to understand a religious believer.
Richard Poley has observed that even We Bollis and Lnires claim to adhere to a coheren!tist account a~f
meaning, their justification for this bridge depends on, at minim, a strong reliabilist theory and often lakes use of
a correspondence theory of truth. If held consistently t h r o ~ n ttheir analyses, their claired coherentist accounts
would be insufficient to justify the existence of a bridge ((Poley 196Bt. The underlying correspondence theory of truth
is not irediately apparent as it works transitively through translation. Bollis' theory of truth @Licitly iaplies
that English bears a correspondence to an independent reality. The language being translated, then, wst bear an
isaorphic relation to English (a traasitivity t vill address in lore detail in chapter 7).
16
The fact that Bollis distingnisbes betveen "be and rationalwand 'false but rationalf beliefs again
suggests the role of a verification theory of meaning. Both are coherent in the saw uay but the latter needs a
different sort of explanation or justification as i t does not properly correspoad to reality.
Lukes makes the same distinction over this very belief. h e r beliefs about h h satisfy rational(2) but fail to
t
satisfy rational(1) criteria; they are coherent bat false (Lnkes 1970:21). It is in this sare way that Lnkes criticizes
the spaetry thesis (Lnkes 1982:292-98) .
The model of .translation presupposed by Hollis and Lukes is, then,
one in which the beliefs of others become intelligible only insofar as
they can be assimilated into a set of conceptual categories and basic
principles of logic that are assumed to be context independent. T h e
original question concerned the translation of statements like the Nuer
claim that "a twin is a birdw or the YON^^ claim about carrying one's
head or soul around in a box. Rather than attempting to understand the
cuLtural context of such a claim or further evaluate the distortions of
meaning that take place in translation, the analysis has, in the end,
eluded those issues and moved on to the problem of falsification. This is
possible only because this theory of cross-cultural interpretation is
based on a theory of translation derived from a theory of meaning that
takes content to be a function of verifiability (or falsifiability);
According to this account, meaning is not context or language sensitive.
Significantly different beliefs must, on this account, b e either fake or
senseless.
While proponents of the bridgehead theory debate the use of
assorted methodological guidelines for resolving problems posed by
apparently irrational beliefs, it seems, in the end, that both Hollis and
Lukes apply a principle of humanity w i t h a vengeance. Their underlying
argument is:
17
The over-sirglified irpiication of IioIding this theory of translation in the context of a realist/
relativist debate is most clearly exaplified by V. Hewton-Slith:
The possibility of translation entails the falsehood of relativisa. fly contapasition, the truth of relativisa
entails the hpassibility of translation. .. The fact that relativists do translate displays that they do not
believe in their om thesis. (Nevton-Mth 1982:llS)
go on and determine the meaning of less simple beliefs, While it seems
that standards of rationality are used only to justify the existence of
such m m m o n simple beliefs, more complex beliefs are often treated as if
the same criteria of inmgibility apply to their interpretations. Western
empiricist criteria of verification are, again, represented as context
independent and apply equally to the more complex beliefs of others.
Hollis very nearIy dismisses the anthropological importance of
interpreting more complex ritual beliefs on the basis that they are
either patently false or obviously meaningless. Statements that can b e
IiteraUy represented and empiricaUy tested are true or false all others
are meaningless>' This sentiment is clear Prom Hollis' observations.
quoted above, that. in order to understand the beliefs of the Other, it
is necessary to assume a "single, objective and neutral worldw (HolIis
1982:74) and this requires a "reference to objective truthw (Hollis
1982:85). It is not surprising that Hollis would find it necessary to take
"the side of judgement against that of charityw in all interpretive
endeavors ( H o l l i s l982:85).I9
18
KoLLis suggests that the only aetaphors that can be understood are those that can be reduced to literal
ceaning. [t is not purely an issue lor translatian theory, here, but a point about s w l e interpretation even uithin a
language. To illustrate, he quotes two lines from a poen: "Life like a doae of my-colomed glass, Stains the white
radiance of etemity."Kollis states, This is vhat Carnap would call a ktaphysid Proposition and only a rash ran
would claiin to how what it leans' (Hollis 1967b:237). There is no aeaning where there is no possibility of apirical
verification in isolation fra context. On this lodel, difference @lies falsity or rimiqlesswss. The translator's
potto becones "like us, or wrong." The self/other dichutag is translated into the tme/fdse dichotory. Hollis hplies
these very oppositions from the beginning lines of Wason and Ritual." Oppositions tbat can be found in the first tw
pages of that essay include:
Rational Beliefs vs. ktapb..sicaI/Ritd Beliefs
Informative VS. Expressive
Rational vs. Hystical
Literal VS. Hetaphorical
Sell vs . Other
And, in any case in which the right column carmot be reduced to the left,
haningfnl vs . iieaaiagless
True VS . False
19
Joseph HargoLis has criticized the debate betueen Kollis/Iakes and Baraes/Bloor on the grounds that the
positions taken by both parties are too extrere. Barnes and Bloor's sociology of kaovledge results in an mecessarg
skepticisr whereas Bollis and Lnkes [implicitly) endorse a very strong fom of realis. Kacgofis identifies a &r of
non-sequiturs that leave Lnlres' argment lor a bridgehead incoherent vithoot further assaptions about reirlim. Each
move in the argument assuaes %at sharing the saae wrld entails sharing the sare conceptual schere (of that cmon
world) or the same cognitive criteria, or the same criteria of rationalikf(Rargo1is 1986:225). Yhile both clah to
ground their theories on a verification theory of truth, there is an implicit endorserent of the correspondence theory
The case for or against metaphysical realism and the erdstence of a
single, objectively knowable world is irrelevant to questions about
translation, O n a bridgehead model of interpretation, it is the assumptbn
of objective truth that has ensured that the desire to judge the Other
supersedes the ability to understand the Other, This central concern
w i t h epistemological assessment is clear in Lukes' discussion of a
number of different interpretations put forth concerning the beliefs
about physiological paternity held by the Tully River Blacks. In his 1903
essay "Superstition, Magic, and Medicinew, WOE. Roth identifies four
possible causes of pregnanw acknowledged by the TulIy River Blacks,
none of which include sexual intercourse?0 During the late 1960's.
Medford Spiro and Edmund Leach debated whether the Tully River
Blacks were indeed entirely ignorant of physiological paternity or
whether their statements of belief w e r e some symbolic or religious way
of expressing the (roughly) accurately understood facts of procreation,
The debate between Spiro and Leach over this particular conflict of
interpretation was p a r t of (and was central to) the larger debate
between intellectualism (literalism) and symbolism/fideism21 (metaphorical
reading) that took place, during the 1960's and 1970's. in anthropology.
The intellectualists saw all expressions of belief, including mystical and
religious beliefs, as attempted explanations or hypothesis about the way
the world really is, Horton's nmntinuitythesisw is a modified example of
of truth that is an @licit metaphysical realism. Hargolis suggests that adopting, not anly a rild relativist
positions, but any veaker fon of realisr (for instance, Pntnar's "internal realis'), wonld leave Kollis' and Lakes'
defense of universalis mrsalmd. "It is quite irpossible to reach any of the universalized conclusions regarding
rationality Lnkes hiaself draws frm a riniaally realist thesis.~Mgolis1906:232)
20
Lnkes quotes the passage t r a Roth [Lukes 1982:283):
% wman begets children because a) she has been sitting over the fire an which she has roasted a particular species of
black bream, which nst have been given to her by the prospective father, (b) she has purposely gone a-hunt* and
canght a certain kind of bullfrog, (c] sae men have told her to be in an interesting condition, or Id) she may dream of
having the child put inside her. Fra: V.E. Both, 'Superstition, kgic, and Micine", dbrfb @eeaslaodE&ograph.ic
BitlIetio, 5 (lgO3), p .22
21
Wile disti@Wg between symbolist and fideist agproaches, Norton categorizes tber together as
approaches that do not read the beliefs of the Mher literally and so, to sae extent, ignore the Other's paint of view,
disrissing any cagnitive content or suggestion that the Other is attmpting to accurately explain sae feature of the
world. Ln any case, they are sirtilar in that they endorse a non-literal reading of ritual beliefs.
this approach. The inteIlectualist a s s u m e s that w e all have a common
interest in explanation and prediction. and our beliefs ought to b e
understood as an attempt to literally and accurately describe the world
to this end. T h o s e who endorse the s y m b o l i s t approach interpret such
wmysticalwbeliefs as expressing something beyond the immediate world,
metaphorically, for reasons other than straightforward description. If so
intended, these beliefs would not be amenable to standard empiricist
evaluation and strict criteria of consistency. Spiro takes the
inteilectualist approach, Leach the s y m b o l i s t , and each applies his
interpretive thesis, in their debate, to the project of deciphering the
meanings of particular statements made by the T m y River Blacbs.
Given substantial differences between the frameworks that each
adopts for interpretation, and given the internal consistency of each
theory, Lukes admits that it is difficult to settle the question of
w h e t h e r the beliefs of the Tully River Blacks display ignorance of the
facts of procreation. If the two interpretive frameworks can give rise to
t w o self-consistent interpretations then it appears impossible to
adjudicate between competing translations. Lukes suggests, in any case,
that the evidence inclines one toward Spiro's interpretation. Yet, even
on Spiro's own account, the evidence presents a t least two possibilities:
a straightforward attribution of "ignorancewand a thesis of "Freudian
repressionn that explains this apparent ignorance by appeal to
psychological mechanisms. Given this further explanatory ambiguity, it
seems difficult to imagine what sort of evidence would settle the issue.
Lukes acknowledges that each position is supported by its own
interpretation of the evidence and then asks what he takes to be the
central question:
22
Geher's om point of entry into the ratiodity debates is alrost exclusively focosed on the issue of
translation. In his 1362 paper, "Concepts and Society", he criticizes the Vinchean functionalist approach as well as the
theory that translation i s accomplished according to a principle of charity. Eis u i n point, in that essay, is that
understanding a foreign concept often regnires explaining the vays in which it is iomhmt.
Be is also keenly aware of the inseparability of vbat is later taken by my (possibly himelf included) as tw
separate projects. He states, "e logical assessmt of an assertion, and the identification of its nearest equivalent
in our language, are intirttely Linlred and inseparable.' (Cellner 1962:35)
cognitive superiority of Western styles of reasoning b y appeal to two
converging arguments* First, in agreement w i t h Horton's earlier thesis,
Gellner makes an wepistemoIogicalargument" suggesting that the method
of Western scientific investigation combined with a healthy skepticism is
conducive to the project of discovering and accurately representing real
aspects of the one real world. Sea~nd,llnlike Horton, Gellner offers a
"socioIogical argumentwin which he appeals to the observation that
others who do not practice this style of reasoning (initially),eventually
come around to seeing the value (or truth) of it and endeavor to adopt
it- In this way, he represents Western, scientific styles of reasoning as
the emerging common end for all cultures. It is this teleological
commitment that motivates Gellner to adopt the superiority claim in an
explicit way not characteristic of Horton's analysis.
While Horton takes explanation to be a universal goal, he does not
assume that explanation must b e reducible to physical, mechanistic,
material terms. Such a style of reasoning is not, in all ways, superior
(even if it is clearly superior in material matters). Horton's own choice
to live out his life in a "traditionalwAfrican culture, along with his
claim that he finds some aspects of that w a y of Life preferable, speak
against Gellner's single-minded materi;rll'sm. The physical, mechanistic
idiom that characterizes Western scientific secondary theory is,
according to Horton, inferior from an ethical/aesthetic standpoint. In
Africa, he finds "an intensely poetic quality in everyday life and
thought, and a vivid enjoyment of the passing moment--both driven out
of Western life by the quest for purity of m o t i v e and the faith in
progressn (Horton 1967:170). Both Gellner and Horton hold prediction and
control to be a universal human goal and yet, Horton is willing to
recognize that, w h i l e s o m e degree of pragmatic control of nature is
necessary for survival. it cannot b e treated as ail-encompassing; there
Be is aware that, often enough, for a particdar concept or belief, there is no seuntic equivalent betveen
languages, and the choice of a near& equivalent statmtlwrd is itself a value judgeaent concerning waning and
rationality. This, I take it, is a key issne that Cellner amf others f a i l to cme to tens with yet rove oa as if they
have. The evolution of Gelher's thought since then characterizes the c a o n progression that 1 trace through rang
others. Once problms of translation give way to assesslents of rationality, the path is clear for the superiority
thesis that Gellner now explicitly endorses.
may be other, equally important, goals that require different explanatory
idioms. The universal rational criteria endorsed by Hollis and Lukes
likewise rest on the assumption that prediction and control of nature is
not only universal but also the sole end served by rationality,
The assumed superiority of Western scientific reasoning follows
from the continuity thesis combined with claims about mgnitive
teleology. In 1988, Ernan M c M u l l i n edited the wHection Consfructrbn and
ConstrainC in which the issue central to the rationality debate had
again shifted. Questions about translation and what criteria of rationality
are to b e applied to interpretations of other WCefsystems are now
entirely absent. The contributors to this collection turn to explicating
rationality in general and assessing claims for the superiority of
Western styles of thought. Thomas M c C a r t h y clearly addresses this latter
concern in "Scientific Rationality and the 'Strong Program' in the
Sociology of Knowledge, " McCarthy acknowledges the historicity of
Western concepts of truth and rationality while also insisting that
Western thought exhibits characteristics that make it clearly superior to
other thought systems,
23
CeLlner does not, like Eorton, hold that there is a lmiversal rationality that uuderlies all thought.
Rather, there is a superior rationality that is found only in sae thought. I group ther together in spite of this
isportant dissimilarity because both positions are based on belief in a cam goal or parpose. A 'continuity thesis"
either fom, whcih postdates prediction and control as a universal goal, must see Western scientific thought (ðer a
particnlar manifestation of universal rationality or as a unique tgrpe of rationality] as superior.
words, the meaning of which can be isomorplu'cally transferred between
languages. Since, as they all claint, translation is actually realized, a l l
h g u a g e s must have this core, and hence it is possible to speak of a
single world language or a single meaning system that is a subset of all
languages.
These bridgehead arguments are only persuasive on the assumption
that translation into a target language must produce a literal, exact
reproduction of what is said in the source language. While this
description of the project of translation was originally in question,
critics moved too quickly from €he question of the possibility of
translation to the question "is the Other rational?" Assumptions about
the success of literal cross-cultural representation of beliefs has lead,
through a chain of reasoning, to the unconditional superiority of the
Western scientific mind and the mmplete absence of the Other. A t best,
the Other can be only a primitive, muddle-headed curiosity.
Gellner's picture of Western, rational self as the product of the
fulfillment of Cartesian method represents the Western mind as the only
one that has access to the real world in spite of the effects of culture.
1
Robert Ulin suggests t3at there is an attempt t o pull away f r o r functionalist thought i n
Evans-Pritchardrs vork but that he is unable to break fror t h i s approach largely because of his role
i n British colonialisr. U1inrs claim is that British antbropologp necessarily rerained functionalist
because the main tenets of functionalisr are suited t o colonialisr ([Jlin 1984:18-21). Linguistic
anthropology, following Pranr Boas, tends to andenine ran1 of the p r a i s e s of functionalist analysis.
Thus, this dual influence creates a tension in Evans-Pritchardrs vork. I will return to this in
chapter four. 1 rill also address some of the relations betueen this style of representation and
doaination, evolationisr, and colonialism in chapters sir and seven.
m a i n t a i n s the functionalist assumption that the anthropologist can be a
neutral. objective observer not affected by political relations!
This combination of an emphasis on functional explanation with an
approach to fieldwork that involves careful and in-depth interpretation
of the beliefs of the Other creates considerable tension in Evans-
Pritchard's work: this has, itself, generated debate and precipitated a
later crisis in anthropology. W e Evans-Pritchard focused on the
beliefs of the Other as they function in their original context, he
presumed that such a amtext muld be readily explicated in terms of
our own scientific understanding. A t the same time, Evans-Pritchard
challenges the goal of objectivism in anthropology by acknowledging the
subjective dimension of ethnography?
The consequence of this theoretical tension in Evans-Pritchard's
work is that he sometimes po-ays the O t h e r as seen from their context
and other times as seen from ours, H e sometimes treats representation
as an objective matter and other times as hopelessly perspectival. The
apparent incompatibility of these consequences brings into question the
larger issue of the nature of anthropology's relation to the Other.
Differences between anthropological and philosophical
interpretations of Zande beliefs are, to a great extent, a product of
these underlying tensions in Evans-Pritchard's work combined w i t h
substantial differences between the two disciplines concerning how the
beliefs of others are translated and assessed. The philosophers who
2
Mary Douglas atteapts t o explain many of the detaiIs o f uitch accusations among the Arande
alinost entirely as a result of British intervention and of t h i s crouding caused bp the settlerents.
According t o Dougias, t h i s forced proxirity of reabers of Xande society strained the rules of
( ~ i g o o o s )social relations resulting in an increase in such accusations (Douglas 1970:xxxv,
1980:59). Eva Gillies, i n the introduction t o the 1976 abridged version of Hitchcraft, Oracles, and
Magic, provides a quite detailed history of British colonialisr i n North Africa and the changes that
took place i n Xande culture a s a d i r e c t result. this historical and political analpsis contrasts with
the absence of any such discussion i n Evans-Pritchardls noticeably ahistorical account,
3
This subjectirity, houever, functions a t the personal rather than cultural level. Evans-
Pritchard acknowiedges t h a t the ethnographer has particular concerns that will shape the l i n e of
questioning and investigation. It remains possible however, according to Brans-Pritchard, for the
ethnographer t o overcome the confines of t h e i r o m culture. Ethnographr appears as a dialogue between
an individual person and another culture rather than a dialogne between tuo individuals o r between tuo
cultures.
made use of examples taken from Evans-Pritchard's studies generally
focus on two m a i n features of 7;mde belief in magic- The first is the
pervasiveness of their belief in magic: Evans-Pritchard says "there is
no niche or corner of 7nnde culture into which (witchcraft) does not
twist itselfw (Evans-Pritchard 1937:18). T h e second is the logic according
to which the relevant beliefs are related and justified- According to
Evans-Pritchard, the Azande routinely fail t o recognize the l o g i d
conclusions of their beliefs, These include failing to see the implications
of the relation between two beliefs, failing to see the inefficacy of
certain practices, and failing to identify the ways in which their beliefs
run contrary to experience. A s such, it appears that both Zande logic
and ontology differ so r a d i d y from our own that one might have a
great deal of difficulty holding that they think rationally, to any
substantial degree, or that their beliefs are similar enough to our own
that the project of translation could ever get off the ground- Yet,
Evans-Pritchard has presumably given detailed translations and
explanations of their beliefs.
In what follows, I will re-evaluate what Evans-Pritchard actually
achieved in his study of Zande witchcraft. Rather than assessing the
beliefs of the Azande in terms of coherence, correspondence to reality
or rationality, I will d r a w attention to the changes in meaning and
conceptual connections that become distorted in translation and how this
affects (and renders extraneous) assessments of rationality. Philosophers
who make use of Evans-PritchardTs study often cite one key passage
that contains what appears to be a glaring violation of Western patterns
of reasoning and then quickly move on to discuss the implications of
such failure to reason properly in relation to a particular theory of
translation or rationality, IQ order to understand just how the Other is
represented or what is translated between cultures (whether in single
passages or complete ethnographies), it will be illuminating to
systematically wmpare the ways in which members of Zande and of
Western culture treat the concept of witcbcraffs
Zande W i t c h c r a f t
It is clear from the very beginning that there is at least one very
important difference between Western and Z a n d e witchcraft= there is
nothing marginal or secretive about Zande witchcraft- It is not a
deviation from standard modes of behavior as it is in the W e s t but,
rather, an integral part of everyday Life, This needs to be made clear so
that one can keep in mind that the beliefs that Evans-Pritchard is
attempting to translate and explain are not deviant esoteric beliefs
outside the frame of everyday We, but everyday beliefs that constitute
the foundational framework for understanding even the simplest
behavior.4
4
This is worth bearing i n rind when assessing the viability of a bridgehead theory. It is not
clear that one i s in a position to first try t o master beliefs pertaining to simple a p i r i c a l natters
before roving on to coapler retaphysical ones or that the ethnographer might be able to distingnish
betueen these tuo types. In Zande culture, the tuo are intenixed. In other uotds, it does not seer to
be the case that there is a separate set of pnrely a p i r i c a l beliefs which ritual beliefs stand apart
fro1 or snpervene upon.
I t i s also worth ref Iecting on the debate betueen HoIlis/lakes and Barnes/Bloor over language
learning. It i s not clear, i n this case, that the ewographer is a t leisure to separate basic from
ritual beliefs and f i r s t concentrate on the foner. Uhile Evans-Pritcbard relates very l i t t l e
concerning the process of coning to understand the Azande, be irplies that one learns to use the
concepts paicklg (whether basic or retaphpsical) and then later addresses the finer details of
meaning. Evans-Pritchard coments:
Evans-Pritchard identifies a number of ways in which the word
Mangu is used, t w o of which are important here- First, the t e r m may
refer to a wwitchcraft-substancecen The Zande believe that witchcraft
emanates from a material substance found in (or near) the stomach of a
person capable of using witchcraft. This substance may be diswvered
b y a post-mortem examination of the person suspected of being a witch,
Second, Mangu may refer to the w i t c h c r a f t emanated by this substance.
This is a psychic power which goes out from the body in order to
perform its deed- Witchcraft always acts in this way, by traveling to the
person or property it is to act upon, It usually travels at night in the
form of a b r i g h t light.
Witchcraft is inherited through unilinear descent. Any son of a
male witch is a witch; any daughter of a female witch is a witch! For
the most part, inheritance is the only way that one can come to possess
this witchcraft substance! It is only possible for someone to practice
witchcraft if they possess this substance inside of them. It is not,
however, the case that one who possesses this substance necessarily
practices witchcraft. The substance can remain dormant or wcool,
making it ineffective.
Azande were talking- about vitchcraft daily, both a m g theaselves and to re; any corrunication
was well-nigh irpossible unless one took witchcraft for granted. (Evans-Pritchard 1937:244)
Yhile certainly not t h e f i r s t concept one is going t o f u l l y understard, it cannot be separated
from the i n i t i a l encounter and then dealt with later. The ateanings of basic personal interactions, as
well as simple interpretations of realitp, are intirately linked to beliefs in witchcraft and must
take their meanings in t h i s context.
5
This belief is a specific instance of a m e general belief concerning inheritance of
traits. In "Sadan KotesIw Evans-Pritchard gives an accoant of the rather conpler theory behind the
passing on of t r a i t s fror the parent to the child. A child's gender, amng other things, is determined
by which parent's s p i r i t o r soul (bisiro) i s stronger. This is in conformitp uith (and supports) the
belief that ranga is passed on through gender lines. (%vans-Pritchard l W b :165-6). Yitchcraft is
passed on with bisi'o and also acts as disim hence is consistently related through the multiple
leanings of t h i s concept (see also Evans-Pritchard 1937:2 f o r a shorter account).
6
The third definition of Mddqa, uhich I have omitted, is a s a reference t o 'uitchcraft-
phlega.~itchdoctors and sorcerers can, bp taking the appropriate medicines, create sorething like
the witchcraft substance i n themselves for the puposes of perfoning magic. I o r i t this reference
because it is not involved i n any of the asuallp cited contradictions and it does not play the s u e
role in everyday life t h a t t h e inherited witchcraft substance does.
Almost any unfortunate event in Zande Life can be attributed to the
intervention of witchcraft. Ill-health, the failure of crops, an
unsuccessful hunting expedition, even the cracking of a piece of pottery
when put to the fire are a l l attributed to the intervention of witchcraft,
A s such, Azande are constanffy a w a r e of the possibility of witchcraft
affecting any endeavor, and are always trying to identify the situations
in which it will intervene as well as trying to combat it.
Whether or not witchcraft is responsible for a particular mishap is
determined by consulting any of a number of oracles. The types of
oracles rank in a hierarchy according to their accuracy and
dependability, The most important of these is the "poison oracle." This
oracle is consulted b y putting a question or the name of a suspected
witch in front of a fowl (chicken) that has been forced to swallow
beage, a potion made from indigenous plants. The fowl will then either
live or die in order to indicate a positive or negative response to the
question. E v e r y appeal to the poison oracle is double checked by
administering benge to a second fowl and asking it to confirm t h e
verdict of the first by asking the same question in the negative form.
This is to safeguard against benge too strong or too weak.
Predictions made by the oracle are not a l w a y s vindicated, and the
Azande are aware that t h e s e pronouncements do not always mincide with
other verdicts or with experience, The first a n d seamd tests m a y
contradict one another or an oracle may determine that a certain state
of affairs wilL come about w h i c h d o e s not. These contradictions however,
do not lead the Zande to question the veracity of the oracle itself-
There are a number of acknowledged ways in which the oracle might be
interfered with.? The apparent failure of one m y s t i d belief is fully
accounted for by appeal to other mystical beiiefs. Evans-Pritchard
suggests:
- - --
7
Evans-Pritcbard lists eight: '(1) the urong variety of poison rap have been gathered, (2)
breach of a taboo, (3) witchcraft, (4) anger of the owners of the forest where the creeper grows (the
source of benge), (5) age of the poison, (6) anger of the ghosts, (71 sorcery, (8) asen (Evans-
Pritchard 1937:155).
A s w e may w e l l imagine, the oracle frequently kills both fowls or
spares both fowIs, and this would prove to u s the futility of the
whole proceeding. But it proves the opposite to the Azande. They
are not surprked at mntradictions; they expect them- Paradox
though it be, the errors as w e l l as the valid judgments of the
oracle prove to them its infallibility. T h e fact that the oracIe is
wrong when it is interfered with by some mystical power shows
how accurate are its judgments when these powers are acluded.
(Evans-Pritchard 1937:155)
8
This refusal to acknowledge the inconsistent irplications of holding these tuo particular
beliefs sinultaneonsly is greatly exaggerated in the critical l i t e r a t a r e on the l a t t e r , and possibly
even, elsewhere, by Evaas-Pritchard hirself. It is clear that the h a n d e do not r i s h t o rake the
ilaplied belief part of their explicit belief system, yet thep often a c t i n a ray that indicates the
acceptance of the irplicatioa. In W d a n Kotes,Vvans-Pritchard relates a n1lrbe.r of accounts of the
autopsies performed in search of ranqn. The living relatives present a t the operation clearly
acknowledge that they rill be irplicated o r exonerated by the findings (Evans-Pritchard 1929b:237-
241). It is only concerning distant blood relatives that the connection is not generally rade. The
distant biological connection is easf to disriss as llaande will often claim that an accused distant
kinsman i s a bastard (Evans-Pritcbard 1937:3). The connection is only partially ignored and can be
explainably disaissed.
those situations in which they express their beliefs in witchcraft
do not force the problem upon them.. . A 7ande is interested in
witchcraft only as an agent on definite occasions and in relation
to his own interests, and not as a permanent condition of
individuals, (Evans-Pritchard 1937:4)
9
The apparent contradiction is, thus, a product not of the Zande concept boro #anqu, but of
the difference between boro aangu and Because being a witch is a deviant condition in
Christian/Scientific society, persecutors are concerned with the state of being a witch. As discwed,
Zande witchcraft i s not deviant. It is so comon that one could, for practical reasons, only be
concerned to protect oneself i n particular situations. It would be inconceivable to eradicate witches
fror the society as was the Christian goal i n the West. Given the different social relations
S U K K O M witchcraft,
~ ~ ~ ~ it rakes perfect sense t o ignore the condition and concentrate an the
activity.
In each of the cases considered above, the apparent inconsistencies
disappear when the larger conW and related beliefs are taken into
account. Hence, while it may b e possible to identify inconsistencies in
Zande thought by consideration of a few isolated propositions, detailed
consideration of the larger system of beliefs suggests that it is not the
case that these are potential inconsistencies for the Zande. The
appearance of blatant inconsistencies is Iargely a product of the ways in
which these examples are made use of in the philosophical Literature.
They are not, strictly speaking, inconsistent in Evans-Pritchard's
account When the examples are cited out of context, however, without
the filling in that Evans-Pritchard is so careful to provide, the Zande
can only seem irrational,
10
Crick notes specifically the discrepancy between oar ideas of freedor and deterrinisr. It
i s generally accepted that a person's character i s shaped by influences beyond hislher control, pet we
hold t h a (legally) responsible for their actions. O u r legal notions depend on not resolving this
contradiction of the sort faronsly elaborated by John Hospers. Another exarple fror legal practice i s
the related issue between chance, accident and responsibility. Ye believe that there are accidents
that are uncontrollable, pet we act as though there i s always a responsible agent against which a
(monetary) clail can be made. The practice of rampant lawsuits in oar culture is no more consistent
with oar other beliefs than are Xande witchcraft beliefs with theirs. One could sap of Western justice
what Evans-Pritchard saps of Oande R U ~ E "Westerners (Azande) see the sense of this argruent bat thep
do not accept i t s conclusions, and it would involve the whole notion of jnstice (witchcraft) in
contradiction mere thep to do sou (Evans3ritchard lW:3),
It is interesting to note that this area of conflicting beliefs and practices in both caltores
centres around the issues of personal responsibility and chance. One right be harder pressed to find a
belief syster that consistently reconciles these issues than t o find one that elbraces such ainor
inconsistencies.
system must stand the test of strict consistency in her study of
witchcraft in England.
I: hope that I have persuaded the reader of one thing, namely, the
intellectual consistency of Zande notions- They only appear
inconsistent when ranged Like lifeless museum objects. When w e
see how an LndividuaL uses them w e may say that they are
m y s t i d but w e cannot say that his use of t h e m is illogical or
even that it is uncritical, I had no difficulty using W d e notions
as Aande themselves use them. Once the idiom is Iearnt the rest
is easy, for in Zandeland one mystical idea follows on another as
reasonably as one common-sense idea follows on another in our
own society. (Evans-Pritchard 1937222)
11
This i s another difference between the use of Zande rangu and Western witchcraf t that often
goes unnoticed. The standard empiricist challenge ta witchcraft beliefs is that they rake c l a i ~ s
(against experience) to be able to (psychically) affect the world. The consistencp probler arises when
one encounters an abundance of cases where a ritual is perforred intending to bring about a specific
effect, and that effect does not arise. This problem i s seldor present i n the function of Zande ra~qa.
The intention of consulting oracles is lost often to avoid interference fror other uitchcraft. That
is, ipstical rethods are used to conbat rpstical forces. Hence, there is scldor e q i r i c a i evidence to
the contrary. Also, rost action taken to avoid witchcraft involves refraining fror a certain activity
when it i s predicted that there w i l l be sore disaster. Since a Xande never acts against the verdict of
the poison oracle, the counter condition is never pat to the test. The question, often stated in
conditional f o n , can never be false since prediction of the interference of witchcraft precludes one
from realizing the antecedent condition. Hence, there is seldor erpirical or logical counter-evidence.
12
Tanya Luhraann discusses conterporary witchcraft beliefs in England and suggests that
Uestern practitioners, likevise, hold their beliefs in conjunction with, rather than in opposition to,
aodern scientific beliefs about reality (lahnann 1989:57). Kystical beliefs are not intended to stand
up to the test of a scientific style of hnothesis testing or verification theory and the application
of sach criteria rust necessarily distort those beliefs. Sirilarly, in the case of fande raagu, sach
beliefs perfom different functions i n a different idior of thought and, as sach, are not arenable to
the kinds of testing procedures ckaracteristic of Yestern science.
Rather than arguing tor ragic as a persuasive account of physical reality, magicians tend to
explain uhy the nonal criteria of truth-testing do not apply t o ragic. Then, they justify
Hence w e see that witchcraft has its own logic, its own rules of
thought, and that these do not exclude natural causation. Belief in
witchcraft is quite consistent w i t h human responsibility and a
rational appreciation of nature. To u s supernaturaL means very
much the same as abnormal or extraordinary. Azande certainly
have no such notions of reality. They have no conceptions of
"naturalw as we understand it, and therefore neither of the
"supernaturalw w e understand it. (Evans-Pritchard 1937=30)
Mary Douglas points out that witchcraft, for the Azande, provides
extended explanations that fulfill functions s b p l y not found in Western
thought. 'It attempts to provide answers for queSfi*ons that Westerners
simply do not ask. She characterizes a specific type of inquiry as
involving "the ego-focused question of w h y any particular mishap
should fall upon m e particuhrlyW(Douglas 1980:51). The Azande require
an explanation beyond that of chance or arbitrary circumstance to
explain why a particular mishap should happen a t a particular place and
time and why certain individuals should b e involved, When this sort of
question is asked in Western culture, it usually has no answer. When it
does, it too is mystical or religious.
Given this extended explanatory function, there is also a sense in
which Zande ideas about maagu perform a function similar to (but richer
than) our notions of misfortune or bad luck. The Azande appeal to
witchcraft in order to both explain misfortune as well as provide a
socially proscribed way of responding to it. They are, again, capable of
explaining the occurrence of an unfortunate event by appeal to the
natural conditions that made that event possible but they also seek to
explain further wnditions that w e would be inclined to attribute to
chance (a concept that doesn't explain much), Evans-Pritchard suggests,
their involverent on the grounds of its spiritualitp, its freedom, i t s aesthetic beauty and so
forth. (Luhrrann 1989:283)
Guhraann suggests that ranp Western practitioners entertain such beliefs not because they
disagree with scientific beliefs, but because they find them incomplete. The Azande share this
sentirent.
What they explained b y witchcraft w e r e the particular conditions
in a chain of causation which related an individual to natural
happenings in such a w a y that he sustained injury* (Evans-
Pritchard 1937:Zl)
13
The Zande verb that Evans-Pritchard translates as Yo bewitchn is no, also reaning a to
shootE (Evans-Pritchard 1937:13). "Arande always say of ritchcraft that it is the cubaga or &ond
spearVEvans-Pritchard 1937:25).Thus, the Amde distinguish between the 'first spears (what we
would call the natural causes) and the "second spear8 [~ritchcraft).Together, these act to bring about
a certain, fully explainable, state of affairs.
and not necessarily apart from, the use of natwabtfc methods of
healing. Success in any endeavor will be attributed to buth, This
important similarity between Zande witchcraft and Western religion adds
mother dimension to the meaning of the concept boro man43~z.~~ There
are those, in every culture, who desire answers to questions that do not
admit of empirical investigation- One is often led to believe in
supernatural powers where there is no possibilim of a naturalistic
explanation, There is good reason to believe that the Azande appeal to
magical nations due to a deeper need to fully explain events than is
permitted b y nalamktic concepts. Westerners still appeal to God or
"fatewfor explanations that are no less metaphysical and n o more
logically consistent or empirically verifiable than Zande witchcraft
beliefs.
Hence, Zande notions of witchcraft do not preclude any
understanding of natural causation, but rather supplement explanations
that appeal to natural causes. Since the Azande do not distinguish two
kinds of causation, h o w e v e r , they do not see their explanations as
appealing in part to natural and in part to supernatural causes. They
see a l l of these things together acting as the complete explanation. The
mystical component is not a mere addition to untversal, rational beliefs
about natural causation, Evans-Pritchard notes that the Azande find it
unusual that w e do not appeal to witchcraft in our explanations. It
appears to t h e m as if w e are not capable of explaMng events as fdly
as they do.''
14
In addition to further f i l l i n g out oar understanding of the concept, this farther dirension
cornprorises the accuracy of t h e translation: bozo ranqu = 'witch.' Supernatural explanations that
appeal t o god are widespread and generally acceptable to Uesterners, d i k e supernatural explanations
t h a t appeal to witchcraft. Phis translational difficulty rill be further investigated a t the end of
this chapter.
15
There is a sense i n which t h i s reshing of n a t ~ r a land r o r a l reasoning draws attention t o a
gap o r possible inconsistency i n Western thought. There is a long history of (Iargelp unsuccessful)
atterpts t o reconcile naturaI with roral phifosophp i n the Vest--a gap t h a t is rather gracefullr
bridged i n Zande thought.
The Veracity of m d e BeUefs
16
In addition to corrents quoted above, Evans-Pritchard rakes rany similar couents that
either flatly s t a t e o r clearIp irplp that the Arande are plain urong about r e a l i t p t h a t their
beliefs, while consistent, do not correspond t o anything:
.... since witchcraft has no real existence.. . (1937:43),
I, too, used t o react to misfortune i n the idiom of witchcraft, and it was often an effort to
check this lapse into unreason (1937:45),
(as opposed t o bzande) Ye rake every effort to rid ourselves of, o r elude, a risfortune by our
knowledge of the objective conditions which cause it (1937:65).
Ye ray ask why comon sense does not triarph over s~perstition(1937:108).
Witchcraft is not real, but an iraginary process (1929b:214).
Host notable, i n Evans-Pritchard's trenty-two reasons rhp "brande do not perceive the futility of
their #agic"l937:201-204}, i s 117: hande do not possess srrfficient knowledge to understand the real
causes of things.
Evans-Pritchard relates only one story i n which it appears that he witnesses an event that can
only be explained by Zande beliefs. Yitchcraft, according t o the Zande, usually travels a t night
emitting a bright light. Evans-Pritchard begins the story of having seen such a light, 'I have only
once seen witchcraft on its path. ...'
He f a i l s t o discover any natural source of this light and
learns, the next day, that the inhabitant of a nearby hut, where the Iight had gone to, had died.
Yhile acknowledging the accord between the events and Zande beliefs, Evans-Pritchard prefers to hold
that this event was never really explained. (Evans-Pritchard 1937:ll)
inasmuch as one finds the same implicit distinction in Evans-Pritchard's
work that was made explicitly by Hollis-
Evans-Pritchard is aware that his own belief system does not mesh
w e l l w i t h that of the Zande. He seems to hold, however, that he is not
trapped in his own language and belief system in the way that the
Azande are. That is, he is capable, because d the mncepts he
possesses, of jumping back and forth between belief systems, whereas
they are not, He is capable of judging content against reality, whereas
they are not. They are hopelessly trapped in their web of (largely false)
beliefs.
17
Polanpi identifies thzee aspects of a spster that fortifp it against competing system.
These are, circularity, epicpclical structure, and suppressed nucleation. After showing how Evans-
Pritchard appeals to these aspects of any thought spster to explain how Xande thoaght can resist
change i n light of evidence, Polanpi shows how these same aspects operate within Yestern cheristry (as
an erarple) t o shor that:
The stability of the naturalistic spster rhich ue canentlp accept instead tests on the sue
. ..
logical structure.. (and). how, within scieace itself, the stabilitp of theories against
experience is raintained by epicyclical reserves rhich suppress alternative conceptions in the
gem. (Polanyi 1958:45?)
This analysis is another my of stating that uhat counts as a 'good reasonyor holding or
changing a belief or set of beliefs i s not an objective ratter bat rather depends on methods
sanctioned by that spster as well as context dependent criteria of uhat counts as evidence. Western
belief spstas are no less self-presening and self-verifying than Zande beliefs.
fundamental difference between scientific and traditional thought cannot
be maintained: Polanyi's analysis shows that every belief s y s t e m acts nut
only to support tbe beliefs contained ia it, but also to falsify those
external to it- This fortifying aspect of any belief system is embedded in
the concepts used to assess beliefs both foreign and domestic, The use
of categories like "mystical notion" and "scientific notionware deeply
theoretical products of our belief system- They stabilize beIiefs by
providing criteria by which to judge foreign beliefs false.
While Evans-Pritchard is f a r more charitable to Zande beliefs than
most of the philosophers who comment on his work, he nonetheiess,
embraces a "superiority thesis." This ethnocentric position is, at least in
part, a result of the assumption that the Literal translation of the beliefs
of the Other has been accomplished and that once translated, these
beliefs can be assessed using theory-laden Western concepts. H e does
not find it necessary to address the problem of the translation of
central concepts because of the belief that (from the quate a t the
heading of this chapter) "the facts w i U be the same without their
labels" (Evans-Pritchard 1937:229), His account clearly displays the
problem of translation by drawing attention, ethnographically, to the
many profound ways in which Zande mangu differs from Western
witchcraft, yet his assessment of the beliefs held by the Azande is
founded on a cross-linguistic appIication of concepts that must take
translation to be wproblematic.
Evans-Pritchard's failure to reflect on the Limitations of his own
language and belief system is tempered by periodic observations. Even
while implicitly holding that the categories of his own thought transcend
the CU1tural/Linguistic context, he often acknowledges that the problem
of understanding the Other is bi-directional and complicated by
translation.
The Definition of W i t c h c r a f t
Hildred Geertz also points out the ways in which Western witchcraft
is defined in opposition to normal thought in the West, She traces the
history of the use of the label in the West and shows how it is defined
negatively against religion and rationality- T h e context in which
witchcraft beliefs developed in the West was f i r s t in opposition to
Christian and then scientific beliefs. Witchcraft derives semantic
associations because of its oppositional role as wnot-religiousn or "not-
reasonablew or "not-practicaln (H. Geertz 1975:75), This negative,
oppositional semantic element is entirely lacking in the meaning of
mangu. Geertz suggests that these substantial differences in contextual
frameworks (and their internal, oppositional dichotomies) render concepts
Like mangu, soroka, and ngua (witchcraft, oracles, and magic)
untranslatable,
18
see Ballea and Sodipo, RPorledge, Belief a d Yitchixaft (1986: Ifl2-lE). The Yoraba, like
the Zande, h e n referring to soreone as a ritch, are speaking more of a person's behavior than a s t a t e
of being (Hallen & Sodipo 1986:112). They sap of a person not that hefshe is aje (ritch) bat that
helshe has ije. Again, the idea that being a witch is a physical state is largely a by-product of the
Western frareuork and the role it plays in that context. 1 discuss this difference i n greater detail
i n chapter seven. The s i a i l a r i t p betueen Yotuba and Zande thought on witchcraft is clear based on ran1
of the observations Evans-Pritchard rakes concerning t h i s sare discrepancy.
The Failure of Literal Translation
If you press a Zande to explain how the poison oracle can see
far-off things he w i l l say that its mbisimo, its soul, sees them. It
might b e urged that if the poison oracle has a soul it must be
animate. Here we are up against the difficulty that always arises
when a native word is translated by an English word, I have
translated the 7;mde word rnbikho as wsoulwbecause the notion
this word expresses in our own culture is nearer to the m d e
notion of mbisimo of persons than any other English word- The
wncepts are not identical, and when in each language the word is
used in a number of extended senses it is no longer possible to
use the original expressions in translation without risk of
confusion and gross distortion, In saying that the poison oracle
has a mbisimo Zande mean little more than "it does somethingwor,
as w e would say, "it is dynamic." (Evans-Pritchard 1937:151)
In some contexts, mbisimo is used in a simfiar fashion as the
mncept "SOUL" o r "spiritwis used in English. It differs drastically,
however. in most other contexts. Traits, including gender and witchcraft
substance* are passed on to descendants through m b & h a Not only
people have mb&ima witchcraft, the poison oracle, and certain medicines
are said to possess rnbibiina Given these substantial differences, it
makes no sense to say that the Zande believe that wsoulwhas such
attributes or functions; rather, it seems appropriate to insist that
mbisimo is untranslatable. M b M m o is not undescribable, but no single
w o r d or short gloss provides an adequate translation.19 The
identification of a possible inconsistency concerning the statement. "if
the poison oracle has a soul than it must be animateVw is clearly a
product not of faulty logic but of faulty trmshtion.
In "The Morphology and Function of Magic," Evans-Pritchard
considers both primary and samndary meanings of the word "magic."
The material dement of Zande magic consists of assorted woods and
roots. T h e Zande word ngua, which Evans-Pritchard translates as
"magicn generally means "wood.n It is oaly in certain contexts that it
means anything like magic, It can also mean wmedicine.wAs such, it is
clear that w e have no parallel concept, and any English word used as a
translation will be a substantial distortion. The "poison oraclen is
another problematic case as the Azande do not consider benge a poison.
A chemical analysis done by Evans-Pritchard Likens benge to strychnine
yet the Azande refuse to entertain questions concerning what would
happen if a great amount were given to one fowl or if a person were to
ingest benge- For the Azande, benge's natural properties have nothing
to do with its effect during consultation of the oracle.
19
Consider one of the staterents Evans-Pritchard ascribes to the Azande that acts as an
inconsistent p r a i s e in the set of beliefs that philosophers are fond of using as an exarple: W e
Bxande believe that witchcraft is inherited." Problem with the translation of witchcraft have already
been discussed pet l i t t l e attention has been paid to the concept of "inberitance.Yhe Azande do not
subscribe to anything like genetic theory; nangu is passed fron parent to child through &is&. As
such, the lzande do not, in fact, believe that "itchcraft' is 'inherited.' They nap believe that
r u p is passad through disi.0, bat this is a significantly different belief.
Evans-Pritchard seems to hold, however, that it is enough to note
these and countIess other conceptual ~ r t i o n s in, order to bring the
tmnshtion back into line- In some sense it does, as long as one
maintains that the unit of translation is the entire ethnography. Long
and detailed descriptions replam simple sentences in representing what
the Zande believe. As long as the reader can maintain focus on a l l of
these conceptual re-definitions and contextualizations, the foreign
concepts will be better understood,
Lack of concern with the effective unit of translation, however,
creates substantid confusion concerning just what is translated, This
confusion is an important unacknowledged motivating factor in the
rationality debates, It is a little surprising but not difficult to see why
both Hollis and Winch (despite t h e dramatic differences) can claim close
affiliation with Evans-Pritchard's method. There is a tension in his work
inasmuch as he w a n t s to both assess foreign statements literally and
relate them (ethnographically) to their broader context, Hollis affiliates
himself with the former project, Winch with the latter. What Evans-
Pritchard fails to realize is that these complex conceptual relations to
the broader context constitute an element of the meaning of any term,
and hence problematize the very idea of literal translation,
Godfrey Lienhardt's analysis of Zande thought identifies the
oversight in Evans-Pritchard's work that creates this unreconcilable
tension. Lienhardt, like many of the others mentioned, engages in a
detailed investigation into the differing background assumptions upon
which Zande thought is founded. Awareness of features of the broader
context makes the statements in question appear rational (or consistent).
Yet, this is not, according to Lienhardt, the end of the interpretive
story (as it m a y be for Evans-Pritchard), If key concepts cross cultural
boundaries only by undergoing sometimes drastic semantic distortion,
then the problem of seeing sense in the practices of the Other is not
addressed by focusing on the issue of rationality; rather, it requires
attention to the issue of translation, It is in the passages where Evans-
Pritchard struggles with the difficulty of translation that he sheds the
m o s t light on the concept in Further. according to
Lienhardt. the activity of cross-&turd translation involves not only a
distortion of the concepts of the Other (as I have already discussed)
20
Sore conterporaq ethnographers construct entire accounts focused heavily on the difficulty
of translating central concepts, Patrick Mcllaughton's Zhe Mande Blacksnitbs: I(bouIedge, Purer, and Art
ia Nest dfrica, i s an etarple of the war in uhich one could treat beliefs in magic and witchcraft
without rarginaliaing those beliefs through attempted literal translation and simltaneoaslp
challenges the beliefs of both crrlt~resengaged in an ethnographic encounter. the Mande bear a
striking reserblance to the hande and, hence, the representational and traaslationdL probiers
confronted by Kc10aughton are shilar to those confronted bp Ems-Pritchard. McHaughton's stratepp
differs significantly in that he does not attenpt to reduce the reaning of key concepts t o the role
they play in the social situation, nor does he allow Western concepts to significantly shape the
interpretation of tbe practices of the Kande blacksriths. M~aughtonbegins with a caution about
trying to iaterpret the beliefs of the Other according to our frarerork for understanding:
Aabiguitp and aabivalence becore even more prorinent when the Mande confront sorcerp, Here we
enter a reah that is difficult to explore, because lestern civiliaation is poorly equipped to
consider the components of Hande sorcery on the b d e t s om tens. Host of our teninology
fails to reflect Mande thinking, and so misapprehensions are perpetuated ahost bp default.. . .
Words such as v i t a witch doctor, or sorcererare not aligned uith the area re Westerners now
take rost seriouslp, science and the Judeo-Christian religion. So, using then to identify
Kande practitioners does not encourage as to reflect upon the atmosphere in which they
actually practice. Ve should keep these liritations in rind. (MclOaughton 1988:llj
Hcbiaughton differs fror Evans-Pritchard, following Lienhardtts caution, precisely in that he is
willing to "quarrel about words,"e attempts to represent sore of the practices of the Made not by
translating thm or by fitting ther into a definable social structure, but by investigating the
relationships betueen different roles aad aspects of Hande life and intent ionally ref raining fro1
structuring those beliefs into translated propositions about reality. He combines sociological,
historical, linguistic, and functional analysis and even negotiates these with interpretations
provided by others.
Key to understanding sorcery among the Mande i s understanding the rord nyiuakaIa. Wle a great
deal of the book i s concerned to elucidate this concept, transIating it ethnographically, it cannot be
translated sirplp or literally. Xyara, according to the Mande, is a basic energy that peneates the
universe. The blacksriths ranipulate agars in order to shape retal. But ngara permeates even the
supernatural world and the ability to raaipulate it in one world carries over t o the other. The
etprologp of the word reveals clues to i t s meaning:
Control is the idea behind another etymology for nydlabala. Kala i s the rord for handle, s ~ c h
as the handle of a hoe or knife. The nJmakaIa clans are handles of power, points of access to
the energy that anirates the universe. (MclTaughton 1988:18-19)
mat is striking about HcIfaughtoncsrepresentation of the Mande is that it appeals to rany
different rethodologies for understanding and refuses to draw conclusions based on any one of thm. Be
leaves raw kep words untranslated, since sole of the differences in approach to reaning reveal
contrary reanings. In other rords, the added evidence, the broader investigation into reaning, tends
to intensify the conp1ications of LransI~tionand representation rather than work touard settling
corpler questions.
but necessarily a distortion of the concepts appealed to in both
languages. Lienhardt states:
21
In appendix I: of Hitchcraft, Oracles and Magic, Evans-Pritchard states that he does not
want to "define uitchcraft, oracles, and ~ a g i cas ideal types of thought but desire[s] to describe
what Aaande understand bp rddgrr, soroka, and a# (Evans-Pritchard 193'1: 226). this conscious
Pritchard, and nearly all who make use of his work, often extract
isolated statements from the context he provides as if they are
unprobfematic Literal translations, and then judge them by Western
standards of verification,
W h i l e Evans-Pritchard reveals the internal consistency inherent in
the belief system of the Other through a detailed sodoIogical account,
he is only able to conclude that those beliefs are false by failing to
acknowledge the context dependency of the Western concepts he uses to
judge those beliefs* Only the Other is wntextualized.
When Evans-Pritchard characterizes the position of the
anthropologist who communicates between cultures or Languages, he
endorses "going nativen to some extent, but then realizes that this idea
is naive. If one remains too immersed in one's own framework the
danger is that it will be impossible to understand the Other.
L
There is a long and less than resolved controversy over to what extent Winch should be considered a
'relativist.' His rejection of the theoretical structure appropriate to the natural sciences is often interpreted as an
eaiorsemt of cultural relativis. Tbe difficulty in situating his position in this debate, bauever, is probably
largely due to his lack of concern on the ratter. His concerns are, as 1uill try to sbm, prior to the realisll
relativim issue. Ee does, houever, distance himself Inn the extreae relativist reading, stating:
We sbdd not lose sight of the fact that the idea that m ' s ideas and beliefs mst be checkable by reference
to s a e t h g M e t - s o l e realitpis an irportlnt one. To abandon i t is to plauge straight into an
extrew Protagorean relativism. (Vinch 1964:81)
Bence, W e lauguge and 'the wrld' are too inthtely intertvined to penit a discussion of an independent
reality, this does not preclude holding that language bears sae relation to the nrrld.
propositions about reality, ready to b e logically arranged and empirically
tested. Instead, he takes a more interpretive approach to meaning
systems through careful attention to the uses and functions of natural
language*
By appealing to Wittgenstein's analysis of language, Winch opposes
the Literalist/realist conception of language which underlies the
approaches taken b y Hollis and Lukes. Fundamental to this framework
for thinking about language is a theoretical separation between language
and the world, between the world as it is, and the Ianguage w e use
(hopefully accurateiy) to represent that world- This distinction is
foundational to w h a t W i n c h rrills the "underlabourer conceptionu of
philosophy, a view that takes "realitynto b e something entirely
independent of language, and language (and each concept within a
l a n g u a g e ) to be a tool for accurately conveying representations of that
reality- The language used in such representations m u s t be
determinatdy and llnambiguously related to the world (even if only
through verification procedures), The goal of philosophy, according to
this view, is to clear language of the many ambiguities that lead to
misunderstandings, rendering meaning perfectly transparentO2 Winch
2
Uit tgenstein' s critique of philosophy is largely directed at this Werlabourer' camption. Vittgenstein
criticizes any semantic thecry that bases meaning strictly on the idation between the ward and the world (as do
correspondence or reference theories of waning)- In other vords, he endeavors to discredit the idea that a word clearly
signifies saething in the vorld or that the reaning of a wrd can be determined by articulating such a relation.
Vittgenstein eaphasizes aspects of #aninb vhich depead on Iarylye use, cantext, and cowention and, in doing so,
raises the issue of meaning indeteniaacy and thereby effectively probImtizes the idea of 'reference"by draring
attention to the non-haogeneity of aatnral language.
buy of his examples center around the problem of translatian as a mans to specdating an seaantic theory. M i l e
uot explicitly characterized as faPsIafiao, the examples are reant to reveal. hw ue light roe to anderstand the
'reaninghof a tern by witnessing its lanp applications. The "Fmderlabourer cmceptim' takes the role of philosophy as
the project vhich tries to rid language of its natnnl inexactness by postnlatiag a hmogeaeity and clarity &ch it
does not have. This is exactly vhat the critics discnssed in chapter one irpIicitlg do. Rather than deriving theory Ira
experience, such critics impose theory on practice to fit the requireeats of popalar theoretical structare.
Wat confuses us is the uniform appearance of wrds when ue hear them spoken or meet Lhea in script or print.
For their appficatim is not presented to us so dearly. Especially when ue are doing philosophy. (PI1
Vittgenstein 1958:6)
We predicate of the thing what lies in the method of representing it, hptessed by the possibility of a
caparison, ue think we are perceiving a state of affairs of the highest generality. (PI04 Vittgenstein
1958:46)
points out, however, that such a mnception of the role of phiIosophy
begs the very question a t issue:
Wittgenstein's analysis of the dependence of aeaning on 'lagwge-games' and the context dependency of what it
reans to "go on in the sare way,' rdativizes leaning to a language or context and significantly problesatizes
translation (at least on the traditional rodel).
Yhen Ime-games change, then there is a change in the concepts, and nth the concepts the reanin@ of
words change. (P65 Uittgenstein 1969:lO)
W e it is not ay parpose to explicitly defend a Yittgensteinian theory of language, by drawing attention to this
approach, I hope to show not necessarily that it is justified in itself, ht rather that it is lore consonant vith
anthropological practice and translation.
investigate how the answer to this question affects translation theory. It
is worth focusing on this debate because M a c I n t y r e and Winch, unIike
the others engaged in the rationality debates, make this problem central
to the goal of understanding the Other, The outcome of their dialogue
provides a substantial foundation for further discussion of the
philosophy of translation.
3
A substantial section of the h k considers the possibility of constming social science theory along the
sare lines as that in the natural sciences (Winch 1958:66-94). While Winch suggests that scientists operate according to
socially accepted d e s (like everyone else), their society is represented as being basically hmrgmw. In other
words, all scientists operate by appeal to the saw set of dearly iaterpreted d e s . Represented in this way, any
natural science rethod viLl be i n m t i b l e vith the social sciences since the goal of the latter necessarily involves
the investigatim of the [different) rules of the H e r (Winch 195&8?,94). Winch states,
'Chis non-philosophical well-consciousness is for the most part right and proper in the investigation of
nature. .. bnt i t is disastrous in the investigation of hmn society, whose very nature is to consist in
different and capeting ngs of life, each offering a diffemt account of the intelligibility of things.
(Winch 1958: 103)
It is arguable that his hguistic analysis strongly suggests a 'sociology of science' interpretation of the
natnral sciences, hmer, Uineh is not concerned to press this issue. Such a direction is pursued homer in the vorks
of critics like Feyerabd and gnhn, within philosophy of science, and, as vell, Bums and Blaor fnr the "sociology of
Wedge' (as discussed briefly in chapter one). &uQess of one's position on the appropriateness of these
extensions of Winch's approach to natmal science, such positions are not pursued by Winch himelf. His speculation on
the cultnre/langmge dependency of Liayistic reanings in interpretive social science is persuasive in itself.
interpretation is, similarly, that the meanings of certain types of
statements are not effected by language or context- B y appeal to the
Wittgensteinian theory of meaning, Winch attacks precisely this
presupposition (Winch 1958:83-4). Following a detailed consideration of
the effects of crossing contexts on linguistic meanings, Winch chaknges
the type of wlogico-experirnentdnapproach to social science (as modelled
after natural science) endorsed by Vilfredo Pareto=
Criteria of logic are not a direct gift of God, but arise out of, and
are only intelligible in the context of, ways of Living or modes of
social We. It follows that one cannot apply criteria of logic to
modes of social life as such, (Winch 1958:lOO)
It seems to m e that one could only hold the belief of the Azande
rationally in the absenm of any practice of science and
technology in which criteria of effectiveness, ineffectiveness and
kindred notions had been built up. But to say this is to recognize
the appropriateness of scientific criteria of judgement from our
.
standpoint.. . This suggests strongly that beliefs and concepts are
not merely to be evaluated b y the criteria implicit in the practice
of those who hold and use them. ( M a c z h t y r e 1964:67)
4
The difference betueen the three possible positions that llacfntyre identifies is that they endorse different
stands an the prefllrably distinct issues of truth and ratianality. Winch sees the particular Zandt beliefs in question
as rational and not false (basically denying the distinction); Ems-Pritchard sees thm as rational but false;
&cIntyre rants to maintain a sense in vhich they are bath irratianal and fdse. Ybat HacIntyre is disagreeing with
(contra Yinch) is that agreamt in rnle foUwing or mcept application is always sufficient for clahhg that
smetbg 'mkes sense."
proper frame for interpreting the former. In the historical wnflict of
ideas, scientific notions have been vindicated over Christian ideas.
This ability to interpret from the standpoint of an historically
vindicated frame of referen- Ieads M a c I n t y r e to hold that "sometimes to
These are tvo of the four possible positions he considers in anthnpalo#y. k dimisses (I), the Lby-
BrahlICarnap position which claim that religions utterances do not refer to anything and that natives have a pre-
logical mtality. This is similar to BoLLis' analysis in believing that, if they do not apply d e s of logic as we do,
then they do not apply rules at all. (2) The Evans-Pritchardhinch psitian proceeds by ding sense of the beliefs and
practices of the Other as understood fro within that contat. The analysis, as Hi~cIntyrecharacterizes it, is closer to
Winch than Dans-Pritehard because he irplies that such an approach gives no grounds [or rejecting magic; Evans-
Pritchard undoubtedIy finds reasons to reject any truth behind the practice of r y i c . (3) The Leach/Braibaite position
pulls opposite of (21, suggesting that the Other an be made sense of only as expressing sawthing sydmlically,
relating sorething other than a propsitian aboat reality. Snch aa approach interprets clairs as reaning smthing other
Lhan vhat the user explicitly says they rean. Position (4) is his aun.
their beliefs are mistaken (on historica3.Iy justified empiricist grounds)-
In the end, MacIntyre holds that when it comes to (empirically
unverifiable or false) beiiefs such as reIating to the existence of the
Christian God or Zande magic
8
hchtyre's story is based on the assnption tlut Uestern science has, bt fact, transcended belief in the
Christian God. There are, of m s e , thriving reIi#ions even in scientific cultures. It is by no leans clear that a
social context for ascrib& mnhg to the concept ot Cod is altogether lacking.
of justification do not share a history, hence, judgement of Zande
beliefs can be made only by appeal to criteria that are external (bath to
other cultures and their histories), WhiIe MacIntyre, unlike many other
parties to the rationality debates, retains a focus on the problem of
translating concepts across frames of reference, his solution depends on
an a p m to universal criteria of judgement no better substantiated
than the criterfa appealed to b y Hollis.
9
It is attention to this irportant dilfereuce that Ulin suggests generated the r a t i d i t y debates in the
first place. l l ~ eprirary difference between Vineh and Ems-Pritchard, as be sees it, is:
This fmdamtal d i s m t betueen Evans-Pritchard and Winch is over the questioa of ðer or not it is
possible to have a context-indewdent notian of reality from which the rationality of beliefs cau be judged.
(ULin 1984:23)
the "scientificw;Evans-Pritchard reserves the former for beliefs
coherent but false, and the latter for coherent and true beliefs- Both
Evans-Pritchard and Pareto impIicitly appeal to an independent reality
as a referen- for interpreting and judging foreign beliefs,
The coherent/true distinction underlying such analyses of foreign
beliefs seems to parallel what MacIbtyre identifies as the two stages of
interpretation. In the first stage, one explains the coherence of beliefs
by appeal to the meaning they have for the Other; in the second, one
judges them by the Light of Western scienc3et While not explicit about
this division, Evans-Pritchard seems to proceed in a similar m a n n e r - Of
all of those who claim affiliation with Evans-Pritchard's approach, o r are
claimed by others to be affiliated with it, it is probably Macfatyre (who
does not claim this affiliation) whose theoretical position is closest to
Evans-Pritchard's. Winch endorses such a reading of Madntyre's theory
( W i n c h 1964~94-5).
Winch makes a point of denying the justification for what
MacIntyre takes to be the second stage of interpretation. T h e
assumption that underlies Madntyre's distinction is that coherence is an
internal feature of language (having to do w i t h a concepts' relations to
other concepts) but truth is an external feature (having to do w i t h a
concepts' relation t o reality or to an historically sanctioned
representation of reality). Meaning is linked more intimately, according
to Madntyre, to the latter. Once the initial translation is accomplished,
one can judge ( b y the criteria of Western science) which statements
accord with reality and which do not, O n this model of interpretation,
correspondence w i t h reality is quite independent from the coherence of
the language itself. It is not a contextual matter what is to be counted
as real and what is to be counted as unreal. Winch denies just this
distinction, following the Wittgensteinian critique of traditional theories
of meaning.
Reality is not what gives language sense. What is real and what is
unreal shows itself ia the sense that language has. Further, both
the distinction between the r e d and the unreal and the concept of
agreement w i t h reality themselves belong to our language, (Winch
1964:82)
A s Wittgenstein endeavored to show, reflection on language use
suggests that it is a mistake to separate "the worldn from *the language
used to describe it," The problem, as Winch identifies it, is that
language, context, verification, history, and culture are far more
intimately intertwined than MadIntyre and atber theorists engaged in the
rationality and relativism debates have granted, Revealing the co~ection
between what others have identified as different aspects or stages of
interpretation re-establishes the problem of cross-cultural interpretation
as one of translation, How is one to ascribe meaning to a statement made
by the Other when translating that statement into English linguistically
divorces it from the context that gives it sense?
Before considering MacIntyre's critique, Winch first turns to
anthropology, specifically Evans-Pritchard's study of the Azande, to
more carefully assess the assumption that concepts cross languages
unaltered, Winch proceeds to pose two important questions arising from
Wittgenstein's theory of Language that have important implications for
anthropology:
We do not initially have a category that Iooks at all like the Zande
category of magic, Since it is w e who want to understand the
Zande category, it appears that the onus i s on us to extend our
understanding so as to make room for the Zande category, rather
than to insist on seeing it in t e r m s of our own ready-made
distinction between science and non-science, C e r t a M y the sort of
understanding we seek requires that w e see the Zande category in
relation to our own already understood categories, But this
neither means that it is right to 'evaluate' magic in terms of
criteria belonging to those other categories; nor does it give any
clue as to wM& of our existing categories of thought w i l l provide
the best point of reference from which w e can understand the
point of Zande practices, (Winch 1964:lOZ)
10
Winch draus attention to the ~ s which
y in this very characterization ensntes that 2ande beliefs uill not
stand the test of eapirical verifiability.
The chief faction of oracles is to reveal the presence ot 'mystical' forces--1 use Evans-Pritchard's t e n
v i t h t c m t t h g $self t o his denial that such farces realty exist. Nou though there are indeed ways of
detenining h t h e r or not rgsticd forces are operating, these ways do not correspond to vhat ue understand
by 'eapirical' confinatirm or ref'utatian. This indeed is a tautology, since such differences in
'conlimatory' procedures are the min criteria for classifying strething as a qstical force in the first
place. (Winch 1961:88)
11
This is mre specifically the topic in Uittgenstein's posthoorrslg published Ib tkhthty (1968).
explidtly rely on an independent or universal logic, but that they fail
to see the logic contained in the very concepts Evans-Pritchard used to
translate the beliefs d the Azandd2 What appears as a mistake Is
largely a product of translation, More to the point, it is the
anthropologist who is making the inistake by failing to refl- on the
logic contained in the target language.
This suggests strongly that the context from which the suggestion
about the contradiction is made, the context of our scientific
culture. is not on the same level as the context in which the
beliefs about witchcraft operate. Zande notions of witchcraft do
not constitute a theoretical system in terms of wbich m d e try
to gain quasi-scientific understanding of the world. This in its
turn suggests that it is the European, obsessed with pressing
Zande thought where it wouId not naturally go-to a
contradiction--who is guilty of misunderstanding, not the Zande.
The European is in fact committing a category mistake. (Winch
1964:93)
12
Auareness of the logic 'containedw by a concept in Euglish is of Imdaental irportaace to rmderstanding the
effect of translation on our understanding of the beLiefs of the Other. I reserve a wre in-depth analysis of this
ayareness for chapter four and the l m s t i c anthropalogists uho make it a central issue.
13
Yinch basically holds this latter vimr since it is not realiy a question as to uhether the Other m i d be
irrational. He states, 'to say of a society that i t has a laqpge is also to say that it has a concept of rationalityw
(Winch 1964:99). f i l e this clah s o d s exactly like one rrdt by LlLis, 'ntimality' has ceased to wan myth@ #re
than sow kind of intercormectedness of beIiefs. It certainly does not entail c a m rules of logic or reference. The
fact that tw such opposed thinkers could say the sac th& about ratioaality shavs hov little agmamt there is on
just vhat is reant by 'ratiouality.' We bilefis mans that there rmst be a nniversal type or pattern of ronwctedness,
Winch ream dy,
language/meaning, the debate over rationality and relativism reveals the
inappropriateness of applying either concept to a theory of cross-
cultural interpretation. It reduces questions of c r o s s - c u l M
understanding to the issue of whether w e ought to use their criteria of
intelligibility or ours in translation: which frame ought to be taken as
primary, as giving the correct meaning to the beliefs in question? While
Winch endorses a position that seems to make the cultural context of the
Other interpretively p r i m a r y , he is, at the same time beginning to
deconstruct the idea that the interpreter is translating between t w o
static, immovable frames of reference and meaning.
Yhen there is a language it mt mke a differencewhat is said and this is only possible vhere the saying of
...
one thing d e s out, an pain of failure to curmicate, the saying of saethiag else This, however, is so
.
far to say nothing about what in particular caustitutes r a t i d behavior in that society.. In other words,
it is not so mch a ~ t t e ofr invoking 'our nom of ratianalitg' as of inpoking our notion of rationality in
speaking of their behavior in tens ot 'confonity to norm'. (Winch 1964:99-100)
guarantee mis-interpretation, B y holding our own concepts and Iogic
constant, as the m e a s u r e of sense, we can never ame to understand a
different belief system.
W i n c h d r a w s attention to MacIntyre's c o m m e n t s on aborigines who
are said to d a b to carry their souls in sticks. M a c I a t y r e suggests that
"we confront a blank wall here, so far as meaning is concerned,
although it is easy to give the rules for the use of the conceptw
(MacIntyre 1964:68). W e confront a blank wall w i t h meaning only so long
as w e Zimit interpretation to description of the way things are in
English, and expect to find a single mncept in Enj@sh that accurately
translates their usage?I For Winch, the problem of understanding the
Other is not a matter of comparing frames, nor of accurately
representhg other representations of reality. In order to come to
understand another belief system, w e must come to understand another
way of Life, anather way of wneptually confronting the world. In this,
the onus is on us to extend our language to accommodate conceptual
connections that are not already mntahed in our belief system.
Winch sees the study of other cultures as a way of studying the
w a y people make sense of life, not just "the worldw. It is arguable, or
maybe just observable, that this is something that the Western scientific
tradition has had a great deal of difficulty doing. From existential
nihilism to technological alienation, contemporary Western culture has
had Liffle to offer concerning the meaning of Life (this is probably why
religious beliefs in God have nut been transcended b y science). Winch,
for instance, sees Zande magic as, in some ways, like aspects of
Christianity in that it provides recognition and ways of dealing w i t h the
fact that one's life is subject to contingencies and uncertainties (Winch
1964:104-5).
14
lt is arguable that it is, ironically, the interptetive litetalist who is respansibIe for the tenera1 aQpeal
of relativisa. By postulating the necessary exlstenee of cross-cultural criteria of sense wbich, by all erpirical
evidence do not exist, one is left vith the fear that carrmiation or detailed understanding between cultures is
inpossible (the extreme relativist position).
sense of human Life, different ideas about the possible importance
that the carrying out of certain activities m a y take on for a man,
trying to m11ternpIa-kthe sense of his life as a whole- ( W i n c h
1964:106)
15
Winch suggests that the d e s and cd~~ventioas embodied by another Miel system shoald not be judged sirpIy
in tens of 'efficiency of production,"but rdated to 'the significance of ban Life' (Winch 1964:105-110). In the
end, he shifts the eqhasis [which dainates the debates) I r a epistemlogical analysis to ethics. Be says Little aboot
this, but it is an irportant change of emphasis. llte prevalent philosophical emphasis on ratianality is itself a
cultural d u e judgment. It is a byproduct of our (at least aczderic) culture that places the intellectual above the
m t i d . Winch states 'onr blindness to the point of priritive lodes of life is a corollary of the pointlessness of
mch of our oun lifevtYineh 1964506). lhis expresses the sare smtiwnt as that expressed by Eortm den he justifies
his reasons far preferring to live in a 'traditional society.'
Like wst apiricists, hlntyre sees value only in truth aml technological success. Epistmlogy as "efficiencyof
prodnction"or trnth as effective 'control over natureWtes precedent (to the point of exclusion) over ethics, as the
significance of hnan Life. Understmding takes precedent aver beliming (onless one believes what is true). This dght
be seen as part of a larger trend in p h i l o s e that sees epistemlqp and (meta)physics as prior to, or prorid@ a
foundation for, ethics.
question as Madntyre suggests that the same behavior can be
understood as following different rules (whether judged from inside or
outside that context) and that people often do not act according to the
rules they explicitly endorse." MacZntyre does, however, concede a few
previously disputed points to W i n c h - Winch's strategy of interpretation
is not, according to MacZntyre, mistaken, b u t incomplete. It is the
correct starting point for the project. of coming to understand another
belief system but Ieaves out the later stage of inquiry that, on
MacIntyreTstwo stage account makes judgement from the outside
possible. First w e interpret the O t h e r on their terms to understand what
they think they are doing, then w e interpret them on our terms t o
explain what they are really doing.
lb
It has been noted by critics more familiar uith Uittgenstein's philosophy that this is not a fair criticis
of Winch. According to Uittgenstein, it is not necessary that the actor explicitly formlate the d e they are foUwing
nor actwily lollw my rules vhich are explicitly fordated. The activity of defying or ignoring rules is itself rnle
governed. On the other hand, hcIntyre does identify an indeterminacy (tbat Uittgenstein was f d y awe of) in
inkqreting the rules being followed. Behavior can be interpreted as confodng to different d e s depending on the
context or purpose of the interpretation.
translation (isomorphidly transmitted) if w e are to explain or criticize
their beliefs."
Maclhtyre amtinues to elaborate the idea that our own history of
modifying and changing beliefs provides an adequate foundation for
judging the beliefs of others. Now restricting his analysis to one
Ianguage and one history, he considers that, at one time, within our o w n
tradition, it might not have made sense to ask whether or not there are
witches (there just were). B u t somehow w e came to see the sense of
raising that question, w e were then able to criticize that judgement and
now firmly beIieve that witches do not e&t. This history provides
evidence that w e appealed to independent or non-contextual criteria.''
17
Both of these positions are seen clearly elaborated a h s t consecutively (I[zcIntyre 1967:12'1). We
QcIntyre acknwIedges the intimy of the relation between language and social Life, he nonetheless laintains that, in
order to explain the behavior of the Other, ue must as= that ue man the sa# Wag as they do concerning the
concepts under discnssion.
18
This is a reiteration of a point lade in "UnderstandingBeligione (&chtyre1964:67) conceruing the
realization that criteria have a history. Rather than relativizing judgement, KacIntyre takes this to indicate that sue
modes of thought (and beliefs) have p m thersehes are effective thaa others.
not unreasonabIe for us to interpret their beliefs from our later vantage
point in this historid progression.19
Whereas the first judgement, mncerning seventeenth century
Scottish witches. depends only on cross-contextual intra-linguistic
comparison, the second case of cross-cultural inter-linguistic comparison,
concerning Zande boro maogu, depends on assumptions about the
possibility of literal translation. MacInQwe is fully aware of this
difficulty,
19
Haclntyre's history is not only lirited to the history of tbe Vest, but, in rang ways, liiited to the
history of science. It is certainly not the case that, in wdern Yestern society, the concept of God has been
transcended by science. A significant percentage of the @ation still believes i n God. Likewise, although to a Car
lesser degree, uitchcraft beliefs persist in the Vest. Although significantly transforaed f r a beliefs said to be held
by seventeenth century uitcbes (if angone a c t d y ever held such beliefs), ritchcraft not only swim in Yestern
culture, bnt has had sorething cf a recent resurgence in popularity (see esp. Lnhn;um 1989).
original question was: "is there any sense in which it could be said that
w e mean the same thing amcerning cross-cultural or cross-linguistic
translations of difficult concepts?w The answer MacIntyre proposes is
that w e can only make judgements across contexts if the meanings of
those concepts do, in fact, translate isomorphicaLly. The desire to make
such judgements does not, however, justify the antecedent condition.
The argument is circular; it assumes, as its maor premise, what
translation accomplishes. The original problem has not been solved,
MacIntyre suggests that if we accept W i n c h ' s thesis,
20
He originally characterizes this situation as existing only tor mple vho live in "highly specific tgpes of
social and adturd situations.... They are the social and institutional cireostances of those uha inhabit a certain
type of frontier or boandary situatioa@(hclntyre 1985:184). These are people in a situation here, for
politicaE/historical reasons, they are forced to speak different languages in different social interactions each of
which presuppose differeat cosdogies (or histories). The exarpks he uses imlve societies occupied by outside forces
attempting to Nose their culture.
21
Ilachtyre, in fact, saests tJut i t is not the case that the of a proper me is ever exhausted by
its relation to a referent. Proper names foUw the pattern revealed in this example:
Ct names ia Be firsf iastam only for those uha are rerbers of sae particular linguistic and cultural
c m m i t y by identifying places and persons i n tens of the scheae of identification shared by, and perhaps
partially constitutive of, that ummity. The relation of a proper are to its beater carmot be elucidated
vitbout reference to such identifying fmctians. And second that 'Doire Colrcille' na#s--dodies a cnrmal
intention of m i g - a place with a contimums identity ever since it becar in fact St. Calmba's oak grove
in 546 and that 'Londonderrg' nimes a settlerent ude only in the seventeenth century and is a nare dose use
presupposes the legitimcy of that settlement and of the use of the hglish langnage to noe it. (Haclntyre
198%185)
It is not that the beliefs of each such community cannot be
represented in any way at all in the Ianguage of the other: it is
rather that the outcome in each case of rendering those beliefs
sufficiently intelligible to be evaluated by a member of the other
community involves characterizing those beliefs in such a way that
they are bound to be *ected- (MacInQme 1985:186)
The fact that certain other parts of the two languages may
translate quite easily into each other provides no reason at aIl for
skepticism about partial untranslatibility, The sentences-in-use
which are the untranslatable parts of this type of language-in-use
are not in fact capable of being logically derived from,
constructed out of, reduced to, or otherwise rendered into the
sentences-in-use w h i c h comprise the translatable part of the same
language-in-use, (Machtyre 1985:188)
--
The exaple kIntyre cites of the sirple sentence 'saw is uhite' alludes to Donald Ikvidson's translation
theory in which this sentem appears as his lost c o l o n and pivotal example. While Davidson's theory w i l l be the
subject of chapter five, it is uo g kIntyre is, here, identifying me of the irportant shortanings of
d ~ t h that
such a theory. The existence of a set of easily translated propositions does not insure that a& a set will provide a
foundation for forther uaderstandhg betueen caltares. The qwstian wrth re-coasideriog in chapter five, to be d m
f r a hclntyre's obsemtions, is 'to vhat extent does &cIntyrels bormdar~rsibation problmtize cross-dtnral
translation, and hov does this effect Davidson's theory?'
120
but finds none etfecti~e?~ The transition from his previous reliance on
a tempered superiority thesis to this lfmited concession to relativism is
the outcome of MacIntyre's new philosophy of language. H e clear& treats
at least some instances of meaning transfer so as to take account of
other cultural contexts and histories. He formulates a strikingly
Wittgensteinian critique of the view of language which takes meaning to
b e a function of reference and sentences to be hypotheses about the
world, H e considers a stranger or tourist who could find the town Doire
Colmcillefiondonderry (given directions) regardless of which name is
used to label it. In this way he addresses the argument that meaning
(as identification) might be extracted from the context of history by
appeal to its referential function.
23
The prirary possibfe solaeioa that he offers is that of learning a third language in order to d a t e
betwxn the two in conflict. For reasons all adequately addressed by HacIntyre, this uill not do, and relativisa remains
the predicarent of the dti-lingual in such a situation. The third language would have to be such that it bad no
allegiance to either of the languages it was b e h g used to &ate be€veen, and it rnst be able to accurately represent
the beliefs of both. The reasons k gives for the impossibility of us@ such a language is that lost languages viU not
satisfy the first criteria. Those that do, got that uay by enbracing a certain heterogeneity that lakes thea mducive
to justifying the relativist position. In other words, the potential solution, by ~ t n r e ,ironically, &races the
problem. A third langnage could only cae to satisfy these criteria by having a certain sort of history.
k i t the history that calrinates in this kiad of educational gallimaufry produced along the uay mas a large
and general avareness ot the wide range of varying and conflict@ tgpes of justificatory ar-t used to
support various types of contending belief, and also of the vide range of varying and contlictiq theoretical
accounts of rational jnstification available to support their use. (hchtyre 1985:196)
The probla is that the old language offers too feu, the nev languge too rang, interpretive possibilities, and
either uay one is faced with the probler of relativism.
It is arguable that d e r n Wlish (his del heterogeneous language) still vould not satisfy the second condition
above. We a heterogeneous language offers more possibilities for representing the beliefs of the Other, i t does not
ensure that any one of those rill be without distortiw or judgement. It is aunecessary to press this point here (in
relation to !facIntyreis atgmnt) since he concedes the inability of d i a t i o n through a third langmge tor the above
reasons.
MadIntyre has identified an all-to-common mistake in translation
theory. This language, as used by a tourist (or philosophers of logic),
often serves as the foundation for claims about cross-cultural
understanding at all levels of inquiry-Such an approach equates the
ability to find a public restroom with understanding the m e a n i n g s of
deeply religious or spiritual beliefs. This extension from the simple to
the complex is only possible if you ignore the linguistic differences
between cultures and the differences between sentences like "snow is
whiten and "Londonderry is a town in Ireland."
A more careful mnsideration of meaning holism and natural
language use reveals a closer link between a belief system and the
Ianguage in which it is expressed, The possibility of perfect synonymy
between concepts cross-culturally is further compromised by adding the
textual history (whether oral o r written) of a culture to the historical
aspects of meaning or justification- MaCIntyre suggests that the
meanings of concepts in a language depend not o d y on a stock of
factual stories (of history) but also myths, fictions, literary conventions
and styles, all of which influence and constrain meaning, So too, the
different textual histories of cultures problematize the idea of
translation.
24
An interesting ~ t i to mp m e in relation to Haclntyre's chancterizatioa of different m e s is "Ew
did modem 01glish get to be such a heterogeneous lmguage?' A large part of the answer to this question would have to
address colonialisa, anthropolagy, d t d mix@ aPd cross-cult& caaniation. Canteaprarg Ehglish is a
conglcaeration of tern barroved f r a other languages, and mterporary EQlish speaking cultures are the byproducts of
countless confrontations with, and incorporations of, other societies. Discassions of witchcraft now often make use of
concepts borroved f r a Eastern religions, a caparison that wuld not have been possible had hglish not already
expanded in a confrontation with and attmt to understand vhrt is antraushtable in those belief systas.
mdtitude of language games that can serve as contexts for
understanding the Other.
When they say such and such (about the causes of pregnancy)
they mean w h a t a person innoce~tof understanding (like a child)
would mean if h e said that the causes of pregnancy were dreams,
catching frogs, e t c (Turner 1980=53)
When they say such and such (about the causes of pregnancy)
they mean what a devout Roman Catholic means when he says that
25
It is interesting to keep in lind that Me' analysis motivates hir to favor the Spim interpretation.
Lnkes' anaIylsis, in chapter I, actuaIly takes place well after the publication of tbe Tmner h k . Lukes cites Tarrier's
view but dislisses it in an r t t m t to derive a mn 'objective' approach. It shoald be M sorprise that Iukes'
rationalist approach to interpretation favors Spiro's hfelIattualistinterpretation as both are founded on sirilar
assmptions. Bel lbv Lerner davs attention to this intirate connection (Lerner 1995:181).
the wnception of Jesus w a s caused by G o d without any male
contribution, and by wcausewthey mean w h a t the Roman Catholic
would mean if he pointed to signs of this dlvine act (like the
annunciation)- (Turner 1980:53)
It is not difficult to see that this i s just the pattern that Evans-
Pritchard's follows in his study of the Azande. H e equates the Zande
belief in witchcraft with the Western project of trying to explain natural
phenomena. The explanation breaks down in various places, and he must
26
Turner describes the pmcedure in greater length:
Ue start with a prrzzle of the [onWere they say x, vhat do ue say?"d hypothesize a rule like Were they
say x, ue say y.@This rule fordates an antlogy betveen the use of xin the one 1e- and the use of gin
the other. Ve ray discover that the hypothesized rule leads ns astray on certain occasions of the use of s. Me
dm mag coaclusions, or cauaot mke omelves understood. 'This gives us a puzzle of the [on%by did the
rule wrk (or appear to work) on this occasion and not on that one?' It is at this point that we rast do the
looking around at the setting. Ue are looking for saethiag specific: material, like conduct, expressiw ased
in cormection n t h x, and so forth, with which to construct analogies betwen the "iue' or set o f asages of
which the expression is a part and such sets in oar ovn language. f'l'arner 198056)
fill in the reasons for this breakdown. These points of breakdown
indicate the dements of untranslatibility in the cross-cultural transfer
of mncepts, Depending on how one translates the belief in question, the
breakdowns in translation will appear in different places and may also
be more or less numerous, Turner implies that Evans-Pritchard has not
aligned Zande beliefs w i t h the practice in our culture to which it bears
dosest resemblance:
21
Tanya Lnhnann carpares wnterporary mgic beliefs rare to religious beliefs both in tens of chzncterizing
causal efficacy and in tens of hw beliefs are defended (LPhnarm 1989:296,336). In fact, very few of her descriptions
appeal to the traditional notion of This amparison with religion alows her to interpret such beliefs as
instmental bnt not necessarily false. Eoans-Pritchard interprets such beliefs as scientifically instrraentaf but
false; Yinch often interprets ther as non-instmntd and hwce not making any real c l h about reality. N6 doubt,
Christian ritnaIs are reant to have sae ef tect an the wrld. Raying, for instance, is intended to prodace results.
L u h m ~is able to interpret witchcraft beliefs smwhere betreen the poles of instrpentalist and -list
approaches. Snch a camparison does, however, have its m lhitations and LPhnarm is carefal to draw attention to the
differences.
@ic is a modernist religion: it challenges the validity of religious dogttim, authoritative sgdology. and
intellectual analysis, vhiie gaining its inspiration f r a archaic primitive form; and its structural
adiguity rests upon a decanstmted mtim of belief. [imhnrnn 1989:336)
upon which to base a comparison between differing beliefs, Turner also
draws attention to the misleading use of the idea of "mntextWin these
debates, Contexts are not pre-given segments of culture; they are a
product of the a t t e m p t to make tmns1ationa.l mmparisons. As such
comparisons are made, that which was sectioned off as the "contextw
appropriate for undermding a particular belief or practice may change
substantially.
Many critiques of r e l a t i v i s m are motivated by fear that giving up
objectivism entails the impossibility of explanation. Turner shows that, in
spite of the lack of theoretical constraints on explanation or a common
bridgehead of universal rationality, fruitful engagement between two
opposing views is still possible, This is precisely what anthropologists
do and what Turner negotiates between the interpretations provided by
Spiro and Leach, H e analyzes the points at which "same-practices"
comparisons breakdown as well as the ways in which these can be
explained away by those who endorse alternative translations. Although
the aspects of each translation that need explaining are different (each
comparison holds the possibility of breaking down at different points), it
does not follow that no comparison between conflicting translations can
b e made. Even without objective constraints on explanation, judgements
can still be made distinguishing better from worse explanations/
translations. The important point is that the translational breakdown (or,
its analysis) ought to remain p a r t of the process of translation. The
successes as w e l l as the failures of each "same practices hypothesis"
are both constitutive of the translation.
A t this point it w i l l be useful to summarize the lessons I draw from
the rationality debates considered in these first two chapters:
1) When translating the beliefs of the Other, the primary issue is
not which concept or statement accurately conveys the content of their
belief in the target language, In cases like those I have considered, no
one statement can. Therefore, the idea of literal translation or the
synonymous cross-cultural transfer of meaning must be abandoned,
2) The crucial question is, rather, given a particular translation,
what distortions are created when a particular translational comparison
is made between the way a concept or sentence is used in the social
context of the Other, and the way the translated concept or s t a t e m e n t is
used in the social context of the anthropologist? This opens up the
further question of what to make of the possibility of understanding the
Other given these breakdowns?
3) T h e basic unit of translation is neither the concept nor the
proposition, but rather the entire ethnographic account of the beliefs,
practices and social s y s t e m in w h i c h the particuIar belief in question is
said to be held, This follows from a rmgnition that no "translation,"
however simple, is a literal representation of the of the Other,
and from an appreciation that explanations, more or less expansive, are
required to account for the distortions, discrepancies, differences, and
analogical breakdowns that inevitably arise in the process of translation.
4) Translations are not entirely accurate nor inaccurate
representations of the beliefs of the Other, but partial and distorted
analogues of other w a y s of thinking. This recognition of a degree of
untranslatibility undercuts the standard paradoxes and oppositions that
structure debate about translation,
5) T h e translator must engage in linguistic self-reflexivity. One
cannot c o m e to terms with w h a t it means to translate "Doire Colmcille"
without coming to terms w i t h w h a t it means to translate it as
"Londonderry." The translator must take account of the effect of taking
a label from the amceptual apparatus of one language and placing it
over a concept f r o m another language.
Having recast w h a t is at issue in debates about translation, it will
be useful to look at work in anthropology that takes language
comparison as central. The linguistic anthropologists I will consider in
the next chapter may b e said to have taken Winch's maxim to its
theoretical limit=
Our language and our social relations are just two sides of the
same coin. To give an account of the meaning of a word is to
describe how it is used; and to describe how it is used is to
describe the social intermurse into which it enters, (Winch
1958:123)
Chapter Four - The LinguiMic Turn in Anthropology
I
Yinch creates a telling staterent of this pervasive oversight by reversing a passue f n Evans-Pritchard's
mrk on the Azande, in order to illustrate the pint that it is not only the Azande uho are constrained by their
languadeIbeliel systm. F r a ~ f M tO d, e s aad higic, Uhch quotes:
Azaude observe the action of the poison oracle as re observe it, but their cbservations are always
subordinated to their befiefs and are incorporated into their beLiefs and made to explain thm and justify
then. Let the reader consider any ar-t that uould utterly deaolish aL1 Zande claias for the p e r of the
oracle. If it were translated into Zande lodes of thought it would serve to support their entire structure of
belief. For their mystical notions are erinently coherent, being interrelated by a netwrk of logical ties,
and are so ordered that they never too crudely contradict sensory experience but, instead, experience seem to
justify the^. The Zande is i r s e d in a sea of mystical notions, and i f be speaks about his poison oracle he
mst speak in a mystical idia. (lhns-Pritchard 1937:150)
Vinch states: 'To locate the point at uhich the important phi1osophic.d issue does arise, I shall offer a parody,
coaposed by changing round one or two expressions in the forgoing quotation.' This reversal dravs attention to the ways
in vhich language (any 1-e) lag be taken to influence belie[ content or constrain thought.
Europeans observe the action ot the poison oracle as Azande observe it, but their observations are alvags
subordinated to their M e f s and are incorporated into their beliefs made to explain then and jastify
thea. Let a Zande consider any argment that nmld utterly refute dl European scepticis about the p m r of
the oracle. If it were translated into eatopean lodes of thought i t voald serve to support their entice
structure of belief. For their scientific notions iue einently coherent, being interrelated by a netuork of
logical ties, and are so ordered that they never too crudely contradict rystical experience but, instead,
emrience seas to justify ther. The Enropean is i r s e d in a sea of scientific notions, and i f he speaks
about the Zande poison oracle he rust speak in a scientific idia. (Winch 1964:09)
The point is d l uade that many anthropologists are often quick to point oat the inflneuce of the laugnage or
conceptual scheae of the Other in forming beliefs withont acknowledging the influence that hisher m language has on
the interpretation of that society or of reality.
the debates over rationality and rehtivism discussed in chapters one
and three-
In the 1930's and early 1940's. Benjamin Whorf created a
controversy in anthropology by proposing what has since been called
the thesis of "linguistic determinismm and/or "linguistic relativism."
Following the path charted by Franl: Boas and Edward Sapir, Whorf
drew attention to the ways in which a particular language shapes the
beliefs and behavior of those who speak it. Significant differences
between belief systems were found to be manifesfed in the languages
used to express those beliefs, These anthropologists generally drew
attention, not to differences in behavior, nor to specific unusual beliefs,
but to differences in ways of speaking about the world and the ways in
which the structure of a language is transferred to the structure of a
particular representation of reality.
Whorf's analysis of linguistic structure and his attention to the
substantial differences in structural features of different languages has
been heavily criticized within both philosophy and anthropology, A large
part of the criticism is, however, a product of conspicuously
unsympathetic interpretations of Whorf's work, misdirected empirical
testing, as well as of unreflective applications of the labels
"determinismwand wrelativisrn,wM y a i m in this chapter is to show that a
great deal of this criticism misses the point by failing to appreciate just
what Whorf was attempting to come to terms with in analyzing structural
differences between languages.
Whorf's work addresses strikingiy similar questions to those that
later emerged in the MacIntyre/Winch debate; he does not, however,
make the case for his claims about cross-cultural representation by
appeal to a priori rules derived from epistemological considerations that
pertain to the possibiLim of translation, nor by explicit appeal to
theories of meaning. Whorf appeals, instead, to the actual practice of the
anthropological aCtMty of translating. Consequently, his work offers a
basis for a more promising characterization of the project of translation
as well as a better understanding of exactly what is ammplished in the
attempt to translate the beliefs of the Other.
In his essay, "The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to
Language," Benjamin Whorf investigates the differences between some
fundamental concepts in the Hopi Indian language and some apparently
related concepts in English. These comparisons allow him to establish a
case for the existence of substantial differences between these
languages and draw attention to some important features of the project
of translation.
Whorf considers a number of examples in which language appears
to influence behavior and belief and reflects on the implications of this
relationship, Ia drawing attention to the intimate connection between
language and belief, as Winch was later to do, Whorf suggests not just
that a particular perception of reality not only shows itself in language,
but that a particular language governs or heavily influences the ways
in which a speaker will perceive reality. One of the clearest statements
of Whorf's thesis is adopted from Edward Sapir whom he quotes at the
beginning of the essay:
Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone
in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are
very much at the mercy of the particular language which has
b e c o m e the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an
illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without
the use of language and that language is merely an incidental
means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection.
T h e fact of the matter is that the "real worldu is to a large extent
uneonsciousiy built up on the language habits of the group..,. W e
see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do
because the language habits of our community predispose certain
choices of interpretation. (Whorf [quoting Sapir] 1956P134)
2
The tw theses are not consistently stated throughout the critical literature. Frank C m , in contrast
to the Robins/Perm formlation, quoted above, characterizes the two as follous: Lingnistic Relativism, considered the
stronger thesis, cakes the claim that, ' B a the world is pmeived is ... detenined by language.' W s t i c
Determinis, considered the weaker thesis, suggests only that, "he tens and gnmr ue use point us toward different
types of things" (fCnnninghP 1973:46-7). b s t writers, houever, consider liqpistic deteninism to be the stroaer
thesis, reversing these definitions.
3
A umber of often quoted stataents in lihrf's essays souud as if he light be endorsing a view consistent
with die "strong thesisa of linguistic deteninis. Be refers to the individual as 'constrained completely' uithin the
'unbreakable bonds' of language (Whorl 1956c:256), or w e s t s that the tens of lin@stic agreaent are "absolutely
obligatory' [iorf 1956g:213-14). Critics often pick up on stateneats such as these in isolation, and suuest that he
endorses a strictly deteninistic thesis and proceed to criticize some version of this. Aside f r a these Ceu dramatic,
rhetorical statemts, there is little in Wharf's writin@ to support such a vier.
It should be re#dered that Worf follws in the tradition of Franz Bars and Edward Sapir, both of uha explicitly
held that structural differences (ubile inflmtial) can be m r n e through cammication (hence are not strictly
deteruinistic) (Boas 1911:24-26). Yhile Sapir and Wrf place #re emphasis on the direction of MIuence Cram language
to thought, the theories of both are consistent with 3oas' vim that neither is strictly deterministic. Sapir , likewise,
is very clear that the connection betwen language and thought is not "deteninistic" (Sapir 193359).
his claim is certainly neither that language alone determines, nor that it
completely determines, what one does. or is able to, think.( Rather.
according to Whorf, there is an intimate relation between a pdcuIar
representation of reality and the language used to express it such that
each is, to s o m e extent, reflected in the other, He chooses to emphasize
Ianguage as a significant factor influencing belief, but this is not to say
that it is the only factor. H e explicitly distances himself from such a
crude deterministic reading, suggesting that culture and language
influence each other:
4
The use of the uord 'deterahisifis often taken to irply that ubat one thinlrs is predlchbIy determined by
one's language. Vhorf, on the contrary, states that "There are connections but not correlations or diagaostic
correspondences between cultural noms and linguistic patterns' (Yhorf 1956f:f59). aorf's d a .is that language
influences vhat ve MitnalI'think, bnt not necessarily uhat ue are capable of thinking. It d d be wre accurate to
suggest that language bnstrains8 rather than 'deteninesWought.
In 'Linguistic Consideration of Thinking in Priritive Coraaities,' Yborf clearly disassociates his viev vith the
deteninistic one often ascribed to hir. iie appeals to the wrks or Boas and Sapit to sabstantiate the clah that
thinking is largely Linguistic, but insists that it is a ustake to see i t as entirely linguistic (Vhorf 1956e:66). He
also states "Ishould be the last to pretend that there is @a so derinite as 'a correlation* betveen culture and
1anguage"tWhorf 1956f:139) but only that belief patterns are 'in consonance' or 'in accord8 with language (Ybort
l9%f: 154).
I t is probable that the distortion caused by the translation of the caacept Veteninisl"fm anthropology to
philosophy is partly responsible for the philosophical problems vith this theory. Tbere is a long history of debate over
'hard deteninis" philosophy and, ahittedlg, the conceptual pdaging that caes uith the philosophical use of the
word 'deteninimWes the analysis appear uurealistic. In any case, the use of the label 'deteninis% found in
the uork of caentators, not Uhorf's m. See also Dell l@s' "bQpes of Linguistic Relativity' (1966 esp. p.158)
for a detailed treabent concerning hw mst critics dstalre Ohorf's anaIysis for uhat has been labelled the "strong
thesis of Linguistic: Deteninisl.@
thought "to a large extent," or wpredisposeswcertain Lines of thinking.
None of this suggests strict determination but rather suggests that
there is a substantizd degree of Linguistic influence on the speaker's
perception of reality-
In order to illustrate this Linguistic influence on belief* Whorf
draws attention to the ways in which the meanings of some t e r m s exceed
any simple referential function and M e t , for speakers, what Sapir
had called a kind of wunconsciouspatterning," His claim is not merely
that the meanings of concepts differ between languages but, more
importantly, that the structure and grammar of a language significantly
contribute to how one structures or "patterns" representations of
reality. Ris analysis is as much a semantic theory as a theory of
anthropological methodology and, in fact, precedes a tradition in
philosophy that similarly foregrounds 'translation theory as a means of
understanding semantics (to be discussed in the next chapter).
In spite of the fact that there is a positive theory of language
implicit in Wharf's writings, his central concern is actually criticalt he is
intent on dispelling some popular assumptions concerning the relation
between language and reason that he regards as mistaken. A large part
of his work is designed to show that a style of reasoning is intimately
Linked to a particular language, In wScienceand Linguisticsw, he
attempts to dispel the idea (key to bridgehead theories) that natural
logic and language are independent. The same point would be
emphasized by Winch twenty years later in his critique of the
underlabourer conception of philosophy. Whorf characterizes the
unreflective nation that language and logic are two distinct things in
the following passage:
5
Another often referred ta statesent of the principle of Linguistic relativity is folmd in 'Mguge, Kind,
and Reality' in vhich Vborl states:
Gvery language is a vast pattern-systa, different fm others, in which are c n l t d l y ordained the Cons and
categories by ohich the personality not d
y colranicates, but also anaIyzes natm, notices or neglects types
of relationships and pkmeua, chvlwls his reasoning, and builds the house of his consciousness. (Vhorf
1956c:252)
that he is willing to consider the broader implications of this failure of
s i m p l e translation for the project of translating and understanding the
beliefs held by members of another culture- B y analyzing structural
differences between languages, Whorf mnfronts the difficulty of
translation and provides not only a re-characterization of that project,
but a new understanding of what our interpretations of other ways of
thinking amount to.
6
This focus, not on individual concepts but on broad linguistic patterns, is also emphasized in 'A Linguistic
Consideration of Thinking in Primitive Comnities' where he states, 'Sense or waning does not result I r a wrds or
lorphmes but frm patterned relations be& uords or m~haes'(Uhorf 195k67). We my of Yhorf's exwles seem
to erehasize the fomr, it is important to realize that he uses such examples to drav attention to the latter.
7
krtrand Russell sirilarly aclwnledges the influence of -tical structute on so# very central concepts
in the history of Yestern retaphysics. Although he daes not drav the same conclusions as Ybort, the clairs about the
influence of g n m r are strikingly sirilu. llrrssell suggests:
'Snbstance"in a ad,is a uetaphysid mistake, due to the transference to the wrld-structure of the
structure of sentences capsed of a subject and a predicate. (IbPsseL1 1945:202)
The point is the sam, that featrues of gramar influence speakers to attribute certain related features to
provides a foundation for some broader and more systematic theories
and representations of the world:
reality. For instance, our distinctions betwen objects and actions are heavily influenced by proper gramatical use of
norms and verbs. Vbori suggests, as an example:
Ve are constantly reading into rutate fictional acting entities, sirply because our verbs NUSt have
substantives in front of tba. We b e to say 'It fla&d' or 'A light flashed, ' setting up an actor, 'it' or
'fight ,' to perfon uhat we call an action, "to flash.' [Uhorf I956d:243)
Hopi gramar, in contrast, allovs sentences to have verbs vithont nouns (or pronouns) and hence it is gramtically
possible to express sirply Washed.Wghting is not a thing for the b p i (an ' i t w t [lashes), but an event--a
f Iashing .
A m e detailed example capares tvo sentences in S h e e with the tuo closest translations in English to show how
the strncture of a language influences deteninations of sirilarity of pbenaena. In 'Languages and Logic,' Worf offers
the Eoglish sentences: '1 pail the branch aside' and "I Ive an extra toe on rg foota and suggests that these have
little sinilarity in English (Vhorf 1956d:233). In Sbavnee, these sentences are ai-1#ma-30-a-a and ni-I%ava-%odWe
respectively. Shamnee bzs a category I Vm, denoting a Corked o u t ~ e The
. sentence structure of Slurnee dram close
similarities between the two phenaena as revealed by the less graceful translations: "I pull it (saething Like branch
of tree) m e open or apart where it forks-d '1 have an extra toe fork@ out like a branch from a n o d tw"#orf
1956d:234). The difference beheen the sentences centers only m d the ending of the second We: pertaining to the
toes. Vhorf ends the discussion with the observation that, d i k e English speakers, 'Shawnee logicians and observers
wuld class the tro phenaeua as intrinsically s M u a ( b r f 1956d;235).
individual word meanings, but on the effect of Linguistic structure on
meaning and on how speakers of a language represent reality-
English, as opposed to Hopi, is a noun oriented language, Hopi
grammar requires fewer nouns and depends heavily on verb and adverb
grammatical forms. Whorf notes the tendency in English, due to its noun
preference, to objectify wncepts, such as time, drawing attention to the
pervasive use of spatial metaphors in English as a consequence of the
grammatical noun-verb structural relationship-
8
In "Science and Liqpistics,%rf attmts to diagram this difference by drawing attention to the different
tenses used by Hopi and Btlish speakers in reporting the event of soreone nmniag. Yhile wish speakers report that
event differently depending on its location on a t h e Line (ran, is cming, will mnj, Hopi report the event depending
on its 'type of validitya [Uhorf 1956g:217). Cramatical tenses depend on a past event's verifiability or a future
event's certainty and the relation of the speaker or listener to the event ratkr than upon any location in linear tire.
This is one example of the effects of iinguistic structure on how
speakers represent and confront reality. English noun preference as
opposed to Hopi verb preference, the English dichotomy of form-and-
substance, the tendency in English to spa* and objectify, and
differences in singular as opposed to plural forms, a l l mntribute to
substantially different ways of mnceptualkbg reality. Whorf identifies
many other correlations between grammatical patterns and conceptual
structures which, when explicated in both languages, allow h i m to
provide a wmparative analysis of substanthlly different ways of
representing reality. This anaIysis works in amjunction with his earlier
remarks on linguistic analogy to further emphasize the influence of
language on thought. H e refers to these conceptual/linguistic
stsucturations as "thought worlds.
9
For a nice analysis on the problers of testing the Sapir-Yborf hypothesis, related to the dair that Yhorf
never intended to put f o m r d a f o d thesis that coald be erpiricalIy tested, and an analysis concerning hw attempts
to test such a "thesis" distort the original clairs, see Bidington "bthe hngmge of Benjpin Gee Yh6rfu (1991) and
also Byles' 'ILo Tgpes of Lin@stic Relativity' (1966:153-165).
of translation, but rather by a preoccupation with rejecting the idea of
cultural relativism.
Notable among the attempts to formulate and test what came to be
known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, w e r e the studies done by Paul
Kay and W i l l e t t Kempton (and also Berlin and Kay) on colour perception.
The idea was that, if one could produce empirical evidence of some
universal cross-cultural perceptions, that this would constitute a
refutation of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (in whatever form it may be
stated). Universal perceptual abmes were taken to provide evidence
for anything from cross-cdturaEy w m m o n conceptual categories to pan-
cultural standards of judgement and even provided a framework for
speaking about universal standards of rationality, It is these types of
studies, recall, to which Lukes appeals in defence of his claims for
universal rationality.
Kay and Kempton isolated t w o claims in the work of Sapir and
Whorf as w e l l as (what they take to be) a commonly held implication:
10
The two languages studied are English, vhicfi has a liqpistic green/blue distinction, and Tarahuara (a
language of Northern Wco) in which the word "siponare' encapasses both green and blue.
The first m of tests done by and Kerptw meal that speakers of the tuo languages judge colour distance
quite differently. EngLish speakers, who make a linguistic distinction, judge the distance of a labelled sarple as
greater frm either blue or green than those uho speak TanbPm, which seers to contin wfut Kay and -ton call the
'Morfian effect."ey then revork the experimt to eliriaate linguistic cues vhich r e d t s in the speakers of each
language aakhg roughly sirilar judgerents about tbe colour distauce. This is interpreted as sh- that pcceptnal
ability is cross-culturally similar. Interestingly, the resalts of such tests could (possibly lore) easily be read as
confinin# the very Lhgnisfic thesis they set oat to discredit. It is ody by c e m @ the linguistic cues that they
get the desired results.
ignore the very analogid (holistic) relations of meaning that were
central to Whorf's analysis,
Robin Ridington also notes that attempts to test the theory, like
those undertaken b y Kay and Kempton are,
11
See Carl Shpson "Iwr Perception: Cross~turalLinguistic Translation and RelativisVn i n d for
tbe lkury of Wal WPior. 21:4 1991.
rdationship between language structure and meaning or belief that m o s t
concerned Whorf. It is only by artificially eliminating this aspect of
m e a n i n g that K a y and Kempton get the results that they want.
It should be clear, then, that such tests establish little or nothing
in the case against thesis (II) (closest to the actual Sapir-Whorf clatm).
A t best, they suggest rather that there are trivial exceptions to thesis
(I) and that the m o s t radical version of thesis (m) is untenable. Kay
and Kempton are attacking a straw man; the case they make is perfectly
consistent with Whorf's analysis of the effects of language on habitual
behavior. They acknowledge that the results of such tests do not
amount to a rejection of the actual Sapir-Whorf hypothesis and they end
up accepting a versionw of the thesis of linguistic relativity not
unlike the one Whorf endorsed in w h i c h Linguistic structure influences
belief but might be overcome (Kay and Kempton 1984:77). It is
interesting to note that other theorists routinely appeal to this study as
one of the primary sources of evidence against linguistic relativism
without acknowledging the qualifications explicitly stated by Kay and
Kempton. Their conclusions are quite different than those usually
attributed to them by advocates of u~fiversalstandards of rationality.
Clifford Geertz has suggested that the reaction against any form of
cultural relativism is best understood as the product of a particular
worry or fear rather than as the result of evidence or any substantial
theory to the amtrary,
12
Think of the rean@ @rednin "Red A# Ilrrg" and thetations of threat and ag@ssion, the maniry of
@black% 'black deathwor 'black lass' via the comotations of evil or fear, or the leaning of 'blue' in 'feeling
blue.' These are evidently mn@erfaasiiw since these coloar tens can be used in new expressioas and dearly carry
these comotations. Conld 'black nss' be translated into a Iaaguage where 'black' does not have connotations of evil?
standards of judgement. Epistemological rela-tivism draws the further
conclusion that inmmmensurable epistemologies are implied by
substantial differences between M e f systems combined with the
absence of any cross-cultural standards of judgement. Spiro suggests
that a great deal of misguided speculation on cultural r e l a t i v i s m results
from adding questionable assumptions to the fairly unmntroversial claim
that there is some cultural diversity (descriptive relativism). According
to Spiro, contemporary anthropology as a whole has embraced this line
of reasoning that progresses from descriptive to normative and
epistemological relativism both of which imply the absence of any
universal principles of judgement rendering cross-cultural interpretation
hopelessly subjective. Embracing this position i m p l i e s that there can be
no more substantial method o r goal for anthropology than partial,
indeterminate interpretation.
Spiro appeals to the fact that anthropologists successfully
communicate with m e m b e r s of other cultures to substantiate the claim
that there is, in fact, no inmmmensurability between belief systems,
which he takes to imply that there must be a substantial degree of
s i m i l a r i t y between belief s y s t e m s (reversing the theoretical progression
between types of relativism), The threat to anthropology is that
acceptance of these relativist theses in any substantial form makes
anthropology a purely interpretive and indeterminately descriptive
project, rather than an explanatmy endeavor, That is, the relativist
predicament precludes anthropology from being properly scientific (Spiro
1986:278). Spiro's counter-argument proceeds from what Spiro expects
from anthropology to what must be the case if those expectations are to
b e satisfied. H e rqtects Whorf's theory, not because it threatens the
possibility of cross-cultural communication, but because it threatens a
certain objective/scientific vision of anthropology.13
13
f t woud
l be an interesting point to pursue [although not one that space gemits here) to consider the wags
in which Whorf's caparative anaiysis of the Hopi language and the idiosyncracies of Lgiish revealed in that analysis
already contain a critique of the my criticisms of his wrk. By this, 1 lean to draw attention to the raag rays in
which the objectiffig tendencies of English that he draw attention to provide a grmding for the critiques of the
sort endorsed by Spim and b u i n g h . Their theories are grounded oa the pzesupposition that English has ao embedded
retaphysics and that it bears an unprobleratic relation to an independent reality. Mern English has evolved in a
culture that concentrated a great deal of its efforts on a confrontation vith nature rather than on conmication with
Frank Cunningham's critique of Whorf seems to follow a similar
pattern. He too frames the debate as an opposition between objectivism
and anti-objectivism. L i n g u i s t i c relativism is aligned with the latter and,
given the translation paradox, is assumed reduce to a kind of cross-
cultural skepticism. Having set the debate in such a frame of polarized
extremes, Cunningham presses the thesis of linguistic determinism to
absurd conclusions, leaving the way open for the only remaining option:
objectivist anti-relativism.
Cunningham implicitly assumes that all belief systems have the same
functions and goals as scientific theories about reality; he endorses a
straightforward intellectuslism. In addition, he understands anthropology
to b e a cross-cultural explanatory endeavor in which world views can be
treated as theories that are in competition with one another, Understood
thus, the price of anti-ob jectivism (or relativism) is the impossibility of
meaningful cross-linguistic theory competition: it entails a kind of moral
and conceptual isolationism. Cunningham is clear about the implications
of giving up scientific objectivity in the project of cross-cultural
understanding:
other cultures. It is no surprise that the language itself wtivates thinkers to want to incorporate ang investigation
of culture into the lode1 of the natml sciences and objectify the Other in explanations rather than understand in
interpretations.
precisely the terms of this debate that are called into question on
Whorf's amunt of the process of translation-This point is made by
Emily Schultz who, like Geertz, objects to relativism being understood as
nihilism or subjectivism.
- -
I4
Hay have identi tied a Uhorfian strain in Thoras Kuhn's analysis of the incuensurlbility of scientific
paradigm. Lirited shilarities are plain enough, yet Uhorf does not endorse an %comemrabilityWesis.
Inco-ens_uEabilityi ~ o r e sthe very coronicative aspect of translation that Worf erpbasized. Ridin#ton notes the
siiilarities behreen Yhorf's umetaphysics underlying language-d Kh's "scientific paradigms' sqgestiag that both
are snbject to similar pmblm vben it roes to eqirical contimation or discanfination, but eqhasires that Worf
does not endorse i n c s u r a b i l i t y (Ridington 1991:249-251). Reading the parallels too closely is precisely what cakes
tests like those done by giy and m t o n seen e if they are relevant to Worf's claim. For a detailed d y s i s of the
similarities, see Kart De Hey's 'Tnro#nsar;lbility of Theories and Untranslatability of Iaq$uage~.~He, however, in my
opinion, pushes the parallels a little too far, suggesting fht Uharf's theory is a sort of incoensnrability thesis
very mch like Knhn's.
156
many ways. than ~nglish." Read thus. it is. ironically. the theories
proposed by Spiro and Crlnningham that pose a potential threat to the
future of anthropology, not Whorf's method- It is precisely by engaging
in a cross-linguistic. self-reflexive, conceptual dialogue rather than
reducing the beliefs of the Other to an object of scientific explanation
tbat Whorf makes understanding the Other, as ofher, possible-
15
"stic nisticusideration' is basidly Erami as a case against the idea that Europeans are capable of sae
kind of superior rationality. Uhorf concludes the essay vith the statemt:
The evolutionary concept, having been dmped upan rodern aan uhile his notions of language and tholyht w e
based on knwledge of only a fw types out of the hundreds of very diverse linguistic types existing, has
abetted his provincial Iinguistic prejudices and fostered the grandiose hohr that his type of t)linlrinl and
the feu European tongues on vhich it is based represent the cnlrination and flower of the evolution of
language. (Uhorf 1956e:84)
'Science and Linguistics"ends on a shilar note (Uhorf 1956g:218).
structures adds another level of indeterminacy to the problem of cross-
cultural understanding; h e identifies another type of cross-linguistic
variation. W M l e Whorf focused m a i n l y on the r e l a t i v i ~that arises from
grammatical and structural differences between languages, Hymes drew
attention to a theoretically prior relativity that has to do w i t h
differences in the use, role, or function of the languages in general
(something Like the differences in "forms of lifew central to Winch's
analysis). An awareness of functional linguistic relativity problematizes,
to some extent, the wmparison of structural differences (of the first
type). N o t only is it possible that the structural differences between
languages motivate different representations of reality, but different
languages might "referR or "representw in dipferent ways, or rely to
different degrees on key concepts Like "reality," "tr~th,~ and "belief."
Hymes observes that, historically, various approaches to
anthropological theory emphasize varianm or invariance in any of four
areas of investigation:
16
Chatterjee drm attention to the fact that one of the problems uith the Linguistic relativity principle is
that cwentators have interpreted language as too lnch Like Enhn's 'paradig."It is the idea that a Ianguage is a
caplete theoretical structure (Me a pvadignf that functions exclusively or primarily to represent reality that gives
rise to the idea of incorensrrrability and relativity (Chatterjee 1985:38). Attention to the different functions of
langnage and the indeteninateness of interpretation calls into question this repmentation of Linguistic systems and
questions whether 'representing reality' is a cross-lingmistically constant category.
17
I sirply burmu this liayistic theory llbel fra Chatterjee who notes:
This attitude to word waning held in c m o by Uittgenstein and Yhorf I will characterize as aoti-
esseotidist, Le., refuting the idea h t wrds are Like labels attached to things, that the meaning of a
word is of the saae nature as the ton of the wrd, definite and reproducible. (Cbatterjee 1985:47)
make the Linguistic relativity principle [LRP) appear threatening. It is
precisely by questioning the viability of an essentialist theory of
meaning that both Whorf and Wittgenstein can envision the possibility of
overcoming the problems of cross-cultural communication and/or "the
bewitchment of our intelligence by means of languagew(PI09
..
Wittgenstein 1953:47). Chatterjeeps Wittgemtenmm extension of Whorf's
analysis Likewise undermines the idea of a preexisting independent
structure of the language of the Other (by making iaferpretatr'on of the
beliefs of the Other (target) language dependent), It is, again, this
assumption that generates the paradox foundational to the rationality
and relativism debates. What is being contested by Whorf implicitly and
post-Whorfians explicitly, is this idea of pre-interpreted determinate
meaning and stable Linguistic structure and so, also, the commonly
understood version of the thesis of linguistic relativism,
Chatterjee combines Wittgenstein's intra-linguistic indeterminacy
w i t h Whorf's self-reflexive inter-linguistic interpretive process to
suggest that Whorf's own method transcends the representation of
language that gives rise to the problem of Linguistic relativism.
18
W t z suggests that there is no possibility of consistently a rm for insights derived C n waning
holism in the language of positivist science. A great deal of the misinterpretation of Uhorf's wrk is due to Zs
atterpt to 'speak holistically osiw a rode of discourse uhose foms require a lechanical-aaterialist reductionis'
(Schnltz1990:18). l3e thesis of lingtiistic deteninisr is a product of this reduction of &at really ararmts to an
altogether different theory of interpretation. This awkward reduction is evident in the characterization of the Sapir-
Wharf hypothesis discussed by Kay and Keapton.
Whorf's procedure as follows:
19
Vhorf dram attention to the uays in which every language "conceals a retapiiysics' (Yharf 195k58).
Translation fror me language into another rakes aauy source language claim appear senseless because they lack the
retaphgsics, in the target language, that provided their jostification. Translations into foreign liqpistic structures
rake everyday claims appear marginal precisely because the metaphysical ander@minghas been stripped away or
drastically distorted [as was the case with b-Pritcbard's translations of Zande claim). Yhorf notes this
distortion:
The abstractions, by approximtion of which we attapt to tecanstrnct for ourselves the retapbysics of the
Hopi, will undoubtedly appear to us as psychological or even $stical in character. (Vborf 1956a:58)
Et is interesting to reflect on the recent attempt within Vestem philosophy to break free f r a its ow contained
metaphysics. It is no accident that such atterpts have had to radically refon the language. Positivists found it
necessary to drastically reduce 1e- in an atteapt to eliminate retaphysics, or, on the other extreme, post-
rodernists allude to an excess of leaning in order to reveal a contained metaphysics or reinterpret a traditian. The
difficulty in find% an idia to translate past~ehghysicalphilosophy into English is also evident fm probleas
confronting the translations of thinkers fm the Continentai post-wtaphysical tradition Ira Beidegger to Derrida. In
order to cornnicate this critique of retaphysics, translators are forced to reshape the target language and expand its
boundaries, and still, much is distorted.
or literal translation into another* This indudes complex, abstract as
well as simple referential terms and concepts.
Second, the activity of translation must involve a focus, not only
on the language of the Other, but be simultaneously Linguistically self-
reflexive. A s John Lucy notes, "we deautomatize our own language
categories by contrasting them with those of other languages" (Lucy
1992:37). Translation, on Wharf's view, works to disrupt a linguistic
complacency, or a blindness, toward the foundations of our own belief
system. I t is this disruption of monological, monolinguistic wnsciousness
that makes possible a cross-CUItural dialogue.
Taken together, these two observations suggest a new model of
translation: rather than viewing it as the simple transfer of meaning
between languages or a sententid mapping between belief systems, it is
better conceptualized as a form of Wogue between languages,
The fear of the impLications of linguistic relativism expressed by
critics who take seriously the translation paradox, is precisely the
condition of the cross-cultural encounter that needs to be fully
acknowledged,
1
Thus, Qnine is an mpiricist but an anti-reductionist. In order to understand Quite's aualysis of 1e-
and translation, it is important to bear in lint? that he is prirarily responding to theories of linguistic reductionism.
%en while he retains a naturalist/phgsicaiist foundation for interpretation, his theory is largely motivated by the
inplications of a holistic approach to language that nudemines the sort of reductionism usually associated vith this
approach. Sima W e suggests that 'the only thing that separates Qnine's behavioriw frm the erpiricist do- of
reductionism is his b o l i a " ( ~ e 1991:96-7). Still, this is no sdll difference. Qnine's reasoning steas fro
ansidering atteapts at reduction M e confronting the possibility that those atterpts rust fail.
emphasizes the holistic thesis that meaning is a function of context, the
s t r u c t u r a l features of a language as w e l l as analogical relationships w i t h
other words/concepts/sentences in the language. This Linguistic holism
undermines any attempt at semantic reductionism-
2
It is vorth keeping this concern in und as a point of amparison with Donald Davidson. Daridson's examples
are dl dram frw faniliar and structurally similar languages, possibly contributing to the significant differences in
his conclusions. @tine pags careful attention to the structural shilarities upon which such translation theory depends
and is often seen as detenined:
Translation be- kindred languages, e.g., Frisian ad English, is aided by reseablance of cognate vord
fans. Translation between mwlated languages, e.g., Ihmgarian and EugLish, ray be aided by traditional
equations that have evolved in step with a shared cnItnre. Wat is relevaat to our purposes is radical
translation, i.e., translation of the language of a hitherto untouched people. (Quine 1960:28)
3
Qaine invents a mthetical 1e- rather investigating an exist@ one precisely to avoid the
philosophical trappings of the preconceptions that care with exaples of actual translation.
behavioral and verbal evidence, The linguist might later find that this
hypothesis is mistaken through further trials where the native utters
gavagai when presented w i t h rats as well as rabbits, or all long-eared
animals: in the face of evidence that speakers of the other language
classify things differently, the translator may be forced to revise
his/her initial translation. Problems aligning referential classes do not
constitute the only, nor the most significant, problem with determining a
translation. Suppose that, given infinite testing and all possible
behavioral responses, the speaker utters wgavagaiwalways and only
when an English speaker would say A c c o r d i n g to Quhe the
linguist is stiU not justified in claiming that "rabbitw is the single
authentic translation of the "meaningwof the statement gavagai, Quhe
suggests that the native wuld be pointing a t "rabbit stages* or
"undetached rabbit parts." Either of these interpretations would be
indistinguishable from "rabbitn even given all possible behavioral
evidence. Quine concludes, on this basis, that there is no exhaustive,
objective criterion b y which to fully determine the meaning of gavagai.
Translators inevitably confront what Quine calls the inscrutability of
referencen; Feleppa describes this thesis as "the field linguist's
inability, in principle, to determine objectively what the subject's
referential and ontological categories realty aren (Feleppa l988:33).4
Quine does not believe that all terms are entirely inscrutable
(Quine 1960:42). In some cases, meaning can be determined by reference
to what he refers to as wstimulusmeaning," as in the case of terms Like
"red," Although the stimulus response to gavagai may be unambiguous,
Quine insists that it does not exhaust the meaning of the statement
"there is a rabbit." Purely observational statements are a small class of
4
Although not lade entirely clear in dbject, Qnine is Iater careful to stress that the inscrutability
of reference is not want to act as a proof for the thesis of the indetenioacy of translation. It is considerations of
the irplications of holim that mtivate the theory (me 1969a:00-81,19?R:118-1031 Feieppa 1988:132). It is because
the unit of translation is neither the uord not the sentence (as one d g h t suspect ira his mles of inscrutability),
but the ohole of language that translation is rendered indeteninzte (Qnine lWb:8, 1969a:tlO). Since any sentence can
be reinterpreted by uking proper adjustments in the interpretations of other statmts, it cmot be settled what a
staterent (objectively) reans, even within a language. Such a clair has vast repercnssions for epistmlo~.The
irportant result, stated in 'Epistmlogy Natunlized,' is that 'epistemlog nor beeaes serantics' (we l969a:89),
and, in an irportant sense, seaantics becaes translation.
sentences that lie at one end of a spectrum that ranges from statements
with fully determinate meaning through partially underdetermined
statements like that identified in the gavagai example, through obviously
theoretical sentences like "there is a neutronw (Quine 1960:42, 1969a=86-
7). This s m a l l class of observation sentences can be unproblematically
translated (Quine 1960:68). While the belief that there exists a class of
determinatelg translatable observation sentences bears resemblance to
bridgehead theories, Quine suggests that the class of statements he
considers purely observational is not sufficient to determine the
meanings of other complex senten- in the Ianguage ( m e 1960.72).
Such simple statements are holophrastic responses to external stimulus
that do not function to stabilize the meanings of other more theoretical
statements in the language ( w e 1969a:86-89). In other words, the
presence of a s m a l l class of determinately translatable observation
sentences will not be sufficient to determine a complete translation
manual that wiU allow one to ascribe contentful beliefs to the speakers
of that language.
Sentences Like "there is a rabbitw remain partially non-
observational because of the contextual and analogical relationships the
meaning of gavagai might bear to other concepts or statements in the
language. Simplistically put, there m a y be "rabbit theoryn which gives
gavagaz' another role in the language. The surrounding body of
knowledge presupposed in the identification of some object, Quine calls
"collateral information." One might, for instance, affirm "there is a
rabbitn even though there is not one in view because of the presence of
a rabbit fly (which is only observed when rabbits are present) or
dissent from "there is a rabbitw when only the ears are observed
because it is not visible enough to be shot at (if that is the only
function a rabbit has). With collated information the meaning of a term
or statement is extended beyond the notion of reference or stimulus
response to include the social function or history of the object and use
of the concept. Consider again MacZntyre's example of the translation of
"Doire-Colmcillew or the translation of tbe Zande t e r m used in reference
to the object referred to by the English wchicken.wAlthough such terms
(in source and target languages) refer to observable objects, their
meanings depend, in large part, on their function and history in a
context or culture. Clearly, collateral information mncerning the role of
the chicken in the practice of Zmde witchcraft impinges on the meaning
of that term while t h e whole history of British-Irish relations affects the
meaning of town names.' No amount of behavioral evidence could exhaust
the intricacies of the meaning of such terms.
5
Kirk discusses this point sarmmding the waning of the ten 'dog.' In sae cuitrues, dags function as pets,
in other cultures as food. He refers to the relevaut collateral infonation as 'dog theory,' suggesting that 'dog'
differs from an obviooslg theoretical ten Like 'neatm~rimril~ in the simplicity of the relevant theory. The point
is that (in both cases) reaning is not, and m o t be, exhausted by reference but bears an essential relation to
supporting concepts. (Kirk 1986:93)
So in the discussion of analyticaI hypotheses he exploits the
remoteness of the jungle language f r o m the translator's in order
to illuminate the claim that, in general, translation between the
two can have nothing to be right or wrong about- In particular,
there are no free-floating meanings which the translator attempts
to identify and re-label, (Kirk 1986:44)
6
@ h e characterizes the "principleof charity' as the f o l l ~ :
The laKir of translation uuderlying all this is that assertions startlingly false on the face of ther are
likely to turn on hidden differences of language. This rardr is stma enough in aL1 of QS to SvelOeuseven
from the homophonic wethod that is so IrmdmtaI to the very acquisition and use of one's rother tongue. The
c m n sense behind the uxir is that one's interlocutor's silliness, beyond a certain point, is less Likely
than bad translation- or, hi the dorestic case, linguistic divergence. (Qnine 196059)
communication, It is justifkble, then, for pragmatic reasons, to translate
gavagai as "rabbitm(Quine 1969c:3). This does not, however detract from
the theoretical point that the transIation is undecidable (Quine 1969b:34),
Any determination of meaning w i l l be based on a p m b extra-empirical
criteria such as charity, familiarity, ease or simplicity.
Not only will translation schemes be shaped by pragmatic concerns.
they will also b e shaped by the conceptual apparatus of the target
language, According to Quine. the process of translation w i l l result in
the partidl projection of the cultural ontology (however ill-defined) or
style of reasoning of the anthropologist onto the beliefs of the Other.
Davidson states:
7
Oavidson suggests:
Ye knw how to give a theory of truth for the r ' o d 1-e: so i f we knew hou to transfon the sentences af
a natural language systmtically into sentences of the f o r d language, we wuld have a theory of truth for
the natnral laquge. Fm this point of view, standard f o r d languages are M e d i a t e devices to assist as
in treating natural languages as more caplex f o r d languages. (Davidson 1987:171)
It should be noted that this is no d ltask. It is, wig, vhat positivists tried and failed to do. A great
deal of Davidson's analysis of translation depends on the success of this 'translonation' from f o r d to natural
languages.
traditional translation theorists assumed; its goal has been misformulated
when translation is characterized as the proj& of matching meanings
(Davidson 1984:128-130). Translation does not proceed by means of a
"transfernor ntranscriptionwof meaning between languages but rather
by matching sentences that have identical truth conditions. What holds
for intra-linguistic interpretation, holds for inter-linguistic
interpretation.
8
The truth of any sentences in a language, according to Davidson, is relative to a l-e, tine and speaker
(Davidson 1984:45). Hence, the more exact staterent of this biconditional is:
"Es regnet' is tme-in-Gem when spoken by x at ti# t i f and only i f it is Wg near x at t.
A further generalization (to a gronp of speakers or a langua#ej offers the proper translation:
9
Davidson does not acknowledge that there will be cases here translation is not passible. me, on the other
hand, suggests that there ray be cases where there will not be correspr,ndhg observation sentences between languages. In
other words, Qniae accepts partial failure of translation; Davidson does not (see Vallace 1986:219). The reasons for
this difference are elaborated belw concerning Davidson's critiqne of conceptual scheaes.
on the other hand, leads him to question the possibility of substantial
conceptual differences across cultures.
10
Quine reseonds to Davidson's critique of his use of the idea of a conceptual schem by implying that his
analysis does not rely on this dichotay and that any confusion light be avoided by simply substituting talk of another
language.
h triad - coneeptd schm, language, and mdd - is not what 1 envisage. I think rather, like Davidson, in
tens of language and the world. I scout the f e n quid as a myth of a rnsenr of labeled ideas. Mere 1
have spoken of a conceptual schae 1 could have spoken of a language. Uhere E have spoken of a very alien
conceptual scheae 1would have been content, Davidson dl1 be glad to Imw, to speak of a language aukward or
baffling to translate. (Quine 1981a:rll)
turns to a consideration of the conditions under which Linguistic
translation can fail.'
Davidson's preliminary considerations mncerning the possibility of
translation are strikingly similar to those proposed b y Hollis. A s
discussed in chapter one, Hollis argues that it is essential to assume a
stoclc of shared meanings between language users, Davidson proposes
not a bridgehead of shared meanings, but a common stock of
propositional truth assignments; if interpretation is to b e possible at all,
then language users must share a stock of senten- heId true. "Truthw
plays the role in Davidson's account that "meaningw did in Hollis*
account. While Davidson's semantic theory differs substantially from
H o b ' , the central problem he addresses is the same as Hollis': that of
how to break into the hermeneutic circle, In translating, one must
simultaneously account for both the truth conditions (or meaning) of a
sentence as well as the content of the belief that the translation of that
sentence is meant to represent, Insofar as translations are, in fact,
aammplished, Davidson posits that ascriptions of truth be held constant
(Davidson 1984~196)just as Hollis found it necessary to assume that
beliefs be held constant-
In order to enter the hermeneutic circle then, Davidson, appeals to
a very strong version of the principle of charity. Because successful
translation is based on shared truth assignments, the principle of
charity must be applied across the board to all types of statements.
Charity becomes not a pragmatic constraint, as for Quine, but an a
priori condition of translation:
11
Davidson's argmnt, here, is mtivated by the fact that he conceptualizes differences in conceptual schms
on the nodel of the i n c a b i l i t y of paradigms as developed by K h and Feyerabend. The case that Davidson rakes
against Yhorl is interestiag precisely becanse it reveals the way ia vhicb his critique of reiativis light be saevhat
misdirected. By asking whether translation is possible between i n c s n r a b l e schemes, he has already stacked the deck.
By definition, it is not. The real question is whether these sche#s should be represented as 'incmensorable' or
whether partial failure of translation @Lies incmenmrability. Yhorf's translations of Hopi concepts and ways of
representing the wrid are carried out as an overam@ of [potential) incammability. Dav-idson to equate (for
reasons developed Mow) ' i n ~ a b l e ~ v i 'significantly
th differeWad this is precisely the equation that Uhorf
suggested could be transcended through translation. I t is Davidson's ass~ptioasabout the utm of translation that
incline hia to lake this equation which, in an iaportant sense, begs the very question at h e .
This method is intended to solve the problem of the
interdependence of beliefs and meaning by holding belief constant
as far as possible while solving for meaning. This is accomplished
by assigning truth conditions to alien sentences that make native
speakers right when plausibly possible, according, of course, to
our own view of what is right. What justifies the procedure is the
fact that disagreement and agreement alike are intelligible only
against a background of massive agreement-
Since charity is not an option, but a condition of having a
workabIe theory, it is m e a n i n g l e s s to suggest that w e might fadl
into massive error by endorsing it. Until w e have successfully
established a systematic correlation of sentences held true with
sentences held true, there are no mistakes to make. (Davidson
I984:I37,19?)
12
Davidson, in a statement strikingig sirilar to one d e by Hollis, claim
If ue cannot find a way to interpret the utterances and other behavior of a creature as revealing a set of
beliefs largely consistent and true by ow oun standards, ue have no reason to count that creature as
ratianal, as having beliefs, or as saying anything. (Davidson 1984:137)
Again, as is the case for EoUs, Davidson's mtfiodologicaL concerns motivate substantial epistmlogical claim.
The conditions of snccessfal translation becae the conditions of thinking (see M e 1991 p.llO).
The transition I r a the lethodological to the aomtive clah has no need of fusther justification for hidson. In
a sense, the constraints on interpretation dictate h a t qualifies as another rind. Mchael h t notes:
Davidson offers no m t to bridge the gap betreen other linds and our understanding of W... givea his
views on interpretation, there is no gap to bridge.. . it is lore appropriate to say that other rinds are the
products of interpretation than i t is to sag that they are the objects of interpretation. Other tinds, on
Davidson's vier, are what we get when ue interpret the behavior of others. (Boot 1!86:293-294)
The V e r y Idea d Suaxssful TranslatTon
13
The "cloud' exarple i s interesting bemuse it represents a concrete case in uhich the approaches taken by
klorf and Davidson significantly diverge. The statement 'a cloud is passing before the m,' in order to be interpreted,
according to Davidson, requires that speaker and interpreter agree not only on the presence of an external situation,
but on important features concerning vhat a cloud is [induding that clouds are made of water vapor)jDavidson 1987:167).
If Yhorf is right, there i s Little or no agreemt between Bglish and Bopi speakers concerning rhat a cloud is.
sentence itself as a complete interpretation? To what degree is the
interpretation contained in the footnote? If w e accept T-sentence (2) as
an interpretation, we have two further problems. First, not only is it
clear that the Hopi mean something quite different by 'o.'mSw' than is
captured by the English wcloud," but, just as importantly, if clouds are
the sorts of things that can be considered Living, then they must also
mean something substantially different than.is captured by the English
"Living." In both cases, further explication o r interpretation is required
to produce a complete interpretation than is provided by either T-
sentence. Whorf provides this explication, but does so ethnographically
rather than by elaborating a series of matching sentences in the two
languages. 14
Consider also the problem of making sense of the Yoruba claim that
they carry their heads or souls in a stick. No doubt there are wntexts
that provide for uncontroversial transIations of statements Like "there is
a headw or "there is a stick"; the difficulties for interpretation arise
when, given these established translations of the component terms, the
Yoruba appear to claim, under other circumstances, that they carry
their heads in sticks. Davidson acknowledges that there may be
problematic complex beliefs of this sort. H e does not expect agreement to
b e pervasive, just that it be the norm. It is simple statements of the
former sort that constitute the norm. Davidson could object that 1 have
focused on troublesome statements and insist that the truth-functional
disparities between t h e m can always be resolved by T-sentence
translations of other statements in the soure language, This response
reflects Davidson's commitment to holism, But holism cuts both ways. It
is important to recognize that translations of simple concepts cannot b e
treated as stable building blocks when complex statements involving
those concepts generate translation difficulties. When a translator learns
14
Dorit Bar41 points out that it is not standard practice to atterpt to ratch truth conditions vhere it
aepears that straightforuard translation has failed.
Uen translation frm a source 1e- into a target language fails, exqianations and descriptioas of why and
how it does, uhile conducted in the target language, typically do not take the fon of pairing of source
discourse with conditions of truth lodated in the target 1-e. (k-OnL994:160)
:
that the Yoruba claim to carry their heads in sticks, this perplmcity
requires reassessing our understanding of their concept of "headw and
"stick." For m o s t English speakers, a head is not the kind of thhg that
can wind u p in a stick, nor a stick the kind of thing that can hold a
head,
Any interpretation of the sentence in question amounts to a r e
interpretation of the supporting sentences. It is possible that many
statements will be interpretable a m r d i n g to Convention-T and yet that
different speakers represent the world in substantially different ways..
Davidson's radical interpretation does not exhaust the possibilities for
translation and does not preclude substantial difference between belief
systems. I suspect that I am reintroducing a semantic e l e m e n t to
interpretation where Davidson thinks one does not belong. I can see no
other way to fully appreciate the implications of holism. Translation m a y
not be a process of identifying the semantic content in foreign
expressions, but it does impose semantic content on them.
Davidson's theory of translation fails to take account of Quine's
"coIlateral informationwand the full implications of meaning holism (that
motivate the indeterminacy thesis) because he focuses exclusively on
examples of relatively easy translations of structurally similar sentences
between closely related languages. In addition, t h e actual translation
practice of anthropologists does not appear to f i t the model of
translation that Davidson treats as paradigmatic. Even if one followed it,
convention-T would not sufficiently mnstrain translation or provide the
guidance necessary for choosing among possible translations. Translators
routinely appeal to evidence beyond truth conditions to establish
interpretations of other beliefs. As Davidson argues. radical
interpretation is not translation, yet a great deal more goes into
providing an interpretation of a foreign belief than can be accounted
for by Davidson's convention-T.
Consider again the translation of the Zande boro mangu as "witchn
when interpreted in the form of a T-sentence, Among the options a
translator might consider the following:
(I) "Bore manguw is true if and only if x is a witch.
(2) Wore manguwis true if and only if x has a certain
substance in their intestines.
(3) wBoromanguwis true if and only if x has the ability to
iU effect other people telepathically.
Charitably Uncharitable
15
bong the problem uith such criteria of tmth or rationality include the possibility that most agents
sirply are not rational by philosophically fonalized standards. ! b y critics have suggested that the principle of
charity is an inappropriate @ide to translation because it requires a premption of rationality that #st agents
sirply do not meet. ifeudersw, b g a r d , Hisbett and Stich refer to studies done by 'hersky and Kahnarm (1974) and
Nisbett and Ross [1!80) in order to support the dlir that people sdda act accord@ to the rules of logic or ratiod
Any approach to translation w h i c h makes the principle of charity
central is called into question by Ian Hacking. H e objects that the key
concepts of indeterminacy, incommensurability, and conceptual schemes
cannot be adequately explicated in terms of truth conditions- According
to Hacking, both Quine and Davidson rely on the notion of bivalence-
that a proposition is either true or is false. in their assessments of the
nature of translation. Hacking argues, by contrast, that the operative
consideration in translation ought to be positivity--whether or not a
certain proposition is in the running for truth-or-falsity, The framework
that makes a statement a candidate for truth-or-falsity, Hacking calls a
"style of reasoning," and the goal of translation is to come to
understand what sorts of things others reason about, what they
consider to be candidates for truth-or-falsity as opposed to what they
hold to be tfue, Statements such as "the poison oracle has revealed x to
be a witchwor "I carry m y head in a stick" are better understood, not
as false in English, but as subjects w e simply do not reason about- To
understand the context that makes such things candidates for truth-or-
falsity is to understand another style of reasoning.
The reason Davidson rejects the idea of a conceptual scheme is
because he insists that translating a foreign statement is to be
accomplished exclusively b y matching truth assignments. B y focusing on
positivity rather than bivdence, Hacking inverts Davidson's reasoning.
Davidson answers the question of cultural difference based on his
theory of translation. Hacking accepts cultural difference and then
attempts to explain translation. While Hacking does not equate his
behavior. If this is right, then any principle for interpretation requiring rules construed in t e n s of ratioaality wiLl
be too strict. Thagard and Nisbett provide a large nmber of exiuples where it is necessary to uuderstand sowone (even
within oar om culture) as violating standard principles of logic because a) such principles are often violated and b)
language can have fuactions other than the cammication of truths fl'hagard and Nisbett 1983:253-261). At best, only a
very aodest or judiciously applied principle of charity is acceptable. Critiques such as those lodated by 'bersky and
i(ahnrmand Hisbett and Ross draw attention to the sense in which Davidson's theory is heavily intellectualist. He
analyzes every staterent as i f i t wst be hlte~retedas a proposition [either true or false) about reality and holds
that mch statements should be consist& and adhere to basic rnles of logic. Vhile this point is not genane to ly
argument, it is a pouedul and influential critiqne.
196
wstylesof reasoningw with QuineCs uconceptual schemes,w16 he suggests
that taking the goal of translation to be an attempt to come to
understand different "styles of reasoning" constitutes a shift of
emphasis that reopens the possibility of a certain type of r e l a t i ~ i s m . ' ~
Hacking states:
16
Hacking distinguishes his 'styles of reasoning" fro Qaine's 'conceptual schenese because opine takes the
defining mark of a concept& scheme to be the set of beliefs held true. A 'style of reasoningu is characterized by what
sorts of statments are candidates lor truth-or-falsehood. A belief system containiag the belief 'there are vitches"
might be rarked as a different conceptual schere f r a one in which the belief "there are no witches' appeared. These two
belief sgsters light be the sare 'style of reasoning,' however, if the latter, although decided in the negative, uere,
nonetheless considered a real possibility.
I7
This type of relativism balances the idea of substantial differences between representations of the world
vith the possibility of mintaining the idea that a style of reasoning bears sore real connection to the uorld and does
not necessarilg entail ineaensatabilitg. BacLiry states:
Although whichever propositions are true rap depend on the data, the fact that they are candidates for being
true is a consequence of an historical evmt. Conversely the rationality of a style of reasoning as a uay of
bearing on the truth of a class of propositions does not seer open for independent criticisr, because the very
sense of ultat can be established by that style depends on the style itself. (Hacking 198256)
not necessarily imply incommensurabiii~and/or untran~latibilit~ .I8
Hacking's analysis of the cross-cultural encounter thus preserves the
possibility of substantial mnceptual differences that may, nonetheless,
b e comrnuni~ated.~~
Another Line of criticism generated b y Davidson's truth-functional
account of translation focuses on the semantic implications of the
possibility of alternative truth schemes. Stephen Stich criticizes the
principle of charity on the grounds that alternate referential schemes
might produce alternate truth schemes? In order to understand the
implications of this point, it is important to understand Davidson's
notion of objectivity. Davidson's objectivism i s founded not primarily on
arguments against relativism but on arguments against skepticism, It is
impossible, according to Davidson, that w e truly engage in the type of
pervasive skepticism entertained by Descartes, In order to think a t all,
w e presuppose some notion of objective truth: "an awareness, no matter
how inarticulately held, of the fact that what is thought may be true or
10
Richard Rorty rodels translation on the notion of cross-cultural conversation rather than conceptual re-
description. He too transcends the probler of incmensurability by re-characterizing the Cunctioa(sJ of langmge a d
the goal of translation.
Only if one shares the logical positivists' c1ah tftat ve all carry around things called W e s of language'
which regalate what we sag uhen, viU one suggest that there is no vay to break out of one's culture.. ...
alternative cultures are not to be thouat of on the mdel of alternative gwetries. Alternative geaetries
are irreconcilabIe because they have axiomatic structures, and contradictory axioms. They are desjjped to be
irreconcilable. Cdtnres are not so desigued, and do not have axiimatic structures. (Rorty 2991:25-26)
In short, substantial conceptual differences and difficulty of translation do not iaply incmensurability unless
one takes the goal of translation to be the rappiug of sentences held true.
19
Peter Vinch, recall, interprets Zande witchcraft practices as being prirarily motivated by ethical concerns
and appeals to our ethical notions in order to explicate this different style of reasoning. ihorf appeals to analogies
uith c y c l i d recurrences in order to explicate hw the Hopi reason about tire. Each interprets the Other not by
paralleling truth assignments between languages, but by explicating differences through an appeal to a multitude of ways
that we reason about other latters. Truth is not the standard of every style of reasoning even within English.
20
Such is largely concerned with the (traditiooauy a r e 'cognitive science') issue of translating lental
states to propositions. The problers he encounters are strikingly sirilar to those discussed i n issues of translation
between languages and the argments apply equally there. This is to be expected, as he is basically addressing the
problm of Qnineanindeteninacy vithia a language. The parallel argument is treated by Quine althonth be ephasizes the
problem encountered in translatiq betreen languages. W e the eaphasis is different, it is no great distortion to
speak of Stich's analysis as i f it were about translation in general.
falsew (Davidson 1995:205). In short, w e must think in t e r m s of
propositional content and w e must understand that our beliefs might be
made false by the world. This is only possible, however, if w e take
many, or most, of our beliefs to be true- Datridson goes on to state:
If you wonder whether you are seeing a black snake, you must
have an idea of what a snake is. You must believe such things as:
a snake is an animal, it has no feet, it moves with sinuous
movement, it is smaller than a mountain. If it is a black snake,
then it is a snake and it is black. If it is black it is not green.
Since you wonder what you are seeing, you m u s t know what
seeing is: that it requires the use of the eyes; that you can see
something without touching it, and so on, I do not wish to give
the impression that there is a fixed List of things you must
believe in order to wonder whether you are seeing a black snake.
The size of the list is very Iarge, if not infinite, but membership
in the list is indefiite, What is clear is that without many of the
sort of beliefs 1 have mentioned, you cannot entertain the
proposition that you are seeing a black snake; you cannot believe
or disbelieve that proposition, wish it were false, ask whether it
is true, or demand that someone make it false. (Davidson 1995:211-
212)
21
The difference between charity and hmanity is trivial if one assoes that the target language is strictly a
tool for conveying truths and is largely (objectively or extra-1ingWicaIly) snccessfnl. There is a substantial
difference bet- the tuo principles uhen one reflects on the dti-functioning of the target language. The principle
of charity actually contains tvo claim: the Other most think like us adour beliefs ast be largely true. The
principle of humanity holds only that the Other mst fhid or use language in my of the s a rays ~ that we do. This
principle rrrains saevbat anbivalent concerning the truth status of beliefs and to what degree langage nsers adhere to
f o d principles of logic and rationality.
rich interpretations apped in order t o substantiate their translations?
David Henderson addresses precisely this question by asking what,
exactly, counts as success in translation for Quine and Davidson. While
Quine seems to admit oniy the possibility of partial o r inmmplete
translation, Davidson's criterion of success in translation is, on
Henderson's account, a particular1y demanding onen (Henderson
1994:174). Quine recognizes a measure of conceptual distance between
cultures depending on the apparent difficulties and distortions of
translation; for example, it may be possible to describe the beliefs of
mother even when it is impossible to accurately translate those beliefs
into statements in the target language. Quine recognizes this to be an
indication that substantial differences obtain between cultures: "the
merit to which w e have to employ gerrymandered constructions in our
home language in translating them provides a m e a s u r e of linguistic
differencew (Henderson l994:l7S, 192 quoting Quine 1981a:41). Quine
clearly accepts that translation may be partial and rely on
circumlocutions; Davidson, by contrast, does not accept the possibility of
partial failure of translation.
Henderson argues that this disagreement represents two different
types of translation. Davidson appeals to what Henderson describes as
"direct &anslation": it takes place where structural similarities between
languages permit easy identifications between sentences (e.g. where "der
schnee ist weiBW can be translated as "the snow is whitew). B y contrast,
examples like those drawn from the work of Whorf and Evans-Pritchard
defy this directness; translation in such cases must work indirectly or
"remnstru~~ely.~
22
Recunstmctive trauslation, according to Eendersoa, is used rhen no concept in the target language lopears
to provide an nnproblenatic equivalent. He suggests that translators are then forced to appeaI to the 'expressive
resources"ool their own language in order to approxiute a description of the beliefs in question. This is, again, to
acknowledge that language provides lore possibilities lor description than literal propositions about reality and that,
Mangu is such a concept according to Henderson. While it bears
s o m e resemblance to Western witchcraft, as I argued in chapter two,
there are countless ways in which it defies this resemblance. Not only
does English lack a ready-made concept to adequately translate mangu,
but the differences between the role played by this Zande concept and
that played by wwitchcraftwin the West has implications for our
understanding of Zande logic that are also lost in translation. Henderson
argues that such cases are the rule rather than the exception in
anthropological work (Henderson 1994:183)- The use of ready made
concepts in the target language may distort the practice of the Other in
significant ways, making the foreign beliefs appear irrational or false, In
such cases, the only way to provide a plausible translation is to
elaborate a detailed ethnographic account that situates the concept
within the broader social context.
Henderson argues that reconstructive translation satisfies
Davidson's criteria of languagehood, but that admitting this type of
translation "undercuts the central Line in Davidson's objection to the
idea of conceptual schemesw (Henderson 1994:187), Significant mnceptual
differences preclude "directwtranslation but do not preclude translation
of any kind. Although it is not acknowledged by Davidson,
reconstructive translation makes it possible to communicate significantly
different concepts between languages. Dorit Bar-On, like Whorf,
investigates examples in which direct translation fails (because of
substantial conceptual differences) but expLicative accounts succeed in
conveying the meanings of significantly different beliefs.
even within a lmguage, there are ung uays to [rare a representation of the world. The translator often appeals to
metaphor or analog (consider again the way Vborf describes Hopi 'they or ccubines aspects of available concepts (as
in the vay Evaas-Pritchard descrik m.
Successful direct translation may impIy a closeness of conceptual
schemes whereas the need for pervasive reconstructive translation m a y
indicate substantial conceptual distance. This is exemplified in the
translations provided by Whorf and many anthropologists, in their
attempts at translating the beliefs of the Other as substantially different
and yet cornmunkable,
The principle of charity is only necessary as a methodological
constraint if a l l translation practice is identified with direct translation.
Henderson suggests, instead, that a "principleof explicabilitywshould b e
the methodological guide for translation. This allows for translation that
conforms to the principle of charity only in the early stages of
translation, in what Henderson refers to as "first approximation
translations (Henderson l98?:227). When translators move on to consider
more complex and divergent beliefs, they are compelled to modify
translations of simple ones in an attempt to explain the differences they
encounter that seem to defy direct
There are t w o points 1 want to make about Henderson's distinction.
First, if the principle of charity is operative only in the early stages of
translation (if at all), then there can b e no a priori constraint imposed
on the potential degree of cross-cultural difference that can be
23
This claim that the principle of charity is operative only in the early stages of translation dram
attention to a lisgniaed, explicit assraption in Hollis' analysis, and iaplicit in Midson's, that i t is irpossible to
make changes to a translation uual once one uses translated sentences as an aid to the translation of others. Bollis
does, and Davidson seers to, a s m e that there is a certain group of sentences (a type or class) that translate
according to principle and then cannot be rodified in Light of later evidence since these serve as premises for later
translations. Henderson's suggestion that the principle of charity is only operative in the early stages of translation
arounts to an acknowledgerent that no translated sentence is h e to revision.
In reference to the exaaple that Qaine so often used, on Davidson's mdel, we wonld be justified in translating
gaviigaias 'there is a rabbit' since the assigneat of truth values is the same for both languages. 'Undetached rabbit
parts9nd 'rabbit stages' are not options since re have no use for truth assignments for these in English. Suppose,
h m r , that further investigation into this other cnlture revealed that these people distinguished, in their language,
things that have a greater value as holes, and things that have a greater value as a s n of parts. They light have a
single ward €ora carplete coin coilection (which English expresses as a collection of puts) and express other things,
uhich English categorizes as wholes, as a collection of parts (like sae old cars). In translating their statements, the
translator may uant to convey this distinction (especially if the other language contained different vords for cars mre
valuable as vboles and cars wre valuable as parts) by finding a way to represent s a e collections as wholes and wholes
as collections. Suppase that rabbits, for these people, Ere of greater d u e once 'parted-out' and hence f e l l under
this category. It might, in this case, be better to translate lawai,on further reflection, as "detached rabbit
earts."e original ("charitable') translation wuld be in need of modification given greater fariliarity with the
language and the beliefs of the Other.
recognized- The assumption that the principle of charity serves only
heuristic purposes implies that it m a y or may not be vindicated b y any
particular linguistic confrontation, Second, if the project of translation
moves beyond the Limits envisioned by Davidson, then T-sentence
translations must b e recognized to be not just first stage interpretive
approximations, but misleading translations in many cases. The failure to
engage in reconstructive translation where there is a substantial
disjunction between mncepts in use results in a misrepresentation of
the belief(s) in question; charity requires, during the initial stages, an
imposition of meaning on the foreign phrase that can only be refined
through subsequent reconstructive translation. T h e indeterminacy of
meaning may preclude fitera1 representation of foreign beliefs, but it
does not preclude misrepresentation.
Motivated by the necessity of reconstructive translation, cross-
cultural accounts of belief systems evolve into ethnographies rather
than bilingual dictionaries. And, while ethnographic interpretations
remain as indeterminate as dictionaries, they do reveal, more clearly, the
nature of the cross-cultural representation that is a product of
translation. Robert Feleppa has proposed a re-conceptuaIization of
translation that reconciles the anthropological practice of ascribing
meaning to foreign beliefs w i t h Quinean commitments to the theoretical
indeterminacy of meaning? Feleppa argues for a wconstr~ctive semantic
anti-realismw (Feleppa 1988:214) which satisfies the interpreter's
inclination to attribute mntent/meaning to the beliefs of the Other
without being ontologically committed to the existence of linguistically
24
Feleppa atteapts to relate the long-standing debate in anthropology snrmmding the eticlexic: distinction to
Qnine's indeteninacy thesis. Roughly speaking, emic concepts are those that are cdtnrally specific (and are often held
to be nutranslatable); etic concepts are lhose that are seen as cross-cultnrallg applicable (or universal). The mean
question related to this distinction is 'Can one ever translate an eric concept?' or 'Can one represent the wrld as the
Other represents it?' This, amding to Feleppa, i s the question that rests on a u s taken idea about dat translation
is.
In light of the iadetenirucy pmbJers we have considered, ue sirply have no warrant for believhg that any
concept expressed in the receptor l a w e or the metalanguage is eric in the senses typically mployed.
(Feleppa 1988: 202-3)
But neither i s there reason to suppose that there are p d g etic concepts either. Clnce translation is
reconceptnalized, there is really no substance to the distinction.
independent meanings- On this account, the attribution of meanings to
the statements made by others are as much a product of our own
language and purposes as theirs.
25
Wle kvidson resists the possibility of relativism by postulating a pervasive sirilarity between
languages, his attack on the idea that translation involves a kind of recovery of leaning also carprorises the idea that
a 1e- c d d be vieved as a stable (pre-interpreted) strncture. The thesis of linguistic relativisa is rendered
solawhat loot not because (as Davidson swests) there can be no substantial difference betueen beIief systms, but
rather becaase (as Davidson also suggests) this idea depends on tbe notion that meanings can be fixed within various
languages and then taken to have deteninate waning only relative to that language. hdeteninacy caprorises the idea
of recovery, questions the idea of linguistic structure, and, hence, pmblmtins the idea of cunceptd or ontoiogicd
relativity.
Ybat ve have shoun... is not that reference is not relative bat that there is no intelligible vay of
relativizing it that justifies the concept of ontological relativity. The relativization lnst appear in the
language in which the relativized predicate mnrs (and hence cmot be to that 1e- or to a theory for
that language). (Davidson 1984:238)
If other belief system are the prodoctsof interpretation rather than the vbjecfsof translation, then it mkes no
sense to speak of preexistent leanings relative to a pre-existent strnctms. Davidson, as a result, questions the very
idea of a "language' i f such a thing irplies a structure of w a s (Davidsan 1986:442-446).
is amassed. One learns about relevant socia.t practices, history, and the
extended uses of concepts. As one acquires a proficiency with such
collateral information, the translation manual takes a form less like a
cross-linguistic di&-ona.ry (of words or sentences) and more like a
detailed ethnography. As FeIeppa emphasizes, the translation manual is
constructive and prescriptive of a meaning system to be imposed on the
beliefs of the Other.
If these characterizations are correct then the central focus of
translation theory should concern what happens when one proposes a
translation scheme in spite of indeterminacy. Because translation is a
prescriptive activity, the nature of translation is inseparable from the
issue of the ethics and the politics of representation.
Chapter Six - Anthropology in Question
Fading Foundations
In order to objectify the other, one is, at the same time, compelled
to objectify the self..,. In the hardening scientific perspective,
primitive characteristics are regarded as remote in t i m e and space;
they are at the base of the evolution toward civilization; and
n been identified as a milinear, inevitably
c i ~ t i o has
progressive movement. (Diamond 1969:401,413)
The idea that other cultures are placed outside of the local present
of the ethnographer as a result of the methods by which they are
represented motivates H y m e s and others to analyze the specific devices
b y w h i c h the Other is marginalized, Much of Hymes' introduction, for
instance, focuses on the way in which the discipline of anthropology is
shaped by the structure of academic departments and teaching methods
(Hyrnes 1969:36-48).' The ways in which other cultures are represented
and the way in which these representations are understood is thus
shaped by the structure of academia (at a local scale) as w e l l as by
aspects of Western culture, language, history, and epistemology (on the
large scale). These critics suggest that the primary task of anthropology
must be to investigate the effects of one's own culture (or sub-culture)
on our representations of other cultures.
1
'l'his attention to the structure of acadeaic institutions, the effects of the pragmatic constraints on
receiving a graduate degree, teaching position, or tenure, as well as vhat gets accepted for publication in journals
etc. has becae a central issue in rmderstanding the oatare of the ethnographic text and hence the representation of the
Other. See also Harcns [ W ) , R a b b (1986:254, & l99l), Said (l9W!2l), Uwer (l9Ri:lO8-llZ), Fabian (I983:94,l2l),
Ceertz (i!83: l%-I63), Marcus and Fischer [l986:2l-2I1 31) and Atkinson (1990:g).
Another critique of this wscientismwis developed by Bob Scholte
who, in "Toward a Reflexive and C r i t i c a l Anthrop~logy,~ looks toward the
future of anthropoIogy and charts a tentative path toward solutions to
the crisis of representation. He captures the central message of the
collection: "we must first subject anthropological thought itself to
ethnographic description and ethnological understandingw (Scholte -
2
I do not uant to dwell mch farther on the realio/reIativim debate since i t is largely irrelevant given
this refraring of the probla. That debate centers on the status of representations, and depends (either ray) on the
possibility of independently existing wanirys, ðer or not ue can look behind the 'interfering glossesg to the
'real' aeaning. Ceertz virtually steps outside of the debate by defending not 'relativis', but rather 'Anti-Anti-
Relativisr' (Ceertz 1989).
The case against relativisa is better expIained, according to Ceertz, by an na~~nstified fear or dismfort with the
supposed implications of the thesis rather than any strong case rade for the realist position. It is widely understood
[feared) that relativism implies a sort of ' a n y t b g toess nihilio, that, without *real"astraiats on hov we think
The truth of the doctrine of cultural (or historical--it is the s a m e
thing) relativism is that w e can never apprehend another people's
or another period's imagination neatly, as though it were our own.
The falsity of it is that w e can never genuinely apprehend it at
all. W e can apprehend it well enough, at least as well as w e
apprehend anything not properly ours; but w e do so not by
looking behhd the interfering glosses that connect u s to it but
through them. (Geertz 1 9 8 3 ~ 4 4 )
and what we call knwledge, there are no constraints at all. Once interpretation takes the place of representation in
anthropological theory, there is no leaning 'behindYo be a realist or relativist about. In just the way that Davidson
and Quine love beyond the standard oppositions that ground that debate, (leertt's eaphasis on the 'interfering glossesm
theaselves directs attention tovard the activity of interpreting the Other, confronting neither realism nor relativia,
but translation.
of our confrontation w i t h different ways of living and making sense of
reality.
3
Paul Radin vas f d g auare of the pmbleas encountered in the idea of representing the thought of 'another
cultnre' as early as 1927. Be observes that mst anthropological wrk is prerised on the idea of a 'group-mind' and that
such an assmtion can only result in iniulegnacies of the account (Badin 192796). W g Schnltz's p r h y criticia of
Benjamin llorf is that he too gives the Eopi only a 'group voice' (Schultz 1990:76-77). The asmption is that one is
interpreting a monolithic thing, a culture that #rely expresses itself through the voices of individuals. In Ems-
Pritchard's account as well, ue are told what "the Azande"k1ieve and not vhat any individual Zande says. Wagner
constantlp draus attention to the distortions necessary in moving f r a the specific individual voice [of the
ethnographic eucormter) to the general group voice of the ethnographic account ad hou the idea of culture is a product
of that rovaent betmu experience and representation.
epistemological presuppositions. Cultures are represented as paradigms,
as definable, rulegoverned ways of confronting reality and, hence, as
systems of ideas much Like scientific theories. As the study of other
cultures, anthropology had always depended on the assumption that
culture is a preexisting, static, homogeneous, defined entity. It is an
assumption that Pollows from the goal of representation.( Because this
invention of culture shapes the representation of the Other, Wagner
characterizes anthropology, not as the study of other beliefs or ways of
living, but a s "the study of man through the assumptrbn of culturem
(Wagner lWFc35)(italics mine).
By constructing an abstract representation of another culture that
reduces the differences within that culture to differences between
cultures (between "usm and VhemW),the Other m m e s a contrastive
object of comparison understood as a stage in the telos of Culture: the
structure of contrasts requires that it be located on a continuum, as
having made greater or lesser progress toward the set of inventions
and achievements that defines "Culturew as such. If anthropology is to
conform to scientific ideals, the unsystematic, two-way dialogue that
actually constitutes the ethnographic encounter must be reduced to a
systematic, univocal representation of the Other.
4
This '9ttatic"aspect of representation has becue a c n there. It vas veli characterized by Bob Scholte in
the ReiOP.eofirlgAoflimpoIogpcollection.The idea of representation is inthatelg Linked with the effort to rodel
anthropology on the methods and goals of the natural sciences. Wysical theory quires that the laus of nature (and the
descriptions and explanations of naturaI processes) rerain static. 'Scientis' in the social sciences lakes this same
requireaent the very condition of hadedge.
Yhw scientim is raised to the encapassing status of a philosophical systea, its ultirate purpose becaes
the ratiooaI explanation of a determinable reality in accord with dversal principles and objectire
t echniqnes. (Scholte 1969: B 6 )
We there had already been a trend in the social sciences to break f r a the wdel of the natural sciences, that
break had not involved a re-evaluation of the goal of explanation. The idea of accurate, static description, or
representation, remhed.
our self-image of culture has c o m e to be applied indiscriminately
to the lifeways of others. (Wagner 1975:125,132)
Fabian traces the history of the idea and use of "timewin the West
from its Judeo-Christian, sacred, tdeological formation to its
secularization and then scientific universalization. His a i m is to give an
account of the concept of t i m e that provides a foundation for
contemporary anthropological research (Fabian 19832-17). A s Wagner
suggested, the idea of a unidirectional, linear time, combined with that
of culture, embodies an evolutionist theory which also provides the
framework and justification for an evolutionary epistemology. Fabian
focuses attention on the implicit teleological element in Christian notions
of time (evolution toward salvation) and of the enlightenment telos of
reason (the perfection of understanding). This understanding of time
motivates and justifies the practice of structuring and taxonomizing
history in terms of epochs or evolutionary stages that lead to the
present self. The self in Western culture thus occupies a privileged
temporal position which simultaneously places the anthropologist (and/or
Western man) ahead in time and above in thought, Anthropological
accounts implicitly proceed by locating other cultures in one or another
of the evolutionary epochs defined by the history of Western thought.
thus distancing the O t h e r from the "presentw of the anthropologist.
Fabian refers to this distancing as a udenial of coevalnesswby which he
means "a persistent and systematic tendency to place the referent(s) of
a~thropologyin a time other than the present of the producer of
anthropological discoursew (Fabian 1983:31), B y creating a text of the
belief system of the Other, their culture is defined in terms of and
displaced to an earlier stage of our own past,
Once other cultures are fenmd off as culture gardens or, in the
terminology of sociological jargon, as boundary-maintaining
systems based on shared values; once each culture is perceived as
Irving in its Time, it becomes possible and indeed necessary to
elevate the interstices between cultures to a methodological
status.,., The very notion of m n t a b h g waUs and boundaries
creates order and sense based on discontinuity and distance.
(Fabian 1983:47,52)
W r i t i n g Culture
5
The choice of this wrk as a case study rakes an avhmrd aission in #kit& Cblture wen lore @parent. In
the introduction, Clifford defends the mission of any leahist essays fror the collection (Clifford 1986a:ld-21) on the
basis that existing lainist works have Little bearing on the specific topic at hand. In chapter seven, I will discuss
an important work constructed as a response to Clifford and Marcus' aission of the M n i s t perspective: kiting
Cdture (1995).
Clifford's critiqae of Shostak can be (and has been) taken in at least tw ways. It can be taken as an example of
an overbearing use of allegory that hopelessly (and unnecessarily) distorts the beliefs of the Other or, i t can be taken
as an exiuple of the unavoidable use of allegory significant in that the necessary distortions are clearly visible i n
this account. A careful reading, I tbink, exonerates Clifford of the foraer icterpretation. Be uses Nisa to demnstrate
that all ethnographic armunts have this effect, that eveq amuut is a "joint pndnction,' the 'p~~bleaatic outam of
intersubjective dialogue, translation, and projection"(Clifford 1986b:109).
Harcas and FiscLr also treat Shostak's Esa at length as a case of a neu direction in anthropology that
a the confines of traditional representation and ackaoyledges its aun constmctedness (Hamsand
(partially) breaks f r
Fischer 1986:j7-59,IO8-l09).
must be translated into a presently adsting, conventional, allegorical
structure. It is, therefore, not the case that the beliefs of members of
one culture are translated into the language of another; what is
accomplished in cross-cultural interpretation is, rather, a conceptual/
linguistic crossing of cultures. By focusing on the ways in which the
literary tropes confer meaning on another belief system, Clifford reveals
the sense in which the ethnography is a "joint production" in which
Shostak's imposition of literary structure shapes the very meaning of
Nisa's statements. Shostak portrays Nisa as an average !Kung woman (as
profoundly other) whiIe a t the same time translating her beliefs in terms
of a "Western feminist allegorywthat makes them familiar and gives them
meaning, Translation in terms of this allegory at once provides a
framework for understanding the beliefs of the Other and distorts those
beliefs; their meaning, in translation, cannot be separated from Shostak's
choice of allegory. Bemuse the imposition of allegorical structure is a
necessary precondition for translation, the choice of a Literary trope
precedes the ascription of meaning to the beliefs in question.6
These insights about the roIe of allegory in representing the
beliefs of the Other have crucially important implications. They make it
clear that the meanings of symbols and statements that are presumed to
characterize a practice (such as witchcraft) are not built up from the
translations of individual sentences, but are, to a great extent, a
product of the type of story told and, these "types of storiesware
6
Crapanzano, in 'Eenes Dilm,n analyzes three types of distortion that take place through translation into
thee different narrative allegories. Bg looking at the arks of Catlin, Goethe, and Geertz, Crapanzano attwpts to
elicit the strategies by rhich each author establishes ethnagraphic authority and persuades the reader that their
interpretation is the truth. Tbese allegories both give leaning to the events described as veil as establish the
ethnographer as a detached observer in a position to rake objective claims. Yet, even uhile grounding the
interpretation, the casting of such foreign events and the determination of their leanings through these allegories,
vhich serve to establish athority, sinltaneously subvert it. "AuAuthority"dissipates as soon a the distorting effects
of the ailegory becme clear.
In all three instances the events described are subverted by the transcending stories in uhich they are cast.
They are sacrificed to their rhetorical function in a literary discourse that is far rmved Ira the
indigenous discourse of their occurreme. (Crapanzano I986:76)
232
themselves cultural constructs! There are no "simplewtranslated units
with which one could then construct an explanatory account. If this is
correct, then the translation of every individual sentence proceeds
under conditions of indeterminacy (a m e a n i n g deficiency, as Quine and
Davidson would have it), yet the postulation of a translation scheme
generates an interpretive meaning surplus. Interpretive understanding
is not built up from an accumulation of evidence or by means of an
appeal to the determinations of meaning in specific sentences; it is
a c c o m p l i s h e d in the act of translating whole belief systems- Translated
sentences convey more semantic content than the author or translator
can control by attempting to establish accuracy by "direct translationR
component parts, This is dear in the analysis of witchcraft developed in
chapter two.
7
Tbis is a point that 1 viU elaborate further at the end of this chapter. We few of the aathors in Yrithg
lhltnre address translation problem specificdlly, rnch is hplied by Clifford's and siular accounts. A key feature to
understanding an ethnographic account or translation mt coacern the Literary allegory or trope uhich it is translated
intu. Tdal Asad, in his contribution to LSitAg Ihltore, does have a great deal to say, houever, concerning theories of
translation that take sentems to be the primary onits of translation. That sort of analysis necessarily ignores the
effect that structure and allegory have on be1ief ascription through the translation of individual sentences.
account- Even though such c r i t i c i s m reveals s o m e of the ways in w h i c h
the Other is mismnstructed, it brings the Other no closer to our
understanding, replacing distance with fiction, and threatens to divorce
ethnography altogether from factual accounting,
Does this mean that the Other is a pure fiction and that
ethnography is about nothing outside itself and its own texts? If there
is no "representation," if there is nothing represented, then it appears
that there is no actual subject. And without this, there is nothing to be
right or wrong about, It is possible to generate a multitude, perhaps an
infinity, of stories about another culture by exploiting countless
divergent allegories all of which seem equally constructed, equally
fictional and equally "real," Initially, Clifford seems to embrae this
radical indeterminacy,
8
W e admirably thorn@, dming fm such a broad nay of authors likdr obscures are than i t clarifies.
As she defines it, ~e label 'post-mdernislR refers to a blatantly inconsistent set of approaches to interpretation
[this shodd be expected a it is tantammt to cabhing all of the vieus tbat fall under & ' heading 'mdecaist and
then call i t a %toryn).
Following a presentation of this broad range of suhstantiallg different approaches to interpretation, she bsically
coabines them all and then delineates two types of posbodernist which she labels 'skeptics' and 'affirmatives' (Rosenau
1992:15). The former allw the perceived free play of interpretation to reduce the project to nihilistic
neaniaglessness, W e the latter atterpt to raintain a irarevork that allows for at least s a e justification for
political action and a displaced fon of representation; in essence, she reduces the skeptical position to uihilia or
"anfihing goes"rdativia, and the af fimative position to roanticia or mdane subjectivism.
!
This is not an mcaon conclusioa for those vho atterpt to read psbodernisl as a 'theory' and reduce i t to
a "method.' In other wrds, aany critics see the absence of well-defined theoretical/ rethodological constraints as the
absence of any constraints vhatsmer. She draws I r a a nmber of soarces to present a 'deconstructive lethod' that
includes the folloving guidelines (Rosenau 1992:121). I repeat a substantial excerpt of it here i f ody because i t is a
strmning example of the distortion produced by this reduction, and a rather clear example of uhy such an approach should
be so widely resisted when presented i n this [om:
-Find an exception to a geaediziation in the text and pub it to the 1 s t so that this generalization
appears absurd; in other wrds, use the exception to undenine the principle.
-Interpret the ar-ts in a text being deconstructed in their rast extreae [on.
-Avoid absolute s t a t m t s in deconstrncting a text, but cultivate a sense of intellectual excitment by
u k h g staterents tbat are both startling and sensational.
-Deny the Iegitimcy of all didlatolies because there are duays a fev exceptions to any generalization based
on bipolar tens, and these can be used to undenine them.
-Hothing is to be accepted; nothing is to be rejected. It is extre#Ly difficult to criticize a decanstructive
argument if no clear viewpoint i s expressed.
- W e so as to penit the greatest norber of interpretations possible; ambiguity and ambivalence are not to
be shunned but rather cultivated. Obscurity lay "protect from serious scmtiny~tEllis1989: 140). The idea is
"to create a text Withoat finality or cmpletion, one with vhich the reader can never be finished.'
-Bploy new and unusual teninology in order tbat Yfariliar positions rag not sea too familiar and othenrise
obviously relevant scholarship uy not seea so obviously relevant"((Bllis 1989: 142).
-@Neverconsent to a change of teninoJoq and duays insist that the vording of the deconstrnctive argument
is sacrosanct.' &re familiar fodations undenine any sense that the deconstmctive position is unique and
.
distinctive (Ellis 1989: 145)
This set of d e s reads like a bad parody and drastically misrepresents uhat my [or lost) post-lodernists are
trying to reveal about the activity of interpreting the Otber.
Given Rosenau's characterization of postmodernism, it is not
surprising that she concludes that it is inappropriate for the social
sciences- The skeptical, n.h. *k h'c postmodernist she defines, is not
widely represented in anthropology, as critical reactions to Tyler (who
probably qualifies as one of Rosenau's postmoderaists) make clear. In
Literary studies, the activity of interpreting texts in ever more inventive
ways has become something of a self-contained, bourgeois pastime in
which academics intentionally Limit their attention to the idiosyncracies
of Ianguage and of each other's texts- Rosenau is acutely attentive to
the insulation of academia from the world that makes possible these
practices and their distorting effects. While the production of
ethnography is deeply conditioned b y academic structure, it need not
be, and indeed typically is not, as blatantly self-referential as Literary
analysis, The obsessive self-referentiality that Ebsenau has identified in
some examples of postmodern interpretation could be as destructive of
anthropology as the unreflective ethnocentric objectivism it is meant to
counter. But, this characterization b y no means exhausts the range of
anthropological practices that have been inspired by critiques of
representation.10
10
This is not to say that ethognphg does not s a e t h s degenerate into pureIg textual reference [as Literary
criticin does precisely becanse its object is generally limited to other texts]. Said seers to suggest that traditional
Orientalisa has done just that [Said 1978:21). Yet Said suggests that this degeneration is a product of
aodemist/stmct~ststyles of representation. Tyler sees the crisis of representation and its self-referentidity as
the end of the story, but most critics see the Other as distorted or displaced in interpretation rather than erased.
Said is clear in feeling that deconstructing the text that refers only to other texts frees rather than dliinishes the
voice of the Other. It is the rodernist text that erases the Other t h r o e essentializing. Armrding to Said,
deconstruction reintroduces history and poLitics into representation. That destabilizing pressure is narrative and is
obtained through a re-read@ that disrupts those comentions which suppress narrative:
Against this static spster of 'sgachrouic essentialism' I have called vision because it presumes the &ole
Orient can be seen pmoptidy, there is constant pressure. The source of pressure is narrative, in that i f
any Oriental detail can be show to rave, or to develop, diachron~ris introduced into the system. Wat semed
stable-and the Orient is spongrous uith stability and unchanging etewty--nw appears unstable.
Instability suggests that history, uith its disruptive detail, its cnrrents of change, its tendency toward
growth, decline, or dramatic louerent, is possible in the Orient and for the orient. Bistory and the narrative
by uhich history is represented argue that vision is insufficient, tbat 'the Orient' as an unconditional
ontological category does an injustice to the potential reality for change. ...Narrative, in short, introduces
an opposing point o l vim, perspective, consciousness to the rmitarg web of vision; it violates the serene
Apollonian fictions asserted by vision. [Said 19'18:240)
O n closer analysis, Rosenau's characterization of deconstruction,
despite her critique of postmodernism, appears far less destructive than
she claims. iier own amount illustrates the consWuctive potential of
these practices.
Regna Darnel1 characterizes Clifford aad hrcos' implication that s a e radicd change has taken place in
anthropology overniot as the "rhetoric of discontinuity.' The self-proclaimed anthropological postrodernists 'reject
the interpretive intelIectd genealogy@(Damell1995:4). In other wrds, the raent is read outside of its oun histow
as a Knhnian paradig shift that distorts the red issue. Very feu of these arrthropologists are professing to give up
same version ot representation (except possibly Tyler). Dunell snggests that the reaction to YnntQf Chltnn? (and the
cmon characterization that i t represents a *postnodern* tnm) is lore a product of the fact that the book's readership
extended beyond the discipLine (rather t b i ~aaythhg it had to say about the state of anthropology) and thereby became
subject to other friuewrks for interpretation that granted credence to this 'rhetoric of discontinuity.' A healthy step
back frm the careless nihilistic conclnsions following the focus on the text resitnates a great deal of &at is said
here as an mtmioaof the work done by Qms, Geertz, Said, and Fabiau rather than as a diaissal of the object of
the critique of representation to justify the unquaLified rejection of any
referential connection to t h e world. Given that deconstruction has not
undercut cross-cuItural representation to the point of m a k i n g it
arbitrary fiction, the question becomes, how should this comection
between the text and the Other b e re-established when all obj&ve
constraints on interpretation have been rejected?
anthropology.
During the sare year as fiL@ Mtm, Marcus and Fischer (both cuntributors to that collection) published
Bnthropology as Iblfwal Critique: do Erperkutal m f 21tbe K i ~ences.We topically shilar to the essays
in Yrifiag Mfure, this rock carefully reads the recent trends in anthropology his toricalIg, sn#gesting,
This experiwltal trend is not really new in its concerns and airs. It is merely a falfillrent of the long-
established contributions that anthropology, through ethnography, has p d s e d to wke. [Warens and Fischer
1946:166)
societies, even if the sense in which they do this is problematized by
critiques of traditional forms of representation:' Nor are these writers
willing to grant that, because ethnography is, in an i m p o r t a n t sense,
creative fiction, a partial product of prevalent Literary conventions, that
any story w i l l do, In practice, the loss of a pureiy referential function
does not reduce ethnography to "anything goesw relativism. Clifford
dearly distinguishes between postmodern literary theory and
anthropological practice and attempts to delimit the range of stories one
can tell about other cultures that are acceptable.
12
Sociologist Pad Atkinson, bt Zl?e E&bgraph.ic~ f i o a also , eaphasizes the partially retained
referential function of ethnographic writing in spite of the p o s W e r n critique of traditional meaning theories:
The post-Sanssurean recognition that the linguistic sign is 'arbitrary' does not condem us to the viw that
ue have lost everything in a sea of whirsical or random seriosis.. .. the recognition of the textual
conventions of ethnography, then, does not rob it of its referential value. (Atkinson f990:176)
Also, in lrbdwstaadiag Bthnodrapbfc Teats, Atkinson accepts poshadem insights, relating h tem to ethnographic
vork and interpretation, yet cautions against the idea that ethnography is entirely self-referential (Atkinson 199250-
51). An auareness oC the effects of textual conventions does not erase the Other entirely. The Other is not entirely in
texts theaselm, but is referred to tho@ texts.
While there may b e a multitude of ways to interpret the beliefs of the
Other, not any story will do.
The emphasis on the politics of interpretation is central to Paul
Rabinow's mntribution to WriZihg Cul- his analysis of representation
reflects the mncerns of earlier critics Like Hymes and Said, He develops
his own deconstructive analysis of the foundations of traditional
representation and, at the same time investigates the ethical constraints
that would operate in a reconstructed responsible anthropology. To this
end, Rabinow considers the critiques of representation developed by
Richard Rorty and Ian Haddug, arguing that these amounts miss an
important feature of cross-cultural representational practice.' They fail
to adequately consider the "politics of powerw that structure every
representation of another culture. bbinow draws on the work of Michel
Foucault to show that every interpretation takes place within the
context of a political relation between the cultures that represent and
are represented, Rabinow draws on Foucault for a more detailed account
of the historical/poiitiCZtl constraints to which Clifford refers, without
going so far as to suggest that historical context Limits interpretation to
"no free-play," as Clifford suggests, Rabinow recognizes that the
postmodern critique of representation does not entail the relativism of
limitless play. Where political and historical factors underpin
justifications of the tactics commonly used to represent other cultures,
the ethnographic O t h e r emerges as a product of ethical and political
relations that are both intercultural and academic, This inevitably
generates representational distortions which Rabinow acknowledges, while
at the same t i m e identifying an arena of debate in which systematic
critical comparison of representations is possible.
13
This wars as a substantial oversight priaarily tca the standpoint of ethnography. In aLl fairness, both
Rorty and Backing dwdop their vieus in the context of a critiqne of the philosophy of (physical) science. Politics is
not so cIearly an issue in such utters. The turn to Foucault is necessitated by considering these probias in reference
to anthropology here politics has been acknowledged as a considerable factor.
suspicious of its own imperial tendencies. It attempts to be highly
attentive to (and respectful of) difference, but is also wary of the
tendency to essentiaIize difference. (Rabinow (1986~258)
Return to language
14
The way ethnographies are read is less a product of the way they are written than it is a product of the uay
they are taught and discussed in Wversity. Asad ends his critique of Cellner's uork by asking uby, it there are so
my pmblas vi th the content of the work, does it continue to be a central piece in introductory anthropology classes?
His ansuer has more to do with the structure of teaching and testing letbods than it does with anything presented in the
piece, The hole idea of testing in school is based on the idea of objeclively correct anmers to central questions.
That structure dictates a r e a m style that reinforces the tendency to objectify the Other.
The process of "cultural translationn is inevitably enmeshed in
conditions of power--professional, national, international, And
among these conditions is the authority of ethnographers to
uncover the i m p l i c i t meanings of subordinate societies. Given that
this is so, the interesting question for enquiry is not whether,
and if so to what extent, anthropologists should be relativists or
rationalists, critical or charitable, toward other cultures, but how
power enters into the process of wCUItural translation,* seen both
as a discursive and as a non-discursive practice. (Asad 1986:163)
1
John hpnto's &T' a Posbetaphysical RationaIity' is an insightfd read@ into the aspects of rodern
academia, and the role played by nethod and theory uithin that context in relation to criteria and assesslents of
rationality. Be suggests that a pasbetaphysical notion of rationality, W e it is desperately needed in the social
sciences, is resisted precisely because it threatens the stnrcture and privile~eof acaderia. The academic, as rational
The (sub)language that emerges is uniquely infIexible and dominant in
intra-linguistic encounters, no less than in cross-linguistic encounters.
In these one-sided Linguistic confrontations, concepts expressed in
almost my natural language will appear, to some degree, incoherent,
ambiguous and irrationaI, Sets of statements expressed in non-academic
English suffer the same Pate as beliefs expressed in foreign languages
in tran~lation.~
An important consideration in assessing the relative power of
languages in translation will b e the contexts in which the target
(sub)languages have evolved and the purposes they serve. Critical
language is critical- Natural languages are shaped by many forces; in
the case of Western languages, the sublanguages of science have
brought about significant modifications in their linguistic resources and
functions, The idea that statements made by the Other can be translated
into such a language and manipulated by its rules without compromising
their meaning constitutes a critical judgement that reflects a profoundly
unequal linguistic power relation.
This linguistic corollary to ethnocentrism suggests that the target
language can accurately express the various utterances of the Other
center, is threatened by any decenterhg (Caputo 198?:209-235). In other rords, a critique of rationality is
sinmItaneously a critique of a c a d ~ a .
2
Xan-cross-cultad speculation on rationality and rational decision mkiq have become highly esoteric
fields, requiring the develo~entand extensive use of rathematics and specialized artificial languages. The linguistic
rift carved by these debates is really not so mch between Eqlish and other natural lauguges, bat rather, betueen
artificial and natural languages (standard English included). fiat is often missed is that lang of the specialized
sublanguages within philosophy and cognitive science are not, strictlg speaking, 'natnd' lauguges.
It is revealing that the expression "it's academic' has cae to lean 'it has no practical bearing on anything-r
'it doesn't really tatter." many cases, the 1-e of acadenia is so refined as to seriously threaten its relation
to, or translation into, any natural or ordinary language. It is this feeling that aotivated Vittgenstein (and
Yittgensteinians) to speak of 'ordinary 1e- philosophy' as opposed to analytic philosophy.
Foundation assnrptions concerning proper criteria of justification, consistency, and theoretical content all
contribute to the situation that any translation of a natural language [which is not, by natm, ere-systematized) , into
a language systen that is constructed in accordrace with uell defined rules of systmticity, w i l l neeessarilg portray
the former as smehnr deficient or corrupt. Bopr Keesing, for instance, has provided a number of in-depth analyses
vhich focus on anthropologists' atteupts to translate the beliefs of the Mber into a specifically acdoku'c frame of
reference or understanding [Keesing 1987). Keesing erphasizes the traaslational distortions caused by the prevalent use
of metaphor in natural languages, in order to drav attention to rays of speaking about phew#wn in comn EagEsh,
that nearly everyone accepts, that mild not, homer, stand the test of rationality that acaderic translators generally
hold up to the Other. Literally interpreted, Feu people appear rational.
without modification, This grants the target language implicit authority
over the language of the Other. Where criticism is the hidden agenda,
translation becomes the instrument of a kind of modern day inquisition.
The linguistic force implicit in academic t r e a t m e n t s of witchcraft Like
Evans-Pritchard's is made explicit in a topically related linguistic
confrontation w h e r e the agenda was judgement in a quite Literal
juridical sense,
Carlo G h b u r g has investigated an example of forceful conflict in
translation in the form of a number of witch trials that took place in
Italy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In ~ ~ h t b a f f l e s ?
Ginzburg suggests that the condemnation of the beliefs and practices of
F r i u h peasants who faced the Inquisition was a product of the way in
which the Church translated some central Friulian concepts, H e argues
that it is possible to trace changes in the w a y the Friulian "benandantiW
used these concepts in response to pressures exerted by Catholic
Inquisitors as they attempted to understand (and condemn) these
practices-
Ginzburg suggests that the benandanti, who were descendants of
early agrarian cults, had very dear ideas about the meaning of their
spiritual activities, In the sixteenth century, Friulian peasants born w i t h
the caul were marked as having an ability and a responsibfity to
protect the crops. They did so by travelling spiritually, at night, in the
form of an animal, to baffle evil witches w h o sought to destroy their
crops- The Catholic Inquisition investigated the benandanti on the
supposition that, in engaging these battles, they were involved in the
practice of witchcraft. By their own accounts however, the benandanti
opposed themselves to witches, The Catholic church, ignoring this
3
It is mth noting that the o r i m title of this wrk is untmlatable tor the same reasons that the
Inquisition could not easi3g translate the practices of the culture in qnestion. The Italian title, IBeoaodanli, has no
parallel in EagIish. 'handanti' refers to a character whose role had waning only within these agrarian cults. The
benandanti travels spiritually at night in the form of an a n i d to battle evil forces that right threaten the crops.
The ten is nearly literally translated as "€hose vbo do ueU' or "good-doers"(Ciazbarg 1985:xi), but this translation
coveys nothing of the supemturd aspects nor goals of the benandanti. 'Witch"wuld certainly f a i l to convey the
benevolent intentions of the benandanti. Batting any appropriate translation of 'benandanti, ' the transIators s@Iy
chose the altogether different title 'Night battles."
distinction, initiaLized a series of trials of Friulian peasants that
spanned more than a century,
Because the Inquisition had no conceptual apparatus that would
allow for a distinction between those engaged in supernatural activities
with witches and witches themselves, and because the benandanti
claimed to travel at night in animal form to do baffle in the service of
angels, the Inquisition found it necessary to categorize their activities
as "witchcraftn and translate their claims as beliefs in witchcraft, Those
engaged in supernatural activities of this sort are witches, and witches
are evil, The Inquisition refused to compromise its own linguistic
categories to accommodate what the benandanti took to be significant
differences, consequently the stories told by the benandanti could only
be understood as instances of stories that the Inquisition already knew
and accepted.
4
In 1Yi@fkffles,%burg provides a great deal of the diaIo@e that took place betueen the h d a n t i and
the inquisitors. In rang instances, the force of the incmpatibility of concepts and the p m r of one frame over another
are dear in the €on that the dialogue takes:
The archbishop asked OLio 'hou he iryined that the sod could go off and leave the body behind. ' The
benandante did not seer to perceive the difficulty. 'The sod which is in the body goes and the body rmains,
and then it returns to tbe badg.' 'Yaa mst tell the truth,' retorted the judge, 'about this separation of the
soul and body uhich is not possible and therefore is a Lie.' [Cinzburg 1985:138)
Wle this is a rather dramtic example, we cur see this very attitude in the dialogue as characteristic of the
exarples monly addressed i n the rationality debates. !tiny of Hollis' coaents, for instance, are only slightly more
capassionate.
Beyond Ethnocentrism
5
'Heneneutics,"a a theoretical positioa or a p p d , is no easier to discass than "psbodernis"iif only
because of the vast range of theories that fa11 under this heading in the literature. Approaches range fm Cadam's
interpretive negotiation that ideally resalts in an eqailibriu or "fusion of horiwms~decisivelywdernist) to John
Caputo's 'radical henenentics' vhich bears close affiliation to lany approaches decisively postadem. Space and
purpose do not penit a detailed analysis of heneneutics. I use the t e n here in the loose sense (as Boy seem to) to
mean, generally, any nefotiating style of interpretation.
interpretive equilibrium. A m o r ding to Hoy, hermeneutics must remain
ethnocentric in only one respect: the anthropologist must begin the
project of interpretation from the standpoint of their own cuIture.
Hermeneutics m a y become ninsidiousIy ethnocentric." however, if the goal
of interpretation is to ensure convergence on one's own way of
representing the world. This is the interpretive corollary to Henderson's
critique of the principle of charity in translation. The fact that w e s t a r t
with certain assumptions by no means implies that w e must continue to
maintain those assumptions through the entire interpretive project. The
problem of lango-centrism arises in parallel manner, if translation
proceeds on the assumption that investigations into different ways of
speaking about the world can be expected to reveal substantial inter-
linguistic convergence on categories and concepts already contained in
the target language, I: have argued that this implicit expectation
underpins transhtion theories that legitimate the distortions which
ensure that the Other will be systematically misrepresented.
B y contrast, a number of oonditions that make cross-cultural
understanding possible have emerged in the critiques of representation
considered thus far. These include, crucially, a presupposition of non-
convergence that Boy makes explicit=
What it means is that natives are not only persons who are from
certain places, and belong to those places, but they are also those
who are somehow iooarcerated, o r confined, in those places,-. they
are prisoners of their "mode of thoughtu, (Appadurai 1992:35)
What would translation look Like if one took seriously these critical
insights about the conditions of cross-linguistic representation? In order
to envision a new form of transiation, it will be useful to take a closer
look at examples of translation where the translator has, through
linguistic self-reflection, managed to suspend significant target language
categories and take account of substantial translational deformations, In
order to consider an alternative approach to making sense of seemingly
irrational beliefs, it will be useful to return, one last time, to the
problem of the knowledge of "paternityn among the TulAy River Blacks,
Carol DeIaney adds yet another twist to the Spiro-Leach debate. so
often discussed in the "rationality debatesmbecause it clearly displays
the conflict between inte11ectualist and symbolist approaches to
representing other cultures. Recall that Lukes accepted Spiro's
intellectualist reading (in Lukes 1982) whereas Turner found reason to
Favor Leach's symbolist reading (in Turner 1980). While parties to the
debate have proceeded by making increasingly sophisticated appeals to
new readings of evidence, the t e r m s of the debate have not changed
significantly because the underlying theory of translation remains
unquestioned, The central problem has remained, "are the Tully River
Blacks ignorant of physiological paternity or are they simply expressing
their knowledge of it symbolically?" The way this question is answered
justifies one or another translation of the key wncepts, DeIaney shifts
the focus of attention away from the way in which the Tully River
Blacks mnceptualize childbirth and family relations to the w a y Western
cultures conceptualize these aspects of social and reproductive life- Her
approach is resolutely comparative and self-reflexive; any determination
of the meanings of the beliefs to be interpreted must be predicated on
an analysis of the meanings of the concepts that might be used to
translate those beliefs- Meaning holism functions not only as an
interpretive constraint on the beliefs w e seek to understand, but also as
a translational mnStra.int on ours-
It does not follow from the fact that the Tully River Blacks have
no concept adequately translated as "paternitywthat their beliefs about
procreation are uninterpretable. A detailed ethnography makes it
possible to mnvey a great deal about what the Tully River Blacks
believe about procreation, so long a s these beliefs are not represented
f y . , ,t@
propositionally as wtheTully River Blacks believe that p a t e ~ ~ l l *is
While Delaney addresses the difficulty of translation and the
necessity of Linguistic self-reflexivity, she does not explicitly consider
the issue of just what information (or misinformation) is wnveyed by a
translation constructed without attention to this linguistic self-
reflexivity. No doubt, a great many conceptual subtleties are lost when
the TulIy River BIacks' beliefs are inappropriately translated in terms of
the English concept "paternity,* subtleties that might be recovered in a
richer ethnographic account, Quine and Davidson both argue that there
will always be inadequate evidence upon which to justify a particular
translation and so conclude that translation is unavoidably
indeterminate, But, once a translation is offered in the form of
propositions that represent a belief or set of beliefs, the semantic
distortions that give rise to the debates over the rationality of the
beliefs of the Other are best understood a s problems that result from
the overdetermioafi'on of meaning through translation, In the example
just discussed, the use of the English concept *paternityn to represent
the beliefs relating to procreation held by the Tully River Blacks,
brings an extended network of meanings in Eoglish to bear on these
beliefs, creating a semantic overflow that generates many of the
inconsistencies identified by critics,
This semantic overflow is only apparent in the context of the
ethnography in which conceptual differencles are explicated, It is only ia
this context that one might use the word "paternalwwithout facilitating
the misrepresenting distortions caused by the overdetermination of
meaning through translation and motivate debates that rely on
assumptions derived from the excess semantic content generated.
Undoubtedly, a translation method or tactic of the kind engaged in by
Delaney would have ensured a better understanding of Zande beliefs
concerning what was misleadingly identified as "witchcraft,* and might
have cut short the long running debate about their rationality,
Barry Hallen and LO. Sodipo offer another example of ethnographic
translation that makes effective use of linguistic selfc-reflexivity and
defuses the well worn translation paradoxes of rationality in relation to
Yoruba witchcraft beliefs. In Ahowledge, Bdkef & W i t c b m a f t : Aoalytz'c
Experiments in African Pliil-~phy, they analyze, with speciaZ attention
to the implications of m e ' s indeterminacy thesis, the standard
translations of some key theoretical concepts, from Yoruba to English, in
order to come to t e r m s w i t h the degree of indeterminacy (or, in some
cases, mis-determinacy) that takes place in the course of such
translation, Both are Western trained academics but of African origin
(one is, in fact, Yoruba). They undertake an investigation of the
meanings of key theoretical concepts and beliefs related to Yoruba
witchcraft practice that becomes, at the same time, an investigation into
the very nature of translation. As in Delaney's analysis, they find that
it is only by clearing up problems inherent in the way w e conceptualize
translation that they can come to t e r m s with problems with the
translations of particular Yoruba concepts.
6
They state:
Wt ue dispute with Qlline is the &m of indeteninacy sMeting%r English language translations of the
Yoruba leanings uuderlying these two tens.... Theoretical translation is extrerelg difficult but it is not so
radically indeterminate. Neither is it totally determinate. It falls saeuhere in betveen, and my vary v i t h
the t e n , (Kden and Sodipo 1986:82,84)
untranslated (or, rather, translated a t great Iength).
The second conclusion Hden and Sodipo draw takes the form of a
question they pose to ethnographers (they s p e c i f i d y mention Evans-
Pritchard) who do not take full acamnt of the difficulw of translation,
To illustrate this c r i t i c i s m , they consider one further concept that
ethnographers of the Yoruba assume is shared w i t h English language
speakers and ask the question, do the Yoruba believe in itchcr craft?^
Anthropologists who attribute w i t c h c r a f t beliefs to the m e m b e r s of
the cultures they study almost always assume that the main difference
between us and them is that we do not believe, and they do believe, in
the existence of witches. The presupposition here is that w e have a
mmmon understanding of what it is to hold and act upon witchcraft
beliefs* Hallen and Sodipo show that, just as there is no cross-cultural
universal common understanding of nbelief,wso to, the Yomba word &ii,
(commonly translated as "witchcraftw)is used in substantially different
ways from the English t e r m "wit~hcraft.~'
7
Ballen and Sodipo point out that the pmblm of translation i s further q l i c a t e d by the fact that experts
in the English speaking world cannot agee on any set of characteristics or a particular Mdel that would lit the
description %itch.' (Wen & Sodip 1986:88-92). In short, not only are ve unclear on the meaning of the t e n to be
translated, neither are ue clear on the meaning of the ten used to transIate, because there is no agreed upon
definition of vitcbcraft in the Vest.
8
The 0d13@ are cansidered t6e mre knowledgeable awng the &rs of the Yoruba cuttnre. The label is
sometimes translated as Wtchdoctor"bbut Hallen and Sodipo suggest that 'raster of nedicinea might be better (EaI2en
and Sadip 1986:10). Wen and Sodip carefully characterize their relationship vith the m3&h to Wizethe
sense in which their ethnography is coIlaborative rather than a detached study of the beliefs of the Other. They state:
'we wanted to relate to the onr3&h wre as colleagues than as infomantsa (Ifallen aad Sodip 1986:lO).
Hallen and Sodipo conclude that the negative judgements made by
anthropologists and philosophers alike about those to whom they
attribute witchcraft beliefs depend upon misleading transIations that
mask important differences of the sort identified above. Translating
Yoruba beliefs about &ii a s being about witches masks the sense in
which a t refers to a transitory attribute rather than a permanent
5
condition. This is a feature that onIy emerges in an ethnography and is
lost when translated a s an isolated proposition. Translated without
attention to the ethnographic context or extracted from that context by
critics, such statements cannot be said to reflect Yoruba beliefs at all.
translation
(of one language
into another) English
relation to =>
transcendental
signified One
9
llleida Asslann h discussed this idea of the 'themgoverning translation theory in 'The Curse and the
Blessing of Babel; or, looking back on Universalisns.' Ber clah is that dl discussion on translation, both objectivist
and relativist, until very recently, has d i e d on the idea of the One as its regulative principle (either for or
against the h e ] .
Until very recently, vhat 1wuld call the regulative ideal of the One was considered as the necessary
frillmrk for intercultural translation. Today, we are beginning to realize that it was precisely this ideal
that has prevented it .... As long as the concept of hmnity uas regulated by the One, interdtnral
cammication uas reduced to the choice of either destruction or fusion. (Ass= 1996:85,99)
Edwk Geittder has also dram attention to the idea of a pre-hterpreted original meaning syster and this
dependence, in translation theory, on a transcendental One:
The existing 'sciences of translation8 tend to be largdy based upon concepts rooted in religion, C e ~ n
idealis, archetypes, or universal language.... Far fra being scientific, these approaches tend to hold a
transcendental, utopian conception of the translation as reproducing the original. (Gentzler 1993:72)
Each foreign belief system is represented as rational only insofar
as the two translational relations (Rl and R2) prove transitive.
Assessments of rationaiity can be viewed as the measure of that
transitivity. In their re-evahations of the project of translation, Quhe
and Davidson effectively criticize the notion that the language of the
Other might be understood as such a fixed, pre-interpreted meaning
system, thus questioning the determinability of XU. Y e t the application of
the principle of charity rests on the assumption that the target
language has a specidl status; the principle of charity can only be
appIied on the assumption that the target language bears an
unproblematic relation to a context independent standard of rationality.
In short, as above, English is assumed to hold a position not of one
language among many, but of the originary Ianguage. Re-evaluations of
translation like those elaborated by Delaney, and W e n and Sodipo,
explicitly question the special status of the target Ianguage through a
method of translation that works self-reflexively (thus questioning the
determinability of R2). Such critiques focus on an aspect of translation
that had been largely unacknowledged--the metaphysics of translation.
In chapter six, I discussed two instances of the importation of
postmodern literary theory into the social sciences (Tyler and Rosenau)
and suggested that these uses of postmodernism are counterproductive
for anthropology. I consider one more "postmodern" approach here
because I believe, by contrast w i t h Tyler, Jacques Derrida does offer
valuable insights for understanding translation practices as exemplified
by Delaney, Hallen and Sodipo and many others. In chapter six, I also
suggested that reinterpretations of traditional anthropology of the sorts
produced by Wagner, Fabian, and Said w e r e clearly examples of
"decon~truction.~ It should now be possible to read Derrida, in relation
to the specific purpose at hand)' in a way that lends greater content
10
I state, % relation to the specific parpose at handn because I want to read a feu selected wrks of
Derrida's as i f they uere singularly about translation. We this is, no doubt, an oversimplification and may produce a
distorted interpretation [it wPld not be the first), I think it very uselal to incorporate this work in such a way
while swwfiat artificially ignoring the other irplications and facets of Derrida's philosophy that mtivate so mch
disapproval as well as the sorts of ris-interpretations that I discussed in chapter six. It would, no doubt, be a
Pascinatiag project to trace the distortions that Derrida' s philosophy bas uadergone through t ramlatian not only
betwen languages but between discipmes as a product of such narrowly centered readings. In any case, space and
to the nature of the linguistic distortion that is translation and further
characterize that project, It is arguable that a great deal of Derrida's
work is first and foremost about translation-
In "Plate's Pharmacym,Derrida discusses at length the translation
of one word from Plato's dMogue Phaedrus and the role its translation
has played in the history of Western Because Derrida's
work has found its way into many academic disciplines in widely
divergent forms, it is worth reemphasizing what this investigation into
the translation of this particular word is meant to demonstrate:
12
Jeanne Famt-Saada, in her study af coateqorary witchcraft practices of the people of the m e in
France, notes that, in anthropologicaI works, translational difficulties are often noticeably absent from the text
because of their appeamce in pre ad post text entries.
Thus scientific status or objectivity is osuaIly made visible in the split betveen the stating subject of
ethnography, and the set of staterents on the native cnltare: in other wrds, in the difference between
forward and text. pavret-Saada 2980:26)
la a sense, the translational distortions are aved fra the objective descrietive text into the personal and
subjective forward. The true ethnography, in a sense, takes place in these rargins or becores a fomd to a non-
existent text. fn these textual margins, the relationship between the ethnographer and the subject as w l l as the
relationship between of the target language and the source Ianguage are not reduced for the purposes of providing a
systemtic description of the beliefs of the Other. Redl that, the only place in Evans-PritW's book &re ue learn
that the Azande have been colonized and med into settlerent carps by the British is in the forward. Similarly
assumption that perfect translation is possible. According to Derrida,
there can be no w p h i I ~ p hof y translationwuntil one comes to t e r m s
w i t h the "translation of p h i l ~ ~ p h y . w ' 3
aarginal, Evans-Pritchard addressed his confrontations uith the difficulty of translation in the afterward and
appendices. The linguistic (and other) factors that cmprorise the possibility of impartial interpretation are
intentionally placed oatside of the text in order to maintain the illusion of objectivity and/or literal representation.
It is only by forcing these difficulties out of the text that i t appears possible to judge the properly represented
beliefs of the Other.
13
Gentzler notes this refocus of erphasis uhen one takes seriously the activity of translation.
With the focus of philosophical investigation redirected fm identity to difference, frua presence to
sngplerent, r n text to preface, translation assmes a central rather than secondary place. (Centzler
1993:146)
Wost every theory of translation is based, vhetber irplicitly or explicitly, on some philosophical, seaantic,
linguistic theory. The trend, begm by Quine, to foreground translation as necessarily prior to other such endeavors,
finds its £dlexpression in the vork ot Jacques Derrida. We very fev critics wold be v m
i to read the
philosophical progression leading ap to Derrida as including Quine, with respect to translation, Derrida is clearly
addressing the pmblea of indetemhaq in coPjmction uith issues that arise as a result of translating in spite of
such indeterminacies.
a smle that w i l l m a k e the difficulties of translation apparent. This is
not, as is often held, a unique style of writing that, itself, produces
anomalies in translation; transIation always exhibits this difficulty,
Derrida's s t y l e calls attention to (rather than creates) the diff*anceL4
of translation.
Derrida's "Living On-Border Linesw calks attention to the inherent
difficulty of translation both b y engaging in the activity of translation
and b y supplying a paraLId c o m m e n t a r y on that translation, Derrida
discusses the ways in which, for instance I ' m & de m o r t defies any
translation that w i l l maintain the connections that this expression has, in
French, to the piece in which it serves as a title.15 Any translation of
the phrase wiJl both lose s o m e t h i n g essential and gain something
excessive in this title's relation to the piece. And yet, imperfect as it
will be, the translation does take place; it is generally translated as
"Death Sentence." B y analyzing this case, Derrida simultaneously
confronts the difficulty of translation and the effects of translating in
spite of this difficulty. Derrida's parallel cross-critical
commentary/translation simultaneously exposes the difficulty of
translation and attempts to answer the question, " w h a t is translated?"
From "Living Onw:
I4
Dif firance is a t e n that, itself, cannot be translated. Derrida pIays on the siriIarities, in Fmch, of
the verbs 'to differu and 'to deferu to colbine Saussure's 8differenceWth the idea that waning is indefinitely
deferred- both description and case of the difficulty of translation.
15
Joseph Grahar mkes tMs same observation concerning the attaet to translate the title of one of Derrida's
essays. Grahan notes the mwidable distortion that wuld f o l k f r a an attempt to translate 'Des Tour de Babel' by
alludiag to a lev of the cormecticms that d d be lost in any Rnglish translation:
'Des Tours de BabelWe title can be read in various wags. Aes reans 'sole'; but it dso means 'of the, "
Yrra the,Qr maboutthe.Vomcudd be tows, twists, tricks, turns, or tropes, as in mm of phrase.
Taken together, des and tows have the same sound as de'tour, the rord for detour. To nark that economy in
language the title has not been changed. (Derrida 1985a:206J
The first inclination at a translation might be 'The Tower of Babel8 yet this auld fail to traaslate irportant
cormections and plays on 1e- tbat d a t e irportantly to the content of the essay and relate the lyth of Eabel to
the twists, tricks, t m s , and tropes of language.
1 know, 1 am already in some sort of untranslatability. B u t I'U
wager that w i l l not stop the procession of one language into
another, the massive movement of this procession, this mrtege,
over the border of another language, into the language of the
other. (Derrida 1979:77)
16
Peggy K i d kt s i z e s this aspect of Derrida's wrk in her htrodnction to 'Des Tours de Babel.'
Deconstrnction is deployed both as a theory of translation which Wenges the M t s of that philosophical
concept and as a practice of translation uhich exhibits, rather thaa conceals, its onr Lhits. (Derrida
1991:242)
Pauline Rosenu's appraisal of postmdernisa (see chapter six) mst probablg £oLlmfro her attempt to reduce it
to a theory about cross-cnltnral interpretation rather than understanding it as a rethod by which one right better
amrapfish that task. To erphasize again, it is dearly what laay anthropologists, not taken to be nihilistic
relativists, are already engaged in.
17
Volfgang lser speaks of the same 'living on% reference to cultare rather than language. In his analysis,
i t becoaes even more clear hw the idea of a stable, unmprarising, essentializing ethos precludes the possibility of
translation, and hov translation disrupts the idea of ethos.
The Life of celture realizes itself in such recursive loops, and it begins to dry up whenever the loop is
dismntirmed by elevating one of the achiements ot i t s interchange into an all-encapassing Eon of
representation. Representation nms counter to translatability, dose ongoing transfomtions are brought to a
standstill by equating culture uith one of its conspicuous features. (her 1996b:258)
Noticeable also, in this extension of Derrida's analysis of translation, is a similarity to Said's critique of
Orientalisr . her opposes 'coranicationVto "representation'% a snqrisiagly shilar way to that found in Said's
work. S~llwhatironically, the 'living o n 9 f culture is possible ody with the death of the idea of self contained,
stable culture.
A cross-caltnral discourse distinguishes itself fro asshilation, iacorparation, and appropriation, as it
organizes aa interchange between cnltures in vtrich the cultures concerned uill not stay the same.. . In this
respect the cross-celtnrd discourse is a reas of m W y supportive self-regeneration of cultures and
provides an opportunity to extend their life s p a . (Iser 1996b:262-3)
la each analysis, it becoles clear how "living-on' calls into question 'border-lines'hnd how the very idea of a
stable culture, language, or rationality is the 'death sentence' of translation.
from one language to another, or w i t h i n one and the same
language, that the signifying instrument would leave virgin and
untouched, (Derrida 1981b:ZO)
18
Vincent Crapantano's &pmes'Dilm 4 Met's &sire i s an insight fd reading of the activity of
"ccentering' in anthropologicd accounts. Sherry Ortner's 'Theory in AnthropoIogy since the SixtiesYs a detailed
reading of the recent history of' theory in aathropolog as a mtin~edtrade of one center or structure for another. Any
historical work that folIows transitions from one frarevork, paradig, or interpretive strategy to another (sametires
inadvertently) reveals this 'stmcturality of structure.'
centering. The disruption of meaning through translation and
interpretation, however, compromises the idea of a f i i pre-eralstlng
center or universally appropriate theoretical structure.
Joseph Crahar notes this erpbasis in Demda's "DesT o m d e Babel."krrida brings to the sarface the
historical and political aspects of translation over and against the modernist teleological and theological aspects that
uurk against cross-cultad anderstandiag. Any appeal to the h e (cod, fusion, or universal rationality) i s only as
political as tyranny. Deconstrnction wrks as a revelation of repressed politics and opens up the possibility of re-
engaging political relations. Such an analysis clearly reflects the politid virtue of a work like Said's, that
confronts oppressive politics in hope of creating a :rarework for a fair political interaction.
suppression of any explicit attention to the activity of structuration
works as a suppression of politics,
By teasing out the assumptions that ground accounts of other
cultures, and laying bare the distortions that take place in translation,
the deconstructive translator reframes the relationship between the
anthropologist's culture and the culture under study. Barbara Johnson
points out how suppression of the activiw of interpretive centering is
itself a pre-judgement that undermines the possibility of political
negotiation, Cross-cultural judgement grounded in unreflective
translation reveals more about an interpretive self positioning than
anything about the beliefs of the Other.
20
See especially Fox, Rabinw, and Ah-Lryhod 11991).
of the long-established coherent self, clearly defined ethnus, or seI€-
justifying mother tongue, s i m u k a n e o u s ~disrupts the possibiLity of
providing unambiguous, objectFve representations of the Other and
facilitates suspension of the Linguistic categories used to translate the
beliefs of the Other. The displaced self writes (and reads) agaiost
clearly defined, static language and culture. T h e cross-cultural
boundary inhabiting anthropologist k a m e s hyper-aware of the
centering process that is typically masked and of the capacity of the
translator to re-center the Self or Other in the context of the cross-
cultural encounter. This disruption of the homogeneity of the reading
culture and the resulting sensitivity to the activity and politics of re-
centering discourse is nowhere more dear in contemporary philosophy
than in recent feminist theory.
Recent feminist theory has been one of the dominant forces in
generating the confrontation with traditional representational
frameworks, Like mntemporary anthropoiogical theorists and Derridian
deconstructionists, feminist theorists directly confront the concealed
politics of representation, Postmodern theory and aligned practices of
decentering the self have been taken as both an ally and foe by
feminists concerned with the politics of representation;21either way the
21
Mimela di hnardo writes at length on the 'paradox of postrodernis' in an introduction to a collection of
essays on f a s t anthropology. On one hand, the feminist critic finds deconstrnction to be a valuable tool in
critiquing the patriarchal centering of Yesteta culture. (In the other hand, i t is also possible that the f a s t qenda
constitutes a centering that could itself be deconstructed. In other words, the f a s t is left without an objective
justification for her position. Yhile d i Leanudo is particularly sensitive to this conflict (as vell as tEie trend in
postnodernisa to divorce criticism fror the vorld), a great deal of her anxiety over postdernisr stem from the view
that i t is, necessarily, just as Bosenau had concluded, another kind of nihilia. She states:
Post-structnralisr is anti-science, antitheory.. . It denies the existence of social order or real hman
selves, declariat the death of the subject ... It can only deconstruct.. . there is no place for any ~raLly
evaluative or politically colitted stance vithin the disintegrating logic of poststructuralisr. It is
Fundamtally nihilistic.... Pasbodernis entails an 'mbrace of modification, a Nietzschean embrace of
the instant, a trivial and lighthearted rejection of politics\.. [the) poststrncturalisl/ postrodernisl
stance is itself innately solipsistic. [di Leananlo 1991:24,26)
If one takes seriously the segment of postmodern theory that I have addressed in this paper, this criticis~is
misplaced, I)econstnrction mu be read as lordly d w t i v e and as a mas to a politically caitted stance. It is,
possibly, the only reans to rove beyond the traditicnal cultural version of solipsism: ethoceutria. Reflections on
translation have s h m that ~1~kmi9mtivatesthe "death of the sabject' (objectifying or erasing the Other). It is
only by displacing the self that the Other becores present.
parallels between feminist philosophy and the recent postmodern and
anthropological critiques of representation are unmistakable, Micaela di
Leonardo charts these debates, making it clear that it is history and
ethics that provide political grounding for the feminist reading, and it
is this political aspect of interpretation that provides an important link
to anthropological theory- It is this link that I would like to investigate
as a final reflection on the political dimensions of translation.
In "The Postmodernist Turn in Anthropology: Cautions from a
Feminist Perspective," Frances Mascia-Lees, Patricia Sharpe, and Colleen
Bailerin0 Cohen suggest that anthropologists would do better to turn to
feminist theory as a framework for a new model of ethnography rather
than to postmodernism. They note that feminist writers address the same
issues of representation and theoretical entering that have concerned
contemporary anthropologists. In addition, feministc have been
consciously and self-critically writing from the position of the Other for
quite some time; certaidy this is a dominant theme in feminist literature
that substantially p r e d a t e s W r i t i n g Culture. While both critical
anthropologists and feminists are concerned to deconstruct tradition,
their work is structured by a political engagement that is not shared by
postmodern Literary c r i t i c i s m ,
Linda Butcheon notes that what dmns traction meals is the relationship between the aesthetic and the political,
which is precisely rhat hrmania (and modernis) mppresses (Eutchwn 1988:200). Main, deconstruction is seen to open
up the possibility of politics rather tban as neglecting it.
D i Leoaardo's fear is c o n in the literature (both in reaction to postrodernisl and relativism). it is the fear
that Ceertz identified in 'Anti mi-Relativisg-the feeling lbat if one does not have an objective justification for a
certain reading, then one has no justification at aU.
to the politics of academia and that postmodernists have, to an important
degree, undermined their own cl;u'm to credibility; the postmodern
literary critic never really engages the world, M y argument here, as
above, is that this objection tells against the form of postmodernism that
found its way, through its various translations and mistranslations, into
American academia, The uparadox of postmodernism" (see ftnt 21) is not
so paradoxical if deconstruction is understood to b e a practice that
engages the world through a re-decentering of politics, as in a work
like Said's, rather than as a negation of politics, as in a work Like
Tyler's- Nor is it a paradox if one takes into account uses of
deconstruction as a methodology for translation that requires linguistic,
self-reflexivity about the politics of cross-cultural interpretation.
Margery Wolf likewise investigates the politics of interpretation and
warns against the lessons that are all too often drawn from postmodern
Literary theory as well as the spiraling critical trap that a great deal of
postmodern c r i t i c i s m has wound for itself by lyrically divorcing itself
from the world. She offers three readings of her experiences living in
Taiwan. She too emphasizes the developed sensitivity of the feminist
writer to the representational and political oppression of the Other (Wolf
1992%-53).
22
Wolf criticizes the recent obsession with experirentation of writing styles as losing si@t of the
aotivation for displacing old form of representation (Wolf 1992:Sl). Experiwnting with ethnographic ton or style rag
have taken a wrong lesson fra krrida. The point is not to divorce wit& frm aoy kind of representation whatsoever
power is a necessary dimension of ethnographic writing just as Clifford
suggested and Derrida demonstrated, Power cannot be eliminated from
the ethnographic encounter, so it must be made explicit. mitigated, and
used responsibly,
Feminist critics claim special insight, not only into the politics of
the Sel.f/Ckher negotiation b e t w e e n cultures, but also w i t h i n academic
disciplines. A recent feminist critique of Writing Culture focuses
attention on w r i t i n g conventions and the politics of the West vs. the
Rest, like those discussed, but also on multifaceted power relations of
representation as used within the academic context, In the introduction
to Women Writing Culture, Ruth Behar soundly criticizes Clifford et, al.
for, even while providing an astute critique of representation, failing to
understand the relationship between that critique and f e m i n i s t theory*
Participants in the earlier School of American Research seminar had, no
doubt, failed in one very important respect to question every centering
tendency compromised by this critique of representation.
If the focus on our "writing culturew has shown anything, it is the
necessity of disrupting the single-voiced homogeneity of that culture
that must precede the possibility of coming to understand the cultural
Other, The self-reflecive turn that ultimately undermines the dichotomies
that facilitate objectification and misrepresentation of the Other must
focus both on the cultural SeM vs, Other (West vs. Rest) negotiation
between cultures as well as the implicit academic Self vs. Other (Upper-
class w h i t e male v s Rest) negotiation w i t h i n the reading c u b e . The
by constrncting accounts rapant rith Forced ambiguities bolstered by cryptic and confusing Literary styles, but to
carefully display the variability and instability of particalar representations. Anthropology needs to relate to
solething outside of itself. It i s only the aature of fwt the existence of) that relation that is called into question.
methodological tactics and effects of feminist theory, academic
diversification, and p o s t m o d e r n interpretation undersmre the importance
of displacing the self in the project of coming to understand the Other.
The focus of translation theory, as I have tried to show, must both
include, and move beyond, a concern with the relation between
ethnographer, subject, and the text produced; it is crucial to consider
the larger community of text users. Each is a juncture at which the
centering activity of interpretation might be reveaIed and held
suspended in order to facilitate understanding. It is no coincidence that
Deborah Gordon concIudes Women W n * t h g Cultum by expIoring the
commodification of academia, the changing purposes of academics and
uses of academia, the ways in which the academic subculture operates,
and the views members have of academia and their own practice. What
recent feminist theory brings back into the anthropological debate is an
awareness of the politics of these centering tendencies as they operate
within academia and through its relations to the rest of the world, and
a s they underpin the force of language in representation. A post-
postmodern political re-decentering, likewise, is neither relativist
erasure nor realist objectification. The feminist critique of Western-
white-male-Self as center is, from the standpoint of translation, an
extension of the linguistic disruption of the masked centering tendency
that characterizes traditional forms of cross-cultural representation and
facilitates misrepresentation.
Every decentering is always also a re-centering. This is
unavoidable, as Derrida and these feminist critics have argued. But this
realization is not inconsistent w i t h the work done by many
postmodernists; feminists and anthropologists should not reject
postmodernism because it calls into question the quest for an o b j e i e
foundation to stabilize this process of recentering. A deconstructive
reading or translation makes one aware of the politics of writing and
creates a context in which one can be more conscious of the play of
force involved in translation, Precisely because readings are situated
historically and ethically, there is the possibilfty of defending a
particular political reading. When this doubly critical method is not
applied, interpretation acts as a masked potitid force that is all-to-
often the final word. The political debate is over before it begins.
The notion of ethnographic responsibility needn't become hollow
s i m p l y because objective foundations have crumbled. On the wntrary,
translation, as represented in this chapter, requires renewed attention
to questions of accountability. It neither incorporates the Other nor
rejects the Other, but acknowledges cultural difference through a self-
refierdve, comparative investigation into Linguistic difference. Feminist
theory has grown and transformed through its translational encounters
w i t h different theoretical approaches and disciplines without
compromising politics or a connection to the world. Critical anthropology
has done the same, but not by following Tyler in eliminating
representation for self-referential evocation, nor by substituting poetry
for description, nor b y reverting to realism and reinforcing traditional
claims to universal rationality. Rather, the promise of recent
anthropological approaches to translation has been realized by
compromising the essentialized Self through self-reflexive, cross-cultural
encounters, by reevaluating what it means to give an account of
another way of life, and by taking responsibility for the partiality of
the representations generated by these encounters. If there is a
"principlewof translation, it is one of Linguistic humility.
Chapter Eight - Conclushn: The Irreducible D i f f i c u l t y of
Translation, or, lhnsktbn R e V d u a t e d
1
h e r characterizes bricohge in a uay that bears sirilarities to the suspension of language that I have
suggested i s essential to a good translation.
A bricolage operates by d i n g assertions and simltaneo~~~lytrying to spotlight ofiat they exclude. Stances
have to be adopted and suspended. Frames for understanding have to be devised and a t the saw time marked off
frm what they are want to repment, as there is no grandstand vim f r a uhich to define interchnge betwen
caltnres. [her 1996a:302)
Themy," it might be said, is the project of artidatiug such a 'grandstand view.'
them, "theoryw and "translationware, in some ways, in tension with one
another, Just as the translated text, variously interpreted, acts a s a
virus contaminating the stability of the receiving Linguistic system, so
too each new translation compromises the possibility of a systematic,
analytic wtransiationtheory,*
This is, of course, not to say that speculation on the nature of
translation is frivolous or unproductive, If 1 am right, such speculation
is required of the politically conscious cross-cultural interpreter. Yet
such speculation will be misguided if its aim is to produce an axiomatic
approach that can determine how the words or sentences of one
language are to be translated into another. wTranslationtheoryw in this
sense is no more or less than the recommendation that transiation
should b e ethnographic, linguistically self-reflexive, and mnducted with
political and ethical sensitivity. As Talal Asad suggests, translators use
a skill rather than appIy a theory. Beyond a few very generd
guidelines for approaching the problem of translation with the right
precautions, the activity itself proceeds on a case by case basis rather
than by following a case-independent set of rules. The flexibility
required for responsible cross-cultural communication is facilitated by
holding that the maxims of translation are open-ended and ethical rather
than precise and epistemological.2
The principle of charity is the methodological culmination (become
theory) of the appeal to "the Onewin philosophical translation theory.
T h e principle of humanity fairs little better as underlying assumptions
about humanism, human evolution, or the privileged cognitive status of
Western scientific culture often reduce it to the principle of charity.
The proper principle for cross-cultural interpretation or translation, if
one is fond of principles, is a principle of Lin-c humilr'* This
requires that the translator be prepared to compromise the target
language in the act of translation,
2
This is not, of course, to say that the translator does not aake nse of a great deal of theory pertaining to
sociology, psychology, econaics, religion, and any of a large number of theoretical fields, not least of all language
theory. It is to say that the alicatiw of this theory to the process of translation is lediated tbronst~the sirple
ethical aaxi~sof translation that I have proposed.
It is this Linguistic abdication of essentialized Self, represented
over and against the Other, that I have made central to a redeveloped
conception of translation. It was, no doubt, for want of a more
substantial theory of translation and a more robustly scientific approach
to cross-cultural representation that Hollis, Lukes and others attacked
the seemingly relativist position endorsed b y W i n c h . They raected any
treatment of cross-cultural interpretation that renders judgement
ungrounded. The gaal of translation, as I have construed the project, is
not judgement but understanding. The failure of Literal transIation in
the form of testable propositions that accurately represent the beliefs of
the Other does not preclude partial ethnographic translation according
to which the Other might be adequately understood. That understanding
is, however, potentially tainted by the ways in which the target
language contains a belief system embedded in its very structure. Any
representation of the beliefs of the Other is shaped by the language
that they are translated into, Failure to address the effects of the
target language structure on cross-cultural belief translations nearly
guarantees misunderstanding.
The theory of the indeterminacy of translation proposed by Quine
and Davidson effectively subverts traditional translation theory and
provides a foundation for a new understanding of the nature of
translation. The operative question, in the aftermath of indeterminacy, is
"what is one to make of translation given that it takes place in spite of
indeterminacy?" M y analyses of contemporary anthropological theories of
cross-cultural interpretation, in chapters six and seven, and m y
narrowly focused reading of Derrida are meant to provide an answer to
this question. These self-reflexive analyses transcend the polarized
oppositions between rational and irrational, realist and relativist, literal
and arbitrary dichotomies that frame treatments of translation, In Light
of these more "practice groundedw analyses, the operative question, is
not "what principles govern or constrain translation?" Translators, in
practice, simply do not appeal to a set of regulative principles when
interpreting the beliefs of the Other. Translators already translate. The
important question is, then, "what takes place in the act of translation?"
What happens when one makes a determination of that which is
indeterminate? These questions redikect attention from the matching of
linguistic units to the broader dynamics of the confrontation between
languages in translation, and to the reading community that makes use
of translations. Practice and politics supersede theory and epistemology
as attention is turned, as Goethe had poetically observed, from the word
and the thought to the power and the deed.
Contemporary anthropologists, unLike Evans-Pritchard, confront the
difficulty of translation by focusing not only on source language
statements and categories, but self-reflexively on target language
concepts and categories as well. Delaney, Hallen and Sodipo structure
whole ethnographies around the difficulty of translating central
concepts, ethnographies that do as much to critique and analyze
concepts in the target language as they do to critique and analyze
beliefs held by the Other. If my analysis is correct, this is the only way
in which a non-margin-g translation of the beliefs of the Other
might be constructed.
Another key feature of this comparative method is its refusal of
demands for interpretive closure or stability. Derrida, and translators of
Derrida, take special care in confronting the irreducible difficulty of
translation and often leave problematic t e r m s untranslated. Many
anthropologists are, likewise, attempting to describe the practices of the
Other whiIe leaving key t e r m s in the source language untranslated.
Patrick McNaughton's The Mande Blacksmiths is an excellent example of
the attempt to adequately describe beliefs very similar to those held by
the Azande by refraining from translating problematic concepts and, as
a result, precluding the imposition of Western scientific categories that
necessarily falsify the beliefs of the Other. McNaughton describes the
practices and beliefs of the nyamalrala without ever translating them as
"w i t c h e s .n3
J
Such refusal to translate largely precludes debates about the rationality of such practices, since one then
creates (or re-creates) a context for waning rather than chooses a ere-lade one. !tcNm@tonspecifically addresses the
b i t s of oar own teninology and acknowledges that the distortions produced by tmslatiq key tens w d d be t w great
(!lcNaughton 1988:LI). &awl for the Wde, is an nnderlying aetaphysical force that uorks on a l l natnial and social
relations tpp.16-18). Ma is the word lor handle. Therefore, the &mkala is shply one rho has a handle on this
By not translating the beliefs of the O t h e r into the uncompromised
categories of the target language, McNaughton and others who translate
self-reflexively and ethnographically engage in a method of
interpretation that avoids playing inquisitor, fordng an incorporation of
the Other into one's own linguistic frame. By foregrounding that which
defies translation through Linguistic &-reflexivity, the ethnographer
exonerates the O t h e r of pre-judgement and allows one's own language to
bend and grow. I have tried to show how the language of academia and
the structure of academia are especially conducive to this inquisitional
practice if engaged unreflecfively- The scholar's goal of producing a
single unambiguously correct representation in a strong, specialized
language is the antithesis of ethically responsible translation.
Following m y analysis, it could be said that Gentzler's
characterization of Derrida's "theorywof translation describes the
necessary shift of focus that I am recommending.
metaphysical pouer (even this short definition is inadequate as a translation without rider knowledge of the nature of
the uhandle"or the 'paver@). Clearly there is no concept in English that translates this idea. KcNaugftton's discussion
of h d e beliefs, then, does not mounter the pmblers that Bollis et al took to be keg to ham-hitchard's muat.
It shodd be clear by now, that neither the h d e nor the Azande believe in 'witchcraft,'
exercise of what Clifford described as "ethnographic resp~nsibility.~
And, while the ethnographer must shoulder a substantial part of that
responsibility by acknowledging the irreducible difficulty of translation,
it must also be shared by the academic reading community, A promising
focus of translation theory is the increased attention being given to the
idiosyncracies of previously isolated academic disciplines by new trends
in cross-disciplinary work. This cross-disciplinary communication, too, is
an activity of translation. As texts move across Lines (whether between
Zande and English, French and English, or anthropological English and
philosophical English), they are re-interpreted, reread and re-written--
dis-placed through translation, The effect is often no less transforming
than in interLinguistic translation. The self-referential complacency of
each discipline is infected by the invasion of this Trojan horse, virus,
or pharmakon t h a t opens up the politics of translation over and against
traditional theory.
Translation is more give than take; it requires a bending of one's
own language to accommodate the Other and to understand cross-
cultural difference, A self-conscious and responsible translation
methodology seeks to understand the Other without imposing Western
epistemological standards on them through language. Cross-cultural
understanding is only possible when calling attention to the difficulty of
translation and sometimes its impossibility.
Tanya Luhrmann concludes her study of contemporary witchcraft in
England in a fashion that stands in stark contrast to Evans-Pritchard's.
Rather than questioning the epistemological status of the beliefs of the
Other, the open and self-refhive nature of translation draws attention
to the surreptitious linguistic limits that w e often place on ourselves,
and potentially allows us to, as Benjamin Whorf had hoped, transcend
those limits.
Bar-On, Dorit
1994 Conceptual Relativism and Translation. In Language, Miod and
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Epistemology (eds. ) Preyer, Siebelt, Ulfig Kluwer Academic
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Bassnett-McGuire, Susan
1980 Translation Studies- Methuen & Co. London
Behar, R u t h
1995 Out of Exile, In Women Writing Culture. ed. Ruth Behar and
Deborah Gordon. University of California Press, Berkeley pp.1-
29
Benjamin, Andrew
1988 Translation and the Ristory of Philosophy. In TextLla.1 Practfce
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1989 TransGatiin and the Nature of Philosopby- A New T h m r y of
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Blount, Ben G,
1995 Language, Culture, and sOcl'e@ Waveland Press, nlrnois
Boas, Franz
1911 Introduction to t h e Handbook of American Innian Languages.
BAE Bulletin 40, Smithsonian Institution. also in Language,
Culture aad M i(ed,) B,G, Blount, Winthrop 1974, pp.9-28
Burton, John W.
1992 A n Ihtroduct;Ilon to Evans-Prifchard, Studia Instituti Anthropos;
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