FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION:

Art. III., Sec. 4, 1987 Constitution: “No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.”

Definition:
General Sense: “At once the instrument and the guaranty and the bright consummate flower of all liberty” – Wendell Philips [embraces a
number of cognate rights all aimed at insuring the free and effective communication of ideas from mind to mind].

Particular Sense: “Freedom to do things without fear or restraint.”

Importance:
 This is the first right that is always curtailed when a free society fall under s repressive regime.
 Our Constitution provides that “Sovereignty resides in the people” who manifest it regularly through their suffrages and by the assertion of their
freedom of expression.
o This sovereignty would be negated if they were denied the opportunity to participate in the shaping of public affairs through the arbitrary
imposition upon them of the bvan of silence.
 Every citizen has the duty and right to offer his views and suggestions to the discussion of the common problems of the community or the nation.
o From these ideas, the people can, in their collective wisdom, choose the best remedies to the difficulties they face.

Several Theories or School of thoughts: (Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC, GR. 205728, January 21, 2015)
1. Deliberate democracy – the right of the people to participate in public affairs, including the right to criticize government actions.
2. Free speech is considered as being “the concept of a market place of ideas”, therefore, it should be encouraged.
3. Free speech involves “self expression that enhances human dignity. This right is a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment among others.
4. Free expression is considered as a marker for group identity.
5. The Bill of Rights, free speech is included, is supposed to protect individuals and minorities against majoritarian abuses perpetrated through the
framework of democracy.
6. Free speech must be protected under the safety valve theory.
- This provides that nonviolent manifestations of dissent reduce the likelihood of violence.

Scope:
 Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent
  The Bill of Right which guarantees to the individual the liberty to utter what is in his mind also guarantees to him the liberty not to utter what is not
in his mind (The Barnette Case)
 The State cannot prohibit the people from hearing what a person has to say. However, this is not demandable to those who who are unwilling to
listen.
 Ang Ladlad Party List vs. COMELEC: The SC held that “citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even defiant.
They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, too are entitled to hold and express their believe
with equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. However, as far as
this Court is concern, our democracy precludes using religious or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from
consideration the values of other members of the community.

Modes of Expression:
 Language, oral and written.
 Symbolism (ie. Clenched fist, the bended knee, the salute to the flag, the flag itself, the mace of the legislature, the picket line, pictures,
caricatures and cartoons
 Wordless – articulation
 Speech (Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC)
o Not limited to vocal communication
o Conduct is sometimes referred as symbolic speech
o Commercial speech is also an expression
 Tarpaulin
 Social Media

Elements of Freedom of Expression:

1. Freedom from previous restraint or censorship; and
2. Freedom from subsequent punishment

Kinds of Restraint:

Content-Based Content-Neutral
The restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech
It is aimed at the contents or idea of the expression or ideas of the
expression
The speaker is to be controlled in his actual speech, or in what he may
actually say.
It is based either on the viewpoint of the speaker or the subject of the
expression.
It bears the presumption of invalidity and measured against the clear and
the present danger rule.
If the restriction is merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or
one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well
defined standards.
The restraint is intended to regulate the time, place, and manner of the
expression under well-defined standards tailored to serve a compelling
state interest, without restraint on the message of the expression.
The speaker is told when or where he may speak
Only a substantial governmental interest is required for its validity

3 Test of Restraints of Freedom of Expression:

a. Dangerous Tendency Doctrine – permits limitation on speech once a rational connection has been established between the speech
restrained and the danger contemplated.
b. Balancing of Interests tests – used when the courts need to balance conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interest observable in given situation of type of situation
c. Clear and present danger rule – speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil
the government has a right to prevent. This rule requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, extremely
serious and the degree of imminence is extremely high.

B. Protected Speech

Note:
- If the utterance is concerned with a public matter – it is protected.
- If the utterance is not concerned with a public matter – this is Unprotected.
- Test of protected or unprotected = whether the utterance is concerned with a public matter, it is protected

a. Prior Restraint
Case Title Case Summary
Near vs. Minnesota - A Minnesota statute declares that one who engages "in the business of regularly and customarily producing,
238 US 697 publishing," etc., "a malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical," is guilty of a
nuisance, and authorizes suits, in the name of the State, in which such periodicals may be abated and their publishers
enjoined from future violations. In such a suit, malice may be inferred from the fact of publication. The defendant is
permitted to prove, as a defense, that his publications were true and published "with good motives and for justifiable
ends." Disobedience of an injunction is punishable as a contempt.
- Held: unconstitutional, as applied to publications charging neglect of duty and corruption upon the part of law-
enforcing officers of the State.
- Liberty of the press is not an absolute right, and the State may punish its abuse
- The operation and effect of the statute is that public authorities may bring a publisher before a judge upon a charge of
conducting a business of publishing scandalous and defamatory matter -- in particular, that the matter consists of
charges against public officials of official dereliction -- and, unless the publisher is able and disposed to satisfy the
judge that the charges are true and are published with good motives and for justifiable ends, his newspaper or
periodical is suppressed and further publication is made punishable as a contempt. This is the essence of censorship.

Prior Restraint – the publisher has to defend that his publication to be with good motives.

New York Times vs. - Respondent sought to enjoin the publication by 2 newspapers of certain official classified papers relating to American
US policy on the Vietnam War.
403 US 713 - Such publication was argued to be detrimental to the security of the US.
- The US SC held:
o Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its validity.
o The government carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such restraint.
o The District Court for the Southern District of new York in the New York times case and he District Court of
Appeals for the district of Columbia case held that the government had not met that burden.
Freedman vs. The Appellant was convicted of exhibiting a motion picture without submitting it to the Maryland State Board of Censors for
Maryland prior approval, despite his contention that the motion picture censorship statute unconstitutionally impaired freedom of
380 US 51 expression. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held:
1. Where motion pictures are concerned, a requirement of prior submission to a censorship board is not necessarily
unconstitutional. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U. S. 43. Pp. 380 U. S. 53-54.

2. One can challenge a licensing statute which endangers freedom of expression whether or not his conduct could be
prohibited by a properly drawn statute and whether or not he applied for a license. P. 380 U. S. 56.

3. There is a heavy presumption against the constitutional validity of prior restraints of expression. Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 370 U. S. 70. P. 380 U. S. 57.

4. A noncriminal process requiring prior submission of a film to a censor avoids constitutional invalidity only with procedural
safeguards designed to eliminate the dangers of censorship. Pp. 380 U. S. 58-60.

(a) The censor must have the burden of proving that the film is expression unprotected by the Constitution. P. 380 U. S. 58.

(b) Any restraint prior to judicial review must be limited to preservation of the status quo and for the shortest period
compatible with sound judicial procedure. Pp. 380 U. S. 58-59.

(c) A prompt final judicial determination of obscenity must be assured. P. 380 U. S. 59.

5. The absence in the Maryland procedure of adequate safeguards against undue inhibition of protected expression renders
the statutory requirement of prior submission to censorship an invalid previous restraint. Pp. 380 U. S. 59-60.

Appellant sought to challenge the constitutionality of the Maryland motion picture censorship statute, Md.Ann.Code, 1957,
Art. 66A, and exhibited the film "Revenge at Daybreak" at his Baltimore theatre without first submitting the picture to the
State Board of Censors as required by § 2 thereof. [Footnote 1] The State concedes that the picture does not violate the
statutory standards [Footnote 2] and

Page 380 U. S. 53

would have received a license if properly submitted, but the appellant was convicted of a § 2 violation despite his contention
that the statute in its entirety unconstitutionally impaired freedom of expression. The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed,
233 Md. 498, 197 A.2d 232, and we noted probable jurisdiction, 377 U.S. 987. We reverse.
Chavez vs. Gonzales - Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the opposition was planning to destabilize the administration by
GR. 168338 releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone conversation allegedly between the President of the Philippines, Gloria
February 15, 2008 Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of the COMELEC.
- The conversation was audiotaped allegedly through wire-tapping.[5] Later, in a Malacaang press briefing, Secretary
Bunye produced two versions of the tape, one supposedly the complete version, and the other, a spliced, doctored or
altered version, which would suggest that the President had instructed the COMELEC official to manipulate the election
results in the Presidents favor. [6] It seems that Secretary Bunye admitted that the voice was that of President Arroyo,
but subsequently made a retraction. [7]

SC held:
- Our history shows that the struggle to protect the freedom of speech, expression and the press was, at bottom, the
struggle for the indispensable preconditions for the exercise of other freedoms.[30] For it is only when the people have
unbridled access to information and the press that they will be capable of rendering enlightened judgments. In the oft-
quoted words of Thomas Jefferson, we cannot both be free and ignorant.
- While all forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of freedom of expression clause, the freedom of
film, television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to
newspapers and other print media, as will be subsequently discussed.
- all speech are not treated the same. Some types of speech may be subjected to some regulation by the State under
its pervasive police power, in order that it may not be injurious to the equal right of others or those of the community or
society.[43] The difference in treatment is expected because the relevant interests of one type of speech, e.g., political
speech, may vary from those of another, e.g., obscene speech. Distinctions have therefore been made in the treatment,
analysis, and evaluation of the permissible scope of restrictions on various categories of speech. [44] We have ruled, for
example, that in our jurisdiction slander or libel, lewd and obscene speech, as well as fighting words are not entitled to
constitutional protection and may be penalized.[45]
- Moreover, the techniques of reviewing alleged restrictions on speech (overbreadth, vagueness, and so on) have been
applied differently to each category, either consciously or unconsciously. [46] A study of free speech jurisprudence
whether here or abroadwill reveal that courts have developed different tests as to specific types or categories of speech
in concrete situations; i.e., subversive speech; obscene speech; the speech of the broadcast media and of the traditional
print media; libelous speech; speech affecting associational rights; speech before hostile audiences; symbolic speech;
speech that affects the right to a fair trial; and speech associated with rights of assembly and petition. [47]
- Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or a combination of three
tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has
been established between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the balancing of interests tests,
used as a standard when courts need to balance conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of type of
situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on the premise that speech may be restrained
because there is substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This
rule requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, extremely serious and the degree
of imminence extremely high. [50]

- As articulated in our jurisprudence, we have applied either the dangerous tendency doctrine or clear and present
danger test to resolve free speech challenges. More recently, we have concluded that we have generally adhered to
the clear and present danger test

- press freedom as part of the larger right of free discussion and expression. It is the chief source of information on
current affairs. It is the most pervasive and perhaps most powerful vehicle of opinion on public questions. It is the
instrument by which citizens keep their government informed of their needs, their aspirations and their grievances. It is
the sharpest weapon in the fight to keep government responsible and efficient. Without a vigilant press, the mistakes
of every administration would go uncorrected and its abuses unexposed

- Philippine jurisprudence, even as early as the period under the 1935 Constitution, has recognized four aspects of
freedom of the press. These are (1) freedom from prior restraint; (2) freedom from punishment subsequent to
publication; [53] (3) freedom of access to information; [54] and (4) freedom of circulation.[55]

- At this point, it should be noted that respondents in this case deny that their acts constitute prior restraints. This presents
a unique tinge to the present challenge, considering that the cases in our jurisdiction involving prior restrictions on
speech never had any issue of whether the governmental act or issuance actually constituted prior restraint. Rather,
the determinations were always about whether the restraint was justified by the Constitution.
- Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual
publication or dissemination.[56] Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from government censorship of
publications, whatever the form of censorship, and regardless of whether it is wielded by the executive, legislative or
judicial branch of the government. Thus, it precludes governmental acts that required approval of a proposal to publish;
licensing or permits as prerequisites to publication including the payment of license taxes for the privilege to publish;
and even injunctions against publication. Even the closure of the business and printing offices of certain newspapers,
resulting in the discontinuation of their printing and publication, are deemed as previous restraint or censorship. [57] Any
law or official that requires some form of permission to be had before publication can be made, commits an infringement
of the constitutional right, and remedy can be had at the courts.

- Given that deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is the hostility against all prior restraints on speech, and any act
that restrains speech is presumed invalid,[58] and any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of
invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows, [59] it is important to stress not all prior restraints on speech are
invalid. Certain previous restraints may be permitted by the Constitution, but determined only upon a careful
evaluation of the challenged act as against the appropriate test by which it should be measured against.

- Hence, it is not enough to determine whether the challenged act constitutes some form of restraint on freedom of
speech. A distinction has to be made whether the restraint is (1) a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned
with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined
standards;[60] or (2) a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter of the
utterance or speech. [61]The cast of the restriction determines the test by which the challenged act is assayed with.

- When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a substantial governmental interest is
required for its validity.[62] Because regulations of this type are not designed to suppress any particular message, they
are not subject to the strictest form of judicial scrutiny but an intermediate approach somewhere between the mere
rationality that is required of any other law and the compelling interest standard applied to content-based
restrictions.[63]The test is called intermediate because the Court will not merely rubberstamp the validity of a law but
also require that the restrictions be narrowly-tailored to promote an important or significant governmental interest that
is unrelated to the suppression of expression. The intermediate approach has been formulated in this manner:
 A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government, if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incident restriction on alleged [freedom of speech & expression] is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. [64]

- On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given
the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive impact. Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear
and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster,[65] with the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality.

- With respect to content-based restrictions, the government must also show the type of harm the speech sought to be
restrained would bring about especially the gravity and the imminence of the threatened harm otherwise the prior
restraint will be invalid. Prior restraint on speech based on its content cannot be justified by hypothetical fears, but only
by showing a substantive and imminent evil that has taken the life of a reality already on ground. [67] As formulated, the
question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as
to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.[68]

- The regulation which restricts the speech content must also serve an important or substantial government interest,
which is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. [69]

- Also, the incidental restriction on speech must be no greater than what is essential to the furtherance of that
interest. [70] A restriction that is so broad that it encompasses more than what is required to satisfy the governmental
interest will be invalidated. [71] The regulation, therefore, must be reasonable and narrowly drawn to fit the regulatory
purpose, with the least restrictive means undertaken. [72]

- Thus, when the prior restraint partakes of a content-neutral regulation, it is subjected to an intermediate review.
A content-based regulation,[73] however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is measured against the clear
 and present danger rule. The latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified by a compelling reason, and the
restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor vague. [74]

- Applying the foregoing, it is clear that the challenged acts in the case at bar need to be subjected to the clear and
present danger rule, as they are content-based restrictions. The acts of respondents focused solely on but one
object a specific content fixed as these were on the alleged taped conversations between the President and a
COMELEC official. Undoubtedly these did not merely provide regulations as to the time, place or manner of the
dissemination of speech or expression.

Estrada vs. Desierto - Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-
GR . 146710-15 Arroyo claims she is the President. The warring personalities are important enough but more transcendental are the
March 2, 2001 constitutional issues embedded on the parties dispute. While the significant issues are many, the jugular issue
involves the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in a democracy, Philippine style.
- The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona Jr, then
the Senate Minority Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled I Accuse. He accused the
petitioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from Governor Singson from November 1998 to August
2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended
for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was referred by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon
Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and the Committee on Justice (then headed by Senator
Renato Cayetano) for joint investigation

The SC ruling
- In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the
exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise
of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of
grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of
the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra
constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as
President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A
brief discourse on freedom of speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of
grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate.
 - Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by Filipinos. Denial of these rights was one of the reasons
of our 1898 revolution against Spain. Our national hero, Jose P. Rizal, raised the clarion call for the recognition of
freedom of the press of the Filipinos and included it as among the reforms sine quibus non.[65] The Malolos
Constitution, which is the work of the revolutionary Congress in 1898, provided in its Bill of Rights that Filipinos shall
not be deprived (1) of the right to freely express his ideas or opinions, orally or in writing, through the use of the press
or other similar means; (2) of the right of association for purposes of human life and which are not contrary to public
means; and (3) of the right to send petitions to the authorities, individually or collectively. These fundamental rights
were preserved when the United States acquired jurisdiction over the Philippines. In the instruction to the Second
Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900 issued by President McKinley, it is specifically provided that no law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition
the Government for redress of grievances. The guaranty was carried over in the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of
July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1966.[66]
- Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution,[67] and the 1973[68] Constitution. These rights are
now safely ensconced in section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

- The indispensability of the peoples freedom of speech and of assembly to democracy is now self-evident. The reasons
are well put by Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual fulfillment; second,
it is an essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth; third, it is essential to provide for participation
in decision-making by all members of society; and fourth, it is a method of achieving a more adaptable and hence, a
more stable community of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary
consensus.[69] In this sense, freedom of speech and of assembly provides a framework in which the conflict
necessary to the progress of a society can take place without destroying the society.

b. Subsequent Punishment

Notes:
- Freedom of expression is not absolute, it is subject to the police power and may be regulated in the interest of public welfare.
- Freedom of expression does not cover ideas that are offensive to the public order or decency or the reputation of persons, which are entitled for
the protection of the State.
 o Therefore, lewd words, obscene word, seditious word, slanderous word, cannot be considered “a step to the truth” and therefore, cannot
enjoy immunity from prohibition and punishment.
- Using Facebook and Twitter to aid or abet wrongdoing online threats are acts punishable under the Cyber Crime Law.
o The SC Held that “if the “Comment” does not merely react to the original posting but creates an altogether new defamatory against the
“Post”, then that should be considered an original posting published on the internet.
o Both the RPC and the Cybercrime Law clearly punish authors of defamatory publications. Libels destroys reputations that society values.
- 3 Major Criteria in determining the liability of the individual for ideas expressed by him:
a. Clear and Present Danger Rule
b. Dangerous Tendency Doctrine
c. Balancing Test

Case Title Case Summary

People vs. Perez - Isaac Perez (Municipal Secretary) and Fortunato Lodovice (citizen) engaged in a discussion regarding the
45 Phil 599 administration of Governor-General Wood, which resulted in Perez shouting “The Filipinos, like myself, must use
bolos for cutting off Wood’s head for having recommend a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our
independence.”

The SC Ruling
- The Provisions of Act no. 292 must not be interpreted as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the people
to peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.
- Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of Government.
- Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, Legislative, and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of
speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious.
Dennis vs. US - As construed and applied in this case, §§ 2(a)(1), 2(a)(3) and 3 of the Smith Act, 54 Stat. 671, making it a crime for any person knowingly
341 US 494 or willfully to advocate the overthrow or destruction of the Government of the United States by force or violence, to organize or help to
organize any group which does so, or to conspire to do so, do not violate the First Amendment or other provisions of the Bill of Rights and
do not violate the First or Fifth Amendments because of indefiniteness.
- Petitioners, leaders of the Communist Party in this country, were indicted in a federal district court under § 3 of the Smith Act for willfully
and knowingly conspiring (1) to organize as the Communist Party a group of persons to teach and advocate the overthrow and
destruction of the Government of the United States by force and violence, and (2) knowingly and willfully to advocate and teach the duty
and necessity of overthrowing and destroying the Government of the United States by force and violence. The trial judge instructed the
jury that they could not convict unless they found that petitioners intended to overthrow the Government "as speedily as circumstances
would permit," but that, if they so found, then, as a matter of law, there was sufficient danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a
right to prevent to justify application of the statute under the First Amendment. Petitioners were convicted, and the convictions were
sustained by the Court of Appeals. This Court granted certiorari, limited to the questions: (1) Whether either § 2 or § 3 of the Smith Act,
inherently or as construed and applied in the instant case, violates the First Amendment and other provisions of the Bill of Rights, and (2)
whether either § 2 or § 3, inherently or as construed and applied in the instant case, violates the First and Fifth Amendments because of
indefiniteness.
- The US Supreme Court Held: The convictions are affirmed

Abrams vs. US - A conviction of conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act by uttering, etc., circulars intended to provoke and encourage resistance to the
250 US 616 United States in the war with Germany, and by inciting and advocating, through such circulars, resort to a general strike of workers in
ammunition factories for the purpose of curtailing production of ordnance and munitions essential to the prosecution of the war.
- When prosecuted under the Espionage Act, persons who sought to effectuate a plan of action which necessarily, before it could be
realized, involved the defeat of the plans of the United States for the conduct of the war with Germany must be held to have intended that
result notwithstanding their ultimate purpose may have been to prevent interference with the Russian Revolution
- It is argued, somewhat faintly, that the acts charged against the defendants were not unlawful because within the protection of that
freedom of speech and of the press which is guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and that the
entire Espionage Act is unconstitutional because in conflict with that Amendment.
- This contention is sufficiently discussed and is definitely negative.
-
Eastern Broadcasting - This petition was filed to compel the respondents to allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE which had been
vs. Dans summarily closed on grounds of national security. The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was
closed on the mere allegation that the radio station was used to incite people to sedition. It alleged that no hearing was
held and not a bit of proof was submitted to establish a factual basis for the closure. The petitioner was not informed
beforehand why administrative action which closed the radio station was taken against it. No action was taken by the
respondents to entertain a motion seeking the reconsideration of the closure action. The petitioner alleged that it
has already sold its radio broadcasting station in favor of Manuel B. Pastrana as well as its rights and interest in the
radio station DYRE in Cebu including its right to operate and its equipment, and that they are not anymore interested in
 pursuing the case any further. The case has become moot and academic. But, for the guidance of inferior courts and
administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions, the Court still issued the guidelines regarding the matter.

SC Ruling: This Case is moot and academic, Petitioner’s petition to dismiss the case is granted
- All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and
expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule
— that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent,
- The clear and present danger test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation
applicable to all utterances in all forums.
- Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among qualified users. A broadcast
corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain frequency without regard for government regulation or for the rights of
others.
- All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause. Necessarily,
however, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to
newspaper and print media
- The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos, Newspapers
and current books are found only in metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of municipalities accessible to fast and
regular transportation. Even here, there are low income masses who find the cost of books, newspapers, and
magazines beyond their humble means. Basic needs like food and shelter perforce enjoy high priorities.
- On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The television set is also becoming universal. Their
message may be simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of listeners including the indifferent or
unwilling who happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or television set. The materials broadcast over the airwaves
reach every person of every age, persons of varying susceptibilities to persuasion, persons of different I.Q.s and
mental capabilities, persons whose reactions to inflammatory or offensive speech would be difficult to monitor or
predict. The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio
audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate analyze, and reject the utterance.
- The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the particular circumstances of broadcast media into account.
The supervision of radio stations-whether by government or through self-regulation by the industry itself calls for
thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling.
- The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it.
Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread uprising. At the same
time, the people have a right to be informed. Radio and television would have little reason for existence if broadcasts
 are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances. Since they are the most convenient and
popular means of disseminating varying views on public issues, they also deserve special protection.
- The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. In the 1918 case
of United States v. Bustos (37 Phil. 731) this Court was already stressing that.

The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs.
Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp
incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an
unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be
too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of
the individual be exalted.

- Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of
expression clauses of the Constitution.

c. “Speech Plus”: Symbolic Speech

Case Title Case Summary
US vs. O’Brien - O'Brien burned his Selective Service registration certificate before a sizable crowd in order to influence others to adopt his anti-war
391 US 367 beliefs. He was indicted, tried, and convicted for violating 50 U.S.C.App. § 462(b), a part of the Universal Military Training and Service
Act, subdivision (3) of which applies to any person "who forges, alters, knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any manner
changes any such certificate . . . ," the words italicized herein having been added by amendment in 1965. The District Court rejected
O'Brien's argument that the amendment was unconstitutional because it was enacted to abridge free speech and served no legitimate
legislative purpose. The Court of Appeals held the 1965 Amendment unconstitutional under the First Amendment as singling out for
special treatment persons engaged in protests, on the ground that conduct under the 1965 Amendment was already punishable, since a
Selective Service System regulation required registrants to keep their registration certificates in their "personal possession at all times,"
32 CFR § 1617.1, and willful violation of regulations promulgated under the Act was made criminal by 50 U.S.C.App. § 462(b)(6). The
court, however, upheld O'Brien's conviction under § 462(b)(6), which, in its view, made violation of the non-possession regulation a lesser
included offense of the crime defined by the 1965 Amendment.

Held:

1. The 1965 Amendment to 50 U.S.C.App. § 462(b)(3) is constitutional as applied in this case. Pp. 391 U. S. 375, 391 U. S. 376-382.

(a) The 1965 Amendment plainly does not abridge free speech on its face. P. 391 U. S. 375.
 (b) When "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in
regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. P. 391 U. S. 376.

(c) A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government and furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedom is no greater than is essential to that interest. The 1965 Amendment meets all these requirements. P. 391 U. S. 377.

(d) The 1965 Amendment came within Congress'."broad and sweeping" power to raise and support armies and make all laws necessary to that
end. P. 391 U. S. 377.

(e) The registration certificate serves purposes in addition to initial notification, e.g., it proves that the described individual has registered for the
draft; facilitates communication between registrants and local boards, and provides a reminder that the registrant must notify his local board of
changes in address or status. The regulatory scheme involving the certificates includes clearly valid prohibitions against alteration, forgery, or
similar deceptive misuse. Pp. 391 U. S. 378-380.

(f) The preexistence of the nonpossession regulation does not negate Congress' clear interest in providing alternative statutory avenues of
prosecution to assure its interest in preventing destruction of the Selective Service certificates. P. 391 U. S. 380.

(g) The governmental interests protected by the 1965 Amendment and the nonpossession regulation, though overlapping, are not identical.
Pp. 391 U. S. 380-381.

(h) The 1965 Amendment is a narrow and precisely drawn provision which specifically protects the Government's substantial interest in an
efficient and easily administered system for raising armies. Pp. 391 U. S. 381-382.

(i) O'Brien was convicted only for the willful frustration of that governmental interest. The noncommunicative impact of his conduct for which he
was convicted makes his case readily distinguishable from Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931). P. 391 U. S. 382.

2. The 1965 Amendment is constitutional as enacted. Pp. 391 U. S. 382-385.

(a) Congress' purpose in enacting the law affords no basis for declaring an otherwise constitutional statute invalid. McCray v. United States, 195
U. S. 27 (1904). Pp. 391 U. S. 383-384.

(b) Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 (1936) and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960), distinguished. Pp. 391 U. S. 384-
385.

376 F.2d 538, vacated; judgment and sentence of District Court reinstated.
Tinker vs. Des Moines - A group of adults and students in Des Moines held a meeting at the Eckhardt home. The group determined to publicize their objections to
School District the hostilities in Vietnam and their support for a truce by wearing black armbands during the holiday season and by fasting on December
393 US 503 16 and New Year's Eve. Petitioners and their parents had previously engaged in similar activities, and they decided to participate in the
program. The principals of the Des Moines schools became aware of the plan to wear armbands. On December 14, 1965, they met and
adopted a policy that any student wearing an armband to school would be asked to remove it, and, if he refused, he would be suspended
until he returned without the armband. Petitioners were aware of the regulation that the school authorities adopted. On December 16,
Mary Beth and Christopher wore black armbands to their schools. John Tinker wore his armband the next day. They were all sent home
and suspended from school until they would come back without their armbands. They did not return to school until after the planned
period for wearing armbands had expired -- that is, until after New Year's Day.
- The District Court recognized that the wearing of an armband for the purpose of expressing certain views is the type of symbolic act that
is within the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment

US Supreme Court Held:

- As we shall discuss, the wearing of armbands in the circumstances of this case was entirely divorced from actually or potentially
disruptive conduct by those participating in it. It was closely akin to "pure speech” which, we have repeatedly held, is entitled to
comprehensive protection under the First Amendment.
Texas vs. Johnson During the 1984 Republican National Convention, respondent Johnson participated in a political demonstration to protest the policies of the
491 US 397 Reagan administration and some Dallas-based corporations. After a march through the city streets, Johnson burned an American flag while
protesters chanted. No one was physically injured or threatened with injury, although several witnesses were seriously offended by the flag
burning. Johnson was convicted of desecration of a venerated object in violation of a Texas statute, and a state court of appeals affirmed.
However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that the State, consistent with the First Amendment, could not punish Johnson
for burning the flag in these circumstances. The court first found that Johnson's burning of the flag was expressive conduct protected by the First
Amendment. The court concluded that the State could not criminally sanction flag desecration in order to preserve the flag as a symbol of
national unity. It also held that the statute did not meet the State's goal of preventing breaches of the peace, since it was not drawn narrowly
enough to encompass only those flag burnings that would likely result in a serious disturbance, and since the flag burning in this case did not
threaten such a reaction. Further, it stressed that another Texas statute prohibited breaches of the peace and could be used to prevent
disturbances without punishing this flag desecration.

Held: Johnson's conviction for flag desecration is inconsistent with the First Amendment. Pp. 491 U. S. 402-420.

(a) Under the circumstances, Johnson's burning of the flag constituted expressive conduct, permitting him to invoke the First Amendment. The
State conceded that the conduct was expressive. Occurring as it did at the end of a demonstration coinciding with the Republican National
Convention, the expressive, overtly political nature of the conduct was both intentional and overwhelmingly apparent. Pp. 491 U. S. 402-406.

(b) Texas has not asserted an interest in support of Johnson's conviction that is unrelated to the suppression of expression and would therefore
permit application of the test set forth in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, whereby an important governmental interest in regulating
nonspeech can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms when speech and nonspeech elements are combined in the same
course of conduct. An interest in preventing breaches of the peace is not implicated on this record. Expression may not be prohibited
 Page 491 U. S. 398

on the basis that an audience that takes serious offense to the expression may disturb the peace, since the Government cannot assume that
every expression of a provocative idea will incite a riot, but must look to the actual circumstances surrounding the expression. Johnson's
expression of dissatisfaction with the Federal Government's policies also does not fall within the class of "fighting words" likely to be seen as a
direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs. This Court's holding does not forbid a State to prevent "imminent lawless action" and,
in fact, Texas has a law specifically prohibiting breaches of the peace. Texas' interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and
national unity is related to expression in this case and, thus, falls outside the O'Brien test. Pp. 491 U. S. 406-410.

(c) The latter interest does not justify Johnson's conviction. The restriction on Johnson's political expression is content based, since the Texas
statute is not aimed at protecting the physical integrity of the flag in all circumstances, but is designed to protect it from intentional and knowing
abuse that causes serious offense to others. It is therefore subject to "the most exacting scrutiny." Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S. 312. The
Government may not prohibit the verbal or nonverbal expression of an idea merely because society finds the idea offensive or disagreeable,
even where our flag is involved. Nor may a State foster its own view of the flag by prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it, since the
Government may not permit designated symbols to be used to communicate a limited set of messages. Moreover, this Court will not create an
exception to these principles protected by the First Amendment for the American flag alone.

d. Assembly and Petition

Case Title Case Summary
Primicias vs. Fugoso - The Right to Freedom of Speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances,
80 Phil 71 are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the Constitutions of democratic
countries. But it is a settle principle that the exercise of those right is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it
shall not be injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other
constitutional rights is termed the sovereign “police power”, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.
- As there is no express and separate provision in the Revised Ordinance of the City of Manila regulating the holding of
public meeting or assembly at any streets or public places, the provision of Sec. 1119 of the said Ordinance to the
effect “that the holding of any parade or procession in any streets or public places is prohibited unless a
permit therefor is first secured from the Mayor, who shall, on every occasion, determine or specify the streets
or public places for the formation, route and dismissal if such parade or procession”, may be applied by
analogy to meeting and assembly in any street or public places.
- Sec. 1119 of the Said Ordinance is susceptible of 2 Constructions:
o 1st – the Manila City Mayor is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse to grant permit for the holding
of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of Manila.
 o 2nd – the applicant has the right to a permit which shall be granted by the Mayor, subject only to the Mayor’s
reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the purpose, with a view
to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets or public places by others, and to
provide adequate and proper policing to minimize risk of disorder.
- The SC adopted the 2nd construction. The ordinance cannot be construed as conferring upon the Mayor power to
grant or refuse to grant the permit, which would be tantamount to authorizing him to prohibit the use of streets or
public places for holdings of meetings, parades or processions, because such construction would make the ordinance
invalid and void or violative of the constitutional limitations.
- The municipal Board is empowered only to regulate the use of streets, parks, and other places, and that the word
“regulate” means and includes the power to control, to govern and to restrain, but cannot be construed as to suppress
or prohibits
Navarro vs. Villegas SC Resolution:
31 SCRA 731
That respondent Mayor has not denied nor absolutely refused the permit sought by petitioner;

That as stated in Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 75, respondent Mayor possesses reasonable discretion to determine or
specify the streets or public places to be used for the assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof by others and
provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order;

That respondent Mayor has expressly stated his willingness to grant permits for peaceful assemblies at Plaza Miranda
during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays when they would not cause unnecessarily great disruption of the normal activities
of the community and has further offered Sunken Gardens as an alternative to Plaza Miranda as the site of the
demonstration sought to be held this afternoon;

That experiences in connection with present assemblies and demonstrations do not warrant the Court's disbelieving
respondent Mayor's appraisal that a public rally at Plaza Miranda, as compared to one at the Sunken Gardens as he
suggested, poses a clearer and more imminent danger of public disorders, breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and even
bloodshed as an aftermath of such assemblies, and petitioner has manifested that it has no means of preventing such
disorders;

That, consequently, every time that such assemblies are announced, the community is placed in such a state of fear and
tension that offices are closed early and employees dismissed, storefronts boarded up, classes suspended, and
transportation disrupted, to the general detriment of the public:
 That civil rights and liberties can exist and be preserved only in an order society;

The petitioner has failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the part of respondent Mayor to grant their application for
permit unconditionally;

The Court resolved to DENY the writ prayed for and to dismiss the petition.
PBM Employees vs. Facts:
PBM - Petitioner Union decided to stage a mass demonstration at the Malacaniang Palace in protest against the alleged
51 SCRA 189 abuses of abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be participated by the Petitioner Union Employees. Upon learning
of the activity by the Respondent Company, the Petitioner Union stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be
cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in their meeting. Likewise, they explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with the
Management. The Respondent informed the Petitioner Union that the demonstration is an inalienable right right of the
union guaranteed by the Constitution but, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice
the normal operation of the Company. The Management warned the Union that those who without previous leave of
absence approved by the Company, who fail to report for work, shall be dismissed because failure result as a violation
of the existing CBA, tantamounting to illegal strike.

SC RULING:
- In democracy, the preservation of and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality is the central
core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilizeation.
- The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security against the assaults of
opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of
those who have no patience with general principles.
- The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to “withdraw subjects from the vicissitudes (or a change that is unwelcome) of
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of the majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the court.
- The freedom of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the immunities
reserved by the sovereign people.
- The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to
man’s enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens
can participate not merely in the periodic establishment o the government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers.
 - The citizen is accorded with these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies
for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers.
- Freedom of assembly and expression occupy a preferred position as they ae essential to the preservation
and vitality of our civil and political institutions and such, “priority gives these liberties the sanctity and the
sanction not permitting dubious intrusions.”
- Workers who joined a demonstration against police abuses did not violate CBA “no-strike no lockout” provision.
o Hence, the conclusion of the CIR that the petitioner union are guilty of bargaining in bad faith due to their
concerted act and stoppage from work cannot be sustained. Said demonstration was purely and completely
exercise of their freedom of expression in general and of their right of assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency (Chief Executive), against the police officers of
the municipality of Pasig.
- It was the duty of the Respondent Employer to protect the Petitioner Union and its members from the harassment of
local police officers.
o It was to the interest of the Respondent Firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its
employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as a consequence
perform more efficiently their respective tasks to enhance its productivity as well as profits.
JBL Reyes vs. - Petitioner JBL Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sough a permit from the city of Manila to hold a peaceful
Bagatsing march and rally on Oct. 26, 1983, from the Luneta Park up to the gates of the US Embassy. It was stated that after the
125 SCRA 553 delivery of two speeches, a petition based on the resolution adopted on the last day by the International Conference
for General Disbarment, world Peace and the Removal of all Foreign Military bases held in Manila would be presented
to the representative of the Embassy of any of its personnel who may delivered the message to the US Ambassador.
The Respondent Mayor Bagatsing denied the request of petitioner due to “police intelligence reports which strongly
militate against the advisability of issuing such permit at this time and at the place applied for”.

The SC RULING:
- Where a limitation is alleged on the exercise of the right to free speech and assembly, the Judiciary is called upon to
examine the effects of the challenged governmental actuation.
- The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic
institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, morals, public
health, or any other legitimate public interest.
- What is guaranteed is peaceable assembly.
o One may not advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent.
o The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a rally or assembly.
 o Resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided.
- There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the
choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start.
- Neither can there be any valid objection for the use of the streets to the gates of the US Embassy.
- The Philippines is a signatory to the Vienna Convention which calls for the protection of the premises of a diplomatic
mission. Denial of permit for a rally in front of a US Embassy justified only the presence of clear and present danger to
life or property of the embassy.
- Even if Manila Ordinance prohibiting the staging of a rally within a 500 radius from an Embassy has not yet been
declared void, still the question of constitutional exercise of right ti stage a public rally confronts the SC.
- Freedom of access to public parks for staging a peaceful public rally guaranteed by Constitution.
- It is true that the licensing official, Respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a
permit would be granted. It is not absolute right and may not be withheld on mayo’s plea that rally may be held
elsewhere instead of the US Embassy – these is in absence of clear and present danger
Malabanan vs. - Suspension for one academic year of students who staged a rally within University premises but outside the place
Ramento indicated in the permit given and for a longer period than allowed, too sever a penalty.
129 SCRA 359 o The SC ruled that respect for the constitutional rights of peaceably assembly and free speech calls for the
setting aside of the decision of respondent Ramento, the penalty imposed being unduly severe. It should be a
much lesser penalty.
- Authority of the school officials over the conduct of their students cannot go so far as to be violative of the right to free
speech and assembly.
- It is quite understandable for student leaders to let loose extremely critical and vitriolic language against school
authorities during a student rally. They may give the speakers the benefit of their applause, but with the activity taking
place in the school premised and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible.
IBP Cadiz, Roques, - A mayor commits grave abuse of discretion when he modifies the permit outright and does not immediately inform the
Butuyan vs. Atienza applicant who should be heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil
GR. 172591 that it may warrant the changing of the venue – the standard of a clear and present danger test is an indispensable
February 24, 2010 condition to such modification.
- It smacks a whim and caprice for a mayor to just impose a change of venue for an assembly that was slated for a
specific public place.

e. Free Speech and Suffrage

Case Title Case Summary
Gonzalez vs.
COMELEC
GR. L-27833
April 18, 1969
Sandidad vs.
COMELEC
181 SCRA 529
National Press Club
vs. COMELEC
207 SCRA 1
Adiong vs. COMELEC
207 SCRA 712
Bayan vs. Ermita
GR. 168338

f. Use of Private Property as a forum for others’ Speech

Case Title Case Summary
Pruneyard Shopping
Center vs. Robbins
447 US 74

C. Unprotected Speech

Defamatory Speech
a. Pre-Sullivan Doctrine in the Philippines
Case Title Case Summary
Policarpio vs. Manila
Times
5 SCRA 148
Lopez vs. CA
34 SCRA 116
US vs. Bustos
37 Phil. 371

b. Sullivan Doctrine
Case Title Case Summary
New York Times vs. Respondent, an elected official in Montgomery, Alabama, brought suit in a state court alleging that he had been libeled by an advertisement in
Sullivan corporate petitioner's newspaper, the text of which appeared over the names of the four individual petitioners and many others. The
advertisement included statements, some of which were false, about police action allegedly directed against students who participated in a civil
376 US 254
rights demonstration and against a leader of the civil rights movement; respondent claimed the statements referred to him because his duties
included supervision of the police department. The trial judge instructed the jury that such statements were "libelous per se," legal injury being
implied without proof of actual damages, and that, for the purpose of compensatory damages, malice was presumed, so that such damages
could be awarded against petitioners if the statements were found to have been published by them and to have related to respondent. As to
punitive damages, the judge instructed that mere negligence was not evidence of actual malice, and would not justify an award of punitive
damages; he refused to instruct that actual intent to harm or recklessness had to be found before punitive damages could be awarded, or that a
verdict for respondent should differentiate between compensatory and punitive damages. The jury found for respondent, and the State Supreme
Court affirmed.

Held: A State cannot, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, award damages to a public official for defamatory falsehood relating
to his official conduct unless he proves "actual malice" -- that the statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless
disregard of whether it was true or false. Pp. 376 U. S. 265-292.

(a) Application by state courts of a rule of law, whether statutory or not, to award a judgment in a civil action, is "state action" under the
Fourteenth Amendment. P. 376 U. S. 265.

(b) Expression does not lose constitutional protection to which it would otherwise be entitled because it appears in the form of a paid
advertisement. Pp. 376 U. S. 265-266.

(c) Factual error, content defamatory of official reputation, or both, are insufficient to warrant an award of damages for false statements unless
"actual malice" -- knowledge that statements are false or in reckless disregard of the truth -- is alleged and proved. Pp. 376 U. S. 279-283.

(d) State court judgment entered upon a general verdict which does not differentiate between punitive damages, as to which, under state law,
actual malice must be proved, and general damages, as to which it is "presumed," precludes any determination as to the basis of the verdict,
and requires reversal, where presumption of malice is inconsistent with federal constitutional requirements. P. 376 U. S. 284.

(e) The evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support the judgment for respondent, since it failed to support a finding that the statements
were made with actual malice or that they related to respondent. Pp. 376 U. S. 285-292.

273 Ala. 656, 144 So.2d 25, reversed and remanded.

Rosenbloom vs.
Metromedia
403 US 29
Garrison vs. Louisiana
379 US 64
Curtis Publishing Co.
vs. Butts
388 US 130
In RE: IML vs. Utah
No. 20010159
15 Nov. 2002

c. Sullivan Doctrine in the Philippine Jurisprudence

Case Title Case Summary
Borjal vs. CA
301 SCRA 1
Vasquez vs. CA
GR. 118971
1999
Guingguing vs. CA
471 SCRA 196
Soliven vs. Makasiar
167 SCRA 394
Ayer Production vs.
Judge Capulong
160 SCR 865

d. Reversion to Pre-Sullivan in Philippine Jurisprudence

Case Title Case Summary
Fermin vs. People
GR. 157643
2008
Diaz vs. People
GR. 159787
2007
Disini vs. Secretary of
Justice
GR. 203335
February 18, 2014
Fortun vs. Prima
Quinsayas
GR. 194578
February 13, 2013

e. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas, Libel in UN Human Rights Committee

f. Adonis vs. The Philippines – CCPR/C/103/D/1815/2008
g. Supreme Court and Freedom of Speech
Case Title Case Summary
In RE: Jurado
In RE: Macasaet

h. “Fighting Words” or Offensive Words

Case Title Case Summary
Chaplinksky vs. New
Hampshire
315 US 568
1942
Cohen vs. California
403 US 15
1971
MVRS vs. Islamic
Da’wah of the
Philippines
GR. 80892
1989
Obsidian Finance
Group, LLC vs. Cox

i. Obscenity
Case Title Case Summary
Roth vs. US
354 US 476
1957
Miller vs. California
37 L. Ed. 2d 419
1973
Gonzalez vs. Kalaw
Katigbak
137 SCRA 717
Pita vs. CA
178 SCRA 362
Reno vs. ACLU
521 US 844
Ashcroft vs. ACLU
No. 00-1293
May 13, 2002
Regina vs. Hicklin
LR 3 QB 360
1868

j. Privacy
Case Title Case Summary
Hannover vs.
Germany
(2004) EMLR 374
(2005) 40 EHRR1
Campbell vs. mirror
Group Newspaper
(2004) UKHL 22