A PROJECT OF THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMPAGNIA DI SAN PAOLO.

SUPPORT FOR THE PORTUGUESE SECTION OF THE SURVEY COMES FROM THE LUSO-AMERICAN FOUNDATION.
 GMF Transatlantic Trends 2003 Partners

Methodology: Taylor Nelson Sofres (TNS Sofres) was commissioned to conduct the survey by telephone interviews
(CATI: Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews) in all countries except Poland, where lower telephone penetration
necessitates face-to-face interviews (CAPI: Computer Assisted Personal Interviews). In all countries, 1,000 women and
men, 18 years of age and older, were interviewed using a random digit-dialing technique. For the results based on the
total sample in each of the eight countries, one can say with 95% confidence that the margin of error attributable to sam-
pling and other random effects is either plus or minus 3 percentage points. For results based on the total European sam-
ple, the margin of error is less than plus or minus 1.4 percentage points. All Europe-wide figures are weighted by the size
of the country’s population. Comparative data listed in brackets comes from Worldviews 2002, undertaken by the
German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (Portugal was not included
in the Worldviews survey).
KEY FINDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

I. FRIENDSHIP UNDER STRAIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

II. PARTNERSHIPS RECONSIDERED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

III. WORKING TOGETHER OR GOING IT ALONE? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

IV. THE TRANSATLANTIC CHALLENGE OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16

V. CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 0 3 | 1
2 | T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 0 3
 Key Findings

IN THE THE WAKE OF THE IRAQ WAR, AMERICANS INCREASINGLY DESIRE

A STRONG EUROPEAN PARTNER, WHILE EUROPEANS WANT
TO RELY LESS ON THE UNITED STATES.

he transatlantic split over war in Iraq has under-
T mined America’s standing with Europeans. In con-
trast, Americans voice a growing commitment to coop-
eration with a strong Europe. These findings are part of
Transatlantic Trends, a new comprehensive survey of
European and American public opinion. This study
explores how both sides of the Atlantic view the world
and their relationship to each other in the wake of the
Iraq war.1 The survey is a project of the German
Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia
di San Paolo. Support for the Portuguese section of the
survey comes from the Luso-American Foundation.
Key findings of the survey include:
• Europeans have grown more critical of U.S. global
leadership, while American support for a strong
European partner has increased.
• Americans and Europeans have similar views of
threats, but different impulses on how to respond
to them.
• If North Korea and Iran acquire weapons of mass
destruction, Americans are more likely than
Europeans to support the use of force to disarm
these countries.
• Despite different attitudes toward Israel, Europeans
and Americans are equally willing to apply pres-
sure to encourage a withdrawal from the West
Bank and Gaza. However, Americans are much
more willing than Europeans to pressure the
Palestinians and Arab states to stop suicide bomb-
ings and terrorism.
• Both Americans and Europeans see U.S. unilateral-
ism as a problem.
• Both view the United Nations favorably and want
to strengthen it, but Americans are willing to
bypass the U.N. if required by national interest.
• Americans and Europeans are more likely to sup-
port military intervention if done under NATO or
U.N. Security Council auspices — the former con-
veys almost as much legitimacy as the latter.
• The largest percentage of Americans since 1947
wants the United States to play an active role in
world affairs.
• Germany, the long-time American ally, now
expresses an unambiguous preference for Europe
over the United States.
• Europeans want to see the European Union
become a superpower like the United States in
order for the EU to cooperate better, rather than
compete, with the U.S. However, the EU resists
increased military spending.

1 Fieldwork was conducted between June 10-25, 2003 in eight countries (France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and the
United States).

T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 0 3 | 3
 I. Friendship Under Strain

he transatlantic rift over the Iraq war was bitter
T and public. While European governments were
divided over the war, many public opinion surveys
showed that European publics were strongly united in
their opposition to war.2 One of the fundamental issues
this survey seeks to illuminate is the extent to which the
disagreement over the Iraq war has soured transatlantic
relations generally and affected public views of one
another.3
EACH SIDE PERCEIVES A GAP IN VALUES.
In recent years, an intense debate has developed over
whether and to what extent a gap in world views has
developed that divides the two sides of the Atlantic.
The “gap” thesis seems to be shared by the public at
large. When asked whether Europeans and Americans
have different social and cultural values, majorities on
both sides of the Atlantic overwhelmingly agreed (83%
of U.S. and 79% of European respondents). Each side
perceives a values gap, although it is not clear what this
perception is rooted in.
INCREASED EUROPEAN DISAPPROVAL
FOR BUSH ADMINISTRATION FOREIGN POLICY.
One topic on which disagreement has grown since 2002
is the Bush Administration’s foreign policy; support in
the United States increased, whereas European disap-
proval grew over last year.4 The one exception was
Great Britain, where there was a slight upturn in
approval (although those registering approval remain a
minority). The similarity of critical responses in France
and Germany was striking, as were the 20-point increas-
es in Italian and German disapproval. (see Figure 1-1)
MAJORITY OF EUROPEANS THINK
IRAQ WAR WAS NOT WORTH THE LOSS OF LIFE.
Transatlantic disagreement also surfaced over the ques-
tion of whether the war in Iraq was worth the loss of
life and other associated costs. While majorities in all
European countries answered “no,” (from 51% in Great
Britain to 81% in Germany and 84% in France), a major-
ity of American respondents (55%) answered “yes.”

2 See, for instance, the polls by Gallup International, Jan. 14-29, 2003, in 37 (including 19 European) countries, and by EOS Gallup in all EU countries, Jan.
21-27, 2003, for data before the war, and the poll by Gallup International/TNS Sofres, April 16-May 8, 2003, for post-war data for 45 (including 23
European) countries.
3 A word of caution: When evaluating the data, it is important to remember how sensitive these survey questions are to recent international events.
4 In the accompanying chart, scores for “approve” and “approve very much,” and for “disapprove” and “disapprove very much” were combined. If one
looks at the full breakout, one sees that polarization within the United States on this question has grown, because the number of those “approving very
much” and “disapproving very much” has grown relative to those “approving” and “disapproving.”

4 | T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 0 3
 DO YOU APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE OF THE WAY
U.S. PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH IS HANDLING INTERNATIONAL POLICY?5
70% Great France Germany Netherlands Italy Poland Portugal Europe U.S.
Britain
60% 62% 60%
57% 58%

50% 53%
Approve

40% 40% 41%

37% 38%
35% 36%
30% 30% 30%

No comparative data available for Portugal

28%

20% 21%
15% 16%
10%

10%

20%
26%
30% 30%
34%
Disapprove

37%
40%
44%

50% 51%
57% 57% 56%
60% 62% 61%
64%
66%
70% 70%
74% 2002 Worldviews 2003 Transatlantic Trends
80% 82% 81% Approve Approve
Disapprove Disapprove
90%

Figure 1-1

These results are in line with other surveys conducted
at roughly the same time on both sides of the Atlantic.
EUROPEANS LIKE THE U.S. LESS,
WHILE AMERICANS LIKE THE EU SLIGHTLY MORE.
Given the disconnect between American and European
publics on foreign policy and the Iraq war, one critical
question is whether that discord has spilled over into
other aspects of the transatlantic relationship. One indi-
cator is the so-called “thermometer” question, in which
survey participants rate their feelings toward various
countries on a scale of 0 to 100, with 100 meaning very
warm, 50 neutral, and 0 very cold. A considerable
“Iraq” effect — i.e., fallout from the war in Iraq — is
indeed apparent.
Of the six European countries surveyed last year,
public opinion in all of them is less favorable to the
United States this year. The largest drop in warmth was
recorded among French respondents (from 60 degrees
in 2002 to 50 degrees in 2003); it is reciprocated by
Americans’ similar cool feelings toward France (from 55

5 In Worldviews 2002, the question was: “How do you rate the G.W. Bush administration handling of the following problems? Would you say the
American administration handling of overall foreign policy has been excellent, good, fair or poor?”

T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 0 3 | 5
 THERMOMETER READINGS –
NATIONS’ FEELINGS TOWARDS THE U.S. AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
100° 100°

90° 90°
2003 2002
80° 80° 80° Italy (84°)
2003 2002 75° Germany (67°)
70° 92° U.S. 70°
74° Portugal
61° Great Britain (68°) 73° France (75°)
61° Italy (68°) 71° EUROPE (70°)
60° 60°
61° Poland (65°) 66° Netherlands (70°)
57° EUROPE (64°) 63° Poland (60°)
neutral 50° neutral 50° 60° U.S. (53°)
56° Germany (63°)
55° Netherlands (59°) 57° Great Britain (59°)
40° 54° Portugal 40°
50° France (60°)
30° 30°

20° 20°

10° 10°

0° 0°

Feelings towards U.S. Feelings towards EU

Figure 1-2

degrees in 2002 to 45 degrees in 2003). Warmth of feel-
ing toward the European Union (EU), in comparison,
increased somewhat among Americans (from 53 to 60
degrees) and remained relatively constant in Europe,
except for a gain in the case of Germany (where the rat-
ing went from 67 degrees up to 75 degrees). Among
Europeans, Americans feel warmest toward Britons
(with a thermometer rating of 79 degrees), while
Britons, along with Italians and Poles, give the United
States a reading of 61 degrees.6
MANY EUROPEANS SEE STRONG
U.S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP AS UNDESIRABLE.
Another possible consequence of the Iraq war is the
drop in support for strong U.S. leadership in world
affairs among European publics (see Figure 2-1, page 8).
Less than a majority (45%) of European respondents see
it as desirable for the United States to exert strong lead-
ership in world affairs, down from 64% in 2002. In con-
trast, 80% of Americans, consistent with last year’s 79%,
continue to see strong EU leadership as desirable.
While Europeans have grown more critical of U.S. lead-
ership, Americans continue to show support for strong
EU leadership.
To sum up, Americans and Europeans are still
friends, but Europeans are more likely to be critical
both of Bush Administration foreign policy in general,
and of the Iraq war in particular. The Iraq war appears
to have unleashed a stronger backlash effect on
European views of the United States than the other
way around.

6 Other public opinion research, notably the Pew Global Attitudes Project, suggests that the low point of European opinion toward the United States was
the Spring of 2003. For instance, according to Pew, in March 2003, 48% of Britons and 31% of French had a favorable view of the United States; by June
2003, when the fieldwork for this survey was conducted, those numbers had risen to 70% and 45% respectively. Another poll (Gallup International/TNS
Sofres, Dec. 2001, Jan. 15-16, 2003, and April 16-May 8, 2003) conducted in many European countries and the U.S. showed similar results. In all coun-
tries surveyed, including the U.S., a strong increase, roughly a doubling between Dec. 2001 and Jan. 2003, took place in the numbers of those who
thought that U.S. foreign policy had negative consequences. By Jan. 2003, this had become the view of majorities in France, Denmark, Germany,
Macedonia, the Netherlands, Russia, Serbia, Spain, and Switzerland, as well as pluralities in Finland and Great Britain. Striking, however, was that this
negative assessment declined in most countries when the question was asked again in April 2003; nonetheless, it still remained the view of at least a
plurality in all European countries surveyed.

6 | T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 0 3
 II. Partnership Reconsidered
he question of whether Americans and Europeans
T are friends is distinct from that of whether both
publics still see each other as partners. Can both sides
acknowledge their differences and still work together?
Or has the current disaffection noticeably weakened
prospects for transatlantic partnership and cooperation?
To answer these questions, it is helpful to tell the U.S.
story and the European story of partnership separately,
before arriving at a transatlantic assessment.
AMERICANS SUPPORT BOTH ACTIVE U.S. GLOBAL
ENGAGEMENT AND STRONG EU LEADERSHIP.
For Americans, there are several notable findings.
Among the most important is that U.S. public willing-
ness to be engaged in the world is at a 50-year high.
When asked whether it is best for the future of the
United States to take an active part in world affairs or
stay out, 77% chose to take an active part. This is the
highest level of support since Americans were first
asked the question in 1947; the 15% saying “stay out”
represents the lowest level ever.7 This support for an
active U.S. role in the world is matched by equally
strong support among Americans for the European
Union to exert strong leadership in world affairs, with
an increasing percentage viewing such EU leadership as
very, rather than somewhat, desirable (43% saw this as
7 Trend data from 1947 through 1973 come from the following national surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of
Chicago: Study T-49, 151, 156, 169, 295, 332, 348, 355, 370, 399 and the 1973 General Social Survey. The 1974 survey was conducted by Louis Harris and
Associates, Inc.
very desirable — up from 31% in 2002 — and 37% as
somewhat desirable — down from 48%. Thus the total
is stable, but the intensity of U.S. feeling has grown).
AMERICANS INCREASINGLY
SEE A STRONGER EU AS DESIRABLE.
When asked whether the United States should remain
the only superpower, 42% said yes (down from 52% in
2002), with only a slightly smaller percentage (37%, up
from 33% in 2002) opting for the European Union to
become a superpower like the U.S. When those respon-
dents, who answered the U.S. should remain the only
superpower, were asked if they would still oppose the
EU as superpower if it meant the EU would share the
costs and risks of global problems, notably, 50% said
“no.” Thus, a majority of Americans wants to see the
European Union become a superpower capable of shar-
ing global responsibilities with the U.S. When the 37%
who favored the EU as superpower were asked if this
would still be the case if the EU sometimes opposed US
policies, 83% of them said “yes,” suggesting the view is
strongly held and unconditional. Therefore, Americans
increasingly see a stronger EU as desirable. By these
measures, Americans, on the whole, are neither isola-
tionists nor unilateralists.
T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 0 3 | 7
 HOW DESIRABLE IS IT THAT THE UNITED STATES
EXERT STRONG LEADERSHIP IN WORLD AFFAIRS?
90% Great France Germany Netherlands Italy Poland Portugal Europe
Britain
80%
75%
70% 72%
68%
64% 64%
60% 63%
57%
55%
Desirable

50% 53%
48%
45% 46% 45%
40% 43%

30%

No comparative data available for Portugal

27%

20%

10%

10%

20% 23% 22%

Undesirable

25%
27%
30% 31%
33% 34%
38%
40% 41%
44%
48% 49%
50% 50%
50%
2002 Worldviews 2003 Transatlantic Trends
60% Approve Approve
Disapprove Disapprove
70% 70%

Figure 2-1

ONLY 45% OF EUROPEANS
DESIRE STRONG U.S. LEADERSHIP.
On the European side, one also sees general public sup-
port for strengthening Europe as a partner of the
United States, as opposed to relying on the U.S. While
the British, Dutch, and Polish still see strong U.S. lead-
ership as desirable (if less so than last year), the French,
Germans, Italians, and Portuguese do not. Majorities in
France (70%), Germany (50%), and Italy (50%) believe
strong U.S. leadership is undesirable. Overall, only 45%
of Europeans, a large drop-off compared to 64% in 2002,
see strong U.S. leadership as desirable. The sharp
change in opinion is striking and, if it persists and is
reflected in government policy, may have important
implications for transatlantic cooperation. This decline
in the European view that U.S. leadership is desirable is
one of the starkest results of the survey.8

8 Put in historical perspective, however, such changes are not a new phenomenon. Earlier crises also led to fluctuations in how U.S. leadership was eval-
uated.

8 | T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 0 3
 IN THINKING ABOUT INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, WHICH STATEMENT COMES CLOSER
TO YOUR POSITION ABOUT THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

60% Great France Germany Netherlands Italy Poland Portugal Europe U.S.
Britain
U.S. remain only superpower

50% 52%

40% 42%

30%

20% 22% 22%

20%
14%
10% 11% 12% 10% 10%
8% 9%
7% 7%
5% 5%
3%
0

No comparative data available for Portugal

10%

20%
EU become superpower

30% 33%
37%
40%
48%
50% 52%
56%
59%
60% 63% 63%
65% 65%

70% 70% 71%

76%
80% 80% 80%

89% 2002 Worldviews

90% 91%
2003 Transatlantic Trends
100%

Figure 2-2

EUROPEANS CONTINUE TO SEE THE EU AS LARGE MAJORITY OF EUROPEANS WANT THE EU

MORE IMPORTANT TO THEIR VITAL INTERESTS
THAN THE U.S.
When European respondents were asked whether the
European Union or the United States was more impor-
tant to the vital interests of their country, majorities in
all countries chose the EU (as was true last year). The
one eye-catching change was in the German numbers,
with 81% (as compared to 55% in 2002) now opting for
the EU and 9% (as compared to 20% in 2002) for the
U.S.
TO BECOME A SUPERPOWER LIKE THE U.S., BUT
SUPPORT DROPS DRAMATICALLY IF GREATER
MILITARY SPENDING IS REQUIRED.
The European desire to build a stronger EU was clearly
expressed in responses to a question about whether the
EU should become a superpower.
It is important to probe what respondents had in
mind when asked about their preferences concerning a
“superpower” role for Europe. Despite the general sup-
port shown by Europeans for a superpower role for the
EU, follow-on questions indicated that that support

T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 0 3 | 9
 may be soft or conditional. For those Europeans who
wanted the U.S. to remain the only superpower, 52%
said that they opposed superpower status for the EU
because they thought it would require increased mili-
tary expenditure. The large majority favoring an EU
superpower role were asked if they would be willing
for the EU to be a superpower even if this implied
greater military expenditure; only 51% answered “yes,”
meaning that support for the EU superpower role
would drop to roughly 36% if greater military spending
were required.
BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC WANT AN EU
SUPERPOWER TO SERVE AS A PARTNER TO THE
Those Europeans and Americans who expressed sup-
port for the EU as a superpower were asked a follow-
on question which gauged whether they thought the
EU should become a superpower in order to better
compete with the U.S. or, rather, to cooperate effectively
with the U.S. in dealing with international problems.9
The results were almost exactly the same as last year,
with 85% of Europeans choosing cooperation over com-
petition (10%). Thus, one could conclude that the major-
ity of Europeans who want the EU to be a superpower
envision an Atlanticist EU, serving as a partner to the
U.S., rather than a Gaullist EU, seeking to serve as a
counterweight to U.S. power.
EU’S NON-MILITARY POWER IS INFLUENTIAL,
SAY AMERICANS AND EUROPEANS.
Both Americans and Europeans were asked whether
they agreed with the statement that the EU may not be
as powerful militarily as the United States, but can still
have influence to solve world problems through diplo-
macy, trade, or development aid. Large majorities of
88% on both sides of the Atlantic expressed agreement,
underscoring a similarity of view in assessing the EU’s
“soft” power.
MAJORITIES ON BOTH SIDES SEE
U.S. UNILATERALISM AS POSSIBLE THREAT.
More surprising was the finding that not only
Europeans, but also Americans, share apprehension of
the way in which the U.S. is exercising its power. When
asked whether U.S. unilateralism is a possible interna-
tional threat in the next 10 years, 78% of Europeans and
67% of Americans listed it as an extremely important or
important threat.
GERMANY CHOOSES EUROPE
OVER THE UNITED STATES.
U.S.
Within Europe, each country has an interesting national
story. Germany provides the most striking example.
Whereas in the 2002 Worldviews survey, Germany
seemed uncertain about its global role, and about
whether Europe or the United States was its natural
partner, that ambiguity has now disappeared, with
Germany choosing Europe.
• When asked whether it would be best for the
future of Germany to take an active part in world
affairs or stay out, 82% of Germans chose an active
part (as compared to 65% in 2002) and 13%, rather
than 23%, opted for staying out.
• Whereas a majority of Germans last year (68%)
thought a strong leadership role for the U.S. in
world affairs was desirable, this year only 45%
gave this response. In 2003, 50% of Germans (as
compared to 27% in 2002) felt strong U.S. leader-
ship was undesirable.
• In 2003, 70% of Germans, as compared to 48% in
2002, said that the EU should become a superpow-
er, like the United States, with only 8% (as com-
pared to 22% last year) opting for the U.S. to
remain the only superpower.
• When asked whether the EU or the U.S. was more

9 This question was formulated as an experimental question and the wording read either “to better compete with the U.S.” or “to counterbalance the U.S.”
The other choice was either “to cooperate effectively with the U.S.” or “to cooperate effectively with the U.S. in dealing with international problems.”
While the wording changes did alter the results somewhat (for instance, “counterbalance” garnered more support than “compete”), strong majorities
across all questions opted for cooperation, regardless of the exact wording.

10 | T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 0 3
 important to Germany’s vital interests, 81% of
German respondents (up from 55% in 2002) said
the EU; 9%, down from 20%, said the U.S.; and 8%
(down from 22%) volunteered the answer that both
are equally important.
To see such clear swings in public opinion from one
year to the next is unusual. The German public’s shift
of support from the United States toward the European
Union is a key factor in explaining the overall shift of
opinion among the European countries surveyed in
favor of the EU. In the wake of the U.S. military victory
in Iraq, the press reported that the Bush Administration
planned to “ignore” Germany due to its opposition to
the war. The data here suggests that ignoring Germany
could have a long-term cost.
The survey documents important changes in the
transatlantic relationship. Americans are more support-
ive than last year of having a strong European partner,
while Europeans are less willing to rely on the United
States on the foreign policy front. The experience of the
past year, with the war in Iraq most likely the dominant
event, appears to have had a generally negative impact
on European views of the United States. In contrast, and
unexpectedly, Americans seem more positively disposed
to the European Union. This lack of symmetry, with
Europeans feeling worse about the U.S. and Americans
feeling better about the EU, is surprising and potentially
significant for policymakers on both sides of the
Atlantic. On the one hand, Europeans starkly question
U.S. global leadership and endorse the EU’s aspiration
to a global role. On the other hand, Europeans clearly
envision a collaboration with the United States in global
affairs, rather than a competition.
T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 0 3 | 11
 III. Working Together or Going it Alone?

hether Americans and Europeans can, in fact,
W work together will depend on a number of fac-
tors. Among them are both their perceptions of threats
and the extent to which they share the same approaches
to meeting those threats. To explore these issues, a
series of questions was asked to gauge threat percep-
tions on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as views on
how governments should respond to such threats.
AMERICANS AND EUROPEANS SEE
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AS TOP THREAT.
In spite of the deep differences across the Atlantic over
Iraq, Americans and Europeans have remarkably simi-

THE FIVE MOST IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL THREATS

ACCORDING TO RESPONDENTS FROM EUROPE AND THE U.S. Important Extremely Important

0 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

26% 70% EUROPE

International
Terrorism
26% 70% U.S.

35% 49% EUROPE

North Korea
WMD
33% 60% U.S.

36% 46% EUROPE

Iran
WMD
28% 57% U.S.

38% 47% EUROPE

Islamic
Fundamentalism
39% 44% U.S.

41% 46% EUROPE

Arab-Israeli
Conflict
43% 39% U.S.

Figure 3-1

12 | T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 0 3
lar assessments of the threats they face.10 When asked
about possible international threats to Europe (“to the
U.S.,” in the United States) in the next 10 years, respon-
dents ranked the five threats illustrated in Figure 3-1 as
the most important.
While there is some difference in the intensity with
which Americans and Europeans perceive these threats,
the similarity of their assessments is more striking than
the divergence. Further, if one looks at the feelings ther-
mometer (a scale of 0-100 from cold to warm),
Americans and Europeans feel roughly the same level
of coolness toward unfriendly countries, such as Iran
(US/31; EU/34), North Korea (US/27; EU/33), and
Syria (US/34; EU/38).
NATO SEEN AS PROVIDING ALMOST AS
MUCH LEGITIMACY AS THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL.
To attempt to gauge how these assessments and feel-
ings translate into policy in specific cases, sur-
vey respondents were given an experimental
question, in which 1/8th of the sample size was
asked about a different scenario involving either
a North Korea or an Iran armed with weapons
of mass destruction (WMD). They were then
asked if they would support military action if it
AMERICANS MORE WILLING TO USE FORCE
AGAINST A NORTH KOREA OR IRAN WITH WMD.
If one looks at overall support for military action
against Iran versus North Korea, 44% of Europeans
support military action in the case of Iran, as opposed
to 37% in the case of North Korea. For Americans, 73%
support military action in the case of Iran and 63% in
the case of North Korea. Thus, in these cases,
Americans are more willing to use force than
Europeans and both are more willing to engage in mili-
tary action against Iran (as compared to North Korea).11
GIVEN THE CHOICE, BOTH SIDES PREFER ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS TO THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE.
When presented with eight different scenarios about a
country either harboring dangerous international ter-
rorists or threatening a neighboring country with
SUPPORT FOR TAKING PART IN
MILITARY ACTION IN KOREA AND IRAN
90%
U.S. U.S. and NATO UNSC Total
Alone Allies
80%
70% 73% 74%

were proposed by the United States, the U.S. 68%

64%
60% 63%
and its allies, NATO, or the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC). The combined results
50%
(i.e., the weighted averages for all of Europe
46%
and the average for both cases) follow: 40% 43%
39% 41%
On the issue of the legitimacy of using mili- 34%
30%
tary force, there appears to be a clear hierarchy
on both sides of the Atlantic, with support for 20%
military action growing in all countries as the
10%
support of allies, then NATO, and finally the
UNSC are invoked. It is notable that NATO sup- 0
port for military action provides almost the
Europe U.S.
same bump in support as does the U.N.
Security Council.
Figure 3-2

10 Worldviews 2002 included questions about threat perceptions, but the wording of the question on the U.S. side differed from that used this year in
Transatlantic Trends. Thus, while the comparative numbers are listed in the topline data for your information, it is problematic to compare directly
responses, as it is unclear whether the wording change or other factors affected U.S. responses in 2003.
11 Survey research experts caution that general conclusions about the proclivity to use force should not be drawn from single questions, because question
wording has a particularly strong impact on outcomes in this area of inquiry.

T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 0 3 | 13
 nuclear weapons, solid majorities of both Americans
and Europeans opt for imposing economic sanctions,
rather than using military force. The percentage of
Americans willing to use force in these cases, while a
clear minority, is larger than that for Europeans (rang-
ing from 19% to 35% on the U.S. side and from 14% to
26% on the European side). The large gap that emerged
across the Atlantic on support for military action in the
cases of a North Korea or Iran armed with WMD
appears to be much narrower when a more general
question is asked offering alternatives other than the
use of force.
STRONG SUPPORT ON BOTH SIDES
OF THE ATLANTIC FOR THE UNITED NATIONS.
To explore further transatlantic views of the United
Nations, one question stated: “Some say, because of the
increasing interaction between countries, we need to
strengthen international institutions to deal with shared
problems, while others say this would only create big-
ger, unwieldy bureaucracies; for the United Nations,
please tell me it if needs to be strengthened or not.”
European opinion proved stable with 74% saying the
UN needs to be strengthened, as compared to 75% in
2002. On the American side, 70%, as compared to 77%
in 2002, opted for strengthening. One might have
expected a much steeper decline on the U.S. side, given
the controversial role of the UN in the run-up to the
Iraq war.
LARGE MAJORITY OF AMERICANS BELIEVE
IN JUST WAR, CREATING GULF WITH EUROPE.
Two additional questions round out the picture of how
both sides of the Atlantic view the role of the United
Nations as provider of international legitimacy. First,
the survey asked whether war can be just.
The gap across the Atlantic on this question is huge.
While Great Britain rests somewhere mid-Atlantic on

UNDER SOME CONDITIONS, WAR IS NECESSARY TO OBTAIN JUSTICE

0 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Great Britain 39% 35%

France 27% 12%

Germany 27% 12%

Netherlands 38% 22%

Italy 28% 15%

Poland 28% 18%

Portugal 29% 16%

Europe 30% 18%

U.S. 29% 55%

Agree Somewhat Agree Strongly

Figure 3-3

14 | T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 0 3
 COMPARING WILLINGNESS TO STRENGTHEN THE UNITED NATIONS OR BYPASS IT:
A CROSS-TABULATION
Do not strengthen
Do not strengthen and do not bypass
and do not bypass U.N.
U.N.

5%
10%

12% 35% 26%

Do not strengthen Strengthen and Do not strengthen
48% and bypass U.N. do not bypass and bypass U.N.
Strengthen and U.N.
do not bypass
U.N.

31%
Strengthen and 34%
bypass U.N.
Strengthen and
bypass U.N.

EUROPE U.S.
Figure 3-4

this issue (and the Netherlands perhaps just off the con-
tinent), there remains a sizeable difference from the
United States.
MOST AMERICANS, UNLIKE EUROPEANS,
BELIEVE BYPASSING THE UN IS JUSTIFIED.
When asked if it is justified to bypass the UN when
vital interests of your country are involved, 36% of
Americans and 16% of Europeans agreed strongly, and
21% of Americans and 24% of Europeans agreed some-
what. Whereas 57% of Americans agreed, 53% of
Europeans disagreed. This helps explain why the Bush
Administration was able to build majority support for
war in Iraq, even in the absence of a second U.N.
Security Council resolution.
When the answers to the questions about strength-
ening the UN and bypassing the UN are combined in
one table (i.e., the results are cross-tabulated), the distri-
bution of answers within Europe and the United States
is revealing.
While majorities in both the United States and
Europe want to strengthen the United Nations, a major-
ity in the U.S. is willing to bypass the United Nations
when vital interests are at stake. The group that both
wants to strengthen the UN and bypass the world body
is slightly larger in the U.S. than in Europe (34% vs.
31%), and the group that does not want to strengthen
the UN and is willing to bypass it is, in the United
States, double that in Europe (26% vs. 12%). When one
combines these two groups in the U.S. case, one sees
the coalition that the Bush Administration relied upon
when it sought support for the Iraq war. These group-
ings suggest that there may be cross-national typolo-
gies, which might be helpful in understanding foreign
policy differences across the Atlantic.12

12 For a deeper analysis of this, please see the Transatlantic Trends website (www.gmfus.org/transtatlantictrends) for an interpretative essay by Dr. Ronald
D. Asmus, Dr. Philip P. Everts, and Dr. Pierangelo Isernia.

T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 0 3 | 15
 IV. The Transatlantic Challenge of Middle East Peace

he challenge both sides of the Atlantic face in AMERICANS FEEL WARMER TOWARD
T devising a common strategy to foster Middle East ISRAEL THAN DO EUROPEANS.
peace is not new. Traditionally, there have been deep
differences across the Atlantic on this issue. However, To gauge the similarity or divergence of public views
with the seeming renewed commitment of the Bush on both sides of the Atlantic toward Israel and the
Administration, following the Iraq war, to tackle a chal- Palestinians, the thermometer rating of warmth is
lenge many view as central to stability in the region, the helpful.
survey sought to explore the potential for transatlantic Clearly, the degree of warmth felt toward Israel is
cooperation. greater in the U.S. than in Europe. On the European
side, the one significant change was the
THERMOMETER READINGS – growth of warm feelings in Germany
NATIONS’ FEELINGS TOWARDS ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS
with regard to Israel. Relatively cool
100° 100°
feelings toward the Palestinians do not
90° 90° appear to differ in any substantial way
across the Atlantic. Unlike Americans,
80° 80°
Europeans do not feel differently toward
2003 2002
70° 60° U.S. 70° Israel and the Palestinians, with both
48° Netherlands (48°)
46° Great Britain (43°)
2003 rating 43. Transatlantic views of Saudi
60° 60° 47° Great Britain
43° EUROPE (38°)
46° Italy
Arabia, Syria, and Iran are broadly
43° France (43°)
neutral 50°
43° Germany (32°)
neutral 50° 45° France similar.
43° EUROPE
43° Italy (42°)
40° 40° 43° Portugal
40° Portugal
33° Poland (29°)
41° Netherlands U.S. SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL LINKED TO
40° Germany
30° 30°
39° U.S. ITS STATUS AS THE ONLY DEMOCRACY
35° Poland IN THE ARAB WORLD.
20° 20°

10° 10° To probe views of Israel more deeply, a

question was asked as to whether Israel
0° 0°
deserves support because it is the only
Feelings towards Israel Feelings towards the Palestinians democracy in the Arab world. In the

Figure 4-1

16 | T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 0 3
 ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: POLICY OPTIONS
The U.S. and Europeans should increase political pressure on Israel to withdraw from Palestinian territory. 13
0 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
34% 41% EUROPE

27% 40% U.S.

The U.S. and Europeans should impose economic sanctions on Israel in order for it to withdraw from Palestinian territory.
0 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
36% 29% EUROPE

30% 22% U.S.

The U.S. and Europeans should stop economic aid to the Palestinians to end their suicide attacks against Israeli civilians.
0 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
26% 26% EUROPE

22% 50% U.S.

The U.S. and Europeans should increase pressure on the Arab states to stop their support of Palestinian terrorism.
0 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
34% 45% EUROPE

19% 70% U.S.

The U.S. and Europeans should send a peace-keeping force to separate the parties.
0 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
34% 33% EUROPE

29% 26% U.S.

Agree Somewhat Agree Strongly

Figure 4-2

U.S., 28% of respondents agreed strongly with this
argument and 35% agreed somewhat (totaling 63%); in
Europe, 12% agreed strongly and 33% agreed some-
what (totaling 45%). The resonance of this issue — look-
ing both at the number who agree strongly and the
overall number who agree — is far greater in the
United States than in Europe.
AMERICANS MUCH MORE WILLING TO EXERT PRES-
SURE ON THE PALESTINIANS AND THE ARAB STATES.
While Americans feel greater warmth toward Israel, as
well as support its status as a democracy, American and
European publics have surprisingly similar views when
it comes to their willingness to put pressure on Israel to
resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Survey participants
were given a list of proposals aimed at helping to end

13 Half of the sample was asked about “the U.S. and Europeans” and half about “the U.S.” The wording change resulted in no statistically significant
difference and thus the answers to the two questions were combined

T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 0 3 | 17
 the conflict.14 The five policy options are listed on the
prior page. While there was majority support on both
sides of the Atlantic to pursue these options, important
differences were also apparent.
Based on responses to these questions, Americans
and Europeans appear almost equally willing to exert
pressure on Israel, while Americans are much more
willing to exert pressure on the Palestinians and the
Arab states. On the questions regarding increasing
political pressure or imposing economic sanctions on
Israel to withdraw from Palestinian territory, Europeans
are slightly more willing to increase political pressure
(75% for Europe versus 67% for Americans) and clearly
more willing to impose economic sanctions (65% versus
52%). When asked about stopping economic aid to the
Palestinians to end their suicide attacks against Israeli
civilians, Americans are unequivocal in their strong
support for such a policy (50% in strong agreement, as
compared to 26% in Europe), whereas in Europe there
is, overall, only a small majority in favor (72% for the
US and 52% for Europe). In the case of increasing pres-
sure on Arab states to stop their support of Palestinian
terrorism, overall support is high in the United States
(89%) and Europe (79%), but the intensity of feeling
among Americans, with 70% agreeing strongly with the
proposal, is far greater than the 45% offering strong
agreement in Europe. One area of unexpected consen-
sus was majority support on both sides of the Atlantic
for sending a peace-keeping force to separate the
parties.15

14 Half of the sample was asked about the “Arab-Israeli conflict” and the other half about the “Israeli-Palestinian conflict.” The wording change resulted
in no statistically significant difference and thus the two sub-samples were combined.
15 On the question of a peacekeeping force, previous surveys have shown a deeply divided or negative U.S. public. In April 2002, a CBS News Poll showed
49% in favor and 43% in opposition to the United States sending in troops as part of a peacekeeping force in order to try and end the fighting between
Israel and the Palestinians. In March 2002, a Princeton Survey Research Associates/Newsweek Poll recorded 32% of American respondents favoring
and 62% opposing sending U.S. troops to Israel as part of an international force with monitoring and peace-keeping responsibilities.

18 | T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 0 3
 V. Conclusions
key message of the survey seems to be that allies
A can simultaneously feel estranged and share for-
eign policy interests that lead them to work together.
Compared to 2002, Europeans like the United States
less and are less willing to rely on U.S. global leader-
ship. Increased European support for a stronger
European Union results, in no small measure, from
clear majorities in Germany opting in this survey for
Europe over the United States. The Germany that
sought never to choose between Europe and the United
States has now expressed an unambiguous preference
for Europe. It remains to be seen whether this trend will
endure.
For the United States, the largest percentage of
Americans since 1947 acknowledges the need for the
United States to take an active part in world affairs.
Americans are both supportive of the Bush
Administration’s foreign policy and of a stronger role
for the European Union. Europeans and Americans,
who want to see the EU become a superpower like the
United States, supported this development in order for
the EU to cooperate effectively with the U.S., rather
than to compete better. A majority of Europeans appear
to want an Atlanticist EU, serving as a partner to the
U.S. Americans remain multilateralists and fear the con-
sequences of unilateralist policies. Furthermore, there is
an overwhelming consensus across the Atlantic that the
EU’s soft (non-military) power has a role to play.
Americans and Europeans have roughly similar
views of threats, but different impulses on how to
respond. On questions regarding North Korea and Iran
acquiring weapons of mass destruction, as well as sce-
narios involving a country harboring dangerous terror-
ists or threatening a neighbor with nuclear weapons,
Americans are more likely than Europeans to support
the use of military force. When given the choice, how-
ever, both sides of the Atlantic express a preference for
imposing economic sanctions, rather than turning to the
military.
On questions regarding international organizations,
both Americans and Europeans opt for strengthening
the United Nations, but a majority of Americans sup-
port bypassing the world body if vital interests are at
stake. On both sides of the Atlantic, NATO offers
almost the same amount of legitimacy for military inter-
vention as does the U.N. Security Council.
On the Middle East peace process, Americans are
much more willing to exert pressure on the Palestinians
and the Arab states than are Europeans. Despite these
differences, transatlantic majorities exist for applying
political and economic pressure on all sides, as well as
for sending a peace-keeping force.
T R A N S A T L A N T I C T R E N D S 2 0 0 3 | 19