DE FACTO OFFICERSHIP (TORRES v. RIBO) – RIGHT TO COMPENSATION (MONROY V.
CA) PUBOFF
MORFE v. MUTUC
Petitioner: Jesus Morfe, a CFI judge assailing the constitutionality of RA 3019
Respondent: Amelito Mutuc, Executive Secretary
The constitutionality of the legal requirement of government officials
and employees to submit sworn declaration of financial conditions, assets and liabilities is
questioned.
GR No. L-20387 / 31 Jan 1968 / J. Fernando
FACTS
This is a petition for declaratory relief filed in the CFI of Pangasinan by plaintiff Jesus Morfe to
declare §7 RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 as unconstitutional. The
said provision is that requiring the periodic submission of a sworn statement of assets and
liabilities.
Petitioner said he agreed that it was a reasonable requirement for a public officer to make a record
of his assets and liabilities upon assuming office. But he maintains that the periodic filing, after
the officer or employee filed the initial one and has assumed office, is oppressive and
unconstitutional.
1
Petitioner contends this violates three constitutional rights:
 The due process clause
 Right to privacy (aka the ban on unreasonable search and seizure)
 Right against self-incrimination
Petitioner claims that there was no need for the provision as the income tax law and the tax
census law also require statements which can serve to determine whether an officer or employee
in this Republic has enriched himself out of proportion to his reported income.
In his answer, the executive secretary Amelito Mutuc admitted the facts and set up a special
affirmative defense,
"That when a government official, like plaintiff, accepts a public position, he is deemed to have voluntarily
assumed the obligation to give information about his personal affair, not only at the time of his assumption of office
but during the time he continues to discharge public trust. The private life of an employee cannot be segregated from
his public life"
He also said that the provision merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of insuring the interest
or general welfare in honest and clean public service and is therefore a legitimate exercise of the
police power.
Petitioner moved for judgment on the pleadings.
Lower court granted relief, declaring said section void insofar as it required periodic submittal of
sworn SALNs. On appeal to the SC.
ISSUE
 WON §7 RA 3019 is constitutional specifically on the portion requiring periodic
submittal of sworn SALNs. YES. CFI reversed.
RATIO
1. Presumption of validity. Petition could be reversed on the absence of evidence to rebut
the presumption of validity. Without evidence presented, as held in Ermita-Malate
Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. The Mayor of Manila, the presumption of
validity must prevail. In the same case, it was said that when the liberty curtailed was
freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for validity of governmental acts was
more rigorous or exacting, as opposed to when only rights of property are imperiled.
Thus the Court further discussed on the merits.
2. On the due process clause. Two questions were discussed by the Court
a. When the state enacts a law under its police power to promote morality in
public service, limited in scope to those in public service, may a public
official claiming to be adversely affected rely on the due process clause to
annul such statute or any portion thereof? YES.
i. Two apparently conflicting concepts here, public office as a public
trust vs public office as property. The Court said that from the
standpoint of security of tenure afforded by the Constitution, then
the public officer can invoke the due process clause as the office is
analogous to property in that sense. This was held by the Court in
a series of cases where it granted civil service employees the right
 DE FACTO OFFICERSHIP (TORRES v. RIBO) – RIGHT TO COMPENSATION (MONROY V. CA) PUBOFF

to procedural due process, where he must be given an opportunity
to be heard and a fair hearing.
b. If YES, was due process observed? YES
i. The Court, after quoting definitions of due process, proceeded to
dispose of this question in one paragraph (with no further
explanations, so it's a bit incomplete). To quote:
It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore
the harsh and compelling realities of public service with its ever-
present temptation to heed the call of greed and avarice to condemn as
arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as that imposed on public
officials and employees to file such sworn statement of assets and
liabilities every two years after having done so upon assuming office.
The due process clause is not susceptible to such a reproach. There
was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police power.
5. On the right against self-incrimination. In a declaratory action proceeding, the objection
based on the guaranty against self- incrimination is far from decisive. The protection
will have to await the existence of actual cases, be they criminal, civil or administrative.
Prior to such a stage, there is no pressing need to pass upon the validity of the fear
sincerely voiced that there is an infringement of the non- incrimination clause.
6. On the allegation that is "an insult to the personal integrity and official dignity" of public officials. On
its face, the statute cannot be assailed. The Court does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. As long as they do not violate any
Constitutional provision, the Courts merely apply and interpret them, regardless of
whether or not they are wise or salutary.

3. On the right to privacy. The Court first discussed the relation between liberty as touched
by the due process question and the right to privacy, and concluded that the right to
liberty will be emasculated without a right to privacy. It recognized the applicability of
the SCOTUS interpretations of the right as held in Griswold v. Connecticut. It then
discussed on Prof. Emerson's view on privacy (an article from the Michigan Law
Review) which said that there is a concept of limited government in the idea that the
government stops short of certain intrusions of personal lives of citizens (with an
interesting footnote, no. 66, quoting Guerrero-Nakpil in the Sunday Times Magazine
discussing that the word "privacy" doesn't even exist in any Filipino language and might
be a Western invention). There is again a one paragraph disposal of the issue at the end,
to quote:
Even with due recognition of such a view, it cannot be said that the
challenged statutory provision calls for disclosure of information which infringes on the
right of a person to privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational relationship such a
requirement possesses with the objective of a valid statute goes very far in precluding
assent to an objection of such character. This is not to say that a public officer, by
virtue of a position he holds, is bereft of constitutional protection; it is only to
emphasize that in subjecting him to such a further compulsory revelation of his assets
and liabilities, including the statement of the amounts and sources of income, the
amounts of personal and family expenses, and the amount of income taxes paid for the
next preceding calendar year, there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise
would be a private sphere
4. On the right against unreasonable search and seizure. The Court discussed the SCOTUS case
of Davis v. United States, which emphasized that gasoline ration coupons are not
private property and thus remain at all times government property and subject to
inspection and recall by it. Davis here was convicted of having a number of gasoline
coupons representing gallons of gasoline, penalized by a 1940 statute. It also discussed
the PH Court case of Stonehill v. Diokno, where the concluding statement is "Such is
precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted
— to outlaw the so-called general warrants." Here there is no such violation as the evil
sought to be prevented does not exist.