Rule 13 - Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments and

Other Papers

RIANO, CIVIL PROCEDURE, Vol. 1, 2014 ed., pp. 342-348.

Rule 14 – Summons

RIANO, CIVIL PROCEDURE, Vol. 1, 2014 ed., pp. 422-466.

1. Potenciano II v. Barnes, G.R. No. 159421, 20 August 2008,

562 SCRA 483

2. Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130974, 16 August

2006, 499 SCRA 21
Facts:

Mrs. Agapita Trajano sought the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by

the US District Court of Hawaii against Ma. Imelda M. Manotoc (Imee Marcos) for
the wrongful death of Mr. Archimedes Trajano committed by military intelligence
in the Philippines allegedly working for Manotoc.

The RTC issued summons for Manotoc addressed at Alexandra Homes, Pasig. It was
served on a Macky dela Cruz described as a caretaker of her unit. Manotoc failed
to file her answer and was declared in default.

On October 1993, manotoc filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of

jurisdiction over her person, stating that she is not a resident of the said condo and
that she does not hold office there, as well as that Macky dela Cruz is not her
representative or employee. Thus no valid service was made. Further, she states
that she is a resident of Singapore.

On October 1994, the RTC denied the motion. On December 1994, denied her MR
for lack of merit.

Manotoc filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA on January 1995,
that was denied on March 1997, and the MR denied on April 1997. The CA ruled
that:
 1) As per findings of the trial court, the residence of Manotoc was indeed at
Alexandra Homes.
2) The disembarkation/embarkation cord and certification were hearsay. It
rejected a proof of her residency in Singapore based on her passport in
which two pages were withheld.

Issue:

Whether there was valid substituted service.

Held:

No.

In actions strictly ‘in perosnam’jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is

mandatory and can be complied with valid service of summons.

If defendant cannot be served, for excusable reason, within a reasonable time,

substituted service can be resorted to.

It is extraordinary in character and a derogation of the usual method of service thus

rules for such must be faithfully complied with.

The requirements of valid substituted service if there is impossibility of prompt

personal service which is 15-30 days for the sheriff are:

1) By leaving copies of summons at defendant’s residence with a person of

suitable age and discretion residing therein or by leaving copies at the
defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person
in charge.
2) The sheriff must narrate in specific details how service in person became
impossible.
3) The attempt must be extraordinary and at least three times. The person of
suitable age and discretion must be at least 18 years old, able to read the
summons written in English, and must be with confidential relation to
defendant. A competent person in charge can be the president or manager.

The substituted service was invalid because the sheriff did not comply with the
requirements. Macky dela Cruz was not a representative of Manotoc. Therefore,
since there was no valid service of summons, there was no jurisdiction acquired.
The RTC’s decision is null and void.
 3. Guanzon v. Arradaza, G.R. No. 155392, 6 December 2006,
510 SCRA 309
FACTS:

Arradaza boarded a jeepney owned and operated by Maidin and Lebita. Following
the jeepney was a dump truck registered in the name of Guanzon. The two
vehicles collided. Arradaza sustained injuries. Despite several demands, Maidin
and Lebita failed to reimburse Arradaza of the actual damages he incurred.
Arradaza filed a case against Maidin and Lebita. The latter filed their answer
arguing that it was the truck driver who was at fault. Therefore, Guanzon, being
the employer, failed to exercise the diligence of a god father in selecting and
hiring the driver.

Summons were served to Guanzon through substituted service via a certain Susan
Ador. Guanzon failed to file an answer and was declared in default.

2 years later, Guanzon filed a MTD on the ground that the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over her because of the defective service of summons.

MeTC adjuged in favour of Arradaza. Guanzon appealed to the RTC Manila. RTC
affirmed the MeTC decision. Appeal to the CA was also denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was proper service of summons on Guanzon.

RULING: Yes. The motor vehicle registration of the truck is under the name of
Guanzon with address at Manresa, QC. The service of summons therein failed
because Guanzon was not known in the said address. Upon inquiry with the SEC,
it was found out that Guanzon was the director of Guanzon Lime Dev’t Company
with address at Caloocan. Service of summons was effected there through Susan
Ador, of suitable age and working in the premises.

The service of summons upon petitioner first attempted by personal service, and
subsequently by substituted service more than meets the requirements set by the
Rules of Court.

4. UCPB v. Ongpin, G.R. No. 146593, 26 October 2001, 368

SCRA 464

Facts:
On November 17, 1994, Philippine Apparel, Inc. (PAI) entered into a credit
agreement with petitioner United Coconut Planters Bank for a case-to-case credit
line in the amount of US$500,000.00. Respondent Roberto V. Ongpin, then
controlling stockholder of PAI, signed as surety, binding himself jointly and
severally liable with PAI for the same amount. PAI availed of the credit line by
drawing on short-term loans and opening letters of credit for the importation of
goods, which amounted to US$650,986.34 or P16,526,653.00. As PAI failed to pay
its obligations, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent Ongpin with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati to enforce his obligation as surety of PAI.
Petitioner sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment on the
following grounds: (1) respondent, in fraud of creditors, had transferred residence
to Hongkong; (2) his obligation was not covered by any collateral; and (3) PAI and
its officers, including respondent, with intent to defraud, did not disclose the fact
that the Bureau of Customs had claims against PAI for unpaid customs duties and
taxes in the amount of P284,010,387.00, which fact could have affected
petitioner's decision whether to grant the loan to PAI.

On November 10, 1995, the trial court issued an order granting petitioner's prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. On November 16, 1995, a
writ of attachment and a notice of garnishment were issued by the trial court,
addressed to the president and corporate secretary of the Dominion Asian
Equities garnishing 8,315,600 shares of stock belonging to respondent.

On March 19, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the appeals
court insofar as it held that the trial court had no jurisdiction on the person of
petitioner and for this reason suspended implementation of the writ of
attachment/garnishment. However, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's
motion.

On August 1, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. Again,
during the pendency of the case, petitioner filed with the trial court on August 15,
1997 another Motion to Serve Summons through Publication with Leave of Court.
In the meantime, on August 27, 1997, this Court issued a resolution dismissing
petitioner's petition for review on certiorari for failure of petitioner to comply
with procedural requirements.

Issue: Whether or not the substituted service of summons on Anne V. Morallo,

executive secretary of the president of PILTEL, was valid.
Held: Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that (1)
substituted service of summons at the PILTEL office where respondent sits as
chairman of the board is invalid as the PILTEL office is not his regular place of
business; and (2) Anne V. Morallo, the executive secretary of PILTEL's president,
was not authorized to receive the summons on behalf of respondent Ongpin as
she was not his executive secretary but that of the president's.

We think no error was incurred by the Court of Appeals in this ruling. Rule 14, §7
of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if, for justifiable causes,
personal service cannot be effected on defendant, service may be effected (a) by
leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof.15 The word "office" or the phrase "regular place of business"
refers to the office or place of business of the defendant at the time of service.
The rule specifically designates the persons to whom copies of the process should
be left. In Mapa vs. Court of Appeals,16 substituted service of summons in a
person claiming to be authorized to receive service of summons in behalf of the
corporation was held to be invalid as far as jurisdiction over the person of the
chairman of the board was concerned inasmuch as he was not holding office in
the corporation but in his residence. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that the
regular place of business of a chairman of the board of directors is the same as
the address of the corporation as it is possible for him to hold office elsewhere.

5. Garcia v. SB and Republic, G.R. No. 170122, 12 October

2009, 603 SCRA 348
FACTS: To recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties in the aggregate amount of PhP
143,052,015.29 that retired Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, his wife, herein petitioner Clarita, children
Ian Carl, Juan Paulo and Timothy Mark had allegedly amassed and acquired, the Republic,
through the Office of the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan on October 29, 2004 a
petition for the forfeiture of those properties.
 Another forfeiture case was filed this time to recover funds and properties amounting to
PhP 202,005,980.55.
 Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II, but subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB
charged the Garcias and three others with Plunder which has a value of PhP 303,272,005.99.
 After the filing of Forfeiture I, the following events transpired in relation to the case:
 (1) The corresponding summons was issued and all served on Gen. Garcia at his place
of detention. Per the Sheriffs Return dated November 2, 2005, the summons was duly
served on respondent Garcias.
  Instead of an answer, the Garcias filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of the SBs lack
of jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture. The OMB countered with a motion
to expunge and to declare the Garcias in default. To the OMBs motion, the Garcia’s
interposed an opposition in which they manifested that they have meanwhile repaired to
the Court on certiorari to nullify the writ of attachment SB issued in which case the SB
should defer action on the forfeiture case as a matter of judicial courtesy.
 The SB denied the motion to dismiss; The same resolution declared the Garcias in default.
 Another resolution denied the Garcias motion for reconsideration and/or to admit answer,
and set a date for the ex-parte presentation of the Republics evidence.
 A second motion for reconsideration was also denied on February 23, 2005, pursuant to
the prohibited pleading rule.
 Despite the standing default order, the Garcias moved for the transfer and consolidation
of Forfeiture I with the plunder case which were respectively pending in different divisions
of the SB. contending that such consolidation is mandatory under RA 8249
(SANDIGANBAYAN).
 On May 20, 2005, the SB 4th Division denied the motion for the reason that the forfeiture
case is not the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
criminal case of plunder.
 (4) On July 26, 2005, the Garcias filed another motion to dismiss and/or to quash
Forfeiture I on, inter alia, the following grounds: (a) the filing of the plunder case ousted
the SB 4th Division of jurisdiction over the forfeiture case; and (b) that the consolidation is
imperative in order to avoid possible double jeopardy entanglements.
 By Order of August 5, 2005, the SB merely noted the motion in view of movants
having been declared in default which has yet to be lifted.

ISSUE: For lack of proper and valid service of summons, W/N the [SB] 4th Division could not
have acquired jurisdiction over petitioners, [and her children], persons, much less make them
become the true parties-litigants, contestants or legal adversaries in forfeiture

HELD: On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the SB did not acquire jurisdiction
over her person and that of her children due to a defective substituted service of summons. There
is merit in petitioners contention.

Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides for the requirements
of a valid substituted service of summons, thus:

SEC. 7. Substituted service. If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section [personal service on defendant], service may be effected (a) by
leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place
of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be bound by its decision
or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever mode authorized by and proper under the
Rules, is the means by which a court acquires jurisdiction over a person.
 In the instant case, it is undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I and II were served
personally on Maj. Gen. Carlos Flores Garcia, who is detained at the PNP Detention Center, who
acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing his signature. It is also undisputed that substituted
service of summons for both Forfeitures I and II was made on petitioner and her children through
Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNP Detention Center. However, such substituted services of summons
were invalid for being irregular and defective
 In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals,[23] we broke down the requirements to be
(1) Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the party relying on substituted service or
the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt
service within a reasonable time. Reasonable time being so much time as is necessary under the
circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract
or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,]
to the other party.[24] Moreover, we indicated therein that the sheriff must show several attempts
for personal service of at least three (3) times on at least two (2) different dates.
(2) Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons
the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service.
(3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing at
defendants house or residence; or on a competent person in charge of defendants office or
regular place of business.

From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted service of summons was
made on petitioner and her children, as the service made through Maj. Gen. Garcia did not comply
with the first two (2) requirements mentioned above for a valid substituted service of
summons. Moreover, the third requirement was also not strictly complied with as the substituted
service was made not at petitioner’s house or residence but in the PNP Detention Center where
Maj. Gen. Garcia is detained, even if the latter is of suitable age and discretion. Hence, no valid
substituted service of summons was made.

Insofar as they pertain to petitioner and her three children, is VOID for lack of jurisdiction
over their persons.

6. Spouses Manuel v. Ong, G.R. No. 205249, 15 October

2014, 738 SCRA 489

7. Domagas v. Jensen, G.R. No. 158407, 17 January 2005,

448 SCRA 663

CASE DOCTRINE: The statutory requirements for a valid substituted service of

summons must be strictly complied with otherwise, jurisdiction over the
person cannot be had.

QUICK DIGEST:

Domagas filed forcible entry case against Jensen

Jensen was in Norway. Sheriff left summons with brother who wasn’t even living
there.

MTC rendered judgement. When Jensen got back, she filed a complaint with RTC
to annul the decision of the MTC.

RTC & CA – there was no valid service of summons;

SC: Yes. Under the RoC if defendant in an action in personam cannot be found, a
substituted service of summons may be done provided it complies with the
requirements set forth in the law.
FACTS:

On February 19, 1999, Domagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against Jensen
before the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan. Domagas allegd that she was the owner
of a parcel of land in Pangasinan with an area of 827 square meters. She further
alleged that on January 9, 1999, Jensen, by means of force, strategy and stealth,
gained entry into her property by excavating a portion thereof and constructing a
fence. Domagas was deprived of 60 square meters of her property along the
boundary line.

The summons and the complaint were not served on Jensen because she was
apparently out of the country. This was relayed to the Sheriff by her brother, Oscar
Layno, who was then in Jensen’s house. The Sheriff left the summons and
complaint with Oscar Layno, who received the same.

On May 17, 1999, the court rendered judgment ordering Jensen and all persons
occupying the property to vacate the disputed area and to pay monthly rentals.
Jensen failed to appeal the decision. A writ of execution was issued on September
27, 1999.

On August 16, 2000, Jensen filed a complaint against Domagas before the RTC of
Dagupan City for the annulment of the decision of the MTC on the ground that due
to the Sheriff’s failure to serve the complaint and summons, the MTC never
acquired jurisdiction over her person. Apparently Jensen was in Oslo, Norway
when summons was sent to her house. Jensen alleged that: (a) when the complaint
was filed, she was no longer a resident of Calasiao, Pangasinan but Oslo, Norway,
and she had leased her house to Eduardo Gonzales; (b) she was at Oslo at the time
the complaint was served; (c) her brother was not a resident of the house and had
no authority to receive the summons and complaint for and in her behalf.

Jensen filed a Manifestation and appended thereto: (a) copy of her passport
showing she left the country; (b) affidavit that she was married to Jarl Jensen, and
had resided in Norway with her husband since 1993; (c) contract of lease between
Jensen and Gonzales; (d) affidavit of Oscar stating he was there to collect the rental
payment from Gonzales.

RTC rendered judgment in favor of Jensen. The trial court declared that there was
no valid service of the complaint and summons on Jensen, considering that she left
the Philippines on February 17, 1999, for Oslo, Norway and her brother was never
authorized to receive the said complaint and summons for and in her behalf.

Upon appeal, the appellate court ruled that the complaint was one for ejectment,
which is an action quasi in rem. CA ruled that since Jensen was temporarily out of
the country, the summons and complaint should have been served via
extraterritorial service under Sec. 15 in relation to Sec. 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court, which requires leave of court. Considering that there was no prior leave of
court and Domagas followed none of the modes of service prescribed by the
Rules of Court, the CA concluded that there was really no valid service of
summons and complaint upon Jensen.

ISSUE(S):

MAIN ISSUE: WON there was valid service of summons & complaint.. NO.

Ancillary issue: WON the ejectment is an action in personam YES.

HELD: YES, NO,

RATIO:

The main issue is anchored on the issue of whether or not the action of the
petitioner in the MTC against respondent is an action in personam or quasi in rem.

An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against
the person, as distinguished from a judgment against the propriety to determine
its state. It has been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce
personal rights or obligations; such action is brought against the person. An action
for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real action and in personam because the
plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal obligation or liability on the defendant under
Art. 539 of the New Civil Code.

MAIN ISSUE:

Citing Asiavest Limited vs. CA, In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the
case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does not
voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service of summons as
provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally
served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be made
in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country,
any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (a) substituted service
set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court;
(3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) any other manner the
court may deem sufficient.

Thus, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant is null and void.
In the present case, the records show that the respondent, before and after his
marriage to Jarl Jensen on August 23, 1987, remained a resident of Barangay
Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. This can be gleaned from the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated August 26, 1992 in which she declared that she was a resident of said
barangay. Moreover, in the Real Estate Mortgage Contract dated February 9, 1999,
ten days before the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 was filed, the petitioner
categorically stated that she was a Filipino and a resident of Barangay Buenlag,
Calasiao, Pangasinan. Considering that the respondent was in Oslo, Norway, having
left the Philippines on February 17, 1999, the summons and complaint in Civil Case
No. 879 may only be validly served on her through substituted service under
Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may
be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence
with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by
leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.

Strict compliance with the mode of service is required in order that the court
may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The statutory
requirement of substituted service must be followed faithfully and strictly and any
substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is rendered
ineffective.
As gleaned from the said return, there is no showing that as of April 5, 1999, the
house where the Sheriff found Oscar Layno was the latters residence or that of
the respondent herein. Neither is there any showing that the Sheriff tried to
ascertain where the residence of the respondent was on the said date. It turned
out that the occupant of the house was a lessor, Eduardo Gonzales, and that
Oscar Layno was in the premises only to collect the rentals from him. The service
of the summons on a person at a place where he was a visitor is not considered to
have been left at the residence or place or abode, where he has another place at
which he ordinarily stays and to which he intends to return

8. Robinson v. Miralles, G.R. No. 163584, 12 December 2006,

510 SCRA 678

FACTS:

Respondent Celita Miralles filed a complaint for collection of sum of money

against petitioner Remelita Robinson, alleging that$20,054 was borrowed by
Robinson, as shown in the MOA they both executed. Summons was served on
Robinson at her given address. However, per return of service of the Sheriif,
petitioner no longer resides there. Thus, the trial court issued an alias summons
to be served at Muntinlupa City, petitioner’s new address. Again, the Sheriff
reported twice thereafter that the summons could not be served on petitioner.
Sheriff Pontente, who was to serve the summons interposed that he was stopped
by the Security Guard of Alabang Hills Village because they were allegedly told by
Robinson not to let anyone proceed to her house if she is not around. Despite the
explanations of the Sheriff, the guards didn’t let him in. Thereafter, the Sheriff
just left a copy of the complaint to A.H. GEROCHE (THESECURITY GUARD), who
refused to affix his signature on the original copy, so he will be the one to give the
summons to petitioner Robinson. Eventually, petitioner Robinson was declared in
default for her failure to file an answer seasonably despite service of summons.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of Miralles ordering Robinson to pay
her obligations plus cost of damages. A copy of the court Order was sent to
petitioner by registered mail at her new address and a writ of execution was also
issued. Robinson filed a petition for relief from the judgment by default. She
claimed that summons was improperly served upon her, thus, the trial court
never acquired jurisdiction over her and that all its proceedings are void.
Petitioner Robinson contends that the service of the summons upon the
subdivision guard is not in compliance with Section 7, Rule 14 since he is not
related to her or staying at her residence, as required by the rule.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court correctly ruled that a substituted service of summons
upon petitioner has been validly effected?
RULING:

YES.

Although the SC have ruled that the statutory requirements of substituted service
must be followed strictly, faithfully, and fully and any substituted service other
than that authorized by the Rules is considered ineffective, the Court frowns upon
an overly strict application of the Rules. It is the spirit, rather than the letter of
the procedural rules, that governs. Obviously, it was impossible for the sheriff to
effect personal or substituted service of summons upon petitioner. We note that
she failed to controvert the sheriff’s declaration. Nor did she deny having received
the summons through the security guard. Considering her strict instruction to the
security guard, she must bear its consequences.

Thus, we agree with the trial court that summons has been properly served upon
petitioner and that it has acquired jurisdiction over her. Where the action is in
personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of summons may be
made through personal or substituted service in the manner provided for in
Sections 6 and 7, Rule14 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended.

SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. – Whenever practicable, the summons

shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or if he
refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.

SEC. 7. Substituted service – If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may
be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence
with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein; or (b) by
leaving the copies at the defendant’s office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof. Under our procedural rules, personal service
is generally preferred over substituted service, the latter mode of service being a
method extraordinary in character.

For substituted service to be justified, the following circumstances must be

clearly established:

(a) personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible;

(b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and(c) the summons was served upon
a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the party’s residence or upon
a competent person in charge of the party’s office or place of business. Failure to
do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds

9. Montefalcon et al v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 165016, 17 June

2008, 554 SCRA 513

Facts:

Vasquez allegedly also refused to give him regular school allowance despite
repeated demands. Petitioner Dolores added that she and Vasquez are not legally
married, and that Vasquez has his own family. Vasquez was declared in default for
failure to answer the service of summons(substituted). The court ordered
Vasquez to acknowledge Laurence and to pay P 5000 monthly. In the same year,
Vasquez surfaced. He filed notice of appeal to which petitioners opposed. Appeal
was granted by the court. Before the appellate court, he argued that the trial
court erred in trying and deciding the case as it “never” acquired jurisdiction over
his person, as well as in awarding P5,000-per-month support, which was allegedly
“excessive and exorbitant.” The appellate court granted Vasquez’s contention.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in holding that the respondent in this case was not
validly served with summons and complaint.

Held: To acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, service of summons

must be personal,[19] or if this is not feasible within a reasonable time, then by
substituted service.[20] It is of judicial notice that overseas Filipino seafarers are
contractual employees. They go back to the country once their contracts expire,
and wait for the signing of another contract with the same or new manning
agency and principal if they wish. It is therefore common knowledge that a
Filipino seaman often has a temporary residence in the urban areas like Metro
Manila, where majority of the manning agencies hold offices, aside from his home
address in the province where he originates. In this case, respondent Vasquez
hails from Camarines Sur but he has lived in Taguig City when the complaint was
filed. Notice may then be taken that he has established a residence in either
place. Residence is a place where the person named in the summons is living at
the time when the service was made, even though he was temporarily abroad at
the time. As an overseas seafarer, Vasquez was a Filipino resident temporarily out
of the country. Hence, service of summons on him is governed by Rule 14, Section
16 of the Rules of Court: When any action is commenced against a defendant who
ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service
may, by leave of court, be also effected out of the Philippines, as under the
preceding section.

10. BPI v. Spouses Santiago, G.R. No. G.R. No 169116, 28

March 2007, 519 SCRA
389
FACTS:
 Respondent (Centrogen) is a domestic corporation engaged in pharmaceutical business,
represented by its President, Edwin Santiago, son of private respondents Spouses Ireneo M.
Santiago and Liwanag P. Santiago.
 Private respondent Centrogen obtained loans from Far East Bank and Trust Company
reaching the sum of P4, 650,000.00, as evidenced by promissory notes executed by Edwin
Santiago.
 Ireneo M. Santiago executed a Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land registered
under his name and located at Sta Cruz, Laguna to secure the loan.
 The same property secured another loan obligation in the amount of P1,504,280.00.
 Centrogen incurred default and therefore the loan obligation became due and
demandable.
 Meanwhile, FEBTC merged with the BPI. As a result, BPI assumed all the rights, privileges
and obligations of FEBTC.
 BPI filed an Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property.
 Spouses Santiago and Centrogen filed a Complaint seeking the issuance of a TRO and
Preliminary and Final Injunction, for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage with BPI.
 The complaint alleged that the initial loan obligation in the amount of P490,000.00,
including interest thereon has been fully paid. Such payment notwithstanding, the amount was
still included in the amount of computation of the arrears as shown by the document of Extra-
Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage filed by the latter. Moreover, the Spouses Santiago
and Centrogen contended that the original loan agreement was for the amount of 5 Million but
only 2 Million was released by petitioner and as a result, the squalene project failed and the
company groped for funds to pay its loan obligations.
 On 27 February 2003, BPI was summoned to file and serve its Answer and on the same
day, summons was served on the Branch Manager of BPI. Instead of filing an Answer, BPI filed
a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and
other procedural infirmities attendant to the filing of the complaint.
 BPI claimed that the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz, Laguna Branch, was not one of
those authorized by Section 11, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court to receive summons on
behalf of the corporation. The summons served upon its Branch Manager, therefore, did not bind
the corporation. Also, alleged lack of authority of the person who signed.
 On 6 March 2003, the RTC ordered the service of new summons to BPI in accordance
with the provisions of the Revised Rules of Court.
 In compliance with the aforesaid Order, the Branch Clerk of Court caused the issuance of
a new summons on 7 March 2003, a copy of which was served upon the Office of the Corporate
Secretary of the BPI on March 11, 2003.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of BPI when the original
summons was served upon the branch manager of its Sta. Cruz, Laguna Branch.

HELD: Sec. 11, Rule 14. Service upon domestic private juridical entity – When the defendant is
a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a
juridical personality service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer or in-house counsel.

Applying the aforestated principle in the case at bar, we rule that the service of summons on BPI’s
Branch Manager did not bind the corporation for the branch manager is not included in the
enumeration of the statute of the persons upon whom service of summons can be validly made
in behalf of the corporation. Such service is therefore void and ineffectual.

However, upon the issuance and the proper service of new summons on 11 March 2003, before
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued on 20 March 2003, whatever defect attended the
service of the original summons, was promptly and accordingly cured.

The Order granting the application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued, the RTC already
acquired jurisdiction over the person of BPI by virtue of the new summons validly served on the
Corporate Secretary. The fact that the original summons was invalidly served is of no moment
since jurisdiction over BPI was subsequently acquired by the service of a new summons.
It bears stressing, that on 7 March 2003, the Branch Clerk of Court issued a new summons which
was properly served upon BPI’s Corporate Secretary on 11 March 2003, as evidenced by the
Sheriff’s Return.
The ultimate test on the validity and sufficiency on service of summons is whether the same and
the attachments thereto where ultimately received by the corporation under such circumstances
that no undue prejudice is sustained by it from the procedural lapse and it was afforded full
opportunity to present its responsive pleadings. This is but in accord with the entrenched rule that
the ends of substantial justice should not be subordinated to technicalities and, for which purpose,
each case should be examined within the factual milieu peculiar to it.

11. Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105838, 22 January

1996, 252 SCRA 92