Special Proceedings Compilation Case Digests

(1) the venue was improperly laid; (2) the trial court did not acquire
RULE 72 jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse was
included in the intestate proceedings; (4)there was absence of
Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the same
family, in accordance with Article 222 of NCC, and (5) no certification of
VDA DE MANALO VS. CA (2001)
non-forum shopping was attached to the petition.
Arcilla, Jay
CA dismissed; MR was denied. Hence, this petition for review.
FACTS:
Troadio Manalo, a resident of Sampaloc, Manila, died intestate
ISSUES:
in 1992. He was survived by his wife and his eleven children, who are all
W/N CA erred in upholding the questioned orders of the RTC
of legal age. He left several real properties located in Manila and in
which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the
Tarlac including a business- Manalo’s Machine Shop with offices at
petition for judicial settlement of estate ?
Quezon City and at Valenzuela. In November, the respondents, who
are eight of the surviving children filed a petition with the RTC for
RULING:
the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for the
NO. The Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration,
appointment of their brother, Romeo, ias administrator thereof. The trial
Settlement and Distribution of Estate is a SPECIAL PROCEEDING and,
court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing and directing
as such, it is a remedy whereby the respondents seek to establish a
the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
status, a right, or a particular fact..
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and directing service
by registered mail of the order. The trial court issued an order declaring
In the determination of the nature of an action or
the whole world in default, except the government, and set the
proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in
reception of evidence of the petitioners. the complaint shall be controlling. A careful scrutiny of the petition belies
the claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said
However, this order of general default was set aside by the trial court petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a
upon motion of the petitioners who were granted ten(10) days within petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such
which to file their opposition to the petition. as the fact of death and his residence which are foundation
facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the
The trial court called resolved such issues in the following administration of the estate rest. It also contains an
manner: enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list
1. admitted the opposition for the purpose of considering the merits 2. of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be
denied the hearing for such affirmative defenses are irrelevant and settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the reliefs prayed
immaterial 3.declared that the court had jurisdiction 4.denied the motion for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention
for inhibition 5.) set the application of Romeo Manalo for to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father.
appointment as regular administrator in the for hearing.
DISPOSITION:Petition is denied for lack of merit
The MR of the petitioners was denied; hence, they filed a petition
forcertiorari, contending that:
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 & LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 1
evidence that a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage
settlements nor there has been decreed a judicial separation of property
between them ,hence, the spouses are prohibited from entering into a
contract of sale. It is not also a valid donation BUT can be regarded as an
PATRICIA NATCHER VS. HON. COURT OFAPPEALS
Arcilla, Jay extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a
compulsory heir of the deceased. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
FACTS: reversed and set aside the lower courts decision ratiocinating t is the
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal
registered owners of a parcel of land in Manila .Upon the death of distribution of the estate. The court a quo, trying an ordinary action for
Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children entered into reconveyance/annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction when it
an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate. They adjudicated and performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of
divided among themselves the real property .Under the agreement: estate of a deceased person.
Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children received ISSUE:
1/14 share of the said property .The heirs executed and forged an May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general
"Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance/ annulment of title with
of Rights"- they subdivided among themselves the parcel of land. damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of property
Graciano then donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of
made by the decedent to any of the heirs?
his interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only
447.60 square meters registered under Graciano's name .The land was HELD:
further subdivided into two separate lots. Graciano sold the 1st lot to a NO. CA decision is AFFIRMED.
third person but retained ownership over the 2ndlot. Graciano married Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines
petitioner Patricia Natcher .He sold the 2nd lot to Natcher, a title was civil action and special proceedings, in this wise: a) A civil actionis one by
issued under her name. Graciano dies leaving his 6 children and Natcher which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
as heirs . prevention or redress of a wrong.
A civil case was filed a complaint before the RTC of Manila by the 6 A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the
children; alleging that Natcher through the employment of fraud, rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a
misrepresentation and forgery, acquired the 2nd lot by making it appear that special civil action. A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party
Graciano executed a Deed of Sale in her favour; that their legitimes have been seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact. There lies a marked
impaired. In her reply, Natcher averred that she was legally married to distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An actionis a
formal demand of ones right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the
Graciano on 20 March 1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise
court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to
considered a compulsory heir of the latter .RTC ruled that the deed of definite established rules. The term special proceedingmay be defined as an
sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a
Natcher is prohibited by law and thus a complete nullity, that no particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are
required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, account of the mere failure of the parties to submit the promised
the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion amicable settlement and/or the Motion for Judgment Based On An
It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings Amicable Settlement. Given the non-contentious nature of special
which are instituted and prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and proceedings (which do not depend on the will of an actor, but on a state
provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity, and that special or condition of things or persons not entirely within the control of the
proceedings include those proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense, but parties interested), its dismissal should be ordered only in the extreme
is instituted and prosecuted according to some special mode as in the case of case where the termination of the proceeding is the sole remedy
proceedings commenced without summons and prosecuted without regular consistent with equity and justice, but not as a penalty for neglect of the
pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions. A special proceeding parties therein. The third clause of Section 3, Rule 17, which authorizes
must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and independent proceeding for the motu propio dismissal of a case if the plaintiff fails to comply with
particular relief, such as may be instituted independently of a pending action, by the rules or any order of the court, cannot even be used to justify the
petition or motion upon notice convenient, though erroneous, termination of the proceedings herein. An
examination of the December 6, 2004 Order readily reveals that the trial
TABUADA VS. RUIZ court neither required the submission of the amicable settlement or the
Azarcon, Pia Lea aforesaid Motion for Judgment, nor warned the parties that should they
fail to submit the compromise within the given period, their case would
FACTS:
be dismissed. Hence, it cannot be categorized as an order requiring
Special proceeding # 5198 (settlement of intestate estate of
compliance to the extent that its defiance becomes an affront to the court
Calaliman) was filed in RTC Iloilo. RTC rendered a decision that they
and the rules. And even if it were worded in coercive language, the
will no longer be setting any hearing as parties assured that they are
parties cannot be forced to comply, for, as aforesaid, they are only
going to submit a "Motion for judgment based on an amicable
strongly encouraged, but are not obligated, to consummate a
settlement" on or before December 25, 2004. On March 2, 2005, RTC
compromise. An order requiring submission of an amicable settlement
terminated the proceedings for failure to submit amicable settlement
does not find support in our jurisprudence and is premised on an
invoking Sec.3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner and Calaliman
erroneous interpretation and application of the law and rules.
filed MR. On the ground that it was premature there being yet no
payment of debt and distribution of estate and that they have prepared HILADO VS. CA
necessary papers for amicable settlement. MR, denied. Hence this Azarcon, Pia Lea
petition.
Facts:
ISSUE: whether or not Judge Ruiz is correct in dismissing the case for
failure of parties to submit amicable settlement? The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15
May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita
RULING: Judge Ruiz erred when it dismissed the case for failure of Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter,
parties to submit amicable settlement. While a compromise agreement or Francisca Benedicto-Paulino. At the time of his death, there were two
an amicable settlement is very strongly encouraged, the failure to pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first,
consummate one does not warrant any procedural sanction, much less was then pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City,
provide an authority for the court to jettison the case. Sp. Proc. No. 5198 Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein.
should not have been terminated or dismissed by the trial court on
The second was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, Won petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of the
with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding deceased person, are entitled to copies of all processes and orders
Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein. pertaining to the intestate proceedings.
Thereafter, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RULING:
RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in Notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth
her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is
the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private respondent as based on a contingent claim. The definition of "intervention" under Rule
administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims.
of administration in her favor. In January 2001, private respondent
submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an
Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband. In the intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent included success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition
being litigated before the Bacolod City courts. of property in the custody of the court x x x" While the language of
Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening
Subsequently, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal
Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, praying that they be interest required of an intervenor "must be actual and material, direct
furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant."
intestate proceedings. petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that
the Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private respondent Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims
of the required inventory of the decedent's estate. Petitioners also filed to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86. These
other pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and
part of private respondent in her administration of the estate, and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule
assailing the inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, 87.
incomplete and inaccurate.
#2
Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide
ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the a creditor or any person interested in the estate, the right to participate in
contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides
proceedings. CA likewise dismissed the petition. for specific instances when such persons may accordingly act in those
proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on
ISSUE: the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or
WON creditors whose credit is based on contingent claim have reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the
the right to participate in the settlement proceeding by way of Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in
intervention under Rule 19 the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such
interests can be protected.
Pampanga. They prayed for the dismissal of the case on the ground that
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the the venue had been improperly laid.
intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than
mandating the service of court processes and pleadings upon them. In The CFI of Rizal ruled in favor of Eugenio Eusebio. Hence the petition.
either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are
being preserved and disposed of in accordance with the rules will be ISSUE:
duly satisfied. Whether or not venue had been properly laid in Rizal?
Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do RULING:

require notice to any or all "interested parties" the petitioners as
"interested parties" will be entitled to such notice. The instances when The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Don Andres Eusebio
notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, up to October 29, 1952, was and had always been domiciled in San
Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the Fernando, Pampanga. He only bought a house and lot at 889-A Espana
account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 Extension, Quezon City because his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated
concerning the petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell him, resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City. Even before he was
personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; able to transfer to the house he bought, Andres suffered a stroke and was
and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an forced to live in his son’s residence. It is well settled that “domicile is not
order for distribution of the estate residue. After all, even the commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one own’s health”
administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the even if coupled with “knowledge that one will never again be able, on
existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners. account of illness, to return home. Having resided for over seventy years
in Pampanga, the presumption is that Andres retained such domicile.
RULE 73 Andres had no intention of staying in Quezon City permanently.

There is no direct evidence of such intent – Andres did not manifest his
Venue and Process desire to live in Quezon City indefinitely; Eugenio did not testify
thereon; and Dr. Jesus Eusebio was not presented to testify on the matter.
EUSEBIO V. EUSEBIO Andres did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando,
Alvarez, Miguel Lorenzo Pampanga. Some of his children remained in that municipality. In the
deed of sale of his house at 889 – A Espana Ext., Andres gave San
FACTS:
Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. The marriage contract signed by
Andres when he was married in articulo mortis to Concepcion Villanueva
In the instant case, petitioner Eugenio Eusebio filed with the CFI
two days prior to his death stated that his residence is San Fernando,
of Rizal a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of
Pampanga.
his father, Andres Eusebio. He alleged that his father, who died on
November 28, 1952, resided in Quezon City. Eugenio’s siblings
The requisites for a change of domicile include (1) capacity to
(Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos),on the other hand,
choose and freedom of choice, (2) physical presence at the place chosen,
who claim that they are illegitimate children of Andres, opposed the
(3) intention to stay therein permanently. Although Andres complied
petition and alleged that Andres was domiciled in San Fernando,
with the first two requisites, there is no change of domicile because the b.)What does the word “resides” in Revised Rules of Court Rule
third requisite is absent. 73, Section 1 mean?
RULING:
With respect to the contention that appellants submitted
themselves to the authority of the CFI of Rizal because they introduced Rule 73, Section 1. “if the decedent is an inhabitant of the
evidence on the residence of the decedent, it must be noted that Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will
appellants specifically made of record that they were NOT submitting shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, except for the purpose only of settled at the CFI in theprovince in which he resides at the time of his
assailing the same. death, And if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the CFI of any
province in which he had estate.
In the whole, the Court found that Andres was, at the time of his
death, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that the CFI of Rizal had The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of the a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to theexclusion of all other courts.
deceased, the venue having been laid improperly. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of thelocation of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceedings, except in an appeal from that court,
GARCIA FULE V. COURT OF APPEALS inthe original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
Alvarez, Miguel Lorenzo record. ”Fule’s own submitted Death Certificate shows that the deceased
resided in QC at the time of his death, therefore the venueof Laguna was
FACTS: improper.
On April 26, 1973 Amado G. Garcia died, he owned property in Venue is subject to waiver (Rule 4, Section 4), but Preciosa did
Calamba, Laguna. On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with CFI not waive it, merely requested for alternativeremedy to assert her rights
Laguna a petition for letters of administration and exparte appointment as surviving spouse. However, venue is distinct from “jurisdiction”
as special administratrix over the estate. Subsequently, the motion was which is conferred by Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended to bewith CFIs
granted..There was an allegation that the wife was Carolina Carpio independently from the place of residence of the deceased.
Preciosa B. Garcia, wife of deceased, and nn behalf of their child: Rule 79 Section 2, demands that the petition should show the
Agustina B. Garcia opposed, which was denied by CFI. Preciosa alleged existence of jurisdiction to make the appointmentsought, and should
that Fule was a creditor of the estate, and as a mere illegitimate sister of allege all the necessary facts such as death, name, last residence,
thedeceased is not entitled to succeed from him. existence, situs of assets, intestacy, right of person who seeks
administration as next of kin, creditor or otherwise to be appointed.
The Court of Appeals reversed and annulled the appointment of
Fule. Preciosa became special administratrix upon a bond of P30, 000.00. Resides – ex vi termini “actual residence”-Elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
ISSUES: which it isemployed.-Same meaning as “inhabitant”.
a.)What is the distinction between venue and jurisdiction
CUENCO VS. CA
Balanay, Rendel Bryan pass upon the factual issues of (1) whether the decedent left or did not
leave a valid will, and (2) whether or not the decedent was a resident of
FACTS: Cebu at the time of his death.
Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the
In 1964, Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila Doctors’ Hospital Cebu CFI), it follows that the said court must exercise jurisdiction to the
survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco and exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the petition for probate was filed by
their two (2) minor sons all residing at 69 Piy Margal St., Sta. Mesa the respondent Rosa Cayetano Cuenco. The said respondent should
Heights, Quezon City, and by his children of the first marriage, assert her rights within the framework of the proceeding in the Cebu
respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction of another court.
Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco
Reyes and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in The respondents try to make capital of the fact that the judge of the Cebu
Cebu. CFI, stated that the petition for appointment of special administrator was
"not yet ready for the consideration of the Court today. It would be
Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly
Letters of Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding ..." It is sufficient to state in
alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu this connection that the said judge was certainly not referring to the
with properties in Cebu and Quezon City. court's jurisdiction over the res, not to jurisdiction itself which is
acquired from the moment a petition is filed, but only to the exercise of
The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings. At all events,
second wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate jurisdiction is conferred and determined by law and does not depend on
of the last will and testament, where she was named executrix. Rosa also the pronouncements of a trial judge.
filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held
in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have ISSUE
acted on the probate proceedings. Whether or not in Special Proceedings, the court with whom the
estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.
Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on
ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that RULING:
CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The No. The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing
opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding
favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon. with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders
and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the last will and
The CA ruled in the following manner: testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix
Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's wish.
settlement of the estate of a deceased person, covers both testate and
intestate proceedings. The Special Proceeding of the Cebu CFI having Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
been filed ahead, it is that court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and estate of a decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
which first attached. It is that court which can properly and exclusively courts, not the court with whom the estate or intestate petition is first
filed. Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears
petition before it and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the on the record" could probably be properly invoked, had such deference
consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should in comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon City court not appeared in the
be left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise record, or had the record otherwise shown that the Cebu court had taken
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. cognizance of the petition before it and assumed jurisdiction.
The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an element Finally, venue was properly assumed by and transferred to the Quezon
of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. If this were City court and that it is the interest of justice and in avoidance of
otherwise, it would affect the prompt administration of justice. It would needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over
be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to the testate estate of the decedent (with the due deference and consent of
be executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his estate in accordance the Cebu court) and its admission to probate of his last will and
therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the testament and appointment of petitioner-widow as administratrix
law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money and without bond in pursuance of the decedent's express will and all its
effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court every time she orders and actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be approved
has an important matter of the estate to take up with the probate court. and authorized rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly had
and to repeat and duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu court
In the case at bar, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of the only to revert once more to the Quezon City court should the Cebu court
intestate petition first filed with it and deferred to the testate proceedings find that indeed and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City
filed with the Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon City court on the strength of incontrovertible documentary evidence of
court to determine the residence of the decedent and whether he did record, Quezon City was the conjugal residence of the decedent.
leave a last will and testament upon which would depend the proper
venue of the estate proceedings, Cebu or Quezon City. SAN LUIS VS. SAN LUIS
Balanay, Rendel Bryan
Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of
jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly FACTS:
presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City During his lifetime, Felicisimo T. San Luis contracted three
was the first choice of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942
home and domicile therein — with the deference in comity duly given by out of which were born six children. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
the Cebu court — could not be contested except by appeal from said predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo
court in the original case. The last paragraph of said Rule expressly married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However,
provides: on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint
... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii,
of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married
the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. Felicidad San Luis (marriage solemnized at California, U.S.A.), then
(Rule 73) surnamed Sagalongos. He had no children with respondent but lived
with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on
December 18, 1992. Upon death of Felicisimo, Felicidad (respondent in resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of
this case) sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and administration was properly filed in Makati City.
the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a
petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the
Makati City. venue of the subject petition for letters of administration was improperly
laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v.
Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds Guray and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, "residence" is
of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence
that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person
the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never
prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should
personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally
married to Merry Lee. Hence the instant petition for review on certiorari.
The RTC ruled that Felicidad, as a widow of the decedent, possessed the ISSUE:
legal standing to file the petition and that the venue was properly laid. Whether venue was properly laid.
Mila, one of the children by first marriage, filed a motion for inhibition
against Judge Tensuan. The motion was granted and the case was RULING:
reraffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Arcangel. Same issues were Yes. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition
raised at the second trial. However, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in
for letters of administration. It held that, at the the time of Felicisimo’s the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time
death, he was duly elected governor and a resident of Laguna. Hence, of his death." The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence"
the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides,"
Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
the decedent was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules -
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature -
On appeal to the CA, it reversed the decision of the RTC. The appellate residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence
"place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of and not domicile in the technical sense. The word "resides" should be
the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.
Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually
In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires CAMAYA VS. PATULANDON
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires Borja, Catherine
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's
domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; FACTS:
however, the residence must be more than temporary. There is a On November 17, 1972, Rufina Reyes (testatrix) executed a
distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and notarized will wherein she devised Lot no. 288-A to her grandson
"residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, Anselmo Mangulabnan. During her lifetime, the testatrix herself filed the
"residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the petition for the probate. Later, the testatrix executed a codicil modifying
fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention her will by devising the said Lot 288-A in favor of her four children
of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Bernardo (the executor), Simplicia, Huillerma and Juan, and her
Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical grandson Mangulabnan – to the extent of 1/5 each.
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not Mangulabnan later sought the delivery to him by executor
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein Patulandong of the title of Lot 288-A, but Patulandong refused to heed
with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may the request because of the codicil which modified the will of the testatrix.
have his residence in one place and domicile in another. In the instant Thus, Mangulabnan filed an ‘action for partition’ against Patulandong in
case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. the RTC. The court in this partition ordered the partitioning of the
Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in property. However, the court holds that the partition is without
Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. From the prejudice to the probate of the codicil in accordance with the Rules of
foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Court. Hence, subsequently, Patulandong filed before the Regional Trial
Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his Court of Nueva Ecija a petition for probate of the codicil of the testatrix.
estate. The subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed Meanwhile, by virtue of the decision in the partition case, Mangulabnan
in the Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over caused the cancellation of the title of the testatrix over Lot No. 288-A and
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, a new TCT was issued in his name. He later on sold the lot to herein
1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches petitioner, Camayas.
of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which Finally, when the RTC ruled on admitting the petition filed by
had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati Patulandong for probate of the codicil, the RTC likewise declared that
City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the the sale between Mangulabnan and Camayas, null and void.
subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of ISSUE:
Makati City. Does the RTC Nueva Ecija as probate court have jurisdiction to
declare the sale between Mangulabnan and Camayas null and void?
Petition is DENIED. RULING:
It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of
proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine
title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally
claimed to belong to outside parties. All that said court could do as
regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should
not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered 2) partition and distribution of the estate among the declared heirs; and
by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, 3) payment of attorney’s fees. Respondent opposed on the ground that
then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to the partition and distribution of the estate is “premature and
resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting precipitate,” considering that there is yet no determination “whether the
claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. properties specified in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or owned
Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question in a joint venture.”
was in the possession of third parties and more important, covered by a The intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and
transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the attorney’s fees but denied petitioner’s prayer for partition and
respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed “premature.” It also
administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory ordered that a hearing on oppositor’s claim as indicated in her
of the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third opposition to the instant petition is necessary to determine ‘whether the
persons of their possession and ownership of the property properties listed in the amended complaint filed by petitioner are
Moreover, Section 48 of the Property Registry Decree provides that entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a co-
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. ownership between the oppositor and the petitioner in their partnership
venture.’”
PACIOLES VS. CHUATOCO-CHING

Borja, Catherine ISSUE:
May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass
FACTS: upon questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of
Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties, stock the decedents estate?
investments, bank deposits and interests in certain businesses. She was RULING:
survived by her husband, petitioner, and their two minor children. Milio It is already recognized that probate court may hear and pass
Pacioles husband of deceased Miguelita filed with the RTC a verified upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine whether
petition for the settlement of Miguelita’s estate. or not a property should be included in the inventory. In such situations
Miguelita’s mother, Miguela, filed an opposition, on the grounds that the adjudication is merely incidental and provisional.
petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of an However, it is apparent from the Resolutions that the purpose of the
administrator; and the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed of hearing set by the intestate court was actually to determine the propriety
“paraphernal properties.” of oppositors (respondents) claim. According to the intestate court, if it is
Petitioner moved to strike out respondent’s opposition, alleging true that the oppositor (respondent) owns the bulk of (Miguelitas)
that the latter has no direct and material interest in the estate. properties, then it means that she has a material and direct interest in the
Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate and, hence, she should be given her day in court. The intended
estate because she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on day in court or hearing is geared towards resolving the propriety of
condition that both of them “would undertake whatever business respondent’s contention that she is the true owner of the bulk of
endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business partners.” Miguelitas estate.
Subsequently, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus
motion that an Order be issued directing the: 1) payment of estate taxes;
Although, the respondent made it appear that her only intent was to
determine the accuracy of petitioner’s inventory, however, a close Respondent filed before the CA a petition for annulment of the adoption
review of the facts and the pleadings reveals her real intention. decree claiming that no proceedings for adoption ever took place. Upon
Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its Motion, RTC suspended the hearing, however CA dismissed the petition
jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to maintain a hands-off which became final and executory.
stance on the matter. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and
reiterated in a long line of decisions, that when a question arises as to Petitioner filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion for immediate resolution of
ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased her opposition. RTC issued a Resolution deferring resolution pending
person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by the outcome of the criminal case filed against the Petitioner for
virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse falsification of public documents.
to that of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be
determined in the course of an intestate or probate proceedings. The Respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Appoint Special Administrator
intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such before the RTC, praying that the Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Paulino
contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its Saguyod be appointed as such, which the court granted.
general jurisdiction as a regional trial court.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration for the appointment of Atty
REYES vs. SOTERO Saguyod reiterating his contention that she is the sole heir of the
Bueno, Jirene Mercy decedent and that the former was appointed without being required to
file a bond. Petitioner subsequently filed a special civil action before the
FACTS: CA alleging that said resolution. CA nullified the resolution of the RTC
and it held that the presiding Respondent Judge Cesar Sotero gravely
Private Respondent Corazon Chichioco filed a petition for the abused his discretion in appointing Atty. Saguyod as special
settlement of estate of Elena Lising, claiming that she is the niece and administrator.
heir of the latter who died intestate.Petitioner Reyes filed for an
Opposition claiming that she was an adopted child of Elena Lising and ISSUE:
the latter’s husband Serafin Delos Santos, hence the petition should be Whether Petitioner need to prove the validity of her adoption as
dismissed and that she be appointed administrator of the estate. assailed by the respondents in the proceeding of settlement of estate.
In her Supplemental she attached Certification issued be the RULING:

Municipal Civil Registrar stating that she was adopted by the spouses No. Petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any
pursuant to a decision rendered by the Court of First Instance evidence other than those which she had already presented before the
promulgated and duly registered with the Office of Civil Registrar. Also trial court. The documents presented by the Petitioners were issued
presenting a copy of Judicial Form indicating that the adoption decree under the seal of the issuing offices and were signed by the proper
was on file in the RTC-Tarlac City and a Decree of Final Distribution officers.
issued by the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) showing that
benefits were paid to Elena Lising, widow of Serafin Delos Santos and Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
his daughter Anna Joyce Delos Santos. performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. Mere imputations of irregularities will not cast a partition combining Lots 1927 and 1112 with an area of 22 hectares. The
cloud of doubt on the adoption decree since the certifications and its partition are as follows: 3 hectares for Crispin Borromeo for his
contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered. attorney’s fees; 5.3 hectares for Francis; 6.33 hectares for Prima and 7.3
hectares for Concepcion. It was also provided therein that the sum of
In this regard it must be pointed out that such contrary proof can be 5,O88.50 pesos as alleged debt of Concepcion should equally divided
presented only in a separate action brought principally for the purpose among the 3 heirs.
of nullifying the adoption decree. It cannot be assailed collaterally in a
proceeding for the settlement of decedent’s estate as held in Santos v. Heirs of Francisco opposed the said partition contending that in an order
Aranzanso. of the court in December 6, 1963, Francisco owned 12 hectares in 18
hectares of Lot 1112 because Prima sold her share to Francis and what is
Respondents cannot assail in these proceedings the validity of the left for Concepcion is only 6 hectares and that the payment for
adoption decree in order to defeat petitioner’s claim that she is the sole Concepcion’s debt was not properly allowed.
heir of the decedent. Absent a categorical pronouncement in an
appropriate proceeding that the decree of adoption is void, the The lower court deferred action on the partition until ownership of the
certifications regarding the matter as well as the facts stated should be 12 hectares is determined in an ordinary action.. Heirs of Francisco
deemed legitimate, genuine and real. moreover filed a supplemental opposition praying that Lot 1920 with 8
hectares should also be included in the project partition.
Petitioner’s status as an adopted child of the decedent remains rebutted
and no serious challenge has been brought against her standing as such. No separate action had been filed with regard to the ownership of the 12
Therefore as long as petitioner’s adoption is considered valid, hectare land hence the trial court approve the project partition excluding
respondents cannot claim any interest in the decedent’s estate. the 12 hectares. Petitioners headed by Filomena Coca, as administrator
assailed the lower court’s decision, which however was sustained by the
COCA VS. BORROMEO CA.
Bueno, Jirene Mercy
Petitioners appealed contending that the lower court as a probate court
FACTS: has no jurisdiction to decide the ownership of the 12 hectare portion of
Lot 1112.
Spouses Juan and Teresa Pangilinan died intestate. They possessed
property namely Lot 1927 with an area of 3.97 hectares covered by OCT ISSUE:
under the name of Juan Pangilinan; Lot 1112 with an area of 18.02 Whether the ownership of the 12 hectare land should be decided
hectares covered by OCT in the name of heirs of Juan Pangilinan and Lot in the intestate proceeding or in a separate action.
1920 with an area of 8 hectares which was surveyed in the name of
Concepcion Pangilinan. The spouses had 3 children namely, Prima, RULING:
Concepcion, and Francisco all surnamed Pangilinan.
It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be
A Special Proceeding was instituted for the settlement of estate of the resolved by the CFI in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its
deceased spouses Pangilinan. The administrator presented a project limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a jurisdictional question. It is
a procedural question involving a mode of practice which may be It appears from the records that Jose Portugal (Portugal, Sr.)
waived. contracted two marriages.
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be 1st marriage with Paz Lazo in 1942 whom he had a daughter named
passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding. That question should Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal (respondent) 2nd marriage with Isabel
be ventilated in a separate action. However that general rule has de la Puerta in 1948, who gave birth to a boy named Jose Douglas
qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and convenience. Portugal, Jr. (petitioners).
Although generally, probate court may not decide a question of title of By virtue of a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights
ownership yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one executed by Portugal Sr. and his 4 siblings, over the estate of their father,
of collation or advancement or the parties consent to the assumption of a parcel of land n Caloocan was issued a TCT in the name of “Jose Q.
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo”.
impaired then the probate court is competent to decide the question of
ownership. Paz died in 1984, while Portugal Sr. died intestate in 1985.
We held that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the In 1988, Leonila executed an “Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of
general rule. Here the probate court had already received evidence on Estate of Deceased Person”, adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel
the ownership of the 12 hectare land during the hearing of the motion for of land, and was subsequently registered (1988) in her name “Leonila
its exclusion from the inventory. The only interested parties are the heirs Portugal Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr.”
who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding.
In 1996, Isabel and Portugal, Jr. (petitioners) filed a complaint against
As pointed out by the appellees they belong to the poor stratum of Leonila for cancellation of Affidavit of Adjudication and TCT issued in
society, they should not be forced to incur additional expenses by her name, alleging that Leonila is not related whatsoever to the deceased
bringing a separate action to determine the ownership of the 12-hectare Portugal, Sr., hence, not entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land,
land. The just, expeditious and inexpensive solution is to require the and accordingly prayed that said TCT be cancelled and a new one be
heirs of Francisco to file in the intestate proceeding , Special Proceeding, issued in their (petitioner’s) name.
a motion in the form of a complaint wherein they should set forth their
claim for the 12 hectare land in question stating the ultimate facts in A Pre-Trial Order was issued & after trial, the trial court dismissed the
support of their claim. case for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction without resolving
the issues as stated in the pre-trial order, on the ground that petitioner’s
status and right as putative heirs had not been established before a
ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR., VS. probate court.
LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN
Borlagdatan, April Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to CA, citing the case of Carino vs.
Carino. In this case, the SC ratiocinates that the court may pass upon the
FACTS: validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even
in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, Doctrine: Debts chargeable against the conjugal property should be filed in the
so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. testamentary proceeding of the deceased wife.
However, the CA found Carino to be inapplicable. The appellate court FACTS:

held that in Carino case, the main issue was the validity of the two
marriages, whereas in the instant case, the main issue is the annulment Spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit were owners of the
of title to property. Thus, the CA affirmed the TC’s dismissal of the case. subject property, being their conjugal property. They were indebted to
respondent Esperanza Tanedo, chargeable against the conjugal property.
Hence, the present petition.
Fausta died leaving a will wherein she appointed her daughter, Maria
Calma as administratrix of her properties. In the probate proceedings,
ISSUE:
WON petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to Maria was appointed as judicial administratrix of the properties of the
determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for deceased.
annulment of respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication and of the TCT
issued in her name. While probate proceedings were pending, respondent Tanedo filed a
complaint against Eulalio Calma for the recovery of the debt. The RTC
RULING: NO. rendered judgment in favor of respondent. In the execution of the
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that judgment, the subject property was sold by the sheriff.
she was the sole heir to Portugal’s estate, executed on February 15, 1988
the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Maria Calma ,as administratrix of the estate of Fausta, filed the present
Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception action to annul the sale of the property and prays that the estate of the
to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should
deceased be declared as the absolute owner. The probate proceedings of
be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a
qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased were instituted in accordance with Act No. 3176.
the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor
therein. ISSUE: Whether the debts may be recovered against the husband of the
deceased.
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A
probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are RULING:No.
the heirs of a deceased.
Under Act No. 3176, there are two actions/remedies for the liquidation
of conjugal property:
CALMA VS. TANEDO
1) Institution of testate or intestate proceedings for the settlement of the
Shain Ann C. estate of a deceased spouse
2) An ordinary action for the liquidation and partition of the property of On the same day, Ocampo signed another document, making it appear
a conjugal partnership. that, for an annual rental, the spouses Potenciano were leasing the house
to him for the duration of the redemption period.
These remedies cannot be availed of at the same time.
Petitioner spouses failed to repurchase the property. Thus, an affidavit
In the present case, a testamentary proceeding was already instituted for for consolidation of title was filed by Potenciano, on the strength of
the partition of the conjugal property. It follows then that when which, the Register of Deeds issued TCT in the name of spouses
respondent filed a suit, the power of Eulalio Calma as legal Potenciano.
administrator of the conjugal property while Fausta was living had
When Edilberto Ocampo and Rufina Reyes died, respondent Potenciano
ceased and passed to Maria Calma as administratrix appointed in the gave Paz Yatco another option to repurchase the property. Yatco sought
testamentary proceedings. to exercise the option and deposited the money in court, when
Potenciano rejected the same. Yatco brought an action to compel
Hence, the claim for the debts which is chargeable against the conjugal respondent to accept the money and to have the property reinstated in
property should have been filed in the testamentary proceedings of the her name and that of her husband. She also alleged that the real
deceased and not against the husband of the deceased who had already transaction between them was an equitable mortgage.
ceased as administrator of the conjugal property.
Potenciano’s children intervened and filed a cross-complaint, alleging
The court also annulled the sale of the subject property. The property that the option to repurchase was null and void as to the share of their
should be demed subject to the testamentary proceedings of the mother Rufina Reyes in the property which share passed to them by
right of inheritance.
deceased Fausta.
OCAMPO VS. POTENCIANO

Castillo, Shain Ann ISSUES:
(1) What is the real contract between the parties?
Doctrine: Husband is no longer an administrator of the conjugal estate of
deceased wife. (2) Whether the surviving spouse (Potenciano) has the authority
to enter in anagreement of repurchase after the death of his wife.
FACTS:
Spouses Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco executed a deed to
convey to spouses Conrado Potenciano and Rufina Reyes by way of sale RULING:
with pacto de retro a town lot with a house. The subject property though
(1) The real contract entered into between petitioner and
registered in the name of Ocampo, in reality it belonged to him and his
respondent was an equitable mortgage. Therefore, the
wife as conjugal property.
consolidation of title effected by respondent Potenciano was null
and void. As a consequence, Potenciano’s children has no right
over the subject property, since the property never passed to RULING:
their parents. No. Under the provisions of the Civil Code the ownership of real
estate passes to the heirs of the owner instantly in his death. Guillerma
(2) Potenciano had no such authority. The rule that upon the Martinez, having died seized of the lands involved in this suit, leaving
dissolution of the marriage by the death of the wife, the the defendants as her only heirs at law, it follows that said heirs instantly
husband must liquidate the partnership affairs is now obsolete. became the owners and were entitled to the immediate possession
thereof. It is not alleged in the complaint nor does it appear from the
The present rules of court now provides that,“when the record or the evidence in this case that there were debts outstanding
marriage is dissolved by the death of either husband or wife, the against Guillerma Martinez at the time of her death. The only ground
partnership affairs must be liquidated in the testate or intestate upon which an administrator can demand of the heirs at law possession
proceedings of the deceased spouse.” of the real estate of which his intestate died seized is that such land will
be required to be sold to pay the debts of the deceased. In the case of
Ilustre, administrator of the estate of the deceased Calzado vs. Alaras
Frondosa (17 Phil. Rep., 321), this court said: "x x x The Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a
RULE 74 petition for partition in case they can not mutually agree in the division.
When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no
Summary Settlement of Estates occasion for the intervention of an administrator in the settlement and
partition of the estate among the heirs. When the heirs are all of lawful
MALAHACAN VS. IGNACIO
age and there are no debts, there is no reason why the estate should be
Castillo, Rochelle Jane
burdened with the costs and expenses of an administrator. The property
belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts against
FACTS:
the estate, the administrator has no right to intervene in any way
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance
whatever in the division of the estate among the heirs."
of the subprovince of Marinduque, Province of Tayabas, the Hon. J.S.
Powell presiding, awarding the possession of the lands described in the
ARCILLAS VS. MONTEJO
complaint to the plaintiff, with costs. The action is brought by Simon
Castillo, Rochelle Jane
Malahacan as administrator of the goods, chattels, and credits of
Guillerma Martinez, deceased, against the defendants, the only heirs at
FACTS:
law of the said deceased, to recover possession of the real estate of which Filed before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga on
the said Guillerma Martinez died seized, which said real estate the
November 12 and 16, 1962, respectively, are two separate petitions
defendants had been occupying for some years before the having direct and special reference to Lot No. 276. This lot, covered by
commencement of this action. Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-244 (2155 (0-656), forms a major part
of the estate of the late Eustaquio Arcillas who died intestate on March 8,
ISSUE:
1958 in the City of Zamboanga. In the petition dated November 12
Whether or not Simon Malahacan can validly demand the
Geronimo Arcillas, one of the heirs of the deceased, sought the
recovery of possession from the Ignacio?
cancellation of TCT No. RT-244 in the name of the deceased and prayed
for the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the heirs in heirs so long as the deceased left no will nor any pending obligations to
the enumerated proportions alleged in the petition. It was claimed that at be paid and his heirs are all of age. We cannot entirely agree with the
various dates after the death of the deceased, several transactions respondents. On a similar contention in the past, we had occasion to
affecting Lot No. 276 transpired, prominent among which were the explain in Rodriguez, et al. v. Tan, et al., 92 Phil. 273: ... section I does not
separate sales of their respective shares and participation in Lot No. 276 preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if
executed by four (4) other children of the deceased in favor of co-heir the estate has no debts or obligation, if they do not desire to resort for
Vicente Arcillas. Invoking section 112 of Act No. 496 (Land Registration good reasons to an ordinary action of partition. While section 1 allows
Act), Geronimo Arcillas argued that the proportion of each heir's the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to
participation in said lot should be accurately reflected in a new certificate resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not compel them to do so
of title. But before any other material pleading could be filed with if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. Said section
respect to this petition, five (5) other children of the deceased filed the is not mandatory or compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made
November 16 petition aforementioned. This later petition, docketed as therein of the word may. If the intention were otherwise the framer of
Special Proceeding No. 632, prayed for the issuance of letters of the rule would have employed the word shall as was done in other
administration in favor of herein petitioner preparatory to the final provisions that are mandatory in character. Note that the word may its
settlement of the deceased's estate. used not only once but in the whole section which indicates an intention
to leave the matter entirely to the discretion of the heirs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge acted properly in dismissing PEREIRA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
the administration proceedings under the authority of section 1, rule 74 Cadavis, Albert
of the New Rules of Court upon averments that the estate left no debts
and all the heirs entitled to share in its distribution are all of age? FACTS:
RULING: • Andres Pereira is an employee of PAL. He died without a will

No. Under section 1, Rule 74 of the New Rules of Court, if the and survived by his spouse victoria herein petitioner and his
decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of sister Rita herein private respondent.
age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties
may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among • Rita instituted a special proceeding before the RTC for the
themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the
issuance of letters of administration in her favor alleging that:
office of the Register of Deeds and should they disagree, they may do so
in an ordinary action of partition. And primarily anchored on the 1) She and Victoria are the only surviving heirs;
proposition that inasmuch as in the present case the minimum
requirements of the aforementioned section obtain, i.e. the decedent left 2) Deceased left no will;
no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, respondents claim that
there is no necessity for the institution of special proceedings and the 3) There are no creditors;
appointment of an administrator for the settlement of the estate for the
reason that it is superfluous and unnecessary. In other words,
respondents apparently view section 1 of Rule 74 as mandatory upon the
4) He left several properties his death benefits to PAL, PALEA, her claim showing that she is the exclusive beneficiary. Second,
PESALA and SSS as well as savings deposit with PNB and the savings deposit of her husband from PNB and PCIB had
PCIB been used to defray the funeral expenses. Finally, only real
property of the deceased extrajudicially settled between them as
5) 300 sqm lot the only surviving heirs.
6) That the spouse is working in London as an auxiliary nurse Respondent argues that it is not for petitioner to decide what
and ½ of her salary forms part of the estate. properties form part of the estate and to appropriate for herself.
She also points out that this function is vested in the court in
• Petitioner filed her opposition and a motion to dismiss alleging
charge of the intestate proceedings.
that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of
administration and if an estate exists, the letters of Petitioner asks this court to declare that the properties specified
administration be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse. do not belong to the estate of the deceased on the basis of her
bare allegations and handful documents. Since this court is the
• RTC appointed Rita administratrix of the estate of the deceased
trier of facts, the court cannot order unqualified and final
upon a bond posted by her in the amount of 1k. The Trial Court
exclusion or non-exclusion of the property involved from the
ordered her to take custody of the real and personal properties
estate.
and make an inventory thereof.
The resolution is better left to the probate court before which the
• Petitioner appealed to CA but CA affirmed the decision.
administration proceeding are pending. The trial court is in the
ISSUES: best position to receive evidence. The function of resolving
WON the property should be included in the inventory or list of
1) WON there exists an estate of the deceased Andres for purposes properties is one clearly within the competence of the probate
of administration? court.
2) WON a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where

there are no debts lefts by decedent?
2) The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the
RULING: same should be judicially administered and the competent court
should appoint a qualified administrator established in sec. 6
1) Petitioner contends that there exists no estate for purposes of
rule 78, in case the deceased left no will or in case he had left
administration for the reason: First, the death benefits from
one, or should he fail to name an executor therein. An exception
PAL, PALEA, PESALA and SSS belong exclusively to her, being
to this rule, when all of the heirs of lawful age and there are no
the sole beneficiary and she submitted letter-replies to support
debts due to the estate, they may agree in writing to partition
the property without instituting the judicial administration or of administration there being no good reasons for burdening the
applying for the appointment of an administrator. estate.
Sec.1 of Rule 74, does not preclude the heirs from instituting PADA-KILARIO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
administration proceedings even if the estate has no debts or Cadavis, Albert
obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an
FACTS:
ordinary action for partition. While Sec. 1 allows the heirs to
• Jacinto Pada had six children, namely, Marciano,
divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to Ananias, Amador, Higino, Valentina and Ruperta.
resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does He died intestate.
not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a
different course of action. It should be noted that recourse to an • His estate included a parcel land a residential and coconut land
administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is in Leyte. It is the northern portion cadastral Lot which is the
sanctioned only if the heirs have good reason for not resorting to subject to the instant controversy.
an action for partition.
• During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, feliciano
When partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate Pada, obtained permission from him to build a house on the
northern. Then feliciano died, his son, Pastor, continued living
should not be burdened with an administration proceeding
in the house together with his eight children. Petitioner Verona
without good or compelling reasons. Pada hilario, one of Pastor/s children, has been living in that
house.
The court see no reason not to apply the doctrine to the case at
bar. There are 2 surviving heirs, and admitted that there are no • The heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extrajudicial
debts. What is apparent is that these 2 are not in good terms. The partition of his estate. For this purpose, they executed
reason why private respondent seeks the appointment is her to a private document which they, however, never registered in
obtain possession for her own purposes, since these properties the office of the Registrar of Deed.
are presently in the hands of the petitioner who supposedly
disposed in fraudulently. • Both Ananias and Marciano, represented by his daughter,
Maria, that cadastral Lot as allocated during the said partition.
The court is of the opinion that this is not a compelling reason Then Ananias died, his daughter, Juanita, succeeded to his right
as co-owner of said property. Juanita Pada sold to engr. ernesto
which will necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of
Paderes, the right of his father, Ananias, as co-owner.
the deceased.
• Later on, Maria Pada sell the coownership right
The Court hold that, the Trial court which the administration
o f h i s f a t h e r , M a r c i a n o . P r i v a t e respondent, who is
proceedings are pending was not justified in issuing the letters the first cousin of Maria, was the buyer.
• Private respondent demanded that petitioner spouses vacate the ction of creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The
northern portion so his family can utilize the said area. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. it follows
amicable settlement was failed. then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the
prescribed formalities is not undermined when no creditors are
• Private respondent filed in the MCTC, a complaint for ejectment involved. Without creditors to take into consideration, it is competent for
with prayer for damages against petitioner spouses. However, the heirs of an estate to enter into agreement for distribution thereof in
the heirs of Amador Pada executed a Deed of Donation manner and upon a plan different from those provided by the rules from
transferring to petitioner Verona Pada hilario, their respective which, in the first place, nothing can be inferred that a writing and be
shares as co-owners of the lot. Petitioner spouses alleged that registered in order to be valid. The partition of inherited property need
the northern portion of the Lot had already been donated to not be embodied in a public document so as to be effective as regards the
them by the heirs of Amador Pada. heirs that participated therein. The 1951 extrajudicial partition of Jacinto
• They contended that the extra-judicial partition of the estate of Pada’s estate being legal and effective as among his heirs, Juanita and
Jacinto Pada executed was invalid and ineffectual since no maria pada validly transferred their ownership rights over the lot to
special power of attorney was executed by Marciano, Amador engr. Paderes and private respondent.
or Higino in favor of their respective children presented them in
the extrajudicial partition.
• Moreover, it was effectuated only through a private document MCMICKING VS. SY CONBIENG
that was never registered in the office of the Registrar of Deeds dela Cruz, Kyzeth
of leyte. the MCTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioner
spouses. FACTS:
• Private respondent appealed to the Regional trial court and
render the reversal of judgment. Petitioners filed in the court of Margarita Jose, a native of the Philippines, died sometime on February
Appeals a petition for relief and later on, a Motion 1902 in Amoy, China. Engracio Palanca was appointed as
for Reconsideration, however, bot here dismissed. Hence administrator of the estate left by Jose, which estate was partly located
this petition. in Hong Kong and partly in the Philippines. Mariano Ocampo Lao
Sempco and Dy Cunyao executed bonds as sureties of Palanca who
ISSUE:
thereafter took possession of all the properties of Jose. Upon the death
Whether or not the extrajudicial partition of the estate is valid of Mariano Ocampo in 1904, Palanca was required to furnish a new
bond, which new bond was subsequently filed through new sureties.
RULING:
We hold that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Mariano Ocampo (Palanca’s former surety) left an estate and Doroteo
Pada among his heirs made in 1951 is valid albeit executed in an Velasco was appointed as its administrator with sureties Mariano
unregistered private document. No law requires partition among heirs to Velasco and Pio de la Guardia Barretto. Mariano Ocampo was also
be in writing and be registered in order to be valid. The requirement in survived by his heirs; a daughter to whom he left 2/3 of his estate and 3
sec. 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of court that a partition
sons in China to whom he left the remaining 1/3 of his estate. Doroteo,
be put in a public document and registeredhas for its purpose the prote
Mariano Ocampo’s estate administrator filed a complete report and McMicking’s claim and such finding of the committee was affirmed by
inventory of the latter’s properties, together with a statement of all his said lower court.
debts and liabilities. As a part of said report, Doroteo filed an
instrument signed by all of the persons interested in the estate of
Mariano Ocampo agreeing to the partitition of the estate among
ISSUE:
themselves without proceedings in court, at the same time assuming the
payment of all obligations against the estate. Such partition agreed to Whether or not Benito Sy Conbieng as administrator of Pio de la
was affirmed and approved by an order of the court and Doroteo, in Guardia Barretto’s estate is liable for the claim made by Jose
pursuance of such order and after having settled all liabilities of the McMicking in favor of Margarita Jose’s estate.
estate delivered all of the properties to the respective devisees and
legatees leaving no property of the estate in his hands.
Sometime in 1908, Engracio Palanca was removed from office as the HELD:
administrator of Margarita Jose’s estate by reason of the fact that
Palanca failed and refused to render an account of the property and Judgment of the lower court disallowing the claim against Pio de la
funds of the said estate and even failed and refused to deliver such Guardia Barretto’s estate affirmed.
property and funds to his successor Jose McMicking who was Doroteo Velasco, for whom the deceased Pio was surety, would not
appointed as administrator of Margarita Jose’s estate in Palanca’s stead. have been liable himself had this action been commenced against him. If
Palanca retained possession of said property and funds, absconded with the principal is not liable upon the obligation, the surety cannot be. The
the same, and never returned to the Philippines. Due to these basis of the liability of a surety on administrator's bond is the fault or
circumstances McMicking instituted a claim against the estate of failure of the principal. If the latter incurs no liability, the former incurs
Mariano Ocampo who was a surety of Palanca. The court approved such none. The administrator who complies with the law incurs no liability
claim and directed that Doroteo Velasco, the administrator of Mariano to any person.
Ocampo’s estate, pay it if he had sufficient funds. No payment was made
to Margarita Jose’s estate. The estate of Mariano Ocampo against which McMicking’s original
claim was made and to which Doroteo Velasco was appointed as
McMicking then instituted a claim against the estate of Pio de la administrator was already partitioned at the time the claim was made.
Guardia Barretto who died in 1905. Pio was one of the sureties of
Doroteo Velasco when he was appointed as administrator of Mariano A partition of the property of a deceased person may be made under the
Ocampo’s estate. Pio left an estate to which the defendant Benito Sy provisions of sections 596 and 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
Conbieng was appointed as administrator. The committee appointed by notwithstanding that an administrator with the will annexed has been
the court to appraise and hear claims against Pio’s estate disallowed appointed and the administration of the estate under said appointment
is in progress. Such provisions are applicable no matter what stage the
administration has reached. obligations and responsibilities in relation to said property. In other
words, if he turns such property over to the owners thereof after a
"SEC. 596. Settlement of intestate estates, without legal proceedings, in partition among them was made in complete accordance with said
certain cases. — Whenever all the heirs of a deceased person are of
sections, and he performs his full duty as such administrator, neither he
lawful age and legal capacity, and there are no debts due from the
nor his bondsmen are liable to any person for such act. An
intestate estate, or all the debts have been paid by the heirs, the
heirs may, by a family council as known under Spanish law, or by administrator cannot be held to accountability for property over which
agreement between themselves, duly executed in writing, he has no power or control or jurisdiction and in which he has no legal
apportion and divide the estate among themselves, as they may interest. The thing on which he was appointed to operate having been
see fit, without proceedings in court." withdrawn wholly beyond his ken by the very power (the law, secs. 596
and 597) which appointed him, there is a complete revocation of the
"SEC. 597. In such case distributees liable for debts. — But if it shall original appointment dating from the day of the removal from his hands
appear, at any time within two years after such settlement and
of the property which he was appointed to administer.
distribution of the estate, that there are debts outstanding
against the estate which have not been paid, any creditor may The administrator has no power or control or jurisdiction and no legal
compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner
interest in the property anymore because by such partition, the estate
hereinafter provided, unless his debt shall be paid, with interest;
passes out of existence. The whole property is taken from the
and the administrator appointed by the court may recover the
assets of the estate from those who have received them, for the administrator and passed on to the owners. They become the absolute
purpose of paying the debts; and the real estate belonging to the owners thereof, subject only to the liability of divestiture on the
deceased shall remain charged with the liability to creditors for happening of certain events; but even such divestiture may be avoided
the full period of two years after such distribution, by paying the debt, which is the moving cause thereof.
notwithstanding any transfers thereof that may have been made."
While at any time within two years after such partition the property, or
These sections provide for the voluntary division of the whole property a portion thereof, then in possession of the partitioning parties, may be
of the decedent without proceedings in court. placed again in administration in the event of the discovery of unpaid debts
"within two years after such settlement and distribution of the estate," it would
Where, after the appointment of an administrator with the will annexed not be the same estate represented by the prior administrator, and he
of a deceased person and the due making of the inventory of the would not be the administrator of the new estate by virtue of his
property and the taking possession thereof by such administrator, an appointment in the old. It would be necessary to appoint, upon proper
agreement is made between the owners thereof under the will already application and notice, another administrator for the purposes set forth
probated partitioning the same between them under said sections of the in said sections. Before this, it is necessary that the requisite conditions are
Code of Civil Procedure, the delivery of the property to such
present; the unpaid debt must be discovered and the creditor must make his
partitioning owners by such administrator, under proper proceedings
application. In the case at bar, neither of the above conditions being
and order of court and after compliance with the provisions of such
present, there could be no administration after partition. No new
sections, is, in effect, a discharge of such administrator as to all future
administrator was or could be appointed. There was no administration. Delfin, all surnamed Gerona, alleged that they are the legitimate
The appointment of commissioners to hear plaintiff's claim was without children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman; that the latter,
authority. It was an appointment in respect to an estate that did not who died on August 9, 1941 was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo de
legally exist and in relation to an administration that had never been Guzman and his first wife, Teodora de la Cruz; that after the death of
inaugurated. The acts of such commissioners were without legal effect. his first wife, Marcelo de Guzman married Camila Ramos, who begot
him several children, namely, respondents Carmen, Jose, Clemente,
In effect, Section 597 creates a statute of limitations, which deprives all Francisco, Rustica, Pacita and Victoria, all surnamed De Guzman; that
debts not discovered within the prescribed time, of the power of Marcelo de Guzman died on September 11, 1945; that subsequently, or
requiring an administration of the estate remaining. Such on May 6, 1948 respondents executed a deed of "extra-judicial
administration, after partition, depends upon the discovery of the debt
settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman",
"at any time within two years after the settlement and distribution of
fraudulently misrepresenting therein that they were the only surviving
the estate." These sections do not operate unless that discovery is made
heirs of the deceased although they well knew that petitioners were,
within the time prescribed.
also, his forced heirs. That respondents had thereby succeeded
The partition provided for in these sections is binding and valid even fraudulently in causing the transfer certificates of title to seven (7)
though not all of the debts actually outstanding were paid before the parcels of land, issued in the name of said deceased, to be cancelled and
partition was made. The discovery of an unpaid obligation after new transfer certificates of title to be issued in their own name, in the
partition does not destroy the partition. It simply furnishes ground for proportion of 1/7th individual interest for each; that such fraud was
the application of the creditor for the appointment of an administrator. discovered by the petitioners only the year before the institution of the
The discovery of a debt after partition does not permit the whole property case; that petitioners forthwith demanded from respondents their share
in possession of the partitioning parties to be thrown into
in said properties, to the extent of 1/8th Interest thereon.
administration. Only so much of the property is subject to such
administration as is sufficient to pay the claim discovered, leaving the
Petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered nullifying said deed of
partitioning persons in undisturbed possession of the remainder. Even
after the discovery of a debt subsequent to partition, the partitioning extra-judicial settlement, insofar as it deprives them of their
persons may prevent any administration whatever by paying the debt participation of 1/8th of the properties in litigation. On the other hand,
discovered, thereby preserving the partition intact in all its parts. respondents maintained that petitioners' mother, the deceased Placida
de Guzman, was not entitled to share in the estate of Marcelo de
Guzman, she being merely a spurious child of the latter, and that
GERONA V. DE GUZMAN petitioners' action is barred by the statute of limitations.
dela Cruz, Kyzeth
The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the action has
prescribed, which decision was affirmed by the CA.
FACTS:
Petitioners herein, namely, Ignacio, Maria Concepcion, Francisco and
ISSUE: FACTS:
Whether or not the action of the petitioners to annul the extrajudicial Spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de Rodriguez initiated
settlement executed by the respondents has prescribed. proceedings before the CFI of Ozamiz City for the legal adoption of
herein petitioner, Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. CFI granted the
petition. Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner and Rosalina
entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguels estate, adjudicating
HELD:
between themselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel. Private
The SC affirmed the decision of the CA affirming the RTC’s dismissal of respondents filed an action to annul the adoption of petitioner before the
the case on the ground that the action has prescribed. CFI of Ozamiz City. CFI denied the petition and upheld the validity of
the adoption. Thereafter, the private respondents appealed said decision
Upon appeal, petitioners contended that since they and the respondents to the Court of Appeals. While said appeal was pending, the
were co-heirs of Marcelo, the action for partition does not prescribe. Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement with respondent
Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and of another sister,
The SC held that although, as a general rule, an action for partition
Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel
among co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the
Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except his brothers and sisters. Court of
defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse title.
Appeals dismissed the appeal but upheld the validity of the adoption of
The statute of limitations operates, as in other cases; from the moment
petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to
the possessor of the property asserts such adverse title. When
claim their share of the properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter
respondents executed the deed of extrajudicial settlement stating
refused saying that Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since they
therein that they are the sole heirs of the deceased, and secured new
were not their blood relatives. Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul
transfer certificates of title in their own name, they thereby excluded
the petitioners from the estate of the deceased, and consequently, set up the 1983 partition. Said complaint was later amended on March 25, 1987
a title adverse to them. to include the allegation that earnest efforts toward a compromise were
made between the plaintiffs and the defendants, but the same failed. The
The action to annul a deed of extrajudicial settlement upon the ground of fraud Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint. The appellate court
may be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Such affirmed the decision of the trial court.
discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed
with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in ISSUES:
the name of the respondents exclusively.
(1) whether or not the complaint for annulment of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition had already prescribed (2)
PEDROSA VS. COURT OF APPEALS whether or not said deed is valid
De guzman , Jabrielle
HELD:
Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to mother, Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of Miguel, she excludes the
persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate, following
extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of Section the provisions of Article 1003 of the Civil Code. The private respondent
1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or Rodriguezes cannot claim that they were not aware of Maria Elenas
heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or adoption since they even filed an action to annul the decree of adoption.
are represented by themselves or through guardians. Petitioner, as the Neither can they claim that their actions were valid since the adoption of
records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. Maria Elena was still being questioned at the time they executed the
Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period is not applicable in her deed of partition. The complaint seeking to annul the adoption was filed
case. The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years. only twenty six (26) years after the decree of adoption, patently a much
Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28, delayed response to prevent Maria Elena from inheriting from her
1987, or three years and ten months after the questioned extrajudicial adoptive parents. The decree of adoption was valid and existing. With
settlement dated March 11, 1983, was executed, we hold that her action this factual setting, it is patent that private respondents executed the
against the respondents on the basis of fraud has not yet prescribed. deed of partition in bad faith with intent to defraud Maria Elena.
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in
publication of extrajudicial settlement. It states: The fact of the question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned.
extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case
newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to
succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, no extrajudicial
any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
Under said provision, without the participation of all persons involved therein or had no notice thereof. As the partition was a total nullity and
in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to
persons. The rule contemplates a notice which must be sent out or issued hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two
before the Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a years from its execution in 1941. To say that Maria Elena was
notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of represented by Rosalina in the partitioning is imprecise. Maria Elena, the
extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after, which was when adopted child, was no longer a minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina,
publication was done in the instant case. only represented her own interests and not those of Maria Elena. Since
Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate automatically vested to his
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of child and widow, in equal shares. Respondent Rodriguezes interests did
extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud. A not include Miguels estate but only Pilars estate.
deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the
heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent Petition is GRANTED.
and vicious. Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel together with her adopting
ESTATE OF FRANCISCO VS. CARREON Jose Francisco y Palumpon's demand for recognition. Her request was
De guzman , Jabrielle granted.
FACTS: Both Rosa Aldana and the Carreons moved for reconsideration,
contending that, inasmuch as Jose Francisco y Palumpon had
Rosa Aldana Francisco petitioned the Court of First Instance of Rizal
withdrawn, there was no authority to continue, for the matter became a
summarily to settle the estate of her husband Jose M. Francisco. Alleging
closed incident. Thereafter, Tiburcia Magsalin Vda. de Francisco, as
that they had three minor children who were his legal heirs, and that the
guardian ad item of the three legitimate, submitted an "amended
deceased left a parcel of land with house thereon, and no creditors, she
motion" wherein she made practically the same allegations of her
asked for declaration that the persons entitled to share in his estate are
previous motion and prayed for identical remedies — except those
the said three minor children, with herself as usufructuary. She
touching the recognition of Jose Francisco y Palumpon. Overruling
requested for appointment as guardian ad item of her three minor
objections, the court admitted the amended motion, heard it granting the
children, and her request was granted in due course. Petition was
interested parties opportunity to present their evidence and arguments,
approved and was registered.
and rendered judgment holding the realty was private property of the
Rosa Aldana Francisco mortgaged her share of the realty to the sisters deceased Jose Francisco, who had acquired it four years before his
Fausta Carreon and Catalina Carreon and was duly registered. marriage to Rosa Aldana. Wherefore it held that the whole property
Afterwards, she conveyed by absolute deed of sale, to the aforesaid passed to the ownership of the three legitimate children of the deceased,
creditors, her interest and participation in the land. This sale was subject to usufructuary rights of the widow; it annulled the mortgage
likewise inscribed in the office of the Register of Deeds. and the sale executed by Rosa Aldana in favor of the Carreon sisters, and
then issued other appropriate instructions to the Register of Deeds.
However, in a motion, Tiburcia Magsalin Vda. de Francisco, mother of
the deceased Jose M. Francisco, allegedly in representation of the minor ISSUES:
Jose Francisco y Palumpon, averred that this minor was a recognized
WON the court erred: (1) in continuing to hear the motion for reopening,
natural son of the deceased, with legal right to participate in his estate,
even after the natural child had withdrawn from the litigation and (2) in
that the previous proceedings were void because Rosa Aldana Francisco
taking cognizance of the annulment of the mortgage and sale, which it
had concealed such fact, and because she had interests in conflict with
could validly consider as a probate court.
those of her three sons, the truth being that the land was private
property of Jose M. Francisco of which she could not have been awarded HELD:
a portion in fee simple.
Supposing the original motion did not afford legal standing to the three
When the motion to annul or reopen was called for hearing, Macaria legitimate children, and that it could not be "amended", as contended by
Palumpon requested in open court the dismissal, without prejudice, of appellants, we perceive no reason to prevent the court below from
considering such amended motion as a new and independent petition in
the expediente, filed expressly on behalf of the three minor children. The personal property is distributed — not where, as here, realty is the
matter of time might conceivably be material in regard in considering the subject of partition.
"amended" motion as "original" motion; but in this case it happens to be
immaterial, because under section 5 of Rule 74 such motion may be Several decisions hold that "If during the summary proceeding some of
lodged with the court within one year after the minors have reached the heirs claim, by title adverse to that of the decedent, some parcels of
majority; and they are still minors now. Incidentally this section 5 fully land, the probate court has no jurisdiction to pass upon the issue which
answers appellants' contention that Tiburcia's moves should have been must be decided in a separate suit". But here there is no question that the
initiated within two years after November 8, 1947. realty belonged to the decedent; and a separate suit was unnecessary,
specially remembering that in these summary settlements the judge is
Appellants may not justly complain that they thought such petition for expected to "proceed summarily" and "without delay""to determine who
readjustment or reopening could take place only within two years as are the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate, and to
prescribed by section 4 of Rule 74 and as annotated in the certificate of apportion and divide it among them."
title; because they are conclusively presumed to know the existence and
provisions of section 5, Rule 74. As the trial judge correctly observed: The resolution under review apportions property admittedly belonging
to the decedent among his legal heirs. It is no objection that it affects the
But the whole trouble is that they accepted the mortgage with the herein appellants. They knew or ought to know the rule permitting such
encumbrance annotated; and while it referred to Rule 74, Section 4, and to reapportionment even after two years, and they have been given
did not specifically mention section 5, the fact that section 4, Rule 74 was every chance to be heard, having been by their own petition, regarded as
therein noted should have been sufficient warning to them that the title parties to the entire proceedings. And section 4, Rule 74 (which must be
was subject to the interest of persons unduly prejudiced hereby. We take deemed extensible to situations covered by section 5, Rule 74) expressly
judicial notice of the fact that in the adjudication in summary settlements authorizes the court to give to every heir his lawful participation in the
more often that not, the order merely says that the sale shall be subject to real estate "notwithstanding any transfers of such real estate" and to
the provisions of section 4, Rule 74. This is the case because the Court can "issue execution" thereon. All this implies that, when within the
not foresee whether the movant would be affected; but section 5 being an amendatory period the realty has been alienated, the court in re-dividing
imposition of the law, and being a mere sequence to the provisions of it among the heirs has authority to direct cancellation of such alienation
Section 4; we hold that where the title on its face shows that it was in the same estate proceedings, whenever it becomes necessary to do so.
subject to the provisions of Rule 74, section 4, a third person who accepts To require the institution of a separate action for such annulment would
it must take notice that he is running the risk of interferring with the run counter to the letter of the above rule and the spirit of these
rights of minors as provided under section 5, Rule 74. summary settlements.
Contrary to appellants' claim, relief for the minors cannot be directed From the foregoing, the conclusion follows that no prejudicial error was
against the bond which, according to appellants, should have been committed by the lower court, whose order is, consequently, affirmed
demanded under section 3, Rule 74, because that section applies where with costs.
It is argued that as the action was instituted almost four years
SAMPILO ET. AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS after the affidavit of adjudication, Exhibit "A", was registered in the
Dimaliwat, Dianne Office of the Register of Deeds Of Pangasinan, the right of action of the
administratrix has prescribed and lapsed because the same was not
FACTS:
brought within the period of two years as Prescribed in Section 4 of Rule
Teodoro Tolete died intestate in January, 1945. Teodoro left four 74 of the Rules of Court.
parcels of land in Pangasinan. He left as heirs his widow, Leoncia de
Leon, and several nephews and nieces. Without any judicial The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial
proceedings, Leoncia (his widow) executed an affidavit (Exhibit A) settlement, or by affidavit, is an ex parte proceeding. It cannot by any
stating that "the deceased Teodoro Tolete left no children or respondent reason or logic be contended that such settlement or distribution would
neither ascendants or acknowledged natural children neither brother, affect third persons who had no knowledge either of the death of the
sisters, nephews or nieces, but the, widow Leoncia de Leon, the decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement or affidavit, especially as no
legitimate wife of the deceased, the one and only person to inherit the mention of such effect is made, either directly or by implication.
above properties”. Leoncia then executed a deed of sale (Exhibit B) of all
Following the above-quoted decision of this Court in the case of
the above parcels of land in favor of Benny Sampilo. Benny then sold
Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, we are of the opinion and so hold that the
(Exhibit C) the parcels of land to Honorato Salacup. These three
provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from
documents were registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years
Pangasinan.
from such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only (1) to persons who
Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for the administration of have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial
the estate of Teodoro Tolete. The complaint alleges that the widow partition, and, in addition, (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74
Leoncia de Leon, had no right to execute the affidavit of adjudication have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the
and that Honorato Salacup acquired no rights to the lands sold to him, decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are
and that neither had Benny Sampilo acquired any right to the said represented by themselves or through guardians.
properties
The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements because
ISSUE: not all the heirs interested have participated in the extrajudicial
settlement, the Court of Appeals having found that the decedent left
Whether or not respondent Felisa Sinopera's right of action to aside from his widow, nephews and nieces living at the time of his
recover her and her co-heirs' participation to the lands in question had death.
not prescribed at the time the action to recover was filed.
RULING:
that the will was in his possession, ordered him to produce it but
RULE 75 Guimco still failed to do so. The court ordered the confinement of
Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary Guimco in the provincial jail.
ISSUE:
US VS. CHIU GUIMCO
Dimaliwat, Dianne Whether the judge was acting within his power when he ordered
the commitment of Guimco to the provincial jail?
FACTS:
RULING:
Joaquin Cruz, a chinese merchant living for many years in the
municipality of Gingoog, Province of Misamis, died while visiting China. No. Section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 5 of
Before his departure from the Philippines he had executed a will before Rule 75), which allows imprisonment of a person who neglects to deliver
Anastacio Servillon, a notary public, in which Chiu Guimco and Co-Iden a will after the death of the testator without reasonable cause, can only
were named as executors. Chiu Guimco is Joaquin Cruz’s brother. be applied when a court is acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction over
the administration of the estates of deceased persons. Where
Guimco, as attorney in fact and manager of the estate of his administration proceedings are not already pending, the court, before
deceased brother, entered into an agreement with his brother’s Filipina taking action under this section, should require that there be before it
wife, whereby she relinquished her claims to the estate for a some petition, information, or affidavit of such character as to make
consideration. He also entered into an agreement with Uy Cuan, his action by the court under this section appropriate.
brother’s Chinese wife, for the distribution of the estate and for the
payment of rentals on her interest in the real estate. No payments have, The remedy provided in section 629 of the Code of Procedure is clearly a
however, been made by Guimco. totally different remedy, having no relation with that provided in section
628 (now section 4 of Rule 75). It is not permissible in a prosecution
Ramon Contreras, acting on behalf of Uy Cuan, wrote a letter to Guimco under Sec. 628 to superimpose upon the penalty of fine therein
urging him to produce the will of the decedent for the institution of prescribed the additional penalty of imprisonment prescribed under Sec.
lawful proceedings in accordance therewith. Guimco replied that the will 629.
in question had never been in his possession and that he had never seen
it. To enforce the production of the will by the accused at a trial under Sec.
628 would virtually compel him to convict himself, since the mere
A complaint was filed under section 628 of the Code of Civil production of the will by him would be conclusive that he had
Procedure charging Guimco with the failure to produce the will within possession of it as charged in the criminal complaint. This would
the time required by law. The court found the accused guilty and constitute an infringement of the provision of law which says that in a
imposed upon him a fine of P1800. Subsequently, the court, believing
criminal action the defendant shall be exempt from testifying against purpose of the opposition is to show that the oppositor is an
himself. acknowledged natural child who allegedly has been ignored in the will
for issue cannot be raised here but in a separate action. This is especially
so when the testator, as in the present case, is still alive and has merely
filed a petition for the allowance of his will leaving the effects thereof
after his death.
GUEVARRA VS. GUEVARRA In Montañano vs. Suesa, court said: "The authentication of the will decides
Dimaampao, Mahadodin no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator
and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law
PALACIOS VS. CATIMBANG-PALACIOS prescribes for the validity of a will. It does not determine nor even by
Dumapias, Gay implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions; that may
be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its
FACTS: authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely un-
June 25, 1946 - Juan Palacios executed his last will and affected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated."
testament. Availing himself of the provisions of the new Civil Code, he On the other hand, "after a will has been probated during the lifetime of
filed on May 23, 1956 before the Court of First Instance of Batangas a a testator, it does not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or revoke the
petition for its approval. In said will, he instituted as his sole heirs his same before he has had a chance to present such petition, the ordinary
natural children Antonio C. Palacios and Andrea C. Palacios. probate proceedings after the testator's death would be in order".The
June 21, 1956 - an opposition was filed by Maria Catimbang to the reason for this is that the rights to the succession are transmitted from
probate of the will. Ground: she is the acknowledged natural daughter of the moment of the death of the decedent (Article 777, new Civil Code.).
petitioner but that she was completely ignored in said will thus Trial court erred in entertaining the opposition and in annulling the
impairing here legitime. She objects to its intrinsic validity or to the portion of the will which allegedly impairs the legitime of the oppositor
legality of the provisions of the will. on the ground that, as it has found, she is an extraneous matter which
July 6, 1956 – court issued an order ADMITTING the will to should be treshed out in a separate action.
probate. After proper hearing concerning the intrinsic validity of the
will, the court issued another order declaring oppositor to be the natural
child of petitioner and annulling the will insofar as it impairs her FERNANDEZ VS. DIMAGIBA
legitime, with costs against petitioner. Dumapias, Gay
Petitioner appealed in order to secure the probate of his will availing
himself of the provisions of Article 838 (2) NCC, which permit a testator FACTS:
to petition the proper court during his lifetime for the allowance of his The heirs intestate of the late Benedicta de los Reyes have
will. petitioned for a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
ISSUE: that of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in a Special Proceeding,
WON the opposition can be entertained/heard. admitting to probate the alleged last will and testament of the deceased,
RULING: and overruling the opposition to the probate.
NO. Its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been On January 19, 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba (respondent), submitted
executed in accordance with the requirements of the law, much less if the to the Court of First Instance a petition for the probate of the purported
will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, executed on October 22, 1930. The (b) whether or not the order of the Court of origin overruling the
will instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. estoppel invoked by oppositors-appellants had likewise become final.
The petition was set for hearing, and in due time, Dionisio Fernandez, (c) whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had been
Eusebio Reyes and Luisa Reyes and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, impliedly revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of
Leonor and Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be heirs the proponent.
intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate asked. RULING:
Grounds: forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of (a) It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively
the proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper
the major portion of the estate made by the testatrix in favor of the execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of
proponent in 1943 and 1944, but conveyances were finally set aside by whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. As such,
this Supreme Court. the probate order is final and appealable; Section 1 of Rule 109
CFI: will was genuine and properly executed; but deferred specifically prescribes that "any interested person may appeal in special
resolution on the questions of estoppel and revocation "until such time proceedings from an order or judgment . . . where such order or
when we shall pass upon the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the judgment: (a) allows or disallows a will."
will or when the question of adjudication of the properties is Appellants argue: they were entitled to await the trial Court's
opportunely presented." resolution on the other grounds of their opposition before taking an
Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration, appeal, as otherwise there would be a multiplicity of recourses to the
and/or new trial, insisting that the issues of estoppel and revocation be higher Courts. This contention is without weight.
considered and resolved. The probate decree of the Court was not appealed on time, the same had
Court overruled the claim that proponent was in estoppel to ask for the become final and conclusive. Hence, the appellate courts may no longer
probate of the will, but "reserving unto the parties the right to raise the revoke said decree nor review the evidence upon which it is made to
issue of implied revocation at the opportune time." rest.
1960, the CFI appointed Ricardo Cruz as administrator for the sole The revocation invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not an express
purpose of submitting an inventory of the estate, and this was done on one, but merely implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly
February 9, 1960. evidencing an abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or
On the question of whether the execution by the testatrix of devise the properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not
deeds of sale of the larger portion of her estate in favor of the affect the will itself, but merely the particular devise or legacy. Only the
testamentary heir, subsequent to the execution of her 1930 testament, total and absolute revocation can preclude probate of the revoked
had revoked the latter, the trial Court resolved against the oppositors testament (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, supra.).
and held the will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and (b) The presentation and probate of a will are requirements of
unrevoked by the deeds of sale." Whereupon, the oppositors elevated the public policy, being primarily designed to protect the testator's,
case to the Court of Appeals. expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a consequence of the
decedent's ownership and right of disposition within legal limits.
ISSUES: Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of a will to deliver the
(a) whether or not the decree of the CFI allowing the will to probate had same to the Court, and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its
become final for lack of appeal. violation (Revised Rule 75). It would be a non sequitur to allow public
policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel.
(c) Article 957(2) of the Civil Code of 1950 (Art. 869 of the Code
of 1889), which recites: IN RE JOHNSON
Art. 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect: Espino, Carla
(2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing
bequeathed or any part thereof, it being understood that in the latter case FACTS:
the legacy or devise shall be without effect only with respect to the part
thus alienated. If after the alienation the thing should again belong to the Emil Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the
testator, even if it be by reason of nullity of the contract, the legacy or United States. He died in the city of Manila leaving a will. The will is an
devise shall not thereafter be valid, unless the reacquisition shall have holographic instrument, being written in the testator's own handwriting,
been effected by virtue of the exercise of the right of repurchase. and is signed by himself and two witnesses only, instead of three
As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such change witnesses required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A
or departure from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her
petition, however, was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city
1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the
subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of the of Manila for the probate of this will, on the ground that Johnson was at
legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba. As found by the Court of Appeals in the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of
its decision annulling these conveyances, "no consideration whatever America; that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of
was paid by respondent Dimagiba" on account of the transfers, thereby that State; and hence could properly be probated here pursuant to
rendering it even more doubtful whether in conveying the property to section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The hearing on said
her legatee, the testatrix merely intended to comply in advance with
application was set for March 6, 1916, and three weeks publication of
what she had ordained in her testament, rather than an alteration or
departure therefrom. Revocation being an exception, we believe, that in notice was ordered in the "Manila Daily Bulletin." Due publication was
the circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the Civil Code of made pursuant to this order of the court.
the Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar.
If the annulment was due to undue influence, then the transferor was not However, after the will had been probated, her daughter from
expressing her own free will and intent in making the conveyances. first marriage, EbbaIngeborg, moved for the annulment of the decree of
Hence, it cannot be concluded, either, that such conveyances established probate and put the estate into intestate administration, thus preparing
a decision on her part to abandon the original legacy. the way for the establishment of the claim of the petitioner as the sole
The recovery of the alienated property "even if it be by reason of the legitimate heir of her father. She contended, among others, that the order
nullity of the contract" does not revive the legacy. An alienation through
admitting the will to probate was made without notice to her. In the
undue influence in no way differs from one made through violence or
intimidation. In either case, the transferor is not expressing his real argument submitted in behalf of the petitioner, that, at the time the court
intent, and it cannot be held that there was in fact an alienation that made the order of publication, it was apprised of the fact that the
could produce a revocation of the anterior bequest. petitioner lived in the United States and that as daughter and heir she
Appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed. was necessarily interested in the probate of the will. It is, therefore,
insisted that the court should have appointed a date for the probate of
PASCUAL VS COURT OF APPEALS
the will sufficiently far in the future to permit the petitioner to be present
Dorado, Czaybeeh
either in person or by representation; and it is said that the failure of the
court thus to postpone the probate of the will constitutes an infringement Legislature to give wide latitude to the remedy here provided, and is not
of that provision of the Philippine Bill which declared that property shall to be restricted to judgments or orders entered in ordinary contentious
not be taken without due process of law. litigation. In other words the utility of the provision is not limited to
actions proper but extends to all sorts of judicial proceedings. The word
ISSUE: "party," used in this section, means any person having an interest in the
subject matter of the proceeding who is in a position to be concluded by
Whether or not the order admitting the will to probate was
the judgment, order, to other proceeding taken.
beyond the jurisdiction of the court and void because it was made
without notice to the petitioner; and Therefore, also in conformity with the doctrine announced in the
Davis case, the petitionerin this case could have applied at any time
RULING:
within six months for March 16, 1916, and upon showing that she had
The proceedings for the probate of the will were regular and that been precluded from appearing in the probate proceedings by conditions
the publication was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to entertain over which she had no control and that the order admitting the will to
the proceeding and to allow the will to be probated. probate had been erroneously entered upon insufficient proof or upon a
supposed state of facts contrary to the truth, the court would have been
In the case of In re Davis, the Court ruled that "the proceeding as authorized to set the probate aside and grant a rehearing. It is no doubt
to the probate of a will is essentially one in rem, and in the very nature of true that six months was, under the circumstances, a very short period of
things the state is allowed a wide latitude in determining the character of time within which to expect the petitioner to appear and be prepared to
the constructive notice to be given to the world in a proceeding where it contest the probate with the proof which she might have desired to
has absolute possession of the res. It would be an exceptional case where collect from remote countries. Nevertheless, although the time allowed
a court would declare a statute void, as depriving a party of his property for the making of such application was inconveniently short, the remedy
without due process of law, the proceeding being strictly in rem, and the existed; and the possibility of its use is proved in this case by the
res within the state, upon the ground that the constructive notice circumstance that on June 12, 1916, she in fact here appeared in court by
prescribed by the statute was unreasonably short." her attorneys and excepted to the order admitting the will to probate.It
follows that the order of March 16, 1916, admitting the will of Emil H.
Further, section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that
Johnson to probate cannot be declared null and void merely because the
“Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a party or his
petitioner was unavoidably prevented from appearing at the original
legal representative from a judgment, order or other proceeding taken
hearing upon the matter of the probate of the will in question.
against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect; Provided, That application therefor be made within a reasonable
time, but in no case exceeding six months after such judgment, order, or MANAHAN VS. MANAHAN
proceeding was taken.” The use of the word "judgment, order or other Espino, Carla
proceeding" in this section indicates an intention on the part of the
FACTS:
The petitioner, Tiburcia Manahan instituted special proceedings (2) No. The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the
No. 4162, for the probate of the will of the deceased Donata Manahan. due execution thereof and it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds
The court set the date for the hearing and the necessary notice required authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent
by law was accordingly published. It, later on, entered the decree action or proceedings. Also, inasmuch as the proceedings followed in a
admitting the will to probate as prayed for. The will was probated on testamentary case are in rem, the trial court's decree admitting the will to
September 22, 1930 and appointed the herein petitioner as the executrix. probate was effective and conclusive against her, in accordance with the
On May 11, 1932, the appellant herein, Engracia Manahan, filed a motion provisions of section 306 of the said Code of Civil Procedure which reads
for reconsideration and a new trial, praying that the order admitting the as follows:
will to probate be vacated and the authenticated will declared null and
void ab initio. She claimed that she was an interested party in the SEC. 306.EFFECT OF JUDGMENT. — . . . .
testamentary proceedings and, as such, was entitled to and should have
1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to
been notified of the probate of the will.
the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased
ISSUE: person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or
relation of a particular person the judgment or order is conclusive upon
(1) Whether or not the petitioner was entitled to and should have the title of the thing, the will or administration, or the condition or
been notified of the probate of the will: and relation of the person: Provided, That the probate of a will or granting of
letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of
(2) Whether or not the will is null and void ab initio on the ground the testator or intestate; . . . .
that the external formalities prescribed by the Code of Civil
Procedure have not been complied with in the execution thereof.
ALABAN VS COURT OF APPEALS
RULING: Hipolito, Nina Anthonette
(1) The appellant's contention is obviously unfounded and FACTS

untenable. She was not entitled to notification of the probate of the will Respondent Francisco Provido filed a petition for the probate of the
and neither had she the right to expect it, inasmuch as she was not an Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado a.
ALLEGATION: he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of her
interested party, not having filed an opposition to the petition for the
will. b. RTC’s RULING: allowed the probate of the will and directed the
probate thereof. Her allegation that she had the status of an heir, being
issuance of letters testamentary to respondent
the deceased's sister, did not confer on her the right to be notified on the Petitioners after 4 months filed a motion for the reopening of the
ground that the testatrix died leaving a will in which the appellant has probate proceedings a. CLAIMs: 1) they are the intestate heirs of the
not been instituted heir. Furthermore, not being a forced heir, she did not decedent. 2) RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to
acquire any successional right. non-payment of the correct docket fees, defective publication, and lack of
notice to the other heirs.
Given that they knew of the decision 4 months after they could have
will could not have been probated because: a) the signature of filed a petition for relief from judgment after the denial of their motion to
the decedent was forged; b) the will was not executed in accordance with reopen. 3. Petition for annulment of judgment must still fail for failure to
law, that is, the witnesses failed to sign below the attestation clause; c) comply with the substantive requisites, a. An action for annulment of
the decedent lacked testamentary capacity to execute and publish a will; judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the
d) the will was executed by force and under duress and improper judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. PURPOSE: to have the
pressure; e) the decedent had no intention to make a will at the time of final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of
affixing of her signature; and f)she did not know the properties to be litigation. 4. Notice is required to be personally given to known heirs,
disposed of, having included in the will properties which no longer legatees, and devisees of the testator a. the will states that the respondent
belonged to her. b. RTC’s Ruling: denied motion 1) petitioners were was instituted as the sole heir of the decedent thus he has no legal
deemed notified of the hearing by publication and that the deficiencyin obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate or personally
the payment of docket fees is not a ground for the outright dismissal of notify them.
the petition. 2) RTC’s Decision was already final and executory even
before petitioners’ filing of the motion to reopen 3. Petitioners filed a
petition to annule RTC’s decision a.CLAIM: there was a compromise
agreement between petitioners and respondents and they learnt the
RULE 76
Allowance or Disallowance of Will
probate proceeding only in July 2001 b.CA’s RULING: petition
dismissed 1) no showing that petitioners failed to avail of or resort to the
SANTOS VS. CASTILLO
ordinary remedies of newtrial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment,
Hipolito, Nina Anthonette
or other appropriate remedies through no fault of their own.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Petitioner Emerita Santos, in her behalf and as guardian of the
W/N the allowance of the will to probate should be annulled for
minor acknowledge natural children of the deceased, filed a petition for
failure to mention the petitioners asparties
probate of the will of Nicolas Azores. She also filed a motion for the
appointment of a special administrator. At the hearing, respondents Jose,
RULING:
Sinfrosa and Antonio Azores, legitimate children of the deceased filed
No 1. Probate of a will is considered action in rem a. Under the
their opposition, on the ground that the court had not acquired
Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any
jurisdiction on the case. Petitioner's allegations being insufficient to
other personinterested in the estate may, at any time after the death of
confer jurisdiction because she did not allege that she had the custody of
the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will
the will, and therefore, was not entitled to present it for probate and
allowed. Notice of the time and place for proving the will must
furtherance because the will that should be probated is the original and
bepublished for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general
not a copy thereof, as the one presented by the petitioner. Petitioner filed
circulation in the province, as well as furnished to the designated or
an amended petition prayingthat respondents be required to present the
other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator b. Petitioners
copies of the will and the codicil in their possession. Court issued an
became parties due to the publication of the notice of hearing 2.The filing
order denying the petition for the appointment of a special administrator
of motion to reopen is similar to a motion for new triala.The ruling
by petitioner and ordered Jose Azores, who has custody of the last will
became final and executor because the motion was filed out of time.
and testament and all other documents in relation thereto, to deliver said
papers to the court within the date from notice. Consequently, petitioner the probate of a will and for the administration of the properties left by a
filed a motion praying that her amended petition be admitted. However, deceased person, the application must allege, in addition to the residence
before this motion was decided, respondents, after their father's death, of the deceased and other indispensable facts or circumstances, that the
presented the original of the will and codicil, and petitioned that they be applicant is the executor in the will or is the person who had custody of
admitted for probate. The court issued an order dismissing the petition the will to be probated. The original of said document must be presented
filed by the petitioner. or sufficient reasons given to justify the nonrepresentation of said
original and the acceptance of the copy or duplicate thereof. Inasmuch as
ISSUE: these requisites had not been complied with in the application filed by
Who is entitled to apply for probate? WON the court acquired the petitioner, the respondent judge did not exceed in jurisdiction in
jurisdiction over the case dismissing the application in question.
RULING:
Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that no will PEREZ VS. PEREZ
shall pass either real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed. Katigbak , Paula Margareth
For this purpose, section 626 provides that the person who has the
custody of he will shall, within 4 days after he knows of the death of the FACTS:
testator, deliver the will to the court which has jurisdiction, or to the On May 25, 1973, the plaintiffs-appellants executed a deed of
executor named in the will. Sections 628 and 629 proscribed coercive real estate mortgage in favor of the Development Bank of the Philippines
means to compel a person having the custody of a will to deliver it to the over the property located in Bataan as security for an agricultural loan of
court which has jrisdiction. Petitioner alleged that the deceased P6,500.00. The mortgage contract was registered in the Registry of Deeds
designated nobody as custodian of his will but that he directed his of Bataan. The plaintiffs failed to pay their obligation which prompted
nephew Manuel Azores to deliver a copy thereof to her, to keep one in DBP in extrajudicially foreclosing the property. the application was filed
his possession, and to turn over the other two copies to his son Jose And the necessary notice of Sheriffs sale was issued and posted by the
Azores, with instructions to the effect that if petitioner or his son failed to deputy sheriff at three (3) public places in Morong, Bataan, where the
present said will for probate, Manuel should take charge of presenting it mortgaged property is located and duly published for three (3)
to the court. +aking everything into account therefore, it is of the court's consecutive weeks in the Olongapo News. On December 19, 1978, the
vieww that Jose Azores, the son of the deceased, had the custody of the public auction sale was conducted at the municipal building in Morong,
will because the original thereof was turned over to him. For the sake of Bataan, wherein Democrito Perez emerged as the winning bidder for
argument, however, admitting that the testator had designated nobody P11,000.00. Certificate of sale in favor of Democrito Perez was issued and
as custodian of the will, it cannot be denied that his act of subsequentl$ registered in the Registry of Deeds. Since plaintiffs-appellants failed to
making a codicil and entrusting the custody thereof to his legitimate exercise their right to redeem the foreclosed property, original defendant
children, clearly modified his last will. In this sense, the custody of both Democrito Perez executed an affidavit of consolidation which resulted in
is entrusted to his legitimate children and not to Manuel Azores or to the issuance of a new TCT. On 1985, a civil case for Annulment of Public
petitioner. Hence, as the legitimate children of the deceased had custody Auction Sale with Damages coupled with Preliminary Injunction and
of the originals of the will and of the codicil, they alone could, had the Prayer for Restraining Order was filed by herein petitioners against the
right and where bound by law to apply for the probate of their father' respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Balanga, Bataan. The
last will. In order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the case for case was dismissed. Petitioners filed an appeal alleging that the RTC
erred in holding that the public auction sale of the subject mortgaged is published for the dissemination of local news and general information;
property was valid despite the lack of notice to them, thus, depriving that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; and that it
them of their right to property without due process of law. They further is published at regular intervals. The newspaper must not also be
alleged that the notice of public auction sale was not validly published in devoted to the interests or published for the entertainment of a particular
a newspaper of general circulation, as required by law. But CA affirmed class, profession, trade, calling, race or religious denomination. The
RTC's decision. Motion for reconsideration was filed but the same was newspaper need not have the largest circulation so long as it is of general
denied. circulation. Based from the testimonies of the witnesses, it was proven
that Olongapo News was indeed a newspaper of general circulation.
ISSUE/s: That although in 1978, it was not published in Morong, Bataan, under
WHETHER THERE WAS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE P.D. No. 1079, it is categorical that in the event there is no newspaper or
REQUIREMENTS ON POSTINGS. WHETHER THERE WAS NO periodical published in the locality, the same may be published in the
PUBLICATION IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION newspaper or periodical published, edited and circulated in the nearest
WHERE THE REAL PROPERTY IS SITUATED. city or province. Since no newspaper of general circulation was being
published in Morong, Bataan, in the year 1978, then the respondents
RULING: were right in availing themselves of the services of the Olongapo News,
No. The requirement on the posting of notices is found in Section which, as found by the trial court, was the nearest publication in Bataan.
3 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, viz: Sec. 3. Notice shall
be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty days in at
least three public places of the municipality or city where the property is DE ARANZ VS. GALING
situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred pesos, Katigbak , Paula Margareth
such notice shall also be published once a week for at least three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the FACTS:
municipality or city. Their position that the puericulture center and the On 3 March 1986, private respondent Joaquin R-Infante filed
municipal building should be considered one and the same place RTC Pasig a petition for the probate and allowance of the last will and
because they were located in one place is pure fallacy and totally testament of the late Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola. The petition
unacceptable for being contrary to the actual state of things. The specified the names and addresses of herein petitioners as legatees and
petitioners further contend that even after the sheriff had posted the devisees. The probate court issued an order setting the petition for
notice, he may not have posted it anymore for the remaining nineteen hearing. Said order was published in the "Nueva Era" A newspaper of
(19) days, as required by Act No. 3135. It could also be, according to general circulation in Metro Manila once a week for three (3) consecutive
petitioners, that after the notice was posted, the same may have been weeks. On the date of the hearing, no oppositor appeared. The hearing
removed from where it was posted either by an act of man or by an act of was then reset and private respondent presented his evidence ex-parte
nature. But such contention was not supported with evidence. As and placed Arturo Arceo one of the testamentary witnesses, on the
correctly held by the trial court and the appellate court, the deputy witness stand. During the proceedings, private respondent was
sheriff has in his favor the presumption that his official duty was appointed executor. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
regularly performed. The petitioners herein were unable to topple this alleging that, as named legatees, no notices were sent to them as required
presumption in the trial court, the Court of Appeals, and now in this by Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and they prayed that they be
Court. -No. To be a newspaper of general circulation, it is enough that it given a period of ten (10) days within which to file their opposition to
the probate of the will. This was denied by the Court. Petition for Lee, Mariline
certiorari was filed and referred to CA which was also dismissed. Hence,
present petition. ACAIN VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Lectura, Erika
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in ruling that the requirement of notice GAN VS. YAP
on heirs, legatees, and devisees is merely a procedural convenience to Lectura, Erika
satisfy the requirements of due process?
RODELAS VS ARANZA
RULING: Lim, Justin
Yes. Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Cof reads: SEC. 4. Heirs,
devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally. —
The court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed
RULE 76
Allowance of Will Proved Outside of the Philippines and
for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known Administration of Estate Thereunder
heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at
their places of residence, and deposited in the post office with the LEON & GHEZZIE VS. MANUFACTURERS LIFE INS.
postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the hearing, if Lim, Justin
such places of residence be known. A copy of the notice must in like
manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not, the
petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor not petitioning, if SUNTAY VS. SUNTAY
their places of residence be known. Personal service of copies of the Lubay, Angela
notice at least ten (10) days before the day of hearing shall be equivalent
to mailing. It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and VDA. DE PEREZ VS. TOLETE
place of the hearing for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the Lubay, Angela
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the
Philippines at their places of residence, if such places of residence be FACTS:
known. There is no question that the residences of herein petitioners Subject of this case is the probate of the will of Spouses Dr. Jose
legatees and devisees were known to the probate court. But despite such F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American
knowledge, the probate court did not cause copies of the notice to be sent citizens and practicing doctors in New York, U.S.A. The spouses
to petitioners. The requirement of the law for the allowance of the will executed separate wills for the benefit of each other. The spouses and
was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for three their family perished when they were trapped by fire that gutted their
(3) weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. home.
Thereafter, their wills were admitted to probate with the
BASA VS. MERCADO Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York. Then, petitioner
Lee, Mariline who is the mother of Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan filed for the reprobate of
the will with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The
MANINANG VS. COURT OF APPEALS will was denied probate for the reason that the documents did not
establish the law of New York on the procedure and allowance of wills. GR NO. 139868; June 8, 2006
The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration to be given sufficient time to
prove New York law was denied. On appeal, petitioner contend that the TOPIC: Rule 77 – Allowance of Will Proved Outside of the
evidence submitted to the RTC were already sufficient to allow probate
Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder
of will.
Facts: Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey
ISSUE:
WON it was necessary to prove the foreign law. (Richard) were American citizens who have resided in the
Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle
RULINGS: Guersey Hill (Kyle). Audrey died in 1979. She left a will wherein
NO.The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard consisting of
wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows:
Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate improvements at Forbes
(1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2)
the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Park, current account with cash balance and shares of stock in
Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) A/G Interiors. Two years after her death, Richard married
the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon. Four years thereafter, Richard
foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills. Except for the first died and left a will wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to
and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence. respondent, except for his shares in A/G, which he left to his
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the
adopted daughter.
probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our
courts cannot take judicial notice of them .Petitioner must have
perceived the omission of the fifth requirement above as in fact she Petitioner, as ancillary administrator in the court where Audrey’s
moved for more time to submit the pertinent procedural and substantive will was admitted to probate, filed a motion to declare Richard and
New York laws but which request respondent Judge just glossed over. Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project of partition of Audrey’s
While the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should
estate. The motion and project of partition were granted.
relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best evidence of
Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator with regards to Richard’s
which the matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated or
denied probate will also filed a project of partition, leaving 2/5 of Richard’s
undivided interest in the Forbes property was allocated to
Respondent Judge was ordered to give the petitioner a reasonable time respondent Candelaria, while 3/5 thereof was allocated to their
within which to submit evidence. three children. Respondent opposed on the ground that under the
law of the State of Maryland, where Richard was a native of, a
ANCHETA VS GUERSAY-DALAYGON legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in
Mercado, Trish the property subject to the legacy.
ANCHETA v. GUERSEY-DALAYGON Issue: Whether or not the decree of distribution may still be
annulled under the circumstances.
Held: A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person

vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if
erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes
final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem.
However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the

estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Further, in
Ramon vs. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party interested in a
probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he
is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or
through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.
Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of

Audrey’s estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated
by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA
Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and
April 7, 1988, must be upheld.
RULE 78
Letters Testamentary and of Administration, When and to
Whom issued
NGO THE HUA VS. CHUNG KIAT HUA

Mercado, Trish
No. It is well settled that the declaration of heirs shall only
take place after all the debts, expenses and taxes have been
NGO THE HUA v. CHUNG KITA HUA paid. A cursory reading of the pertinent section discloses
GR NO. L-17091; Sept. 30, 1963 that what the court is enjoined from doing is the assignment
or distribution of the residue of the deceased’s estate before
Facts: the above-mentioned obligations chargeable to the estate
are first paid. Nowhere from the said section may it be
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First
inferred that the court cannot make a declaration of heirs
Instance of Rizal appointing Chung Kiat Hua as
prior to the satisfaction of these obligations. It is to be noted,
administrator of the estate of the deceased Chung Liu.
however, that the court in making the appointment of the
Ngo The Hua, claiming to be the spouse of the deceased, administrator did not purport to make a declaration of heirs.
filed a petition to be appointed administratix of the estate of
the aforementioned deceased. The petition was opposed by MEDINA ET. AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
the children of the deceased claiming that Ngo Hua is Mansul, Nabral
morally and physically unfit to execute the duties of the trust
MALOLES II VS. PHILLIPS
as administratix, and that the she and the deceased Mansul, Nabral
procured an absolute divorce in Taiwan. The lower court
found that Ngo Hua and the deceased were validly divorced REPUBLIC VS. MARCOS
Pangilinan, Legis
in Taipei. The court issued an order appointing Chung Kiat
Hua as administrator instead. TORRES VS. JAVIER
Pangilinan, Legis
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in passing upon the DE GUZMAN VS. LIMCOLIOC
Rabanal, Michelle
validity of the divorce obtained by Ngo Hua and the
deceased and upon the filiation of the oppositors? FACTS:
Held:
Proceso de Guzman died on January 1, 1937, without leaving a will. The
deceased was first married to Agatona Santos, with whom he had four
children, named Nicolasa, Apolinario, Ana and Tomasa. After Agatona's during his second marriage with Angela Limcolioc. The court bore these
death, the deceased contracted a second marriage with Angela allegations in mind. It is true that the case was not heard for the purpose
Limcolioc, with whom he did not have any child. of establishing these allegations, but when Angela asked for the
reconsideration of the appointment of Nicolasa, she did not deny these
allegations and merely stated that they do not justify her appointment as
administratrix. For failure of Angela to deny these allegations, thus
On the 7th of the same month of January, 1937, the Court of First
taking them for granted, the court was justified in considering them
Instance of Rizal appointed Nicolasa de Guzman judicial administratrix
when it denied the reconsideration of its resolution and when it
of the properties of the deceased Proceso de Guzman. On the 8th of the
sustained the appointment of Nicolasa.
same month of January, 1937, Angela Limcolioc, widow of the deceased,
asked that this appointment be set aside and that she had named
administratrix instead, on that ground of her preference as the widow.
The court denied this petition and sustained the appointment of If the properties left by the deceased Proceso de Guzman were acquired
Nicolasa. From these resolutions, Angela appealed. during his marriage with Agatona Santos, his children, among them
Nicolasa, have more interest therein than his now widow, Angela
Limcolioc, who would only be entitled, by way of usufruct, to a portion
equal to that corresponding to one of the children who has received no
ISSUE:
betterment.
Whether the trial court erred in not appointing her

TORRES VS. SICAT
administratrix of the estate of the deceased Proceso de Guzman and in
Rabanal, Michelle
appointing Nicolasa de Guzman as such administratrix without first
setting the case for hearing. FACTS:
On August 25, 1950, Luis Morales, married to Hermenegilda
Sicat, died in the municipality of Tarlac, Tarlac Seven days later, Jose
Torres alleging to be a creditor of the conjugal partnership commenced
RULING: this special proceeding in the Tarlac court petitioning for the issuance of
letter of administration in favor of Atty. Pedro B. De Jesus, for the
purpose of settling the estate of the deceased.
The application filed by Nicolasa de Guzman for her
Twelve days afterwards the widow voiced her opposition, and claimed
appointment alleges that during the marital life of the deceased with his preference to be appointed as administratrix. She said the only close
first wife Agatona Santos, both, through their mutual labor, acquired all relatives and forced heirs were her six legitimate minor children, besides
the properties left by the deceased, not having acquired any property herself.
"The surviving widow" the trial judge stated, "has always consistently
RTC: refused to recognize the credits" and manifested her determination to
"resist the claims of creditors."
The petitioner presented evidence. The oppositor submitted none. Then
the trial judge, disregarding the preference established by law for the ISSUE:
surviving widow, entered on August 16, 1951 an order appointing Atty. Whether RTC’s appointment should be upheld, ignoring the
Pedro B. De Jesus as administrator. surviving widows preferential right.
Under section 6, rule 79 of the Rules of Court, when a person dies RULING:
intestate, administration should be granted: In our opinion it is a sound juridical principle that the
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be administrator should not adopt attitudes nor take steps inimical to the
interests of the creditors. The administration of the intestate is
(b) if such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, undertaken for the benefit of both the heirs and the creditors. but by
or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, . . . it may creditors we mean those declared to be so in appropriate proceedings.
be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and Before their credits are fully established they are not "creditors" within
willing to serve; the purview of the above principle. So it is not improper — it is even
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be proper — for the administrator or whoever is proposed for appointment
granted to such other person as the court may select. as such, to oppose, or to require competent proof of, claims advanced
against the estate. "The propriety of contesting particular claims must
The trial judge was cognizant of this statutory preference. But he frequently be left largely to his discretion and no presumption of bad
expressly stated his reason for disregarding it, saying in effect: faith or misconduct will be made against him." (34 C. J. S., p. 259.)
"Apparently the amount of credits exceeds the value of the conjugal
assets; therefore the interest of the creditors deserves paramount At the hearing of the petition for the appointment of administrator, this
consideration. Now inasmuch as the widow has shown hostility to the widow practically did nothing more than to inform the alleged creditors,
creditors by openly disputing their credits, she is therefore unsuitable, "prove your credit before I honor it." That is not necessarily dishonest
for having adverse interests." nor contrary to real creditors. And then, not having opposed all
creditors, because she did not deny the estate's liability to the People's
A probate court cannot arbitrarily disregard the preferential rights of the Bank, she could not strictly be considered hostile to the creditors. Had
surviving spouse to the she acknowledged indebtedness to every one coming forward with a
administration of the estate of a deceased person; but if the person claim, regardless of its merit, she would be useless, even harmful, both to
enjoying such preferential rights is unsuitable the court may appoint the heirs and the actual creditors.
another person.
Under the rules (Rule 87) creditors; claims may be filed, and considered,
Unsuitableness for appointment as administrator may consist in adverse only after the regular administrator has been appointed. Hence, in
interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the selecting the administrator, the court could not yet normally accord
estate of such an extent as to render the appointment inadvisable. priority treatment to the interests of those whose credits were in dispute.
And counsel for herein appellant did well in opposing the presentation grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio Suntay III (Emilio III)
of evidence of the objected credits at the hearing, arguing in part, and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio I was married to Isabel
Cojuangco, and they begot three children, namely: respondent, Isabel;
. . . the time has not yet arrived when this court can even entertain the Margarita; and Emilio II. Emilio I’s first marriage was subsequently annulled.
presentation of those exhibits because the stage of presenting claims has Thereafter, Emilio I had two children out of wedlock, Emilio III and
not yet arrived. Consequently, this court can not even receive as Nenita Suntay, by two different women. Respondent and her siblings
evidence the said documents as evidence of indebtedness, because if Margarita and Emilio II, lived separately from their father and paternal
those evidence will be accepted then we will be in a position to rebut grandparents. After her spouse’s death, Federico adopted their illegitimate
them and to enter into actual trial to show that they are not really grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita. On October 26, 1995, respondent
evidence of indebtedness, and in that case we will not terminate because filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor.
then we will be contending as to whether those were really executed or Federico filed his opposition. Being the surviving spouse of Cristina, he
really contracted. ... is capable of administering her estate and he should be the one
appointed as its administrator; that as part owner of the mass of conjugal
On the other hand, the appealed order conceding that the evidence properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal preference in the
"showed clearly that the surviving widow is fully competent in a high administration. After a failed attempt by the parties to settle the
degree to administer the intestate of her deceased husband", plainly proceedings amicably, Federico filed a Manifestation dated March
indicates that except for her supposed hostility to creditors she was 13, 1999, nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator of the
suitable for the trust. Consequently, having found that her attitude did decedent’s estate on his behalf. The trial court granted Emilio III’s Motion for
not per se constitute antagonism to the creditors, we must necessarily Leave to Intervene considering his interest in the outcome of the case. In
declare and enforce her superior right to appointment as administratrix the course of the proceedings, Federico died. The trial court rendered a
under Rule 79. decision appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III, as administrator of decedent
Cristina’s intestate estate. Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the
Wherefore, the questioned order appointing Atty. Pedro B. De Jesus is CA, which reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the
annulled, and one will be entered requiring the issuance by the court a Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III. The CA zeroed in on Emilio III’s
quo of letters of administration to the widow appellant subject to such status as an illegitimate child of Emilio I and, thus, barred from
terms and conditions as are appropriate under the Rules. Costs against representing his deceased father in the estate of the latter’s legitimate mother,
the appellee. the decedent.
ISSUE :
SUNTAY III VS. COJUANGCO-SUNTAY Who, as between Emilio III and respondent, is better qualified to act as
Rivera, Hiezll Wynn administrator of the decedent’s estate.
FACTS: HELD:
On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina married to Dr. Federico The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate succession is
died intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Suntay (Emilio I), to give preference to the wishes and presumed will of the decedent,
predeceased both Cristina and Federico. At the time of her death, absent a valid and effective will. The basis for Article 992 of the Civil
Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico, and several Code, referred to as the iron curtain bar rule, is quite the opposite
scenario in the facts obtaining herein for the actual relationship between of the person to apply for administration or to request
Federico and Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, was that administration be granted to some other person, it
akin to the normal relationship of legitimate relatives. Emilio III was may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors,
reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her husband, if competent and willing to serve;
Federico, who both acknowledged him as their grandchild. Emilio III is
a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the distribution of (c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to
the latter’s estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, not simply serve, it may be granted to such other person as the
representing his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I. court may select.
From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in

excluding Emilio III from the administration of the decedent’s estate. As However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends
Federico’s adopted son, Emilio III’s interest in the estate of Cristina is as on the attendant facts and circumstances of each case. Jurisprudence has
much apparent to this Court as the interest therein of respondent, long held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound
considering that the CA even declared that under the law, Federico, discretion of the trial court. In the main, the attendant facts and
being the surviving spouse, would have the right of succession over a circumstances of this case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration
portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share by both respondent and Emilio III of their grandmothers, Cristina’s
in the conjugal partnership. estate.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the
preference in the appointment of an administrator of an estate: basis of intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent,
Cristina, did not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration grandchildren. Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally
granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the raised the status of Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, legitimate child. The peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakingly
or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption
administration shall be granted: in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and
antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, deceased.
or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to
such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next The petition is GRANTED.
of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and
willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may RULE 79

be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be Opposing Issuance of Letters Testamentary, Petition and
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, Contest for Letters of Administration
or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death
was made to sign the deed of assignment, Adela did not know the true
GUTIEREZ VS VILLEGAS value of the estate.
Rodriguez, Maria Lorraine The administrator Villegas and Rizalina denied the allegations of
fraud, undue influence and the like.
FACTS: Adela presented with the Probate Court, a motion praying that
In 1954, Irene Santos died intestate, leaving as her only heirs her the administrator and/or his attorneys be required to furnish her all
surviving spouse Jose Villegas and two nieces — daughters of a deceased copies of pleadings filed or to be filed in the intestate proceedings, it
brother, Rizalina and Adela Gutierrez. Thereafter, the surviving spouse appearing that the administrator presented pleadings in Court without
filed with the Rizal CFI- Pasay, a petition for Letters of Administration , serving her copies thereof.
and was appointed administrator of the estate. In the petition, he named An opposition was interposed by the administrator, who alleged
as intestate heirs, besides himself, the 2 nieces of his deceased wife. that the movant, although originally a party to the probate proceeding,
Under the unverified manifestation signed by Adela Gutierrez, has voluntarily and expressly desisted from being so, and that having
accompanied by a public instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihan at assigned by sale, all her rights, interests and participations in the estate,
Salinan", renounced all her rights , interests and participation in the she has no longer any legal standing in the case.
estate of Irene in favor of her sister. CFI: Favored Adelina and ordered the administrator to furnish
However, Adela averred that the deed of assignment of her the former copies of pleadings.
rights, participation and interest in the estate of Irene Santos and the first Rizalina and the Administrator appealed.
manifestation were obtained thru fraud practiced by the administrator
upon her and were vitiated by mistake or undue influence. Therein, she
narrated that due to stringent financial conditions, she (Adela) requested ISSUE:
the administrator for an advance of P2,000.00 from the estate. The Whether or not Adela Santos Gutierrez has a right to intervene
administrator refused on the ground that it is against the law, but in the probate proceeding.
suggested that she might obtain a loan from her sister Rizalina, offering
to help. Thereafter, the administrator informed Adela that he was able to RULING:
secure the conformity of Rizalina to give her a loan of P10,000.00 instead YES. It cannot be successfully denied that Adela Santos
of only P2,000.00. Adela was then brought by Villegas and Rizalina to the Gutierrez is an indispensable party to the proceedings in question. Her
office of their lawyer, where she was made to sign a document she could interest in the estate is not inchoate, it was established at the time of
not read. The lawyer asked Adela to sign another document, which he death of Irene Santos. While it is true that she executed a deed of
said was to be presented in Court and explained the contents of the assignment, it is also a fact that she asked the same to be annulled, which
document signed the day before. It was only then that Adela came to action is now pending before the CFI-Pasig Although Adela had filed a
know that said document was a deed of sale. When Adela protested, manifestation dropping herself from the proceedings and presenting
Villegas told her that the matter could be discussed better in his house. therewith the supposed Deed of Assignment, the record, nevertheless
During the discussion, Villegas informed Adela that the amount of fails to show that action thereon had been taken by the probate Court.
P50,000.00 which Rizalina was paying for her share in the inheritance, Every act intended to put an end to in division among co-heirs and
was probably more than what she would get in the estate, because the legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should
estate is not valuable and had plenty of debts. Although Adela did not purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other
want to accept the money, Villegas refused to take them back. When she transaction. No serious argument can be offered to deny the co-heirship
of appellee in the estate under probate. It appearing (if We assume the RULING:
due execution of the Deed of Assignment), that the transaction is in the No.Petitioner Cipriano is not an interested person in the estate of
nature of extrajudicial partition, court approval is imperative, and the the decedent. In the present case, there was really no settlement
heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over the estate and proceedings. The remedy of the petitioner is to rescind or to annul the
over their persons, by the mere act of assignment and desistance. Even if deed of assignment or the extrajudicial partition. The assignment took
the partition had been judicially approved on the basis of the alleged place without pending settlement proceeding. The properties subject
deed of assignment, an aggrieved heir does not lose her standing in the matter of the assignment were not under the jurisdiction of the
probate court. Adela was not a third person; she was an original party settlement court. Allowing that the assignment must be deemed a
therein. partition between the assignor and assignee, the same does not need
court approval to be effective between parties. An extrajudicial partition
DURAN VS. DURAN is valid as between participants even if the requisites of Sec. 1 Rule 74 are
Rodriguez, Maria Lorraine not followed, since such requisites are for purposes of binding creditors
and non-participating heirs only.
FACTS: Under the Rules of Court, a petition for administration and
Pio Duran died intestate. Among his alleged heirs are Josefina, settlement of an estate must be filed by an interested person. And in the
as surviving spouse; several brothers and sisters; nephews and nieces. meanwhile, the assigning heir cannot initiate a settlement proceedings,
Subsequent to his death, Cipriano, one of the surviving brothers, for until the deed of assignment is annulled or rescinded, it is deemed
executed a public instrument assigning and renouncing his hereditary valid and effective against him, so that he is left without that “ interest”
rights to decedent’s estate in favor of Josefina for consideration. in the estate required to petition for settlement proceedings.
However, a year later, Cipriano filed in CFI-Albay a petition for intestate
proceedings to settle Pio’s estate and an ex parte motion to be appointed TAYAG VS. TAYAG-GALLOR
as Special Administrator. Josefina opposed and moved for the dismissal Salayog, Benny Rico
upon the ground that the petitioner is not an interested person in the
estate, in view of the deed of transfer and renunciation, in the FACTS:
alternarive, she asked to be appointed administratrix. Whereas Cipriano Respondent, Tayag-Gallor or TG, filed a petition for the
alleged that Josefina was not the decedent’s wife and that the deed of issuance of letters of administration over the estate of Ismael
assignement was procured through fraud, with gross inadequacy of Tayad. She claims that she is 1 of 3 illegitimate children of
consideration and vitiated by lesion.
Ismael. Ismael was married to petitioner but they didn't have
Meanwhile, Miguel, another brother of decedent, filed a petition
any children of their own.
to be joined as co-petitioner of Cipriano. Josefina moved to strike out
said petition as an improper attempt to intervene in the case.
CFI: dismissed the petition of Cipriano for lack of interest in the Ismael died intestate, leaving behind 2 lots and one
estate premised on the deed of assignment signed by Cipriano. motor vehicle, both in possession of petitioner. Petitioner
Cipriano and Miguel appealed. promised respondent and her brothers 100K each as their share
ISSUE: in the proceeds of the sale of the motor vehicle. Petitioner only
Whether petitioner Cipriano can be considered as an “interested gave half.
person” in the estate
Respondent alleged that petitioner intends to dispose of The petition for the issuance is a suit for the settlement of the
the properties of Ismael to the respondents prejudice, Petitioner intestate estate of Ismael Tayag. The right of respondent to
opposed this petition of TG asserting that the properties were maintain such a suit is dependent on whether she is entitled to
purchased by her using her own money, she even denied all of successional rights as an illegitimate child which may be
petitioners allegations. established through voluntary or compulsory recognition.
Petitioner filed for dismissal for failure to state a cause of Petitioner’s ground is essentially based on her contention that
action. Petitioner reiterated that she is the sole owner of the by Ismael's death, respondent can no longer establish her
properties by presenting TCTs. She also averred that it was filiation. However, petitioner overlooked the fact that
necessary for respondent to show proof that she was respondent's successional rights may be established not just by
acknowledged and recognized by Ismael Tayag. There being no judicial action to compel recognition but also by proof that she
such allegation, the action becomes one to compel recognition. had been voluntarily acknowledged.
DENIED. CA also denied petitioners motion and directed the
trial court to proceed with the dispatch. CA ruled that the Respondent was yet to show her proof of filiation because of
allegation of respondent that she is an illegitimate child suffices petitioner's opposition. So, there is no way yet to determine if
for a cause of action, without the need to state that she had been her petition is actually one to compel recognition or whether she
recognized or acknowledged. has a material and direct interest to maintain the suit. So, the
allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child suffices even
Petitioner came to the SC and asserts that respondent without stating that she has been recognized or acknowledged.
should not be allowed to prove her filiation in the settlement of
Ismael's estate. Because the claim of filiation should not be This petition by petitioner is DENIED.
allowed to be proved in an action for settlement of an estate.
ISSUE: Whether respondent's petition for the issuance of letters

of administration sufficiently states a cause of action
considering that she merely alleged she is an illegitimate child? RULE 80
Special Administrator
RULING: YES.
Petition for issuance of letters of administration must be filed FULE VS. COURT OF APPEALS
by an interested person. An interested party is one who would Salayog, Benny Rico
be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a
claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be
FACTS:
material and direct.
- Amado Garcia died - left property in Calamba, Laguna.
- Virginia Garcia Fule (illeg sis) àpet for letters of admin & ex parte
appointment as special administratix in CFI Laguna
- Motion was granted. o Because there are many CFIs, ROC fixed the venue (of
- Preciosa Garcia (wife) and in behalf of their child - opposed settlement of estates, probate of will & issuance of letters of
- failure to satisfy jurisdictional requirement & improper admin) - place of residence of deceased / province
venue (avers no domicile/residence of deceased as ▪ Death Certificate àdeceased resided in QC at the time of
required by Rule 79 Sec. 21) - death certs presented by Fule his death, therefore the venue of Laguna was improper
show QC as deceased’s last residence (death cert admissible to prove residence of deaceased at
- Fule was a creditor of the estate, and as a mere illegitimate time of his death)
sister of the deceased is not entitled to succeeding o Rule 73 Sec 13 - really a matter of venue
from him2 ▪ Clause “so far….”
- CFI - denied opposition ▪ Caption “Settlement of estate of Deceased Person. Venue
- CA reversed and annulled the appointment of Fule and Processes
- Preciosa became special administratrix upon a bond of P30k.
▪ Contained in a law of procedure - merely a matter of
method & convenience to parties
ISSUES/HELD
o Rule 4 Sec 4 - Venue is subject to waiver
a) Venue v. Jurisdiction ▪ but Preciosa did not waive it, merely requested for
➢ JURISDICTION – power/authority of court over subject matter alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse
o Jurisdiction over all probate cases is w/ CFIs independently
from the place of residence of the deceased (Judiciary act 1948)
b) What does the word “resides” in Rule 73 Sec 1 mean
o Not changed by procedure
➢ Resides – “actual residence”
o There are cases though that if such power is not exercised
- Requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place
conformably w/ procedure, court loses power to exercise it
legally. However, this doesn’t amount to loss of jurisdiction
- In statutes fixing venue “residence” &“domicile” synonymous
àeven when statue uses “domicile”, it is still construed as
over subject matter but only over the person or that judgment
residence & not domicile in its technical sense
may be rendered defective for lack of something essential to
sustain it.
➢ VENUE – place where each case shall be brought
3 RULE 73 Sec.1. if the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled at the CFI in the province in which he resides at the
time of his death. And if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the CFI of any province in
which he had estate.
1 Rule 79 Sec 2 - petition should show the existence of jurisdiction to make the The court 1st taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall
appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts such as death, name, last exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
residence, existence, situs of assets, intestacy, right of person who seeks administration as The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of
next of kin, creditor or otherwise to be appointed the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
2NCC Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestado from the legitimate proceedings, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in jurisdiction appears on the record.
the same manner from the illegitimate child.
- Elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or Section 1 — Appointment of Special Administrator — When there is
purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause
- Popular sense – the personal, actual or physical habitation of a including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the
person, actual residence or place of abode court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge
- No particular length of time required but must be more than of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are
temporary decided and executors or administrators appointed.
➢ legal residence or domicile – requires bodily presence and an Under the above rule, the probate court may appoint a special
intention to make it one’s domicile. administrator should there be a delay in granting letters testamentary or
of administration occasioned by any cause including an appeal from the
allowance or disallowance of a will. Subject to this qualification, the
DISPOSITION: Fule’s petition DENIED. appointment of a special administrator lies in the discretion of the Court.
This discretion, however, must be sound, that is, not whimsical, or
DE GUZMAN VS. GUADIZ Contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle.
Sumaway, Dylan The basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rules is broad
enough to include any cause or reason for the delay in granting letters
FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of testamentary or of administration as where a contest as to the will is
Nueva Ecija, Branch V, Gapan, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 865 being carried on in the same or in another court, or where there is an
for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by one Catalina appeal pending as to the proceeding on the removal of an executor or
Bajacan instituting the herein petitioner as sole and universal heir and administrator, or in cases where the parties cannot agree among
naming him as executor. themselves. Likewise, when from any cause general administration
The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss and/or opposition cannot be immediately granted, a special administrator may be
contending, among others, that all the real properties of Catalina Bajacan appointed to collect and preserve the property of the deceased.
are now owned by them by virtue of a Deed of Donation Intervivos The facts justifying the appointment of a special administrator are:
executed on June 19, 1972 by Arcadia Bajacan and Catalina Bajacan in (1) Delay in the hearing of the petition for the probate of the win.
their favor; that on September 30, 1977, the respondent judge resolved to (2) The basis of the private respondents' claim to the estate of Catalina
defer resolution on the said motion to dismiss until the parties shall have Bajacan and opposition to the probate of the will is a deed of donation
presented their evidence; that a motion for the appointment of a special dated June 19, 1972 allegedly executed by the deceased Catalina Bajacan
administrator was filed by the petitioner on September 23, 1977 alleging and her late sister Arcadia Bajacan in their favor.
that the unresolved motion to dismiss would necessarily delay the There is an immediate need to file an action for the annulment of such
probate of the will and the appointment of an executor. deed of donation in behalf of the estate. Precisely, the petitioner filed
The respondent judge issued an order denying the motion for Civil Case No. 1080 in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija Branch
appointment of a special administrator. V, against the herein private respondents.
ISSUE: whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of Upon the filing of this petition, the respondent judge, on motion of the
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order private respondents, postponed the hearing of the probate of the will
d denying petitioner's motion for the appointment of a special which was then scheduled on August 23, 1978 to September 20, 1978.
administrator The reasons for the appointment of a special administrator are:
RULING: Rule 80, Sec. 1, of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
The reason for the practice of appointing a special administrator rests in Rolando Relucio filed a motion praying that the petitioner be declared in
the fact that estates of decedents frequently become involved in contempt of court for failing to deliver to him, after demand, all papers,
protracted litigation, thereby being exposed to great waste and losses if documents, titles and properties of the estate under her administration.
there is no authorized agent to collect the debts and preserve the assets In the order dated April 10, 1951, the Court of First Instance of Manila
in the interim. The occasion for such an appointment usually arises denied this motion for contempt and appointed the Equitable Banking
where, for some cause, such as a pendency of a suit concerning the proof Corporation as special administrator pending the appeal of the petitioner
of the will, regular administration is .delayed. No temporary from the order of January 15, 1951.
administration can be granted where there is an executor in being RULING: From the very position taken by the respondent Judge of the
capable of acting, however. Court of First Instance of Manila, it is plain that the motion for
Principal object of appointment of temporary administrator is to immediate execution of the order of January 15, 1951, was in effect
preserve estate until it can pass into hands of person fully authorized to denied, with the result that the petitioner must be deemed as having the
administer it for benefit of creditors and heirs. right to continue as administratrix until her appeal is finally disposed of.
It appears that the estate the properties registered under the Torrens It is noteworthy that the petitioner was named in the will of Felipe
system in the name of the deceased Catalina Bajacan consisting of eighty Relucio, Sr., (already duly probated) not only as administratrix but as
(80) hectares of first class agricultural land. It is claimed that these 80 executrix, and her substitution by Rolando Relucio in virtue of the
hectares produce P50,000.00 worth of palay each harvest twice a year. appealed order of January 15, 1951 is not for any cause, but is based
Obviously there is an immediate need for a special administrator to solely on the circumstance that Rolando Relucio is an heir
protect the interests of the estate as regards the products. The cases in which a special administrator may be appointed are
All the facts which warrant the appointment of a special administrator in specified in section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court which provides as
accordance with Rule 80, Sec. 1 of the Revised Rules of Court are present follows: "When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of
in the case at bar. administration occasioned by an appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of a will, or from any other cause, the court may appoint a
RELUCIO VS SAN JOSE special administrator to collect and take charge of the estate of the
Sumaway, Dylan deceased and executors or administrators thereupon appointed." A
special administrator may also be appointed in a case covered by section
FACTS: Petitioner, Julita Relucio, was appointed administratrix of the 8 of Rule 87 which provides as follows: "If the executor or administrator
testate estate of Felipe Relucio, Sr., Upon petition filed on June 27, 1950 has a claim against the estate he represents, he shall give notice thereof,
by Lorenzo, Rolando and Leticia Relucio, to which the petitioner filed an in writing, to the court, and the court shall appoint a special
opposition, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued an order on administrator who shall, in the adjustment of such claim, have the same
January 15, 1951, appointing Rolando Relucio as administrator in power and be subject to the same liability as the general administrator or
substitution of the petitioner. executor in the settlement of other claims. The court may order the
Before the appeal could be perfected, Rolando Relucio moved for the executor or administrator to pay to the special administrator necessary
immediate execution of the order appointing him as administrator. funds to defend such claim."
The court merely made reference to the letters of administration issued There is no pretense that the case at bar is one falling under either section
in favor of Rolando Relucio and did not pass on the motion for 1 of Rule 81 or section 8 of Rule 87. In any view of the case, there is a
immediate execution. regular administrator. Pending her appeal from the order of January 15,
1951, the petitioner had the right to act as administratrix.
Whether or not the probate court may appoint a special administratix
DE GUZMAN VS ANGELES and issue a writ of possession of alleged properties of a decedent for the
Tomarong, Marian preservation of the estate of the said deceased person even before the
FACTS:
probate court causes notice be served upon all interested parties
On May 5, 1987 Private Respondent Elaine de Guzman filed a petition
HELD:
for the settlement of the intestate estate of Manolito de Guzman before
RTC of Makati City. The petition alleges among others that petitioner as No. In the instant case, there is no doubt that the respondent court
the surviving spouse of the decedent is most qualified and entitled to the acquired jurisdiction over the proceedings upon the filing of a petition
grant of letters of administration. On May 22, 1987, PR filed a motion for for the settlement of an intestate estate by the private respondent. Verily,
writ of possession over 5 vehicles registered under the name of the said notice through publication of the petition for the settlement of the estate
deceased person, alleges to be conjugal properties of the de Guzmans of a deceased person is jurisdictional, the absence of which makes court
and in order to preserve the assets of her late husband, but which are at orders affecting other persons, subsequent to the petition void and
present in the possession of PR’s father-in-law, herein Petitioner Pedro subject to annulment. In the instant case, no notice as mandated by
de Guzman. section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court was caused to be given
by the probate court before it acted on the motions of the private
On May 28, 1987, PR filed her “ex-parte motion to appoint petitioner as
respondent to be appointed as special administratrix, to issue a writ of
Special Administratix of the estate of Manolito de Guzman”. Hearing
possession of alleged properties of the deceased person in the widow's
was set on June 5, 1987, however, no notice was given to petitioner. In
favor, and to grant her motion for assistance to preserve the estate of
the order dated June 5, 1987, the RTC granted the PR’s motion to be
Manolito de Guzman.
appointed as special administratix. The RTC issued another order dated
June 8, 1987, granting the Urgent ex-parte Motion for assistance filed by A special administrator has been defined as the "representative of
PR for appointment of two deputy sheriffs with some decedent appointed by the probate court to care for and preserve his
military/policemen to assist her in preserving the estate of her late estate until an executor or general administrator is appointed." The
husband. Petitioner resisted on taking the subject vehicles on the ground petitioner as creditor of the estate has a similar interest in the
that they were his personal properties. Thereafter, petitioner filed a preservation of the estate as the private respondent who happens to be
petition to annul the RTC’s orders dated June 5 and June 8, 1987. He the widow of deceased Manolito de Guzman. Hence, the necessity of
alleges that the appointment of a special administrator constitutes an notice as mandated by the Rules of Court. It is not clear from the records
abuse of discretion for having been made without giving petitioner an exactly what emergency would have ensued if the appointment of an
opportunity to oppose said appointment. administrator was deferred at least until the most interested parties were
given notice of the proposed action. No unavoidable delay in the
ISSUE:
appointment of a regular administrator is apparent from the records.
HEIRS OF CASTILLO VS. GABRIEL ISSUE:
Tomarong, Marian
Whether the appointment of Dolores as special administratix by probate
On January 25, 1989, Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel, wife of Lorenzo court is proper
Almoradie, died in Malabon City leaving behind a sizable inheritance
consisting mostly of real estate and shares of stock. A month after her HELD:
death, Crisanta’s mother commenced an intestate proceedings before
Yes. The Court has repeatedly held that the appointment of a special
RTC of Malabon City docketed as Spc. Proc. No. 192-MN. She prayed
administrator lies in the sound discretion of the probate court. A special
among others that the letters of administration be issued to her son, administrator is a representative of a decedent, appointed by the probate
Mariano Yanga, brother of Crisanta. RTC appointed Lorenzo as court to care for and preserve his estate until an executor or general
administrator. However, the marriage between Lorenzo and Crisanta administrator is appointed. When appointed, a special administrator is
was declared void for being bigamous. Then, RTC removed Lorenzo as regarded not as a representative of the agent of the parties suggesting
administrator and appointed Mariano. the appointment, but as the administrator in charge of the estate, and, in
fact, as an officer of the court. As such officer, he is subject to the
On October 16, 1989, Belinda Dahlia Castillo filed a motion for supervision and control of the probate court and is expected to work for
the best interests of the entire estate, especially its smooth administration
intervention, claiming that she is the only legitimate child of Lorenzo
and earliest settlement. The principal object of appointment of temporary
and Crisanta but on June 2, 1990 Belinda Castillo died. On November 3,
administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass into hands of
1989, Roberto Y. Gabriel filed before RTC a petition for probate of an person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and
alleged will and for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favour. He heirs. In many instances, the appointment of administrators for the
alleged that he discovered his mother’s will on Oct. 25, 1989 in which he estates of decedents frequently become involved in protracted litigations,
was instituted as the sole heir and designated as alternate executor for thereby exposing such estates to great waste and losses unless an
the named executor therein, Francisco Yanga, brother of Crisanta, who authorized agent to collect the debts and preserve the assets in the
interim is appointed. The occasion for such an appointment, likewise,
had predeceased the latter. The RTC of Malabon City dismissed the
arises where, for some cause, such as a pendency of a suit concerning the
intestate proceedings of Spec. Proc. No. 192-MN. The probate court proof of the will, regular administration is delayed. The new Rules have
appointed Roberto Y. Gabriel as special administrator of his mother’s broadened the basis for the appointment of an administrator, and such
estate. However, on April 16, 2001, Roberto died. His widow Dolores appointment is allowed when there is delay in granting letters
filed a Manifestation and Motion where she informed the probate court testamentary or administration by any cause, e.g. , parties cannot agree
about her husband’s death and prayed that she be admitted as substitute among themselves. It needs to be emphasized that in the appointment of
in place of her late husband and be appointed as administratix as well. a special administrator (which is but temporary and subsists only until a
regular administrator is appointed), the probate court does not
Heirs of Belinda opposed to it contended that she was not Crisanta’s
determine the shares in the decedents estate, but merely appoints who is
next of kin. RTC appointed Dolores as special administratix. The Heirs of entitled to administer the estate. The issue of heirship is one to be
Belinda moved to reconsider but it was denied by the probate court. CA determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on
affirmed the decision of the lower court. the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of
distribution. Thus, the preference of respondent is sound, that is, not Administrator because she (Rowena) is presently employed in the
whimsical, or contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle. The United Nations in New York City. The probate Court appointed Alonte
petitioners strenuous invocation of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of as Special Administratix. On On December 12, 1980, the surviving
Court is misplaced. The rule refers to the appointment of regular
husband, Romarico Vitug, filed an "Opposition and Motion" and prayed
administrators of estates; Section 1, Rule 80, on the other hand, applies to
that the Petition for Probate be denied and prayed for his appointment as
the appointment of a special administrator. It has long been settled that
the appointment of special administrators is not governed by the rules Special Administrator because the Special Administratix appointed is not
regarding the appointment of regular administrators related to the heirs and has no interest to be protected. On December 18,
1980, Nenita P. Alonte posted her Php100,000 bond and took her oath of
office before a Notary Public. On February 6, 1981, the Probate Court set
aside its Order of December 2, 1980 appointingNenita as Special
Administratrix, and appointed instead the surviving husband, Romarico
as Special Administrator for the reasons that under Section 6, Rule 78, of
the Rules of Court, the surviving spouse is first in the order of preference
for appointment as Administrator as he has an interest in the estate; that
the disinheritance of the surviving spouse is not among the grounds of
disqualification for appointment as Administrator; that the next of kin is
CORONA VS COURT OF APPEALS
Tresvalles, Kris appointed only where the surviving spouse is not competent or is
unwilling to serve besides the fact that the Executrix appointed, is not
FACTS: the next of kin but merely a niece, and that the decedent's estate is
nothing more than half of the unliquidated conjugal partnership
On November 10, 1980, Dolores Luchangco Vitug died in New York, property.
U.S.A., leaving two Wills: one, a holographic Will dated October 3, 1980,
which excluded her husband, respondent Romarico G. Vitug, as one of ISSUE:
her heirs, and the other, a formal Will sworn to on October 24, 1980, or
about three weeks thereafter, which expressly disinherited her husband Whether the Appellate Court erred in upholding the appointment of the
Romarico "for reason of his improper and immoral conduct amounting surviving husband as special administrator
to concubinage, which is a ground for legal separation under Philippine
HELD:
Law"; bequeathed her properties in equal shares to her sisters Exaltacion
L. Allarde, Vicenta L. Faustino and Gloria L. Teoxon, and her nieces This Court, in resolving to give due course to the Petition taking into
Rowena F. Corona and Jennifer F. Way; and appointed Rowena F. account the allegations, arguments and issues raised by the parties, is of
Corona, herein petitioner, as her Executrix. On November 21, 1980, the considered opinion that petitioner's nominee, Nenita F. Alonte,
Rowena filed a petition for the probate of the Wills before the Court of should be appointed as co-Special Administrator. The executrix's choice
First Instance of Rizal and for the appointment of Nenita Alonte as of Special Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the
wide latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her Will, is dismissal of Horacio Rodriguez, as special administrator of the estate of
entitled to the highest consideration. Objections to Nenita's appointment the deceased, and the appointment, in his stead of Ramon Plata. The
on grounds of impracticality and lack of kinship are over-shadowed by motion was set for hearing on Feb 23, 1956 but was postponed to Feb 27,
the fact that justice and equity demand that the side of the deceased wife 1956. Although notified of this order, Rodriguez did not appear on the
and the faction of the surviving husband be represented in the date last mentioned. Instead, he filed an urgent motion praying for
management of the decedent's estate. additional time within which to answer the charges preferred against
him by Basilia Salud and for another postponement of said hearing. This
En passant, it is apropos to remind the Special Administrators that while motion was not granted, and Basilia Salud introduced evidence in
they may have respective interests to protect, they are officers of the support of said charges, whereupon respondent Judge by an order,
Court subject to the supervision and control of the Probate Court and are dated February 27, 1956, found Rodriguez guilty of abuse of authority
expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate, its smooth and gross negligence, and, accordingly, relieved him as special
administration, and its earliest settlement. administrator of the estate of the deceased and appointed Basilia Salud
as special administratrix thereof, to "be assisted and advised by her
niece, Miss Victorina Salud," who "shall always act as aide, interpreter
and adviser of Basilia Salud." Said order, likewise, provided that "Basilia
MATIAS VS GONZALES Salud shall be helped by Mr. Ramon Plata . . . who is hereby appointed
Tresvalles, Kris as co-administrator."
FACTS:
On May 15, 1952, Aurea Matias initiated said special proceedings with a Aurea asked that said order be set aside and that she be appointed
petition for the probate of a document purporting to be the last will and special co-administratix with Horacio on the ground that Basilia is over
testament of her aunt, Gabina Raquel, who died single on May 8, 1952, at 80 years of age, totally blind and physically incapacitated to perform the
the age of 92 years. The heir to the entire estate of the deceased — except duties of said office and the said movant is the universal heiress of the
the properties bequeathed to her other niece and nephews, namely, deceased and the person appointed by the latter as executrix of her
Victorina Salud, Santiago Salud, Policarpio Salud, Santos Matias and alleged will. This motion was denied and maintained the appointment of
Rafael Matias — is, pursuant to said instrument, Aurea Matias, likewise, the three. However, on March 17, 1956, Basilia Salud tendered her
appointed therein as executrix thereof, without bond. Basilia Salud, a resignation as special administratix by reason of physical disability, due
first cousin of the deceased, opposed the probate of her alleged will, and, to old age and recommended the appointment of victorina Salud.
after appropriate proceedings, the court, presided over by respondent
Judge, issued an order, sustaining said opposition and denying the Shortly afterwards, or on June 18, 1956, respondents Ramon Plata and
petition for probate. Subsequently, Aurea Matias brought the matter on Victorina Salud requested authority to collect the rents due, or which
appeal. Meanwhile, or on February 17, 1956, Basilia Salud moved for the may be due, to the estate of the deceased and to collect all the produce of
her lands, which was granted on June 23, 1956. On June 27, 1956, said HELD:
respondents filed another motion praying for permission to sell the
palay of the deceased then deposited in different rice mills in the Although Horacio Rodriguez had notice of the hearing of the motion for
province of Cavite, which respondent judge granted on June 10, 1956. his removal, dated February 17, 1956, the record shows that petitioner
Later on, or on July 10, 1956, petitioner instituted the present action herein received copy of said motion of February 24, 1956, or the date
against Judge Gonzales, and Victorina Salud and Ramon Plata, for the after that set for the hearing thereof. Again, notice of the order of
purpose of annulling the above mentioned orders of respondent Judge, respondent Judge, dated February 23, 1956, postponing said hearing to
upon the ground that the same had been issued with grave abuse of February 27, 1956, was not served on petitioner herein.
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In her motion of February 17, 1956, Basilia Salud prayed for the dismissal
Petitioner argued that she should have preference in the choice of special of Horacio Rodriguez, and the appointment of Ramon Plata, as special
administratix of the estate of the decedent being the universal heiress to administrator of said estate. Petitioner had, therefore, no notice that her
said estate and the executrix appointed in the alleged will of the main opponent, Basilia Salud, and the latter's principal witness,
deceased, that until its final disallowance — which has not, as yet, taken Victorina Salud, would be considered for the management of said. As a
place she has a special interest in said estate, which must be protected by consequence, said petitioner had no opportunity to object to the
giving representation thereto in the management of said estate; that, appointment of Basilia Salud as special administratrix, and of Victorina
apart from denying her any such representation, the management was Salud, as her assistant and adviser, and the order of February 27, 1956, to
given to persons partial to her main opponent. That the Rules of Court this effect, denied due process to said petitioner.
do not permit the appointment of more than one special administrator
The rule, laid down in Roxas vs. Pecson to the effect that "only one
and that Ramon and Victorina were authorized to collect the rents and
special administrator may be appointed to administrator temporarily"
sell the palay without previous notice to petitioner.
the estate of the deceased, must be considered in the light of the facts
Respondents maintain that respondent Judge acted with the scope of his obtaining in said case. The lower court appointed therein one special
jurisdiction and without any abuse of discretion; that petitioner can not administrator for some properties forming part of said estate, and a
validly claim any special interest in the estate of the deceased, because special administratrix for other properties thereof. Thus, there were two
the probate of the alleged will and testament of the latter — upon which (2) separate and independent special administrators. In the case at bar
petitioner relies — has been denied; that Horacio Rodriguez was duly there is only one (1) special administration, the powers of which shall be
notified of the proceedings for his removal; and that Victorina Salud and exercised jointly by two special co-administrators. Moreover, there are
Ramon Plata have not done anything that would warrant their removal. authorities in support of the power of courts to appoint several special
co-administrators.
ISSUE: whether the judge committed grave abuse of discretion for not
appointing the named executrix and the propriety of appointing more
than one administratix ROXAS VS. PECSON
Tuason, Jannelle preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards
appointed, and for that purpose may commence and maintain suits as
FACTS: administrator, and may sell such perishable and other property as the
court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any
Pablo M. Roxas died leaving properties in Bulacan. The petitioner, debts of the deceased." (Section 2, Rule 81.)
widow of the deceased, filed a petition for the probate of an alleged will
of her deceased husband and for her appointment as executrix of his
DE GALA VS. GONZALES
estate designated in said will. Petitioner was appointed as special
Tuason, Janelle
administratrix and qualified as such over the objection of the
FACTS:
respondents who sought the appointment of Maria, sister of the
deceased. Upon petition by the respondents, the respondent judge Severina Gonzales executed a will in which Serapia de Gala, a niece of
rendered his resolution appointing the petitioner as special Severina, was designated executrix. The testatrix died leaving no heirs
administratrix only of all the conjugal properties of the deceased, and by force of law, and Serapia, through her counsel, presented the will for
Maria Roxas as special administratrix of all capital or properties probate. Apolinario Gonzales, a nephew of the deceased, filed an
belonging exclusively to the deceased Pablo M. Roxas. opposition to the will on the ground that it had not been executed in
ISSUE: conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Serapia de Gala was appointed special administratrix of the
Whether or not respondent judge acted in excess of the court's estate of the deceased.
jurisdiction in appointing two special co-administratices of the estate of On the other hand,Sinforoso, husband of the deceased, filed a motion
the deceased. asking the appointment of Serapia de Gala as special administratrix be
cancelled and that he, be appointed in her stead. The motion was
RULING: opposed by both Apolinario Gonzales and by Serapia de Gala, but it was
nevertheless granted.Serapia was removed, and Sinforoso was appointed
Yes. There is absolutely no reason for appointing two separate special administrator in her place, principally on the ground that he had
administrators. As under the law, only one general administrator may be possession of the property in question and that his appointment would
appointed to administer, liquidate and distribute the estate of a deceased simplify the proceedings.
spouse, it clearly follows that only one special administrator may be
appointed to administer temporarily said estate, because a special ISSUE:
administrator is but a temporary administrator who is appointed to act
in lieu of the general administrator. "When there is delay in granting Whether or not petitioner may be removed as a special administratix of
letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from the estate of the deceased
the allowance or disallowance of will, or from any other cause, the court
may appoint a special administrator to collect and take charge of the RULING:
estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided
and executors or administrators thereupon appointed," (sec. 1, Rule 81). Yes. The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in the sound
Although his powers and duties are limited to "collect and take charge of discretion of the court; the function of such an administrator is only to
the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and collect and preserve the property of the deceased and to return an
inventory thereof; he cannot be sued by a creditor and cannot pay any Whether or not it is proper for the trial court to dismiss the
debts of the deceased. The fact that no appeal can be taken from the services of Alvin Co on the basis of the criminal charges filed against him
appointment of a special administrator indicates that both his even if he had not yet been convicted
appointment and his removal are purely discretionary, SC cannot find
RULING:
that the court below abused its discretion in the present case. In The Court ruled in the affirmative. As a special co-administrator,
removing Serapia de Gala and appointing the present possessor of the Alvin Co may be removed by the trial court even if the grounds for his
property pending the final determination of the validity of the will, the removal are not enumerated under the rules. This is because he is a
court probably prevented useless litigation. special administrator, not a regular administrator, and special
administrators are not covered by the rules covering regular
administrators. The appointment of special administrators are left to the
sound discretion of the courts, and thus, the removal of special
LIWANAG VS. REYES administrators are also left to the sound discretion of the courts.
Umbalin, Norissa
ALCASID VS SAMSON
ANDERSON VS. PERKINS Uy, Charles
Umbalin, Norissa
FACTS:
CO VS. ROSARIO
Uy, Charles An application for the issuance of letters of administration was
filed by herein respondents in favor of one of their numbers, herein
FACTS:
respondent Jesus V. Samson, in the CFI of Albay. Such application was
Upon the death of the father of herein parties, Co Bun Chun, the
RTC of Makati City appointed petitioner Luis Co as co-administrator granted and on the same day, Jesus Samson was appointed special
together with a Vicente Yu. Subsequently, petitioner nominated his son, administrator for the estate. Said appointment was opposed by herein
Alvin Co, as special co-administrator, which motion was granted by the petitioner Josefina Samson, the widow of Jose Samson, the deceased,
trial court. About four years later, numerous criminal charges have been together with her three minor children. They asked that Josefina, and not
filed against Alvin Co, and at the basis of the same, the other heirs asked Jesus be appointed administrator. After two years of hearing, the trial
that he be removed as special co-administrator. Said motion was granted court appointed Antonia Codia, city treasurer, petitioner, as regular
by the trial court. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for
administrator. The court also ordered Jesus to turn over to Codia all
Reconsideration, but upon the denial of the same, he brought the matter
to the CA under Rule 65. The CA affirmed the decision, hence, this papers regarding the administration of the estate in the March 12, 1956
appeal order. Upon motion of the widow, the April 3, 1956 Order was issued,
ordering Jesus to turn over all documents to Codia within three days. It
would appear, however, that respondents opposed the appointment of
Codia but their motion was denied, hence, they went up to the CA who
ISSUE:
decided in favor of herein respondents on the basis of Cotia v Pecson
where it was ruled that the appeal stayed the appointment of Codia. and Raymundo Cordero as sureties. When an account was made,
Aggrieved, petitioners filed this petition before the Court Soriano was indebted to the estate. Thus, the lower court ordered the
execution of his bond.
ISSUE:
Some time later, Soriano and the new administratrix entered into a
Whether or not Codia qualifies as administrator of the estate settlement whereby Soriano ceded certain real properties to the estate,
thereby reducing his indebtedness to P5,000. The sureties now
RULING: question the jurisdiction of the court to execute the bond.
The Court ruled in the affirmative. At the outset, it must be ISSUE:

noted that the appointment of Jesus Samson was as special
Whether or not a probate court has the power to order the execution of
administrator, while that of Codia was of a regular administrator. The
an administrator's bond?
appointment of a special administrator is discretionary upon the court, HELD:
hence, the court may also remove the said special administrator,
including when a regular administrator is appointed. Section 3, Rule 81 To begin with, it lies within discretion of the court to select an
of the Rules of Court provides that the authority of the special administrator of the estate of a deceased person. Before an
administrator, or an executor, enters upon the execution of his trust,
administrator ends when a regular administrator is appointed. Even
and letters testamentary or of administration are issued, the person to
assuming that Cotia v Pecson applies – which it does not because that is whom they are issued is required to give a bond in such reasonable
the removal of a regular administrator – still, the authority of Jesus sum as the court directs, with one or more sufficient sureties,
Samson has ended because the April 3 Order is a special order as was conditioned upon the faithful performance of his trust. The
required by Section 2, Rule 39. It boils down to the fact that the administrator is accountable on his bond along with the sureties for
the performance of certain legal obligations.
appointment of special administrators is up to the discretion of the court.
It is clear that the Court of First Instance, exercising probate
JUNQUERA VS. BORROMEO
jurisdiction, is empowered to require the filing of the administrator's
Viernes , Wayne
bond, to fix the amount thereof, and to hold it accountable for any
RULE 81 breach of the administrator's duty. Possessed, as it is, with an all-

embracing power over the administrator's bond and over
Bonds of Executors and Administrators administration proceedings, a Court of First Instance in a probate
proceeding cannot be devoid of legal authority to execute and make
COSME DE MENDOZA V. PACHECO, 64 PHIL 134 (1937) that bond answerable for the very purpose for which it was filed. It is
true that the law does not say expressly or in so many words tat such
FACTS: court has power to execute the bond of an administrator, but by
necessary and logical implication, the power is there as eloquently as
Manuel Soriano was former administrator of the estate of Cosme. As if it were phrased in unequivocal term.
such administrator, he filed a bond for P5,000 with Januario Pacheco
WARNER, BARNES & CO. VS. LUZON SURETY CO, INC. produce counter-affidavits that would raise any 'genuine issues as to any
Vizcarra, William material facts.'
The CFI rendered a summary judgment sentencing LSC to pay WBC the
FACTS: sum of P6,000. From this judgment the defendant appealed.
Warner, Barnes and Co., Ltd.(WBC), filed a complaint against
Luzon Surety Co., Inc.(LSC), of the recovery of the sum of P6,000. The RULING:
basis of the complaint was a bond in the sum of P6,000 filed by Agueda Under the first assignment of error, LSC contends that the lower
Gonzaga as administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Agueda Gonzaga in court had no jurisdiction to pass upon its liability under the bond in
Special Proceedings No. 452, the condition being that said bond would question, because it is only the probate court that can hold a surety
be void if the administratrix "faithfully prepares and presents to the accountable for any breach by the administratrix of her duty, citing the
Court a correct inventory of all the property of the deceased which may case of Mendoza vs. Pacheco, 64 Phil., 134. It is, however, noteworthy that
have come into his possession or into the possession of any other person while the citation is to the effect that the probate court has jurisdiction
representing him according to law, if he administers all the property of over the forefeiture or enforcement of an administrator's bond, it was not
the deceased which at any time comes into his possession or into the held therein that the same matter may not be litigated in an ordinary
possession of any other person representing him; faithfully pays all civil action brought before the court of first instance.
debts, legacies, and bequests which encumber said estate, pays whatever
dividends which the Court may decide should be paid, and renders a Under the second assignment of error, LSC claims that there are genuine
just and true account of his administrations to the Court within a year or controversies between the parties litigant, and that, contrary to the
at any other date that he may required so to do, and faithfully executes allegations of the complaint, the administratrix made a return to the
all orders and decrees of said court." court of the war damage payments she received; the administratrix
cannot be charged with having failed to pay plaintiff's claim because
It was alleged in the complaint that WBC had a duly approved claim there is no showing that she was ever authorized to pay approved
against the Estate of Aguedo Gonzaga in the sum of P6,485.02, plus 2 per claims; the administratrix may be presumed to have rendered an
cent annual interest; that the administratrix violated the conditions of her accounting of her administration, likely in 1948, in accordance with
bond "(a) by failing to file an inventory of the assets and funds of the section 8 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. In answer, it is sufficient to
estate that had come into her hands; (b) by failing to pay or discharge the state that the allegations that the administratrix failed to file an
approved claim of the plaintiff; (c) by failing to render a true and just inventory, to pay the plaintiff's claim, and to render a true and just
account of her administration in general, and of the said war damage account of her administration, are factual and remained uncontroverted
payments in particular."; that the defendant, as surety in the bond, failed by counter-affidavits which the appellant could have easily filed.
to pay to the plaintiff, notwithstanding the latter's demand.
Under the third and fourth assignments of error, it is insisted for LSC
The LSC filed an answer setting up the special defenses that the that the bond in question was executed in favor of the Republic of the
complaint did not state a cause of action. Philippines and that the proper procedure would seem to be that it
might be enforced in the administration proceedings were it was filed.
On January 6, 1953, the WBC filed a motion for summary judgment, This view is likewise not tenable. Though nominally payable to the
alleging that "the special defenses relied upon by the LSC in her Answer Republic of the Philippines, the bond is expressly for the benefit of the
raise only questions of law, and the WBC believes that LSC cannot heirs, legatees and creditors of the Estate of the deceased Aguedo
Gonzaga. There is no valid reason why a creditor may not directly in his court granted the motion of the defendants to have both bonds cancelled.
name enforce said bond in so far as he is concerned. Hence, plaintiff files a case in the CFI. The court (CFI) allowed the
plaintiff to recover since the bonds were in force and effect from the
Under the fifth assignment of error, it is alleged that the WBC should filing until 1962. The Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme
have first filed a claim against the Estate of the deceased administratrix Court on questions of law.
Agueda Gonzaga, in conformity with section 6 of Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court providing that "Where the obligation of the decedent is joint and ISSUE:
several with another debtor, the claim shall be filed against the decedent
Are the bonds still in force and effect from 1955 to 1962
as if he were the only debtor, without prejudice to the right of the estate
to recover contribution from the other debtor." Apart from the fact that RULING
his defense was not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer and was therefore waived (section 10, Rule 9 of the Rules of YES. Under Rule 81 (Sec.1) of the Rules of Court, the
Court), it appears that even as late as September 17, 1952, when the administrator is required to put up a bond for the purpose of
present complaint was filed, (more than two years after the death of indemnifying creditors, heirs, legatees and the estate. It is conditioned
Agueda Gonzaga), there were no proceedings for the administration of upon the faithful performance of the administrator's trust. Hence, the
her estate, with the result that section 6 of Rule 87 loses its applicability. surety is then liable under the administrator's bond.
Moreover, it is to be noted that the LSC had also chosen to file a third-
party complaint in the present case against Romualdo Araneta, joint and Even after the approved project of partition, Quebrar as administrator
several counter-guarantor of the deceased administratrix, instead of still had something to do. The administration is for the purpose of
presenting a claim against the latter's estate. liquidation of the estate and the distribution of the residue among the
heirs and legatees. Liquidation means the determination of all the assets
Wherefore, it being understood that the defendant-appellant is sentenced of the estate and the payment of all debts and expenses. It appears that
to pay to the plaintiff-appellee only the sum of P6,000, plus the cost, the there are still debts and expenses to be paid after 1957.
same is hereby affirmed.
Moreover, the bond stipulation did not provide that it will terminate at
LUZON SURETY CO., INC. VS. QUEBAR the end of the 1st year if the premium remains unpaid. Hence, it does not
Vizcarra, William necessarily extinguish or terminate the effectivity of the counter bond in
the absence of an express stipulation to this effect. As such, as long as the
FACTS
defendant remains the administrator of the estate, the bond will be held
Luzon Surety issued two administrator's bond in behalf of defendant
Quebrar as administrator of 2 estates (Chinsuy and Lipa). The plaintiff liable and the plaintiff's liabilities subsist being the co-extensive with the
and both Quebrar and Kilayko bound themselves solidarily after administrator.
executing an indemnity agreement where both the defendants agreed to
pay the premiums every year. In the years 1954-55, the defendants paid
the premiums and the documentary stamps. In 1957, the Court approved RULE 82
the project of partition, while in 1962, Luzon Surety demanded payments Revocation of Administration, Death, Resignation and
of premiums from 1955 onwards. It was also in the same year when the Removal of Administrator or Executor
OCAMPO VS OCAMPO
BORROMEO VS BORROMEO Yatco, Nathaniel
Yatco, Nathaniel
FACTS: FACTS:
Dr. MaximoBorromeo died testate designating Borromeo Vicente and Maxima Ocampo died intestate leaving 3 children
Brothers Estate, Inc. as sole heir. His brother CanutoBorromeo acted as namely Leonardo, Renato and Erlinda. The 3 siblings divided the profits
executor of the said will. The said corporation is owned by the testator of the decedents’ estate among themselves. Subsequently, Leonardo died
and his brothers and sisters. Proceedings have been instituted. The leaving his surviving spouse Dalisay and 3 children namely Vince,
widow, Johanna Hofer Borromeo filed an Urgent Motion to remove the Merlinda and Leonardo, Jr. When Leonardo died, Renato and Erlinda
executordue to negligence in the performance of duties and unfitness to took over to the exclusion of the widowed wife Dalisay.Dalisay and her 3
continue as executor. While the action was still pending, children filed a petition for intestate proceedings of the estate of Vicente,
CanutoBorromeo withdrew his joint bank account with the decedent and Maxima and her deceased husband Leonardo. It seeks to settle the estate
deposited it on his and his other brother Exequiel’s joint account without and appoint an administrator to divide such as they were not receiving
authority from the Court. In time the petition was heard and the judge any profit anymore. Respondents Renato and Erlinda countered
relieved Canuto as executor for some reasons including that of the assailing the petition defective as it sought two estates in one proceeding
unauthorized withdrawal of the decedent’s joint account with the (Estate of Vicente and Maxima; and Leonardo’s estate.)There was a
executor.Canuto appealed. Canuto claims that they were joint owners of motion to appoint Renato and Erlinda as administrators but was
such account and either of them (decedent or Canuto) has right over it. countered by Dalisay as it would cause further injustice and nominated
ISSUE: WON a conflict of interest arose in such withdrawal made by Binan Rural Bank as administrator. Trial Court accepted that respondent
Canuto which is a ground for removal as executor of the estate. Renato and petitioner Dalisay be appointed as joint administrators.
Petitioner Dalisay was revoked of her appointment as her nomination of
RULING: Binan Rural bank constituted a waiver and the court found that she is
Yes.It was found by the SC that the money taken from the joint unfit to such office.Renato and Erlinda, as special administrators, was
account in the Bank was done by Canuto with representation as executor ordered by the court to produce a true inventory of the estate. RTC later
of the estate of deceased Dr.Maximo. There was bad faith in the on revoked the appointment of Renato and Erlinda for failure to comply
concealment of property belonging to the decedent’s estate. Canuto with the order and failure to pay the bond as prescribed by the rules and
should have deposited the P23, 930.39 on the estate andnot at his that there was an alleged sale made by them involving a real property
disposal. It then constituted as hiding such property from the widow belonging to the estate. Renato and Erlinda (Respondents herein)
and he, as executor of the estate, bypassed judicial adjudication of the appealed to the CA and CA ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse
said property.Conflict between the interest of the executor and the of discretion in appointing Melinda (daughter of Dalisay) as a regular
interest of the deceased is ground for removal or resignation of the administrator.
former, who has thereby become unsuitable to discharge the
trust. According to Rule 82, sec 2, if an executor neglects to settle his ISSUE:
account and settle the estate according to law, the court may remove him
WON the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion on the
or, in its discretion permit him to resign.
revocation of the respondents as special administrators and appointment
of Merlinda (daughter of Dalisay) as regular administratrix.
RULING” FACTS:
As early as 1961, Marciano Cuizon applied for the registration of
The court finds no abuse of discretion on the revocation but several parcels of land in Mandaue City docketed as L.R. Case No. N-
finds it improper for Merlinda to be a “regular” administratrix. The
179. In 1970, he distributed his property between his two daughters,
probate court may at its discretion appoint or remove special
administrators toher than the groundsenumerated in the Rules. The Rufina and Irene, to whom the salt beds subject of the controversy was
respondents were not able to comply with the payment of the bond given. In 1971, Irene executed a Deed of Sale with Reservation of
which is required in Rule 81 and also, there was evident bad faith on the Usufruct involving the said salt beds in favor of petitioners Franciso et
part of the respondents as administrators when an alleged sale of the al. Although the decision in L.R. Case No. N-179 was rendered way back
property included in the estate was done thru a conditional deed of sale. in 1972, the decree of registration and the corresponding O.C.T. was
As a result of such transaction, it deprived the estate of profits accruing issued only in 1976 in the name of Marciano Cuizon. In that same year,
from the said real property (monthly rentals.) Such reason of the
T.C.T No. 10477 covering the property in question was issued to Irene.
probate court being grounded on equity, justice and legal principles. As
to the appointment of Merlinda, it must be as a “special” administrator The latter died in 1978. During the extrajudicial settlement of the estate,
and not a “regular” administrator. Rule 78 determines the persons to be Rufina, the mother of Francisco et al., adjudicated to herself all the
appointed as regular administrators. She is neither an heir or a creditor property of Irene including the salt beds in question. She then executed a
to the estate. However, the SC held her as a special administratrix due to deed of Confirmation of Sale wherein she confirmed and ratified the
her competency in filing the bond and true inventory of the estate as 1971 deed of sale and renounced and waived whatever rights and
soon as the RTC appointed her of such responsibility. Such acts clearly
interests and participation she may have in the property in question in
manifested her intention to serve willingly. Pending the proceeding for
favor of the petitioners. The deed was annotated in T.C.T. No. 10477.
regular administration, Merlinda is designated as special administratrix
of the estate. Subsequently, T.C.T. No. 12665 was issued in favor of the petitioners. In
1978, Domingo Antigua, who allegedly was chosen by the heirs of Irene
RULE 83 to act as administrator, was appointed administrator by the CFI of Cebu.

Antigua included the salt bed in the inventory of Irene’s estate and
Inventory and Appraisal . Provision for Support of Family asked the Cebu CFI to order petitioners to deliver the salt to him. The
Cebu CFI granted the same.
ISSUE:
SEBIAL VS. SEBIAL
Alvarez, Miguel Lorenzo Whether a court handling the intestate proceedings has
jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a TCT issued in
GARCIA VS. GARCIA
Arcilla, Jay favor owners who are not parties to the intestate proceedings if the said
parcels of have been?
CUIZON VS. RAMOLETE
Azarcon, Pia Lea RULING:
No. It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge FACTS:
of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which Ignacio Abuton died, testamentary, leaving two sets of children
are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All said court could do by two different wives. First from DionisiaOlarte whom he had 12
is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the children and 3 already died. Second from, Teodora Guinguing whom he
inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there had 4 children, all still living. Upon allowance of the will, Gabriel
is dispute, then the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort Binaoro was appointed as administrator. Binaoro submitted the
to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of inventory to the court but he included only the lands which the testator
title because the probate court cannot do so. In the instant case, the had devised to the children of the second marriage, omitting other lands
property involved is not only claimed by outside parties but it was sold possessed by him at the time of his death and which were claimed by the
seven years before the death of the decedent and is duly titled in the children of the first marriage as having been derived from their mother.
name of the vendees who are not party to the proceedings. In Bolisay vs.
Alcid, the Court held that “if a property covered by Torrens Title is
involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given This prompted Teodora Guinguing to file a motion, asking that
due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the the administrator be required to amend his inventory and to include
contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the therein all property pertaining to the conjugal partnership of Ignacio
property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an Abuton and DionisiaOlarte, including property actually in the hands of
appropriate ordinary action.” Having been apprised of the fact that the his children by her which (the motion alleged) had been delivered to her
property in question was covered by a TCT issued in the name of third four minor children as an advancement. The purpose of the motion was
parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion of the to force the first set of children to bring into collation the properties that
respondent administrator and excluded the property in question from had been received by them, in conformity with article 1035 of the Civil
the inventory of the property of the estate. Code; and the motion was based partly on the supposition that Ignacio
Abuton had never in fact effected a liquidation of the conjugal property
pertaining to himself and DionisiaOlarte.
This motion was formally opposed by two of the children of the

GUINGUING VS. ABUTON
first marriage, namely, Agapito and CalixtoAbuton y Olarte.
The trial judge found that after the death of the first wife the
testator had acquired no property after the first marriage and the testator
liquidated the ganacial estate and had divided among the first set of At the same time that this title was issued, AgapitoAbuton procured two
children all of the property that pertained to the first wife in the division, other titles, Nos. 11651 and 11654, covering adjacent properties to be
with the exception of the home-place in the poblacion, in which the issued in his own name. From the circumstance that title No. 11658 was
testator had continued to reside till death. The share pertaining to the issued in the name of DionisiaOlarte the opponents, theAbutons , appear
testator in said division was, so the court found, retained in his own to believe that this land was her particular property and should now vest
hands; and this property constituted the proper subject matter of the exclusively in her heirs. This conclusion is erroneous. There is nothing to
present administration proceedings. show that the land covered by title No. 11658 was not acquired by the
spouses during their marriage, and the circumstance that the title was
taken in the name of the wife does not defeat its presumed character as
ganacial property. Therefore, in liquidating the ganacial property of the
ISSUE:
first marriage it was within the power of the surviving husband to assign
Whether or not the provisional inventory should include all other property to the first set of children as their participation in the
property pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the deceased. estate of their mother and to retain in his own hands the property for
which a composition title had been issued in the name of the wife.
RULING:
Yes.The making of the inventory is necessarily of a preliminary

and provisional nature, and the improper inclusion of property therein
RULE 84
General Powers and Duties of Executors and Administrators
or the improper omission of property therefrom is not absolutely
decisive of the rights of persons in interest. In addition, the inclusion of a WILSON VS REAR
property in the inventory does not deprive the occupant of possession; Borja,Catherine
and if it is finally determined that the property has been properly
included in the estate, the occupant heir is liable for the fruits and FACTS:
interest only from the date when the succession was opened (art. 1049,
July 14, 1925, Charles C. Rear was murdered by some Moros on
Civ. Code). The provisions of the Civil Code with reference to collation
his plantation. The whole plantation consisted of public lands. J.J. Wilson
clearly contemplate that disputes between heirs with respect to the
qualified as special administrator of the estate on November 17, 1925.
obligation to collate may be determined in the course of the
administration proceedings. Later, the property of the estate was appraised at P20,800, of
which the commissioners filed an inventory and report, which was also
Among the properties remaining in possession of Ignacio
signed by Wilson. January 4, 1927, the commissioners made and filed a
Abuton at the time of his death was a piece of land covered by a
report of claims against the estate, but by reason of the fact that it was
composition title No. 11658, issued in 1894 in the name of DionisiaOlarte.
claimed and alleged that the administrator did not have any funds to legal duty of the administrator to administer, settle, and close the
pay, on March 30, 1927, the court ordered the administrator to sell a administration in the ordinary course of business, without any
portion of the property. unnecessary delay. Neither does an administrator, in particular, without
a specific showing or an order of the court, have any legal right to
After due notice, the public sale took place, and the property was sold to continue the operation of the business in which the deceased was
Wm. Mannion for P7,600. April 26, 1927, engaged, or to eat up and absorb the assets of the estate in the payment
of operating expenses. Yet, in the instant case, the administrator on his
March 23, 1928, Wilson filed his final account which later was amended
own volition and without any authority or process of court continued
on June 10, 1928, to which the heirs made numerous and specific
the operation of the plantation, and in the end, as shown by his own
objections, including that Wilson, as special administrator and as
report, the estate, which was appraised at P20,800, with actual debts of
administrator, was neglectful and imprudent and he committed waste.
the deceased of only P1,655.54, was all wiped out and lost, and left with
He is, therefore, liable.
a deficit of P1,809.69.
ISSUE:
Is Wilson, as special administrator, liable?

SAN DIEGO VS. NOMBRE
RULING: Borlagdatan, April
The law does not impose upon an administrator a high degree of care in FACTS:
the administration of an estate, but it does impose upon him ordinary
-AdeloNombre as duly constituted judicial administrator leased
and usual care, for want of which he is personally liable. In the instant a fishpond to Pedro Escanlar (respondent)
case there were no complications of any kind and in the usual and
ordinary course of business, the administrator should have wound up -Terms of the lease : 3yrs
and settled the estate within eight months from the date of his
appointment. -It is executed without previous authority or approval of the Court
where the proceedings was pending
When he was appointed and qualified as administrator, the law imposed
-Nombre was removed as administrator by Order of the court and one
upon him legal duties and obligations, among which was to handle the
SofronioCampillanos was appointed in his stead
estate in a business-like manner, marshal its assets, and close the estate
without any unreasonable or unnecessary delay. He was not appointed -Campillanos filed a motion asking for authority to execute a lease
to act for or on behalf of the creditors, or to represent the interests of the contract of the same fishpond in favor of petitioner for 5 years from 1961
heirs only. He should have administered the affairs of the estate for the
use and benefit alike of all interested persons, as any prudent business - Nombre opposed this alleging that to grant such motion by the new
administrator would nullify the contract of lease validly executed
man would handle his own personal business. When appointed, it is the
-The court denied the petition & affirmed CA's ruling.
RULING OF TRIAL COURT: -While it may be admitted that the duties of a judicial administrator and
an agent (petitioner alleges that both act in representative capacity), are
in some respects, identical, the provisions on agency this should not
apply to a judicial administrator
-It held that the contract with Escanlar was null and void, for want of
judicial authority and that unless he would offer the same as or better -A judicial administrator is appointed by the Court. He is not only the
conditions than the prospective lessee - San Diego representative of said Court, but also the heirs and creditors of the estate.
-No good reason why the motion for authority to lease the property to -A judicial administrator before entering into his duties, is required to
San Diego should not be granted file a bond.
RULING OF CA: -This is not applicable in case of agency wherein agent is only
answerable to his principal. The protection which the law gives the
-It reversed the trial court's decision explaining that even in the absence principal, in limiting the powers and rights of an agent, stems from the
of such special powers, a contract or lease for more than 6 years is not fact that control by the principal can only be thru agreements, whereas
entirely invalid the acts of a judicial administrator are subject to specific provisions of
law and orders of the appointing court.
-No such limitation on the power of a judicial administrator to grant a
lease of property placed under his custody is provided for in the present
law
-In accordance with Article 1647, CC it is only when the lease is to be

recorded in the Registry of Property that it cannot be instituted without
special authority
-However under Rule 85, Section 3, of the Rules of Court it authorizes a

judicial administrator, among other things, to administer the estate of the JARODA VS. CUSI
deceased not disposed of by will which includes leasing the property Bueno, Jirene
FACTS:
ISSUE: WON a judicial administrator can validly lease property of the

estate without prior judicial authority and approval
Antonio Tan filed for a Special Proceeding before the respondent court
RULING: stating that the deceased Carlos Villa Abrille died intestate leaving
estates consisting of his conjugal share in real and personal properties
and some of them are shares in the co-ownership in Juna Subdivision
and cash on bank. ISSUE: Whether Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion when
it granted the withdrawal of the bank deposits, as well as the order
which approved the power of attorney of Special Administrator Tan to
sell or dispose the lots co-owned by the deceased in Juna Subdivision.
The heirs of the deceased are his surviving spouse, nine (9) children
(among them the herein petitioner, Natividad V. A. Jaroda), and four (4)
grandsons, among them the herein respondent, Antonio V. A. Tan. After
Respondent Tan was appointed special administrator he petitioned for RULING:
the withdrawal of sums of P109,886.42 and P72,644.66 from the
Philippine National Bank, which sums were not listed in his petition for
administration as among the properties left by the deceased instead Yes. We agree with petitioner that the order allowing the special
actually belong to and were held in trust for the co-owners of the Juna administrator to withdraw the bank deposits standing in the name of the
Subdivision. Powers of attorney purportedly signed by the co-owners decedent is in abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In
authorizing the late Carlos Villa Abrille to sell the lots in the Juna the first place, said withdrawal is foreign to the powers and duties of a
Subdivision and to deposit the proceeds thereof with the Philippine special administrator, which, as Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court
National Bank were exhibited. The court granted the petition. provides, are to —take possession and charge of the goods, chattels,
rights, credits and estate of the decease and preserve the same for the
Tan executed, together with the other co-owners of the Juna Subdivision
executor or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose
a power of attorney appointing himself as attorney-in-fact to sell (or)
may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only
dispose the lots in the 99.546-hectare subdivision. Tan filed before the
such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special
court for the approval of the power of attorney executed authorizing
administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless
himself to sell the lots, which the court also granted.
so ordered by the court.
Petitioner Natividad V. A. Jaroda moved to nullify the order that
allowed the withdrawal of the bank deposits, as well as the order which
approved the power of attorney which was granted by the respondent In the second place, the order was issued without notice to, and hearing
court. Jaroda appealed but it was also dismissed. Petitioner Jaroda filed
of, the heirs of the deceased. The withdrawal of the bank deposits may
the present petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction alleging,
among other things, that appeal would not be speedy and adequate as be viewed as a taking of possession and charge of the credits of the
respondent Tan has sold and continues to sell the subdivision lots on the estate, and apparently within the powers and duties of a special
strength of the respondent court's order, to her irreparable prejudice and administrator; but actually, said withdrawal is a waiver by the special
that of the other heirs which the Court gave due and issued an order administrator of a prima facie exclusive right of the intestate estate to the
restraining the respondent from selling the share of the intestate estate. bank deposits in favor of the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision, who
were allegedly claiming the same as alleged by the administrator in his
motion.
It is well settled that an executrix holds the property of her testator's
estate as a trustee and that an executrix will not be permitted to deal
with herself as an individual in any transaction concerning the trust
The bank deposits were in the name of the deceased; they, therefore, property.
belong prima facie to his estate after his death. And until the contrary is
shown by proper evidence at the proper stage, when money claims may
be filed in the intestate proceedings, the special administrator is without
power to make the waiver or to hand over part of the estate, or what The opinion of some commentators that, as a general rule, auto-contracts
appears to be a prima facie part of the estate, to other persons on the are permissible if not expressly prohibited and that there is no express
ground that the estate is not the owner thereof. If even to sell for provision of law prohibiting an administrator from appointing himself
valuable consideration property of the estate requires prior written as his own agent, even if correct, cannot and should not apply to
notice of the application to the heirs, legatees, or devisees under Rule 89 administrator of decedent's estates, in view of the fiduciary relationship
of the Rules of Court, such notice is equally, if not more, indispensable that they occupy with respect to the heirs of the deceased and their
for disposing gratuitously of assets of the decedent in favor of strangers. responsibilities toward the probate court. A contrary ruling would open
Admittedly, no such notice was given, and without it the court's the door to fraud and maladministration, and once the harm is done, it
authority is invalid and improper. might be too late to correct it.
b) The order approving the power of attorney executed by administrator A concrete example would be for administrator Tan to authorize agent
Tan and appointing himself as attorney-in-fact to sell the subdivision lots Tan to sell a lot for P50, with the condition that if he can sell it for more
for a price at his discretion is, likewise, void for want of notice and for he could keep the difference; agent Tan sells the lot for P150.00; he
approving an improper contract or transaction. retains P100.00 and deposits in the bank P50.00 "in the name of Antonio
V. A. Tan, in trust for Juna Subdivision" (as worded in the power of
attorney. Annex "F-1"); thus, administrator Tan's accounting to the estate
for the sale of the lot for P50 would be in order, but the estate would
As provided under Section 4 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court , power of have been actually cheated of the sum of P100, which went to agent Tan
attorney for the sale of the pro-indiviso share of the estate requires in his individual capacity.
"written notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees who are interested in
the estate to be sold" and admittedly, administrator Tan did not furnish
such notice.
The court below also failed to notice that, as alleged in the FACTS:
administrator's petition after the death of Carlos Villa Abrille the
administrator Tan, in his personal capacity, had replaced said deceased • A verified complaint for disbarment case filed by Mauro
as manager of the Juna Subdivision by authority of the other co-owners. Mananquil against Atty. Villegas w/ gross misconduct or
By the court's questioned order empowering him to represent the malpractice committed while acting as counsel of record of one
interest of the deceased in the management of the subdivision, the Felix Leong in the latter’s capacity as administrator of the
administrator Tan came to be the agent or attorney-in-fact of two Testate Estate of the late Felomina Zerna. The complainant was
different principals: the court and the heirs of the deceased on the one appointed special administrator after Felix Leong died.
hand, and the majority co-owners of the subdivision on the other, in
• March 21, 1961, respondent was retained as counsel of record
managing and disposing of the lots of the subdivision. This dual agency
for Felix Leong, one of the heirs of the late Felomina Zerna, who
of the respondent Tan rendered him incapable of independent defense of
was appointed as administrator of the Testate Estate of the
the estate's interests against those of the majority co-owners. It is highly
Felomina Zerna.
undesirable, if not improper, that a court officer and administrator, in
dealing with property under his administration, should have to look to • A lease contract was executed between Felix and the Heirs of
the wishes of strangers as well as to those of the court that appointed Jose Villegas represented by respondent’s brother in law
him. A judicial administrator should be at all times subject to the orders Marcelo involving, among others, sugar lands of the Estate.
of the appointing Tribunal and of no one else.
• Felix Leong was designated as administrator and owner, by
testamentary disposition, of 5/6 of all said parcels of land.
Jaroda's interest in the estate demands that she be heard by the court in
• The lease contract was for 4 sugar crop years, w/ 10% yearly
all matters affecting the disposal of her share, and that the administrator
rental of the value of the sugar produced from the leased land.
should primarily protect the interest of the estate in which she is a
participant rather than those of the decedent's co-owner. The partial • April 20, 1965,the formal partnership of Hijos De Jose Villegas
partition approved by the court has no effect, one way or the other, upon was formed among the heirs of Jose Villegas, of which
the orders contested in the present case because it is not definite whether respondent was a member.
the lots described in the 57 pages of the partition agreement correspond
to those of the Juna Subdivision as described in the power of attorney. • Another lease contract was executed bet. Felix and the
partnership, containing basically the same terms and conditions
as the 1stcontract , w/ Marcelo signing again as representative of
the lessee.
MANANQUIL VS. VILLEGAS
Cadavis , Lloyd
• After the demise of Marcelo, respondent was appointed to enter into the lease contracts involving the properties of the estate
manager of Hijos De Jose Villegas by the majority of partners. even without prior judicial authority and approval.
• Renewals of the lease contract were executed bet. Felix and Thus, considering that administrator Felix was not required
Hijos De Jose Villegas and respondent signing therein as under the law and prevailing jurisprudence to seek prior authority from
representative of the lessee. the probate court in order to validly lease real properties of the estate,
Villegas, as counsel of Felix, cannot be taken to task for failing to notify
• In 1980, respondent was replaced by his nephew Geronimo the probate court of the various lease contracts involved herein and to
Villegas as the manager of the family partnership. secure its judicial approval thereto.
• Villegas was both counsel of Felix Leong and a partner in the 2. NO. there is no evidence to warrant disbarment, although Villegas
partnership of Hijos De Jose Villegas. should be suspended from the practice of law because he participated in
the renewals of the lease contracts involving the properties of Zerna’s
• When Felix died, this disbarment case was filed by Mananquil. estate in favor of the partnership of Hijos De Jose Villegas. Under Art.
He alleged that the lease contracts were made iniquitous terms 1646 of the Civil Code, “lawyers, with respect to the property and rights
and conditions. He also alleged that Villegas should have which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by
notified and secured the approval of the probate court in virtue of their profession” are prohibited from leasing, either in person
Zerna’s estate before contracts were renewed, Villegas being or through the mediation of another, the properties or things mentioned.
counsel of that estate’s administrator. Such act constituted gross misconduct, hence, suspension for 4 months.
ISSUES: 1. WON Villegas should have first secured the probate court’s
approval regarding the lease?
2. WON Villegas should be disbarred?

RULE 85
Accountability and Compensation of Executors and
RULING: Administrators
1. NO. Pursuant to sec.3 of the Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a JOSON VS. JOSON
judicial executor or administrator has the right to the possession and Castillo, Shain Ann
management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so
FACTS:
long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of Tomas Joson died on July 5, 1945 in Nueva Ecija leaving behind
administration. He may, therefore, exercise acts of administration heirs and properties. He married three times and was survived by nine
without special authority from the court having jurisdiction of the estate. (9) heirs: two (2) children and grandchildren by his first wife Eufemia de
For instance, it has long been settled that an administrator has the power la Cruz; two (2) daughters by his second wife Pomposa Miguel and his
third wife and surviving widow Dominga M. Joson.
ISSUES:
Upon his death, his will was presented to the RTC of Nueva Ecija by his (1) Is the duty of an administrator to make an accounting of his
son Felicisimo Joson for probate. In August, said will having been duly administration a mere incident which can be avoided once the estate has
probated, Felicisimo Joson was appointed administrator of the estate been settled?
and, accordingly, he filed an inventory of the properties left by the
deceased. (2) Are the proceedings deemed terminated by the mere execution of an
extrajudicial partition of the estate without the necessity of having the
The administrator filed his first account and second account for the year accounts of the administrator heard and approved by the court?
1945-1946 and 1946-1947 respectively. This was ordered by the court to
be examined by the clerk of court but the same has never been (3) Is the administrator ipso facto relieved of his duty of proving his
approved.On, 1948, the administrator filed another account for the year account from the moment said partition has been executed?
1947-1948 and, upon motion of the heirs, he was ordered to file an
accounting covering the properties under his administration. RULING:
(1) No.The duty of an administrator to render an account is not a mere
Eduardo Joson, one of the heirs, filed an opposition to all the accounts incident of an administration proceeding which can be waived or
filed by theadministrator where he alleged that the administrator disregarded when the same is terminated, but that it is a duty that has to
diminished the shares of the heirs and had padded his expenses of be performed and duly acted upon by the court before the
administration. administration is finally ordered closed and terminated.
The heirs were able to compromise their differences and entered into an The trial court erred in acceding to the motion for in doing so it
extrajudicial settlement and partition of the entire estate under the disregarded the express provisions of our rules relative to the settlement
provisions of the Rules of Court which provides for the settlement of the of accounts of a judicial administrator specifically Section 1, Section 8,9
estate without court intervention. This settlement was contained in two and 10.
documents executed on the same date wherein they manifested that they
are entering into it because of their desire to put an end to the judicial (2) No. The proceedings is not deemed terminated by the mere execution
proceeding and administration. of an extrajudicial partition of the estate. The fact that all the heirs of the
estate have entered into an extrajudicial settlement and partition in order
Without said accounts having been heard or approved, the to put an end to their differences cannot in any way be interpreted as a
administrator filed a motion to declare the proceedings closed and waiver of the objections of the heirs to the accounts submitted by the
terminated and to relieve him of his duties as such. Heir Eduardo Joson administrator not only because to so hold would be a derogation of the
filed an opposition to said motion but, after hearing, the court issued an pertinent provisions of our rules but also because there is nothing
order declaring the proceedings terminated and relieving the provided in said partition that the aforesaid accounts shall be deemed
administrator not only of his duties as such but also of his accounts waived or condoned.
notwithstanding the heirs' opposition to said accounts.
(3) No.The administrator is not yet relieved of his duty of proving his
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. account.While the attitude of the heirs in concluding said extrajudicial
settlement is plausible and hascontributed to the early settlement of the
estate, the same cannot however be considered as release of the administration ..., and he shall render such further accounts as the court
obligation of the administrator to prove his accounts.This is more so may requite until the estate is wholly settled." In the instant case, further
when, according to the oppositors, the administrator has committed in accounts by the executrix appear to be in order, in view of the fact that
his accounts a shortage in the amount of P132,600.00 which certainly the dividends sought to be accounted for are not included in the final
cannot just be brushed aside by a mere technicality. accounts rendered by the executrix. It appears that the interests of all the
parties will be better served and the conflict between petitioners and
respondent will be resolved if such additional accounting is made.
TUMANG VS. LAGUIO Further, "it has been held that an executor or administrator who receives
Castillo, Rochelle Jane assets of the estate after he has filed an account should file a
supplementary account thereof, and may be compelled to do so, but that
FACTS: it is only with respect to matters occuring after the settlement of final
In Special Proceeding No. 1953 involving the estate of the late account that representatives will be compelled to file supplementary
Dominador Tumang and pending before the Court of First Instance of account." It is only in a case where the petition to compel an executor to
Pampanga, the widow of the deceased, namely Magdalena A. Tumang, account after he has accounted and has been discharged fails to allege
administratrix and executrix of the will, filed a petition to declare the that any further sums came into the hands of the executor, and the
testate proceedings definitely terminated and closed with respect to executor specifically denies the receipt of any further sums that the
herself and two of her children — Melba Tumang Ticzon and Nestor A. accounting should be denied.
Tumang. The petition was premised on the fact that the aforesaid heirs
had already acknowledged receipt of the properties adjudicated to them,
and in order for such properties to be transferred in their names, there RODRIGUEZ VS. SILVA
was need for an order of the court declaring the proceedings closed with Dela Cruz, Kyzeth
respect to the aforesaid heirs. The petition was opposed by appenee's
daughter, Guia T. Laguio and her children on the ground that appellee, PHIL. TRUST CO., VS. LUZON SURETY
as administratrix and executrix, had not yet delivered all properties Deguzman, Jabrielle
adjudicated to them. Moreover, the oppositors contended that there
could be no partial termination of the proceedings. Thereafter, the FACTS:
administratrix withdrew the aforementioned petition. Court of First Instance of Manila appointed Francis R. Picard, Sr.
as Administrator the Intestate Estate of the deceased James R. Burt upon
ISSUE: a bond. Thereafter he submitted and the Court approved his bond in the
Whether or not the court should have required the executrix to required amount, with appellant Luzon Surety Co., Inc. as his surety.
render an accounting of the cash and stock dividends received after the Court dismissed Picard, as administrator and appointed the Philippine
approval of her final accounts. Trust Co. in his place. The latter submitted an inventory-report showing
that the only asset of the Intestate Estate of Burt that had come into its
RULING: possession was the sum of P57.75 representing the balance of the
Yes. Section 8 of Rule 85 provides that the "executor or checking account of said deceased with the Philippine National Bank. A
administrator shall render an account of his administration within one review, however, of the record of the case reveals that former
(1) year from the time of receiving letters testamentary or of Administrator Francis Picard, filed an inventory of the estate of the
deceased, from which it appears that the sole property he found was the jurisdictions, in ours probate court is possessed with an all-embracing
amount of P8,873.73 in current account with the Philippine National power not only in requiring but also in fixing the amount, and executing
Bank. This amount was reduced to P7,986.53 after deducting therefrom or forfeiting an administrator's bond. The execution or forfeiture of an
his expenses in the amount of P887.22; and as reported by him in his administrator's bond, is deemed be a necessary part and incident of the
petition , the further expenses in the amount of P865.20 were deducted, administration proceedings as much as its filing and the fixing of its
thereby leaving the balance of P7,121.33. Court hereby orders said amount. The rule, therefore, is that the probate court may have said bond
Francis Picard, to deliver within 48 hours from the receipt of a copy of executed in the same probate proceeding. Moreover, the condition of the
the order the difference of P7,063.58 to the present Administrator, administrator's bond in question is that Francis L. Picard shall faithfully
Philippine Trust Company. Picard, submitted an itemized statement of execute the orders and decrees of the court; that if he did so, the
disbursements made by him as administrator of the estate, showing that obligation shall become void, otherwise it shall remain in full force and
the estate funds amounted to P7,986.53; that he reported to the Court effect. In having been established that Picard disbursed funds of the
additional expenses incurred amounting to P865.20, thus leaving a estate without authority, the conclusion follows that he had and his
balance of P7,121.33; that thereafter he disbursed the sum of P250.00 to surety became bound upon the terms of their bond. Appellant also
defray the burial expenses of the deceased, thus leaving a balance of contends that it was not proper for the lower court to order the
P6,871.33; that on several occasions he had delivered to Feliciano Burt confiscation of its bond because no prejudice or injury to any creditor,
adoptive son of the deceased James R. Burt different sums of money heir or other interested person has been proved. This is also without
totalling P5,825.00, thus leaving a balance of P972.33. After considering merits. According to the record, the claims against the estate filed by
this statement, the Court, issued an order finding Picard, guilty of Antonio Gardiner and Jose Teruel for the sum of P200.00 and P3,205.00,
having disbursed funds of the estate amounting to about P8,000.00, respectively, were approved by the probate court but the same have
without authority. Picard was prosecuted for estafa. Having pleaded remained unpaid because of lack of funds. Finally, appellant claims that
guilty to the charge, judgment of conviction was accordingly rendered, it had been released from liability as surety because it received no notice
and he was, besides, held civilly liable. Court issued an order requiring of the proceedings for the determination of the accountability of the
appellant Luzon Surety Co., Inc. to show cause why the administrator's administrator. This contention we also find to be untenable. From the
bond filed by it on behalf of Picard would not be confiscated. Appellant nature of the obligation entered into by the surety on an administrator's
filed a motion to set aside said order. Court denied appellant's motion bond — which makes him privy to the proceedings against his principal
and ordered the confiscation of its bond. After the denial of appellant's — he is bound and concluded, in the absence of fraud and collusion, by a
lotion for reconsideration, it took the present appeal. judgment against his principal, even though said surety was not a party
to the proceeding. In the case of the De Mendoza vs. Pacheco, 64 Phil.
ISSUES: WON (1) the Court cannot order the confiscation of the 135, the sureties on the administrator's bond were held liable thereon
administrator's bond, on prejudice or injury to creditors, legatees or heirs altho they were not parties to the proceeding against the administrator,
of the estate of James R. Burt having been shown, and (2) a probate court nor were they notified in connection therewith prior to the issuance of
cannot, ex proprio motu, prosecute the probate bond. the court order for the confiscation of the bond. Lastly, according to
Section 11, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, upon the settlement of the
RULING: account of an executor or administrator, his sureties "may upon
Appellant's contention that the probate court, ex proprio motu, application, be admitted as a party to such accounting." The import of
cannot order the confiscation or forfeiture of an administrator's bond, is this provision is that the sureties are not entitled to notice but may be
clearly without merit. Whatever may be the rule prevailing in other allowed to intervene in the settlement of the accounts of the executor or
administrator if they ask for leave to do so in due time. WHEREFORE, Quasha for failure of the administrators to submit an accounting of the
the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs. assets and expenses of the estate as required by the court.
QUASHA-PENA VS. LCN CONS. Eventually, the RTC granted the second Motion for Payment;
Dimaliwat, Dianne however, it reduced the sums to be paid. LCN, then filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied by the RTC. Recourse was then
FACTS: resorted to the Court of Appeals. On May 2006, the Court of Appeals
promulgated a Decision essentially ruling in favor of LCN. While the
Raymond Triviere passed away on December 14, 1987. On Court of Appeals conceded that Atty. Syquia and the Quasha Law
January 13, 1988, proceedings for the settlement of his intestate estate Office, as the administrators of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere,
were instituted by his widow, Amy Consuelo Triviere, before the RTc of were entitled toadministrator's fees and litigation expenses, they could
Makati City Atty. Enrique P. Syquia and Atty. William H. Quasha of the not claim the same from the funds of the estate.
Quasha Law Office, representing the widow and children of the late
Raymond Triviere, respectively, were appointed administrators of the ISSUE:
estate of the deceased in April 1988. As administrators, Atty. Syquia and Whether or not Quasha Law Office is entitled to payment of the
Atty. Quasha incurred expenses for the payment of real estate taxes, expenses incurred as executor or administrator of the estate of Triviere.
security services, and the preservation and administration of the estate,
as well as litigation expenses. HELD:
No. Section 7, Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
In February 1995, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed before the reads: Section 7. What expenses and fees allowed executor or
RTC a Motion for Payment of administrator. Not to charge for services as attorney. Compensation
their litigation expenses but the RTC denied the said motion in provided by will controls unless renounced. When the executor or
May 1955. administrator is an attorney, he shall not charge against the estate any
professional fees for legal services rendered by him.
In 1996, Atty. Quasha also passed away. Atty. Redentor Zapata
also of the Quasha Law Office, The afore-quoted provision is clear and unequivocal and needs
took over as the counsel of the Triviere children, and continued no statutory construction. Here, in attempting to exempt itself from the
to help Atty. Syquia in the settlement of the estate. On 6 September 2002, coverage of said rule, the Quasha Law Office presents conflicting
Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed another Motion for Payment, for arguments to justify its claim for attorney's fees against the estate. At one
their own behalf and for their respective clients. point, it alleges that the award of attorney's fees was payment for its
administration of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere; yet, it would
On the other hand, LCN, the only remaining claimant against later renounce that it was an administrator.
the Intestate Estate of the Late Raymond Triviere filed its Comment
on/Opposition to the Motion on 2. LCN countered that the RTC had SISON VS. TEODORO
already resolved the issue of payment of litigation expenses when it Mahadodin Dimaampao
denied the first Motion for Payment filed by Atty. Syquia and Atty.
UY TIOCO VS. IMPERIAL Time within which claims shall be filed.—In the notice
Dorado, Czaybeeh provided in the preceding section, the court shall state
the time for the filing of claims against the estate, which
RULE 86 shall not be more than twelve nor less than six months
after the date of the first publication of the notice.
Claims against Estate However, at any time before an order of distribution is
entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to
AFAN VS DE GUZMAN
Espino, Carla file his claim within the time previously limited, the
court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are
FACTS: equitable, allow such claims to be filed within a time not
exceeding one month.
On July 12 1957, De Guzman filed a claim in the special proceeding for
the settlement of intestate estate of ArsenioAfan. The claim was allegedly The second sentence thereof clothes the court with authority to permit
due from Afan, with interest thereon, within 30 days from August 16, the filing of a claim after the lapse of the period stated in the first
1949, as set forth in a promissory note then issued by Afan. On July 22, sentence, but prior to and distribution, subject to the following
1957, theadministratix objected to the consideration of the claim upon conditions, namely (1) there must be tin application therefor; (2) a cause
the ground, among others, that it had been filed long after the expiration must be shown why the permission should be granted; and (3) the
of the period for the presentation of claim against said estate. The lower extension of time granted for the filing of the claim shall not exceed one
court issued the order refusing to entertain the aforementioned claim. De (1) month.In this case, De Guzman has not sought permission to file the
Guzman invokes, in support of his appeal, section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules claim. Moreover, the same does not allege any reason why he should be
of Court. He maintains that his claim was filed prior to the distribution excused for his failure to file the claim in this proceeding within the
of the estate of the deceased. Further, he now alleges, for the first time, a period stated in the Rules of Court.
"cause" why the lower court should allegedly have considered his claim.
He says, in his brief that he had no actual knowledge of the fact that the Second, on his contention that he had no actual knowledge of the fact
estate of the deceased was then already in the process of settlement. that the estate of the deceased was then already in the process of
settlement, the Court found otherwise. He had actual knowledge of the
ISSUE: present proceeding long before the filing of his claim therein on July 27,
1957. It appears that, during the lifetime of Afan, or on May 24, 1950, De
Whether or not the claim of De Guzman should be granted
Guzman instituted, against him, a civil case to recover the amount of the
RULING: promissory note. The Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the trial
court in favor of De Guzman and ordered a trial de novo. Sometime after
No. First, as provided in Section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court: the records had been remanded to the lower court, Afan died. On
August 15, 1955, that court issued an order requiring counsel for his
heirs to submit to the court the number of the intestate estate Petitioners are the oppositors in the special proceeding case
proceedings of the deceased Arsenio R. Afan. This order was complied filed by private respondent Luis Tan for the settlement of the estate of
with on August 30, 1955 and a copy of "notification" containing the the late Dominga Garcia. In 1977, Luis Tan, allegedly the only surviving
son of Dominga Garcia who died sometime in 1930 in Canton, China,
required information was served upon counsel for De Guzman, as
filed for the issuance of the letters of administration in favor of Alfonso
plaintiff therein. On January 18, 1956, his counsel filed in said case a
Atilano. Garcia left a parcel of land located in Davao City which is under
motion for the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased the possession of the heirs of Ramon Pizarro. Respondent court set the
Afan, to substitute him as defendant therein. On January 24, 1956 De petition for hearing and the said order and petition were duly published.
Guzman filed, therefore, a statement, entitled "compliance", setting forth After the private respondent Tan had begun presentation of evidence,
the names, ages and addresses of the heirs of the deceased, "as shown by the parties entered into a compromise and the petitioners withdrew their
the records in Special Proceedings No. 26858, entitled 'Instance estate of opposition to the intestate proceedings. Meanwhile in 1979, Tan and the
City of Davao filed a joint motion asking the respondent court to take
Arsenio R. Afan' before the Court of First Instance of Manila," with the
notice of the agreement which in substance seeks to proceed with the
prayer that said "heirs be substituted as party defendants" in Case No. determination of the heirs of Dominga Garcia which shall be
1148, "in place of the deceased Arsenio R. Afan." Yet, De Guzman choose determinative of their respective claims against the estate. Petitioners
not to file his claim in such proceeding until July 27, 1957, one year and a filed their opposition and the respondent court issued an order taking
half after the filing of his aforementioned "compliance."Instead of note of the agreement. Private respondent Tan filed a motion to drop
furnishing a "cause" for the extension of the reglementary period for the and exclude the petitioners on the ground that they do not even claim to
filing of his claim, this omission on the part of De Guzman fully justifies be heirs of the deceased Garcia. Respondent court dismissed both claims
of the petitioners on the ground that they are barred for having been
the denial of such extension and the order appealed from. In one case,
filed out of time.
the Court have already held that failure to file a claim within the time ISSUE:
provided therefor upon the sole ground that the claimant was WON the order of the respondent court which directed that the
negotiating with one of the heirs for payment, is not sufficient to justify filing of claims against the estate be filed within 6 months after the first
extension. Lastly, the Court also ruled in another case that where a publication of the notice is null and void and violative of Sec 2, Rule 86
claimant knew of the death of the decedent and for four or five months of Revised Rules of Court.
thereafter he did nothing to present his claim, this can hardly be
RULING:
considered as a good excuse for such neglect. Yes. The range of period specified in the Rules is intended to
give the probate court the discretion to fix period for the filing of claims.
Therefore, De Guzman’s claim should not be granted on the ground that The probate court is permitted by the rule to set the period provided it is
it was filed out of time. not less than 6 months nor more than 12 months from the date of the first
publication of notice. Since the notice issued and the period set by the
court was not in accordance with the requirements of Sec 2, Rule 86,
HEIRS OF PIZARRO vs. CONSOLACION what should apply then is the period as provided for by the rules which
Hipolito, Nina Anthonette is not less than 6 months nor more than 12 months from the date of first
publication. The first publication of notice in the Mindanao Times was
FACTS:
on March 30? 1978. Thus, the two claims of the petitioners against the Whether or not Gutierrez’s claim for damages based on
estate which were filed on March 5, 1979 and March 29, 1979 respectivelu unrealized profits is a money claim against the estate of the deceased
were filed on time. Maria Gerardo Vda. de Barretto?
GUTIERREZ VS. DATU RULING:

Katigbak, Paula Yes. The word "claims" as used in statutes requiring the
presentation of claims against a decedent's estate is generally construed
FACTS: to mean debts or demands of a pecuniary nature which could have been
In 1940, Maria Gerardo Vda. De Barretto, owner of fishpond enforced against the deceased in his lifetime and could have been
lands in Pampanga, leased to Ricardo Gutierrez for a term to expire on reduced to simple money judgments; and among these are those
May 1, 1947. On November 1, 1941, it was found that the dikes were founded upon contract. The claim in this case is based on contract —
opened, resulting in their destruction and in the loss great quantities of specifically, on a breach thereof. It falls squarely under section 5 of Rule
fish inside, to the damage and prejudice of the lessee. 87 "Upon all contracts by the decedent broken during his lifetime, even
though they were personal to the decedent in liability, the personal
Gutierrez, while the testate proceeding was opened, filed a representative is answerable for the breach out of the assets." A claim for
complaint for 2 items: first, for the sum of P32,000.00 representing breach of a covenant in a deed of the decedent must be presented under
advance rentals he had to the decedent and second, the sum of a statute requiring such presentment of all claims grounded on contract.
P60,000.00 as damages in the concept of earned profits, that is, profits
which the claimant failed to realize because of the breach of the lease The only actions that may be instituted against the executor or
contract. administrator are those to recover real or personal property from the
estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an
On June 7, 1957, appellant commenced an ordinary civil action injury to person or property, real or personal. The instant suit is not one
against the executrix of the testate for the recovery of the same amount of of them.
P60,000 referred to as the second item. In July 1957 appellant amended
his claim in the testate proceeding by withdrawing therefrom the item of
P60,000.00, leaving only the one for refund of advance rentals in the sum AGUAS VS. LLEMOS
of P32,000.00. Lee, Mariline
After the issues were joined in the present, the court dismissed BPI VS. CONCEPCION AND HIJOS
the action for abandonment by both parties. Appellant moved to Lectura, Erika
reconsider; the court denied the motion for reconsideration on the
ground that the claim should have been prosecuted in the testate IMPERIAL INS., VS. DAVID
proceeding and not by ordinary civil action. Lim, Justin
ISSUE: STRONGHOLD VS. REPUBLIC

Lubay, Angela
FACTS:
Republic Asahi Glass contracts with JDS for the construction of their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of law. Hence, his death did
roadways and drainage systems in RAG's compound. JDS does so not result in the extinguishment of those obligations or liabilities, which
andfiles the required compliance bond with Stronghold Insurance acting merely passed on to his estate. Death is not a defense that he or his estate
as surety. The contract is 5.3M the bond is 795k. JDS falls woefully can set up to wipe out the obligations under the performance bond.
behind schedule, prompting RAG to rescind the contract and demand Consequently, petitioner as surety cannot use his death to escape its
the compliance bond. The owner of JDS dies and JDS disappears. Shire monetary obligation under its performance bond.
fuses to pay the bond claiming that the death of JDS owner extinguishes
the obligation.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner’s liability under the performance bond was MBTC VS. ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT CORP
automatically extinguished by the death of Santos, the principal. Mercado, Trish
RULING:: SANTOS VS. MANARANG

Mansul, Nabral
As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor
does not extinguish the obligation.Obligations are transmissible to ESTATE OF OLAVE VS. REYES
Pangilinan , Legis
theheirs, except when the transmission is prevented by the law, the
stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation.Only SALONGA-HERNANDEZ VS. PASCUAL
obligations that are personal or are identified with the persons Rabanal Michelle
themselves are extinguished by death.Furthermore, the liability of
petitioner is contractual in nature, because it executed a performance
bond, as a surety, petitioner is solidarilyliable with Santos in accordance
with the Civil Code. RULE 87
Actions by and Against Executors and Administrators
Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the
prosecution of money claims arising from a contract against the estate of HEIRS OF GREGOIRE VS. BAKER
a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are not actually Rivera, Hiezll Wynn
extinguished.What is extinguished is only the obligee’s action or suit
FACTS: J. H. Ankrom died, and thereafter, A. L. Baker, qualified as his
filed before the court, which is not then acting as a probate court.
administrator. The administrator filed his inventory of the assets
In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos pertaining to the estate of his decedent, in which inventory was included
had under his contracts with respondent were not intransmissible by a tract of land covered by Torrens certificate of title and containing an
area of more than 930 hectares. The heirs of Rafael Gregoire filed a claim
against the estate of Ankrom for the sum of $35,438.78, U. S. currency, or creditor files in court a bond with sufficient surety, to be approved by
P70, 877.56, based upon a judgment rendered in the Supreme Court of the judge, conditioned to indemnify the executor or administrator
the Republic of Panama. It appears that the total recognized claims against the costs of such action. Such creditor shall have a lien upon the
against the estate amounted originally to P76,645.13, but four of the judgment by him so recovered for the costs incurred and such other
creditors, having claims in the amount of P1,639.82, have been paid in expenses as the court deems equitable. The remedy of the heirs of
full, leaving a balance owing by the estate of P75,005.31, the greater part Gregoire is, therefore, to indemnify the administrator against costs and,
of which is comprised of the claim of the appellants. As the affairs of the by leave of court, to institute an action in the name of the administrator
estate stood upon the original inventory, there appeared to be sufficient to set aside the assignment or other conveyance believed to have been
assets to pay all claimants; but while these intestate proceedings were made in fraud of creditors.
being conducted, the administrator discovered that a year and a half
before his death, Ankrom had executed a mortgage on the property here
in question in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Two days after
SINFOROSO PASCUAL VS. PONCIANO PASCUAL
this mortgage had been executed, Ankrom appears to have made an Rodriguez, Maria Lorraine
assignment of all his interest in the mortgaged property to one J. G. Jung,
of Cincinnati, Ohio, for a purported consideration of the sum of P1 and FACTS:
other good and valuable considerations. In view of these conveyances by The plaintiff and defendants are legitimate children of the
testratix, Eduarda de los Santos.In 1940, while the proceedings for the
his intestate, the administrator presented an amended inventory,
probate of the will of the deceased Eduarda de los Santos were pending
omitting therefrom the tract of 930 hectares with its improvements
in CFI-Rizal plaintiff, Sinforoso Pascual, instituted in the CFI-Pampanga
thereon, the same being the land covered by the transfers above against Ponciano S. Pascual and others, an action for the annulment of a
mentioned. The court made an order, approving of the omission by the contract of sale of a fishpond situated in Pampanga, supposedly
administrator of said property from the inventory; and its is from this executed without consideration by said deceased in her lifetime in favor
order that the present appeal is here being prosecuted. of the defendants.
HELD: When there is a deficiency of assets in the hands of an executor or Defendants filed of a motion to dismiss, alleging want of cause
administrator to pay debts and expenses, and when the deceased person of action, limitation of action, wrong venue and pendency of another
action. RTC: granted the motion on the ground that the action should
made in his life-time such fraudulent conveyance of such real or
have been brought by the executor or administrator of the estate left by
personal estate or of a right or interest therein, as is stated in the the deceased, and directed the plaintiff to amend his complaint. Plaintiff
preceding section, any creditor of the estate may, by license of the court, filed an amended complaint. However, RTC declared that such
if the executor or administrator has not commenced such action, amendment did not cure the insufficiency of the complaint, dismissed
commence and prosecute to final judgment, in the name of the executor the action.
or administrator, an action for the recovery of the same and may recover
for the benefit of the creditors, such real or personal estate, or interest ISSUE: Whether the action should have been filed by the executor and
not by the plaintiff-heir?
therein so conveyed. But such action shall not be commenced until the
HELD: No. report. Jesus filed a motion in court to require Cerilio to turn over to him
Under Rule 86, section 1, of the new Rules of Court, actions for the personal properties belonging to the intestate supposed to be in
the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the deceased for Cerilio’s possession. Thereafter, writ of execution was issued. By virtue
causes which survive may be prosecuted or defended by his executor or
of it, the provincial sheriff issued notice of attachment against the real
administrator. Upon the commencement of the testate or intestate
property described in COT of the Register of Deeds and under the tax
proceedings the heirs have no standing in court in actions of the above
character, except when the executor or administrator is unwilling or fails assessment in the name of Cerilio. Cerilio filed an urgent motion to set
or refuses to act, in which event to heirs may act in his place. aside the writ of execution and for writ of preliminary injunction which
Here, the fictitious sale is alleged to have been made to the was opposed by Jesus. The public auction was set and Jesus Modesto
defendants, one of them, Miguel S. Pascual, being the executor named as the highest and only bidder. Then, Certificate of final sale in
appointed by the probate court. Such executor naturally would not bring favour of Jesus was issued by the Provincial Sheriff. Cerilio filed motion
an action against himself for recovery of the fishpond. His refusal to act
for reconsideration, however, it was denied by the CFI. In pursuance to
may, therefore, be implied. And this brings the case under the exception.
It should be noted that in the complaint the prayer is that the fishpond the writ of possession filed by Jesus, the Provincial Sheriff issued a
be delivered not to the plaintiff but to the executor, thus indicating that notification to Cerilio placing Jesus in possession of the real property
the action is brought in behalf of the estate of the deceased. sold to him. Cerilio filed petition for certiorari to annul the proceedings
had before the CFI of Leyte.
VELASQUEZ VS. GEORGE ISSUE:

Salayog, Benny Rico
Whether the CFI had the authority to decide whether the properties, real
or personal belong to the estate or to the persons examined
RIOFERIO ET. AL. VS COURT OF APPEALS
Sumaway, Dylan HELD:
MODESTO VS. MODESTO No.

Tomarong, Marian
If an executor or administrator or any interested individuals in the estate
FACTS:
of the deceased, complains to the court having jurisdiction of the estate
Bruno Modesto died leaving several heirs, among them, Cerilio
that a person/s are suspected of having possessed or having knowledge
Modesto and Jesus Modesto. In the course of the intestate proceeding,
of the properties left by a deceased person, or of having concealed,
Jesus, acting as administrator of the estate of Bruno, filed in the CFI of
embezzled or conveyed any of the said properties of the deceased, the
Tacloban, Leyte, motion to cite and examine under oath several persons,
court may cite such person/s to appear before it and may examine him
especially Cerilio regarding the properties concealed, embezzled or
or them on oath on the matter of such complaint. In such proceedings the
fraudulently conveyed which was granted by the lower court. Joint
trial court has no authority to decide whether or not said properties, real
commissioners were appointed by CFI. Thereafter, submitted their
or personal, belong to the estate or to the persons examined. If, after such
examination there is good reason to believe that said person or persons understood by the administrators who have more than once asserted
examined are keeping properties belonging to the estate, then the next that "the probate court has jurisdiction to determine the ownership of the
step to be taken should be for the administrator to file an ordinary action fishpond for purposes of inclusion in the inventory of the properties. So
in court to recover the same. it was made clear by the Probate Court itself which, at the outset, stated
that the hearing on the matter was meant "merely to determine whether
or not the fishpond should be included as part of the estate and whether
VALERA VS. INSERTO
or not the person holding it should be made to deliver and/or return **
Tresvalles, Kris
(it) to the estate. And so it was emphasized in another Order, denying
FACTS: In the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the reconsideration of the Order of September 17, 1980. Judge Adil
decedent spouses, Rafael Valera and Consolacion Sarrosa — in which afterwards granted the administrators' motion for execution of the order
Eumelia Cabado and Pompiro Valera had been appointed administrators pending appeal, and directed the sheriff to enforce the direction for the
— the heirs of a deceased daughter of the spouses, Teresa Garin, filed a Garin Heirs to reconvey the fishpond to the estate. The corresponding
motion asking that the Administratrix, Cabado, be declared in contempt writ was served on Manuel Fabiana, the supposed caretaker. Voicing no
for her failure to render an accounting of her administration. Cabado objection to the writ, and declaring to the sheriff that he was a mere
replied that no accounting could be submitted unless Jose Garin, Teresa's lessee, Fabiana voluntarily relinquished possession of the fishpond to the
husband and the movant heirs' father, delivered to the administrator an sheriff. The latter, in turn, delivered it to the administrators.
18-hectare fishpond in Baras, Barotoc Nuevo, Iloilo, belonging to the
Later however, Fabiana filed a complaint-in-intervention with the
estate and she in turn moved for the return thereof to the estate, so that it
Probate Court seeking vindication of his right to the possession of the
might be partitioned among the decedents' heirs. Jose Garin opposed the
fishpond, based on a contract of lease between himself, as lessee, and
plea for the fishpond's return to the estate, asserting that the property
Jose Garin, as lessor. 16 But Judge Adil dismissed his complaint.
was owned by his children and this was why it had never been included
in any inventory of the estate. In the meantime, Jose Garin — having filed a motion for reconsideration
of the above mentioned order of Judge Adil (declaring the estate to be
The Court viewed the Garin Heir's motion for contempt, as well as
the owner of the fishpond), in which he asserted that the Probate Court,
Carbado's prayer for the fishpond's return within the purview of Section
being of limited jurisdiction, had no competence to decide the ownership
6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. The incident was set for hearing and
of the fishpond, 22 which motion had been denied 23-filed a notice of
thereafter, the court issued an order commanding the heir of Teresa
appeal from said Order. 24 But he quickly abandoned the appeal when,
Garin to reconvey immediately the fishpond to the estate of the spouses.
as aforestated 25 Judge Adil authorized execution of the order pending
There seems little doubt, however, that the Court's pronouncement appeal, instead, he initiated a special action for certiorari prohibition and
regarding the estate's title to the fishpond was merely provisional in mandamus )with prayer for preliminary injunction) in the Court of
character, made solely to determine whether or not the fishpond should Appeals
be included in the inventory of estate assets. So it was evidently
Court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive,
and is subject to the final decision in a separate action that may be
ISSUE: whether the probate court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of instituted by the parties. 32
and decide the issue of title covering a fishpond being claimed by an heir
adversely to the decedent spouses The same norm governs the situation contemplated in Section 6, Rule 87
of the Rules of Court, expressly invoked by the Probate Court in
HELD: justification of its holding a hearing on the issue arising from the parties'
conflicting claims over the fishpond. 33 The examination provided in the
Jurisdiction of Probate Court
cited section is intended merely to elicit evidence relevant to property of
Settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial the decedent from persons suspected of having possession or knowledge
Court), acting as a Probate Court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thereof, or of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away the same.
thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title Of course, if the latter lays no claim to the property and manifests
to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless willingness to tum it over to the estate, no difficulty arises; the Probate
the claimant and all the Other parties having legal interest in the Court simply issues the appropriate direction for the delivery of the
property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the property to the estate. On the other hand, if the third person asserts a
question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third right to the property contrary to the decedent's, the Probate Court would
persons are not thereby prejudiced, the reason for the exception being have no authority to resolve the issue; a separate action must be
that the question of whether or not a particular matter should be instituted by the administrator to recover the property. 34
resolved by the Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its
Parenthetically, in the light of the foregoing principles, the Probate Court
limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g., probate, land registration, etc.,
could have admitted and taken cognizance of Fabiana's complaint in
is in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one,
intervention after obtaining the consent of all interested parties to its
involving a mode of practice which may be waived.
assumption of jurisdiction over the question of title to the fishpond, or
The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application ascertaining the absence of objection thereto. But it did not. It dismissed
of the exception to the rule. As already earlier stressed, it was at all times the complaint in intervention instead. And all this is now water under
clear to the Court as well as to the parties that if cognizance was being the bridge.
taken of the question of title over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose
Possession of Fishpond Pending
of settling the issue definitely and permanently, and writing "finis"
thereto, the question being explicitly left for determination "in an Determination of Title Thereto
ordinary civil action," but merely to determine whether it should or
should not be included in the inventory. This function of resolving Since the determination by the Probate Court of the question of title to
whether or not property should be included in the estate inventory is, to the fishpond was merely provisional, not binding on the property with
be sure, one clearly within the Probate Court's competence, although the any character of authority, definiteness or permanence, having been
made only for purposes of in. conclusion in the inventory and upon Benedicto, PH ambassador to Japan and the principal stockholder of
evidence adduced at the hearing of a motion, it cannot and should not be RPN 9, the only station allowed to broadcast during martial law, rented
subject of execution, as against its possessor who has set up title in the studios owned by ABSCBN and occupied the same during
himself (or in another) adversely to the decedent, and whose right to negotiation about the monthly rentals. Due to failure to reach the desired
possess has not been ventilated and adjudicated in an appropriate action. monthly rental rate, the counsel for petitioner demanded RPN 9 to
These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens vacate the studios and pay rentals but respondents refused to do so. At
title to the property is not in the decedents' names but in others, a the end of Marcos’ regime, ABS CBN was returned to the Lopez’ and
situation on which this Court has already had occasion to rule. allowed operation. Unfortunately, the complaints previously filed were
dismissed by the Ombudsman for lack of probable cause. Hence, the
In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a present petition. Noteworthy is the fact that Benedicto died during the
property covered by Torrens title is involved, the presumptive pendency of the case and was dropped as party herein.
conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the
absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof ISSUE:
should be consider as the owner of the property in controversy until his
title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, Whether or not the civil liability of Benedicto subsists even after his
particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself death, which extinguished his criminal liability.
is in the persons named in the title
RULING:
No. The rules on whether the civil liability of an accused, upon death, is
extinguished together with his criminal liability, has long been clarified
and settled in the case of People v. Bayotas:
ABS-CBN VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
Tuason, Jannelle 1. Death of an accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
FACTS: based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
Petitioners executed separate complaint-affidavits charging private
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
respondents of several violation of penal laws when they went to the
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
premises of ABS CBN and informed the employees thereof regarding the
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in sensostrictiore."
forced closure of the premises of the station and stoppage of its
operation due to the LOI No. 1 issued by then Pres. Marcos during 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
Martial Law. notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article
1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of Umbalin, Norissa
the same act or omission:
BUAN VS. LAYA
a) Law
Uy, Charles
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts FACTS:
d) x xx A contingent claim for P50,000 was filed by Sylvia Laya against the
e) Quasi-delicts intestate estate of the deceased Florenica and Rizalina Buan. The
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 contingent claim was based on the fact that a Philippine Rabbit Bus,
above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only owned and operated by the spouses Buan, collided with a private car
by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, resulting to the death of Juan Laya, the father of Sylvia Laya. The driver
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure15 as amended. of the bus was charged with homicide and serious physical injuries
The separate civil action may be enforced either against the through reckless imprudence and was sentenced therefor. The heirs of
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending
Juan Laya had reserved the right to file a separate civil action, and they
on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above. did so. Administrators of the estate opposed the contingent claim,
arguing that the same could not be allowed because it has not been filed
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of
before the death of the spouses. The CFI of Tarlac admitted the claim, but
his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases
where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to denied that a portion of the estate be set aside to answer for the claim.
its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together Counsel for administrator then moved to set aside the order, but before
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations they could do so, the civil action instituted in Manila was declared
on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency premature because the criminal conviction is not yet final, and ordered
of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 plaintiffs therein to file an amended complaint, which they did so. The
of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension
CFI of Tarlac then dismissed the contingent claim on the ground that the
on a possible [de]privation of right by prescription.
reason for the same had ceased to exist. Assuming that an amended
Applying the foregoing rules, ABS-CBN's insistence that the case at complaint had been filed, still, the same had not yet been acted upon.
bench survives because the civil liability of the respondents subsists is
stripped of merit. ISSUE
Whether or not the contingent claim may be admitted

RULE 88 RULING
Payment of the debts of the Estate
The Court ruled in the affirmative. A contingent claim is one that, by its
ALDAMIZ VS. JUDGE OF CFI-MINDORO nature, is dependent upon the happening of an uncertain event. it may
or may not develop into a valid claim, depending upon that uncertain In consideration of P1,000 received by Felisa Pañgilinan, a
event. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased, Juan C. Laya, would document was executed by her giving Eusebio A. Godoy, an option to
succeed in the action brought in Manila against the administrators of the buy a dredge for the sum of P10,000. It appears from that document that
estate of the deceased spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina P. Buan, is the dredge is the common property of the vendor and of the brothers
the uncertain event or contingency upon which the validity of the claim Demetrio, Jose, Guillermo, Alfredo, and Paz, all surnamed Orellano; that
presented in the administration proceedings depends. the condition was that Godoy was to pay the whole price of the dredge
within twenty days; and that said option was granted in accordance with
While the contingent event had not yet happened, Sylvia has no claim the power of attorney executed by her coowners who reserved the right
upon the intestate estate, for such claim would only arise after the event to ratify whatever sale might be made, or option granted by Pañgilinan,
happened. As such, the contingent claim may not be dismissed. their attorney-in-fact. The latter's co-owners did not ratify the option
Contingent claims follow the result of the action, and as such, the fact contract. Before the expiration of twenty days, the Godoy was ready to
that the case is temporarily dismissed may not terminate the claim, as make complete payment of the price, but Pañgilinan failed to deliver the
only the final results of the action could do that. The rules provide that a dredge. Then the Godoy brought suit in the CFI against Feliza
contingent claim is to be presented in the administration proceedings in Pañgilinan, Paz Orellano, Jose Orellano, Demetrio Orellano, Guillermo
the same manner as any ordinary claim, and that when the contingency Orellano, and Alfredo Orellano, praying that they be ordered to deliver
arises which converts the contingent claim into a valid claim, the court the dredge, upon payment by him of the sum of P9,000; to pay him the
should then be informed that the claim had already matured. sum of P10,000 as damages, and to return to the plaintiff the sum of
P1,000 should the carrying out of the sale become impossible.
The defendants Orellano set up in their answer a general denial

of the facts alleged in the complaint and, as a special defense, alleged
DINGLASA VS. ANG CHIA that the dredge in question was the property of the intestate estate of
Viernes, Wayne Julio Orellano, pending in the CFI, and under the administration of
Felisa Pangilinan; that Godoy perfectly knows that said dredge is under
judicial control and could not be disposed of without judicial authority,
RULE 89 and that the court has never authorized the sale mentioned in the
complaint filed herein; and that the defendants Jose, Guillermo, and
Sales, Mortgages, and other Encumbrances of Property of decedent Alfredo surnamed Orellano are at present under age, and the defendant
Paz Orellano is a married woman who had not obtained the consent of
GODOY VS. ORELLANO her husband before executing the power of attorney in favor of the
Vizcarra, William Pañgilinan.
FACTS :
The defendant Felisa Pañgilinan filed a separate answer, and
alleges: that Godoy, as well as the defendants, and the notary who
prepared the aforesaid option sale, were all aware of these facts, and In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the
they led her to believe that she had the authority to dispose of the dredge Pañgilinan was not, in her capacity as judicial administratrix of the
in her name and by themselves; that believing herself to be under intestate estate of Julio Orellano, legally authorized to sell, or contract to
obligation to comply with the aforesaid option deed, she applied to the sell, any property belonging to said estate without the authority of the
court of probate for permission to sell the dredge in the sum of P10,000; court, and the contract entered into by her with the plaintiff, without this
that on the day of the hearing of the motion, her co-defendants who had authority, is null and void.
themselves authorized her by means of a power of attorney on the
The judgment appealed from is reversed and the complaint against the
ground that there were higher bidders and the best thing to do was to
appellant Felisa Pañgilinan is hereby dismissed.
sell it at public auction; that in view of this opposition, Pañgilinan asked
the court that it be sold at public auction, and the court authorized said
defendant to sell it at public auction; that the Pañgilinan did not at any CFI OF RIZAL VS. COURT OF APPEALS
time refuse to make delivery of the dredge to the Godoy, but that it was Yatco, Nathaniel
the court that would not give her the authority to do so; and that she is
FACTS:
all times ready to return the P1,000 received from the plaintiff and that
she has tendered it several times, but that the Godoy refused to accept it. Elena OngEscutin, executrix of testate estate of late
PoncianoOngLacson asked for authority from probate court to sell a real
The judge a quo rendered judgment, ordering Pañgilinan to pay property to pay taxes and claims against the estate. It was granted and
Godoy the sum of P2,000 with legal interest. thus was sold to GanHeng for P400K. The sale was perfected and taxes
were paid for the estate. Felix Ong filed an opposition on the approval
ISSUE: by the court of such sale and offered P450K for such real property and
prayed for the acceptance of such offer. Probate court dismissed Felix
Whether or not the option contract between Pañgilinan and Ong’s petition, and so did the CA. However upon MR of Felix Ong, the
Godoy is void because of absence of authority of the court. CA found that the probate court committed grave abuse of discretion as
such offer by Felix Ong was at a higher price and thus more beneficial
RULING: for the estate.
Under the law, the court has exclusive jurisdiction to authorize the sale ISSUE:
of properties like the one under consideration and the power of attorney
WON the CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the
executed by the heirs of Orellano in favor of Pañgilinan, without probate court’s approvale of the sale to GanHeng.
authority of court, has no legal effect, and this is the more so, since two
of the said heirs are under age, and the others did not ratify the option RULING:
contract, as provided in the aforesaid power of attorney.
Yes. The sale to be annulled was a private sale and not thru power of attorney executed by him, on behalf of the intestate
public auction. Felix Ong had no legal personality to impugn such sale of estate, appointing himself to sell share of
real property to GanHeng. Felix was neither a creditor nor an heir to the the estate in the subdivision lots. CFI granted the petition.
estate. Also, he did not comply with the bond requirement of Rule 89, sec
3 of the Rules. Persons interested on such property of the estate may be
prevented by posting a bond which is fixed by the court. Furthermore, Jaroda moved to nullify the 2 CFI orders. CFI denied the
the subsequent motion filed by the executrix to withdraw the sale as the motion for lack of merit. Jaroda elevated the case to the SC.
property in question is now worth P1M is denied. GanHeng was a
purchaser in good faith and the estate had already benefitted from the Issue:
payment made by GanHeng. The SC affirmed the private sale made by
the executrix and GanHeng.
(1) Whether or not the CFI Order allowing the withdrawal of
bank deposits was in abuse
JARODA VS. CUSI of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction? .
Alvarez, Miguel Lorenzo
Facts: (2) Whether or not the CFI Order approving the power of
attorney is valid.
The Special Proceeding was commenced by Antonio Tan
(Tan) alleging in the petition that Carlos Villa Abrille died Ruling:
intestate and that his heirs are his surviving spouse, 9 children
(among them is petitioner Natividad Jaroda) and 4 grandsons,
among them respondent Tan. On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled in the
affirmative. Said withdrawal is foreign to the powers
Tan was appointed special administrator. and duties of a special administrator. (Rule 80.2)
Tan filed a petition for the withdrawal of sums from PNB The CFI order was issued without notice to, and hearing
alleging that these sums were registered in the name of the of, the heirs of
the deceased. The withdrawal of the bank deposits may be
deceased but they were actually held in trust for co-owners of
viewed as within the powers and duties of a special
Juna Subdivision. CFI granted this motion.
administrator; but actually, it is a waiver by the special
administrator of a prima facie exclusive right of the intestate
CFI issued to Tan letters of administration. Tan filed a
estate to the bank deposits in favor of the co-owners of the Juna
petition alleging that the deceased was a manager and co-owner
Subdivision. The bank deposits were in the name of the deceased
of Juna Subdivision and praying for approval by the court of the
so they belong prima facie to his estate after his death. And
until the contrary, the special administrator is without power to GATMAITAN VS. MEDINA
make the waiver or to hand over part of the estate to other Azarcon, Pia Lea
persons on the ground that the estate is not the owner thereof.
FACTS:
On March 10, 1956, Felicisimo Gatmaitan filed a petition, seeking
On the second issue, the High Tribunal ruled in the his appointment as administrator of the property of his wife, Veronica
negative. The CFI order is void for want of notice and for Medina, who died intestate. Gorgonio Medina and Dominica Medina, as
approving an improper contract or transaction. heirs of the deceased (she being their full-blooded sister), filed an
opposition, praying that Gorgonio Medina, or a neutral third party, or
Felicisimo Gatmaitan and Gorgonio Medina, jointly, be appointed as
An administrator is not permitted to deal with himself as administrator or administrators of the estate. The court appointed
an individual in any transaction concerning trust property. Felicisimo Gatmaitan as administrator of the estate with a bond and
This is because of the n view of the fiduciary relationship that Gorgonio Medina as co-administrator without compensation and bond.
they occupy with respect to the heirs of the deceased and their On March 14, 1957, administrator Gatmaitan filed an amended inventory
responsibilities toward the probate court. of the estate but was opposed on the ground that the same did not
represent the true and faithful list of the properties left by the deceased.
In view of the opposition, the hearing and consideration of the amended
By the CFI’s order, administrator Tan came to be the inventory was postponed until further assignment. On April 2, 1957, the
agent of two different principals: the court and the heirs of heirs of the deceased, through counsel, filed a "Motion for Partial
the deceased on the one hand, and the majority co-owners of Partition and Distribution," The court heard counsel for administrator
the subdivision on the other, in managing and disposing of the Gatmaitan and for the heirs or oppositors, but without receiving any
evidence whatsoever. The administrator, Gatmaitan, filed a motion for
lots of the subdivision. This dual agency of Tan rendered him
reconsideration, calling attention to the fact that, contrary to what the
incapable of independent defense of the estate's interests order states, "he has not agreed to the partial distribution of the estate in
against those of the majority co-owners. the manner contained in the order", and urging that "the sums ordered to
be partially distributed are not warranted by the circumstances
obtaining" in the case and that, moreover, "the manner of distribution
will work difficulties to the estate and to the heirs themselves". Motion
was denied for lack of merit. Gatmaitan filed a notice of appeal from the
PAHAMOTANG VS. PNB foregoing orders. Appellant filed a record on appeal and notified counsel
Arcilla, Jay for the oppositors of the date he would move for the approval thereof by
the court. The court approved the record on appeal presented by
RULE 90 appellant for failure to file written opposition thereto as required in the
order of the court notwithstanding the length of time that had already
Distribution and Partition of the Estate elapsed. In his brief, appellant only made one assignment of error, and it
reads thus: The lower court gravely abused its discretion in directing a
partial distribution of the intestate estate of the deceased Veronica
Medina in favor of appellees, without requiring the distributees to file no bond was fixed by the court as a condition precedent to the partial
the proper bonds pursuant to the provisions of Rule 91, Section 1 of the distribution ordered by it, a bond which, because of the reasons already
Revised Rules of Court. adduced, becomes all the more imperative. Rule 91, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court, specifically provides as follows: When the debts, funeral
ISSUE:
WON the lower court gravely abused its discretion in directing a charges, and expenses of administration, the allowances to the widow,
partial distribution of the intestate estate of the deceased Veronica and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with
Medina in favor of appellees, without requiring the distributees to file law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or
the proper bonds pursuant to the provisions of Rule 91, Section 1 of the administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing
Revised Rules of Court. upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the person entitled to
the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which is
RULING:
entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective
The lower court, erred in rendering the order appealed from. A shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having
partial distribution of the decedent's estate pending the final termination the same in his possession. . . . No distribution shall be allowed until the
of the testate or intestate proceedings should as much as possible be payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or provided
discouraged by the courts and, unless in extreme cases, such form of for, unless the distributees or any of them, give a bond, in the sum to be
advances of inheritance should not be countenanced. The reason for this fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations
strict rule is obvious — courts should guard with utmost zeal and within such time as the courts directs. Appellees contend that the order
jealousy the estate of the decedent to the end that the creditors thereof be of partial distribution having been issued pursuant to an agreement of
adequately protected and all the rightful heirs assured of their shares in the parties, the same could not now be assailed by the appellant. While
the inheritance. Why the appealed order is unwarranted is evident on the wording of the appealed order seem to indicate that it was rendered
three counts. Firstly, the partial distribution was prematurely ordered by with the conformity of the heirs, there is reason to believe that it was just
the lower court. It appears that at the time the questioned order was a mistaken impression on the part of the court. Soon after the order was
rendered, the amended inventory and appraisal filed by the rendered, the administrator-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration,
administrator-appellant was not yet even accepted, and it was still under among other things, calling the attention of the court that he never
consideration by the court, in view of an opposition to the admission agreed to the partial distribution of the estate in the manner ordained in
thereof by some of the heirs. Moreover, it seems that notices for the the appealed order. Although said motion was denied for lack of merit,
presentation of claims by possible creditors of the estate had not yet been the court did not deny categorically appellant's imputation, which could
published, so that the period for the presentation of claims had not as yet have been easily averred to by it; nor did the appellees at any time prior
elapsed. Consequently, it cannot be safely said that the court had a to this appeal controvert the aforesaid allegation of the administrator.
sufficient basis upon which to order a partial distribution of the There is plausibility in appellant's statement that the agreement referred
properties, having in mind the adverse effects that it might have on the to in the order was actually one between the appellees among
rights of the creditors and the heirs alike. Second, and more important, themselves. It should be noted, furthermore, that the bond required by
the Rules is not solely for the protection of the heirs then appearing, but In December 1987, Raymond Triviere died intestate and the
also for the benefit of creditors and subsequent claimants who have not proceedings for the settlement of his estate were instituted by his widow,
agreed to the advances. Lastly, appellees urged that this appeal was Amy Consuelo Triviere. Atty. Enrique P. Syquia (Syquia) and
Atty.William H. Quasha (Quasha) of the Quasha Law Office,
prematurely taken in that appellant has not as yet formally objected to
representing the widow and children of the late Raymond Triviere,
the proffered bond as mentioned in an alleged order of the court, dated
respectively, were appointed administrators of the estate of the deceased.
May 16, 1957. The tenor of the order of May 16, 1957, as well as the fact As administrators, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha incurred expenses for
that neither said order nor the "constancia" of appellees are included in the payment of real estate taxes, security services, and the preservation
the Record on Appeal, indicates that the belated offer to file a bond and administration of the estate, as well as litigation expenses. Atty.
amounted to no more than an attempt of appellees to settle the particular Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed before the RTC a Motion for Payment of
issue between the parties that was rejected by the appellant. That the their litigation expenses.
record on appeal was approved much later, on July 15, 1957, and yet
RTC denied their motion citing their failure to submit an accounting of
without the written opposition . . . required in the order of this Court the assets and liabilities of the estate under administration in May 1995.
dated June 12, 1957, notwithstanding the length of time that has already
elapsed and the absence of proof that the bond offered was ever filed In 1996, Atty. Quasha also passed away. Atty. Redentor Zapata (Zapata),
and approved by the Court, fortify that conclusion. Anyway, since the also of the Quasha Law Office, took over as the counsel of the Triviere
purpose of the bond required by section 1, paragraph 2, of Rule 91 is to children, and continued to help Atty. Syquia in the settlement of the
protect not only the appellant but also the creditors and subsequent estate. On 6 September 2002, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed another
Motion for Payment, for their own behalf and for their respective clients,
claimants to the estate, in order that they may not be prejudiced by the
claiming for the payment of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
partial distribution, the amount of the bond could not be fixed without
hearing such interested parties, and there is no showing that they were LCN Construction Corp., as the only remaining claimantagainst the
consulted. Hence, the bond offered could not affect the merits of this Intestate Estate of the Late Raymond Triviere in Special Proceedings,
appeal, although the Court below is not precluded for approving a new filed its Comment on/Opposition to the afore-quoted Motion on 2
bond. Wherefore, the order of partial distribution appealed from is set October 2002. LCN countered that the RTC had already resolved the
issue of payment of litigation expenses when it denied the first Motion
aside, without prejudice to the issue of another order after strict
for Payment filed by Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha for failure of the
compliance with the Rules of Court. The records are ordered remanded to
administrators to submit an accounting of the assets and expenses of the
the lower court for further proceedings.
estate as required by the court.
Among others, LCN argued that its claims are still outstanding and
chargeable against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere; thus, no
QUASHA-PENA VS. LCN CONSTRUCTION*
distribution should be allowed until they have been paid; especially
considering that as of 25 August 2002, the claim of LCN against the
FACTS: estate of the late Raymond Triviere amounted to P6,016,570.65 as against
the remaining assets of the estate totaling P4,738,558.63, rendering the Petitioners, maintain that the RTC Order should not be construed as a
latter insolvent. final order of distribution, but a mere interlocutory order that does not
end the estate proceedings. Only an order of distribution directing the
RTC issued its Order, taking note that the widow and the heirs of the delivery of the residue of the estate to the proper distributees brings the
deceased Triviere, after all the years, have not received their respective intestate proceedings to a close and, consequently, puts an end to the
shares in the Estate, declaring that there was no more need for administration and relieves the administrator of his duties. That the said
accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate considering that the Order grants the payment of certain amounts from the funds of the
estate has no more assets except the money deposited with the Union estate to the petitioner children and widow of the late Raymond Triviere
Bank of the Philippines and that both the Co-Administrator and counsel considering that they have not received their respective shares therefrom
for the deceased are entitled to the payment for the services they have for more than a decade. Out of the reportedP4,738,558.63 value of the
rendered and accomplished for the estate and the heirs of the deceased estate, the petitioner children and widow were being awarded by the
as they have over a decade now spent so much time, labor and skill to RTC, their shares in the collective amount of P600,000.00. Evidently, the
accomplish the task assigned to them; and the last time the remaining portion of the estate still needs to be settled. The intestate
administrators obtained their fees was in 1992. proceedings were not yet concluded, and the RTC still had to hear and
rule on the pending claim of LCN against the estate of the late Raymond
LCN sought recourse from CA maintaining, among others, that the Triviere and only thereafter can it distribute the residue of the estate, if
awards violate Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, as there still any, to his heirs.
exists its (LCN's) unpaid claim in the sum of P6,016,570.65.
ISSUE:
CA conceded that Atty. Syquia and the Quasha Law Office, as the
administrators of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere, were entitled Whether or not the awards of the RTC in favor of the petitioner, children
to administrator's fees and litigation expenses, they could not claim the and widow constitute a partial distribution of the estate and is
same from the funds of the estate reasoning that the award of expenses proscribed by Rule 90 Section 1.
and fees in favor of executors and administrators is subject to the
qualification that where the executor or administrator is a lawyer, he RULING:
shall not charge against the estate any professional fees for legal services
rendered by him. Instead, the Court of Appeals held that the attorney's Yes. Petitioners, insist that the awards in favor of the petitioner children
fees due Atty. Syquia and the Quasha Law Offices should be borne by and widow of the late Raymond Triviere is not a distribution of the
their clients, the widow and children of the late Raymond Triviere, residue of the estate, thus, rendering Section 1, Rule 90 of the Revised
respectively. Rules of Court inapplicable.
The appellate court likewise revoked the P450,000.00 share Section 1, Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
and P150,000.00 share awarded by the RTC to the children and widow of
the late Raymond Triviere, respectively, on the basis that Section 1, Rule Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made. - When the
90 of the Revised Rules of Court proscribes the distribution of the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to
residue of the estate until all its obligations have been paid. the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in
accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the
executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and them, gives a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the
after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs."
persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts,
to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover In sum, although it is within the discretion of the RTC whether or not to
their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other permit the advance distribution of the estate, its exercise of such
person having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before discretion should be qualified by the following:
the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to
the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, [1] only part of the estate that is not affected by any pending controversy
the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. or appeal may be the subject of advance distribution (Section 2, Rule
109); and
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations [2] thedistributees must post a bond, fixed by the court, conditioned for
above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, the payment of outstanding obligations of the estate (second paragraph
or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, of Section 1, Rule 90).
conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs. There is no showing that the RTC, in awarding to the petitioner children
and widow their shares in the estate prior to the settlement of all its
While the awards in favor of petitioner children and widow made in the obligations, complied with these two requirements or, at the very least,
RTC Order dated 12 June 2003 was not yet a distribution of the residue took the same into consideration. Its Order is completely silent on these
of the estate, given that there was still a pending claim against the estate, matters. It justified its grant of the award in a single sentence which
still, they did constitute a partial and advance distribution of the estate. stated that petitioner children and widow had not yet received their
Virtually, the petitioner children and widow were already being respective shares from the estate after all these years. Taking into
awarded shares in the estate, although not all of its obligations had been account that the claim of LCN against the estate of the late Raymond
paid or provided for. Triviere allegedly amounted to P6,016,570.65, already in excess of
the P4,738,558.63 reported total value of the estate, the RTC should have
Section 2, Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly recognizes been more prudent in approving the advance distribution of the same.
advance distribution of the estate, thus:
Section 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. - Petitioners invoked Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court,where the
Notwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal in proceedings to Court sustained an Order granting partial distribution of an estate.
settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon
such terms as it may deem proper and just, permit that such part of the However, in Dael is the estate has sufficient assets to ensure equitable
estate as may not be affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed distribution of the inheritance in accordance with law and the final
among the heirs or legatees,upon compliance with the conditions set judgment in the proceedings and it does not appear there are unpaid
forth in Rule 90 of these rules. (Emphases supplied.) obligations, as contemplated in Rule 90, for which provisions should
have been made or a bond required, such partial distribution may be
The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of allowed.
Court allows the distribution of the estate prior to the payment of the
obligations mentioned therein, provided that "the distributees, or any of
No similar determination on sufficiency of assets or absence of any Borja’s heirs. Although the administratrix of Quintin de Borja’s estate
outstanding obligations of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere was was the party named in the partition in behalf of that estate, the present
made by the RTC in this case. In fact, there is a pending claim by LCN petitioners took active part in the proceeding for the reason that they had
against the estate, and the amount thereof exceeds the value of the entire
been declared their father’s sole heirs in the settlement of their father’s
estate.
estate. Moreover, one of these children was herself the duly appointed
Furthermore, in Dael, the Court actually cautioned that partial administratrix of the last named intestate estate.
distribution of the decedent's estate pending final termination of the
testate or intestate proceeding should as much as possible be ISSUE:
discouraged by the courts, and, except in extreme cases, such form of
advances of inheritance should not be countenanced. The reason for this Can the remedy to recovery the property be done by motion in
rule is that courts should guard with utmost zeal and jealousy the estate the same intestate proceeding?
of the decedent to the end that the creditors thereof be adequately
protected and all the rightful heirs be assured of their shares in the RULING:
inheritance.
Pertinent to the question posed by the petitioners is section 1 of
Rule 91 which provides as follows:
TORRES VS. ENCARNACION
Borja, Catherine
"When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the
FACTS: allowances to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the
estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the
The petitioners contest the jurisdiction of the respondent Judge
application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in
to issue the order herein sought to be reviewed directing them to deliver
the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the
to the administrator of the intestate estate of Marcelo de Borja, a certain
estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the
parcel of land which is in petitioners’ possession and to which they
proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may
assert exclusive ownership. They contend that the administrator’s
demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or
remedy to recover that property is an action at law and not by motion in
administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If
the intestate proceeding.
there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of
the deceased person or as to the distributive share to which each person
It appears that in the above-entitled intestate estate, the
is entitled under the law, the testimony as to such controversy shall be
commissioners appointed by the court submitted on February 8, 1944, a
taken in writing by the judge, under oath.
project of partition, in which the land in question, which is and was then
in the possession of the herein petitioners, was included as property of
"No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations
the estate and assigned to one Miguel B. Dayco, one of Marcelo de
above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees,
or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, 1. To Dr. Luis U. Santos, citizen of the Philippines, of age, married to
conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the Socorro Manankil and resident of Malolos, Bulacan, is hereby awarded
court directs."cralairtua1aw library and adjudicated an undivided FIVE-EIGHTH(5/8) share in each of the
above-described properties; and
Applying this Rule, the probate court, having the custody and 2. To Purificacion Santos-Imperial, citizen of the Philippines, of age,
control of the entire estate, is the most logical authority to effectuate this married to Eloy Imperial and resident of Malolos, Bulacan, is hereby
provision within the same estate proceeding, said proceeding being the awarded and adjudicated an undivided THREE-EIGHTH(3/8) share in
most convenient one in which this power and function of the court can each of the properties described above;
be exercised and performed without the necessity of requiring the parties
Santos filed a Motion for Correction of both the Amended
to undergo the inconvenience, delay and expense of having to commence
Project of Partition of 1966, approved by the Court on June 6, 1967, and
and litigate an entirely different action.
the Final Partial Project of Partition of March 22, 1968, likewise approved
by the same court on April 26, 1968, claiming that the partition submitted
to the Court was erroneous, as the same did not conform with the ruling
laid down in the case of Santillon vs. Miranda
IMPERIAL VS. MONOZ
Borlagdatan, April
-Luis contended that he should get the properties partitioned
while oppositor-petitioner Purificacion Santos Imperial, the only child
FACTS:
(adopted), should get only the remaining of the estate.
-On 1957, Luis Santos surviving spouse of the deceased Fermina
ISSUES:
Bello Santos, who died intestate filed Special Proceeding No. 1049,
entitled "Intestate Estate of Fermina Bello Santos", in CFI Bulacan
WON:
-Luis was appointed regular Administrator on 1958, as there was
(1) An order of a probate court in testate or intestate proceedings
no opposition filed by the only other heir, herein petitioner Purificacion
approving a project of partition which clearly fixed the distributive share
Santos Imperial
to which each heir is entitled is merely interlocutory in nature so that the
probate court can correct and set aside the same anytime; or is final and,
-Later on petitioner Purificacion Santos Imperial entered her
therefore, appealable within the 30 day period for appeal; and
appearance in the abovementioned intestate proceedings as Oppositor,
and filed a motion to require the regular administrator to render an
(2) A court can order the correction of an erroneous final decision after it
accounting
had become final and executory.
-This resulted in the approval by the Court a quo on 1967 of the
RULING:
project of partition with the following awards:
(1)
-The contention of petitioner to the effect that the orders of the court a LOPEZ VS. LOPEZ
quo dated 1967 as well as that of 1968, are final as the same have Bueno, Jirene
determined the distributive shares of the known forced heirs, finds
support in the very same case cited by the respondents as their authority. FACTS:
-This Court citing the case of Santillon held that in deciding the issue as Concepcion Lopez filed a petition in the intestate proceedings of the
to whether the order of the lower court is final and appealable, went on deceased Emeterio Lopez, claiming to be an acknowledged natural
to say: daughter of the deceased and praying that she be declared his universal
heiress entitled to a summary award of his estate, same being valued at
It is clear that the order of the lower court is final and, therefore, less than six thousand pesos (P6,000). The oppositors-appellants filed an
appealable to this Court. opposition, denying petitioner’s claim and praying that, as they are
nephews and nieces of the deceased, they be adjudged entitled to the
Under Rule 109, section 1, a person may appeal in special proceedings property.
from an order of the Court of First Instance where such order
"determines ... the distributive share of the estate to which such person is Concepcion Lopez filed later an amended petition, alleging that,
entitled." according to a new assessment, the estate was worth nine thousand
pesos (P9,000) and that, therefore, its distribution could not be made
The two (2) questioned orders, being final in character, should have been summarily but thru regular administration proceedings. Accordingly, an
appealed by the party adversely affected within the 30-day reglementary administrator was appointed who, but appellants filed a motion that
period provided for appeal. This was not done. they be declared heirs of the deceased. The court issued an order
declaring the petitioner an acknowledged natural daughter of the
(2) deceased entitled to the rights accorded her by law. The oppositors
appealed.
-The contention of petitioner that an order which has already become
final and therefore executory is not subject to correction, finds support in ISSUE: Whether Concepcion Lopez is an acknowledged natural
Chereau vs. Fuentebella, where it was held that an erroneous decree or daughter of Emeterio Lopez who died intestate, leaving no legitimate
judgment although granted without legal authority and contrary to the descendants, ascendants or widow.
express provision of the statute, is not void. Here, as no appeal was
taken, the decree must be conceded to have full force and effect. An RULING:
erroneous decree is not a void decree.
Yes. Concepcion Lopez is an acknowledged daughter of the deceased
-The questioned orders having become final and, therefore, executory and is the only heiress.
because of the failure of the herein respondent Luis U. Santos to appeal
on time by allowing the period for appeal to lapse before filing his Contrary to appellants’ contention it is a well-settled rule that a person
motion for correction on June 18, 1968, he has to suffer the misfortune claiming to be an acknowledged natural child of a deceased need not
brought about by his own negligence and fatal inadvertence maintain a separate action for recognition but may simply intervene in
the intestate proceedings, by alleging and proving therein his or her
status as such, and claiming accordingly the right to share in the
inheritance. GUY VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Cadavis, Lloyd
The petition filed by Concepcion Lopez in the intestate proceedings is
alleged to be insufficient. It is said that there is no prayer therein that she FACTS:
be declared an acknowledged natural child, but only that she be
adjudged universal heiress, of the deceased. In the body of the petition • Private respondents-minors Karen and Kamille Oanes Wei,
there is an allegation that she is a natural child of the based and has been represented by their mother Remedios filed a petition for letters
in an uninterrupted possession of such status. of administration.
The court ruled that inasmuch as the recognition of her status is a • Private respondents alleged that they are the duly
prerequisite to her right to heirship, her prayer that she be declared
acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died
universal heiress implies a like prayer that she be recognized as an
acknowledged natural child. Furthermore, it is a well-settled rule of intestate leaving an estate valued at P10m consisting of real and
pleadings, applicable to motions or petitions, that the prayer for relief, personal properties. His known heirs are his surviving spouse
though part of the pleading, is no part of the cause of action or defense Shirley Guy and children Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and
alleged therein, and the pleader is entitled to as much relief as the facts Michael.
duly pleaded may warrant. In previous cases, similar facts were held
to be sufficient to entitle a natural child to recognition. • Private Respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular
administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei Estate.
Appellants claim that they had no notice either of the petition for the
Prayed by Petitioner Michael, son of the decedent, be appointed
declaration of heirs or of the date set for the hearing thereof. We find in
the record no evidence affirmatively showing that they had no such as special administrator of the estate.
notice; therefore, the presumption of regularity of proceedings should
stand. • Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He asserted
that his father left no debts and that his estate can be settled
In the motion for reconsideration filed by them, the lack of notice is without securing letters of administration pursuant to sec.1, rule
alleged; but the motion is not even verified. Besides, according to the 74. He argued that private respondents should have established
record Attorney Simplicio B. Peña was the counsel for both the their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima
administrator and the oppositors-appellants. The petition for declaration
wei pursuant to Art.175 of the family code.
of heirs, although signed by Attorney Simplicio B. Peña as "abogado del
administrador", was, in fact, a petition filed in behalf of the oppositors-
appellants as their right to succession is therein asserted and prayed for.
• The other heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss on the ground that
Under these circumstances, there exists sufficient ground for holding, as the certification against forum shopping has been signed by the
we do hold, that the oppositors-appellants had notice of the petition as private respondents and not their counsel. They contended that
well as of the hearing where the said attorney was present. Remedios should have executed the certification on behalf of her
minor daughters.
• Petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that private respondents 2. whether the release and waiver of claim precludes private
claim have been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise respondents from claiming their successional rights?
extinguished by reason of Remedios Release and waiver of
3. whether private respondents are barred by prescription from
claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational
proving their filiation?
assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor
children discharge the estate of SimaWei from any and all RULING:
liabilities.
1. Rule 7, sec.5 of the ROC provides that the certification on non-forum
• RTC-denied the motion to dismiss as well as the supplemental shopping should be executed by the plaintiff or the principal party.
motion to dismiss. It ruled that while the Release and waiver of Failure to comply with the requirement shall be cause for dismissal of
claim was signed by Remedios, it had not been established that the case. However, liberal application of the rules is proper where the
she was the duly constituted guardian of her minor daughters. higher interest of justice would be served. In Sy Chin vs CA, we ruled
No renunciation of right occurred. Trial court also rejected that while a petition may have been flawed where the certificate of non-
petitioner’s objections on the certification against forum forum shopping was signed only by counsel and not by the party, this
shopping. procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial justice.
So it is in the present controversy where the merits of the case and the
• Petitioner mover for reconsideration but was denied. He filed a
absence of an intention to violate the rules with impunity should be
petition for certiorari before CA which affirmed the RTC orders.
considered as compelling reasons to temper the strict application of the
CA denied the MFR. Hence this petition.
rules.
• Petitioner argues that the CA disregarded existing rules on
2. As regards Remedios release and waiver of claim, the same does not
certification against forum shopping; that the release and waiver
bar private respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid
of claim executed by Remedios released and discharged the Guy
and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms
family and estate of Sima Wei from any claims or liabilities; and
which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or
that private respondents do not have the legal personality to
benefit which legally pertains to him. In this case, we find that there was
institute the petition for letters of administration as they failed
no waiver of hereditary rights. The release and waiver of claim does not
to prove their filiation during the lifetime of Sima Wei.
state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that
remedies received 300k and an educational plan for her minor daughters
• Private respondents contended that their counsels certification
by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims
can be considered substantial compliance with the rules on
of whatsoever nature and kind against the estate of the late Rufino Guy
certification of non-forum shopping.
Susim. Considering that the document did not specifically mention
ISSUES: 1. Whether private respondents should be dismissed for failure private respondents hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot
to comply w/ the rules on certification of non-forum shopping? be construed as a waiver of successional rights.
Even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of parent died during their minority are given the right to seek recognition
private respondents, such waiver will not bar the latter’s claim. Under for a period of up to 4 years from attaining majority age.
article 1044 of CC, parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate
the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. Not having Under the family code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is
been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the established by a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document or a private
their rights as heirs of the deceased. handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for
recognition may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime.
In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived However, if the action is based upon open and continuous possession of
their successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as the status of an illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the
acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased. rules or special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent.
3. Anent the issue on private respondents filiation, we agree with the CA
that a ruling on the same would be premature considering that private It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription
respondents have yet to present evidence. Before the family code took depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by private respondents
effect, the governing law on actions for recognition of illegitimate in proving their filiation. However, it would be impossible to determine
children was article 285 of the Civil code, to wit: the same in this case as there has been no reception of evidence yet. This
court is not a trier of facts. Such matters may be resolved only by the
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be RTC.
brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the
ff.cases:
1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in

which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of
4 years from the attainment of his majority;
Xxxx
In this case, the action must be commenced within 4 years from the
finding of the document. RULE 91
Escheats
We ruled in Bernabe vs Alejo, that illegitimate children who were still
minors at the time of the Family code took effect and whose putative
INRE ESTATE OF LAO SAYCO
Castillo, Shainn
statement of the places where the realty is located.Moreover, the notice
FACTS: summoning the persons who believed they were entitled to his property
This is an appeal by the Chinaman Lao Chiama, administrator of should have been published for at least six consecutive weeks, and not
the estate of the decedent Bernardo Rafanan Lao Sayco, aliasSaya, and for three.Furthermore, the person who lays claim to the property left by
guardian of the minor Lay Chuyting from the judgment rendered in a the decedent at death, as the latter's successor or heir, must prove his
special proceeding. identity and rights.
The municipal council of Mambajao appeared in the said
proceedings and prayed that, since Bernardo Rafanan died in that In the present case, counsel for the municipality of Mambajao
pueblo without leaving any known legitimate successor,the real and merely prayed for an order of reversion and for the adjudication in
personal property left by the said decedent within the district of the behalf of the municipality of the property aforementioned; he did not
property left by the said decedent within the district of the comply with the provisions of the law by furnishing the required proofs
aforementioned municipality be awarded to the latter. The administrator in regard to the matters hereinabove indicated, which must be the
also prayede that his administration be closed, and, as the guardian of subject of an investigation.
the Chiaman Lay Chuyting, requested that the property referred to be REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS
delivered to the latter as the son and sole heir of the decedent Rafanan. Castillo, Rochelle Jane
The municipal council of Mambajao,which believed that it was FACTS:

entitled to the said property, opposed the delivery of the property to the
alleged heir. For more than three (3) decades (from 1952 to 1985) private
respondent Amada Solano served as the all-around personal domestic
The lower court, rendered judgment ordering that the property helper of the late Elizabeth Hankins, a widow and a French national.
left by the decedent, Bernardo Rafanan Lao Sayco, be assigned to the During Ms. Hankins' lifetime and most especially during the waning
municipality of Mambajao, Province of Misamis, to be administered by years of her life, respondent Solano was her faithful girl Friday and a
its municipal council and placed at the disposal of the school in the same
constant companion since no close relative was available to tend to her
manner as other property intended for the same use.
needs. In recognition of Solano's faithful and dedicated service, Ms.
ISSUE: Hankins executed in her favor two (2) deeds of donation involving two
Whether the municipality of Mambajao is entitled to the (2) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808 of the Registry of
property left by the decedent. Deeds. Private respondent alleged that she misplaced the deeds of
donation and were nowhere to be found. While the deeds of donation
RULING:
were missing, the Republic filed a petition for the escheat of the estate of
No. Rule 91 of the Civil Procedure provides the rules for filing a
petition for escheat. In the present case,it does not appear that there was Elizabeth Hankins before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. During
made, at the request of counsel for the president and the municipal the proceedings, a motion for intervention was filed by Romeo Solano,
council of Mambajao, the inquisition provided by law, for the record is spouse of private respondent, and one Gaudencio Regosa, but on 24 June
not accompanied by any certified copy of the investigatory of the real 1987 the motion was denied by the trial court for the reason that "they
and personal property that belonged to the said decedent, with a miserably failed to show valid claim or right to the properties in
question." Since it was established that there were no known heirs and the petition for escheat. In the present case, the Colegio de San Jose, Inc.
persons entitled to the properties of decedent Hankins, the lower court and Carlos Young appeared alleging to have a material interest in the
escheated the estate of the decedent in favor of petitioner Republic of the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan; the former because it claims to be the
Philippines. exclusive owner of the hacienda, and the latter because he claims to be
the lessee thereof under a contract legally entered with the former
ISSUE: (underscoring supplied). (d) A judgment in escheat proceedings when
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive against all
Whether or not the lower court had jurisdiction to declare the
persons with actual or constructive notice, but not against those who are
same escheated in favor of the state.
not parties or privies thereto. As held in Hamilton v. Brown,"a judgment
RULING: (A)We rule for the petitioner. Escheat is a proceeding, unlike of escheat was held conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement
that of succession or assignment, whereby the state, by virtue of its to all persons interested. Absolute lack on the part of petitioners of any
sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal property of a person dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any right, or in any way injure
who dies intestate leaving no heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a him, constitutes due process of law, proper notice having been
property is claimed by the state to forestall an open "invitation to self- observed." With the lapse of the 5-year period therefore, private
service by the first comers." Since escheat is one of the incidents of respondent has irretrievably lost her right to claim and the supposed
sovereignty, the state may, and usually does, prescribe the conditions "discovery of the deeds of donation" is not enough justification to nullify
and limits the time within which a claim to such property may be made. the escheat judgment which has long attained finality.
The procedure by which the escheated property may be recovered is
generally prescribed by statue, and a time limit is imposed within which
such action must be brought. (b) In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an RULE 109
escheated property must file his claim "within five (5) years from the Appeals in Special Proceedings
date of such judgment, such person shall have possession of and title to
TESTATE ESTATE OF VDA. DE BIASCAN VS. BIASCAN
the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be accountable to him
Dela Cruz, Kyzeth
for the proceeds, after deducting the estate; but a claim not made shall be
barred forever." The 5-year period is not a device capriciously conjured REPUBLIC VS. NISHINA
by the state to defraud any claimant; on the contrary, it is decidedly De guzman, Jabrielle
prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious in
FACTS:
asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a final
Nisaida Sumera Nishina (respondent), represented by her
judgment. (c) In a special proceeding for escheat under sections 750 and
mother Zenaida Sumera Watanabe, filed before the RTC of Malolos,
751 the petitioner is not the sole and exclusive interested party. Any Bulacan a verified petition for cancellation of birth record and change of
person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property sought to surname. In her petition, respondent alleged the following: She was born
be escheated is likewise an interested party and may appear and oppose on October 31, 1987 in Malolos, Bulacan to her Filipino mother Zenaida
and Japanese father Koichi Nishina who were married. Her father later proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First
died. Her mother married another Japanese, Kenichi Hakamada. As they Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order
could not find any record of her birth at the Malolos civil registry, or judgment: (a) Allows or disallows a will; (b) Determines who are the
respondents mother caused the late registration of her birth under the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the estate
surname of her mothers second husband, Hakamada. Her mother and to which such person is entitled; (c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in
Hakamada eventually divorced. Her mother married another Japanese, part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim
Takayuki Watanabe, who later adopted her by a decree issued by the presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it; (d) Settles
Tokyo Family Court. It was filed and recorded in the civil registry of the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian; (e)
Manila. It surfaced that her birth was in fact originally registered at the Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a
Malolos Civil Registry under the name Nisaida Sumera Nishina,hence, deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final
her filing before the RTC of her petition praying that her second birth determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing,
certificate bearing the surname Hakamada, issued through late except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special
registration be cancelled; and that in light of the decree of adoption, her administrator; and (f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case,
surname Nishina in the original birth certificate be changed to Watanabe. and affects the substantial rights of the person appealing unless it be an
After hearing the petition, RTC, granted respondents petition and order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration.
directed the Local Civil Registry of Malolos to cancel the second birth The above-quoted rule contemplates multiple appeals during the
record of Nisaida Sumera Hakamada and to change it from NISAIDA pendency of special proceedings. A record on appeal in addition to the
SUMERA NISHINA to NISAIDA SUMERA WATANABE. Before the notice of appeal is thus required to be filed as the original records of the
Court of Appeals, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, case should remain with the trial court to enable the rest of the case to
alleging that petitioner adopted a wrong mode of appeal since it did not proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by said
file a record on appeal as required under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 41 court and held to be final. In the present case, the filing of a record on
(appeal from the RTCs) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The appeal was not necessary since no other matter remained to be heard
appellate court dismissed petitioners appeal, holding that since and determined by the trial court after it issued the appealed order
respondents petition before the RTC is classified as a special proceeding, granting respondents petition for cancellation of birth record and change
petitioner should have filed both notice of appeal and a record on appeal of surname in the civil registry. WHEREFORE, the petition is
within 30 days from receipt of the October 8, 2007 Order granting GRANTED.
respondents petition, and by not filing a record on appeal, petitioner
never perfected its appeal
RULES 99-100
ISSUE: Adoption and Custody of Minors
WON the CA erred in dismissing the appeal.
REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND BOBILES
Dorado, Czaybeeh
RULING:
SECTION 1, Rule 109 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
REPUBLIC VS. TOLEDANO AND SPOUSES CLOUSE
specifies the orders or judgments in special proceedings which may be
Espino, Carla
the subject of an appeal, viz: SECTION 1. Orders or judgments from
which appeals may be taken. An interested person may appeal in special FACTS:
On February 21, 1990, Spouses Alvin Clouse, a natural-born US Citizen There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not
and Evelyn Clouse, a former Filipino who became a naturalized US qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional
citizen, filed a petition to adopt Solomon Alcala, a minor who is Evelyn's cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is not a former
youngest brother. The trial court granted the petition. Republic, through Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America.
the Office of the Solicitor General appealed contending that the lower In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by
court erred in granting the petition for the spouses are not qualified to consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place,
adopt under Philippine Law. when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to
adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent
ISSUE: Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino
citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in
Whether or not Spouses Clouse are qualified to adopt
1988.
RULING:
Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to
Under Articles 184 and 185 of The Family Code of the Philippines, qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184. She was a former
private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately,
Solomon Joseph Alcala. the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without
violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband
Article 184, paragraph (3) expressly enumerates the persons who are not and wife. It reads:
qualified to adopt, viz.:
Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the
(3) An alien, except: following cases:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
consanguinity;
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino
spouse; or Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a
condition that must be read along together with Article 184.
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly
with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Under the Family Code, joint adoption by husband and wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental
Aliens, not included in the foregoing exceptions, may adopt Filipino authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. As the child to be
children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to
be provided by law.
require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony created after the right has vested. As long as the petition for adoption
between the spouses. was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in
governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and
retains it until it fully disposes of the case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of
the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
REPUBLIC VS. MILLER commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in
Hipolito, Nina Anthonette criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by a subsequent
happenings or events, although of a character which would have
FACTS: prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. Therefore, an
On July 29, 1988, Spouses Miller, both American citizens, filed alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effectivity of the Family
with the RTC, Angeles City a verified petition to adopt Michael Magno code, although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code,
Madayag, a Filipino child, under the provision of the Child and Youth may continue with his petition under the law prevailing before the
Welfare Code which allows aliens to adopt. The natural parents executed Family Code. Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the
affidavits giving their irrevocable consent to the adoption and the DSWD interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They
recommended approval of the petition on the basis of its evaluation. On are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered decision granting the petition for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of
adoption. On August 3, 1998, the Family Code became effective, society and family in the person of the adopter, as well as childless
prohibiting the adoption of a Filipino child by aliens. The Solicitor couples or persons to experience the joy of parenthood and give them
General appealed to the granting of the petition for adoption by the RTC. legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their
natural parent instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be
ISSUE: sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
Whether or not aliens may be allowed to adopt a Filipino child objectives of the law.
when the petition for adoption was filed prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code prohibiting the same. IN RE MICHELLE LIM
Katigbak, Paola Margareth
RULING:
Yes. An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth FACTS:
Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition,
acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent Monina Lim (petitioner) is an optometrist by profession. On
enactment of a new law disqualifying him. The enactment of the Family 1974, she married Primo Lim. Being childless, they registered the minor
Code, effective August 3, 1988, will not impair the right of respondents children entrusted to them by certain Ayuban as their own----named
who are aliens to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim.
vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall be
governed by the law then in force. A vested right is one whose existence, When Primo died, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American
effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of citizen. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the
the holder. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the amnesty given under RA 8552 to those individuals who simulated the
enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions
for the adoption of Michelle and Michael. At the time of the filing of the These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens
petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7.
while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore
RTC dismissed the petitions on the ground that since the petitioner had necessary since the children have been emancipated having reached the
remarried, she should have filed the petition jointly with her new age of majority. This is untenable. It is true that when the child reaches
husband. Motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied. Mere the age of emancipation that is, when he attains the age of majority or 18
consent of the husbend was insufficient because the law gives additional years of age emancipation terminates parental authority over the person
requirements, such as residency and certification of his qualification, and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for
which the husbandmust comply. As to the argument that the adoptees all acts of civil life. However, parental authority is merely just one of the
are already emancipated and joint adoption is merely for the joint effects of legal adoption. Other effects were enumerated in Article V of
exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that even an RA 8552.
emancipated child acquires certain rights from his parents and assumes
certain obligations and responsibilities. Petitioner further insist that joint adoption was possible since Olario
already filed a case for dissolution of marriage, the court ruled that until
Hence, the present petition. and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage
between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the
ISSUE: case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is required.
Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt?
RULE: CANG VS. CLAVANO

Denied. Under Section 7 of RA 8552, the use of the word Lectura, Erika
“shall” means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for DSWD VS. BELEN
adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption Lim, Justin
were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband,
Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption
on this ground.
REPUBLIC VS HERNANDEZ
Even if Olario gave his consent, there are requirements that must be Lubay, Angela
complied, as set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove
that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the FACTS:
Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least
three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl
(3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the
(4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement
is allowed to enter the adopters country as the latters adopted child.
None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.
the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his RULING:
adoption.
No.
Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the
same petition for adoption objecting to the joinder of the petition for Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effect of
adoption and the petitions for the change of name in a single proceeding, adoption:
arguing that these petition should be conducted and pursued as two
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a
separate proceedings.
legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of
name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the
different from and are not related to each other, being respectively surname of the adopters;
governed by distinct sets of law and rules. Petitioner further contends
The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear
that what the law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as
the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is
a matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter and as a natural
the change of the adoptee’s surname to follow that of the adopter which
consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the
is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and
change of the registered given or proper name, and since this would
must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if
involve a substantial change of one’s legal name, a petition for change of
not prayed for by petitioner.
name under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the
substantive and adjective requisites therefor being conformably satisfied. However, the given or proper name, also known as
the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for
originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive
adoption with a prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5,
relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the
Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to
adoptee’s registered Christian or first name. The automatic change
avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging
thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the
protracted and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no
purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an
prohibition in the Rules against the joinderof adoption and change of
adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively
name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in a
inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be
single petition.
granted.
ISSUE:
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil
WON respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change register is the name appearing therein. If a change in one’s name is
of the given or proper name if the adoptee in a petition for adoption. desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the
substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for respondent abandoned her family in 1992; secondly, she is mentally
change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the unstable; and thirdly, she cannot provide proper care to the children.
sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and
ISSUES:
accordingly determined.
1. Whether or not the custody of the minor children be given
to the mother.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict
2. Whether or not the father is obligated to provide financial
compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order
support to the minor children not in his custody.
to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an
independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed RULING:
by its own set of rules. Afortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any 1. Yes. Section 213 of the Family Code states that:
other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of “In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be
another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take
into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child
significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law
over seven years of age, unless the parent is unfit.
system. No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
IN RE STEPHANIE GARCIA otherwise.”
Mercado, Trish
In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the sole and
foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral
BRIONES VS. MIGUEL
welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective
Dumapias, Gay*
resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents.
However, the law favors the mother if she is a fit and proper
SY VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Rivera, Hiezll Wynn person to have custody of her children so that they may not only receive
her attention, care, supervision but also have the advantage and benefit
FACTS: of a mother’s love and devotion for which there is no
substitute. Generally, the love, solicitude and devotion of a mother
On 19 January 1994, Mercedes Tan Uy-Sy filed a petition for cannot be replaced by another and are worth more to a child of tender
habeas corpus against Wilson Sy before the Regional Trial Court of years than all other things combined.
Manila, Branch 48, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 94-69002.
Mercedes prayed that said writ be issued ordering Wilson to produce 2. Yes.
their minor children Vanessa and Jeremiah before the court and that Article 203 of the Family Code states that the obligation to give
after hearing, their care and custody be awarded to her as their mother. support is demandable from the time the person who has a right to
receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except
In his answer, Wilson prayed that the custody of the minors be from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand.
awarded to him instead. Petitioner maintained that Mercedes was unfit The Court likewise affirms the award of P50,000.00 as support for the
to take custody of the minors. He adduced the following reasons: firstly, minor children. As found by both courts, petitioner’s representations
regarding his family’s wealth and his capability to provide for his family RTC: resolved in favor of private respondent, decreeing that, the
more than provided a fair indication of his financial standing even jurisdictional requirements having been fully complied with.
though he proved to be less than forthright on the matter. In any event,
this award of support is merely provisional as the amount may be Republic through the Solicitor General appealed. The Solicitor General
modified or altered in accordance with the increased or decreased needs contends that private respondent's allegations of ridicule and/or
of the needy party and with the means of the giver. isolation from family and friends were unsubstantiated and cannot
justify the petition for change of name. He claims that for private
respondent to cast aside the name of his adoptive father is crass
ingratitude to the memory of the latter and to his adoptive mother who
is still alive, despite her consent to the petition for change of name.
RULE 103 Further, the Solicitor General posits that the reversion of Maximo Wong
to his old name violates Articles 341 and 365 of the Civil Code, which
Change of Name
requires an adopted child to use the surname of the adopter.
CA: Affirmed.
REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS (May 21, 1992) Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Rodriguez, Maria Lorraine
ISSUE:
Whether the reasons given by private respondent in his petition
FACTS:
for change of name are valid, sufficient and proper to warrant the
Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of
granting of said petition.
Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina. When he was but 2 and a half years
old and then known as Maximo Alcala, Jr., and his sister Margaret
RULING: YES. The assertion of the Solicitor General was unacceptable.
Alcala, was then 9 years old, they were, with the consent of their natural
parents and by order of the court, adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and The testimony of private respondent in the lower court bears out the
Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos. Hoong Wong, now existence of valid cause in his bid for change of name: that he observed
deceased, was an insurance agent while Concepcion Ty Wong was a that “Wong” as a surname embarrassed him to his friends and when he
high school teacher. They decided to adopt the children as they goes with Chinese friends he cannot talk Chinese; that private
remained childless after 15 years of marriage. Upon reaching the age of respondent was living in Campo Muslim, a Muslim community but no
22, private respondent, by then married and a junior Engineering
one can believe that he is a Muslim; that he has a little business of
student, filed a petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was
Furniture but has little customer because no one believes that he is
averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him
from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry Muslim. Hence, the SC upheldthe decision of respondent appellate court.
when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim The purpose of the law an allowing of change of name as contemplated
community, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien by the provisions of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is to give a person an
nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, opportunity to improve his personality and to provide his best interest.In
thus hampering his business and social life; and that his adoptive mother granting or denying the petition for change of name, the question of
does not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname.
proper and reasonable cause is left to the discretion of the court. The
evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the While it is true that under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the
best evidence available is required.In the present case, the court had effect that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it
exercised its discretion judiciously when it granted the petition. must nevertheless be borne in mind that the change of the surname of the
adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of adoption proceedings.0
Justice dictates that a person should be allowed to improve his
The act of adoption fixes a status, viz., that of parent and child. More
social standing as long as in doing so, he does not cause prejudice or
technically, it is an act by which relations of paternity and affiliation are
injury to the interest of the State or other persons .Nothing whatsoever is recognized as legally existing between persons not so related by nature.
shown in the record of this case that such prejudice or injury to the It has been defined as the taking into one's family of the child of another
interest of the state or of other persons would result in the change of as son or daughter and heir and conferring on it a title to the rights and
petitioner's name. privileges of such. The purpose of an adoption proceeding is to effect
To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show this new status of relationship between the child and its adoptive
parents, the change of name which frequently accompanies adoption
not only some proper or compelling reason therefor but also that he will
being more an incident than the object of the proceeding. 31 The welfare
be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the of the child is the primary consideration in the determination of an
grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) When application for adoption.
the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) When the change results as a legal consequence, as in
legitimation; (c) When the change will avoid confusion; (d) Having SILVERIO VS. REPUBLIC
Salayog, Benny Rico
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name,
unaware of her alien parentage; (e) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino PEOPLE VS. CAGANDAHAN
name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without Sumaway, Dylan
prejudicing anybody; and (f) When the surname causes embarrassment
and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a REPUBLIC VS. AQUINO
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public Tomarong, Marian
interest.
REPUBLIC VS. MARCOS
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the Tresvalles, Kris
question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of
the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court FACTS: On March 30, 1968, a verified petition was filed by private
and not all the best evidence available. Summarizing, in special respondent Pang Cha Quen alleging that she is a citizen of Nationalist
proceedings for change of name, what is involved is not a mere matter of
China, married to Alfredo De la Cruz, a Filipino citizen; that she had
allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of
the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support resided in Baguio City since her birth on January 29, 1930; that by a
thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and previous marriage to Sia Bian alias Huang Tzeh Lik, a citizen of
with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in Nationalist China, she gave birth to a daughter, May Sia alias Manman
the courts. Huang on January 28, 1958 in the City of Manila; that on January 12,
1959, she caused her daughter to be registered as an alien under the Then, respondent Judge issued an order on February 12, 1969
name of Mary Pang, i.e., using the maternal surname, because the child's authorizing the name of the minor, May Sia alias Manman Huang, also
father had abandoned them; that her daughter has always used the name known as Mary Pang, to be changed to Mary Pang De la Cruz.
Mary Pang at home and in the Baguio Chinese Patriotic School where
she studies; that on August 16, 1966, petitioner Pang Cha Quen married The Government, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the
Alfredo De la Cruz; that as her daughter has grown to love and Supreme Court on the ground that the court's order is contrary to law
recognize her stepfather, Alfredo De la Cruz, as her own father, she
ISSUE: whether respondent Judge erred in granting the petition
desires to adopt and use his surname "De la Cruz" in addition to her
although private respondent Pang Cha Quen failed to adduce proper
name "Mary Pang" so that her full name shall be Mary Pang De la Cruz;
and reasonable cause for changing the name of the minor "May Sia" alias
that Alfredo De la Cruz gave his conformity to the petition by signing at
Manman Huang."
the bottom of the pleading; that the petition was not made for the
purpose of concealing a crime as her ten-year old daughter has not HELD: The Government's contention is well-taken.
committed any, nor to evade the execution of a judgment as she has
never been sued in court, and the petition is not intended to cause 1. We accordingly hold that for a publication of a petition for a change of
damage or prejudice to any third person. She prayed that her daughter name to be valid, the title thereof should include, first, his real name, and
be allowed to change her name from May Sia, alias Manman Huang, to second, his aliases, if any. this Court explained the reason for the rule
Mary Pang De la Cruz. requiring the inclusion of the name sought to be adopted and the other
names or aliases of the applicant in the title of the petition, or in the
On April 4, 1968, respondent Judge issued an order setting the hearing of caption of the published order. It is that the ordinary reader only glances
the petition on September 16, 1968 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning and fleetingly at the caption of the published order or the title of the petition
inviting all interested persons to appear and show cause, if any, why the in a special proceeding for a change of name. Only if the caption or the
petition should not be granted. The order also directed that it be title strikes him because one or all of the names mentioned are familiar to
published at the expense of the petitioner in the Baguio and Midland him, does he proceed to read the contents of the order. The probability is
Courier, a newspaper of general circulation in Baguio City and Mountain great that he will not notice the other names or aliases of the applicant if
Province, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, the first they are mentioned only in the body of the order or petition.
publication to be made as soon as possible. The order also commanded
that the Solicitor General and the City Attorney of Baguio be furnished In the case at bar, the caption of both the verified petition dated March
copies of the order and petition. 30,1968, and the published order of the trial court dated April 4, 1968
read, thus:
On September 16, 1968, when the petition was called for hearing, nobody
opposed it. Upon motion of petitioner's counsel, respondent Judge IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF THE MINOR MAY SIA
authorized the Clerk of Court or his deputy to receive the evidence of the ALIAS MANMAN HUANG TO MARY PANG DE LA CRUZ, PANG
petitioner, Pang Cha Quen. CHA QUEN, Petitioner. (P. 15, Rollo.)
The omission of her other alias-- "Mary Pang"-- in the captions of the Clearly, these are not valid reasons for a change of name. The general
court's order and of the petition defeats the purpose of the publication. rule is that a change of name should not be permitted if it will give a
In view of that defect, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the false impression of family relationship to another where none actually
subject of the proceedings, i.e., the various names and aliases of the exists. we specifically held that our laws do not authorize legitimate
petitioner which she wished to change to "Mary Pang De la Cruz." children to adopt the surname of a person not their father, for to allow
them to adopt the surname of their mother's husband, who is not their
father, can result in confusion of their paternity.
2. The following have been considered valid grounds for a change of Another reason for disallowing the petition for change of name is that it
name: was not filed by the proper party.
(1) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to Clearly, the petition for change of name must be filed by the person
write or pronounce; desiring to change his/her name, even if it may be signed and verified
by some other person in his behalf. In this case, however, the petition
(2) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
was filed by Pang Cha Quen not by May Sia.Hence, only May Sia herself,
(3) when the change will avoid confusion (Haw Liong vs. Republic, L- alias Manman Huang, alias Mary Pang, when she shall have reached the
21194, April 29,1966; Chill Hap Chin vs. Republic, L-20018, April 30, age of majority, may file the petition to change her name. The decision to
1966; Republic vs. Tanada, et al., L-31563, November 29, 1971; Alfon vs. change her name, the reason for the change, and the choice of a new
Republic, I,51201, May 29, 1980); name and surname shall be hers alone to make. It must be her personal
decision.
(4) having continuously used and been known since childhood by a
Filipino name, unaware of his alien parentage (Josefina Ang Chay vs.
Republic, L-28507, July 31, 1980); or
IN RE: PETITION OF JULIAN WANG
(5) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former Tuason, Jannelle
alienage all in good faith and not to prejudice anybody (Uy vs. Republic,
FACTS:
L-22712, November 29, 1965).
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City to parents
As may be gleaned from the petition filed in the lower court, the reasons Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to
offered for changing the name of petitioner's daughter are: (1) that "her each other. When his parents subsequently got married, they executed a
daughter grew up with, and learned to love and recognize Alfredo de la deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was changed
Cruz as her own father. (2) to afford her daughter a feeling of security from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
and (3) that "Alfredo de la Cruz agrees to this petition, and has signified The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in
his conformity at the foot of this pleading" Singapore for a long time because they will let him study there together
with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore. allow one to drop the middle name from his registered name? We have
Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother to answer in the negative because middle names serve as to identify the
are not carried in a person’s name, they anticipate that Julian Lin maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish
Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he
registered name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might has.
also be asking whether they are brother and sister since they have In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the
different surnames. Hence, they filed a petition for change of name
dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such change
and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin
of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and
Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have
convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his
his registered name changedto Julian Lin Wang.RTC denied the petition
middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute
because the reasons for the change of name were not within the grounds proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete
recognized by law. Appeal made thereon was subsequently denied.
name.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the denial to grant the change of name was proper. REPUBLIC VS. CAPOTE
Umbalin, Norissa
RULING:
Yes. The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be
‘proper and reasonable cause’ for which the change is sought. To justify
a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some
RA 9048 & 10172
proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced Clerical Error Law
by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change
of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, BATBATAN VS. OFFICE OF LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
Uy, Alexander
change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the
FACTS:
change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and
been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of
Petitioner Eligia Batbatan is the mother of two minor children,
alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing Jorge Batbatan Ang and Delia Batbatan Luy. The surnames were taken
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is from then name and alias of their father, Ang Kiu Chuy, alias Sioma Luy.
no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent Petitioner and Sioma Luy were never married, and Sioma Luy is married
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.16 to another woman. Petitioner filed the petition to remove the name of the
The present petition seeks to drop the middle name altogether. Decided father so that the son would be Jorge Batbatan and the daughter would
cases in this jurisdiction involving petitions for change of name usually be Delia Batbatab. The petition was denied by the trial court on the
deal with requests for change of surname. There are only a handful of grounds that the records show that it was the petitioner who supplied
cases involving requests for change of the given name and none on the information in the birth certificate of her son, and that entries in the
requests for changing or dropping of the middle name. Does the law
records of birth are correctable only if the effect would not change status,
citizenship, or any substantial alterations. Such changes must be decided Natividad K. Lee-Miguel and Thomas K. Lee, filed two (2) separate
in the appropriate proceeding. petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records
of birth of the petitioners—Marcelo Lee, Albina Lee-Young, Mariano
ISSUE: Lee, Pablo Lee, Helen Lee, Catalino K. Lee, Eusebio Lee, and Emma
Lee.
Whether or not the name change could be allowed
A case was filed against all petitioners, except Emma Lee, before RTC
RULING: Manila assigned to respondent Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion. A
similar petition against Emma Lee was filed before the RTC of
The Court ruled in the affirmative. The changes sought by Kalookan and assigned to the sala of respondent Judge Jaime T.
petitioner would not affect the status of the children because they are Hamoy.
illegitimate in the first place. The law requires that illegitimate children
Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false and erroneous
should carry the surname of their mothers and that is precisely what the entries in all pertinent records of birth of petitioners by deleting
petitioner was trying to achieve here. A clerical error implies mistakes by and/or canceling therein the name of “Keh Shiok Cheng” as their
the clerk in copying or writing, the making of wrong entries in the public mother, and by substituting the same with the name “Tiu Chuan”,
records contrary to existing facts. It is not a clerical error if it would bring who is allegedly the petitioners’ true birth mother.
about a substantial change.
The private respondents alleged in their petitions that they are the
legitimate children of spouses Lee Tek Sheng and Keh Shiok Cheng
who were legally married in China.
Tiu Chuan was introduced by Lee Tek Sheng to his family as their
new housemaid but immediately became his mistress. As a result of
their illicit relations, Tiu Chuan gave birth to petitioners.
LEE VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time
G.R. NO. 118387, 367 SCRA 110
Tiu Chuan gave birth to each of the petitioners, their father, falsified
OCTOBER 11, 2001
the entries in the records of birth of petitioners by making it appear
Meiki , Merlin
that petitioners’ mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.
FACTS:
Since the birth of petitioners, it was Tiu Chuan who took care of the
The private respondents are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his
petitioners. They all lived in the same compound Keh Shiok Cheng
lawful wife, Keh Shiok Cheng. The petitioners are children of Lee
and private respondents were residing in. All was well, therefore,
Tek Sheng and his concubine, Tiu Chuan.
before private respondents’ discovery of the dishonesty and fraud
perpetrated by their father, Lee Tek Sheng.
Private Respondents—Rita K. Lee, Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng, Rosa K.
Lee-Vanderlek, Melody K. Lee-Chin, Lucia K. Lee Tek Sheng-Ong,
Julian K. Lee, Henry K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Victoriano K. Lee,
When Keh Shiok Cheng died, Lee Tek Sheng insisted that the names 2. Whether or not the private respondent’s suits amounted to a
of all his children, including those of petitioners’, be included in the collateral attack against petitioner’s legitimacy in the guise of a Rule
obituary notice of the former’s death that was to be published in the 108 proceeding
newspapers.
The private respondents requested the NBI to conduct an HELD:

investigation. After investigation, the NBI prepared a report that the The proceedings are simply aimed at establishing a particular fact,
false entries in the records of birth of petitioners made it appear that status and/or right. The thrust of said proceedings was to establish the
the latter were legitimate children of Kek Shiok Cheng. factual truth regarding the occurrence of certain events which created
or affected the status of persons and/or otherwise deprived said
It was this report that prompted private respondents to file the persons of rights.
petitions for cancellation and/or correction of entries in petitioners’
records of birth with the lower courts. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court establishes the status or right
of a party, or a particular fact. The petitions filed by private
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions on the grounds respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners’ records of
that: (1) resort to Rule 108 is improper where the ultimate objective is birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or biological
to assail the legitimacy and filiation of petitioners; (2) the petition, reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and
which is essentially an action to impugn legitimacy was filed given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth records.
prematurely; and (3) the action to impugn has already prescribed.
Contrary to petitioners’ contention that the petitions before the lower
Respondent Judge Veneracion denied the motion to dismiss for failure courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is
of the petitioners to appear at the hearing of the said motion. not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok
Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latter’s children.
On the other hand, respondent Judge Hamoy issued an Order stating There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all between
that the petitioners have complied with the jurisdictional Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners.
requirements for the Court to take cognizance of this case.
In Republic vs. Valencia, this Court, held that even substantial errors
Petitioners’ attempts at seeking a reconsideration of the above- in a civil register may be corrected and the true facts established
mentioned orders failed and they appealed to the CA. The CA, provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
however, found no merit in their arguments and dismissed their appropriate adversary proceeding. A proceeding for correction and/or
petition. cancellation of entries in the civil register under Rule 108 ceases to be
summary in nature and takes on the characteristics of an appropriate
adversary proceeding when all the procedural requirements under
ISSUES: Rule 108 are complied with.
1. Whether or not resort to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court
is proper “Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all
relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where
opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the
opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly or any person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to
weighed and considered, the suit or proceeding is ‘appropriate.’ be cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively
prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings.”
The pertinent sections of rule 108 provide: (Underscoring supplied.)
‘SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the According to the Court of Appeals, the proceedings taken in both
civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or petitions for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of
claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made birth of petitioners in the lower courts are appropriate adversary
parties to the proceeding.’ proceedings.
‘SEC. 4. Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of the petition, the We agree. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:
court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the
same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be entries of birth was filed by private respondents and pursuant to the
published once in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a order of the RTC-Manila, dated February 17, 1993, a copy of the order
newspaper of general circulation in the province.’ setting the case for hearing was ordered published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
‘SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or the Philippines. In the RTC-Kalookan, there was an actual publication
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction of the order setting the case for hearing in “Media Update” once a
is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or week for three (3) consecutive weeks. In both cases notices of the
from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition orders were ordered served upon the Solicitor General, the Civil
thereto.’ Registrars of Manila and Kalookan and upon the petitioners herein.
“Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding Both orders set the case for hearing and directed the Civil Registrars
concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil and the other respondents in the case below to file their oppositions to
register are - (1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or the said petitions. A motion to dismiss was consequently filed by
claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing herein petitioners Marcelo, Mariano, Pablo, Helen, Catalino and
of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to - (1) issue an order Eusebio, all surnamed Lee, and Albina Lee-Young in the RTC-Manila,
fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause and an opposition was filed by Emma Lee in the RTC-Kalookan.
the order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the In view of the foregoing, we hold that the petitions filed by the private
province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition: - respondents in the courts below by way of a special proceeding for
(1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming any cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil registers with the
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought. requisite parties, notices and publications could very well be regarded
“If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition as that proper suit or appropriate action. (Underscoring supplied.)
for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even
if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court The petitioners assert, however, that making the proceedings
can no longer be described as “summary”. There can be no doubt that adversarial does not give trial courts the license to go beyond the
when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar ambit of Rule 108 which is limited to those corrections contemplated
by Article 412 of the New Civil Code or mere clerical errors of a by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to
harmless or innocuous nature. The petitioners point to the case of prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary
Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic, which is of a later date than Republic vs. admitted. x x x.” (Underscoring supplied.)
Valencia, where this Courtreverted to the doctrine laid down in earlier
cases, starting with Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic, prohibiting the It is true that in special proceedings formal pleadings and a hearing
extension of the application of Rule 108 beyond innocuous or harmless may be dispensed with, and the remedy granted upon mere
changes or corrections. Petitioners contend that as held in Go, et al. vs. application or motion. But this is not always the case, as when the
Civil Registrar, allowing substantial changes under Rule 108 would statute expressly provides. Hence, a special proceeding is not always
render the said rule unconstitutional as the same would have the effect summary. One only has to take a look at the procedure outlined in
of increasing or modifying substantive rights. Rule 108 to see that what is contemplated therein is not a summary
proceeding per se. Rule 108 requires publication of the petition three
At the outset, it should be pointed out that in the cited case of Labayo- (3) times, i.e., once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks (Sec. 4). The
Rowe vs. Republic, the reason we declared null and void the portion of Rule also requires inclusion as parties of all persons who claim any
the lower court’s order directing the change of Labayo-Rowe’s civil interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction (Sec.
status and the filiation of one of her children as appearing in the 3). The civil registrar and any person in interest are also required to
latter’s record of birth, is not because Rule 108 was inappropriate to file their opposition, if any, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
effect such changes, but because Labayo-Rowe’s petition before the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice (Sec. 5).
lower court failed to implead all indispensable parties to the case. Last, but not the least, although the court may make orders expediting
the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss
Far from petitioners’ theory, this Court’s ruling in Labayo-Rowe vs. the petition or issue an order granting the same (Sec. 7).
Republic[ does not exclude recourse to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules
of Court to effect substantial changes or corrections in entries of the Thus, we find no reason to depart from our ruling in Republic vs.
civil register. The only requisite is that the proceedings under Rule Valencia, that Rule 108, when all the procedural requirements
108 be an appropriate adversary proceeding as contra-distinguished thereunder are followed, is the appropriate adversary proceeding to
from a summary proceeding. Thus: effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil
register. It must be conceded, however, that even after Republic vs.
“If the purpose of the petition [for cancellation and/or correction of Valenciathere continues to be a seesawing of opinion on the issue of
entries in the civil register] is merely to correct the clerical errors which whether or not substantial corrections in entries of the civil register
are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, may be effected by means of Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the
under a summary procedure, issue an order for the correction of a New Civil Code. The more recent cases of Leonor vs. Court of
mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect Appealsand Republic vs. Labradordo seem to signal a reversion to the
the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are Ty Kong Tin ruling which delimited the scope of application of Article
substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed 412 to clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register.
after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of
the issues involved. Changes which affect the civil status or In Republic vs. Labrador, the Court held that Rule 108 cannot be used
citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be to modify, alter or increase substantive rights, such as those involving
threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child. We ruled thus:
issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected
‘On its face, the Rule would appear to authorize the cancellation of “x x x. After a mature deliberation, the opinion was reached that what
any entry regarding “marriages” in the civil registry for any reason by was contemplated therein are mere corrections of mistakes that are
the mere filing of a verified petition for the purpose. However, it is clerical in nature and not those that may affect the civil status or the
not as simple as it looks. Doctrinally, the only errors that can be nationality or citizenship of the persons involved. If the purpose of
canceled or corrected under this Rule are typographical or clerical the petition is merely a clerical error then the court may issue an order
errors, not material or substantial ones like the validity or nullity of a in order that the error or mistake may be corrected. If it refers to a
marriage. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious substantial change, which affects the status or citizenship of a party,
to the understanding; error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake the matter should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon
in copying or writing (Black vs. Republic, L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958); or the nature of the issue involved. Such action can be found at random
some harmless and innocuous change such as a correction of name that in our substantive and remedial laws the implementation of which
is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the will naturally depend upon the factors and circumstances that might
parent (Ansalada vs. Republic, L-10226, Feb. 14, 1958).’ arise affecting the interested parties. This opinion is predicated upon
the theory that the procedure contemplated in article 412 is summary
‘Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil in nature which cannot cover cases involving controversial issues.”
status of petitioner and her children from legitimate to illegitimate, the
same cannot be granted except only in an adversarial x x x.’ This doctrine was taken a step further in the case of Chua Wee, et al.
vs. Republicwhere the Court said that:
‘Clearly and unequivocally, the summary procedure under Rule 108,
and for that matter under Article 412 of the Civil Code cannot be used “From the time the New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950
by Mauricio to change his and Virginia’s civil status from married to until the promulgation of the Revised Rules of Court on January 1,
single and of their three children from legitimate to illegitimate. x x x’ 1964, there was no law nor rule of court prescribing the procedure to
secure judicial authorization to effect the desired innocuous
“Thus, where the effect of a correction of an entry in a civil registry rectifications or alterations in the civil register pursuant to Article 412
will change the status of a person from “legitimate” to “illegitimate,” of the New Civil Code. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court now
as in Sarah Zita’s case, the same cannot be granted in summary provides for such a procedure which should be limited solely to the
proceedings.” implementation of Article 412, the substantive law on the matter of
correcting entries in the civil register. Rule 108, like all the other
It is, therefore, high time that we put an end to the confusion sown by provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme
pronouncements seemingly in conflict with each other, and perhaps, Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13 of Art.
in the process, stem the continuing influx of cases raising the same VIII of the Constitution, which directs that such rules of court ‘shall
substantial issue. not diminish or increase or modify substantive rights.’ If Rule 108
The basis for the pronouncement that extending the scope of Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or
to substantial corrections is unconstitutional is embodied in the early corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the
case of Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic[40] that first delineated the extent or understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial
scope of the matters that may be changed or corrected pursuant to alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation,
Article 412 of the New Civil Code. The Supreme Court ruled in this or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby become
case that: unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying substantive
rights, which changes are not authorized under Article 412 of the New Thirdly, Republic Act No. 9048 which was passed by Congress on
Civil Code.”[43] (Underscoring supplied). February 8, 2001 substantially amended Article 412 of the New Civil
We venture to say now that the above pronouncements proceed from a Code, to wit:
wrong premise, that is, the interpretation that Article 412 pertains only
to clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, effectively “SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and
excluding from its domain, and the scope of its implementing rule, Change of First Name or Nickname.- No entry in a civil register shall
substantial changes that may affect nationality, status, filiation and the be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
like. Why the limited scope of Article 412? Unfortunately, Ty Kong typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can
Tin does not satisfactorily answer this question except to opine that be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil
the procedure contemplated in Article 412 is summary in nature and registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this
cannot, therefore, cover cases involving controversial issues. Act and its implementing rules and regulations.”
Subsequent cases have merely echoed the Ty Kong Tin doctrine
without, however, shedding light on the matter. The above law speaks clearly. Clerical or typographical errors in
entries of the civil register are now to be corrected and changed
The flaw in Ty Kong Tin lies in its theory that Article 412 without need of a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil
contemplates a summary procedure. registrar or consul general. The obvious effect is to remove from the
First of all, Article 412 is a substantive law that provides as follows: ambit of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors in entries
“No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a of the civil register. Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of
judicial order.” Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil
It does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed register. This is precisely the opposite of what Ty Kong Tin and other
except to say that the corrections or changes must be effected by cases of its genre had said, perhaps another indication that it was not
judicial order. As such, it cannot be gleaned therefrom that the sound doctrine after all.
procedure contemplated for obtaining such judicial order is summary
in nature. It may be very well said that Republic Act No. 9048 is Congress’
response to the confusion wrought by the failure to delineate as to
Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 uses both the terms what exactly is that so-called summary procedure for changes or
“corrected” and “changed”. In its ordinary sense, to correct means “to corrections of a harmless or innocuous nature as distinguished from
make or set right”; “to remove the faults or errors from” while to that appropriate adversary proceeding for changes or corrections of a
change means “to replace something with something else of the same substantial kind. For we must admit that though we have constantly
kind or with something that serves as a substitute”. The provision referred to an appropriate adversary proceeding, we have failed to
neither qualifies as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected nor categorically state just what that procedure is. Republic Act No. 9048
does it distinguish on the basis of the effect that the correction or now embodies that summary procedure while Rule 108 is that
change may have. Hence, it is proper to conclude that all entries in the appropriate adversary proceeding. Be that as it may, the case at bar
civil register may be changed or corrected under Article 412. What are cannot be decided on the basis of Republic Act No. 9048 which has
the entries in the civil register? We need not go further than Articles prospective application. Hence, the necessity for the preceding
407 and 408 of the same title to find the answer. treatise.
On April 23, 2001, Carlito et al. filed an Amended Petition3 in which it
was additionally prayed that Carlito’s second name of "John" be
deleted from his record of birth; and that the name and citizenship of
Carlito’s father in his (Carlito’s) marriage certificate be corrected from
"John Kho" to "Juan Kho" and "Filipino" to "Chinese," respectively.
On September 14, 2001,7 the OSG entered its appearance with an

authorization to the city prosecutor of Butuan City to appear in the
case and render assistance to it (the OSG).
On January 31, 2002, respondents presented documentary evidence

REPUBLIC VS. KHO showing compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the
GR. NO. 170340 petition and testimonial evidence consisting of the testimonies of
JUNE 29, 2007 Carlito and his mother, Epifania. During the same hearing, an
Meiki , Merlin additional correction in the birth certificates of Carlito’s children was
requested to the effect that the first name of their mother be rectified
FACTS: from "Maribel" to "Marivel."
On February 12, 2001, Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona RTC Ruling:
and Heddy Moira filed before the RTC of Butuan City a verified
petition for correction of entries in the civil registry of Butuan City to The trial court directed the local civil registrar of Butuan City to correct
effect changes in their respective birth certificates. Carlito also asked the entries in the record of birth of Carlito, as follows: (1) change the
the court in behalf of his minor children, Kevin and Kelly, to order the citizenship of his mother from "Chinese" to "Filipino"; (2) delete
correction of some entries in their birth certificates. "John" from his name; and (3) delete the word "married" opposite the
date of marriage of his parents. The last correction was ordered to be
In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in his birth effected likewise in the birth certificates of respondents Michael,
certificate of the citizenship of his mother to "Filipino" instead of Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira. As well as the prayer for the correction
"Chinese," as well as the deletion of the word "married" opposite the in the birth certificates of Carlito’s minor children are granted.
phrase "Date of marriage of parents" because his parents, Juan Kho Further, the trial court granted the correction prayed for in Carlito’s
and Epifania Inchoco (Epifania), were allegedly not legally married. marriage certificate.
The same request to delete the "married" status of their parents from
their respective birth certificates was made by Carlito’s siblings Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC Decision to
Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira. With respect to the birth the CA, faulting the trial court in granting the petition for correction of
certificates of Carlito’s children, he prayed that the date of his and his entries in the subject documents despite the failure of respondents to
wife’s marriage be corrected from April 27, 1989 to January 21, 2000, implead the minors’ mother, Marivel, as an indispensable party and to
the date appearing in their marriage certificate. offer sufficient evidence to warrant the corrections with regard to the
questioned "married" status of Carlito and his siblings’ parents, and
the latter’s citizenship.
claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
CA Ruling; parties to the proceeding.
By the assailed Decision of October 27, 2005, the CA denied xxxx

petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court. Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of
Rule 108. Her interest was affected by the petition for correction, as
any judicial determination that June was the daughter of Armando
ISSUE: would affect her ward’s share in the estate of her father. x x x.
Whether the failure to implead Marivel and Carlito’s parents rendered Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of
the trial short of the required adversary proceeding and the trial Appeals correctly pointed out that the defect was cured by compliance
court’s judgment void. NO with Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by publication x x x.
xxxx
HELD: The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole
world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the
A similar issue was earlier raised in Barco v. Court of Appeals. That decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded
case stemmed from a petition for correction of entries in the birth under Section 3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out. x x x
certificate of a minor, June Salvacion Maravilla, to reflect the name of
her real father (Armando Gustilo) and to correspondingly change her xxxx
surname. The petition was granted by the trial court. Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a
thing and not against a person. The decision on the petition binds not
Barco, whose minor daughter was allegedly fathered also by Gustilo, only the parties thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is
however, sought to annul the trial court’s decision, claiming that she validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the
should have been made a party to the petition for correction. Failure to whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely
implead her deprived the RTC of jurisdiction, she contended. all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the
right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that
In dismissing Barco’s petition, this Court held that the publication of brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court
the order of hearing under Section 4 of Rule 108 cured the failure to with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.
implead an indispensable party.
Given the above ruling, it becomes unnecessary to rule on whether
The essential requisite for allowing substantial corrections of entries Marivel or respondents’ parents should have been impleaded as
in the civil registry is that the true facts be established in an parties to the proceeding. It may not be amiss to mention, however,
appropriate adversarial proceeding. This is embodied in Section 3, that during the hearing on January 31, 2002, the city prosecutor who
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, which states: was acting as representative of the OSG did not raise any objection to
Section 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the the non-inclusion of Marivel and Carlito’s parents as parties to the
civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or proceeding.
Parenthetically, it seems highly improbable that Marivel was unaware With respect to the correction in Carlito’s birth certificate of his name
of the proceedings to correct the entries in her children’s birth from "Carlito John" to "Carlito," the same was properly granted under
certificates, especially since the notices, orders and decision of the trial Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the
court were all sent to the residence she shared with Carlito and the cancellation or correction of entries involving changes of name falls
children. under letter "o" of the following provision of Section 2 of Rule 108:
It is also well to remember that the role of the court in hearing a Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon good
petition to correct certain entries in the civil registry is to ascertain the and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be
truth about the facts recorded therein. cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separation; (e) judgments of annulment of marriage; (f) judgments
With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel, their declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
certificate of marriage25 shows that indeed they were married on adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization;
January 21, 2000, not on April 27, 1989. Explaining the error, Carlito (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m)
declared that the date "April 27, 1989" was supplied by his helper, judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a
adding that he was not married to Marivel at the time his sons were minor; and (o)changes of name. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
born because his previous marriage was annulled only in 1999.Given
the evidence presented by respondents, the CA observed that the Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which
minors were illegitimate at birth, hence, the correction would bring governs petitions for change of name) were not complied with,
about no change at all in the nature of their filiation. observance of the provisions of Rule 108 suffices to effect the
correction sought for.
With respect to Carlito’s mother, it bears noting that she declared at
the witness stand that she was not married to Juan Kho who died in More importantly, Carlito’s official transcript of record from the
1959. Again, that testimony was not challenged by the city prosecutor. Urious College in Butuan City, certificate of eligibility from the Civil
Service Commission, and voter registration record satisfactorily show
The documentary evidence supporting the deletion from Carlito’s and that he has been known by his first name only. No prejudice is thus
his siblings’ birth certificates of the entry "Married" opposite the date likely to arise from the dropping of the second name.
of marriage of their parents, moreover, consisted of a certification
issued on November 24, 1973 by St. Joseph (Butuan City) Parish priest The correction of the mother’s citizenship from Chinese to Filipino as
Eugene van Vught stating that Juan Kho and Epifania had been living appearing in Carlito’s birth record was also proper. Of note is the fact
together as common law couple since 1935 but have never contracted that during the cross examination by the city prosecutor of Epifania, he
marriage legally. did not deem fit to question her citizenship. Such failure to oppose the
correction prayed for, which certainly was not respondents’ fault, does
A certification from the office of the city registrar, which was not in any way change the adversarial nature of the proceedings.
appended to respondents’ Amended Petition, likewise stated that it
has no record of marriage between Juan Kho and Epifania. Under the Also significant to note is that the birth certificates of Carlito’s
circumstances, the deletion of the word "Married" opposite the "date of siblings uniformly stated the citizenship of Epifania as "Filipino." To
marriage of parents" is warranted. disallow the correction in Carlito’s birth record of his mother’s
citizenship would perpetuate an inconsistency in the natal
circumstances of the siblings who are unquestionably born of the On May 16, 2007, respondent Executive Secretary, in representation of
same mother and father. the Office of the President, announced an appointment in favor of
respondent Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
Outside the ambit of substantial corrections, of course, is the to fill up the vacancy created by the retirement on April 28, 2007 of
correction of the name of Carlito’s wife from "Maribel" to "Marivel." Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. The appointment was reported
The mistake is clearly clerical or typographical, which is not only the following day, May 17, 2007, by the major daily publications.
visible to the eyes, but is also obvious to the understanding
considering that the name reflected in the marriage certificate of On May 18, 2007, the major daily publications reported that the
Carlito and his wife is "Marivel." appointment was "recalled" or "held in abeyance" by Malacañang in
view of the question relating to the citizenship of respondent Gregory
Apropos is Yu v. Republic which held that changing the appellant’s S. Ong. There is no indication whatever that the appointment has been
Christian name of "Sincio" to "Sencio" amounts merely to the righting cancelled by the Office of the President.
of a clerical error. The change of name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz
Labayu to Emperatriz Labayo was also held to be a mere innocuous On May 19, 2007, the major daily publications reported that
alteration, which can be granted through a summary proceeding. The respondent Executive Secretary stated that the appointment is "still
same ruling holds true with respect to the correction in Carlito’s there except that the validation of the issue is being done by the
marriage certificate of his father’s name from "John Kho" to "Juan Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)."
Kho." Except in said marriage certificate, the name "Juan Kho" was
uniformly entered in the birth certificates of Carlito and of his Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to respondent Ong
siblings. through respondent Executive Secretary is patently unconstitutional,
arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abuse of discretion
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this
fact is plain and incontestable, and that his own birth certificate
indicates his Chinese citizenship. Petitioners attached a copy of said
birth certificate as Annex "H" to the petition. The birth certificate,
petitioners add, reveals that at the time of respondent Ong’s birth on
May 25, 1953, his father was Chinese and his mother was also Chinese.
KILOSBAYAN VS. ONG
G.R. NO. 177721 Petitioners invoke the Constitution:
JULY 3, 2007
Meiki , Merlin Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "No
person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower
collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines ."
FACTS: Sec. 2 of Art. IV defines "natural-born citizens as those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect their Philippine Citizenship."
Ong’s Comment:
Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted that eleven years after
respondent Ong’s birth his father was finally granted Filipino Respondent Ong submitted his Comment with Opposition,
citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make maintaining that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen; that petitioners
respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen. have no standing to file the present suit; and that the issue raised
ought to be addressed to the JBC as the Constitutional body mandated
Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ of certiorari be issued annulling to review the qualifications of those it recommends to judicial posts.
the appointment issued to respondent Ong as Associate Justice of this Furthermore, the petitioners in his view failed to include the President
Court. who is an indispensable party as the one who extended the
appointment.
Subsequently, on May 24, 2007, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for
the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), praying that a As to his citizenship, respondent Ong traces his ancestral lines to one
TRO be issued, in accordance with the Rules of Court, to prevent and Maria Santos of Malolos, Bulacan, born on November 25, 1881, who
restrain respondent Executive Secretary from releasing the was allegedly a Filipino citizen5 who married Chan Kin, a Chinese
appointment of respondent Ong, and to prevent and restrain citizen; that these two had a son, Juan Santos; that in 1906 Chan Kin
respondent Ong from assuming the office and discharging the died in China, as a result of which Maria Santos reverted to her
functions of Associate Justice of this Court. Filipino citizenship; that at that time Juan Santos was a minor; that
Juan Santos thereby also became a Filipino citizen;6 that respondent
Executive Secretary’s Comment: Ong’s mother, Dy Guiok Santos, is the daughter of the spouses Juan
Santos and Sy Siok Hian, a Chinese citizen, who were married in 1927;
Respondent Executive Secretary accordingly filed his Comment, that, therefore, respondent’s mother was a Filipino citizen at birth; that
essentially stating that the appointment of respondent Ong as Dy Guiok Santos later married a Chinese citizen, Eugenio Ong Han
Associate Justice of this Court on May 16, 2007 was made by the Seng, thereby becoming a Chinese citizen; that when respondent Ong
President pursuant to the powers vested in her by Article VIII, Section was eleven years old his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was
9 of the Constitution, thus: naturalized, and as a result he, his brothers and sisters, and his mother
were included in the naturalization.
SEC. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and Judges of lower courts
shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the Bureau of
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Immigration and the DOJ a certification and an identification that he
Such appointments need no confirmation. is a natural-born Filipino citizen under Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 of
the Constitution, since his mother was a Filipino citizen when he was
Respondent Executive Secretary added that the President appointed born.
respondent Ong from among the list of nominees who were duly Petitioners, in turn, filed a Consolidated Reply, in which they asserted
screened by and bore the imprimatur of the JBC created under Article their standing to file this suit on the strength of previous decisions of
VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution. Said respondent further stated: this Court, e.g., Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona8 and
"The appointment, however, was not released, but instead, referred to Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato,9 on the ground that the case is
the JBC for validation of respondent Ong’s citizenship." one of transcendental importance. They claim that the President’s
appointment of respondent Ong as Supreme Court Justice violates the
Constitution and is, therefore, attended with grave abuse of discretion and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Finally, they reiterate that that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his
respondent Ong’s birth certificate, unless corrected by judicial order father.
in non-summary proceedings for the purpose, is binding on all and is
prima facie evidence of what it states, namely, that respondent Ong is Furthermore, as petitioners correctly submit, no substantial change or
a Chinese citizen. The alleged naturalization of his father when he was correction in an entry in a civil register can be made without a judicial
a minor would not make him a natural-born Filipino citizen. order, and, under the law, a change in citizenship status is a
substantial change.
ISSUE: Republic Act No. 9048 provides in Section 2 (3) that a summary
administrative proceeding to correct clerical or typographical errors in
Whether or not respondent Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen. NO a birth certificate cannot apply to a change in nationality. Substantial
corrections to the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the
civil registry should, therefore, be effected through a petition filed in
HELD: court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
He is still required to submit evidentiary documents. The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the
nationalities of respondent Ong’s ancestors, by various births,
In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, docketed as B.E. marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be
No. 1398-N filed on September 14, 1979, under O.R. No. 8131205 of that threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing
date, respondent Ong alleged that he is qualified to be admitted to the records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence would have
Philippine bar because, among others, he is a Filipino citizen; and that to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong’s mother, was a
he is a Filipino citizen because his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in the records of this
Chinese citizen, was naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong, Court. Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged
was a minor of eleven years and thus he, too, thereby became a ancestral tree as well as his citizenship under the time-line of three
Filipino citizen. As part of his evidence, in support of his petition, be Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an
submitted his birth certificate and the naturalization papers of his appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the
father. His birth certificate states that he was a Chinese citizen at birth Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from
and that his mother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a Chinese citizen and his doing so.
father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was also a Chinese citizen.
It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted
evidence of naturalization that this Court allowed respondent Ong to
take the oath as a lawyer.
It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent

Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent
recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration

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(1) the venue was improperly laid; (2) the trial court did not acquire

Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do RULING:

RULE 73 Andres had no intention of staying in Quezon City permanently.

PACIOLES VS. CHUATOCO-CHING

In her Supplemental she attached Certification issued be the RULING:

However, the CA found Carino to be inapplicable. The appellate court FACTS:

OCAMPO VS. POTENCIANO

RULING: • Andres Pereira is an employee of PAL. He died without a will

2) WON a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where

Petitioners herein, namely, Ignacio, Maria Concepcion, Francisco and

(1) The appellant's contention is obviously unfounded and FACTS

Held: A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person

However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the

Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of

NGO THE HUA VS. CHUNG KIAT HUA

Whether the trial court erred in not appointing her

From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may RULE 79

ISSUE: Whether respondent's petition for the issuance of letters

The Court ruled in the affirmative. At the outset, it must be ISSUE:

RULE 81 breach of the administrator's duty. Possessed, as it is, with an all-

RULE 83 to act as administrator, was appointed administrator by the CFI of Cebu.

This motion was formally opposed by two of the children of the

Yes.The making of the inventory is necessarily of a preliminary

Is Wilson, as special administrator, liable?

-In accordance with Article 1647, CC it is only when the lease is to be

-However under Rule 85, Section 3, of the Rules of Court it authorizes a

ISSUE: WON a judicial administrator can validly lease property of the

2. WON Villegas should be disbarred?

GUTIERREZ VS. DATU RULING:

ISSUE: STRONGHOLD VS. REPUBLIC

RULING:: SANTOS VS. MANARANG

VELASQUEZ VS. GEORGE ISSUE:

MODESTO VS. MODESTO No.

Whether or not the contingent claim may be admitted

The defendants Orellano set up in their answer a general denial

1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in

The municipal council of Mambajao,which believed that it was FACTS:

RULE: CANG VS. CLAVANO

The private respondents requested the NBI to conduct an HELD:

On September 14, 2001,7 the OSG entered its appearance with an

On January 31, 2002, respondents presented documentary evidence

By the assailed Decision of October 27, 2005, the CA denied xxxx

It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent

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