A PROJECT FOR FINAL ASSESSMENT IN THE SUBJECT COURSE

PROFESSIONAL TRAINING

CONFESSION OF CO-ACCUSED AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY

SUBMITTED BY
Shasshank Gautam
B.A.LL.B.(HONS.)
Introduction
Under our law a confession affecting the maker thereof and a co-
accused in a joint trial for the same offence, may be considered both against the
maker and a co-accused. This provision is contained in Section 30 of the Evidence
Act. It is as follows: Section 30, Evidence Act, “When more persons than one are
being tried, jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such
persons affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the Court may
take into consideration such confession as against such other person as well as
against the person who makes such confession.
The confession of a co-accused is no doubt admissible in evidence. The co-
accused un-corroborative by any other evidence is not sufficient to sustain to
conviction. The court can not straightway start with the confession of co- accused.
If there is substantial evidence against the accused and there remains some doubt
lingering them the confession of the co-accused may be taken into consideration to
set that doubt at rest.1
The S.C. held2 that is the provisions of Section 30 of Evidence Act, the
Confession of co-accused has to be regarded as amounting to evidence is general
way because whatever considered by the court is evidence. In that sense the
circumstances as well as probabilities considered by the court as amount to
evidence. But these are not defined as evidence U/S 3 of the Evidence Act.
Prior to passing of Evidence Act 1872, the statement of an accused person
was not evidence against a tell as prisoner or one who was jointly tried
By with person making it.

1
Xavier Cochin v. Food Inspector Mattemcherey AIR 1968 Kerala 66.
2
Haricharan Kurni v. State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC 1184.
 In English law a prisoner is not liable to be affected by confession of his
accomplices.
The general rule is that the confession of an accused person is not evidence
against any one but himself only. A confession implicated the names of the other
person. It was held that it should be proved in its integrity. But it was the duty of
judge not to consider the evidence against any one but the confess nor itself. It two
persons were charged with joint commission of an offence, one of them on his
examination before a magistrate, stated in the hearing of the other that they both
that they both committed the offence the other did not deny it. It was held that this
statement of one was not evidence against the other.3 it is necessary that the person
confessing and other person against whom his confession is to be taken into
consideration should be tried
Jointly.
The High Courts in India have a view that the confession of the co- accused
can be used only in the support of other evidence. Clearly there must be evidence.
It can not be made the foundation of conviction is correct.4
A confession of a person jointly tried with the prisoner can be taken
Into consideration against him, it must appeal that the confession implicates the
confessing person substantially to the same extent as it implicates the confessing
person against whom it is to be used. A person admits guilt to the fullest extent
and exposes himself to the pains penalties provided for his guilt. Then there is
guarantee for truth of his confession. The legislature provides that the statement
may be considered against his fellow prisoners charged with
Same crime.

3
R. v. Applely 3 Starts 33.
4
Bhubani Sahu v. The Kind 1949 PC 257.
 A statement made by an accused person before it can be taken into
consideration against a fellow prisoner. According to section 30 of the Act, must
amount to a confession, on the part of the maker with respect to the offence
which all one charged.5 His confession may be taken into consideration
against such other as well as against himself because the admission of his guilt
operates as a sort of sanction which is to some extent affords some guarantee of the
truth of the whole statement.
Section 30, is a very exceptional indeed, an ordinarily provision by which
something which is not evidence may be used against the person at his trial. So
such provision must be used with greatest caution and care.
 Scope
The section enacts that when more that one person being tried jointly for
the same offence, a confession made by one person from them affecting himself
and such other persons is proved the court may take into consideration such
confession as against such other persons as well as against the confessor. The word
may, in this section make it clear that it is the discretion of the court to consider it
or not, against such other person. It is not bound in law to use such confessional
against such other persons. It has also emphasized that such confessional
statements being not given on oath, not in the presence of co- accused. It veracity
can not bee tested by cross-examination. So it should be used against the maker
and not against the others. This section has introduced first time in Indian Evidence
Act, in 1872 and makes a departure from the common law of English. It is an
innovation of a very serious character, which is liable to cause injustice if it is not
properly understood and applied. It can be used against the co-accused only to
support the other evidence. It cannot be made foundation of conviction against
him.

5
Bhadresurar Sardar v. Emperor, AIR 1928 Calcutta 416.
This section applies to confessing not to statements which do not admit the guilt
of the conferring party. It is opposed to the principle of jurisprudence to use the
statement against a person without giving him the opportunity of cross-
examination, the person making the statement.
The Privy Council in Bhubani v. King, 6 discussed the exact scope of
Section 30:
Section 50 applies to confession not to the statements. This section seems to
be based on the view that an admission by an accused person of his own guilt
affords some sort of sanction in support of the truth of his own confession against,
other as well as co-accused. It is a weak type of confession, section 307 does not
define the co-accused evidence. It is not based on the oath, not in the presence
of the co-accused, not it can be cross-examined. It is supporting evidence not
amounting to proof.
The Supreme Court approved these observations of Privy Council in a case
of Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P.8
Where the other evidence against the accused is less satisfactory and the
prosecution seeks to rely on the confession of the co-accused. Then the
presumption of innocence, which is the basis of criminal jurisprudence assists the
accused person and compel the court to render the verdict that the charge is not
proved against him and so the accused is entitled to benefit of the doubt.9 It is
obvious that the confession of an accused can not be used as a substantive piece of
evidence against co-accused.10 Th e principle is that where there is
Evidence against the co-accused is sufficient if the court believes to support his

6
1944 SC 257.
7
Evidence Act.
8
AIR 1952 SC 159.
9
State of Rajasthan v. Chetan Lal, 1970 Cr. L.J. 1206.
10
Public Prosecutor v. Shalik Ibrahim, AIR 1964 A.P. 548.
conviction then this kind of confession described U/S 30 may thrown into
scale as an additional reason for believing that evidence.11
The court must insist on independent evidence which implicates the co-
accused. The fact and circumstances must raise not a mere suspicion is not, but
proved beyond doubt the co-accused person complicity in the crime. Mere
suspicion is not proof. The extra judicial confession of a co-accused involving
the other co-accused can not be utilized against them in the absence of the other
independent evidence.12
In case of Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P.13 the accused committed the
Crime. He confessed the crime and implicating himself and Kashmira Singh. The
court convicted the accused and Kashmira Singh appealed to the S.C. The court
acquitted the appellant and held that a man should not be deprived his life and
liberty only on the basis of uncorroborated confession of his co- accused.

Evidence of Accomplice
An accomplice being a participant in the crime, his testimony suffers form
infirmity and casts doubt as to it truthfulness. The court should not accept his
testimony unless there are other circumstances in the case or other independent
evidence lending to assurance of the truthfulness of the evidence of the
accomplice. Each case would depend upon its facts. No hard fast rule can be
laid down. The general rule is that an accomplice is untrustworthy unless
corroborated unless corroborated by other evidence.14 the statement of an
accomplice is not strengthened by the concurrent statement of any number
of accomplices.15

11
Devanchand v. State, AIR 1965 Orissa 66.
12
Buder Ganda v. State, AIR 1965 Orissa 170.
13
AIR 1952 SC 159.
14
Badri Ram Didwania v. State of Bihar 1987 Patna 283.
15
Yaqub Khan Ahmed Khan v. State of M.P. 1977 MP CJ 523.
 The statement of accomplice as witness in case is a substantive piece of
evidence and stand on different footing than the co-accused evidence co-
accused’s evidence is not evidence16 U/S of Act.
A self exculpatory statement of an accused cannot be treated as confession. It can
be used as an admission against the person making it. It can not be used as evidence at
all against the other accused.17 Evidence other than confession not sufficient in itself
for finding of guilt.
Only self inculpating statements of accused person amount to confessions.
If only a part of statement is inculpatory and the rest exculpatory, it can not relied
upon either against accused persons or against co-accused.18
A retracted confession which does not inculpate the accused can not treated
as evidence against the other co-accused.19
A confession falling under this Section 30 is admissible against the accused
as well as co-accused even though it is retracted against all. The amount of
credibility depends upon the circumstances of the case. It must be corroborated.20
Section 30 is to be read with section 24 to 27 of the act. If confession
Are relevant according to the provisions of section 24 to 27 than section 30 of can
not make it inadmissible against the co-accused or vice versa?
Section -30 states that:
When more persons than one are tried jointly for the same offence, and a
confession made by one of such persons is proved, the court may take into
consideration, such confessions as against the person who makes such confession.

16
Hari Charan v. State of Bihar AIR 1964 SC 1184.
17
Man Alli v. State, 1970 Cr. L.J.
18
Baldeo Gwaia v. State of Assam 1977, Cr. L.J. 1516.
19
Ram Naik v. State, AIR 1965 Orissa 31.
20
State of Assam v. U.N. Rajkowa 1975 Cr. L.J. 354.
 Section 30, Evidence Act
Under our law a confession affecting the maker thereof and a co-
accused in a joint trial for the same offence, may be considered both against the
maker and a co-accused. This provision is contained in Section 30 of the Evidence
Act. It is as follows: Section 30, Evidence Act: “When more persons than one
are being tried, jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such
persons affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the Court may
take into consideration such confession as against such other person as well as
against the person who makes such confession.

The Rule is an Innovation

A provision corresponding to this section was not in existence prior to the

enacting of this section. A similar provision was not to be found in the older

enactments, such as the Evidence Act of 1855 or the Criminal Procedure Codes of

1861 and 1872. So in former times a former times a confession of an accused

person is treated as evidence only against him and it could not be taken to be

corroborative evidence of any kind of evidence, against anybody other than

himself. Similarly in Queen v. Darbarro Das it was held that the confession of one
prisoner could not be used as corroborative evidence against another prisoner. In

Queen v. Sadhu Mandal Phear, J. expressed the position in much stronger language as

follows: “Until the passing of the Indian Evidence Act, such dangerous material as this

could not be used as evidence against the co- accused person, and even by that Act, the

legislature only bestowed a discretion upon the court to take into consideration, such a

confession as against such person as well as against the person who made such

confession.”
 Principle

Normally a confession is useful as evidence against the accused person

who makes it. But by Section 30 of Evidence Act, it is laid down that it may be
taken into consideration against the co-accused also, provided it affects the
confessor as well as the co-accused. This is an important qualification because a
person would not incriminate himself for the sake of incriminating the other co-
accused, unless it is true. In other words the self-incrimination of an accused person
vouchsafes the truth of the accusation of the other. West J. in Empress v. Daji
Narsu, very emphatically said that “Where a person admits guilt to the fullest
extent and exposes himself to the pains and penalties provided for his guilt, there
is a guarantee for the truth of the statement of the accused and the legislature
provides that the statement may be considered against his co-prisoners charged
with the same crime, ‘Straight, J., in Queen Empress v. Fagrup expressed this
principle as follows: “What was intended was that where a prisoner, to use a
popular phrase makes a clean breast of it and unreservedly confesses his own guilt
and at the same time implicates another who is jointly tried for the same offence,
his confession can be taken into consideration against such other as well as
against himself, because the admission of his own guilt operates as a sort of a
sanction, which to some extent takes the place of the sanction of an oath, and
affords some guarantee that the whole statement is a true one.” In another case the
same learned Judge pithily said that the confessing prisoner – must “tar himself and
the person or persons he implicates with one and the same brush”. “The
object sought by the rule of law,” said West J., in Queen Empress v. Nur
Mahomed” is a safeguard for sincerity and for information.”
English Law is Different from the Indian Law as far as this Particular
Rule is Concerned
This provision is contrary to the principle of law in England. Markby in his
“Evidence” says: “The principle is flatly in contradiction to the law of England,
where Judges always take the greatest pains to prevent the statements of prisoners
affecting the case of a fellow prisoner.” The following passage from Taylor
contains the English Law on the subject:
“A prisoner is not liable to be affected by the confession of his
accomplices; and so strictly is this rule enforced, that where a person is
indicated for receiving stolen goods, a confession by the principal that he
was – guilty of the theft, was held by all the Judges to be evidence of that
fact as against the receiver; and it would be the same if both parties are
indicated together, and the principal were to plead guilty. Even in cases of
conspiracy after the common enterprise is at an end, whether by
accomplishment or by abandonment, no one is permitted by a subsequent
act or declaration of his own to affect the other conspirators. His confession
therefore, subsequently made is only admissible in evidence against
himself.”
The ancient Roman law, which is the mother of many modern laws, had
also not got any rule such as the one under consideration. Rule criticized as no
other rule is.
 No other section has evoked such a furors of judicial disapprobation and
stern criticism as Section 30 of the Evidence Act. By every possible device of
interpretation the operation of this section is sought to be kept in narrow confines.
Judges have not stinted in language to express their conscientious-objection
regarding this rule. In R. v. Jaffer Ali Glover., said that section introduced a
dangerous element; and Phear J., characterized this matter as “dangerous material”.
Couts Trotter CJ., in re Lilaram, said: “I have always thought that this was a most
unsatisfactory section and was a needless tampering with the wholesome rule of
the English Law that a confession is only evidence against the person who makes
it.”
Reilly J., observed that “it is very exceptional, indeed are extraordinary
provision, by which something which is not evidence may be used against an
accused person at his trial; such a provision must be used with the greatest caution
and with care to make sure that we do not stretch it one line beyond its necessary
intention.”

Learned authors also have not viewed with favour this provision,
Norton says : ‘This section introduced an innovation of a very serious
character. It has always been held that a confession only binds or affects the party
making it. The present section makes it receivable against a third party when he is
jointly indicated with the confessing criminal. The objection, if any, is not to go
to the weight of the confession. The Judge may take it into consideration as against
the third party. I conceive that even this is dangerous latitude, in India more
especially. When the third party is indicated, but not jointly, with the party
confessing the confession is still not receivable against such third party. I see no
ground for the distinction now drawn where the parties are jointly indicated.”
Cunningham in the introduction to his book on Evidence says: “The Judges are
relieved from the attempts to perform an intellectual impossibility by a provision,
that, when more persons than one are tried for an offence and one makes a
 confession, affecting himself and any other of the accused, the confession
may be taken into consideration against such other person as well as the person
making it.

Such a confession is of course, in the highest degree suspicious, it

deserves ordinarily very little reliance; but nevertheless it is impossible for a
single Judge to ignore it and under the Evidence Act, he need no longer pretend to
do so. The exclusion in fact, was one of those rule of evidence borrowed from
the English system.” The learned author says that “the policy of the section was
much criticized” and endorses what one writer had said, namely, “that the best
consideration which the court can give a confession within this section will
probably be to hold that it will not act upon it against third parties.”

Salient Features of the Provision

This section has not lain down that the confession under it should be

evidence both against the maker and the co-accused. As the legislature has not

Gone so far as to assign to this material, the status of evidence, it can be said that

the legislature is conscious of the inherent weakness of the confession under

Section 30 to have high evidentiary value. The section is very guardedly worded

and uses the expression “may take into consideration” a confession such as is

mentioned in Section 30. This expression furnishes the key for the interception of

the section and also pin-points its logic and rationale. Giving a plain meaning to

the section in the light of the above observations, this section goes no further than

this that is, where there is evidence against the co-accused sufficient if believed, to

support his conviction, then it may be thrown into the scale as an additional reason

for believing that evidence. Cunningham in his Evidence says “that the Indian

judge has simply to consider whether the confession ought to have any weight

with him and if any weight how much, in the opinion he forms about the case. The

exclusion of confession of this kind from the definition of evidence is intended,

apparently to remind the Judge that he is dealing with very unsound material and

that, though he takes them into consideration, he must not rely on them as the sole
 and even as the chief basis of his belief.” The justification for this

provision, therefore, is that it does not make this kind of confession substantive

evidence against the co-accused; but it only enables a court to take it into

consideration along with other evidentiary material to see whether the guilt of the

co-accused is driven home to him. So conviction of co-accused for an offence

can never be based upon the confession of the other accused taking his trial

along with the former person and even if it is taken into consideration, there

must be other cogent and substantial evidence pointing to the guilt of the co-

accused for drawing a verdict of guilty as far as the co-accused is concerned.

 Section must be strictly construed
It has been held over and over again in a catena of decisions that this
section has to be construed very strictly. Thus it has been said “Section 30 of Act I
of 1872, introduces, as it does, an entirely new, and I am inclined to think,
rather dangerous element into the conduct of criminal trials, and ought to be
constructed with great strictness.” It was remarked in in re-Maridimuthu, that this
section should be construed “with the greatest caution and with care to make sure
that we do not stretch it one line beyond its necessary intention.”
The same anxiety which characterized he interpretation of this section so
as not to make it comprehensive in import, is to be seen in the judicial
interpretation according to which for invoking the rule of this section, the
confession prisoner must “implicate himself to the same extent as his co- prisoner
whom he incriminates. There is authority even in older cases for saving “That the
statement of one prisoner cannot be taken as evidence against another prisoner
under Section 30 unless the parties are admittedly in parti delicto i.e. when the
confession prisoner implicates himself to the full, as much as his co-prisoner

whom he is criminating.” (Emperor v. Baijoo) 21 to the

Effect, West J., in Emperor v. Daji Narsu, 22 i t was observed, and it is as
Follows; “When a person admits guilt to the fullest extent and exposes himself to
the pains and penalties provided for this guilt, there is guarantee for his truth and
the Legislature provides that his statement may be considered against his fellow
23
prisoners charged in the same crime, Straight, J. In Emperor v. Jagrup,
summed up this position in the following excellent manner: “What
Was intended with regard to Section 30 of the Evidence act, was that, where a

21
25 WR 430 Cr.
22
6 Bom. 288.
23
7 All 646.
prisoner, to use a population phrase, makes a clean breast of it, and unreservedly
confesses his own guilt, and at the same time implicates another person who is
jointly tried with him for the same offence, his confession may be taken into
consideration against such other person as well as against himself, because
his own guilt operates a sort of sanction which to some extent, takes the place
of an oath, and so affords some guarantee that the whole statement is a true one.
But where there is no full and complete admission of guilt, no such sanction or
guarantee exists and for this reason, the ‘confession’ in Section 30, cannot be
construed as including a mere inculpatory admission which falls short of being an

admission of guilt.” The same learned Judge in R. v. Ganiraj,24 expressed the

implications of Section 30 as follows – The test, Section 30 intended to be
applied to a statement of one prisoner proposed to be used in-evidence as against
another, is, to see whether it is sufficient by itself to justify the conviction of the
person making it of the offence for which he is being jointly tried with the other
person or persons against whom it is tendered. In fact to use a popular and well
understood phrase, the confessing prisoner must far himself and the person or
persons he implicated with one and the same brush.”
The principle in Ganiraj’s case has been followed in R. v. Mulu, 25 and
Bhadraswar v. R.26 But the rule laid down in R. v. Ganiraj was explained in later
decisions to mean that all that is required to make the confession admissible
against a co-accused is that it should substantially implicated its

Maker in regard to the offence for which he and his co-accused are charged.

24
2 All 444.
25
2 All 646.
26
AIR 1928 Calcutta 418, 109 Indian Cases 351.
Admission of actual guilt is not necessary. It is sufficient if the admission
constructively established his guilt as well as that of a co-accused.

Confession should affect the maker as well as co-accused

Where a person being tried jointly with other persons, made a statement
disowning any guilty knowledge, seeking to clear himself, at the expense of other
persons. It is necessary that the statement should amount to a distinct confession of
guilt. Statements however criminating made by a prisoner in self-exculpation or
to reduce his guilt to something lower than what is alleged against the other,
should not be taken into consideration against anybody except himself. An
accused said that he went under pressure and fear of imminent death to the
place of occurrence, that he took no part in the dacoity, that he stood outside the
house and that at the end went away, was held to be a self-exculpatory statement
but not a confession.

Tried Jointly – Significance

Tried jointly’ – before a confession can be taken into consideration against
a co-accused, it is necessary that the confessor and the co-accused should be tried
jointly for the same offence. As the expression used in the section is tried jointly, it
appears that all other proceedings other than a trial as such are excluded. So
accused persons in the proceedings before the stage of charge and in committal
proceedings cannot be said to be tried jointly. Who can be tried jointly is also
prescribed by law. Section 239, Cr. P.C. says that (1) persons accused of the same
offence committed in the course of the same transaction, (2) persons accused of
an offence and persons accused of abetment, of an offence or of an attempt to
commit such offence, (3) persons accused of more than one offence of the same
king committed by them jointly within the period of twelve months, (4) persons
accused of different offences committed in the course of the same transaction, (5)
persons accused of an offence which includes theft, extortion or criminal
misappropriation, and persons accused of receiving or retaining, or assisting
in the disposal or concealment of, property possession of which is alleged
to have been transferred by any such offence committed by the first named
persons, or of abetment of or attempting to commit any such last mentioned
offence, (6) persons accused of offences under Section 411 and 414 of the I.P.C.
or either of those sections in respect of stolen property the possession of which has
been transferred by an offence.

One or more Persons should be legally tried jointly

“Tried jointly” in Section 30, means legally tried jointly. Thus where it is
not possible to try a certain number of persons jointly, it cannot be said that they
are tried jointly and any confession of any one of such accused persons cannot be
used under Section 30. Thus the confession of an accused jointly tried in fact
with another cannot be used against the other, if form any cause, such as the
absence of legal commitment, the prisoner alleged to have confessed has to be
dissociated from the proceedings. To make a joint trial legal, the accusation should
be a real one a distinct from being merely an expedient to justify joinder of
charges.

Is it necessary that the confessing accused should implicated himself

and his co-accused in all the offences for which they are jointly tried
Persons can be tried jointly for a number of offences which they had
committed during the course of a transaction. Then a question arises, whether the
confession of one of the accused should implicate him and his co-accused in all
the offences regarding which they are jointly tried, for taking it into consideration
against the co-accused? Or is it possible to consider the confession with regard to
one common offence, if the confession implicates the maker and a co-accused in
the matter of its commission, even though regarding other common offences, the
confessor implicates his co-accused but not himself? In some cases the view
taken is that “offence” includes “offences” and so the confession must implicate
the maker and to co-accused
In all the offences for which they are jointly tried. Thus, when A is charged along
with B and C for the offences of sodomy and murder and A makes a statement that
all of them committed sodomy and the murder was committed by B and C, it
was held that the confession of A is not admissible against B and C even
regarding the offence of sodomy though it is admissible against the
Maker.
27
In Periyasami v. R., it was held that in a charge of murder and
disposal of the dead body, against tow persons, the confession of one of them
should implicate both the accused regarding both the offences, before it could be
considered against them. In this case the confessor said that the other accused
killed a man and under threat compelled him to help in disposing of the body. In
the trial in another case of two persons, P was charged with offence of
committing rape on a girl and H with the offence of abducing her, The confession
of P regarding the offence of rape, containing a reference to the offence of
abduction committed by H, cannot be sued against H. Where two persons were
jointly tried, one under Section 372 and the other under Section 373, IPC, and
neither was charged for the offence of abetment, the confession of one is held to be
not admissible against the other.

Confession of one of several accused persons regarding only one of

several similar offences for which all the accused are jointly tried
But there are a group of cases which took a different view. According to
these cases, a confession implicating the maker and co-accused with regard to one
of several offences for which they are jointly tries, can be taken into consideration
against both of them in respect of that offence along. Thus where the accused
pus the blame for a murder entirely on the co-accused
Persons, but implicates himself and the others with regard to the offence of
27
54 Mad. 75.
 Robbery, it is admissible against them so far as the offence of robbery is
concerned, but not as regards the offence of murder. In one case two accused
persons were jointly tried for the major offence of murder, and they were also tried
for the minor offence of hurt by poisonous substance. The confession of one
regarding offence under Section 328 IPC implicating both, operates against
them in respect of the minor offence but not in respect of the offence of murder.
The protagonists of the view the Section 30, Evidence Act, should be
strictly construed would like to restrict the application of Section 30, to a
confession which implicates both the maker and co-accused regarding all the
offences for which they are tried. But what is the plain meaning of the words used
in the section? It merely says that a confession be taken into consideration
both against its maker and a co-accused, if it affects both of them regarding the
offences for which they are jointly tried. The expression used is not ‘fully affects’.
So when a confession implicates its maker and a co- accused regarding one of
several offences for which they are tried, it is nonetheless, affecting its maker
and the co-accused who are taking their trial jointly.

Co-Accused
When more than one person are being tried for one and he same offence
or offences, they are called co-accused.28
(A) Illustrations – “A” and “B” are jointly tried for the murder of “C”. It is proves
that “A” said, “B” that I murdered.
(B) “A” is on his trial for the murder of C. There is evidence to show that
“C” was murders by A and B and that “B” said, A and I murder “C”.

28
Vinayak v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 S.C. 1793.
This statement may not be taken into consideration by the court against
A as B is not being tried jointly. Three
essential conditions of section 30 are:
(a) Person confessing and others are being tried jointly. (b) They being
tried by the same offence.
(c) Confession is affecting the confess and the other accused.

Joint Trial

Section 30 only relates the confession made by accused person who being
jointly tried for the same offence at the same time with the accused against whom
the confession is used. Two persons are charged with murder and one of them
made a statement to a Magistrate, it was held that the statement of an
accused could only be taken into consideration as against the other person U/S 30.
If two accused were being tried jointly the same offence.
The tried jointly means “legally tried jointly and not imply tried jointly as a
matter of fact. The confession of person who is dead and was never brought
to trial is not admissible U/S 30 as the confession of co-accused.29
When a person makes a confessional statement implicating him and the accused,
but did before the commencement or completion of an enquiry his statement is not
admissible U/S 30 of Evidence Act.
But where during the joint trial of two accused persons one died but before
his death, his confession has been put on the record, it was held that the confession
could be used against the other accused.30
The confession of an approver can be used U/S 30 only when he is
being tried jointly with the prisoners and not after he has become approver and
Removed from the dark.

29
Achhaylal Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1947 P.C. 90.
30
Ram Sarup v. Emperor, 1937 Calcutta 39.
 An approved can not be deemed as being jointly tried with the accused, his
confession is not therefore admissible U/S 30 against the accused. A confession
of an absconding co-conspirator who is not tried jointly with other conspirators
can not be used against the latter.
Where a jointly trial start but could not last as one of the accused absconded
and the case of that accused was separated U/S 51231 Section 30 of the Act would
not attracted and the statement of the other accused, was not useable against the
absconding accused.32
“A, B & C commit murder of D. A is arrested B and C absconded. A
makes a confession. He is tried and convicted. After words B and C arrested, sent
for trial. At their trial the confession of “A” can not be taken into
consideration for the simple reason that they are tried separately or not
jointly.”
When the confessing person pleaded guilty and was therefore, convicted
and sentenced. It was held that he could no longer be considered as being jointly
tried with the others. A statement made by co-accused can not, when he had been
ordered to be tried separately be used against the accused examining the co-
accused as a witness in the case.
 Retracted Confession
The retracted confession can into be taking into consideration against the
co-accused or the confessing accused.46 it can only be used in support of other
evidence. It can not be made the foundation of a conviction. Its value is extremely
weak. The evidentiary value of retracted confession against co- accused is
considerably less. Fullest corroboration of such confession is necessary. A
retracted confession is sufficient evidence for convicting the confessor if the court
believes it to be true.
The sum up the confession of an accused person is to be taken into
consideration, under this section, against is co-accused must be of the offence for
which accused are being tried jointly. The jointly trial must be of very offence for
which they are being tried jointly.
The confession is to be taken into consideration under this section must be
proved formally before the case for the prosecution comes to an end. The amount
of the credibility of the retracted confession depends upon the
Circumstances of the case. Such a confession can used only to support the
Other evidence.

45
1980 Cr. L.J. (Gujrat) 234.
46
Ram Parkesh v. State of PB AIR 1959 SC 1.
. The Privy Council is ruling has been approved by the Supreme Court in a case
Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P.47
Retracted confessions are not sufficient in itself for finding of guilt. Only self
inculpatory statements of accused person amounts to
Confession. If only a part of statement is inculpatory and the rest exculpatory, it
can not be relied upon either against accused persons or against co-
accused.48
A retracted confession which does not inculpate the offence can not be
treated as evidence against the other co-accused.49
A confession falling under this section 30 is admissible against the accused
as well as co-accused even though it is retracted all. The amount of credibility
depends upon the circumstances of the case. It must be corroborated.50

47
AIR 1952 SC 159, Sudhir Chand v. State, 1971 Cr. L.J.
48
Baldeo Gwaia v. State of Assam, 1977 Cr. L.J. 1516.
49
Ram Naik v. State, AIR 1965 Orissa 31.
50
State of Assam v. U.N. Rajkowa, 1975 Cr. L.J. 354.