MINORITY POLITICS IN BANGLADESH, 1947-1971

by.

MUHAMMAD GHULAM KABIR

B.A. (Honours), 1972, M.A. 1974,

University of Rajshahi

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

(Department o f P o l i t i c a l Science)

• We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming

to the r e q u i r e d s t a n d a r d

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

A p r i l , 1978

<_) Muhammad Ghulam K a b i r , 1978

 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for

an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that

the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study.

I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis

for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or

by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication

of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my

written permission.

Department of Political Science

The University of B r i t i s h Columbia

2075 Wesbrook P l a c e
Vancouver, Canada
V 6 T 1W5

6
 ABSTRACT

The p a r t i t i o n i n g of I n d i a i n 1947 along r e l i g i o u s lines

l e f t a l a r g e m i n o r i t y community i n both I n d i a and, P a k i s t a n .

The purpose o f t h i s study i s to examine p o l i t i c s of the Hindu

m i n o r i t y i n East Bengal from independence i n 1947 to the

emergence o f Bangladesh i n 19 7 1 .

Two hypotheses have been examined i n the course of t h i s

study. F i r s t l y , i t i s hypothesized t h a t when a p r e v i o u s l y

dominant community i s thrown i n t o a m i n o r i t y p o s i t i o n , i t s

leaders^ attempt to r e c o n c i l e the community w i t h the e x i s t i n g

s i t u a t i o n and attempt p o l i t i c a l readjustment i n v o l v i n g

compromises. The c o r o l l a r y hypothesis i s t h a t the achievement

o f the goals o f the m i n o r i t y i s dependent on the a t t i t u d e and

the i n t e r n a l c o h e s i o n of the dominant community. The evidences

we f i n d from t h i s study show t h a t the Hindu m i n o r i t y i n E a s t

Bengal made compromises i n i t s stand on i s s u e s such as (1) a

secular-democratic c o n s t i t u t i o n , (2) I s l a m i c nomenclature o f

the r e p u b l i c , and (3) r e s e r v a t i o n of the o f f i c e o f the head o f

s t a t e f o r Muslims. However, they fought to e s t a b l i s h a j o i n t

e l e c t o r a t e system. They were s u c c e s s f u l i n a t t a i n i n g t h i s g o a l

o n l y w i t h the d i v i s i o n o f the Muslim p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i n E a s t

Bengal, and l a t e r with the estrangement o f the Muslims i n E a s t

and West P a k i s t a n .
 TABLE OF C O N T E N T S

Page

ABSTRACT i i

TABLE OF C O N T E N T S i i i

LIST OF T A B L E S i v

ABBREVIATIONS V

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v i

CHAPTER

1 Introduction ^ 1

2 I n i t i a l Chaos and t h e s t r u g g l e f o r C o n s t i t u t i o n a l
S a f e g u a r d s : The F i r s t Phase o f M i n o r i t y Politics,
1947-1954 17

3 The M a x i m i z a t i o n o f t h e Hindu P o s i t i o n : The

S e c o n d P h a s e o f M i n o r i t y P o l i t i c s , 1954-1958 . 56

4 R e t r e a t and Regrouping: The T h i r d Phase o f

M i n o r i t y P o l i t i c s , 1958-1971 94

5 Conclusion 123

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 131

i i i
 LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

I Religious Distribution i n Pakistan, 1951 2

II Percentage D i s t r i b u t i o n of the Population by

R e l i g i o u s Groups f o r E a s t Bengal 3

III Growth Rate o f R e l i g i o u s Communities i n E a s t

Bengal a s R e c o r d e d i n 1901 t o 1961 C e n s u s e s . . . 7

iv
 ABBREVIATIONS

AL Awami League

AML Awami M u s l i m League

BPC Basic Principles Committee

CAP Constituent Assembly of Pakistan

EBDO Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order

EBLA East Bengal Legislative Assembly

EPCP Communist Party o f East Pakistan

EPSU East Pakistan Students Union

NAP National Awami Party

SAC Students Action Committee

NDF National Democratic Front

SCF Scheduled Caste Federation

UF United Front

UPP United Progressive Party

v
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My foremost debt i s t o my thesis supervisor,. Professor

John R. Wood. He r e a d through the thesis a t a l l stages with

great patience a n d made v a l u a b l e criticism. I am a l s o grateful

to t h e two o t h e r m e m b e r s o f my thesis committee, Professor

R.S. Milne and Professor Barrie M. M o r r i s o n , who o f f e r e d useful

comments.

My fellow graduate students, K. R a m a n a t h a n , Donald Crone,

Kanti Bajpai, a n d M. M u s t a f a Alam also helped me while I was

writing this thesis. My Bengali friends on campus, particularly

Joseph D'Lilva, Syed M. Bulbul, and Sudhir K. Saha were also a

source of support.

Above a l l /I should like t o extend my appreciation to

Miss Margaret Friesen and h e r s t a f f of the Inter Library Loan

division of the University of British Columbia Library. Most

of the research materials were borrowed from different

libraries i n North America, and M i s s Friesen was a l w a y s very

helpful i n securing them. Finally, my deepest gratitude goes

to Evelyn Riediger, without whose constant help and encourage-

ment this study would n o t have been possible.

vi
 CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The h i s t o r y of modern human c i v i l i z a t i o n is full of

instances of violence d e r i v i n g from the hatred of one

religious community against another, or one race against another.

Millions of people have been killed or driven out of their

homeland because of their differences with the dominant racial,

religious, or linguistic group. Many m i n o r i t y communities have

been crushed, condemned to wither away, or denied the right to

develop. The Indian subcontinent, in particular, has witnessed

many scenes of communal conflict between m a j o r i t y and minority.

The purpose of this study i s to investigate minority politics

in the geographic area which i s now called Bangladesh during

the period 1947-1971.

Present-day Bangladesh was a part of Pakistan until the

latter's dismemberment in 1971. India was p a r t i t i o n e d on the

basis of the "two-nation" theory, and Pakistan came into

existence as a Muslim state in 1947. But this Muslim state

was left with a large non-Muslim minority, particularly in

East Bengal (now Bangladesh). The n o n - M u s l i m s made up nearly

one-fourth of the total population of East Bengal after

partition and accounted for approximately 14 per cent of the

entire population of Pakistan. The Hindus constituted the bulk

of the non-Muslim minority; 13 out of 14 people i n the minority

were Hindus. The other religious minorities consisted of

negligible numbers of C h r i s t i a n s , Buddhists, and Parsis.

 2

Socially, the Hindu community was b r o a d l y divided into two

groups: upper class Caste Hindus, and t h e lower class

Scheduled Castes. The l a t t e r comprised nearly 55 per cent o f

the entire community. Since t h e Hindus were t h e most

important religious m i n o r i t y , and p o l i t i c a l l y very significant,

the present study deals with them.

TABLE I

Religious Distribution i n Pakistan, 1951

Area Muslim Caste Scheduled Christian Others

Hindu Caste

Q. "Q.
O % Q
".
O Q,
"5
15

Pakistan 85«9 5-7 7»2 0*7 0*5

West Pakistan 97*1 0*5 1 »1 1*3 -

East Bengal 76»8 10 12 0-3 0*9

Source: P o p u l a t i o n C e n s u s o f P a k i s t a n , 1951, Table VI.

The " o t h e r s " i n c l u d e t h e B u d d h i s t s a n d P a r s i s .
No s e p a r a t e e n t r y w a s made f o r t h e s e t w o c o m -
munities i n the census f i g u r e s .
\'

In I n d i a as a whole before partition, Hindus were i n a

majority while Muslims were a minority. In East Bengal, the

Hindus were politically, economically, and s o c i a l l y f a r more

advanced than the Muslims. Numerically they were a minority,

but they dominated the fields of trade a n d commerce, the admini-

strative services, and t h e p r o f e s s i o n s . The Caste Hindus lived

in towns, and t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e b u i l d i n g s and properties—in

some c a s e s more than 85 per cent--in each town of East Bengal

3
were owned by them. In undivided Bengal, they made u p 60 p e r

cent o f the t o t a l urban population. In Dacca and Chittagong

4
they/were i n a majority. A l lnoteworthy industrial concerns,
including nine cotton mills, two glass factories, four match

factories, and one cement f a c t o r y were owned by them.^ They

owned big import-export companies, big businesses, and had a

considerable share i n banking. They also had a near-monopoly

in professions such as law, medicine, and teaching. The vast

majority of government servants were Hindus. They were also

the biggest landlords of the province.

TABLE II

Percentage D i s t r i b u t i o n of the Population

by R e l i g i o u s Groups f o r E a s t B e n g a l

Year Muslims Hindus Others

1901 66*1 33 «0 0*9

1911 67*2 31 »5 1 «3

1921 68«1 30*6 1 «3

1931 69«5 29 »4 1 »2

1941 70*3 28*0 1*8

1951 76»9 22 .0 1*1

Source: P o p u l a t i o n Census o f P a k i s t a n , 1951.

Vol.1, S t a t e m e n t 2-D, p . 27-

The Bengali Hindus played a very prominent role in the

7

Indian nationalist movement and Bengal was the cynosure of i t .

Until the end of World War I, the f r e e d o m movement of India was

dominated by them. The first Indian president of the Indian

National Congress was a Bengali. At the turn of this century,

Bengal witnessed the famous swadeshi movement over the issue of

the partition of Bengal. At the same t i m e , terrorist movements

were spearheaded by the Hindus, and the two leading terrorist

groups, the Jugantar Dal and the Anushilan Samity, were based in
 4

East Bengal. Later, these terrorists were persuaded to join

the Congress, and t h e y became the main organizational force of

the Congress party. The leadership of the Bengal Congress and

8
the terrorist organizations was drawn from the Hindu bhadralok.

Bengali prominence i n the nationalist movement, however,

declined with the rise of Gandhi after the close of World War
9

I. Two Bengalis, C.R. Das and Subhas Bose, unsuccessfully

challenged the Gandhian leadership of the nationalist movement

in the 1920s and 1930s. Despite the fact that Bengali Hindus

lost prominence i n the nationalist movement, Bengal remained one

of the most volatile centres of the freedom struggle through to

the end of the British r a j . Before p a r t i t i o n , the Bengal

Congress was dominated by East Bengal congressmen, and their

nominee, Dr. P.C. Ghosh, became the first chief minister of

10

West Bengal after partition. The two most important bases of

Congress support, the Khadi Pratisthan of Satish Das Gupta, and

the Abhoy Ashram of P.C. Ghosh, were located i n East Bengal.

The history of the b i r t h of Pakistan was associated with

unprecedented communal strife and bitterness. In the final

days of the Pakistan movement when the possibilities of peaceful

negotiation between the two communities disappeared, the city of

Calcutta witnessed the ghastly "Calcutta Killings" in which

thousands o f u n a r m e d members of both communities were slaughtered

11

in unrestrained communal warfare. The Calcutta riots were

followed by the same k i n d o f communal violence i n the neigh-

bouring province of B i h a r , and, as well, i n the district of

12

Noakhali i n East Bengal. These bloodbaths undoubtedly helped

to influence the Congress leadership to finally accept the Muslim

demand for a s e p a r a t e homeland and the d i v i s i o n of India on a

religious basis.

The Hindus d i d not feel secure i n the new Pakistan because

it was meant t o be a Muslim state, and communal harmony was

already upset. The mass m i g r a t i o n of Hindus and transfer of

assets began as early as June and July of 1947. Almost a l l of

the Hindu families were joint families, and when they decided

to leave Pakistan, they left b e h i n d one or two members of their

families to look after their property. Calcutta was the centre

of Bengal's financial, commercial, and professional activity,

and the Hindus had traditional links with this city. Moreover,

most of the upper class Hindus had property and relatives in

Calcutta and other parts o f West Bengal. As a result, divided

families were v e r y common a m o n g the Hindus i n East Bengal after

partition. At the time of independence, a l l high-ranking Hindu

1 4

civil servants opted for service i n India instead of Pakistan.

Divided families, the transfer of assets and businesses, and the

migration of civil servants a l lcontributed t o the growth of

suspicion among M u s l i m s that the Hindus were trying to weaken

the new Muslim state. They often accused the Hindus of having

a "divided, loyalty".

The Hindu minority i n East Bengal began i t s life i n the

new political system i n an atmosphere of communal hatred,

distrust and disgrace. The Hindus had struggled f o r the

independence of India and had been deadly opposed to the

partition o f Akhahd Bharat (undivided India). To them, parti-

tion meant the "vivisection" of their motherland. Under the

 6

circumstances, they were not favourably disposed to citizen-

ship of Pakistan. Moreover, the political party of the Muslims,

the Muslim League, which captured power in Pakistan, had waged

a bitter struggle against the Hindus during the past several

decades. Not surprisingly, the East Bengali Hindus felt

insecure when they found that they were to become citizens of

Pakistan by fate. Most observers predicted that the Hindu com-

munity was likely to diminish in size, i n wealth, and in

15

talent. The exodus of Hindus from East Bengal to India

continued throughout the existence of Pakistan. As shown in

Table I I I , the Hindu proportion of the population dropped by

21 per cent during the period 1941-1951.

In view of the bleak prospect of the survival of the

minority i n East Bengal, the following questions will be

examined in this study: W h a t was the response of the Hindus to

the new political system of Pakistan? What general policies

were followed by the Hindu leadership i n order to safeguard the

interest of the community? How did they endeavour to safeguard

their interests i n the constitutional framework of. P a k i s t a n ?

How s u c c e s s f u l were they i n maximizing their position and

achieving their goals when they held the balance between the

two vying Muslim political parties i n East Bengal during the

period 1954-1958? Finally, w h a t was the strategy of the

community during the autocratic rule of the Ayub regime and the

rapidly changing i n t e r l u d e of the last days of Pakistan?

_ When we proceed to an examination of the minority question

in East Bengal, we should note that communal bitterness in

 (

TABLE I I I

Growth Rate o f R e l i g i o u s Communities i n E a s t Bengal a s Recorded i n 1901 t o 1961 Censuses

Number o f Persons i n Thousands and Percentage V a r i a t i o n

P.C. P.C. P.C. P.C. P.C. P.C

Communities 1901 1911 incr- 1921 incr- 1931 incr- 1941 incr- 1951 incr- 1961 ina
ease ease ease ease ease ease

Muslims 19,113 21,202 11 22,646 7 24,731 9 29,509 19 32,227 9 40,890 27

Hindus (1) 9,545 9,952 4 10,166 2 10,453 3 11,747 12 9,239 -21 9,890 2

Christians - - - - - 61 - 53 -13 107 102 149 40

Others 269 401 49 442 10 359 20 690 92 359 -48 421 17

Total 28,927 31,555 33,254 _ 35,604 _ 41,997 — 41,932 — 50,840 —

(1) Hindus i n c l u d e d b o t h C a s t e Hindus and Scheduled C a s t e , a s Scheduled C a s t e Order was

made i n 1936.

Source: P o p u l a t i o n Census o f P a k i s t a n , 1961, B u l l e t i n No.2, p.15.

 ) 8

16

Bengal i s of relatively recent origin. Hindus and Muslims

lived side by s i d e i n Bengal f o r centuries w i t h o u t any major

communal strife. As a m a t t e r o f f a c t , there had been little

difference i n culture between t h e two c o m m u n i t i e s . As noted by

A.F. S a l a h u d d i n Ahmed: "In fact, i n many respects, the culture

of the upper class Hindus was similar to that o f the upper class

Muslims, and t h i s continued t o b e s o down to the early part of

17
the nineteenth century..." Similarly, rural Muslims led lives
18

that w e r e much t h e same a s t h o s e o f t h e i r Hindu neighbours.

They were o p p r e s s e d b y t h e same zamindar a n d t h e same money-

lender i n t h e same w a y . They shared each other's sorrow and

happiness. Communal politics was generated i n the l a t t e r part

of British rule. Even S i r Syed Ahmed, the philosophical father

of the Pakistan movement, a d m i t t e d t h a t the increasing hostility

between t h e two c o m m u n i t i e s was due m a i n l y t o t h e r i s e of

19

educated classes.

The minority question has a t t r a c t e d little attention from

political scientists though i t has been instrumental i n World

War I and other major wars i n this century. Anthropologists

and sociologists i n recent years have taken initiatives to

explain ethnicity and m i n o r i t y problems. At the close of the

Second World War, Louis Wirth pioneered the study o f minority

problems and o f f e r e d a definition and a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of

minorities. He defined a minority "as a group of people who,

because of their physical or cultural characteristics, are

singled o u t from the others i n the society i n which they live

for differential and unequal t r e a t m e n t , a n d who, therefore,

 regard themselves as objects of collective discrimination.

The existence of a minority i n a society implies the existence

of a corresponding dominant group enjoying higher social status

and greater privileges. Minority status carries with i tthe

o

exclusion from full p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the l i f e of the society."

J.A. Laponce has examined the problem of protecting

>m i n o r i t i e s from the perspective of political science.

Addressing himself to a host of questions r e l a t i n g t o democracy

and minorities, the impact of minorities on p o l i t i c a l parties,

the e l e c t o r a l system, parliament, administration, and t h e

judiciary, Laponce develops a d e f i n i t i o n which i s more appro-

priate to our case study. According t o h i m , "A m i n o r i t y i s a

group of people who, because o f a common racial, linguistic,

religious or national heritage which singles them o u t from t h e

politically dominant c u l t u r a l group, fear that they may either

be prevented from integrating themselves into the national

community of their choice o r be o b l i g e d t o do so a t t h e expense

21

of their identity." By this d e f i n i t i o n a minority c a n be a

racial, linguistic, r e l i g i o u s , or n a t i o n a l i t y group, different

from the dominant group by any o f t h e s e traits. A minority can

either seek to maintain a separate identity or to integrate

with the national community.

With t h e above d e f i n i t i o n i n mind, L a p o n c e makes an

important classification of minorities into two groups:

minorities by w i l l , and m i n o r i t i e s by f o r c e . The k e y element

of this classification i s the attitude of the minority towards

the dominant group. The m i n o r i t y may wish t o be assimilated

 10

within the majority, or i t may refuse to do so. According to

him, "The minority that desires a s s i m i l a t i o n but i s barred is

a minority by force. The minority that refuses assimilation is

22

a minority by will." The Negroes of the United States

exemplify the former, while the French Canadians represent the

latter. Although a s s i m i l a t i o n i s the key concept of his

classification, Laponce does not define the term. Assimilation

bears both s o c i o l o g i c a l and political connotations. Milton

Gordon demonstrates that the process of assimilation has

different dimensions like cultural, structural, marital,

identificational, attitude receptional (absence of prejudice),

23

behaviour receptional (absence of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ) , and civic.

A minority may wish to assimilate in the political sense, in

that i t would be treated equally with the majority, but may not

wish to undergo other dimensions of the assimilation process.

In my j u d g e m e n t , when the term assimilation i s used in the

political sense, i n t e g r a t i o n would be a more appropriate term.

Integration is a process through which previously separated or

segregated elements are brought together. A politically inte-

grated minority may or may not be an assimilated minority.

Laponce concludes that minorities by force do not want to

be treated as a separate group, but, on the contrary, want to

share fundamental and civil rights with a l l other citizens.

Minorities by will, meanwhile, demand preferential treatment

in order to maintain their identities. With regard to electoral

systems, an intercommunal party system based on membership of

both dominant and minority groups i s -favoured by both types of

 . .11

the m i n o r i t i e s because i t g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e s their bargaining

position. Separate e l e c t o r a t e s and the r e s e r v a t i o n of seats

i n parliament o f t e n c o n t r i b u t e to the development of communal

p a r t i e s , so they are not always seen as a means of safeguarding

24

the m i n o r i t y interest. Separate e l e c t o r a t e and communal

party systems may be r e j e c t e d by the m i n o r i t y because under

such circumstances i t would be i n a p o s i t i o n of permanent

m i n o r i t y , w i t h a permanent p l a c e i n the o p p o s i t i o n . Communal

e l e c t o r a t e and party systems i n c r e a s e the danger of r e i n f o r c i n g

the cohesion of the dominant group and increasing anti-minority

feelings. As a r e s u l t , the t e n s i o n between the m i n o r i t y and

the m a j o r i t y i s a n a t u r a l c o r o l l a r y of such a system.

In the course of t h i s study, Laponce's c a t e g o r i z a t i o n of

m i n o r i t i e s w i l l be used and h i s a s s e r t i o n s r e l a t i n g to the

e l e c t o r a l and party systems w i l l be t e s t e d . I t should be noted

t h a t he does not present a comprehensive theory of minority

p o l i t i c s i n h i s study. He i s p r i m a r i l y concerned about how to

p r o t e c t m i n o r i t i e s i n modern democratic s t a t e s . Moreover,

some of h i s claims do not seem to be v a l i d i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s .

For example, he i s of the o p i n i o n t h a t the members of the

minority groups are o f t e n a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l
25

class. T h i s might be t r u e i n the case of the Negroes i n the

United S t a t e s , or Tamils i n S r i Lanka, or Chinese i n Malaysia,

but t h i s i s not so i n I n d i a , or i n Bangladesh. The nature of

the problem o f the m i n o r i t i e s i s d i f f e r e n t i n d i f f e r e n t

contexts. Whenever we.proceed to examine one problem of a

c e r t a i n country, we should always have an eye on the p e c u l i a r

aspect o f the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of t h a t country. I f we t r y to

 12

apply a theory developed i n t h e West t o South A s i a i n toto,

that might be an impediment t o a proper understanding of a

phenomenon.

In view o f the absence o f any theory pertinent to the

pattern of minority behaviour and t h e m a j o r i t y - m i n o r i t y

relationahip i n East Bengal, the following hypotheses will be

examined i n the course of this study:

1. When a previously dominant community i s thrown into a

minority p o s i t i o n , i tperceives a great threat to i t s

continued dominance and s u r v i v a l . When i tfinds that i ti s not

possible to regain i t s previous position, i t s leaders attempt

to reconcile the minority community with the existing situation,

and adopt pragmatic policies to adjust t o t h e new political,

system. In the case o f the Hindus of East Bengal, this politi-

cal readjustment involved a number o f compromises i n its

previous political stand on i s s u e s such a s : 1) a s e c u l a r demo-

cratic c o n s t i t u t i o n ; .2) t h e I s l a m i c nomenclature of the

republic; 3) t h e r e s e r v a t i o n o f t h e o f f i c e o f t h e head of the

state f o r Muslims; a n d 4) t h e e l e c t o r a l system.

2. I t i s also hypothesized that the achievement of the goals

of the minority i s dependent on t h e a t t i t u d e and internal

cohesion of the majority community. I f the latter i s a compact

group, i tdoes n o t need t o be r e s p o n s i v e to the minority. But

if i ti s divided, the minority i s i n a better position to

bargain and t o maximize i t s interests. Thus, i n the case o f

the Hindus of East Bengal, i t c a n b e shown that a transition

took place i n i t s political position. In the f i r s t few years

 13

after partition, when the Muslims were a cohesive community

2g

and communalism was at i t s peak, the Hindu community was

plunged into a chaotic struggle for survival during which i t s

leaders fought for constitutional safeguards. After the 1954

elections i n East Bengal, the cohesion of the dominant Muslim

community was lost. With the schism i n the dominant community,

the Hindus were successful i n maximizing their position.

Under attack from the martial law regime, they retreated after

1958. Later, as the Muslims of East and West Pakistan became

more and more estranged the Hindus regrouped with the Muslims

in a struggle f o r an autonomous East Bengal.

The following chapter describes the first phase of

minority politics i n the initial chaotic years of independence

covering the period 19 4 7 - 1 9 5 4 . In doing so, emphasis is given

to the role of the H i n d u members i n the first Constituent

Assembly and in the East Bengal Assembly. Chapter III discusses

the role of the H i n d u members i n the second Constituent Assembly

and i n United Front politics during the period 1954-1958.

Chapter IV deals with the last phase of minority politics in

Bangladesh during the period 1958-1971. In Chapter V, the

validity of the hypotheses and the answers to the questions

posed in this chapter are discussed i n the light of the

evidence provided.
 14

NOTES - Chapter I

1. According t o t h e "two-nation" t h e o r y , t h e Hindus and

M u s l i m s o f I n d i a c o m p r i s e d two ' n a t i o n s ' a n d t h e s e two
n a t i o n s c o u l d n o t s u c c e s s f u l l y l i v e t o g e t h e r i n one
political unit. M.A. J i n n a h f o r m u l a t e d t h i s t h e o r y a n d
demanded a s e p a r a t e homeland f o r t h e M u s l i m s o f t h e I n d i a n
subcontinent. To t h e H i n d u s and t h e C o n g r e s s p a r t y t h i s
t h e o r y was u n a c c e p t a b l e and they opposed i t t o t h e very
l a s t minute of the B r i t i s h r u l e i n India. For a full
account o f t h e "two-nation" theory and t h e p a r t i t i o n o f
I n d i a , see Hafeez M a l i k , Moslem N a t i o n a l i s m i n I n d i a and
P a k i s t a n (Washington: P u b l i c A f f a i r s P r e s s , 1963); A n i l
S e a l , The Emergence o f I n d i a n N a t i o n a l i s m (London:
C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 19 68) ; V . P . M e n o n , T h e
T r a n s f e r o f Power ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s ,
1957) ; C H . P h i l i p s , e t a l . , T h e P a r t i t i o n o f I n d i a
(London: George A l l e n a n d Unwin, 1970); A b d u l Hamid,
Muslim Separatism i n I n d i a (1858-1947) ( L a h o r e : Oxford
U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 19 6 7 ) ; C h o u d h u r y Mohammad A l i , T h e
E m e r g e n c e o f P a k i s t a n (New Y o r k : C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s ,
1 9 6 7 ) ; a n d H.V. H o d s o n , T h e G r e a t D i v i d e ( L o n d o n : O x f o r d
University Press, 1969).

2. T h e name o f t h e p r o v i n c e o f E a s t B e n g a l w a s c h a n g e d t o E a s t
Pakistan with the promulgation o f t h e 1956 C o n s t i t u t i o n .
H o w e v e r , E a s t B e n g a l was o f t e n r e f e r r e d t o a s E a s t P a k i s t a n
s i n c e 1947. I sometimes u s e t h e terms E a s t Bengal and
East Pakistan interchangeably.

3. Samar Guha, N o n - M u s l i m s B e h i n d t h e C u r t a i n of East Pakistan

( C a l c u t t a : A u t h o r , 19 5 0 ) , p . 3 3 . "

4. J.H. B r o o m f i e l d , E l i t e C o n f l i c t i n a P l u r a l S o c i e t y
( B e r k e l e y : U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1968), p.5.

5. Guha, o p . c i t . , p.33.

6. M i n o r i t i e s i n Pakistan (Karachi: Pakistan Publication,

n d . ) , P P . 8 - 9 ; K.B. S a y e e d , T h e P o l i t i c a l S y s t e m o f
P a k i s t a n (Boston: Houghton M i f f l i n Co., 1967), p.187;
J.K. Ray, Democracy and N a t i o n a l i s m on T r i a l : A Study o f
E a s t P a k i s t a n (Simla: Indian I n s t i t u t e o f Advanced Study,
•1968), p . 3 5 ; a n d A r e a H a n d b o o k f o r B a n g l a d e s h (1975),
p.321.

7. F o r a b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n o f Bengali involvement i nt h e
n a t i o n l i s t movement, s e e Myron W e i n e r , P a r t y B u i l d i n g i n
a New N a t i o n : I n d i a n N a t i o n a l C o n g r e s s ( C h i c a g o : U n i v e r s i t y
o f C h i c a g o P r e s s , 1 9 6 7 ) , p p . 3 2 4 - 3 2 7 ; a n d M a r c u s P. F r a n d a ,
P o l i t i c a l Development and P o l i t i c a l Decay i n Bengal
( C a l c u t t a : Fima K.L. Mukhopadhyaya, 1971), pp.31-35.
 15

8. The term 'bhadralok' i s key to the understanding o f

%

B e n g a l i Hindu s o c i e t y . The term bhadralok l i t e r a l l y

means " r e s p e c t a b l e people" or "gentlemen". They are the
dominant e l i t e i n both r u r a l and urban s o c i e t y , and are
drawn mainly from the t h r e e h i g h e s t c a s t e s of the Hindu
society. They u s u a l l y have a landed i n t e r e s t , or are
employed i n p r o f e s s i o n a l o c c u p a t i o n s . They are d i s t i n -
guished from o t h e r s by t h e i r deportment, t h e i r speech,
t h e i r s t y l e o f housing, t h e i r e a t i n g h a b i t s , t h e i r
o c c u p a t i o n s , and t h e i r a s s o c i a t i o n s . B e n g a l i Hindu s o c i e t y
of today i s s t i l l dominated by the bhadralok. For an
a n a l y s i s o f the bhadralok, see B r o o m f i e l d , o p . c i t . , pp.
5-20.

9. For a d i s c u s s i o n of the d e c l i n i n g r o l e of the B e n g a l i s i n

the n a t i o n a l i s t movement, see Leonard A. Gordon, Bengal:/
The N a t i o n a l i s t Movement 1 8 7 6 - 1 9 4 0 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1974).

10. Weiner, o p . c i t . , p . 3 2 6 .

11. For an account of the C a l c u t t a R i o t s , see S i r F r a n c i s Tuker,

While Memory Serves (London: C a s s e l , 1 9 5 0 ) .

12. For an account of the N o a k h a l i R i o t s and Gandhi's peace

e f f o r t , see A t u l y a Ghosh, N o a k h a l i ( C a l c u t t a : np., 1 9 4 7 ) ;
and T r a i l a k y a Nath Chakravorty, J e l e T r i s h Bachar O Bharater
Swadhinata Sangram ( T h i r t y Years i n P r i s o n and the Indian
Independence Struggle) (Mymensingly: Author, 19 68) , pp.
356-360.

13. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, I n d i a Wins Freedom (Calcutta:

O r i e n t Longmans, 19 5 9 ) .

14. A t the time o f p a r t i t i o n i n 19 4 7 , the t o t a l Muslim r e p r e - '

s e n t a t i o n i n the I n d i a n C i v i l S e r v i c e (ICS) and Indian
P o l i t i c a l S e r v i c e (IPS) cadres was o n l y nine per c e n t .
Out o f the t o t a l 95 Muslim ICS-IPS o f f i c e r s who opted f o r
s e r v i c e i n P a k i s t a n , only two were B e n g a l i s . While the
number o f Muslim o f f i c e r s i n Bengal was v e r y i n s i g n i f i c a n t ,
t h a t of Hindus was equal t o the B r i t i s h ICS-IPS o f f i c e r s
i n Bengal i n e a r l y 19 4 7 . Hindus had more r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
i n the lower a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s e r v i c e s . See Ralph B r a i b a n t i ,
" P u b l i c Bureaucracy and J u d i c i a r y i n P a k i s t a n " , i n Joseph
La Palombara, ed., Bureaucracy and P o l i t i c a l Development
( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 6 7 ) , 2 n d ed.,
p p . 3 6 4 - 3 6 5 ; and Muzaffar Ahmed Choudhury, The C i v i l S e r v i c e
i n P a k i s t a n (Dacca: NIPA, 1 9 6 3 ) , p . 7 8 .

15. K e i t h C a l l a r d , P a k i s t a n : A P o l i t i c a l Study (New York: The

M a c m i l l a n Co., 1957), p.265.

16. Rajni Kothari, P o l i t i c s i n India (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown

and Co., 1970), p.62.
 16
17. A . F . S a l a h u d d i n Ahmed, S o c i a l I d e a s a n d S o c i a l C h a n g e i n
B e n g a l , 1818-1835 ( L e i d e n : J . J . B r i l l , 1 9 6 5 ) , p . 1 7 .

18. B a d r u d d i n Umar, S a m p r a d a h a (Communalism) ( D a c c a : Mowla

B r o t h e r s , 1966); Ghulam M u r s h i d , Swadhinata Sangramer
S a n s k r i t i k Patabhumi ( C u l t u r a l Background o f Independence
Struggle) (Calcutta: Associated P r i n t e r s , 1971).

19. Cited i n C h o u d h u r y Mohammad A l i , o p . c i t . , p . 9 .

20. L o u i s W i r t h , "The P r o b l e m o f M i n o r i t y G r o u p s " , i n R a l p h

L i n t o n , e d . , T h e S c i e n c e o f Man i n t h e W o r l d C r i s i s (New
York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1945), p.346.

21. J.A. Laponce, The P r o t e c t i o n o f M i n o r i t i e s (Berkeley,

U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1960), p.6.

22. I b i d . , p.12.

23. F o r an a n a l y s i s o f t h e a s s i m i l a t i o n p r o c e s s , see M i l t o n
M. G o r d o n , A s s i m i l a t i o n i n A m e r i c a n L i f e (New Y o r k :
O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 19 6 4 ) ; a n d h i s e s s a y , " T o w a r d a
G e n e r a l Theory o f R a c i a l and E t h n i c Group R e l a t i o n s " , i n
N a t h a n G l a z e r a n d D a n i e l P. M o y n i h a n , e d s . E t h n i c i t y
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1975), pp.
84-110. H i s hypotheses a r e that i n a majority-minority
group contact c u l t u r a l a s s i m i l a t i o n w i l l occur first,
a c c u l t u r a t i o n may t a k e p l a c e w i t h o u t o t h e r t y p e s o f
a s s i m i l a t i o n , and f i n a l l y , i f s t r u c t u r a l a s s i m i l a t i o n
occurs along with or subsequent t o a c c u l t u r a t i o n , a l l
other types o f a s s i m i l a t i o n w i l l i n e v i t a b l y take place.
Gordon, i n G l a z e r and Moynihan, p.84.

24. Laponce, op.cit., pp.178-180; also Chapters V I I and VIII.

25. I b i d . , p.13.

26. The term communalism i s used i n t h e I n d i a n subcontinent to

denote p o l i t i c s based on r e l i g i o u s l i n e s . I use t h e term
i n that sense here.
 17

CHAPTER II

I N I T I A L CHAOS AND THE S T R U G G L E

FOR C O N S T I T U T I O N A L S A F E G U A R D S :
THE F I R S T P H A S E OF M I N O R I T Y P O L I T I C S , 1 9 4 7 - 1 9 5 4

August 14, 1947 marked the beginning of a new era i n the

political life of East Bengal. With independence and partition,

accompanied by an unprecedented communal holocaust, the existing

political m a t r i x was c o m p l e t e l y changed. The achievement of

Pakistan indicated the reversal of the dominance of the Hindus

in East Bengal. The place of the Hindu elites of the preparti-

tion e r a was t a k e n o v e r by West Pakistanis, refugee Muslims

from other parts of India, and Bengali Muslims. The Hindus faced

a unique situation because t h e y were not prepared to accept

Pakistan and the p a r t i t i o n of Bengal. The resulting dilemma

among the Hindus charted the course of Hindu politics f o r the

first few years of independence. The object of this chapter i s

to examine how the defeated Hindu elite tried to safeguard the

Hindu interest i n Pakistan i n the first confusing years of the

newly born political system.

Initial Reaction to Partition

The Hindus were the champions of Indian nationalism and

fought f o r the independence of "undivided" India. When

Pakistan actually came into being, i t was a great shock f o r the

Hindus. The typical Hindu attitude towards this new nation was

described by Pravash Chandra Lahiry, a leading Congress leader

of East Bengal, i n h i s memoirs. Recalling the first day of

independence i n h i s home town, Rajshahi, he lamented that he

 18

was a freedom fighter of the Indian nationlist movement. It

was unfortunate that he was no longer an Indian, but had to

1
become a Pakistani. He had to accept this dishonour. He

further added that the Hindus' eyes expressed "a sense of

2

defeat but they had to keep an artificial smiling face".

Professor Samar Guha, secretary of the East Bengal Minorities'

Association, also bewailed the fact that the Hindus of East

3

Bengal were "no longer Indians". In the first session of the

Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (CAP), Kiran Shankar Roy,

leader of the Opposition Congress party, f r a n k l y admitted that

the Congress party was not very happy because of the division
4

of India, and the partition of Bengal.

It was quite natural for the Hindus to have psychological

reservations about Pakistan because i t meant the defeat of

their much cherished symbol of Indian nationalism, a symbol

with which they Identified for a long time. Pakistan was to

become a Muslim homeland, and they could easily see that their

opportunities would be very restricted. The Hindu fear was

redoubled by the fact that political p o w e r was captured by the

Muslim League, which allowed no place f o r Hindus in the

political decision-making arena. In view of their political

prospects in Pakistan, almost a l l prominent Hindu leaders

migrated to India. However, of the leading Hindu politicians,

Kiran Shankar Roy and D.N. Dutta, leader and deputy leader

respectively of the Congress assembly party i n undivided Bengal

legislative assembly, decided to stay on i n East Bengal. The '

Hindu leaders who chose to remain i n Pakistan were motivated

 19

by the disposition t o take the leadership of the now befallen

5

Hindu community i n Pakistan, and some o f them d i d not have

the necessary base of support i n West Bengal to engage in

politics there. The mass m i g r a t i o n o f Hindus to India started

immediately before partition. By the middle of 1948, about

one million Hindus had migrated t o West Bengal. The stream of

migrants was relatively thin before the 1950 riots after which

more than one million Hindus crossed the border i n the year
7 '

19 5 0 . During the first few years of independence, the

migration was mostly confined to the bhadralok section of the

Hindu community. In most cases, they would send the young and

female members of the family to India, leaving behind one or

two o l d e r members t o l o o k a f t e r t h e i r property or professions.

Political Structure of Pakistan A f t e r Independence

In order to understand the nature of minority politics in

the new republic, i t i s necessary to have some insight in the

working of the political system at that time. The Pakistan

m o v e m e n t was spearheaded by the Muslim League and after inde-

pendence, p o w e r was captured by i t both at the c e n t r e and in

the provinces. Mohammad A l i J i n n a h was the undisputed leader

of the p a r t y and became the first Governor-General of Pakistan.

He exercised his authority i n the same way that British

Governor-Generals did. The first Pakistan Cabinet appointed

by him was much more like a viceregal "executive council".^

The nominations to the C a b i n e t were made b y him personally and

10

he also decided their portfolios. As noted by K.B. Sayeed,

"With the exception of Mr. L i a q u a t A l i Khan, the other Muslim

 20
L e a g u e members of the... cabinet were not outstanding leaders

of the Muslim League... Prominent Muslim League leaders like

Mr. Khaliquzzaman, Mr. H.S. Suhrawardy, the Premier of Bengal,

11

and Nawab Ismail had not been nominated..."

An important thing to note i s that popular Bengali Muslim

League leaders were excluded from the top hierarchy of the

emerging ruling elite of Pakistan. Before partition, the

Bengal Muslim League was largely dominated by H.S. Suhrawardy

and Abul Hashim, general secretary of the Bengal Muslim League.

But on the eve of partition, they were excluded from the leader-

ship of the party and government by the shrewd manoeuvering of

the central leadership of the Muslim League. They were replaced

by the members of more conservative and landlord-dominated wing

of the party l e d by Khwaja Nazimuddin and Akram Khan.. F a z u l Huq,

former chief minister and the most popular Muslim leader of

Bengal, was also ousted from the Muslim League a few years

before independence. Huq, Suhrawardy, and Hashim were the

advocates of a more or less independent Eastern Pakistan along

the lines o f .the historic Lahore Resolution. Jinnah feared

that the continued presence of Suhrawardy and Huq on the scene

might lead to a s e p a r a t i s t movement i n Bengal. So he opted for

the subservient Bengali Muslim League group l e d by Nazimuddin.

The l a n d l o r d group had common interests with West Pakistani

leaders and feared mass p o l i t i c s . On the other hand, Suhrawardy

and Huq were mass leaders and represented the rising Bengali

Muslim middle class. As early as 1948, the exclusion of popular

Bengali leaders resulted i n the growth of a sense of frustration

 21

among a section of Bengali Muslim leaders. This frustration

was ultimately manifested in a ' f i s s i p a r o u s tendency' in East

12

Bengal, and provincial autonomy became an i m p o r t a n t theme in

the p o l i t i c s of P a k i s t a n almost from the day of i t s inception.

Minority Parties

Before proceeding to a discussion of the r o l e of Hindu

politicians i n the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan and i n the

East Bengal Legislative Assembly, l e t us turn to the organiza-

tional characteristics of the minority parties. Before parti-

tion, the Indian National Congress was the party of Indian

nationalism, and the Hindus of East Bengal were solidly behind

it. With growing communal politics, the Muslim League

successfully mobilized the Muslim masses of East Bengal into

its fold, while the Congress party was further isolated from

the Muslim masses and for a l lpractical purposes became a Hindu

party. After partition, most of the influential congress

leaders left Pakistan. Even Kiran Shankar Roy, leader of the

Opposition Congress Party i n the Constituent Assembly, left

Pakistan within e i g h t months to take up a ministerial position

in t h e West Bengal Cabinet.

The Congress party underwent a split i n the middle of 1948

as a result of a controversy over the future strategy of the

party. A group of Congress leaders was of the opinion that

under the changed.circumstances, the continuance of the Congress

party as such would go against the interest of the minority

community, and the Hindu leaders would f u r t h e r be isolated from

the general Muslim public. Another section of the Congress

 22

party believed that under the existing system of separate

electorates, i t would be wiser to continue the operation of

the Congress, and to retain i t s previous name. They felt that

because of,the sentimental ties of the Hindus with the Congress,

13
it would be able to continue to attract their votes.

D.N. Dutta, deputy leader of the opposition i n the East

Bengal Legislative Assembly (EBLA) and a member of the CAP, and

K.K. Dutta, another member o f the EBLA, were the leaders of the

former group. They convened a conference called the "Eastern

Pakistan Political Convention" at Comilla on July 18, 1948.

The Convention resolved to form a new party called the "Pakistan

Gana Samity" (Pakistan People's Association) whose membership

. . 14

would be open to a l l , irrespective of caste, creed or religion.

D.N. Dutta and his a s s o c i a t e s were of the view that "with the

partition, the time had come w h e n communalism should be fought

by forging a programme m a i n l y f o r economic upliftment of the

1 5

masses regardless of any community distinctions." Immediately

after the formation of the Gana Samity, D.N. Dutta launched a

province-wide campaign for a joint electorate. His party also

held the view that the a c t i v i t i e s of the Congress party should

16

be confined to India. The economic platform of the party

attracted the other existing minor Hindu p a r t i e s to join hands

with the Gana Samity. Later, i t was joined by the socialist

members of the Congress, a section of the Forward Bloc, and

the Pakistan Socialist Party, headed by a legendary figure of

1 7

the Indian independence movement, T r a i l a k y a N a t h Chakravorty.

The name o f the party was changed to United Progressive Party

(UPP) in 1954.
 Shortly after the formation of the Gana Samity, those who

did not agree with this dissenting group, reconstituted the

Congress Party as the Pakistan National Congress at a confer-

18
ence of the rump Congressmen from a l l over East Bengal. It

was decided that the Pakistan National Congress would keep no

19

organizational link with the parent o r g a n i z a t i o n in India.

A new 250-member body was formed, an eight-member committee

was appointed to draft a party constitution, and the existing

district and lower level committees were recognized as units of

the party. ^ 2
This group of Hindu leaders argued that whether

the Congress party remained as such or changed i t s name, Hindus

would be subjected to intimidation i n the p r e v a i l i n g communal

atmosphere. Thus, they needed a party and leadership which

21

could support their cause and help i n k e e p i n g up their morale.

Although the Gana Samity was formed with the novel objective to

forge a political party h a v i n g membership from both Hindus and

Muslims, i t failed to a t t r a c t any Muslim support. It therefore

maintained i t s existence as a Hindu party, and championed their

causes. The two Hindu parties were separate entities on paper

only, and t h e members of t h e Gana Samity retained their identity

22

as the Congress Bloc i n the CAP and the EBLA.

Members of the scheduled castes formed the largest Hindu

group i n East B e n g a l , and were economically and socially far

behind the caste Hindus. The Congress party enjoyed the

23

support of the scheduled castes. A section of the dissatis-

fied scheduled caste members formed the Scheduled Caste

Federation (SCF) before partition. The SCF had long been in

alliance with the Muslim League and, as a result, was rewarded

with a cabinet post i n the Central Cabinet of Pakistan.

J.N. Mandal/ leader of the SCF, was appointed a Cabinet

minister i n the interim Cabinet of India in 19 46 from the

Muslim League quota. After independence, he became M i n i s t e r

for Law and Labour i n the first Pakistan Central Cabinet.

The SCF cooperated closely with the Muslim League after inde-

pendence .

If we look at the working of the minority parties we find

that their activities were limited to the four walls of the

assemblies, and that they had little mass contact. Lahiry

maintains that, "Though there was a party called Pakistan

National Congress after independence i n East Bengal, i t could

not launch any democratic movement. T h i s was not possible for

24
any Hindu-led political party." "Whatever mass contact we

had," he adds, "was i n the form of articulating their grie-

25

vances i n the assembly." Under the existing circumstances,

though the Congress "was s e c u l a r and democratic i n i t s avowed

creed, i t had no other

alternative but to concentrate more on
26
protection of minorities."
Jinnah and the Minorities

The CAP was s e t up i n pursuance of an announcement by the

British government, dated June 3, 1947. Its total membership

was 79, of which 41 were from East Bengal. There were 13 seats

reserved f o r the Hindus of East Bengal and a l l but one belonged

to the Congress party. Three other m i n o r i t y members were

elected from West Pakistan. A l l Muslim members except two

 25

belonged to the Muslim League. T h e members o f t h e CAP were

elected indirectly b y t h e members o f the provincial legislative

assemblies.

The first session o f the Constituent Assembly met i n

Karachi on August 10, 1 9 4 7 , u n d e r the able leadership of Jinnah.

Mandal, the Scheduled Caste associate o f the Muslim League, was

elected temporary president of the inaugural session o f the

CAP. This was a gesture of goodwill to the minorities, although

the motive behind i t was probably t o show the world that the

newly born Muslim state of Pakistan had a place f o rthe

minorities. "Today, gentlemen," Mandal declared on t h e

occasion of his election, " i t gives me much pleasure to declare

that the election as Chairman o f a member from a minority

community augurs very well with the creation of Pakistan,

because Pakistan today i s the result o f p e r s i s t e n t and legiti-

mate demand o f t h e m i n o r i t y community, namely, Muslims o f

India... People of minority communities i n Pakistan may be

assured, as they have been assured repeatedly by t h e Muslim

League leaders, and p a r t i c u l a r l y Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad A l i

Jinnah, that the people of minority communities would not only

27

be treated justly and f a i r l y but generously too."

Jinnah was elected president o f t h e CAP the next day. In

his address of felicitation Kiran Shankar Roy, l e a d e r of the

opposition Congress party outlined h i s party's policy: "As f a r

as we a r e concerned, S i r , i f the Pakistan which you have i n

your mind means a secular democratic State, a State which will

make no d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n a citizen and a c i t i z e n , which will

deal fairly with a l l irrespective of caste, creed or

community, I assure you that you s h a l l have our utmost coopera-

28

tion." He frankly admitted that the Congress party was n o t

very happy because of the division o f I n d i a , and t h e p a r t i t i o n i n g

of Bengal. "But as t h i s arrangement has been agreed upon by

the two p a r t i e s , " he d e c l a r e d , "we accept i tloyally, and shall

work for i tloyally. We accept the citizenship of Pakistan

29

with a l l i t s implications." "And i n t u r n , " he continued,

"we shall expect the rights and p r i v i l e g e s o f the minority

guaranteed i n the Constitution, guaranteed not only i n the

Constitution but actually respected i n the day t o day working

of t h e government.

Jinnah, i n h i s reply t o t h e g r e e t i n g s , , made several

assurances to the minorities. In h i s speech, which was later

described by Hindus as t h e " C h a r t e r of Minority Rights" i n

Pakistan, Jinnah declared: " I know there are people who do

not q u i t e agree with the d i v i s i o n of India and t h e p a r t i t i o n of

Punjab and Bengal. Much h a s b e e n said against i t , b u t now i t

has been accepted, i t i s the duty o f every one o f us t o loyally

abide by i t and honourably act according t o t h e agreement which

is now final and b i n d i n g on a l l . . . I f y o u change your p a s t and

work together i n a spirit that everyone o f y o u , no m a t t e r what

community he b e l o n g s t o , no m a t t e r what relations he had with

you i n the past, no m a t t e r what h i s colour, caste or creed, i s

first, second and l a s t a citizen of this State with equal rights,

privileges and o b l i g a t i o n s , there w i l l be no e n d t o t h e p r o g r e s s

31
you will make."
 He f u r t h e r d e c l a r e d , "you are f r e e ; you are f r e e to go

to your temples, you are f r e e to go to your mosques or to any

other p l a c e s of worship i n t h i s S t a t e of P a k i s t a n . You may

belong to any r e l i g i o n or c a s t e or c r e e d — t h a t has n o t h i n g to

32

do w i t h the b u s i n e s s of the S t a t e . " And he concluded w i t h

these words: "In course o f time Hindus would cease to be Hindus

and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not i n the r e l i g i o u s

sense, because t h a t i s the p e r s o n a l f a i t h of each individual,

33

but i n the p o l i t i c a l sense as c i t i z e n s o f the S t a t e . "

J i n n a h , as a pragmatic p o l i t i c i a n made t h i s pronouncement

because he knew that a t t h a t c r i t i c a l juncture of h i s t o r y i t

was not p o s s i b l e f o r P a k i s t a n to s u r v i v e without the m i n o r i t i e s .

They were dominant i n the economic l i f e of the c o u n t r y . It

was a l r e a d y apparent t h a t Hindus had been s h i f t i n g their

c a p i t a l and b u s i n e s s to what the p r e s s c a l l e d "safe zones" i n

India. Dawn, the organ o f the Muslim League, a l l e g e d t h a t an

estimated c a p i t a l of 200 c r o r e s had been s h i f t e d to I n d i a by

e a r l y J u l y , 1947. T h i s was termed "Hindu h o s t i l i t y " to P a k i -

stan, "motivated by a d e s i r e to h i t the P a k i s t a n Exchequer by

34

denying i t a b i g source of revenue." I f Hindus l e f t Pakistan

en masse i t would a l s o c r e a t e insurmountable problems i n the

administrative f i e l d . E a s t Bengal's a d m i n i s t r a t i v e machinery,

i n p a r t i c u l a r , was l a r g e l y manned by Hindus. Moreover, i f there

was a mass exodus from P a k i s t a n , i t would r e s u l t i n an influx

of more refugees from I n d i a than P a k i s t a n c o u l d accommodate.

I t would a l s o be a heavy blow to the economy of P a k i s t a n

because w h i l e Hindu migrants were prosperous people, Muslim

 28

35
refugees from I n d i a were mainly agriculturalists.

Jinnah was even ready i n 19 47 t o change the name and the

character o f the Muslim League P a r t y . I t was r e p o r t e d that a

P a k i s t a n N a t i o n a l League would be formed which would replace

the Muslim League, and be open t o a l l c i t i z e n s of P a k i s t a n

36

i r r e s p e c t i v e o f r e l i g i o n , c a s t e , or creed. Dawn, i n an

editorial called " P o l i t i c a l Readjustments", h e l d t h a t i t would

e f f e c t i v e l y remove any l i n g e r i n g doubts o f the m i n o r i t i e s as

37

to t h e i r s t a t u s . However, t h i s p r o p o s a l was not c a r r i e d out

when the Muslim League C o u n c i l met i n Karachi l a t e i n December,

1947 and the l i q u i d a t i o n o f the Party a t t h a t moment was deemed

38
unwise by the l e a d e r s h i p .
While J i n n a h s aforementioned pronouncements i n the CAP were
1

h a i l e d by the m i n o r i t i e s , they caused some s t i r among the r i g i d

and uncompromising advocates o f an I s l a m i c state. Some argued

t h a t Jinnah's statement amounted t o the abandonment o f the

39

i d e a l s o f the Muslim League. Dawn q u i c k l y attempted t o c o r r e c t

this 'misinterpretation . 1
I t / p o i n t e d o u t t h a t Jinnah merely

meant the non-Muslims would not be debarred from p a r t i c i p a t i n g

i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f P a k i s t a n and t h a t they would not be

40

d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t by i t s laws, or s u f f e r economically.

T h i s s e s s i o n o f the CAP appointed a 15-member Committee

on Fundamental Rights of C i t i z e n s of Pakistan and on Matters

Relating to M i n o r i t i e s . The appointment o f t h i s committee was

o b v i o u s l y made t o assure the m i n o r i t i e s t h a t t h e i r r i g h t s and

i n t e r e s t s would be safeguarded i n P a k i s t a n . But the happy

atmosphere o f communal harmony began t o wane with the onset o f

the communal f r e n z y i n both I n d i a and P a k i s t a n , and t e n s i o n

between the two c o u n t r i e s soon i n c r e a s e d over the i s s u e o f the

a c c e s s i o n o f p r i n c e l y s t a t e s l i k e Hyderabad and Kashmir.

M i n o r i t i e s as Champions'of. E a s t Bengal I n t e r e s t

The Hindu p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s , i n the absence o f any other

o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s , championed B e n g a l i i n t e r e s t s i n the CAP and

i n the EBLA. They c o u l d read the growing d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n o f

B e n g a l i Muslims a g a i n s t the c e n t r a l r u l i n g e l i t e . By v o i c i n g

the demands o f E a s t Bengal, they hoped t o forge g r e a t e r u n i t y

w i t h B e n g a l i Muslims, thereby making t h e i r stay i n E a s t Bengal

easier. When the f i r s t s e s s i o n o f the CAP was convened on

February 24, 1948, P r o f e s s o r Raj Kumar Chakraverty o f the

Congress p a r t y moved an amendment motion which sought to have

a s i t t i n g of the CAP h e l d i n Dacca a t l e a s t once a year. He

suggested t h a t he d i d not move the amendment from any sense of

narrow p r o v i n c i a l i s m , but from a high sense o f duty t o the

41

people of E a s t e r n P a k i s t a n . Two B e n g a l i Muslims, Tamizuddm

Khan and Begum S h a i s t a Ikramullah, supported the motion. How-

ever, i t was not c a r r i e d because L i a q u a t A l l Khan, prime

m i n i s t e r of P a k i s t a n , p o i n t e d out t h a t Dacca was f a c i n g s e r i o u s

problems o f accommodation. Instead, the P r e s i d e n t was empowered

to convene a s e s s i o n of the CAP o u t s i d e K a r a c h i . Thus, Dacca

42

could be the p l a c e o f assembly s e s s i o n a t a l a t e r time.

The demand f o r B e n g a l i as one o f the s t a t e languages o f

P a k i s t a n was a l s o f i r s t v o i c e d by the Hindu members. D.N. Dutta

moved on February 25, 1948 an amendment which sought to make

B e n g a l i one o f the o f f i c i a l languages o f the C o n s t i t u e n t

 30

Assembly. "The State language...," he demanded, "should be

the language which i s used by the majority of the people of

the State, and for that, S i r , I consider that Bengali language

43
is a lingua franca of our State."

He further claimed that he voiced "the sentiments of the

44
vast millions" of the country. His amendment proposal was
45
supported by other members o f the Congress Party. The motion

was opposed by Liaquat A l i K h a n who alleged that the mover

tried "to create misunderstanding between the different parts

46

of Pakistan." He further declared, "Pakistan has been

created because of the demand o f a hundred million Muslims in

the subcontinent and the language of a hundred million Muslims

is Urdu and, therefore, i t i s wrong f o r him (Dutta) now to try

and create the situation that as the majority of the people of

Pakistan belongs to one part of Pakistan, therefore the

language which i s spoken there should become the State language

of Pakistan. Pakistan is a Muslim State and i t must have as

47

its lingua franca the language of the Muslim nation."

Liaquat's pronouncement that Pakistan was a Muslim State

was bitterly resented by the opposition Congress leader of the

CAP, Sris Chandra Chattopadhyaya. He asserted, "So long my

idea was that Pakistan i s not a Muslim State but a people's state

and i t belongs to both Muslims as well as to non-Muslims. If

today the statement of the Leader of the House is accepted,

then i t i s a matter of serious consideration f o r the non-Muslims

whether they have any right to take part i n the framing of the

Constitution as well. That is really very important because in

 31

4
that case, Muslims only... should frame their own Constitution."

Tamizuddin Khan, Deputy President of the Assembly, in his reply

to the debate, maintained that Jinnah in his first speech to

the Assembly had made i t clear that a l l minorities had equal

49

rights with the Muslims.

The language issue gathered velocity i n East Bengal in

early March, 19 4 8 , when the students of Dacca University

launched a movement f o r the recognition of the Bengali language

5,0

as one of the state languages. On March 11, 1948, they staged

a strike which was f o l l o w e d by more student unrest in the

province over the next few days. However, the Hindu leaders

were not associated with the activities of the "Action

Committee" which was formed by different student and youth

51

groups of Dacca to lead the movement. The language distur-

bance compelled Khwaja Nazimuddin, premier of East Bengal, to

sign an agreement with the students pledging the recognition of

Bengali.

When the first session of the EBLA met on March 15, 1948,

Manoranjan Dhar, Pratap Chandra Guha Roy, and Nellie Sen Gupta

expressed their full support f o r the s t u d e n t s and p r o t e s t e d

53
against their p e r s e c u t i o n by police. N a z i m u d d i n moved a
r e s o l u t i o n on A p r i l 6, 1 9 4 8 , t h a t B e n g a l i s h o u l d be a d o p t e d as
54

the official language of the province rather than English.

D.N. Dutta and other Hindu members put forward a number of

amendments which recommended to the

C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly t h a t
55
B e n g a l i be made o n e o f t h e s t a t e l a n g u a g e s o f P a k i s t a n .
Since t h e d e m a n d f o r B e n g a l i was a r t i c u l a t e d i n t h e CAP
and i n t h e EBLA by Hindu members, the ruling party tried to

create an impression i n the public mind that the language move-

ment had been inspired by the h o s t i l e Hindu leaders of India.^

Dawn e v e n alleged that i t was due to the machinations of fifth

57

columnists, i n other words, the Hindus. The language issue

became insignificant for a few years after this event, only to

take a serious turn i n 1952 when the central ruling elite

revived i t s attempt to impose Urdu as the sole state language

of Pakistan. By that time the growing Muslim opposition in

East B e n g a l was taking definite shape and political organiza-

tions like t h e Awami League and the Youth League were gaining

momentum and support. The famous F e b r u a r y movement, which

compelled the government to recognize Bengali as one of the

state l a n g u a g e s , was l e d by these growing Muslim opposition

groups, and the Hindu leaders had little connection with i t .

K.K. Dutta.: d e c l a r e d on the floor of the CAP that "the move-

m e n t was nurtured by the Muslims and i t was carried on by the

58

Muslims a l o n e u n a i d e d by anyone from outside."

Despite their non-involvement i n t h e movement, Hindu

members i n the E B L A made fiery speeches and supported the cause

inside the Assembly. Manoranjan Dhar asked f o r an explanation

from the Premier about the p o l i c e firing on the students.

D.N. D u t t a , B.K. Das, and Govinda L a i Banerjee also voiced the

59

demands of the demonstrators for Bengali. Similarly, Hindu

members of t h e CAP strongly supported the motion o f Nur Ahmed,

a Bengali Muslim, that Bengali

a l o n g w i t h U r d u s h o u l d b e made
60
the state language of Pakistan. One p o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n o f
Hindu non-involvement i n the language movement i s that the

Congress party had by t h a t time become an i n s i g n i f i c a n t force

in terms o f mass following. Another i s that the growing

Muslim opposition forces were hesitant t o be s e e n as c o l l a b o r a -

ting with t h e Hindus.

Struggle f o r C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Safeguards

The 'first b i g step' i n framing t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n was taken

with the adoption of the "Objectives Resolution" o r t h e "Aims

and Objects" of the future Constitution o f Pakistan. On March

7, 19 4 9 , Liaquat A l i Khan moved the Objectives Resolution:

"In t h e name o f A l l a h , the Benificent, the M e r c i f u l ;

WHEREAS s o v e r e i g n t y o v e r t h e e n t i r e u n i v e r s e b e l o n g s
t o G o d A l m i g h t y a l o n e a n d t h e a u t h o r i t y w h i c h He h a s
delegated t o the State o f Pakistan through i t s people
f o r b e i n g e x e r c i s e d w i t h i n t h e l i m i t p r e s c r i b e d b y Him
is a sacred trust;

T h i s C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e people
o f P a k i s t a n r e s o l v e s t o frame a c o n s t i t u t i o n f o r t h e
sovereign independent State o f Pakistan;

WHEREIN t h e S t a t e s h a l l e x e r c i s e i t s powers and

a u t h o r i t y through t h e chosen representatives of the
people;

WHEREIN t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f d e m o c r a c y , f r e e d o m ,
e q u a l i t y , t o l e r a n c e and s o c i a l j u s t i c e , as e n u n c i a t e d
by I s l a m , s h a l l be f u l l y o b s e r v e d ;

WHEREIN t h e M u s l i m s s h a l l b e e n a b l e d to order
t h e i r l i v e s i n t h e i n d i v i d u a l and c o l l e c t i v e spheres
i n a c c o r d w i t h t h e t e a c h i n g s and r e q u i r e m e n t s o f Islam
as s e t o u t i n t h e H o l y Quran and t h e Sunna;

WHEREIN a d e q u a t e p r o v i s i o n s h a l l b e made f o r t h e
m i n o r i t i e s f r e e l y t o p r o f e s s and p r a c t i s e t h e i r
r e l i g i o n s and develop t h e i r c u l t u r e s ;

WHEREBY t h e t e r r i t o r i e s now i n c l u d e d i n o r i n
a c c e s s i o n with P a k i s t a n and such o t h e r ' t e r r i t o r i e s
a s may h e r e a f t e r b e i n c l u d e d i n o r a c c e d e t o P a k i s t a n
s h a l l form a F e d e r a t i o n where t h e u n i t s w i l l be
 34

autonomous w i t h such boundaries and l i m i t a t i o n s

on t h e i r powers a n d a u t h o r i t y a s may b e p r e s c r i b e d ;

WHEREIN s h a l l b e g u a r a n t e e d f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t s
i n c l u d i n g e q u a l i t y o f s t a t u s , o f o p p o r t u n i t y and
before law, s o c i a l , economic and p o l i t i c a l justice,
and f r e e d o m o f t h o u g h t , e x p r e s s i o n , b e l i e f , faith,
worship and a s s o c i a t i o n , s u b j e c t t o law and p u b l i c
morality.

WHEREIN a d e q u a t e p r o v i s i o n s s h a l l b e made t o
safeguard the legitimate i n t e r e s t s of m i n o r i t i e s
and backward and d e p r e s s e d c l a s s e s ;

WHEREIN t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e of the judiciary shall

be fully secured;

WHEREIN t h e i n t e g r i t y o f t h e t e r r i t o r i e s o f t h e
F e d e r a t i o n , i t s independence and a l l i t s r i g h t s
i n c l u d i n g i t s s o v e r e i g n r i g h t s on l a n d , s e a and a i r
s h a l l be s a f e g u a r d e d ;

So t h a t t h e p e o p l e o f P a k i s t a n may p r o s p e r a n d
a t t a i n t h e i r r i g h t f u l and honoured p l a c e amongst t h e
n a t i o n s o f t h e W o r l d a n d make t h e i r f u l l c o n t r i b u t i o n
towards i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and progress and happi-
ness o f humanity."61

The Objectives Resolution, which clearly indicated that

the future constitution o f Pakistan was g o i n g t o be based on

"Islamic Principles", was a t t a c k e d by t h e Hindu members. They

argued that Pakistan was a c o u n t r y c o n s i s t i n g o f people

professing various religions, and t h e framing of the constitu-

tion should not cause any a p p r e h e n s i o n or distrust among a n y

section o f the people. They particularly objected to the

first two c l a u s e s of the Resolution.

The first clause of the Resolution was a t t a c k e d by t h e

Hindus because i twanted t o make G o d t h e u l t i m a t e sovereign

authority. B.K. D u t t a a n d R a j Kumar C h a k r a v e r t y i n their

amendments to this clause sought t o make t h e p e o p l e t h e

63
sovereign authority i n the State. Their anxiety was that i f
sovereignty belonged to God, instead of the people, then

Pakistan would not be a democratic state. They asked that

64

religion be kept separate from politics. They were also very

concerned about the growing influence of the Ulema (Islamic

scholars) who advocated an Islamic Constitution for Pakistan.^

B.K. Dutta held that the acceptance of this resolution after

t h e d e m i s e o f J i n n a h was t o him symptomatic of the "rising

t i d e " o f communal p o l i t i c s . ^

K.K. Dutta also advanced arguments in favour of people's

sovereignty. He argued that the basic fundamental p r i n c i a p l e s

of the c o n s t i t u t i o n must be the democratic principles of

government. He demanded, "a firm, bold, definite, unequivocal

proclamation of the political, economic and social principles

of the C o n s t i t u t i o n of Pakistan as a democratic state, with

all the powers vested i n the people..." He also expressed

his fear that some U l e m a were trying to interpret Islamic

democracy as a theocracy where the minority could be treated

as "dhimmies" (inferior citizens) who could not have any share

6 8

in government and administration.

The fourth clause dealing with the principles of democracy,

"as enunciated by Islam" was also vehemently opposed by the

Hindus for i t implied that democracy was subject to i n t e r p r e t a -

tion by Muslims according to their own religion. Hindus feared

that this would mean t h a t Pakistan would not be a complete

democracy, but a democracy t h a t was subject to i n t e r p r e t a t i o n

by the majority community. "We shall resent it," B.K. Dutta

declared, "for generations under this clause...you (have)

 36

condemned us f o r ever t o an i n f e r i o r status and prevented for

all time t o come P a k i s t a n from growing up into a country of

69
well-knit, homogeneous p e o p l e . " He further claimed that

under this clause t h e m i n o r i t i e s would be w i t h o u t any legiti-

70

mate right t o share power."

The "enabling clause", the f i f t h of the Resolution, was

also opposed by t h e Congress members, though i td i d not create

as much furor as t h e above-mentioned two c l a u s e s . They

opposed this clause because i t amounted t o making Islam the

State religion of Pakistan, which would jeopardize the interest

of non-Muslims. P.H. Barma demanded that similar provisions be

made to enable non-Muslims t o order their lives i n accordance

71

with the teachings and requirements of their own religions.

The Muslim League tried to convince the minority members

that their l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t s would be f u l l y protected under

the future constitution. Sardar Nishtar, Central Cabinet

minister, clarified the p o s i t i o n o f the Muslim League and

asked t h e non-Muslims n o t t o be m i s l e d by t h e propaganda o f

72

some s o - c a l l e d Ulema,. Maulana Usmani, leader of thepro-

Muslim League Ulema, a l s o made i t clear that non-Muslims were

7

guaranteed a l l civic and r e l i g i o u s rights i n an I s l a m i c state.

However, S.C. C h a t t o p a d h y a y a , leader o f the opposition party,

in h i s concluding remarks on t h e d e b a t e , stated h i s objections

to the Islamic clauses and expressed h i s hope that the consti-

tution would be f r a m e d i n such a way that i t would suit non-

Muslims as w e l l as Muslims. He hoped the time would come when

political p a r t i e s based on r e l i g i o u s lines would cease to exist

so that there would not be any p r o v i s i o n i n the constitution

which might debar a non-Muslim from becoming the Head of the

74
State. Liaquat assured the minorities that "A non-Muslim

can be the head of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n under a constitutional

75

government..." He a l s o asked them not to be misled by the

propaganda of the " s o - c a l l e d Ulema who were actually the

'enemies of Islam'."^

Although Liaquat declared that the non-Muslims were equal

in every respect i n an Islamic s t a t e , he made i t abundantly

clear that Pakistan was founded to fashion the lives of Muslims

77

in accordance with the teaching and traditions of Islam.

The adoption of the r e s o l u t i o n was opposed tooth and nail by

the opposition. They fought to make the constituion democratic

and secular. However, a l l of their eighteen amendments were

brushed aside. The debate ended with a solemn assurance from

Liaquat that the interests of the m i n o r i t i e s would" be fully

protected. The r e s o l u t i o n was adopted on March 12, 19 4 9 . On

the same d a y , a twenty-five member Basic Principles Committee

(BPC) was set up to draft the Constitution.

By the beginning of the 1950s several important changes

had taken place i n the politics of Pakistan. Mohammad A l i

Jinnah was dead, and the rivalry between East Bengal and the
i

Punjab took a serious turn. Khwaj.a N a z i m u d d i n was the

Governor-General, but his powers were greatly curtailed by the

passing of the Government of India (Second Amendment) Act of

1950. Under such circumstances, Liaquat A l i Khan presented the

Interim Report of the BPC on September 28, 1950. The Interim

 38

Report aroused mass protests a l l over East Bengal because of

its undemocratic and anti-East Bengal nature. Even the East

78

Bengal Muslim League protested against it. Opposition

political forces convened a "Grand National Convention" on the

Constitution i n Dacca in early November, 1950. The Convention

resolved that a democratic, federal Republic of Pakistan be

established, and a draft Constitution f o r P a k i s t a n was also

79

proposed. However, the Congress P a r t y had no involvement in

this anti-BPC movement i n East Bengal. Perhaps after the 1950

riots the Hindu community was more cautious not to offend the

ruling p a r t y , and they kept themselves aloof from agitational

politics. Besides, although the Interim Report was thoroughly

undemocratic, i t d i d not contain any provisions f o r an Islamic

nomenclature of the State, or any religious qualification of

80

head of state. Thus the BPC Report d i d not concern them

greatly. Moreover, the rising Muslim opposition was also alert

not t o be called 'enemy agents' for aligning itself with the

Hindus. The consideration of the BPC,Report was postponed in

the face of rising opposition from East Bengal.

Liaquat moved the Interim Report of the Committee on

Fundamental Rights and on Matters Relating to Minorities on

October 4, 1950. But i t contained only the Report of the Sub-

committee on Fundamental R i g h t s , so the Hindus opposed i t s

g

consideration without the Report of the Minority Subcommittee.

They pointed out that they were anxious for their political

safeguards, and without these safeguards specified in the

Minority Subcommittee Report, the Report of the Fundamental

 39
82
Rights Subcommittee could n o t be considered. Their opposition

was s e t aside on t h e p l e a that i t would delay the constitution-

83
making process. Three Muslim independent members from West

Pakistan voted with the Opposition on t h e a d o p t i o n of the

84
Report. On the whole, the minority representatives were

happy with the adoption of the report on fundamental rights.

"I am happy to note," declared Professor Chakraverty, "that a l l

citizens have been declared equal before law...I am happy t o

note that there shall be no d i s c r i m i n a t i o n on grounds o f

religion, caste, sex...I am happy further to note that freedom

of conscience and the r i g h t t o p r o f e s s , practise and propagate

85

religion has been guaranteed..."

The Electorate Issue: Separate of Joint?

During the entire period of constitution-making i n Pakistan,

the electorate issue received t h e most attention from the Hindus.

The Congress party had always been opposed to the separate

electorate system i n undivided India. They believed that the

separate electorate system had u l t i m a t e l y been responsible f o r

the rise o f the 'two-nation' theory, and t h e b i r t h of Pakistan.

After independence, when they were thrown into the minority

position, they d i d n o t change their previous ideological stand

on the electorate issue. S.C. C h a t t o p a d h y a y a reiterated the

Congress p o l i c y when he d e c l a r e d that, "We, the Congress people,

s t i l l stick to our one-nation theory a n d we believe that the

people of Pakistan, Muslims and non-Muslims, consist o f one

86

nation and they are a l l Pakistanis." The i s s u e of joint

versus separate e l e c t o r a t e was zealously debated by Hindu

 40

members o f t h e CAP in April, 1952 when the e x i s t i n g electoral

l a w was amended by the Government of India (Third Amendment)

Bill to provide a separate electorate f o r Scheduled Castes.

The Congress Party members protested against this 'vivisection'

of the Hindu community. They claimed that a l l the Hindus in

East B e n g a l were i n favour of a joint electorate and referred

87

to the resolution of the M i n o r i t y Conference i n March, 1952.

They were opposed to separate electorates because they knew

that under that system they would become "a perpetual

minority" having no share i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the country-.

A communally divided electoral system would keep the minorities

away from e f f e c t i v e political participation under the existing

political a l i g n m e n t s , so t h e y were eager t o have a joint elec-

torate even though the chances of Hindus t o be elected to

assemblies would diminish to a great extent. But they were

hopeful that the joint electorate system would make t h e Muslim

leaders responsive t o Hindu demands. They hoped f o r the

formation of secular parties i n East B e n g a l where they would be

able to play significant political roles. The issue of the

electorate was one of t h e most delicate issues f o r the Hindus,

and was a recurrent theme i n the p o l i t i c a l controversy of

Pakistan. This issue will be dealt with i n greater detail in

the following chapter.

Adoption of t h e BPC Report

Khwaja Nazimuddin, who stepped into the p o s i t i o n of Prime

Minister a t the death of Liaquat A l i Khan, presented the Report

of the BPC on December 22, 1952. Nazimuddin's Report led to

 41
8 9
protests i n West Pakistan, particularly i n Punjab. The

consideration of the report was postponed i n the face of Punjab

opposition to i t . Meanwhile, G h u l a m Muhammed, who was both

Governor-General and the main representative of Punjabiinterests,

dismissed Nazimuddin on April 17, 1953, using the Anti-Ahmadi

Disturbances as a pretext. <After his dismissal, Mohammad A l i

of Bogra was installed as the prime minister. He moved a next

BPC Report for consideration on October 7, 1953.

Bogra came w i t h a parity of representation formula i n this

BPC Report which satisfied the Punjabi interests. The Hindu

i

members opposed the Islamic emphasis of the new BPC Report.

They strongly opposed the p r o v i s i o n that no law would be

enacted which was repugnant t o the Quran and Sunna. They

asked t o keep the personal laws of Hindus free from the purview

of such a provision. They also resented the provision f o r the

establishment of a government organization to propagate

Islamic teaching. They sharply criticized the nomenclature of

the state and the r e l i g i o u s q u a l i f i c a t i o n of t h e head of

4 - 4 - 9 0
state.

When their objections to the proposed c o n s t i t u t i o n were

not heeded, Hindu members o f t h e CAP walked out and absented

themselves from further deliberations on the Constitution.

S.C. Chattopadhyaya, leader of the Congress Party made a state-

ment b e f o r e walking out. "We, the Hindus," he stated, "form

about 14 per cent of the population. We are citizens of the

State of Pakistan and always anxious t o make P a k i s t a n a pros-

perous d e m o c r a t i c , modern State. We, i n our humble way have

been working in the Assembly and i t s Committees, to make a

suitable C o n s t i t u t i o n , but the recent trend and proceeding of

this House have been a disappointment to a l l of us...from the

trends of the proceedings h i t h e r t o , we feel that any further

participation by us, the representatives of the Hindu minority,

in the Constitution-making, will be of no efficacy. So the

members of my Party have resolved not to take part in the

discussion of the Report of the Basic Principles Committee in

91

the present context of things..." The two Scheduled Caste

m e m b e r s who were Muslim League associates also followed the

Congress Party. However, the Congress Party came b a c k to the

CAP at the final stage of the adoption of the Report in

September, 1954. Professor Chakraverty made i t clear in his

speech that they came b a c k at that stage only to lodge their

protest "more strongly and critically," and

t o make i t known
92
that they were not a party to the Constitution.
The Hindus and the A b o l i t i o n of the Zamindari System

While the Hindu members of the CAP were fighting for a

secular democratic constitution, their counterparts in the EBLA

were engaged in safeguarding Hindu i n t e r e s t s and voicing the

grievances of the minorities i n the day-to-day life of the

province.

Before independence, land ownership in East Bengal was

monopolized by Hindus. Nearly 75 per cent of the land holdings,

including a l l of the biggest zamindari holdings belonged to

93

them. While the zammdars were Hindus, the majority of the

tenants were Muslims. There were rising t i d e s of movements for

the abolition of the zamindari system before independence.

Though the Bengal Muslim League was dominated by big Muslim

landlords, i t championed the abolition of the system without

94
any compensation f o r the landlords. A Bill to this effect

was moved by the Muslim League government i n the Bengal

95
Legislative Assembly before partition. Since the Congress

Party of Bengal was controlled by the Hindus, i t opposed the

96
abolition of the zamindari system. It also opposed the

Bengal Tenancy (Amendment) A c t o f 1928, and t h e Money Lenders

97

Bill. After partition, they continued their opposition to

land r e f o r m and strove to maintain their landed interest.

The East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Bill was

moved by the Muslim League i n the very first session of the

EBLA on April 7, 19 4 8 . The mover of the B i l l claimed that i t

would bring about "a v e r i t a b l e revolution" i n the socio-econo-

mic structure by making the tiller of the soil t h e owner of

9 8

the land he cultivated. The Bill provided that at the time

of acquisition of the z a m i n d a r i s , no person would be entitled

to retain any land i n his possession i n excess of 200 standard

bighas or a quantity of ten standard bighas per person of h i s

family, whichever was greater. It also sought to give s i x to

fifteen times the net income of the rent receiver as compensa-

tion. Although Muslim League leaders were committed to the

abolition of the zamindari system without any compensation,

they made p r o v i s i o n f o r i t because, first, the party leader-

ship i n the province was now firmly i n the hands of Muslim

landlords, and second, jotedars (minor landlords) were

predominantly Muslims. The growing influence of the jotedars

can be discerned from the fact that i n i t s second draft the

Bill provided f o r 200 bighas per family while i n the original

Bill, immediately before independence, each family was provided

with 100 bighas. However, t h e mover of the Bill argued that

the wholesale appropriation w i t h o u t any compensation would

create great insecurity everywhere which was bound to stifle

all private enterprise and cause disastrous consequences in the

99
economic development of the new state.

It is interesting to note that class interests prevailed

over party policy while the Bill was under consideration. In

this respect, both the Muslim League and the Congress leaders

approached the whole question according to their own class

interests.^ 0 0
Muslim League leaders such as A.T. Mazhurul

Huque, Abdus Salam, S h a m s u d d i n Ahmed, and Majibur Rahman

101
opposed any kind of compensation f o r the zammdars. Huque

even complained that compensation had been advocated by those

102
who had some interests i n the zamindari system. Rahman

directly attacked t h e mover of the Bill (himself a Zamindar)

103
for failing to safeguard the interests of the tenants.
10

Meanwhile, two ministers advocated compensation for zamindars.

The mover proposed to send the Bill for scrutiny to a Special

Committee consisting of forty-five members. Two Muslim members,

Abdus Salam and Madar Bux, opposed sending the Bill to a

Special Committee of which about half of the.members were

1 05

themselves zamindars. On the o t h e r hand, B.K. Das, leader

of the Congress party supported the motion to send the Bill to

a Special Committee. I U U

The Report of the Special C o m m i t t e e was taken up for

consideration by the EBLA on November 15, 19 4 9 . The Report

recommended two significant changes i n the Bill. These would

reduce t h e maximum landholdings to 100 b i g h a s , and lower the

compensation from two to ten times the annual income as

compared to the six to fifteen times of the o r i g i n a l Bill.

Along with the Hindus, three b i g Muslim landlords appended

107

their notes of dissent from the Report. Some m e m b e r s of the

Committee revealed that they d i d not stick t o any party

principles while they s a t on the committee. On several

occasions, some m e m b e r s of both parties opposed their own

10 8

party members. When t h e Bill was considered i n the

Assembly, heated debate took place on the question of compensa-

tion and the ceiling of landholdings. A Congress member, A.C.

Adhikary, demanded that the Bill be sent to the Special

Committee for reconsideration because some "fundamental"

changes had been made in i t . Manoranjan Dhar, and other

109

Congress leaders supported him. Congress leaders like

S.K. A c h a r i y a , Dhar, D.N. Dutta and o t h e r s demanded more and

"fair" compensation f o r the zamindars.

They a l s o c r i t i c i z e d
11 0
the c e i l i n g on l a n d h o l d i n g p e r f a m i l y . Muslim Leaguer
K h a i r a t H o s s a i n and o t h e r s a s k e d f o r a c q u i s i t i o n w i t h o u t any
111 .
compensation. However, a l l t h e amendments t o t h e B i l l were
d e f e a t e d a n d t h e B i l l was p a s s e d i n D e c e m b e r , 1950.

Articulation of Minority Grievances

With the establishment of new political authority i n East

Bengal in 1947, the m i n o r i t i e s were tossed into a hostile

situation. They had to face serious obstacles in their day-to-

day life. After the establishment of the new provincial

capital i n Dacca, the government faced acute housing problems

for government o f f i c e s and f o r government servants. Before

independence, a majority of the houses i n Dacca belonged to

Hindus. Since a large number of the Hindus left Pakistan after

partition, the provincial government found an opportunity.to

requisition Hindu houses for the aforementioned purposes. This

"ruthless requisition" was the greatest complaint in other

areas too. C o n g r e s s members such as G.C. Bhattarcherjee,

P.C. Lahiry, and J.N. Bhadra made c o m p l a i n t s against requisi-

tioning and other minority grievances i n the first session of

11 2

EBLA m 1948. Their other complaints were against the

seizure of firearms from the minority communities, illegal

harassment by the Muslim National Guards, e x t r a c t i o n of large

sums for the Quaid-i-Azam Relief Fund, and arbitrary arrests of

minority leaders. S i m i l a r c o m p l a i n t s by t h e H i n d u members were

113
l o d g e d i n t h e CAP. They a l s o v o i c e d m i n o r i t y grievances in
114
a l m o s t e v e r y s e s s i o n o f t h e E B L A a n d t h e CAP. They a l s o
p r o t e s t e d the c e n t r a l government's d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p o l i c y

against the Hindus i n the granting of export and import

115

licenses. They suspected that this was done d e l i b e r a t e l y

to patronize rising Muslim businessmen. Besides voicing their

grievances inside assemblies, they resorted to submitting

memoranda t o t h e p r o v i n c i a l and c e n t r a l governments to redress

. . 116
their grievances.
 47

When H i n d u leaders tried to voice the grievances of the

.minority, they were often attacked by the ruling party and

the press for their alleged "divided loyalty" or disloyalty to.

Pakistan. Dawn m a d e a number of editorial comments against

117

them as "deliberate recalcitrants." These a l l e g a t i o n s were

based on the fact that i n most cases the minority leaders had

a portion of their family living in India. Some o f them even

118

took active interest i n West Bengal politics. A critical

Hindu writer also admitted that of-the t h i r t e e n Hindu members

of the CAP, six lived permanently in Calcutta, India. Simi-

larly, only a few H i n d u members of the EBLA resided in East

Bengal permanently. These Calcutta-based members used to go to

119
Dacca and Karachi at the time of assembly sessions, and
12

their loyalty was questioned on the floors of the assemblies.

During the Budget Session of the CAP (Legislature) in 1950,

B.K. Dutta's speech was i n t e r p r e t e d by ruling party leaders as

disloyal, and the Congress party decided not to take part in

the rest of the d e l i b e r a t i o n of the Session. Moreover, the

Congress party had no newspaper in East Bengal, so i t s members

had to depend on the newpapers of West Bengal to publish their

views—which r e i n f o r c e d government attacks on their disloyalty.

Khwaja Nazimuddin declared on June 8, 19 48 that those who

supported the West Bengal papers had "no right to live in

121
Pakistan."

While the minority leaders were not very effective in

safeguarding the i n t e r e s t s of the m i n o r i t i e s , the Governments

of India and Pakistan did play an important role i n doing so.

 48

On April 19, 1948 the Neogy-Ghulam Muhammed agreement between

India and Pakistan was concluded to protect the i n t e r e s t s of

122

the minorities i n both countries. In February, 19 5 0 , there

was again a communal f l a r e - u p i n which thousands of Hindus

were killed, followed by an unprecedented level of Hindu

migration from East Bengal. In e a r l y March of that year, the

Prime M i n i s t e r of India asked Pakistan to stop the communal

disturbances, otherwise he would take "other steps." This

warning produced good results. The Prime M i n i s t e r of Pakistan

immediately visited India, and the famous "Delhi Pact" was

signed on April 8, 1950 which eased communal tension in both

countries.

From the above discussion i t i s evident that the Hindu

minority had little effect on the political process of Pakistan

in the first few years of i t s existence. Minority members made

123

complaints about their i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s on several occasions.

Even the Scheduled Caste m e m b e r s who collaborated with the Mus-

lim League could hardly exert any i n f l u e n c e on government

policy, except i n some c a s e s of permits and scholarships for

12 4

their community. J.N. Mandal, long time associate of the

Muslim League and a central cabinet minister until his exit to

India, left Pakistan in disgust without even tendering his

resignation after the riots of 1950. During this period, the

Hindu leadership concentrated i t s efforts on voicing the

grievances of the community in the assemblies, and struggled to

make the c o n s t i t u t i o n more secular and democratic. Controversy

over the political strategy was responsible for a split in the

Congress party. A section of the Congress party, which in

194 8 f o r m e d the Gana Samity, was more pragmatic in realizing

the changed political c o n t e x t and in outlining the strategy of

the Hindu community thereby.

During this period, the entire Hindu community was under

attack from the dominant community. As a result, the previous

hostility and differences of opinion between the Caste Hindu

and Scheduled C a s t e p o l i t i c i a n s were removed to a large extent.

The SCF was increasingly drifting away from i t s former ally,

the ruling Muslim League, and making political alliances with

the Congress and Gana Samity. The resulting united effort on

the part of the Caste Hindus and Scheduled Caste leaders can

be seen from the M i n o r i t y Conferences of 1948 and 1952, and

also in their various joint statements articulating minority

demands.

The undercurrents of the political process in Pakistan

were rapidly changing. In the provincial election of East

Bengal in early 1954, the ruling Muslim League was entirely

routed, opening a series of possibilities f o r both the

nationalist Bengali Muslims and the Hindus. The ruling elite

of Pakistan was overwhelmed with a crisis which l e d to the

dissolution of the Constituent Assembly when i t was on the

point of adopting the new constitution i n October, 1954. With

the dissolution began a new chapter i n the politics of Pakistan,

one i n which the m i n o r i t y Hindus began to play a more effective

role.
 50

NOTES - Chapter II

1. P r a v a s h C h a n d r a L a h i r y , P a k - B h a r a t e r Rup R e k h a . (A
S k e t c h o f I n d o - P a k i s t a n ) ( N a d i a : Shayma P r a k a s h a n i , 1968),
Vol.1, pp.36-67.

2. Ibid., p.33.

3. Samar Guha, Non-Muslims, p.37.

4. C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly o f Pakistan (hereafter CAP),

Debates, V o l . 1 . ( 1 ) , p.13, A u g u s t 11, 1947.

5. T r a i l a k y a Nath Chakravorty, J i b a n S m r i t i (Memoirs)

( C a l c u t t a : B e n g a l P u b l i s h e r s L t d . , 1969), p.71.

6. Marcus F. F r a n d a , P o l i t i c a l Development and P o l i t i c a l

D e c a y i n B e n g a l , p . 2 3 6 ; a n d K a n t i B. P a k r a s i , The
U p r o o t e d ( C a l c u t t a : E d i t i o n s I n d i a , 1971), p.23. By t h e
e n d o f 1947, ( W e s t ) P a k i s t a n r e c e i v e d 5.5 m i l l i o n r e f u g e e s
f r o m I n d i a a n d a b o u t 3.5 m i l l i o n H i n d u s a n d S i k h s h a d left
West Punjab f o r I n d i a . K.B. S a y e e d , T h e C e n t r a l G o v e r n -
ment o f P a k i s t a n , 1947-1951 (Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n , M c G i l l ,
1956) p.80.

7. Franda, o p . c i t . , p.236.

8. Sayeed, op.cit•, pp.15-51.

9. Ibid., p.68.

10. Ibid., p.55.

11. I b i d . , and a l s o M a u l a n a A b u l Kalam A z a d , I n d i a Wins Free-

dom ( C a l c u t t a : O r i e n t Longman's, 1959), pp.164-165.

12. For a d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n o f the c e n t r i f u g a l f o r c e s , see

K.B. S a y e e d , P a k i s t a n : T h e F o r m a t i v e P h a s e (London:
O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 6 8 ) , 2nd e d . , pp.274-278; A b u l
M a n s u r A h m a d , Am'ar D e k h a R a j i n i t i r P a n c h a s a B a c h a r a
( F i f t y Y e a r s o f P o l i t i c s as I See I t ) ( D a c c a : N a u r o j ,
1 9 6 8 ) , A t a u r R a h m a n K h a n , O j a r a t i r D u i B a c h a r a (Two Y e a r s
of Chief Ministership) (Dacca: A v i j a n P u b l i s h i n g House,
1964) .

13. J . Sen Gupta, E c l i p s e o f East P a k i s t a n (Calcutta: Renco,

1963), p.40; and L a h i r y , o p . c i t . , pp.362-367.

14. Dawn (Karachi), July 20, 1948.

15. Sen Gupta, op.cit., p.42.

16. Dawn, op.cit.

17. Sen Gupta, op.cit., p.41.

 51
18. Dawn, A u g u s t 20, 1948.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Sen Dupta, o p . c i t . , p.41.

22. Ibid.

23. S c h e d u l e d C a s t e s u p p o r t f o r t h e Congress p a r t y c a n be
s e e n f r o m t h e 19 46 e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s . In this election
t h e S c h e d u l e d C a s t e F e d e r a t i o n won o n l y 12 p e r c e n t o f
t h e S c h e d u l e d C a s t e v o t e s , w h e r e a s t h e C o n g r e s s won
almost a l l Hindu seats i n Bengal. Government o f I n d i a ,
1945-1946 E l e c t i o n R e s u l t s ( p u b l i s h e d i n 1 9 4 8 ) , pp.24,
71 .

24. Lahiry, op.cit., p.171.

25. Ibid., p.172.

26. Sen Gupta, o p . c i t . , p.40.

27. CAP, D e b a t e s , V o l . 1 (1), p.2, August 10, 1947.

28. Ibid., Vol. 1 (2), p.13, August 11, 1947.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. I b i d . , p.19.

32. I b i d . , p.20.

33. Ibid.

34. Dawn, J u l y 11, 1947.

35. CAP ( L e g i s l a t u r e ) (hereafter CAP (L) ) , V o l . 1 ( 3 ) , p . 2 9 .

F e b r u a r y 28, 1948.

36. Dawn, N o v e m b e r 26, 1947.

37. Ibid., November 27, 1947.

38. Ibid., December 17, 1947.

39. Sayeed, The C e n t r a l Government...pp.47-48.

40. Dawn e d i t o r i a l : " P e r v e r s e P r o p a g a n d a " , August 26, 1947;

c i t e d i n Sayeed, o p . c i t . , p.48.
 52
41. CAP, Debates, Vol.2' (1), pp.5-6, February 24, 1948.

42. Ibid., pp.6-7.

43. Ibid., Vol.2 ( 1 ) , p.15, February 25, 1948.

44. Ibid.

45. I b i d . , see the speeches of P.H. Barma, B.K. Dutta, and

S.C. Chattopadhyaya.

46. Ibid., p.17.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid., p.20 .

49. Ibid., p.22.

50. F o r a f u l l and a u t h o r i t a t i v e a c c o u n t o f t h e language

movement, s e e B a d r u d d i n Umar, P u r b o B a n q l a r B h a s a A n d o l a n
O Tatkalin Rajniti (Language Movement and C o n t e m p o r a r y
P o l i t i c s i n E a s t B e n g a l ) , V o l s . 1 a n d 2, ( D a c c a : M o w l a
B r o t h e r s , 1969 a n d 1 9 7 5 ) ; a n d H a s a n H a f i z u r R a h m a n ,
Ekushe February (February 21st) (Dacca: P u t h i P a t r a
Prakashani, 1954).

51. Umar, op.cit., Vol.1, pp.59-61.

52. Ibid., pp.77-82.

53. Ibid., pp.83-88.

54. E a s t Bengal L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly (hereafter EBLA),

Proceedings, V o l .1 ( 4 ) , pp.57-58, April 6 , 1948.

55. Ibid., pp.134-161, A p r i l 8, 1948.

56. Umar, o p . c i t . , pp.72-73.

57. Dawn, D e c e m b e r 16, 1947.

58. CAP, Debates, Vol.11 ( 3 ) , p.22, April 10, 1952.

59. EBLA, P r o c e e d i n g s , V o l . 7, pp.53-58, February 21, 1952.

60. CAP, D e b a t e s , V o l . 1 1 ( 3 ) , A p r i l 10, 1952. (See speeches

o f P r o f e s s o r R a j Kumar C h a k r a v e r t y , K.K. Dutta, B. N a n d y ,
a n d D.N. Dutta).

61. Ibid., Vol.5 ( 1 ) , pp.1-2, March 7, 19 4 9 .

62. Ibid., p.8.

63. Ibid., Vol.5 ( 2 ) , pp.13-17, March 8, 1949.

 53

64. I b i d . . B.K. Dutta, pp.. 13.-17.

65. For a .detailed discussion o f t h e i n f l u e n c e o f t h e Ulema

i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s , see Leonard B i n d e r ,
R e l i g i o n and P o l i t i c s i n P a k i s t a n ( B e r k e l e y : U n i v e r s i t y
o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1961) a n d a l s o F r e e l a n d A b b o t ,
Islam and P a k i s t a n ( I t h a c a : C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s ,
1968).

66. CAP, Debates, op.cit.. p.15. March 8 r 1949.

67. Ibid. , K.K. Dutta, p.22.

68. Ibid. , pp.22-23.

69 . Ibid. , Vol.5 ( 3 ) , p.27, March 9, 1949 •

70. Ibid. , p.28.

71 . Ibid. , pp.32-33.

72. Ibid. , Vol.5 ( 4 ) , pp.55-61, March 1 0 , 1949 .

73. Ibid. , Vol.5 ( 3 ) , pp.43-49, March 9, 1 9 4 9 .

74. Ibid. , Vol.5 ( 5 ) , pp.89-90, March 12, 1 9 4 9 .

75. Ibid. , p.95.

76. Ibid. , p.94.

77. Ibid. , Vol.5 ( 1 ) , p.2, March 7, 1949.

78. For a d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e a n t i -BPC R e p o r t move-

ment, see-Uinar, o p _ . c i t . , V o l . 2 , pp.380-416.

79. Ibid. , pp.390-404.

80. CAP, D e b a t e s , Vol.8 ( 1 ) . A n n e x u r e . pp .16-57, September

28, 1950.

81 . Ibid. , Vol.8 ( 2 ) , pp.66-68, October 4, 1950.

82. Ibid. , p.66.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid., p.117.

85. Ibid., Vol.8 ( 3 ) , pp.160-161, October 6, 1950

86. Ibid., Vol. 5 ( 5 ) , p.93, March 12, 1949.

87. Ibid., Vol.11 ( 3 ) , p.50, A p r i l 10, 1952. ,

 54

88, S e e s p e e c h e s o f B.K. D u t t a , D.N. D u t t a , B . C . N a n d y ,

P r o f e s s o r C h a k r a v e r t y , S.C. C h a t t o p a d h y a y a , V o l . 1 1 (3-8),
A p r i l 10-19, 1952.

89. J.K. Ray, Democracy and N a t i o n a l i s m on T r i a l , pp.6 3-76.

90. CAP, D e b a t e s , Vol.15 (3-20), October 8-November 2, 1953.

91 . Ibid., Vol.15 ( 2 0 ) , pp.658-659, November 2, 1953.

92. Ibid., Vol.15 ( 3 1 ) , pp.504-505, September 21, 1954.

93. Rounaq Jahan, P a k i s t a n : F a i l u r e i n N a t i o n a l Integration,

p.18. F o r a d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e Z a m i n d a r i system,
s e e B a d r u d d i n Umar, C h i r o s t h a i i B o n d o b a s t a O B a n q l a d e s h e r
K r i s h a k (Permanent S e t t l e m e n t and P e a s a n t s o f Bangledesh)
(Dacca: Subarna Prakashan, 1972).

94, Ahmad, o p . c i t . , p.249.

95. Umar, o p . c i t . , pp.122-134.

96. Ibid. , p.123.

97. EBLA, Proceedings, speech by Monohar D h a l i , V o l . 4 (3) ,

p . 2 3 , November 3 0 , 19 4 9 .

98. I b i d . , V o l . 1 ( 4 ) , p . 8 8 , A p r i l 8, 1 9 4 8 .

99. Ibid.. , p . 9 4 .

100. For a d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s o f the c l a s s p o l i t i c s o f the

a b o l i t i o n o f the zamindari system, see Badruddin Umar,
Purbo Banqlar Bhasa Andolan..., V o l . 2 , pp.127-183

101 . EBLA, Proceedings, V o l . 1 ( 4 ) , p p . 9 7 - 1 0 2 , A p r i l 7, 1948

102. Ibid. , p.98.

103. Ibid. , pp.101-102.

104. Ibid. , pp.102-103, 118-119.

105. I b i d . , pp.99, 111-112.

106. Ibid. , pp.114-115.

107. Ibid. , V o l . 4 ( 1 ) , pp.202-203.

108. I b i d . , p.87.

109. Ibid. , pp.56-84.

110. Ibid. , pp.56-84.

 55

111. Ibid., p . 1 91 .

112. EBLA, Proceedings, Vol.2, pp.2-60, June 7 and 10, 1948.

113. CAP (L), Debates, Vol.1 (8 a n d 9 ) , pp.286, 219, March

6 a n d 9, 1948.

114. F o r e x a m p l e , s e e EBLA, P r o c e e d i n g s , V o l . 3 ( 3 ) , V o l . 4 (1),

1949 ; V o l . 5 ( 1 ) , 1 9 5 1 ; V o l . 6 ( 2 ) , 1 9 5 2 ; CAP (L) ,
Debates, Vol.1 ( 5 ) , 1951; V o l . 1 ( 9 ) , 1952.

115. EBLA, P r o c e e d i n g s , Speech by B i n o d e B e h a r i Mallick,

Vol.4 ( 4 ) , p . 1 3 5 , D e c e m b e r 10, 1952.

116. Guha, op.cit., pp.72-75, and Ray, op.cit., p.31.

117. Dawn, A u g u s t 27, October 17 and November 2, 19 4 8 .

118 Lahiry, op.cit., p.132.

11 9 Guha, o_p_ . c i t . , p . 2 9 .

120 EBLA, P r o c e e d i n g s , V o l . 3 ( 3 ) , p.7, March 26, 1949 and

CAP(L), Debates, Vol.1 (6), p.198, March 20, 1950.

121 EBLA, Proceedings, Vol.3, p.52, June 8, 1948.

122. R e c u r r e n t Exodus o f M i n o r i t i e s from E a s t P a k i s t a n (New

D e l h i : The I n d i a n C o m m i s s i o n o f J u r i s t s , 1965), p.5.

123. EBLA, Proceedings, Vol.1 ( 4 ) , p.80, A p r i l 6, 1948

(B.K. Das), Vol.4 ( 1 ) , p . 6 3 , N o v e m b e r 15, 1949.

124. Letter of R e s i g n a t i o n of Mandal, c i t e d in Recurrent

Exodus o f M i n o r i t i e s . . . , pp.354-372.

125. CAP, D e b a t e s , s e e S p e e c h o f B.K. Dutta, Vol.11 (3),

p p . 4 9 - 5 0 , A p r i l 10, 1952.
 56

CHAPTER III

MAXIMIZATION OF THE HINDU P O S I T I O N :

THE SECOND P H A S E OF MINORITY P O L I T I C S , 1954-1958

The year 1954 was a turning point i n the political life

of East Bengal in that i t marked the historic victory of the

United Front (UF) i n the provincial elections. The victory

ushered in a new opportunity f o r the Hindu m i n o r i t y to play

an effective role i n the political process. The resulting

change in Pakistani politics made i t possible for the Hindus

not only to safeguard effectively, but to maximize their

interest. The schism i n the majority community placed them

in position, unthinkable after partition, to become an

important component of the ruling coalition governments both

at the centre and i n East Bengal. They now took part in the

constitution-making process not as members of the opposition,

but as an i n f l u e n t i a l partner of the ruling coalition govern-

ment. But their membership of the ruling coalition party was

not obtained without paying a price. They had to make compro-

mises on a number of different issues. This chapter will deal

with the changing position of the Hindu minority.

Growing Secularism and the Rise of the Bengali Opposition Groups

During the first few years of Pakistan, the people of

East Bengal were disillusioned with the misrule of the Muslim

League, and the slogans of 'Islam' and 'Muslim nationhood' lost

their appeal. Bengali Muslims became frustrated by the sheer

neglect of their province by their f e l l o w Muslim brothers of

 West Pakistan. They were becoming more anxious about the slow

development of their own province, in contrast to the rapid

development of West Pakistan under the patronage of the central

ruling elite of the Muslim League. They also found that the

opportunities created in the services, professions, and

business by the migration of Hindus, were q u i c k l y absorbed by

West Pakistanis and non-Bengali Muslim refugees. The economic

and political chagrin of the Bengali Muslims led to the forma-

tion of the Awami M u s l i m League (AML) in early 19 49 by the

'vernacular elite'.

The AML quickly seized a l l available opportunities to

expand i t s support base. The language movement of 1952

supplied i t with a u n i v e r s a l l y popular issue which was crucial

to i t s development. By the beginning of 1953, the AML had

become the most organized political force i n the province.

The main planks of the 44-point programme of the AML were full

provincial autonomy for East Bengal and the recognition of

Bengali as one of the state languages of Pakistan. The

language movement had a far-reaching impact on the political

orientation of the Bengali Muslim m a s s e s who had only a few

years back enthusiastically backed the Pakistan movement.

As they began to review their r e l a t i o n s h i p with West Pakistan,

Bengali nationalism was fostered; a phenomenon w h i c h has been

rightly described by Badruddin Umar as "Musalmaner Swadesh

2

Prattabartan"((Bengali) Muslim's Return Home). The AML became

the avant-garde of rising Bengali nationalism.

With growing estrangement between East and West Pakistan,

 58

the salience of religious identity on the part of the Bengali

Muslims receded.. Along with the banishment of upper class

Hindus, went the competition with the Bengali Muslims. On the

other hand, Bengali Muslims found that a mutuality of interest

developed between them and the Hindus against their common

enemy, i . e . the West Pakistani ruling elite. As a result,

communalism began to lose i t s appeal among Bengali Muslims.

The process was helped by the anti-BPC movement of 1950, and

the language movement o f 19 52. With the gradual decline of

communalism, secular political groups now opened the membership

of their organizations to Hindus, and were ready to launch

joint struggles with the Hindus which were quite unthinkable

after partition. The d e c i s i o n on the part of the dissident

Bengali Muslims to forge political unity with the Hindus was a

radical step towards a newer political orientation in East

Bengal.

The first political organization to open membership to

all communities was the Youth League. I t was formed in 1951 by

the Communists to mobilize a l l sections of East Bengal's

population on a minimum programme of secularism, anti-feudalism,

3
and unfettered democracy. The Youth League countered the

communal cultural policy of the Muslim League and played a very

4

important role in the language movement. In A p r i l 1952, i t

organized a student front called the East Pakistan Students

Union. This union, whose m a i n planks were non-communalism and

anti-imperialism, gradually became one of the most powerful

student organizations of the province.

 In terms of membership and leadership, the Communist
5
Party of East Pakistan ( E P C P ) was predominantly a Hindu party.

Thus i t was easy for the government to repress the EPCP by

branding them "enemy (Indian) agents". As a result, i t decided

to penetrate other popular parties in an attempt to incorporate

non-communal, a n t i - f e u d a l , and anti-imperialist planks in their

platforms. In 1951, i t resolved to work through the AML. How-

ever, Haji Danesh (a former member of the Communist Party of

India) and some o f his associates, defied this official decision

and formed the Ganatantri Dal (Democratic Party) in early 1953.

In fact, the Ganatantri Dal was the first secular party in East

Bengal, and opened i t s door to the Hindus. I t was successful

in drawing support from both Hindus and Muslims, but i t s

leadership remained predominantly Muslim.

In 1953, A.K. Fazlul Hug who had suffered in the political

wilderness since the defeat of his party i n the 1946 elections,

organized the Krishak Sramik Party (KSP - Peasants and Workers

party) to fight the forthcoming election. The KSP was composed

mainly of his followers and friends. It lacked any definite pro-

gramme .r.-and i t s main capital was the p o p u l a r i t y of i t s leader.

The 19 54 Elections

In March 1954, historic provincial e l e c t i o n s were held

in East Bengal. The minority p a r t i e s fought f o r the 72 seats

reserved for them. The most prominent minority parties on

the electoral scene were the Congress, the United Progressive

Party (formerly the Gana Samity), and the Scheduled Caste

Federation. The first two p a r t i e s were the major contenders

 60

for caste Hindu seats. The minority leaders attempted to form

an alliance on the eve of the election, but due to the earlier

split between the Congress and the UPP, they f a i l e d to do so.

The UPP tried unsuccessfully to form an electoral alliance with

the SCF and to fight the election under the banner of the
7

Minority United Front. The leaders of the SCF, for tactical

reasons, decided to fight the election on their own. They

thought that by contesting the election under their own party

banner, they would be able to attract more scheduled caste

votes. They were also motivated by the fact that another group

of the SCF, under the leadership of D.N. Barori (a M u s l i m League

associate and a provincial minister until the e l e c t i o n s ) was in

the field. They thought that i f they did not fight the election

under their own party banner, another group of the SCF might get

an opportunity to attract more scheduled caste votes. The

latter group of the SCF was i n favour of a separate electorate

and f a i l e d to win a single seat, while the former group

gained twenty-seven out of thirty-eight scheduled caste seats.

On the eve of the election, a l l the anti-Muslim League

forces realized the opportunity to be gained by forming a

united front against the governing Muslim League. The result-

ant United Front (UF) was composed of the AML, the KSP, the

Nezam-i-Islam (a m i n o r party of Muslim Ulema opposed to the

Muslim League and for a l l practical purposes, an ally of Huq),

and the Ganatantri Dal. The UF drew up a 21-point manifesto

which included a l l the popular demands of East Bengal. The

two most important demands o f the 21-point program were full

 61

regional autonomy for East Bengal (excluding defence, foreign

affairs, and currency) and the r e c o g n i t i o n of Bengali as one

of the state languages. However, the above-mentioned programme

was full of conflicting goals. The UF, a conglomeration of

various antagonistic parties, was united mainly for the

purpose of opposition to the ruling party rather than because

of any positive policy, and f a c t i o n a l i s m was present from the

9
very beginning.

The UF coalition won a landslide victory i n the election.

It captured 223 out of 237 Muslim seats in a House of 309,

while the Muslim League b a r e l y managed to survive by winning

only 10 seats. A l l the important leaders of the League,

including the ministers of the provincial cabinet, were

defeated. The UF obtained 97 1/2 per cent of the Muslim votes,

and was later j o i n e d by three independent and one Khilafat-i-

Rabbani party members.

The party strength i n the East Bengal provincial assembly

10
in April 1954 was as follows:

Muslim Seats Minority Seats United Front

United Front 227 Congress 24 Awami L e a g u e 143

Muslim League 10 Scheduled Caste KSP 48
Federation 27 Nezam-i-Islam 22
United Progres- Ganatantri Dal 13
sive Party 13 Khilafat-i-Rabbani 1
Ganatantri Dal 3
Communist P a r t y 4
Independent 1

237 72 227

The victory of the UF i n the East Bengal elections set the

stage for the minorities to play a crucial role i n the subsequent

political development of Pakistan, particularly in East Bengal.

The victory threw the central ruling elite of Pakistan into

an uneasy predicament because i t s Bengali leaders had lost

their credibility. Immediately after the electoral victory,

the UF leaders appealed to the Bengali members of the CAP to

11

resign and to "respect the wishes of the people." Later,

the rivalry between the Punjabi Governor-General, Ghulam

Muhammed, and the Bengali group of the CAP reached its climax

when the latter tried to curtail the power of the former by

passing a number of bills i n the CAP by i t s numerical strength

1 2
and by forming an a l l i a n c e w i t h the S i n d h i g r o u p . The
period between 1954 a n d 1958 was c h a r a c t e r i z e d by extreme
13

instability and political intrigues. In this brief period

there were five governments at the centre. East Bengal had

three governments and was under governor's rule for nearly two

years. This situation gave the minorities a unique chance to

"fish in troubled waters" and to maximize their interest.

Dismissal of the UF Government and the Dissolution of the CAP

In early April 1954, the UF formed i t s government with

Fazlul Huq as the chief minister, but the seeds of disunity in

the UF were present from the very start. The two major

parties, the KSP and AML could not agree on the s e l e c t i o n of

14 <

ministers, and Fazlul Huq formed a four-member cabinet,

three belonging to his party, and a f o u r t h drawn from his allied

party, Nezam-i-Islam. However, he enlarged the cabinet on

May 15, 1954, and the AML was included in i t . At this point

the Hindu members were not part of the UF government, though

they extended their full support to the new government. The

central ruling elite of Pakistan could not accept the UF

victory, and the UF ministry was dismissed by the central

government within two months of i t s assumption of power by

15
invoking Article 92A. The central government accused the UF

government of "bringing about the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n " of Pakistan

16
and called Huq a self-confessed traitor.

After the d i s m i s s a l .of the UF ministry, there followed a

dramatic period of a l l i a n c e formation among the different

political forces in the country. The re-alignment of political

forces was quickened when the Governor-General, Ghulam Muhammed,

dissolved the first CAP i n October, 1954. He charged that the

existing CAP had failed to produce a constitution for the

country over the previous seven years and that i t had lost its

legitimacy. So he "magnanimously" accepted the popular demand

1 7

and ordered its dissolution. However, i t i s clear that he

dissolved i t not because i t had failed to produce a constitu-

tion but rather because i t had produced a

c o n s t i t u t i o n which
18
was not acceptable t o him and the P u n j a b i g r o u p . The a c t o f
the G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l was p r e c i p i t a t e d by the " s u r p r i s i n g

aggressiveness" of the Bengali group in the last few weeks of

19

the first CAP. The UF leaders hailed the dissolution

because i t opened a new possibility for the UF to take part in

the central government. The Congress party also welcomed the

dissolution, and i t s leader, S.C. Chattopadhyaya declared:

"The Muslim League w i l l not be able to thrust on the minority

20
a c o n s t i t u t i o n which they rejected wholesale.
 64

Restoration of Parliamentary Government

and t h e F o r m a t i o n o f t h e S e c o n d CAP

After the dissolution o f t h e CAP, Ghulam Muhammed

nominated a so-called "ministry of talents". There was no

central legislature a n d G h u l a m Muhammed began to rule the

country be d e c r e e . His "controlled democracy" lasted f o r about

one year, during which period h e made a number o f manoeuvers i n

order t o win the support o f one o f t h e B e n g a l i groups and

provide legitimacy to h i srule. A s t h e UF w a s a l r e a d y a divided

house a n d i t s two l e a d e r s , H.S. S u h r a w a r d y and F a z l u l Huq h a d

been arch rivals f o ra long time, G h u l a m Muhammed had t h e

opportunity to play one a g a i n s t the other. Moreover, t h e UF

leaders had s u f f e r e d p o l i t i c a l oblivion since the establishment

of Pakistan, and they found i tirresistible t o come t o t e r m s

with a Governor-General who could re-install a government i n

East Bengal. Under such circumstances, H.S. S u h r a w a r d y joined

the central cabinet i n December 1954. He w a s g i v e n an under-

standing by t h e G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l that he w o u l d b e made Prime

Minister immediately after joining the cabinet, a n d he w o u l d

be entrusted with the task of constitution-making. Furthermore,

21

the next election would be h e l d within one year. To their

surprise, t h e AML leaders found that a nominee of Fazlul Huq,

Abu Hossain Sarkar, was a l s o appointed a minister along with

Suhrawardy. This clearly indicated that the Governor-General

was playing with both groups separately, a tactic which contri-

buted to the disintegration o f t h e UF.

With the prospect of restoration of parliamentary govern-

ment i n East Bengal, inter-party conflict i n t h e UF r e a c h e d the

point of no return in early 1955. The AML, being the

majority party of the UF, made n o secret of the fact that i t

wanted the chief ministership and control over the ministry

as a whole. Accordingly, the AML passed a vote of no confi-

dence i n F a z l u l Huq as the leader of the UF on February 17,

1955. This no confidence r e s o l u t i o n brought the final split

in the UF. The AML and KSP were now vying with each other for

the favour of the central government in order to return to

power i n East Bengal. s

Meanwhile, the Governor-General was trying to convene a

constitutional convention i n order to pass a constitution

according to his terms. He issued an ordinance to that effect

22

m April 1955 with Suhrawardy's backing. The KSP, the

Congress, and the Muslim League i n East Bengal vehemently

opposed this proposal on the grounds that the proposed conven-

23

tion was unconstitutional. They also demanded a new consti-

tuent assembly. They were prompted by the fear that in such a

convention the powerful Governor-General would be able to impos

a c o n s t i t u t i o n which would serve Punjabi interests. However,

the Governor-General's intentions were f r u s t r a t e d by a decision

of the Federal Court of Pakistan on April 10, 19 5 5 . The court

ruled against the summoning of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l convention and

asked the Governor-General instead to call a new constituent

assembly.

The ruling of the Federal Court stirred new action on

the part of the Pakistani central ruling elite. Prime Minister

Bogra, who was completely at the mercy of the Governor-General

after the dissolution of the CAP,,felt renewed hope i n the

prospect o f a f u t u r e assembly where he c o u l d establish himself

as the leader o f t h e House, w i t h the help of the Bengali

members. Since H.S. Suhrawardy himself was a possible

candidate f o r t h e f u t u r e prime m i n i s t e r s h i p , Bogra opted f o r

the KSP i n h i s alliance-making. In a b i d t o gain KSP support,

he restored i t t o government i n East Bengal i n June 1955, when

the Governor-General was out of the country. Abu H o s s a i n Sarkar,

the nominee o f Huq, formed t h e new UF g o v e r n m e n t . Of t h e

original UF, t h e S a r k a r m i n i s t r y enjoyed the support of the

KSP, a splinter group o f t h e AML o f 20 m e m b e r s , t h e Nezam-i-

Islam, and t h e Ganatantri Dal. Another 19 m e m b e r s o f t h e AML

joined t h e KSP a t the time of the formation o f t h e new govern-

ment.

The Hindu members played a crucial part i n the formation

of the Sarkar ministry. In spite of the support of the other

groups o f t h e UF, i t would n o t have been p o s s i b l e f o r t h e KSP

to form a government without the solid support of the minority

bloc o f 72 m e m b e r s . As a reward, three m i n o r i t y members were

accommodated i n t h e m i n i s t r y , t w o o f whom b e l o n g e d to the

Congress, and t h e t h i r d t o t h e SCF. B.K. Das, l e a d e r of the

Congress party, was given charge o f the important Finance

portfolio. A l l the minority groups were unanimous i n their

support o f t h e new government. The r e a s o n s f o rminority support

have been analyzed by J.K. Ray. He m a i n t a i n s that the

minorities "refused to side with Suhrawardy, the author of the

ghastly Calcutta riots o f 1 9 4 6 , i n t h e AML-KSP tussle. Fuzlul

 67

Huq, moreover, a s s u r e d them that he would fitht fora secular

democratic Constitution, including a joint electorate system,

in t h e new C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly which, i n accordance with the

decision of the Federal C o u r t , had t o be convened soon by t h e

25
Governor-General."

After the realignment of forces, the strength of

26

different parties o f t h e U F was e s t i m a t e d a s follows:

April 1954 April 1955.

AML 132 104

AML (splinter group) 0 20

KSP 48 67
new U F
Nezam-i-Islam 22 22 group - 195

Ganatantri Dal 13 13

Khilafat-i-Rabbani 1 1

Hindu groups 72 72

The AML soon r e a l i z e d the importance o f t h e Hindu support

in the existing p o l i t i c a l situation. I n a b i d t o woo the Hindu

leaders t o s u p p o r t t h e AML, i tdropped t h e word 'Muslim' from

its nomenclature and adopted t h e new name A w a m i L e a g u e (AL) a

few months later. The AL l e a d e r s h i p was aware that the Hindus

had psychological reservations about working i n cooperation

with a party h a v i n g communal nomenclature and membership

restricted t o t h e Muslims only. T h e A L now opened i t s door t o

non-Muslims as w e l l . However, i twould be u n f a i r to say that

the A L was s o l e l y motivated by t h e d e s i r e t o woo the Hindus.

The leftist elements, including the party chairman, Maulana

Bhasani, had long been trying t o make t h e AML a secular party.

 68

The second Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (CAP) was

summoned to meet on July 7, 1955. The members of the new CAP

were elected indirectly by the members of the provincial

assemblies. The party composition of the CAP was as follows:

Muslim League 26

United Front (KSP) 16

Awami L e a g u e 13

Congress 4

Scheduled Caste Federation 3

United Progressive Party 2

Others . . 16

80

The new CAP had an equal number of representatives from

both wings of Pakistan. Its composition was different from th

first CAP in that the Muslim L e a g u e was no longer the majority

party. While i t was the majority party i n West Pakistan, i t

had no footing i n East Bengal. On the other hand, the East

Bengal p a r t i e s had no representation i n the CAP from West

Pakistan. This situation compelled the major p a r t i e s of the

two wings to compromise, and a compromise formula was agreed

upon by the Muslim League, AL, and KSP. The Murree Pact was

signed when the second CAP met for the first time on July 7,
28

19 5 5 . The f i v e - p o i n t a g r e e m e n t was as follows:

1. One unit i n West Pakistan

2. Full regional autonomy for East Bengal

3. Parity i n a l l spheres

4. Joint electorate
5. B e n g a l i and U r d u - two state languages
 By signing this Pact, the Bengalis surrendered their

numerical majority and also limited their ability to form anti-

Punjabi coalitions with politicians from the smaller provinces

of West Pakistan. On the other hand, West Pakistan gave in to

the East P a k i s t a n i demands for the r e c o g n i t i o n of Bengali, full

provincial autonomy, the joint e l e c t o r a t e , and parity in

parliamentary representation, civil service recruitment, and

developmental resource allocation.

Muslim League-UF Government

at the C e n t r e a n d t h e 19 56 C o n s t i t u t i o n

After the conclusion of the Pact, the question arose of

electing a new prime minister of Pakistan. The Muslim League

and the AL decided to form a coalition government, and as a

part of the Muslim League-AL agreement i t was understood that

29

H.S. Suhrawardy would head the new government. However,

Fazlul Huq decided to block the prime ministership of his

arch-rival and made n e g o t i a t i o n s with the Muslim League at the

eleventh hour.^^ Although both Fazlul Huq and H.S. Suhrawardy

demanded full r e g i o n a l autonomy, a joint e l e c t o r a t e , and the

adoption of Bengali as one of the state languages, Fazlul Huq's

bid to form the ministry seemed more acceptable to the Muslim

League. Huq represented the majority of the Bengali members

including the m i n o r i t i e s , and he did not demand the prime

ministership. As a result, the Muslim League-UF coalition

government was installed on August 12, 19 55 with Choudhury

Mohammad A l i a s t h e p r i m e m i n i s t e r .
The n i n e m i n o r i t y members o f E a s t Bengal i n the CAP played
 70

an important role in the rapid ministry-making drama t h a t was

taking place in the central capital. B.K. Das, leader of the

Congress, described later in the CAP how they made i t possible

to bring the c o a l i t i o n to power. Without the support of the

minorities the AL arid KSP were equally balanced in the CAP, so

their support was very crucial. The basis of the minorities'

support was an understanding on the joint electorate. "It was,"

B.K. Das revealed, "on the basis of an undertaking given in

writing that we joined the United Front Party and the under-

taking was about providing joint electorate system in the

„31

Constitution. The minority members w e r e immediately rewarded

for their support with ministerial positions. K.K. Dutta (UPP)

and A.K. Das (SCF) were included in the central cabinet. It

should be noted that a l l of the Hindu parties were accommodated

in the central and provincial cabinets. The Congress had

already been given cabinet posts in East Bengal, so the UPP was

accommodated in the central cabinet. The SCF, being the largest

Hindu group, was given m i n i s t e r i a l rewards both at the centre

and in East Bengal.

The first thing the c o a l i t i o n government did was to pass

the One Unit Bill in the CAP in September 1955. The CAP began

deliberations on the constitution on January 9, 1956. With

the reopening of the constitutional debate, the Hindu members

were again vocal in asserting their demand. They concentrated

their e f f o r t s mainly on three issues, namely: the Islamic

nomenclature of the republic, the reservation of the head of

the state for Muslims, and the joint electorate.

 71

Although the H i n d u members were part of the coalition

party, they vehemently opposed the clauses concerning the

above-mentioned issues. The Hindu members' opposition to the

Islamic nomenclature of the state stemmed from the obvious

reason that i t meant a subordinate p o s i t i o n f o r non-Muslims in

Pakistan. Dr. S.K. Sen (UPP), in the course of debate,

concluded: "Now, by giving this name "Islamic", what do we

find—non-Muslims, i f they want to stay here, I am pained to

say because i t is shocking, they must accept a subordinate

position. I t means that i n an Islamic state they have to

embrace that religion i f they want to rise to full stature;

otherwise they will have to leave the country. You will have

32

to bow to a p o s i t i o n of inferiority." He also mentioned the

H i n d u members' d i s s o c i a t i o n from the coalition party meeting

when t h e nomenclature was discussed there. They (Hindus)

argued that the Islamic nomenclature would help create mischief

33

by the Ulema and other f a n a t i c elements. Furthermore, i t

would result in a greater exodus of Hindus to India. They

noted that, when L i a q u a t A l i K h a n was alive, there was no place

for such nomenclature or limitation of the qualification of the

head of the state 1

in the Basic P r i n c i p l e s Committee Report.

The AL was against the p r o v i s i o n of an Islamic state, and on a

division on this clause the opposition marshalled the highest

number of votes (22 opposed as against 47 in favour). The

H i n d u members, i n c l u d i n g the two central ministers and a

provincial minister (who was also a member of the CAP), voted

34
with the opposition. They also suggested that strict party
 72

d i s c i p l i n e should not be imposed a t the time of framing the

constitution.

The m i n o r i t y members v i g o r o u s l y opposed A r t i c l e 3 2 (2)

which provided f o r a Muslim head of s t a t e . They put forward

the same argument t h a t the c l a u s e was derogatory to the r i g h t s

guaranteed to the m i n o r i t i e s i n the chapter on fundamental

r i g h t s , and to the c l a u s e s which provided f o r equal opportuni-

t i e s and equal r i g h t s f o r a l l c i t i z e n s of P a k i s t a n . They a l s o

added t h a t A r t i c l e 3 2 (2) r e l e g a t e d non-Muslims t o the status

of second-class citizens. Hindu members, i n c l u d i n g the two

c e n t r a l m i n i s t e r s , moved amendments to t h i s c l a u s e and on a

3 6

d i v i s i o n on t h i s c l a u s e , voted with the opposition.

However, the m i n o r i t y members were not as c r i t i c a l about

these two p r o v i s i o n s as they were about the separate e l e c t o r a t e

system. Mahfuzul Huq noted: "But t h i s time, the Hindu repre-

s e n t a t i v e s took a (more) moderate a t t i t u d e towards the Islamic

p r o v i s i o n s than they had taken i n the f i r s t Assembly. This was

mainly due to the f a c t t h a t i n the second Assembly they were

not i n the O p p o s i t i o n but r a t h e r an important component of the

37

ruling coalition party."

However, I cannot agree w i t h Huq t h a t the Hindus toned

down t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n to these I s l a m i c p r o v i s i o n s o n l y because

they were an important partner of the r u l i n g c o a l i t i o n . They

were i n t e r e s t e d i n g e t t i n g a democratic c o n s t i t u t i o n which

would t r e a t a l l c i t i z e n s e q u a l l y , i r r e s p e c t i v e of religion.

The d r a f t c o n s t i t u t i o n was discussed i n the meetings of the

c o a l i t i o n party f o r about two months and a l l the provisions

excepting three—the Islamic nomenclature of the republic, the

reservation of the office of the head of state for Muslims,

38

and the joint electorate system--were unanimously adopted.

The Hindus, one might conclude, were happy w i t h the rest of

the constitution. As for the nomenclature issue, they knew

that given a democratic c o n s t i t u t i o n with- equal rights for

every citizen, the name o f the republic really mattered little.

As A.K. Dutta admitted, "An intelligent Hindu...will not be '

afraid of this nomenclature in the least; he will understand

that there is nothing in i t . He will look to the Constitution

itself and the Constitution will show t h a t i t is a democratic

39

state of high standard. There is nothing to be afraid of..."

Furthermore, in a parliamentary democracy the head of state is

a figurehead only. The constitution provided for a cabinet

form of government with a prime minister a s ' i t s head. There

was no disqualifying provision for Hindus becoming prime

minister. The following comments by K.K. Dutta confirms this

interpretation of Hindu attitudes. He observed, "I must admit

that in the body of the Constitution there has been no discri-,

mination in the rights between a Muslim and a non-Muslim. The

Constitution has been quite fair and provisions have been made
40

giving equal rights to the Muslims and non-Muslims."

The Fight for a Joint Electorate 1

Although the Hindus seemed ready to compromise on the

Islamic nomenclature of the republic and the reservation of the

office of the head of state for Muslim issues, they were not

ready to forgo their ' i r r e d u c i b l e minimum' demand for a joint

electorate. They had been opposed to separate e l e c t o r a t e s

in i n d i v i d e d I n d i a , j u s t as they had been opposed to the "two-

n a t i o n " theory. To them, the acceptance of separate e l e c t o r a t e s

meant the acceptance o f the "two-nation" theory. After

independence, they continued t h e i r r e j e c t i o n of the separate

e l e c t o r a t e s system. The m i n o r i t y groups passed r e s o l u t i o n s i n

favour of a j o i n t e l e c t o r a t e i n t h e i r p a r t y meetings as e a r l y
41

as 19 48. The Hindu o p p o s i t i o n to separate e l e c t o r a t e s i n

the CAP can be t r a c e d back t o e a r l y 1952 when the CAP amended

the Government of India A c t , 19 35 to provide separate e l e c t o r a t e s

42
f o r the scheduled c a s t e s . The Hindus a l s o opposed the

Government of India A c t (Amendment: 5th and 6th schedule) Bill,

1951 which sought to perpetuate separate e l e c t o r a t e s i n Sind.

They demanded t h a t the passage of the b i l l would not a f f e c t the

e l e c t o r a l r u l e s of East Bengal. The r u l i n g p a r t y gave them an

assurance, i n t h a t regard. ^

The c l a u s e p e r t a i n i n g to the e l e c t o r a l system was debated

in the CAP on February 21, 1956, o n l y n i n e days before the final

adoption of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . Both the AL and Hindu members

opposed the government p r o p o s a l . B.K. Das, S.K. Sen, Gour

Chandra B a l a , Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and Mahmud A l i moved

44

amendments seeking a joint electorate. The arguments of the

Hindu members were the same.as they were b e f o r e . They main-

t a i n e d t h a t a separate electorates, system would r e l e g a t e them to

45
dependent
a p o s i t i o nonof the
e t emranjaolr istuyb o rcommunity
d i n a t i o n , f and
o r a they
"crumb of be
would favour."

The p r e v a i l i n g separate e l e c t o r a t e s system, i n s t e a d of safe-

guarding minority i n t e r e s t s , would leave them permanently

vulnerable. They would not be effective in the political

process of the country, for Muslim leaders would not have to

be responsive to the Hindu population. The Hindu leaders

thought that i f a joint electorate were accepted, the attitude

of the Muslim leaders would be changed. D.N. Dutta showed the

Hindu logic in his speech on the electorate issue. He main-

tained, "We will be able to elect 72 members o u t of 309 (of

East Bengal Assembly), which means, S i r , that 237 members, who

will form the administration of the country, will not be

responsible to the Hindus... I am prepared to be ruled by

Muslims i f as a matter of fact I have got the r i g h t of electing

them to the Assembly so that they will be my.chosen represen-

tatives they will be responsible to us, and we shall feel,

Sir, that we have got a share in the administration of the

„46
country.

They were also opposed to separate electorates because they

might aggravate communal tension and lead to periodic communal

47

riots. One of the biggest problems of the minority community

in the first few years of independence was the achievement of

communal peace and security. Thus they advocated a joint

electorate in the hope that i t would create a more congenial

atmosphere for the Hindus to continue to live i n East Bengal.

They were also motivated by the hope that a joint

electorate system would lead to the emergence of secular

political parties i n East Bengal. They thought that they

would be able to play a significant role in those political

 76

parties and thus be able to safeguard their interests more

effectively. Their belief was strengthened by t h e emergence

of secular p o l i t i c a l parties like t h e AL and G a n a t a n t r i Dal

which pursued non-communal policies.

However, i t was obvious that the acceptance of a joint

electorate would reduce t h e number of minority representatives

in both legislatures. I t seems that they were fully aware o f

their potential loss, but they were hopeful of future gains.

As pointed o u t by P r o f e s s o r R a j Kumar Chakraverty as e a r l y as

1952, during the Constituent Assembly debates: " S i r , we know

that i f the system of joint e l e c t o r a t e i s accepted, none o f us

sitting on this side o f t h e House has a chance of being

returned to the l e g i s l a t u r e b u t , S i r , we are prepared for that

contingency. We know that risk. We are ready t o go into

political oblivion. We a r e ready to~ e f f a c e ourselves, but we

are sure a n d we are convinced that the system of joint electorate

will help t h e b u i l d i n g up o f a s t r o n g and u n i t e d country based

on peace, goodwill and contentment of a l l sections of the

i ..4 8
people."

As mentioned earlier, the Muslim League-United Front

government at the centre was formed on the understanding that

a joint e l e c t o r a t e would be provided i n the constitution. At

the time of actual constitution-making, West Pakistan Muslim

League leaders pressed f o r separate electorates. As a result,

the ruling coalition could n o t come t o , a consensus about the

electorate system and t h e issue-was shelved until the last

moment. The m i n o r i t y members w e r e hopeful that they would be

 able to influence the decision of the coalition party, so they

d i d not q u i t the coalition government when p r o v i s i o n s regarding

the nomenclature and Muslim head of state were passed. They

expected that their coalition partners would respect the

earlier agreement on a joint electorate. Since the UF govern-

ment i n East Bengal was heavily dependent on minority support,

the ruling coalition at the centre had to devise a compromise

formula i n order to retain minority support.

The r e s u l t i n g c o m p r o m i s e was Article 145 of the Constitu-

tion which provided that parliament, after ascertaining the
\

views of the p r o v i n c i a l assemblies, would pass an Act on the

electorate issue. However, H i n d u members demanded that the

issue should be settled in the C o n s t i t u t i o n Assembly because

it was an important matter to them. If there were a clear

provision in the Constitution, i t could not be amended easily,

so they opposed the idea of postponing the issue for parliament
49
to decide. When A r t i c l e 145 was put to a vote, a l l of the

H i n d u members, excepting the two central ministers, voted with

t4-1,h e o p p o s i t i. o.n.. 5 0

The decision to postpone the electorate issue was nonethe-

less a v i c t o r y on the part of the minorities in the sense that

it was definitely one step ahead of the BPC Report of 1952. The

BPC Report had clearly recommended separate electorates for

Pakistan. Moreover, i t was almost certain that the East Bengal

Assembly would recommend a joint electorate, because both the

AL arid KSP were committed to i t . The Hindu members w e r e given

a d e f i n i t e assurance in that respect. As B.K. Das later

 78

disclosed, "My esteemed friends Mr. Abu Hossain Sarkar and

Mr. Hashimuddin rang me from here (Dacca)... They a l l said,

"Well, do not t r y to have the matter decided i n the Constituent

Assembly. Bring i t down t o the Province and we shall give you

Joint Electorate." Not only that, along with Mr. Sarkar, my

esteemed friends Messrs. Ashrafuddin Choudhury and Abdus Salam

51

went to Karachi, requested me to agree to the said proposal."

In spite of their unsuccessful bid to get a joint

electorate, the H i n d u members were successful i n having two

amendments added to the draft constitution. One proposed by

K.K. Dutta dealt with the right of the religious communities

to establish and maintain their own educational institutions.

The second, moved by Rasa Raj Mandal, sought guarantees that

the State would safeguard the legitimate rights and interests

of minorities, including their due representation in the

52

federal and provincial services.

Being frustrated at not getting the joint electorate

system incorporated into the constitution, the Hindu groups

withdrew their support from the UF-Muslim League coalition

53

government at the centre and i n East Bengal. However, the

withdrawal of their support d i d not affect the continuation

of the central ruling coalition because i t had a majority with-

out the Hindu members. The Hindu members (except f o r K.K. Dutta

and A.K. Das) along with the AL and the Ganatantri Dal members

walked out of the C o n s t i t u e n t A s s e m b l y on t h e day o f t h e

54
adoption of the Constitution. They termed the c o n s t i t u t i o n
55
"an unfortunate p i e c e of document." H o w e v e r , K.K. Dutta
 79

appealed to the minorities to judge the c o n s t i t u t i o n on the

basis of i t s working. He asked them to work hand in hand with

the Muslims, because non-cooperation would be suicidal for

them.

After the adoption of the c o n s t i t u t i o n , the political

scene began to change very rapidly. In East Bengal (now named

East Pakistan after the adoption of the constitution), the

Sarkar ministry was in a shaky p o s i t i o n because of the with-

57

drawal of the Hindu groups and the Ganatantri Dal. It no

longer commanded the majority support in the East Pakistan

Assembly, so i t was afraid to face the Assembly. "During the

whole 15 months of i t s power," G.W. Choudhury noted, " i t

58

showed little respect to parliamentary practices." Abu

Hossain Sarkar was t r y i n g hard to bring back the minority

members i n order that his coalition government might survive.

He lured them w i t h ministerial positions and ambassadorial

59

appointments. He was successful i n winning a section of the

UPP led by Pravash Chandra Lahiry. Lahiry was given the port-

folio of finance in the Sarkar ministry. His acceptance of a

ministerial position resulted in a split in the UPP. J. Sen

Gupta maintains that Lahiry could not resist the temptation of

6C

becoming a minister, superseding his party leader D.N. Dutta.

However, Lahiry explained that he and his other friends could

not a l i g n with the AL, because the AL was led by Suhrawardy,

"the father of the Calcutta riots." It i s notable that with

a relatively better political position, the Hindu groups

weakened in their solidarity. The decrease of Hindu unity

 80

stemmed from the fact that they were no longer intimidated by

the Muslims, but were treated with more respect. When the

Hindu groups withdrew their support from the UF-Muslim League

coalition, they asked the ministers of their respective parties

to resign. But K.K. Dutta, A.K. Das, and Madhusudan Sarkar

defied the decisions of their parties. As a result, they were

expelled from their parties. During the subsequent ministry-

making drama, some H i n d u members showed an opportunistic

tendency by disrespecting their party decisions and by aligning

with one Muslim party or another.

Since the Sarkar ministry lost the support of the

majority of the minorities, the AL was making every effort to

align with them and come t o power i n East Pakistan. The AL

leaders were often seen driving to the Congress office at

Sutrapur i n Dacca. They were also negotiating with the

D.N. Dutta group of the UPP. The AL and the Congress came to

an agreement on the basis of a f i v e - p o i n t programme. The

agreement included a firm commitment by the AL to fight for a

joint electorate and (in the event of i t s coming to power at

the centre) to amend the Constitution to make i t secular and

democratic. The AL also gave an assurance that a 23 per cent

6 2

quota of services for the minorities would be implemented.

As a result of the AL-Congress alignment, the Sarkar ministry

lost i t s majority. The Assembly was summoned to meet on

August 13, 19 56. I t was prorogued only four hours before its

meeting when the incumbent ministry discovered that i t was going

to be defeated in a vote of no confidence. The Sarkar ministry

finally resigned on August 30, 1956. On' S e p t e m b e r 6, the

 81

AL-Congress coalition government came t o power with the

support o f t h e UPP (Dutta group), t h e SCF, and t h e Ganatantri

Dal. The c a b i n e t , headed by A t a u r Rahman Khan, had four Hindu

members.

The new coalition government, out of necessity, had not

only t o accede t o the Hindus more than their due s h a r e of the

cabinet, b u t h a d t o make immediate provision f o r the joint

electorate system. Immediately after the assumption o f power,

the Ataur ministry passed a resolution i n the provincial

assembly that a joint e l e c t o r a t e be p r o v i d e d f o r election to

63

the national and p r o v i n c i a l assemblies. T h e r e s o l u t i o n was

passed by a v o t e o f 159 f o r , a n d 1 a g a i n s t . This was a great

victory of the minority parties.

In t h e meantime, the political s i t u a t i o n i n West Pakistan

was also r a p i d l y changing. A new political party, the

Republican Party, was formed which included a section of the

sitting Muslim League legislators. The R e p u b l i c a n Party

aligned with t h e AL, and an A L - R e p u b l i c a n coalition government

headed b y H.S. Suhrawardy came t o power at the centre with the

support of the minorities on September 1 2 , 19 5 6 . Rasa Raj

Mandal, a Scheduled Caste member, was included i n the cabinet.

When the f i r s t session of the National Assembly met i n Dacca,

Suhrawardy introduced the Electorate Bill, 1956, o n O c t o b e r 10.

The Electorate Bill provided fora joint electorate f o r East

Pakistan and separate electorates f o r West Pakistan. I t was a

compromise formula to suit the major parties of the coalition

government. The Muslim League a n d t h e KSP o p p o s e d the Bill.

 82

64
The Bill was passed by 48 to 19 votes. The Bill was passed

in a hurry, and the session of the Assembly continued from eight

in the morning to the small hours of the next morning. Suhra-

wardy wanted to get the Bill passed before his scheduled

departure f o r China on October 15. The haste i n which the Bill

was passed reveals the urgent d e s i r e of the coalition government

to f u l f i l l the demands of the Hindus and the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of

the Hindu groups. Eventually, the Electorate B i l l was further

amended by the Electorate (Amendment) Bill, 19 5 7 , to provide

65

for a joint e l e c t o r a t e i n both wings of Pakistan. Thus the

minorities won their battle for a joint electorate ten years

after the independence of Pakistan.

Political Chaos, Unstable Ministries, and the Hindus

Once the C o n s t i t u t i o n was adopted, the political

kaleidoscope of Pakistan, and of East Pakistan in particular,

was taking rapid turns almost every day. There were three

governments at the centre and three (including one lasting only

24 hours) i n East Pakistan during the period 1956-1958. The

different Muslim political groups were v y i n g with each other

for power, and major political parties like the Muslim League,

AL, and the KSP underwent splits. Thanks to the extremely

chaotic state of the Muslim political parties, the Hindus were

often able to get their demands met.

In July 1957, the AL underwent a split over the issues

of full r e g i o n a l autonomy for East Pakistan and foreign policy.

The dissenting leftists,^together with the party chairman,

Maulana Bhasani, formed the N a t i o n a l Awami Party (NAP). The

 83

formation of the NAP had serious consequences f o r the stability

of the A L - c o a l i t i o n government i n East Pakistan. The NAP

commanded the support of 25 members i n the p r o v i n c i a l assembly

who previously were supporters of the coalition party. The

Ataur ministry was thus i n a very shaky position. The AL tried

in vain to counterbalance the strength of the NAP by bringing a

section of t h e KSP (Azizul Huq group) i n the coalition govern-

66

ment. As a result, the dependence of the ministry on the

Hindu m e m b e r s was increased more than ever. As n o t e d by G.W.

Choudhury: "The ministry i s now a t the complete mercy of the

Hindu members, even though they represent only 12 per cent of

the population. The exploited Muslim peasants of East Pakistan

supported t h e movement for Pakistan i n t h e hope that domination

by the Hindu m i n o r i t y would come to an end, but today political

instability i n East Pakistan has given

the Hindu members undue
67
predominance i n the Province's affairs."

At the centre, the Republican Party withdrew i t s support

from the coalition government i n October 19 5 7 , because of

Suhrawardy s 1
opposition to t h e R e p u b l i c a n demand to dismantle
68

one unit i n West Pakistan. A new coalition was formed by the

Muslim League, the Republican Party and a section of the KSP

(Hamidul Huq group). The Hindu groups were not part of this

new coalition government. The coalition government was headed

by I.I; Chundrigar of the Muslim League. The Muslim League had

always been opposed to a joint electorate because, to them,

the acceptance of the joint electorate meant the negation of

the "two-nation" theory and the ideology of Pakistan. The

 84

only condition of the Muslim League-Republican alliance was

69

that the joint electorate system would be repealed.

Chundrigar declared on the day of his assumption of power that,

"the Republican Party has in the national i n t e r e s t come to the

conclusion that they would support the immediate s u b s t i t u t i o n

70

of separate electorates for joint electorates.". However,

the Muslim League and the Republican Party were arch enemies

and t h e i r uneasy a l l i a n c e ended in less than two months when

the latter changed its policy regarding the electorate again.

The Republican Party finally came t o a decision not to re-open

the electorate issue. This led to the resignation of Chundrigar

on December 11, 1957. On December 16, 1957, the Republican

Party formed another government w i t h the support of the AL and

Hindu members. They (AL-Hindus) decided to support the govern-

ment w i t h o u t accepting any cabinet positions. The only

condition of their support was that the coalition government

would stick to the joint electorate system and arrange an early

71

general election in the country. The Hindus were eager to

preserve their victory on the electorate issue, even i f i t meant

sacrificing ministerial positions. The new cainbet had two

H i n d u members b u t neither of them represented any minority

party. After their expulsion from their respective parties,

K.K. Dutta was now a member o f the Republican Party, and

A.K. Das was an independent scheduled caste member.

By the end of 1957, East Pakistan was facing a grave

economic crisis. Smuggling across the border to India took an

alarming turn, causing a shortage of essential foodgrains and

 85

other commodities. As a result, the value of Pakistan

currency dropped. In December 1957, the Ataur Ministry of

East Pakistan, with the help of the military, launched

"Operation Close Door" (OCD) to prevent smuggling across the

Indo-Pakistan border. Some H i n d u businessmen were secretly

engaged i n smuggling and were being chased by the army. In

fact, the Hindus were the hardest h i t by the operation, and the

H i n d u members of the EBLA protested the general harassment of

their community. Chitta Ranjan Sutar (a s c h e d u l e d caste

member) of the NAP moved an adjournment motion to discuss OCD

on March 13, 1958. His motion was supported by the Hindu

members and the NAP members. But Ataur dismissed the critics

of the OCD and alleged that "Mr. Sutar has disgraced our Army

72

and by d i s g r a c i n g our Army he has disgraced Pakistan."

Ataur's stand on the OCD spelled the doom o f his ministry. The

dismissal of the adjournment motion created serious repercussions

in the Congress party. A section of the Congress leaders under

the leadership of B.K. Das, gave their ultimatum to Ataur

Rahman K h a n to withdraw the army immediately. Otherwise they

would withdraw their support from the coalition ministry.

When A t a u r failed to act a c c o r d i n g l y , they withdrew their

73

support. Although the Hindus failed to compel Ataur to with-

draw the army, they were s u c c e s s f u l i n p r e s s u r i z i n g the Noon

government at the centre to withdraw the Prevention of Smuggling

(Special Powers) Ordinance in early 1958. "Thus the edge of

the anti-smuggling operations," noted Talukder Maniruzzaman,"

was blunted to satisfy the interests of the minority

• _. .,74
c o m m u n i t y . "•
 86

After the withdrawal of the minority support, the Ataur

ministry on March 22, 1958, was at the point of c o l l a p s e '.

because of a division on a government motion. However, i t s

collapse was avoided when the NAP decided to, a b s t a i n from

75

voting. On March 31, 1958, Governor Fazlul Huq dismissed

the Ataur ministry and installed a new cabinet (with Abu

Hossain Sarkar as the chief m i n i s t e r ) on the grounds that the

Ataur ministry had lost majority support. However, the AL

with the support of the central government, managed to oust

the governor and the new cabinet within 24 hours.

The sinking Ataur ministry finally suffered a vote of

no-confidence on June 18, 1958 when m o r e m i n o r i t y members

defected and the NAP decided to withdraw i t s support. Again

Abu Hossain Sarkar formed a cabinet with the help of the

Lahiry group and the UPP and a section of the SCF on June 20.

Finally, Sarkar confronted a vote of non-confidence and lost

the ministry on June 25. The provincial assembly was suspended

on June 25. However, the AL pressurizing the central govern-

ment managed to come b a c k to power on August 25, 1958. But

the political crisis of the country was taking dramatic turns

every day. In the provincial legislature, no clear majority

could be formed among any of the c o n t e s t i n g groups and the

deputy speaker of the East P a k i s t a n Assembly was seriously

injured when a fight broke out between the government and

opposition parties on September 23. The deputy speaker later

died in hospital. After fifteen days of this chaotic episode,

martial law was proclaimed i n the whole country. The imposi-

tion of martial law on October 8, 1958 marked the collapse of

 87

parliamentary democracy in Pakistan.

During the period 1954 to 1958, the Hindu minority

achieved a significant advance toward securing i t s interests\

The situation was completely different from the initial years

of Pakistan, when t h e Hindus could not play an effective role

in the politics of the country. They were not successful in

achieving a totally secular c o n s t i t u t i o n , but they definitely

exerted influence i n making the c o n s t i t u t i o n more liberal-

democratic, thereby safeguarding the minority interests. Their

greatest success was the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of the joint electorate

system i n the constitution. From 1955 to 1958 they shared

power with the Muslims both at the centre and i n East Pakistan,

with the exception of the two-month Chundrigar ministry in

1957. They received ministerial rewards disproportionate to

their size. The Sarkar ministry had three H i n d u members. The

Ataur ministry had four Hindu representatives in a cabinet of

ten. They were also successful in implementing the 23 per cent

service quota for the Hindus. Most importantly, Hindu colla-

boration with the c o a l i t i o n , governments resulted in a sense of

security among o r d i n a r y Hindus. They shed their fear, and

their migration to India dropped considerably. Thus, this

period has been described by Hindu leaders as the time when

the Hindu minority lived most happily i n East Pakistan.

During this period, the Hindus were more compromising

than before. When they were coalition partners, they did not

insist on amending the c o n s t i t u t i o n to drop the Islamic

nomenclature of the r e p u b l i c or the disqualification of non-

 88

Muslims to the office o f t h e head of state. I t i s notable

that they started playing an e f f e c t i v e role only when t h e

Muslim political groups o f t h e UF lost cohesion i n 1955. The

nearly balanced strength o f t h e two M u s l i m political parties

made i tpossible f o r t h e Hindus to play a crucial role during

this period, i n t h e sense that their support could now

determine the rise and f a l l of ministries.

 89

NOTES - Chapter I I I

Rounaq J a h a n u s e s t h e term " v e r n a c u l a r e l i t e " t o denote

t h e . e x c l u d e d s e c t i o n o f t h e M u s l i m L e a g u e who w e r e
mobilizing strength with the decrease i n popularity of
the Muslim League. F o r an account o f t h e r i s e o f t h e
Awami L e a g u e , s e e R o u n a q J a h a n , P a k i s t a n : F a i l u r e i n
N a t i o n a l I n t e g r a t i o n (Dacca: O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s ,
1 9 7 3 ) , p p . 3 8 - 4 9 ; a n d a l s o A b u l M a n s u r Ahmad, R a j n i t i r
Panchasa B a c h a r a , pp.310-343. Ahmad was a t o p l e a d e r o f
the AL and a t r u s t e d f r i e n d o f Suhrawardy.

B a d r u d d i n Umar, S a n s k r i t i k S a m p r a d a y i k a t a (Communalism
in Culture) (Dacca: J a n a m a i t r i P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1966),
pp.8-11.

T a l u k d e r Maniruzzaman, "Radical P o l i t i c s and t h e

E m e r g e n c e o f B a n g l a d e s h " i n P a u l R. B r a s s a n d M a r c u s
F. F r a n d a , e d s . , R a d i c a l P o l i t i c s i n S o u t h A s i a
( C a m b r i d g e , M a s s . : MIT P r e s s , 1973), p.228.

Ibid., p.229.

See next chapter, section on t h e l e f t i s t movement.

Maniruzzaman, op.cit., pp.228-231.

Lahiry, Pak-Bharater Rup R e k h a , pp.363-379.

Keith Callard, Pakistan (New Y o r k : M a c M i l l a n Company,

1957), p.248.

Jahan, op.cit., p . 4 5 ; a n d Ahmad, op.cit., pp.333-335.

T h e s e f i g u r e s a r e t a k e n f r o m Ahmad o p . c i t . , p . 3 3 3 , a n d
L a h i r y o p . c i t . , p.379. H o w e v e r , t h e r e a r e some m i n o r
v a r i a t i o n s on these f i g u r e s i n C a l l a r d , o p . c i t . , p.59;
and M a h f u z u l Huq, E l e c t o r a l P r o b l e m s i n P a k i s t a n (Dacca:
A s i a t i c S o c i e t y o f P a k i s t a n , 1966), p.81. While
C a l l a r d u s e s t h e K a r a c h i n e w s p a p e r s f o r h i s d a t a , Huq
does n o t mention h i s s o u r c e . S i n c e b o t h Ahmad a n d
L a h i r y were i m p o r t a n t l e a d e r s o f t h e assembly, I
c o n s i d e r t h e i r f i g u r e s more a c c u r a t e .

R i c h a r d L . P a r k a n d R i c h a r d S. W h e e l e r , " E a s t B e n g a l
Under Governor's R u l e " , F a r E a s t e r n Survey, 2 3 ( 9 ) ,
September 1954, pp. |<3-f .

J.K. Ray, Democracy and N a t i o n a l i s m on T r i a l , pp.105-106

S t a n l e y M a r o n , ''The P r o b l e m o f E a s t Pakistan", Pacific
A f f a i r s , 28 ( 2 ) , J u n e 1 9 5 5 , p . 1 3 8 .

For a full account of this period, s e e Ahmad, op.cit.,

 90

pp.322-562; P a r k and W h e e l e r , o p . c i t . ; R i c h a r d L. P a r k ,
"East Bengal: Pakistan's Troubled Province", Far Eastern
S u r v e y , 23 ( 5 ) , May 1954, pp.70-74; S t a n l e y Maron, "A
New P h a s e i n P a k i s t a n P o l i t i c s " , F a r E a s t e r n S u r v e y , 24
( 1 1 ) , November 19 55; R i c h a r d S. W h e e l e r , " G o v e r n o r -
G e n e r a l ' s R u l e i n P a k i s t a n " , F a r E a s t e r n S u r v e y , 24 ( 1 ) ,
J a n u a r y 1955; and G.W. C h o u d h u r y , "The E a s t P a k i s t a n
P o l i t i c a l Scene, 1955-1957," ••''. P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , 30 ( 4 ) ,
December 1957, pp.312-320.

14. However, t h i s d i s a g r e e m e n t d i d n o t b r i n g a b o u t any split

i n t h e UF a t t h a t moment b e c a u s e F a z l u l Huq was t h e most
p o p u l a r l e a d e r o f t h e UF. I t was a l r e a d y d e c i d e d b e f o r e
t h e e l e c t i o n t h a t he w o u l d become t h e c h i e f m i n i s t e r o f
t h e p r o v i n c e , w h i l e Suhrawardy w o u l d go t o t h e c e n t r e .
A f t e r the e l e c t o r a l v i c t o r y , a s e c t i o n of the AML
demanded t h e c h i e f m i n i s t e r s h i p i n r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e
f a c t t h a t t h e AML was t h e l a r g e s t p a r t y i n t h e c o a l i t i o n .
S u h r a w a r d y , who was more e a g e r t o c a p t u r e power a t t h e
c e n t r e , d i d n o t want t o d i s p l e a s e F a z l u l Huq. So he
d i s m i s s e d t h e AML's c l a i m t o t h e c h i e f m i n i s t e r s h i p .
Ahmad, o p . c i t . , pp.335-337.

15. A r t i c l e 92A o f t h e Government o f I n d i a A c t , 19 35 empowered

the c e n t r a l government t o d i s m i s s a p r o v i n c i a l government
on g r o u n d s o f emergency. c i r c u m s t a n c e s .

16. Ray, o p . c i t . , pp.98-103; a l s o Ahmad, o p . c i t . , pp.338-340.

17. Maron, "The Problem of E a s t Pakistan", p.138.

18. K.B. S a y e e d , P a k i s t a n : The F o r m a t i v e P h a s e (Karachi:

P a k i s t a n P u b l i s h i n g House, 1 9 6 0 ) , p.420.

19. M a r o n , o p . c i t . , p.162.

20. Richard S. Wheeler, "Governor-General's Rule i n Pakistan",

p . 4.

21. Ahmad, o p . c i t . , pp.347-348.

r
22. Ibid., p.355.

23. Ibid.

24. T a m i z u d d i n K h a n , a B e n g a l i a n d t h e s p e a k e r o f t h e CAP until

i t s d i s s o l u t i o n i n O c t o b e r 1954, appealed to the Sind High
Court against the u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l act of the Governor-
General. The S i n d C o u r t u p h e l d h i s v i e w s . So t h e
Governor-General a p p e a l e d t o t h e F e d e r a l C o u r t whose
d e c i s i o n went i n f a v o u r o f t h e l e g a l i t y o f t h e Governor-
G e n e r a l ' s power t o d i s s o l v e a C o n s t i t u e n t A s s e m b l y .
H o w e v e r , t h e c o u r t a l s o d e c l a r e d t h a t he had t o c o n v e n e
a new C o n s t i t u e n t A s s e m b l y .
 91

25. Ray, o p . c i t . , p . 1 1 2 ; a l s o B.K. Das, CAP, Debates,

Vol.1 (1oTT P - 4 7 0 , September 5, 1 9 5 5 .

26. Ahmad, o p . c i t . , p . 3 5 7 .

27. K e i t h C a l l a r d , o p . c i t . , p . 6 4 . The "Others" category

c o n s i s t e d o f the F i r o z . Khan Noon group (3 members),
F a z l u r Rahman (Independent Muslim League), Dr. Khan
Saheb, Mian I f t i k h a r u d d i n (Azad P a k i s t a n P a r t y ) , F a z l u l
Karim (Communist), three Muslim a s s o c i a t e s (Gibbon,
Abdul B a r i , S. K i r p a l d a s ) , and s i x s t a t e and t r i b a l
leaders.

28. Ahmad, o p . c i t . , p p . 3 6 6 - 3 6 7 .

29. Ibid., pp.368-384.

30. Maron, "A New Phase i n P a k i s t a n P o l i t i c s " , p . 1 6 3 ; Ahmad,

op.cit., pp.373-386.

31. N a t i o n a l Assembly o f P a k i s t a n ( h e r e a f t e r NAP), Debates,

Vol.2 ( 3 ) , p . 1 9 9 , October 10, 1956.

32. CAP, Debates, V o l . 1 ' ( 7 6 ) , p . 3 3 6 9 , February 1, 1956.

33. I b i d . . V o l . 1 ( 8 0 ) , p p . 3 3 6 7 - 3 6 9 7 , February 2 9 , 1 9 5 6 ,
speech of S.K. Sen, B.K. Dutta, B.K. Das, Rasa Raj Mandal.

34. I b i d . , V o l . 1 ( 7 6 ) , p . 3 4 1 1 , February 2 1 , 1956.,

35. I b i d . , V o l . 1 ( 6 3 ) , p . 2 4 0 6 , February 3, 1 9 5 6 , speech by

B.K. Das.

36. I b i d . , V o l . 1 ( 7 6 ) , p p . 3 4 1 5 - 3 4 3 0 , February 2 1 , 1 9 5 6 , speech

of Gour Chandra B a l a , Rasa Raj Mandal, B.K. Das, K.K. Dutta
and B.K. Dutta.

37. Huq, o p . c i t . , p . 8 6 .

38. CAP, Debates, V o l . 1 ( 8 0 ) , p . 3 7 1 2 , February 2 9 , 1956.

39. I b i d . , V o l . 1 ( 7 6 ) , p . 3 4 0 6 , February 2 1 , 1 9 5 6 .

40. Ibid., p.3411.

4 1
• Ibid., Vol.11 ( 3 ) , pp.49-50, speech o f B.K. Dutta, A p r i l
10, 1 9 5 2 ; and Huq, op.cit., pp.66-67.

42 See Chapter I I , pp. 39-40.

43. CAP, Debates, V o l . 9 ( 2 ) , p . 3 3 , A p r i l 11, 1951.

44. I b i d . , V o l . 1 ( 7 6 ) , p p . 3 4 3 4 - 3 4 6 6 , February 2 1 , 1956.

 92

45. Ibid., Vol.9 ( 4 ) , p.65, A p r i l 15, 1952.

46. Ibid., p.75.

47. I b i d . , V o l . 1 (76), p.3455, speech o f Rasa Raj Mandal,

F e b r u a r y 21, 1956.

48. I b i d . , Vol.11 ( 4 ) , p . 7 1 , A p r i l 15, 1956; a l s o s p e e c h of

S.K. S e n , V o l . 1 ( 7 6 ) , p . 3 4 5 0 , F e b r u a r y 2 1 , 1 9 5 6 .

49. Ibid. r speech o f B.K. Das, p.3447.

50. I b i d . , p.3468..

51. E a s t P a k i s t a n Assembly, Proceedings, Vol.15 ( 3 ) , p.208,

O c t o b e r 1, 1 9 5 6 .

52. CAP, D e b a t e s , V o l . I ( 6 5 ) , p . 2 5 4 3 , F e b r u a r y 6, 1956 and

Vol.1 ( 7 5 ) , p . 3 2 6 9 , F e b r u a r y 20, 1956.

53. I b i d . , V o l . 1 ( 8 0 ) , pp.3672-3673, s p e e c h o f B.K. D a s ,

F e b r u a r y 2 9 , 1956; Huq, o p . c i t . , pp.112-113; L a h i r y , op.
cit., pp.414-415.

54. Ibid., p.3680.

55. Ibid., p.3700, speech o f S.K. Sen.

56. Ibid., pp.3709-3710.

57. For a discussion of East Pakistan p o l i t i c a l situation at

t h a t t i m e , s e e C h o u d h u r y , "The E a s t P a k i s t a n P o l i t i c a l
Scene, 1955-1957", pp.312-320.

58. Ibid., pp.315-320.

59. Ray, op.cit., pp.12 3-124.

60. J . Sen Gupta, Eclipse of East Pakistan, p.251.

61. Lahiry, op.cit., pp.418-443.

62. Sen Gupta, op.cit., pp.251-252.

63. East Pakistan Assembly, Proceedings, Vol.15 ( 3 ) , pp.156-

228.

64. NAP, Debates, Vol.2 (4) p p . 321-322, October 11, 1956.

65. Ibid., Vol.2 (12), pp.839-875, April 22, 1957.

66. Ahmad, o p . c i t . , p p . 5 2 0 - 5 2 5 ; Ray, op.cit., p.133;

Choudhury, o p . c i t . , pp.318-320.
 93

67. - Choudhury, o p . c i t . , p.320.

68. Ray, o p . c i t . , pp.137-138;"Ahmad, op.cit., pp.525-535.

69. Huq, o p . c i t . , p.140.

70. Dawn ( K a r a c h i ) , October 19, 1957, c i t e d i n Huq, op.cit.,

p.140. ~~

71. Huq, o p . c i t . , pp.144-145; Ahmad, o p . c i t . , p.543.

72. East Pakistan Assembly, Proceedings, Vol.18 (2),p.51 f

M a r c h 17, 1958. *

73. Khan, op.cit., pp.306-308.

74. T a l u k d e r M a n i r u z z a m a n , The P o l i t i c s o f D e v e l o p m e n t (Dacca:

G r e e n Book House L t d . , 1971), p.112.

75. Ray, o p . c i t . , p.145.

76. P.C. L a h i r y , I n d i a P a r t i t i o n e d a n d M i n o r i t i e s i n Pakistan

( C a l c u t t a : W r i t e r s ' Forum, 1964), pp.33-34.
 94

CHAPTER IV

R E T R E A T AND REGROUPING:
THE T H I R D P H A S E OF M I N O R I T Y P O L I T I C S , 1958-1971

The coup d'etat i n October 1958 by G e n e r a l Ayub Khan

marked the collapse of parliamentary democracy and t h e

beginning o f a new period i n Pakistan politics entirely

i

different from any p r e c e d i n g one. The i m p o s i t i o n of martial

law was accompanied by a t o t a l suspension of political activi-

ties f o r about four years. A l l the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s were

banned, t h e n a t i o n a l and p r o v i n c i a l assemblies were d i s s o l v e d ,

and t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n was abrogated. The c e n t r a l and p r o v i n -

cial governments were dismissed, and t h e r u l e of the military

was established. Freedom of the press and a s s o c i a t i o n were

taken away from the people, and heavy censorship was imposed

on the press. Tens o f thousands of political leaders and

workers, particularly i n East Pakistan, were thrown into jail.

Prominent Bengali politicians, i n c l u d i n g Maulana Bhasani,

H.S. Suhrawardy, and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman were arrested. Of

all regimes i n Pakistan, i t was A y u b ' s m a r t i a l l a w r e g i m e

2

which was m o s t resented by t h e m i n o r i t y community. During

the Ayub regime, the Hindus, along with the Bengali Muslims,

were on t h e r e t r e a t , and were a l m o s t wiped out politically.

Later, they regrouped with the Bengali nationalists i n their

struggle against t h e common enemy, the Pakistan central ruling

elite.
 95

The M a r t i a l Law Regime arid t h e Hindus

In order to legitimize i t s seizure o f power, t h e new

regime blamed the politicians f o rbringing Pakistan to the

brink of disaster. Charges of corruption and misconduct were

levelled by t h e regime against former ministers and politicians.

In East Pakistan, t h e Awami League, K S P , a n d NAP party members

and Hindu politicians were the primary targets o f t h e regime.

Muslim Leaguers were n o t a f f e c t e d by t h e r e g i m e ' s reprisals,

and this created s u s p i c i o n among the minorities that the

military g o v e r n m e n t was pro-Muslim League and anti-Hindu.

Along with Bengali political Muslim leaders, prominent Hindu

leaders i n c l u d i n g Manoranjan Dhar, General Secretary of the

Pakistan National Congress until i t was banned, were arrested.

The martial law regime i n i t s attempt to put further

curbs on p o l i t i c a l leaders, issued the Elective Bodies ( D i s -

3

qualification) Order (EBDO), 1959. The Order was u s e d n o t

only against so-called corrupt politicians, but against popular

leaders who were a potential threat t o the regime. The term

"misconduct" defined by the.order was w i d e enough i n i t s scope

4

to include subversive activities, jobbery, and corruption.

Six prominent Hindu leaders were disqualified from political

participation under EBDO. They were: Suresh Chandra Das

Gupta, former president of Pakistan National Congress and ex-

MLA; Basanta Kumar D a s , f o r m e r leader o f the Congress assembly

party and e x - m i n i s t e r o f c e n t r a l and p r o v i n c i a l governments;

D.N. Dutta, ex-MCA and p r o v i n c i a l minister; Pravash Chandra

Lahiry, former provincial minister; T r a i l a k y a Nath Chakravorty,

ex-MLA; and Bejoy Chandra Roy, ex-MLA."' The EBDO t r i a l s were

o f t e n f a r c i c a l and the t r i b u n a l s c o n s t i t u t e d f o r the purpose

o f t e n d i d not even examine any w i t n e s s e s . The charges against

Hindu p o l i t i c i a n s i n v a r i a b l y i n c l u d e d s u b v e r s i v e activities

and t h e i r a l l e g e d a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h a n t i - P a k i s t a n i o r g a n i z a t i o n s
7

and elements.

At the i n i t i a l stage o f m a r t i a l law r u l e those Hindu

l e a d e r s who were not put i n p r i s o n c e l l s were s u b j e c t e d to

c o n s i d e r a b l e harassment. The houses o f prominent Hindu l e a d e r s

were o f t e n watched and surrounded by i n t e l l i g e n c e people, thus

r e s t r i c t i n g t h e i r movement. T h i s had a v e r y negative effect

on o r d i n a r y Hindus, as they were now separated from t h e i r

leaders. The Hindus had. always looked t o t h e i r l e a d e r s t o

a r t i c u l a t e t h e i r g r i e v a n c e s i n and o u t o f p a r l i a m e n t . Now

t h a t t h e i r l e a d e r s were l i v i n g i n i s o l a t i o n , the morale o f

8

common Hindus d e t e r i o r a t e d . Moreover, i n order t o enhance i t s

p u b l i c image, t h e regime launched a f r e s h a t t a c k on smuggling

a c r o s s the border. Under m a r t i a l law, the s e i z u r e o f goods i n

a p e r i o d o f one month amounted t o n e a r l y the t o t a l of goods

9

s e i z e d i n t h e p r e c e d i n g eleven y e a r s . We have seen i n the

p r e c e d i n g chapter how Hindus were a f f e c t e d by anti-smuggling

measures under the Operation C l o s e Door. The anti-smuggling

o p e r a t i o n s were c a r r i e d out by the army, and the P a k i s t a n army

being predominantly a West P a k i s t a n i i n s t i t u t i o n , had a n t i -

I n d i a and a n t i - H i n d u overtones. Thus, the new anti-smuggling

o p e r a t i o n s h i t Hindus the hardest.

The economic o p p o r t u n i t i e s of the m i n o r i t i e s were
 squeezed g r e a t l y d u r i n g the Ayub regime. They were

d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t i n the matter o f g r a n t i n g import-export

licences. The e x i s t i n g Hindu e n t e r p r i s e s a l s o faced difficulty

10

when the q u e s t i o n of renewal of government s a n c t i o n arose.

Some Hindu concerns, i n c l u d i n g the C h i t t a Ranjan Cotton M i l l s ,

were taken over by the government f o r a l l e g e d mismanagement

which " i f allowed to c o n t i n u e would r e s u l t i n a l o s s of produc-

11

t i o n of e s s e n t i a l commodities." The p o l i c i e s of the regime

caused a f r e s h wave of m i g r a t i o n t o I n d i a . However, m i g r a t i o n

12

was extremely d i f f i c u l t because the border was tightly sealed.

During the r u l e of Ayub Khan, the Hindu community

s u f f e r e d from a l a c k of e f f e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p because their

l e a d e r s were not a v a i l a b l e to a r t i c u l a t e t h e i r demands and

grievances. Four d e f i n i t e p a t t e r n s i n the Hindu l e a d e r s h i p are

found d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . One group o f Hindu l e a d e r s , including

Manoranjan Dhar, D.N. Dutta, and Phani Mazumdar, served terms i n

p r i s o n a t d i f f e r e n t times. The EBDO and the absence o f any

hope of f u t u r e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n d u r i n g the Ayub regime

l e d a second group to leave the c o u n t r y i n d e s p a i r . Among

prominent l e a d e r s , B.K. Dutta and P.C. L a h i r y l e f t the country

a f t e r the i m p o s i t i o n o f m a r t i a l law. S r i s Chandra Chattapadhyaya,

former l e a d e r o f the Congress p a r t y i n the f i r s t CAP, had

a l r e a d y been l i v i n g i n India. Not o n l y p o l i t i c i a n s , but some

h i g h l y p l a c e d Hindu o f f i c i a l s ( i n c l u d i n g a High Court j u s t i c e

and a CSP o f f i c e r ) l e f t the country and s e t t l e d down i n West

13

Bengal a f t e r the i m p o s i t i o n of m a r t i a l law. A t h i r d group,

i n the absence of any c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and p a r l i a m e n t a r y politics,

 98

kept their distance from a c t i v e i n v o l v e m e n t i n any politics.

This group included lawyers, doctors, and teachers. The

14

Hindu leadership i n East B e n g a l was relatively old. The

fourth group consisted of the older leaders, most o f whom

gradually retired and then died. This group included such

prominent leaders as Suresh Chandra Das Gupta, K.K. Dutta,

15
Haran Ghosh Choudhury and K h i t i s h Chandra Biswas.
The Basic Democracy System

President Aybu's martial law regime lacked legitimacy.

In h i s attempt to create legitimacy f o r the regime and to

begin institution-building at the local level, Ayub introduced

a new system of local government i n October 1959 known as the

16

Basic Democracies. Under the new system, 8,126 union

councils were created, each representing an average population

of 10,000. Each union council consisted of an average of ten

members, called Basic Democrats, elected directly by universal

adult franchise, each representing roughly a population of one

17
thousand. The B a s i c D e m o c r a c i e s were e n t r u s t e d w i t h m u l t i p l e
functions: administrative, developmental, l o c a l self government,
18

and constitutional. Their most important function after Ayub

promulgated a c o n s t i t u t i o n i n 1962, was to serve as the

electoral college f o r the election of the president and the

national and p r o v i n c i a l assemblies. Universal adult franchise

was replaced by the electoral college consisting of 80,000

Basic Democrats, 40,000 from each wing.

Hindu representation i n the Basic Democracies was

minimal. In the first Basic Democracies election in 1959,

only 4 , 9 6 5 Hindus were e l e c t e d J
During the r u l e o f Ayub the

system of B a s i c Democracies was f u r t h e r strengthened i n an

attempt to c r e a t e a permanent base of p o l i t i c a l support f o r the

regime. The regime needed the support of the B a s i c Democrats

to get i t s p r e s i d e n t i a l and assembly candidates elected. The

regime i n j e c t e d m i l l i o n s of rupees i n t o the r u r a l areas i n the

name of the "Works Programme". T h i s works programme was

20

supported by American a i d under the P L

480 programme. The

B a s i c Democrats were e n t r u s t e d w i t h the implementation of the

works programme, and the expenditures were never a u d i t e d by

government agencies. As a r e s u l t , they were provided with the

opportunity t o make f o r t u n e s j u s t by a p p r o p r i a t i n g a s u b s t a n t i a l

p o r t i o n of the works programme money. Thus, d u r i n g the Ayub

r u l e , the B a s i c Democrats emerged as a "nouveau r i c h e " c l a s s i n

21
the r u r a l areas. As noted by Rehman Sobhan, "...the B a s i c
Democracies system (had) by 1964 become the monopoly of a
22

c l e a r l y i d e n t i f i a b l e socio-economxc class." The growth of

t h i s new Muslim kulak c l a s s i n the r u r a l areas was buttressed

by the regime's d e c i s i o n to i n c r e a s e the maximum s i z e of land-

holdings from 100 to 350 standard bighas (125 acres) i n 1961.

By t h i s time, i n the absence o f Hindu l a n d l o r d s , the rising

Muslim s u r p l u s peasants and j o t e d a r s had already consolidated

their positions. The B a s i c Domocracies system r e s u l t e d i n the

c o n c e n t r a t i o n of economic and p o l i t i c a l power i n the same hands

23

i n the r u r a l areas. T h i s f a c t i s s u b s t a n t i a t e d i f we look at

the socio-economic backgrounds of the B a s i c Democrats. They

came from the top ten to f i f t e e n per cent of the r u r a l popula-

 100
tion, and the majority of them were below forty-five years of
24
age. When P r e s i d e n t Ayub formed his political party, the

Convention Muslim League, in 19 6 3 , they became its primary

25

members.

The Anti-Ayub Democratic Movement

By the beginning of 19 62 student unrest against the

m a r t i a l law r e g i m e began t o i n c r e a s e . Students of Dacca
U n i v e r s i t y and o f o t h e r c i t i e s d e m o n s t r a t e d i n t h e streets for

2 6

the r e s t o r a t i o n of democracy and for the end of martial law.

President Ayub tried to dismiss the students' demonstrations

by alleging that communists from Calcutta and Agartala were

27

responsible for the East Pakistan unrest. Increasing popular

dissatisfaction with martial law made A y u b promulgate a

constitution for Pakistan on March 1, 1962. I t came into effect

on June 8 of the same y e a r with the withdrawal of martial law

after f o r t y - f o u r months. The Ayub C o n s t i t u t i o n of 19 62 provided

for a p r e s i d e n t i a l form of government, with great concentration

of power in the hands of the president. It also provided for

national and p r o v i n c i a l assemblies with limited authority.

This constitution, like i t s predecessor, reserved the office of

2 8

the head of the state only f o r Muslims. The president and the

members of the national and p r o v i n c i a l assemblies were to be

elected by the Basic Democrats. Ayub ruled another seven years"

t i l l the collapse of the regime i n the 1968-1969 mass upsurge.

This period has been described as the period of

'constitutional
29
autocracy' by a p r o m i n e n t s t u d e n t of Pakistan politics.
A f t e r l i f t i n g m a r t i a l law a number o f p o l i t i c a l prisoners
 101

i n c l u d i n g some Hindus who had been h e l d s i n c e 1958 were f r e e d .

Dacca and other c i t i e s witnessed fresh p o l i t i c a l activities

by the o l d p a r l i a m e n t a r y politicians. On June 25, 19 62,

nine l e a d i n g B e n g a l i l e a d e r s o f t h e defunct AL, t h e KSP, and

the Muslim League made a statement demanding the framing o f

a new c o n s t i t u t i o n based on p a r l i a m e n t a r y democracy and

31

universal adult franchise. T h i s famous statement by the

nine l e a d e r s was f o l l o w e d by province-wide a g i t a t i o n f o r the

r e s t o r a t i o n o f f u l l democracy and the subsequent formulation

of the N a t i o n a l Democratic F r o n t (NDF) comprising the major

p o l i t i c a l groups i n East P a k i s t a n under the l e a d e r s h i p o f
32
Suhrawardy.

The s t r i k i n g f e a t u r e i s t h a t no Hindu l e a d e r s were

i n c l u d e d among the nine l e a d e r s nor were they a s s o c i a t e d with

the formation o f the NDF» The Hindu absence from the

p o l i t i c a l scene can be e x p l a i n e d by the f a c t t h a t the com-

munity had s u f f e r e d the l o s s o f many o f i t s prominent l e a d e r s

e i t h e r by death o r by m i g r a t i o n . The remaining Hindu l e a d e r s

might have thought i t wise to wait and not enter i n t o the bad

books o f t h e i r a l r e a d y h o s t i l e r u l e r s . Moreover, a l l the

prominent Hindu p o l i t i c i a n s were based i n d i s t r i c t towns out-

s i d e o f Dacca, so they were not r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e f o r any

j o i n t e f f o r t t a k i n g p l a c e i n Dacca. The d i m i n i s h i n g r o l e o f

the Hindus d u r i n g the Ayub regime can be d i s c e r n e d by the

1962 and 1965 n a t i o n a l and p r o v i n c i a l assemblies election

results. In both n a t i o n a l assemblies the Hindu r e p r e s e n t a t i o n

was n i l , and i n both p r o v i n c i a l assemblies there were o n l y

 102

four non-Muslim members, including one Buddhist, in each

33

assembly.

Ayub envisaged a partyless political system when he

introduced his constitution, and political parties remained

banned even after the 19 62 election to the national and pro-

vincial assemblies. However, the introduction of the

Constitution and the formation of the assemblies made i t

necessary f o r him to create political support f o r the regime.

Out of this n e c e s s i t y the regime passed the Political Parties

Bill, 19 62 which provided f o r the revival of political parties

under severe restraints. EBDOed politicians were debarred

from joining or forming a political party. Similarly, the v

ban on the Communist P a r t y was not lifted. The formation of

any political party working a g a i n s t the "integrity" or

34
" s e c u r i t y " o f P a k i s t a n was a l s o prohibited. Ayub r e c e i v e d
the support o f a s e c t i o n of the o l d M u s l i m L e a g u e w h i c h he

35

revived, and subsequently became i t s president. In East

Pakistan an attempt was made b y o p p o s i t i o n groups not to

revive the former political parties and to struggle for the

restoration of full democracy under the leadership of the NDF

A f t e r the death o f S u h r a w a r d y i n December 1963, the NDF was hope-

lessly divided and by the first quarter of 19 64, a l l of the

major political parties i n East P a k i s t a n had re-emerged.

None o f the Hindu parties, however, was revived after

the withdrawal of the ban on political parties. The reason for

this i s probably that except f o r Manoranjan Dhar, a l l other

important Hindu l e a d e r s were either EBDOed, m i g r a t e d to India,

 103

or dead. Moreover, they thought that in the existing context,

when east-west hostility had intensified, i t was possible to

work with secular Bengali parties like the Awami L e a g u e , NAP,

and NDF. .This was particularly true of the younger generation

of the Hindu leadership who had fewer emotional ties with the

nationalist movement of the Indian National Congress of the

pre-independence era.

Although the Hindus did not revive their political parties,

they did not remain totally inactive. In late 1963, a dozen

Hindu leaders met at the residence of D.N. Dutta at Comilla

and held closed door discussions about the future course of

action of the community. I t was resolved in this meeting that

a general conference of the minority would be held i n Dacca in

January 19 64. D.N. Dutta was elected chairman of the proposed

conference, while a reception committee with Trailakya Nath

Chakravorty as c h a i r m a n was formed. However, this conference

could not be held owing to the outbreak of communal violence

in Dacca and other places i n January of that year. Later, in

June, a 22-member Hindu delegation under the leadership of

D.N. Dutta met the p r o v i n c i a l governor and submitted a memo-

randum. The memorandum v o i c e d the grievances of the minority

community including the lack of s e c u r i t y , meagre representation

in the assemblies and in the superior civil services, and the

3 6

absence of a secular constitution.

In early January 19 64 communal violence broke out in

Dacca, Khulna, and some o t h e r places i n the province over the

issue of the missing sacred hair of Prophet Muhammad, kept in

 104

the H a z r a t b a l mosque i n the Indian p a r t of Kashmir. The 1964

r i o t was the most s e r i o u s i n s t a n c e of communal s t r i f e since

1950. However, the d i f f e r e n c e between the 1950 and 1964 r i o t s

i s t h a t the a t t i t u d e of B e n g a l i Muslims was totally different

t h i s time. The r i o t s broke out t h i s time at the i n s t i g a t i o n of

some of the l e a d e r s of Ayub's Convention Muslim League, and

mainly p a r t i c i p a t e d i n by non-Bengali Muslims. The casualities

were not g r e a t because most B e n g a l i Muslims a c t i v e l y resisted

communal i n s t i g a t i o n . Leading p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s i n c l u d i n g

Maulana Bhasani, Sheikh Mujib, and Ataur Rahman Khan made pub-
37

l x c appeals f o r communal peace. Dacca U n i v e r s i t y student

l e a d e r s condemned the r i o t i n g i n c i d e n t s and a l l e g e d t h a t they

were i n s t i g a t e d by i n t e r e s t e d elements i n an attempt to d i v e r t

38

people from the anti-Ayub democratic movement. The leading

newspapers of Dacca a l s o launched a n t i - r i o t s propaganda, and

seven e d i t o r s o f the popular Dacca newspapers i n j o i n t state-

39

ments made repeated appeals f o r communal peace. An all-party

committee r e p r e s e n t i n g d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , student

o r g a n i z a t i o n s , and t r a d e unions was formed. The committee made

a statement e n t i t l e d "East Bengal Stands A g a i n s t Communal
40

Riots." Thousands o f c o p i e s of t h i s statement were d i s t r i b u t e d ,

and the committee brought out peace p r o c e s s i o n s i n d i f f e r e n t

c i t i e s i n East Pakistan. As a r e s u l t , the communal v i o l e n c e

came t o a h a l t immediately.

I t has been observed t h a t the f a t e of the Hindu m i n o r i t y

was o f t e n determined by I n d o - P a k i s t a n i r e l a t i o n s . I f the

r e l a t i o n s between the two c o u n t r i e s d e t e r i o r a t e d , the Hindu

 105

41
minority would almost certainly suffer. When the Indo-

Pakistani war broke out over Kashmir i n September 1965,

important leaders of the Hindu community including Trailakya

Nath Chakravorty and Phani Mazumdar were arrested. Most of

them were not released b e f o r e the middle of 1966, though the

hostility between the belligerents ceased after the 17-day war.

The 1964 riot and the 1965 war caused another wave of Hindu

migration to India. In these two years the number of refugees

registered i n West Bengal was far greater than a l l those of

the p r e c e d i n g seven years.^

The Leftist Movement and the Hindus

The communist movement i n undivided Bengal had been

dominated by Hindus, though initially the Communist Party was

founded i n 1920 by three Muslim communists, Muzaffar Ahmad,

44
Abdur Razzak, and Abdul Hamim. The leadership of the
45
Communist Party was largely drawn from the Bengali bhadralok•

When B e n g a l was partitioned, more than 10,000 communists

46

decided to stay on i n Pakistan. The Communist Party was

subjected to intensive repression by the Pakistan government

when i t adopted the Zhdanov line advocating a bloody socialist

revolution i n South Asia i n the early years of independence.

The party attempted to foment peasant revolt i n some p a r t s of

East Pakistan, but was immediately s u p p r e s s e d by the Govern-

ment. As a result, a large number of the party members were

either i m p r i s o n e d o r went underground. The Communist Party

suffered a great loss after the 1950 riots, when two-thirds of

47
its members migrated to India. Even after this migration, th
 106

vast majority of the remaining East P a k i s t a n Communist Party

48

(EPCP) members were Hindus.

The EPCP was outlawed in 1954. After that, the party

worked both underground and through open political parties

like the Awami League, the Ganatantri Dal, and later the
49

National Awami P a r t y when i t was formed in 1957. After the

imposition of martial law, prominent communist leaders were

either arrested or went underground with warrants of arrest

hanging over their heads. Lala Sharadindu De, Amal Sen,

Santosh Banerjee, Nani Bhattacherjee, Dhiren Das, Manmath De,

Ratan Sen, Amulya Lahiry, Visnu Bhattacherjee and Ajoy Roy

spent approximately eleven years in prison each and were only

released in 1969 when the anti-Ayub mass upsurge forced him to

release a l l political prisoners. More communist leaders were

thrown behind prison bars with the outbreak of the 1965 war.

Ranesh Das Gupta, Purnendu Dastidar, Jiten Ghosh, Mani Krishna

Sen, Rabi Nyogi, Nagendra Nath Sarkar, Satyen Sen, Ranesh

Maitra, Joytish Bose, and Shanti Sen were detained as security

50

prisoners and were released in 1969. While the above-men-

tioned l e a d e r s were imprisoned, Mani Singh, Sukhendu D a s t i d a r ,

Sudhanashu '.Bimal, D u t t a , Anil Mukherjee, Nalini Das, Gyan

Chakravorty, Amar Sen, Sudhin Roy, Barin Dutta, and Khoka Roy

escaped arrest, went underground, and carried on party

activities.
The EPCP, until i t s split into pro-Moscow and pro-Peking
51

groups in 19 6 6 , was l e d by Mani Singh. He was the secretary-

general of the EPCP from 1951 until his arrest in late 1967.
 107

When t h e E P C P underwent a split along the same lines as the

international communist movement, M a n i S i n g h and most of the

senior Hindu communists formed the pro-Moscow group. Also

among the cadres, the majority of the Hindus sided with the

pro-Moscow group o f Mani Singh. The breakaway p r o - P e k i n g EPCP

(Marxist-Leninist) was formed with another Hindu communist,

Sukhendu Dastidar, as i t s secretary-general. But the majority

of the top leaders, as w e l l as the cadres o f t h i s group, were

Muslims from a comparatively younger age group with better

52

education. The EPCP (ML) later underwent further splits and

about a half dozen pro-Peking groups were active in East

Pakistan i n the late 60s. With the lone exception of the Siraj

Sikdar group, a l l other factions had Hindus i n their leader-

53

ship. Like t h e EPCP, the communist-dominated NAP also under-

went a split i n 1967, and the pro-Moscow NAP showed a pattern

of leadership s i m i l a r ' t o t h e pro-Moscow EPCP. I t had a higher

number of Hindus among the top leadership than the pro-Peking

54

NAP l e d by Maulana Bhasani.

In the absence of electoral politics and with further

intensification of anti-West Pakistan sentiments during the

Ayub regime, radical politics had a great appeal f o r the

younger generation of East Pakistan. During martial law, when

all other political parties remained more or less inactive, the

EPCP carried on i t s activities underground. I t had been

especially successful in recruiting a large number of students

through i t s front organization, the East Pakistan Students

Union (EPSU). The top leadership o f t h e EPSU i n the 60s now

 108

provided the leadership of the different leftist political

55

parties. The 1960 generation of Bengali s t u d e n t s was more

secular than i t s predecessor because i t had not witnessed any

bitter communal relations, and had become increasingly dis-

56

trustful of traditional religious politics. This development

made i t easier f o r the o l d Hindu communist leadership to

attract more support. While i n the early years after partition,

the overwhelming majority of the communist cadres were from

the Hindu community, ninety per cent of the cadres of the

57

different leftist parties were Muslims by 1970. Leftist

students played a leading role i n the 1968-1969 anti-Ayub mass

upsurge and both groups of the EPSU were a dominating component

of the Students Action Committee (SAC) which l e d the movement

in East Pakistan. The 11-point demands of the SAC reflected

radicalism of the
l e f t i s t s and the demands f o r autonomy by the
5 8
Bengali nationalists. The H i n d u leftists were also very
prominent i n the peasant o r g a n i z a t i o n s and i n the trade union
59
movement. Despite their poor start i n the early 1950s, the
6 0

communists had made a g r e a t advance by 19 7 0 .

The communist groups had not launched any revolutionary

movement since the suppression of 1948-1950. The membership of

the different communist groups were, i n most cases, limited to

the urban, educated class. The Hindu bhadralok

dominated the Bengal Communist party since the 1930s. The

Hindu involvement i n the communist groups sprang more from an

ideological m o t i v a t i o n than from any conscious effort to safe-

guard the minority interest. However, some o f them m i g h t have

 109

thought that the Hindu survival i n Pakistan could only be

secured by establishing a socialist system.

The N a t i o n a l i s t Movement and the Hindus

In spite of the fact that the leftists emerged as a

strong force, however, they failed to capture the leadership

of the popular movement i n East Pakistan. The East Pakistan

political scene was overwhelmed by the rise of militant

Bengali nationalism i n the latter half of the Ayub regime.

Ayub ruled Pakistan for a period of eleven years with the

backing of a civil-military bureaucracy. Bengali representa-

tion i n these two institutions was minimal. Ayub's rule had

a dampening effect on the i n t e g r a t i v e process of Pakistan.

Bengalis had no access to Ayub's "ruling class" which was

exclusively drawn from the top echelons of the civil and

military bureaucracy. Thus the sense of frustration and

ineffectiveness among Bengali political leaders, precipitated

during the Ayub era, added new militancy to Bengali political

demands. Bengali resentment against the Pakistani national

elite was further enhanced by the fact that the economic fortune

of Pakistan was monopolized by a small group of industrialists

6 2

from West Pakistan. Bengali a l i e n a t i o n from the Pakistan

political system was further exacerbated by repeated attacks on

Bengali c u l t u r e and language by the Ayub regime.

In the 1965 presidential election, the Bengali political

leaders joined the Combined Opposition Parties (COP) to fight

President Ayub. In spite of tremendous popular enthusiasm in

East Pakistan, the COP candidate, Fatema Jinnah, was defeated.

 110

This defeat convinced Sheikh Mujib, the champion of the rising

Bengali nationalist movement, t h a t "Ayub could not be dislodged

under the existing electoral system of Basic Democracy.

Having lost a l l hope o f attaining political power through

electoral processes, the Bengali political leaders were now

thinking i n terms of launching a mass movement against Ayub.

Their determination was increased by the 1965 Indo-Pak war,

for during the war, East Pakistan was totally cut off from other

parts of the world, and Bengalis felt completely helpless.

Sheikh Mujib missed no opportunity to exploit the situation.

As Maniruzzaman notes, "Sheikh Mujibur Rahman—a political

entrepreneur par excellence—thought that East Pakistan's sense

of isolation could be manipulated to spark a nationalist

explosion among the politically discontented and economically

6 3

frustrated Bengalis." At a press conference, Sheikh Mujib

declared, that "The question of autonomy appears to be more

important after the war. T i m e h a s come f o r making East Pakistan

6 4

self-sufficient i n a l l respects." At this opportune moment,

Sheikh Mujib and his party, the Awami League, came o u t with a

radical programme to consolidate the Bengali support for the

rising n a t i o n a l i s t movement.
I n e a r l y 1966 Sheikh Mujib put forward h i s famous six-
65

point programme, "the charter of survival." The six-point

programme was a significant departure from the past autonomy

demands of the Bengalis. Jahan notes: "Unlike previous Bengali

demands, i t did not call upon the central government to do more

for East Pakistan, but.asked the Central government to l e t -

East Pakistan do more for i t s e l f . " 6 6

The programme demanded
 111

67
maximum autonomy f o r East Pakistan. I t immediately sparked

a political movement i n East Pakistan. Complete support f o r

the movement was shown in different mass m e e t i n g s , student

rallies, and s t r e e t corner meetings. The climax o f t h e move-

ment reached on June 7, 196 6 w h e n a p r o v i n c e - w i d e hartal

(general strike) p a r a l y s e d the whole life of East Pakistan,

Ayub branded Sheikh Mujib as 'secessionist' and t h r e a t e n e d to

68

use t h e 'language o f weapon'. Sheikh Mujib and h i s c l o s e

associates were imprisoned and a so-called 'Agartala Conspiracy

Case' was initiated against Sheikh Mujib and o t h e r s f o r an

alleged "conspiracy to bring about the secession of East

Pakistan."

The six-point programme received total support from the

Hindus. The p r i m a r y reason for their support was that the

Bengali nationalist movement was the antithesis of religious

Pakistani nationalism. The Hindus always clamoured for a

secular democratic constitution, a n d t h e Awami League promised

that. The extreme rightist spokesman o f Hindu nationalism i n

India, Organizer, commented that t h e new movement reflected

"the triumph of cultural n a t i o n a l i s m over religious national-

69

ism." To some Hindus i t was a faint r a y o f hope for a united

Bengal, i f not a united India. Moreover, they thought that

their lives would be more secure i n a more autonomous E a s t

Pakistan, because under the six-point programme the control of

the traditionally a n t i - H i n d u West P a k i s t a n i leaders over East

Pakistan would be remote. Finally, t h e Awami League advocated

more friendly relations with India, a prospect which won

 112

enthusiastic Hindu support.

A mass upsurge i n 1968-1969 swept over a l l parts of

Pakistan, resulting i n the collapse of t h e Ayub regime and the

release of S h e i k h M u j i b and other political leaders. After the

fall o f Ayub, G e n e r a l Yahya Khan came t o power and a second

martial l a w was proclaimed i n Pakistan. A l l political activities

were again: suspended f o r the period from March to December

1969. Yahya Khan promised a general election on the basis of

universal adult franchise t o be held in late 19 7 0 . Sheikh

Mujib and the AL participated forcefully i n the election,

70

calling i t a referendum on the six-point programme. Over-

whelming popular support f o r t h e Awami L e a g u e was manifested

in the e l e c t i o n results i n East Pakistan. I t won 167 seats out

of 169 seats i n East Pakistan. The West Pakistani leaders

were not ready t o concede the overwhelming victory of the Awami

League. The first session o f the newly elected assembly was

scheduled f o r March 3, 1971, but i t was p o s t p o n e d by Yahya with

a view to pressuring t h e Awami L e a g u e t o come to terms with the

West Pakistani leaders. The decision to postpone the assembly

session s p a r k e d s p o n t a n e o u s mass p r o t e s t s a l lover East

Pakistan. East Pakistan appeared t o be on the verge of a total

"mass r e v o l u t i o n " and the machinery of the central government

was completely paralysed. After a series of negotiations

between S h e i k h M u j i b and Yahya which yielded no results, the

latter decided to unleash a civil war i n East Pakistan which

u l t i m a t e l y l e d t o t h e emergence o f B a n g l a d e s h .
I n t h e 19 70 e l e c t i o n , t h e A w a m i L e a g u e r e c e i v e d unqualified
 113

support from the Hindus. The reasons f o r t h e i r support f o r

the s i x - p o i n t programme have been d i s c u s s e d e a r l i e r . In e a r l y

1970, the East P a k i s t a n M i n o r i t y Conference r e s o l v e d t o work

71

c l o s e l y w i t h the m a j o r i t y community. T h i s o b v i o u s l y meant

working u n i t e d l y w i t h the Awami League, which by t h a t time had

emerged as t h e symbol o f B e n g a l i n a t i o n a l i s t a s p i r a t i o n s . Of

the o l d Hindu p o l i t i c i a n s , Phani Mazumdar, Gour Chandra Bala,

and A.K. Das j o i n e d the Awami League and fought the e l e c t i o n

on i t s t i c k e t . Sheikh Mujib toured the densely Hindu populated

areas w i t h these Hindu l e a d e r s to win t h e i r support. However,

o n l y one Hindu was nominated f o r the n a t i o n a l assembly elections,

and e i g h t f o r the p r o v i n c i a l assembly e l e c t i o n s by the Awami
72

League. The reasons f o r t h i s poor Hindu r e p r e s e n t a t i o n among

the Awami League c a n d i d a t e s are t h a t there were not many Hindu

p o l i t i c i a n s w i t h n a t i o n a l s t a t u r e a v a i l a b l e , and a l s o t h a t the

Hindus were l a t e e n t r a n t s t o the Awami League o r g a n i z a t i o n . The

extent o f the Hindu support f o r the Awami League can be shown

by the f a c t t h a t none of the o l d Congressmen who decided t o

f i g h t the e l e c t i o n i n the name o f the Congress p a r t y i n some

h e a v i l y concentrated Hindu areas, were s u c c e s s f u l i n g e t t i n g
73
elected.
The 1970 e l e c t i o n s c r e a t e d h i g h hopes among the Hindus.
They were convinced t h a t the Awami League v i c t o r y would improve
74

the c o n d i t i o n s o f the Hindu m i n o r i t y . A l s o , the Awami League

slogans o f J a i Bangla (Long L i v e B e n g a l ) , and Tomar Desh Amar

Desh Bangladesh, Bangladesh (Your country My Country Bangladesh

Bangladesh) e a s i l y a t t r a c t e d Hindu support. Only a few days

 114

before h i s death i n the middle o f 1 9 7 0 , the former Hindu

MLA T r a i l a k y a Nath Chakravorty made an e x t e n s i v e tour o f I n d i a .

He addressed many press conferences and r e c e p t i o n s . He was

a l s o given a g a l a r e c e p t i o n by a j o i n t s e s s i o n of the Indian

Parliament. Everywhere he made emphatic d e c l a r a t i o n s t h a t i n

the coming e l e c t i o n s i n E a s t P a k i s t a n , the p r o g r e s s i v e forces

would win. " I would not l i k e to d i e " , he d e c l a r e d , "before

75

the e l e c t i o n s . " In h i s address t o the Indian Parliament he

recounted the r i s e of secularism i n East Pakistan. He expres-

sed optimism t h a t i f the p r o g r e s s i v e f o r c e s won, t h e Hindu

76

m i n o r i t y would not leave East Bengal anymore. He a l s o p r e d i c -

ted, with great accuracy, t h a t , "Mujib w i l l show m i r a c l e i n
77

the election."

In order t o crush the n a t i o n a l i s t movement, the P a k i s t a n

army s t a r t e d a campaign o f genocide i n Bangladesh on March 25,

1971. The Hindus i n p a r t i c u l a r were t a r g e t s o f the army. In

the f i r s t few days o f t h e P a k i s t a n army's o p e r a t i o n s , their

t a r g e t s were the student d o r m i t o r i e s , B e n g a l i p o l i c e and E a s t

P a k i s t a n R i f l e s headquarters, and the Hindu populated areas o f
7 8

Dacca. In other c i t i e s , too, Hindus became prime t a r g e t s o f

the army crackdown. Prominent Hindu p o l i t i c i a n s , lawyers,

d o c t o r s , businessmen, and t e a c h e r s , whenever found, were k i l l e d

by the army. During the e n t i r e p e r i o d o f the c i v i l war, they

were d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t by the P a k i s t a n army. T h e i r houses

were burnt, property l o o t e d , women raped, and temples ,
79

destroyed. Under such circumstances, they e i t h e r had to

c r o s s the border and take s h e l t e r i n I n d i a , or e l s e had t o f l e e

 115

to the remotest v i l l a g e s where there were no army camps.

L a t e r , t h e i r l i v e s i n the v i l l a g e s were a l s o made i n s e c u r e

when the P a k i s t a n army r e c r u i t e d 10 0 , 0 0 0 Razakars, a Bengali

collaborator m i l i t i a force. These Razakars, along with the

l o c a l Muslim League, J a m a a t - i - I s l a m i and Nezam-i-Islam

workers, c a r r i e d out i n d i s c r i m i n a t e k i l l i n g s and l o o t i n g o f

v i l l a g e s where the B e n g a l i g u e r r i l l a s were a c t i v e . During t h e

nine-month l i b e r a t i o n war p e r i o d , n e a r l y t e n m i l l i o n refugees

80

f l e d to I n d i a , o u t o f which seven m i l l i o n were Hindus. The

^ P a k i s t a n i army a c t i o n a g a i n s t the Hindus was motivated by t h e i r

attempt to c r e a t e a r i f t among the B e n g a l i s by i n d u c i n g the

poorer s e c t i o n s o f the Muslims t o engage i n l o o t i n g and other

kinds o f o p p r e s s i o n of t h e i r Hindu neighbours. Moreover, the

West P a k i s t a n i l e a d e r s were keen t o see E a s t P a k i s t a n ' s popu-

l a t i o n reduced t o p a r i t y with West P a k i s t a n so t h a t the B e n g a l i s

c o u l d never again c l a i m a m a j o r i t y over West P a k i s t a n . I f they

c o u l d push t e n m i l l i o n Hindus i n t o I n d i a , t h a t would achieve

their nefarious goal.

During the war o f l i b e r a t i o n , B e n g a l i Muslims and Hindus

fought shoulder t o shoulder, though the Hindus bore the major

brunt o f the P a k i s t a n i m i l i t a r y o p p r e s s i o n i n terms o f l o s s of (

property, l i f e and p h y s i c a l d i s l o c a t i o n . Information i s not

a v a i l a b l e as to the exact numbers of Hindus i n the Bangladesh

Mukti B a h i n i ( L i b e r a t i o n Army). I t i s c l e a r t h a t the over-

whelming m a j o r i t y o f the g u e r r i l l a s were Muslims, because the

v a s t m a j o r i t y of them were r e c r u i t e d from school, college,

81
and u n i v e r s i t y students. Although the Bangladesh government
 116

i n e x i l e d i d not i n c l u d e any Hindus i n the c a b i n e t , i t

8 2
agreed under d i p l o m a t i c pressure from the S o v i e t Union to

s e t up a C o n s u l t a t i v e Committee i n September 1971 which i n c l u d e d

two Hindu p o l i t i c a l leaders.

During the Ayub and Yahya regimes, the Hindus s u f f e r e d

p o l i t i c a l l y and economically. The Hindus, as a p o l i t i c a l

f o r c e , were suppressed to the extent of v i r t u a l non-existence.

The r u l e of m a r t i a l law, the B a s i c Democracy system, and the

t o t a l l y undemocratic Ayub c o n s t i t u t i o n pushed them out of the

p o l i t i c a l arena. The b i g g e s t problem the community was facing

was t h a t of s u r v i v a l . T h i s prompted the Hindu l e a d e r s not to

get i n v o l v e d i n p o l i t i c s . However, the r i s e of Bengali

n a t i o n a l i s m r a i s e d new hopes among the Hindus, and they r e a d i l y

gave i t t h e i r f u l l support. The l i b e r a t i o n of Bangladesh i n

December 1971 w i t h the h e l p of the Indian army marked the end

of a chapter o f communal p o l i t i c s i n East Bengal. The v i c t o r y

of the B e n g a l i n a t i o n a l i s t movement under the l e a d e r s h i p of

the Awami League, a s e c u l a r party f r i e n d l y i n i t s a t t i t u d e

towards I n d i a , opened up newer p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r the Hindus

i n the new r e p u b l i c of Bangladesh. They c o u l d now hope t h a t

Bangladesh would frame a s e c u l a r c o n s t i t u t i o n , and they would

be able to p l a y a more e f f e c t i v e r o l e i n the p o l i t i c a l process.

They a l s o thought t h a t the emergence of Bangladesh would put an

end to d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t them, and t h e i r l o y a l t y to the

country would no longer be questioned.

 117

NOTES - Chapter IV

1. For a d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n o f the Ayub regime i n P a k i s t a n ,

see Rounaq Jahan. P a k i s t a n : F a i l u r e i n N a t i o n a l I n t e g r a -
t i o n , and Lawrence Z i r i n g . The Ayub Khan E r a (Syracuse:
Syracuse U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 7 1 ) .

2. P.C. L a h i r y , India P a r t i t i o n e d and the M i n o r i t i e s i n

Pakistan, pp.36-74. Two West Bengal Hindu j o u r n a l i s t s '
works c o n t a i n emotional accounts o f the m a r t i a l law
regime i n P a k i s t a n : Sakuntal Sen, I n s i d e P a k i s t a n
( C a l c u t t a : Compass P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1 9 6 4 ) ; and Amitava Gupta,
Purbo P a k i s t a n (East Pakistan) ( C a l c u t t a : Anandadhara
Prakashan, 1969) . -

3. EBDO was promulgated by Ayub s h o r t l y a f t e r the coup under

which a t o t a l o f 78 prominent p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s were
d i s q u a l i f i e d from p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n f o r a p e r i o d o f
e i g h t years ending on December 3 1 , 1 9 6 6 .

4. K.B. Sayeed, The P o l i t i c a l System o f P a k i s t a n , p . 9 4 .

5. NAP, Debates, Vol.1 ( 1 2 ) , March 3 0 , 1 9 6 4 , p p . 6 9 8 - 6 9 9 .

6. T r a i l a k a y a Nath Chakravorty. Jiban Smriti, pp.86-89.

7. The P a k i s t a n Observer (Dacca), March 2 6 , A p r i l 5 , and

May 1 2 , 1 9 6 0 .

8. Lahiry, op.cit., pp.37-78.

9. Sayeed, o p . c i t . , p . 9 4 .

10. Lahiry, op.cit., p.39.

11. The P a k i s t a n Observer, December 2 , 19 6 0 .

12. Only a very few m i g r a t i o n s between I n d i a and P a k i s t a n took

p l a c e w i t h government a p p r o v a l . G e n e r a l l y people from each
s i d e o f the border managed t o c r o s s the border s e c r e t l y .

13. Government o f P a k i s t a n , Report o f the C o n s t i t u t i o n

Commission, 1961, pp.75-76.

14. Myron Weiner conducted a survey i n 1 9 5 7 - 1 9 5 8 o f the changing

p a t t e r n s of l e a d e r s h i p i n West Bengal. He found t h a t the
m a j o r i t y of>the Congress p a r t y l e a d e r s were born between
1900 and 1 9 2 0 . The Congress l e a d e r s h i p o f E a s t Bengal a l s o
would r e v e a l t h e same p a t t e r n , because the l e a d e r s h i p o f
the Congress p a r t y i n both Bengals came from the same stock.
Moreover, the Hindu l e a d e r s h i p i n E a s t P a k i s t a n was
r e l a t i v e l y o l d e r because no new r e c r u i t m e n t i n l e a d e r s h i p
took p l a c e there a f t e r the p a r t i t i o n . F o r West Bengal,
 118

see Myron Weiner, "Changing P a t t e r n s o f P o l i t i c a l

l e a d e r s h i p i n West B e n g a l " , i n P o l i t i c a l Change i n S o u t h
A s i a ( C a l c u t t a : F i r m a K.L. Mukhopadhyaya, 1963),
pp.177-227.

The l i s t i s c o m p i l e d from Lahiry, Pak-Bharater Rup Rekha,

pp.362-372.

For an a n a l y s i s o f t h e working o f t h e B a s i c Democracies,

see J a h a n , o p . c i t . , pp.109-142; Sayeed, o p . c i t . , pp.144-
2 6 0 ; Rehman S o b h a n , B a s i c D e m o c r a c i e s i n E a s t P a k i s t a n
( D a c c a : B u r e a u o f E c o n o m i c R e s e a r c h , 1 9 6 8 ) ; M. R a s h i d u z z -
man, " P a k i s t a n ' s L o c a l B o d i e s a n d S o c i a l C h a n g e : T h e
Emerging P a t t e r n o f L o c a l L e a d e r s h i p , " O r i e n t , 9 (1968),
p p . 1 2 5 - 1 2 8 ; a n d A.T.R. Rahman, A n A n a l y s i s o f t h e
Working o f B a s i c Democracy I n s t i t u t i o n s i n East P a k i s t a n
( C o m i l l a : PARD, 1 9 6 2 ) .

Mahfuzul Huq. Electoral Problems i n Pakistan, p.153.

Jahan, op.cit., p.113.

Huq, o p . c i t . , p . 1 6 5 . The e l e c t i o n t o t h e l o c a l
c o u n c i l s had always been under t h e j o i n t e l e c t o r a t e
system. The B a s i c Democratic system d i d n o t change t h e
e l e c t o r a l system i n the l o c a l c o u n c i l e l e c t i o n s . But
t h e H i n d u c o m m u n i t y , u n d e r t h e m a r t i a l l a w r e g i m e , was
s u f f e r i n g from a sense o f i n s e c u r i t y , so t h e i r partici-
p a t i o n i n t h e e l e c t i o n was v e r y limited.

F o r e x a m p l e i n t h e y e a r 1961 a l o n e , US $621 m i l l i o n w a s
p r o v i d e d f o r t h e r u r a l works programme. Sobhan, o p . c i t . ,
p.105.

Jahan, op.cit., p.122.

Sobhan, op.cit., p.88.

Ibid., p.240.

For t h e i r background d a t a , s e e Sobhan, o p . c i t . , pp.77-89;

and J a h a n , o p . c i t . , p p . 1 2 0 - 1 2 1 , t a b l e s V I , 2,3,4 a n d 5.

Sobhan, o p . c i t . , pp.259-260. The B a s i c Democrats

v i g o r o u s l y s u p p o r t e d t h e Ayub regime u n t i l i t s c o l l a p s e
i n e a r l y 19 6 9 , b u t t h e y c h a n g e d t h e i r political
a l l e g i a n c e w i t h t h e doom o f t h e r e g i m e . They q u i c k l y
j o i n e d t h e AL and formed i t s backbone i n t h e r u r a l a r e a s .

Ittefaq (Dacca), February 7, a n d M a r c h 17, 1962.

Ibid., March 23, 1962.

For a discussion o f t h e 1962 C o n s t i t u t i o n , see

 119

G.W. C h o u d h u r y , C o n s t i t u t i o n a l D e v e l o p m e n t i n P a k i s t a n
( V a n c o u v e r : The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a P r e s s ,
1 9 6 9 ) , 2nd e d . , p p . 1 7 8 - 2 4 9 .

29. K . B . Sayeed, op.cit., pp.101-126.

30. Ittefaq, June 9, 26, 1962.

31. I b i d . , J u n e 25, 1962. The n i n e l e a d e r s i n c l u d e d t h r e e

former c h i e f m i n i s t e r s of E a s t P a k i s t a n , Nurul Amin,
Abu H o s s a i n S a r k a r , and A t a u r Rahman K h a n , and a l s o s i x
o t h e r l e a d e r s , H a m i d u l Huq Chowdhury, S h e i k h M u j i b ,
E u s u f A l i C h o w d h u r y , Mahmud A l i , Sayed A z i z u l H u q , and
P i r Mohsenuddin.

32. The NDF was f o r m e d by S u h r a w a r d y a f t e r h i s r e l e a s e f r o m

j a i l and t h e p r i n c i p a l o b j e c t o f t h e F r o n t was t h e
r e s t o r a t i o n o f p a r l i a m e n t a r y democracy and u n i v e r s a l
adult franchise. The F r o n t was composed o f t h e Awami
L e a g u e , NAP, K S P , and some o t h e r l e a d e r s o f o t h e r g r o u p s .
The f o r m a t i o n o f t h e NDF was d e c l a r e d by a j o i n t s t a t e -
ment by 54 l e a d e r s f r o m t h e b o t h w i n g s o f P a k i s t a n . The
s i g n a t o r i e s d i d n o t i n c l u d e any H i n d u s . Ittefaq,
O c t o b e r 5, 19 62.

3. The 1962 f i g u r e i s t a k e n f r o m H u q , o p . c i t . , p . 1 6 5 ; and

t h e 1965 f i g u r e i s t a k e n f r o m The 1965 P r o v i n c i a l
A s s e m b l y E l e c t i o n R e s u l t s (Government o f P a k i s t a n
Publications).

34. J.K. Ray, Democracy and N a t i o n a l i s m on T r i a l , pp.258-260.

35. A n o t h e r s e c t i o n o f t h e M u s l i m League d i d n o t f a v o u r Ayub

and r e v i v e d t h e P a k i s t a n M u s l i m League ( C o u n c i l ) . This
g r o u p o f t h e M u s l i m was l e d by Khwaja N a z i m u d d i n , and i t
advocated p a r l i a m e n t a r y democracy.

36. Chakravorty, o p . c i t . , pp.109-124. A l s o , see H e r b e r t

F e l d m a n , " T h e Communal P r o b l e m i n t h e I n d o - P a k i s t a n
S u b c o n t i n e n t , " P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , V o l . 4 2 (2), 19 69,
pp.145-163.

37. Ittefaq, January 8 and 14, 1964.

38. Ibid., January 6, 1964

39. Ibid., January 12 and F e b r u a r y 23, 1964.

40. Ibid., January 15 and 16, 19 64.

41. Keith Callard, Pakistan, p.265.

42. Chakravorty, op.cit., p.100.

 120

43. Marcus F r a n d a , " R a d i c a l P o l i t i c s i n West B e n g a l , " i n

P a u l Brass and Marcus Franda, eds., R a d i c a l P o l i t i c s i n
S o u t h A s i a (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. P r e s s , 1973), p.185,
Table 3.1.

44. F o r an e l a b o r a t e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e B e n g a l Communist
movement, s e e F r a n d a , R a d i c a l P o l i t i c s i n West B e n g a l
( C a m b r i d g e , M a s s . : M . I . T . P r e s s , 1971) a n d G e n e D. O v e r -
s t r e e t a n d M a r s h a l l W i n d m i l l e r , Communism i n I n d i a
(Berkeley: U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1959).

45. Franda, op.cit., p.7.

46. F r a n d a , "Communism a n d R e g i o n a l P o l i t i c s i n E a s t
P a k i s t a n , " i n P o l i t i c a l Development and P o l i t i c a l Decay
i n West B e n g a l , p.231. B y 1947 l e s s t h a n f i v e p e r c e n t
o f t h e membership o f t h e Communist P a r t y i n B e n g a l were
Muslims. A l s o , B a d r u d d i n Umar, P u r b o B a n g l a r B h a s a
A n d a l o n 0 T a t k a l i n R a j n i t i , V o l . 1 , p . 3 0 9.

47. Ibid., p.237.

48. Umar, o p . c i t . , p . 3 0 6.

49. F o r an a c c o u n t o f t h e communist movement i n E a s t B e n g a l

in post-partition p e r i o d , see Talukder Maniruzzaman,
"Radical Politics and t h e Emergence o f Bangladesh", i n
Brass and Franda, o p . c i t . , p p . - 2 3 - 2 7 7 ; a n d Umar, o p . c i t . ,
pp.287-352.

50. I t t e f a q , F e b r u a r y 23, 1969. D u r i n g t h e Ayub regime t h e

v a s t m a j o r i t y o f p o l i t i c a l . p r i s o n e r s were communists and
Hindus. A h m e d u l K a b i r , a NAP member o f t h e p r o v i n c i a l
a s s e m b l y , a l l e g e d t h a t t h e a u t h o r i t i e s were showing a
communal a t t i t u d e b e c a u s e t h e v a s t m a j o r i t y o f t h e
p o l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r s were H i n d u s , Sangbad ( D a c c a ) , J u n e 27,
1966.

51. Maniruzzaman, o p . c i t . , p.239.

52. Ibid., p.240.

53. I b i d . , pp. 240-252. F o r b i o g r a p h i c a l n o t e s on t h e Bang-

l a d e s h communist l e a d e r s , see Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh:
An U n f i n i s h e d R e v o l u t i o n ? " J o u r n a l o f A s i a n S t u d i e s ,
V o l . 3 4(4) A u g u s t 1975, pp.909-911 .

54. Ibid., p.240.

55. The most p r o m i n e n t EPSU l e a d e r s o f t h e e a r l y 60s a r e :

Mohammad F a r h a d ( p r e s e n t g e n e r a l - s e c r e t a r y o f t h e p r o -
Moscow Communist P a r t y o f B a n g l a d e s h ) ; K a z i Z a f a r Ahmad
( f o r m e r s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l o f t h e B a n g l a d e s h NAP (Bhasani)
 121

and p r e s e n t s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l of the U n i t e d Peoples

P a r t y (UPP); P a n k a j B h a t t a c h e r j e e ( p r e s e n t g e n e r a l -
s e c r e t a r y o f t h e NAP (Muzaffar); R a s h e d Khan Menon
( C o n v e n o r , B a n g l a d e s h C h a s i S a m i t y and a t o p l e a d e r of
t h e UPP); Begum M a t i a C h o w d h u r y ( o r g a n i z i n g secretary of
t h e NAP (Muzaffar)); S a i f u d d i n M a n i k (a l e a d i n g trade
u n i o n l e a d e r ) ; and H a i d e r A k b a r Khan Rano (another
important trade union leader).

56. Franda, op.cit., p.251.

57. Maniruzzaman, op.cit., p.251.

58. F o r a c i s c u s s i o n o f the 1 1 - p o i n t programme, see

Maniruzzaman, o p . c i t . , pp.259-260.

59. For a d i s c u s s i o n of the r o l e of the l e f t i s t s in trade

u n i o n movement s e e K a m r u d d i n Ahmad, L a b o u r Movement i n
E a s t P a k i s t a n ( D a c c a : R o u s h a n A r a Ahmed, 1 9 6 9 ) ; f o r the
p e a s a n t movement, s e e Umar, o p . c i t . V o l . 1 1 , p p . 1 8 4 - 3 1 4 ;
and J i t e n G h o s h , G a r a d e r A r a l Theke ( L e t t e r s f r o m J a i l ) ,
(Dacca: N a u r o j K i t a b i s t a n , 1970); and S a t y e n Sen, Gram
Banglar Pathepathe (Dacca: P u t h i p a t r a , 1967).

60. Maniruzzaman, op.cit., pp.250-251.

61. Jahan, op.cit., pp.62,89.

62. Ibid., p.60.

63. Maniruzzaman, op.cit., p.258.

64. Cited i n Maniruzzaman, ibid.

65. S h e i k h M u j i b u r Rahman, S i x - P o i n t s - O u r Demand f o r

Survival ( D a c c a : E a s t P a k i s t a n Awami L e a g u e , 1 9 6 6 ) .

66. Jahan, op.cit., p.167.

67. For a d i s c u s s i o n of the six-point programme, see Jahan,

o p . c i t . , pp.167-170.

68. Ibid., p.180.

69. Cited in Frontier (Calcutta), July 3, 1971.

70. Maniruzzaman, op.cit., p.261.

71. Ittefaq, January 7, 1970.

72. Ibid., December 20, 1970.

73. I b i d . , D e c e m b e r 12 a n d 2 0 , 1970. Four Congressmen ran for

n a t i o n a l a s s e m b l y s e a t s , and six f o r p r o v i n c i a l assembly
 122

seats. T h e C o n g r e s s P a r t y a t t h a t t i m e was a l m o s t n o n -
existent. A few o f t h e o l d C o n g r e s s l e a d e r s d e c i d e d t o
f i g h t t h e e l e c t i o n i n t h e name o f t h e p a r t y .

74. L a l i t Kumar S a n y a l , B i p l a b T a p a s h M a h a r a j T r a i l a k y a N a t h
( R e v o l u t i o n a r y Hero Maharaj T r a x l a k y a Nath) (Calcutta:
M a h a r a j S m r i t i Rakshma S a m i t y , 1 9 7 4 ) , p . 6 .

75. B e d o u i n (pseud.) M a h a r a j e r Chokhe B a n g l a d e s h (Bangladesh

i n t h e Eyes o f Maharaj) ( C a l c u t t a : De's P u b l i s h i n g House,
1970) , p . 1 .

76. Sanyal, op.cit., p.6.

77. Ibid., p.296.

78. Maniruzzaman, op.cit., pp.266-267.

79. M. M a n i r u z z a m a n M i a , " V i o l a t i o n o f Human R i g h t s a n d

G e n o c i d e i n B a n g l a d e s h , " i n K a b i r C h o u d h u r y , et. a l . , e d .
A N a t i o n i s Born ( C a l c u t t a : C a l c u t t a U n i v e r s i t y Bangla-
desh Sahayak Samity, 1972), pp.29-30.

80. Z i l l u r R. K h a n , " M i n o r i t i e s i n B a n g l a d e s h , " i n M a r v i n

D a v i s , ed. B e n g a l : S t u d i e s i n L i t e r a t u r e , S o c i e t y and
History (East L a n s i n g : Michigan U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1976),
p . 1 0 4 ; G e o r g e T. C u n l i n , e t a l . , D e m o g r a p h i c Crisis
( D a c c a : F o r d F o u n d a t i o n , 1 9 7 5 ) , p . 5 ; New Y o r k T i m e s ,
September 2 1 , 1 9 7 1 .

81. Maniruzzaman, op.cit., p.271.

82. Frontier, December 4, 1 9 7 1 .

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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

By now i t should be abundantly clear to the reader that

the Hindu m i n o r i t y i n Bangladesh represents a unique case.

Rarely does one find examples i n h i s t o r y where a previously

dominant community suddenly becomes a minority due to new

political arrangements. The Hindus were in a majority in

undivided India, and when they were thrown into a minority

position i n East Bengal their dominance was reversed.

Previously downtrodden Muslims seized economic and political

power i n the newly e s t a b l i s h e d Muslim homeland. As a result,

we find a shifting pattern of minority behaviour in East

Bengal during the period 1947-1971. This pattern can be

described and explained as follows:

1. Initial Chaos and Struggle for Constitutional Safeguards:

The Hindu community i n East Bengal was i n i t i a l l y seized with

bewilderment when India was p a r t i t i o n e d along religious lines.

The great shock of partition, accompanied by communal bloodshed,

caused a chaotic reaction to the new political system of

Pakistan. The e n t i r e Hindu community was on the verge of dis-

integration. One s e c t i o n of i t immediately left the country,

fearing great losses of status and opportunity i n the predomi-

nantly Muslim homeland. The initial Hindu migration was limited

to the well-to-do Hindu bhadralok with s e r v i c e or professional

backgrounds, who had some foothold in India. But most Hindus

in East Bengal did not have a footing i n West Bengal and could
 f

124
not b e g i n a new life there. Despite their abhorrence, they

had to accept the citizenship of Pakistan. Still others chose

to remain i n East Bengal to see the actual workings of the

new p o l i t i c a l system, a n d t h e n make their decision t o stay or

leave. This latter group was d i s i l l u s i o n e d b y t h e 1950 riots

and the operation o f t h e new p o l i t i c a l machinery, and t h e

exodus o f Hindus accelerated greatly after t h e 1950 riots.

After partition, most o f the prominent Hindu leaders left

East Bengal i n despair, having lost a l l hopes for effective

political participation i n Pakistan, where political power was

being monopolized by a s i n g l e Muslim communal party. The

remainder o f the Hindu leadership concentrated on articulating

minority grievances and s e e k i n g constitutional safeguards f o r

the community. Some o f t h e Hindu leaders were deceived by t h e

hope that partition was temporary and that Pakistan would

eventually go b a c k to India. During the first.few years of

Pakistan, t h e Hindu leadership concentrated a l l i t s attempts on

the prevention o f the passage o f an Islamic constitution. Their

demands f o r a secular-democratic constitution were m o s t l y ignored

by the ruling Muslim League.

Among the Hindu leaders, a section was p r a g m a t i c enough ,

to sever the emotional ties with the Congress party, and form

the Gana Samity. They realized the necessity of the redirection

of Hindu politics towards fostering unity w i t h t h e dominant

community. I n an attempt to ally with the Bengali Muslims, t h e

Hindu leaders espoused Bengali causes i n t h e c e n t r a l and

provincial assemblies.
 1 2 5

2. Maximization o f M i n o r i t y P o s i t i o n : While they c o u l d not

p l a y an e f f e c t i v e r o l e during the f i r s t few years o f

independence, the Hindus made a s i g n i f i c a n t advance i n

maximizing t h e i r p o s i t i o n a f t e r the d e f e a t o f the Muslim League

i n E a s t Bengal i n the 1 9 5 4 elections. During the p e r i o d 1 9 5 4 -

1 9 5 8 , they shared p o l i t i c a l power with t h e m a j o r i t y community

both a t the centre and i n East Bengal. As an important

component of the c o a l i t i o n government, they took p a r t i n

constitution-making. T h e i r support was i n s t r u m e n t a l i n deter-

mining the f a t e o f the d i f f e r e n t c o a l i t i o n m i n i s t r i e s . They

were s u c c e s s f u l i n g e t t i n g t h e i r most important demand, the

j o i n t electorate, incorporated i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n . By t h i s

time, the Hindus r e a l i z e d the hard r e a l i t i e s o f P a k i s t a n

p o l i t i c s and were more moderate i n t h e i r i d e o l o g i c a l demand f o r

a purely secular c o n s t i t u t i o n . They accepted the n e c e s s i t y o f

g e t t i n g t h e i r other demands met by compromising on i d e o l o g i c a l

issues.

The Hindu e f f e c t i v e n e s s dates back o n l y t o the d e f e a t o f

the Muslim League i n East P a k i s t a n . The r e s u l t i n g l a c k o f

cohesion between the Muslims o f East and West P a k i s t a n , and

l a t e r t h e s p l i t o f the UF, made i t p o s s i b l e f o r the Hindus to

p l a y an e f f e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l r o l e and g e t the j o i n t e l e c t o r a t e

system i n c o r p o r a t e d i n the C o n s t i t u t i o n . The more the Muslim

p o l i t i c a l groups were d i v i d e d , the more e f f e c t i v e were the

Hindus i n the p o l i t i c a l process.

3. R e t r e a t and Regrouping: A f t e r the i m p o s i t i o n o f m a r t i a l law,

the Hindu community completely retreated. Hindu advancement i n

 126

p o l i t i c s was ended with the c o l l a p s e of the parliamentary

system. The r e p r e s s i v e , a n t i - H i n d u and a n t i - I n d i a n m a r t i a l

law regime f o r c e d the Hindus to r e t r e a t . Even when Ayub Khan

i n s t a l l e d a q u a s i - c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government, they d i d not stage

a comeback i n the p o l i t i c a l arena. S u r v i v a l was the g r e a t e s t

problem f a c i n g the community, and the l e a d e r s opted f o r a t i m i d

e x i s t e n c e o f the community. The Hindus were always f r e e t o

migrate to I n d i a . T h i s very f a c t e x p l a i n s the l a c k of any

s e r i o u s e f f o r t oh the p a r t o f the Hindu l e a d e r s to r e b u i l d

t h e i r p o l i t i c a l base, and t h e i r gradual retreat. Had there

been no o p p o r t u n i t y to migrate to I n d i a , they would have made

s e r i o u s attempts to re-emerge politically.

The r a p i d p o l a r i z a t i o n i n the East-West P a k i s t a n relation-

s h i p d u r i n g the Ayub e r a opened up newer p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r the

Hindus. The Muslim League and communal p o l i t i c s became t o t a l l y

d i s c r e d i t e d among the B e n g a l i Muslims. Bengali nationalist

Muslims were now f i g h t i n g a g a i n s t the r u l i n g West P a k i s t a n i

Muslim e l i t e . The B e n g a l i n a t i o n a l i s t s were espousing the

causes of s e c u l a r i s m , u n f e t t e r e d democracy, provincial

autonomy, and equal r i g h t s f o r a l l c i t i z e n s — c a u s e s f o r which

the Hindus had fought a long time. The schism between the

Muslims o f the two wings o f P a k i s t a n l e d to the regrouping of

v t h e Hindus with the Awami League. The Hindu regrouping was

manifested i n the 1970 e l e c t i o n s and the Bangladesh l i b e r a t i o n

movement.

The uncompromising stand of the Hindus on the j o i n t

e l e c t o r a t e system e x p l a i n s t h e i r attempt to i n t e g r a t e them-

 127

selves politically with t h e m a j o r i t y community. They were

aware o f what the adoption of the joint electorate system would

mean: they would n o t be a b l e t o w i n a s many seats as they could

under the separate electorate system. However, they thought

that only through forging political unity with t h e dominant

group could they live peacefully i n a predominantly Muslim

country. Hindu p r i d e was also at the root of their demand.

"The minorities of East Pakistan," wrote Trailakya Nath

Chakravorty, "are n o t used to being considered minorities.

They a r e t h e o n e who fought f o r the independence of the country.

It was unthinkable f o r the Hindus t o ask the Muslim community

to safeguard the Hindu interest through special privileges.

However, the joint electorate system ultimately worked against

the Hindus as a p o l i t i c a l force. I n t h e 19 73 e l e c t i o n s i n

Bangladesh, only 3.3 p e r c e n t of the total seats i n parliament

were won by Hindus, and they a l l belonged to the ruling Awami

3
League.

It was hypothesized at the beginning of this study that

when a p r e v i o u s l y dominant group i s thrown into a minority

situation, i t s l e a d e r s attempt to reconcile t h e community with

the existing situation and attempt political readjustment

involving compromises. The e v i d e n c e , described during the

course of this study, supports our hypothesis. The Hindu

minority i n East Bengal underwent stages of political readjust-

ment and i t s l e a d e r s made compromises i n their political stand.

The corollary hypothesis was that the achievement of the goals

of t h e m i n o r i t y i s dependent on t h e a t t i t u d e and internal

 128

cohesion o f the m a j o r i t y . I t i s now c l e a r t h a t the Hindus

were s u c c e s s f u l i n a t t a i n i n g t h e i r g o a l s o n l y as long as the

Muslim p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i n East P a k i s t a n were d i v i d e d . The

Hindu demand f o r a s e c u l a r - d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n was only

achieved a f t e r the estrangement of the Muslim community i n

East and West P a k i s t a n which u l t i m a t e l y r e s u l t e d i n the

emergence o f Bangladesh.

T h i s t h e s i s has shed new l i g h t on the understanding of

the m i n o r i t y problem as w e l l as on Laponce's a s s e r t i o n s . His

a s s e r t i o n t h a t a m i n o r i t y by f o r c e wants an intercommunal p a r t y

system i s not supported by the p a t t e r n of m i n o r i t y politics

until 1958. Despite the e x i s t e n c e o f the AL and other non-

communal p a r t i e s , the Hindu l e a d e r s h i p p r e f e r r e d to r e t a i n the

e x i s t e n c e of t h e i r p a r t i e s . The Hindus j o i n e d the AL only

d u r i n g the l a t t e r p a r t of the Ayub regime with the r i s e of the

n a t i o n a l i s t movement, and w i t h the d e c l i n e of the Hindu

community as a p o l i t i c a l f o r c e . T h i s leads me t o conclude t h a t

the m i n o r i t y preference f o r an intercommunal p a r t y i s a f u n c t i o n

o f d i f f e r e n t economic, s o c i a l , and p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s . Also,

Laponce's concept of a s s i m i l a t i o n needs f u r t h e r c l a r i f i c a t i o n .

In the case o f the Hindus of East Bengal, there was never any

attempt to a s s i m i l a t e s o c i a l l y or r e l i g i o u s l y . However, i t has

been found i n the present study t h a t the Hindu community wished

to i n t e g r a t e p o l i t i c a l l y w i t h the m a j o r i t y i n s o f a r as they

fought f o r and won a j o i n t e l e c t o r a t e system. During the first

few y e a r s , though they demanded a j o i n t e l e c t o r a t e , they d i d

not j o i n s e c u l a r p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s dominated and l e d by the

 129

Muslims. Later, however, during the Ayub regime they became

even more integrated politically by joining the Awami League

and other secular parties.

The Hindu m i n o r i t y i n Bangladesh has been dwindling since

the inception of Pakistan. During the course of the brief

existence of united Pakistan, thousands of Hindus paid the price

of partition with their lives and m i l l i o n s had to suffer

unbearable social and economic dislocation and distress. The

near-obliteration of the Hindus during the past 30 years does

not seem likely to be reversed in a short period of time. It

is hoped that the Hindu m i n o r i t y will become an integral part

of Bangladesh society and politics i n the next generation, when

there will be fewer memories of communal politics, and when

politics will be based more on ideological lines or programmes

than on religious identity.

 130

NOTES - Conclusions

Pravash Chandra L a h i r y , I n d i a P a r t i t i o n e d and M i n o r i t i e s

i n P a k i s t a n , pp.85-86; and A t u l y a Ghosh, P a k i s t a n O
S a m p r a d a i k S a m a s y a ( P a k i s t a n a n d t h e Communal P r o b l e m )
( C a l c u t t a : C o n g r e s s Bhawan, 1 9 5 6 ) .

Trailakya Nath Chakravorty, Jiban Smriti, p.114.

Zillur R. Khan, "Minorities i n Bangladesh," Chart I I ,

p.111.
 131

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The Economist (London)
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