G.R. No.

118328 October 8, 1998

MARCIANA SERDONCILLO, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES FIDEL and EVELYN

BENOLIRAO, MELITON CARISIMA, and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

MARTINEZ, J.:

This petition for review assails the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 14, 1994 in CA
G.R. CV No. 39251 1 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
(Branch 108) in Civil Case No. 7785, dated June 30, 1992 directing herein petitioner to demolish
and remove all illegal structures which she constructed in front of the subject lot, to vacate the
said property and right of way, and return possession thereof to the respondents.

The antecedent facts:

The subject premises was formerly part of the estate of H. V. Ongsiako, comprising of 1,806
square meters, more or less, located at the corner of Pilapil and N. Domingo Streets, Pasay City.
The legal heirs of H.V. Ongsiako organized the United Complex Realty and Trading Corporation
(UCRTC) which subdivided the property into fourteen (14) lots, Lots 555-A to 666-N. The
subdivided lots were then offered for sale with first priority to each of the tenants, including the
private respondents and petitioner. 2 Lot 666-H has an area of 248 square meters, consisting of
two (2) parts. One part is the residential portion with an area of 112 square meters purchased by
private respondents-spouses Benolirao 3 while the second part is the right of way for Lot 666-I
and the aforesaid residential portion. 4 Private respondent Carisima purchased Lot 666-I.
Petitioner, who was occupying the western end and front portions of the aforesaid lots declined
the offer to purchase any of the lots offered for sale by UCRTC. 7

Petitioner continued paying rentals to H.V. Ongsiako's wife, Mrs. Rosario de Jesus. Thereafter,
the collection of rentals was stopped prompting petitioner to file on June 30, 1987, Civil Case
No. 5456 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City for consignation of rentals against
UCRTC, Rosario de Jesus and the spouses Carisima. The consignation was granted by the trial
court and was eventually affirmed on appeal by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch
109 on October 25, 1989. 6

On May 5, 1989, UCRTC executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of private respondents-
spouses Benolirao for Lot 666-H. 7 This sale was annotated at the back of UCRTC's title on Lot
666-H. 8

On June 2, 1989, after unsuccessful oral and written demands were made upon petitioner,
UCRTC instituted an action against her for recovery of possession of the subject premises before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 114 docketed as Civil Case No 6652. 9 On July
15, 1990, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint of UCRTC, stating in
part, to wit:
It is clear, therefore, that plaintiff, not having been authorized in writing for the purpose, may not
validly bring an action to enforce a perceived easement of right of way pertaining to the owners
of Lots 666-H and 666-I or the Benolirao and Carisima families, while Benjamin Ongsiako
possessed the authority to institute the case (Exhibit "G"), plaintiff is not the real party in
interest. Furthermore, the situation obtaining does not call for the enforcement of an easement of
right of way. Defendant Seldoncillo is not the owner of and has never claimed ownership over
the portion of Lot 666-H on which her house is erected. A servitude is an encumbrance imposed
upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner (Article
613, New Civil Code). In the present case the ejectment of defendant Serdoncillo from the
portion of Lot 666-H occupied by the house at the instance of the proper party (Renato
Bolinarao's family ) would remove the obstruction.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing consideration, the complaint against the defendant
Marciana Serdonillo, as well as defendant's counterclaim, is dismissed for lack of merit. Without
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 10

UCRTC did not appeal the aforesaid decision of the Regional Trial Court, hence, the same
became final.

On November 20, 1989, Serdoncillo instituted Civil Case No. 7749 for the Exercise of
Preferential Rights of First Refusal against UCRTC and private respondents-spouses a Fidel and
Evelyn Benolirao praying for the annulment of sale of a portion of lot 666-H sold to the
Benolirao spouses on the ground that said transfer or conveyance is illegal. She claimed that she
has the preferred right to buy the said property and that the same was not offered to her under the
same terms and conditions, hence, it is null and void. UCRTC and private respondents prevailed
and this case was dismissed. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the same was dismissed on July
9, 1992. 11

On November 20, 1990, private respondents made their final demand on petitioner reiterating
their previous demands to vacate the property. 12 On December 13, 1990, private respdndents
filed their complaint for recovery of possession of the subject premises against petitioner before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108, docketed as Civil Case No. 7735, which
compiaint alleges these material facts:

5. That plaintiffs, being then registered owners of the properties designated as lot 666-H and
666-I, are likewise the owners/grantees of the right of way granted by United Complex Realty
and Trading Corporation which was correspondingly annotated in its title (Annex "B-3" ) under
Entry No. 205154/T-172291 of the Register of Deeds of Pasay City;

6. That since 1982 the defendant has built and constructed a residence and pig pen on the
plaintiffs' right of way as well as on the front portions of the latter's properties leaving them
virtually obstructed with no ingress or egress from the main road;
7. That verbal and written demands made upon the defendant by the plaintiffs to remove and
demolish her structures had been ignored, the last of which was on November 20, 1990, xerox
copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "C" and taken as an integral part hereof, but despite
such demands, the defendant failed and refused and still fails and refuses to remove and vacate
her illegal structures on the portion of the properties as well as on the right of way of plaintiffs.

8. That plaintiffs in compliance with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law lodged a complaint
before the Barangay Captain, Barangay 84, Zone 10 of Pasay City, which certified filing of the
same in court, xerox copy of said certification is hereto attached as Annex "D" and taken as
integral part hereof;

9. That due to the unjustified refusal of the defendant, the plaintiffs are suffering the unnecessary
inconvinience of the absence of decent and sufficient ingress and egress on their properties, and
will continue to suffer the same unless the illegal structures are finally demolished and/or
removed by the defendants; 13

Petitioner, in her Answer, put up the defense that she is the legitimate tenant of said lots in
question since 1956, pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder, thus:

13. That Lot 666-H and Lot 666-I mentioned in the complaint are formerly portions of a big
track(sic) of land consisting of 1,806 square meters then owned by H.V. Ongsiako;

14. That since 1956 and before the 1,806 square meters of lot owned by H.V. Ongsiako was
subdivided into fourteen (14) lots in 1982, defendant is (sic) already a legitimate tenant and
occupant family of around 400 square meters of the 1,806 square meters of the said land then
owned by H.V. Ongsiako by erecting her residential house thereon at the agreed monthly rental
of P15.00 and increased to P 100.00;

15. That upon the death of H.V. Ongsiako his heirs continued collecting the monthly rental of the
premises from the defendants;

16. That the heirs of H.V. Ongsiako formed a corporation known as UNITED COMPLEX
REALTY AND TRADING CORPORATION and the big parcel of land consisting of 1,806
square meters was transferred to the said corporation and subdivided in 1982 into fourteen (14)
lots, two (2) of which lots are the very same lots leased by the defendant from H.V. Ongsiako
and later from his heirs and then from United Complex Realty and Trading Corporation as
alleged in the preceding pars. l3, 14, and 15; 14

The issues having been joined, trial on the merits ensued. On June 30, 1992, the trial court
rendered its decision in favor of private respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW of the foregoing, and finding preponderance of evidence in plaintiffs'

favor, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) Ordering the defendant to demolish and remove all illegal structures she constructed on the
front portions of the subject lots and on the right of way of the plaintiff;
2.) Ordering the defendant to vacate the property and right of way and return possession thereof
to the plaintiffs,

3) Ordering the defendant to pay the cost of suit.

As to the damages (actual and moral) no award is given. In the absence of proof of fraud and bad
faith by the defendants, the latter are (sic) not liable for damages (Escritor Jr. vs. IAC, 155
SCRA 577).

Actual and compensatory damages require substantial proof. In the absence of malice and bad
faith, moral damages cannot be awarded (Capco vs. Macasaet, 189 SCRA SCRA 561).

As to the attorney's fees, each party should shoulder his/her expenses.

SO ORDERED. 15

Aggrieved by the trial court's decision, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that:
1) the lower court should have dismissed the complaint of private respondents considering that
based on the letter of demand dated November 20, 1990, the action filed should have been
unlawful detainer and not an action for recovery of possession; 2) the action filed by private
respondents is barred by res judicata considering that the present action is identical with that of
Civil Case No. 6652; 3) the lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of
action with respect to enforcement of right of way vis a vis defendant; and 4) the lower court
erred in ordering that defendants vacate the properties in question since the lease of defendants
thereon was still in existence and had not yet been terminated. 16

On July 14, 1994, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision sustaining the findings
of the trial court and dismissed the appeal of petitioner, stating in part as follows:

The issue as to the proper action has been resolved by the respondent court, to wit:

The defense that what should have been filed is an ejectment case and not recovery of
possession, is not also correct. The filing of this case for recovery of possession, instead of an
ejectment case, is not altogether unjustified. The Benoliraos and Carisima became the owners as
early as May, 1989. Verbal and written demands had been ignored. There is an immediate need
for plaintiffs to use the right of way, which up to the present time is obstructed. At most, what
surfaced is a technicality which should be abandoned.

A plain reading of the complaint shows that plaintiff-appellees cause of action is for recovery of
possession of their property which was encroached upon by defendant-appellant. 17

A motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision filed by petitioner on August 8, 1994 18
was denied by the respondent on September 23, 1994. 19

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner ascribes one single error committed by the respondent court, to wit:

THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS (Sp.
Fifteenth Division) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF JURISDICTION IN DECIDING AS
AN ACCION PUBLICIANA AN EJECTMENT OR UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE (THE
JURISDICTION OF WHICH CLEARLY PERTAINS TO THE INFERIOR COURT), A CASE
BASICALLY INVOLVING AN EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY.

Petitioner asserts that the respondent court erred in sustaining the trial court's finding that the
complaint filed by private respondents for recovery of possession of the subject premises is an
accion publiciana notwithstanding the fact that the action was filed within one (1) year from
demand. Petitioner contends that private respondents should have filed an action for unlawful
detainer and not an action for recovery of possession against petitioner. Consequently, the trial
court is without jurisdiction to hear and determine Civil Case No. 7785. In support of her
contention, petitioner cited the cases of Bernabe vs. Luna 20 and Medina vs. Court of Appeals, 21
which she states is strikingly similar to the facts of this case. Consequently, the rulings of this
Court in these two cases are squarely applicable and controlling in the case at bar.

Private respondents, however, aver that they were merely successors-in-interest of UCRTC and
therefore step into the shoes of the latter. They claim that the demand to vacate required by law
should at the very least be reckoned from June 2, 1989, the date of the filing of the complaint in
Civil Case No. 6652 considering that their demands are simply a reiteration of UCRTC's
demands against petitioner. Private respondents further contend that the allegations in the
complaint determine the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, the complaint in Civil Case No. 7785
specifically alleged that private respondents are the owners of lots 666-I and 666-H as evidenced
by transfer certificates of title and prayed for recovery of possession of a portion thereof
including its right of way illegally and unlawfully possessed by petitioner.

Petitioner's position is without merit.

It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. As a necessary consequence,
the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or
upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely
depend upon the defendant. 22 What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the
action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the
character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. 23 Accordingly, the issues in the instant
case can only be properly resolved by an examination and evaluation of the allegations in the
complaint in Civil Case No. 7785. 24

In this regard, to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant
on the land, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show such a statement of facts as
to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy,
without resort to parol testimony, as these proceedings are summary in nature. 25 In short, the
jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver
facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was
effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria. 26

In the case of Javier vs. Veridiano II 27 this Court held that the doctrine in Emilia v. Bado, 28
decided more than twenty-five years ago, is still good law. It preserved the age-old remedies
available under existing laws and jurisprudence to recover possession of real property, namely:
(1) accion interdictal, which is the summary action for either forcible entry or detentacion,
where the defendant's possession of the property is illegal ab initio; or for unlawful detainer or
desahucio, where the defendant's possession was originally lawful but ceased to be must be so by
the expiration of his right to possess, both of which must be brought within one year from the
date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry; and from the date of last demand, in
case of unlawful detainer, in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan court; (2) accion
publiciana which is a plenary action for recovery of the right to possess and which should be
brought in the proper regional trial court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one
year; and, (3) accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of
ownership and includes the jus possidendi brought in the proper regional trial court.

Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is thus an action whereby plaintiff alleges

ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. It is different from
accion interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right to
possess without claim of title. In Banayos vs. Susana Realty, Inc., 29 this Court held that:

We have consistently held that a complaint for forcible entry, as distinguished from that of
unlawful detainer, in order to vest jurisdiction upon the inferior court, must allege plaintiff's prior
physical possession of the property, as well as the fact that he was deprived of such possession
by any of the means provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, namely: force,
intimidation, threats, strategy and stealth, "for if the dispossession did not take place by any of
these means, the courts of first instance, not the municipal courts, have jurisdiction.

xxx xxx xxx

The aforesaid Rule 70 does not, however, cover all of the cases of dispossession of lands. Thus,
"whenever the owner is dispossessed by any other means than those mentioned he may maintain
his action in the Court of First Instance, and it is not necessary for him to wait until the
expiration of twelve months before commencing an action to be repossessed or declared to be
owner of the land." Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction over actions to recover possession
of real property illegally detained, together with rents due and damages, even though one (1)
year has not expired from the beginning of such illegal detention, provided the question of
ownership of such property is also involved. In other words, if the party illegally dispossessed
desires to raise the question of illegal dispossession as well as that of the ownership over the
property he may commence such action in the Court of First Instance immediately or at any time
after such illegal dispossession. If he decides to raise the question of illegal dispossession only,
and the action is filed more than one (1) year after such deprivation or withholding of possession,
then the Court of First Instance will have original jurisdiction over the case. The former is an
accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of ownership as well as possession, while the
latter refers to an accion publiciana, which is the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary
action in an ordinary proceeding in the Court of First Instance.

A reading of the averments of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7785 undisputably show that
plaintiffs (private respondents herein) clearly set up title to themselves as being the absolute
owner of the disputed premises by virtue of their transfer certificates of title and pray that
petitioner Serdoncillo be ejected therefrom. There is nothing in the complaint in Civil Case No.
7785 alleging any of the means of dispossession that would constitute forcible entry under
Section (1) Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, nor is there any assertion of defendant's possession
which was originally lawful but ceased to be so upon the expiration of the right to possess. It
does not characterize petitioner's alleged entry into the land, that is, whether the same was legal
or illegal nor the manner in which petitioner was able to construct the house and the pig pens
thereon. The complaint merely avers that a portion of the lot owned by private respondents and
its right of way have been occupied by petitioner and that she should vacate. The action therefore
is neither one of forcible nor of unlawful detainer but essentially involves a dispute relative to the
ownership of 4.1 square meters of land allegedly encroached upon by petitioner and its adjoining
right of way. Indeed, the Ocular Inspection Report of the Branch Clerk of Court, states that:

. . . (T)he right of way hit directly the defendant Serdoncillo's property consisting of a two-storey
residential house made of wood and GI sheets and occupying the entire width of the rear portion
of the right of way. A coconut tree stands on the middle of the road, at the back of which is a
shanty made of rotten G.I. sheets around it which is used as pigpens and place of washing clothes
extended from defendant's house. To gain access to plaintiff's property, the group turned right
and passed between an "aratiris" tree and cemented firewall owned by Mr. Belarmino making
only one person at a time to pass. This passageway has only a width of 0.5 meter which is being
used by the defendant and her members of the family aside from the plaintiffs.

. . . Two (2) monuments of the lot boundary of the plaintiff's property are existing, but the rest
are nowhere to be found. According to Mrs. Benolirao, they are located within the premises of
the defendant's house. At the back of Benolirao is a private property gutted by fire.

. . . Upon request, the group wass granted permission by the relatives of the defendant to inspect
the place. The group further noticed that defendant's improvements were even encroaching on
the plaintiff's lot by approximately 4.1 meters, more or less. The house of the defendant is facing
the plaintiff's property; there is a small chicken house and there is also a dog house standing near
it. 30

It is noted that at the time of the filing of said complaint, Civil Case No. 7749, an action for
annulment of the sale between UCRTC and private respondents Benolirao of Lot 666-H initiated
by petitioner was likewise pending in another court. This case puts in issue the validity of private
respondents' acquisition of the subject lots and ultimately their ownership of Lot 666-H.

Thus, what is noticeable in the complaint is that private respondents definitely gave petitioner
notice of their claim of exclusive and absolute ownership, including their right to possess which
is an elemental attribute of ownership. 31 It is immaterial whether or not private respondents
instituted their complaint one month from date of last demand or a year thereafter. What is of
paramount importance is that the allegations in complaint are of the nature of either an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria.

Petitioner's reliance on the Bernabe and Medina cases, which she claims to be squarely
applicable under the circumstances herein, is entirely misplaced. While it is true that in these two
cases the complaints were filed before the one-year period had expired from date of last demand,
the allegations in the complaint failed to state material facts which are indicative of a case of
either an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. Thus, the Court in Bernabe stated that:

In their complaint, plaintiffs (petitioners herein) allege that they are the owners of a parcel of
land with an area of 199.4 square meters more or less, located in Tondo, Manila, that defendant
(private respondent herein) constructed a house on said lot without plaintiff's permission; that on
November 14, 1980, plaintiffs thru counsel made a written demand for the removal of said house
as well as for the recovery of damages for the reasonable use and occupation thereof; and that
defendant refused and failed to comply despite repeated demands.

xxx xxx xxx

We have noted that while petitioners allege in their complaint that they are the owners of the lot
on which the house of the private respondent is constructed, their attached TCT shows that the
lot is still in the name of Fejosera Investment Incorporated, Private respondent and said company
entered into a contract of lease in 1950 for the use and occupation of said lot. Petitioners
allegedly bought the lot in question in 1973, and they must have been fully aware of the
occupancy of the private respondent of the premises in question. Yet, they did not take any
action to remove the house of the private respondent or to inform the respondent that they had
become the new owners of the lot in question. It is clear therefore that the lease was allowed to
continue.

xxx xxx xxx

Consequently, the possession of private respondent over the lot in question became illegal only
on November 14, 1980, when the formal demand to pay and vacate the premises was sent to him.
32

The allegations in the complaint clearly show that plaintiffs were already the owners of the
property when defendant constructed a house on the disputed lot without their permission. That
despite formal demand defendant failed to vacate and surrender possession of the property to
them. Indeed, the averments in plaintiffs' complaint present jurisdictional facts which do not
illustrate plaintiffs' action as either an action publiciana or accion reivindicatoria but that of
forcible entry or unlawful detainer. Thus, the trial court correctly dismissed plaintiffs' complaint,
pertinent portion of which is quoted hereunder:

It is clear on the face of the complaint that at the time of the filing of this case on February 19,
1981, the defendant was in possession, as a tenant, of the premises. When plaintiff's counsel,
therefore sent a written notice on November 4, 1980 requiring defendant to vacate the premises
when this action was brought, the one (1) year period after the unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession has not yet set in. It is clear that this is an ejectment case within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the City Court of Manila.

SO ORDERED. 33

We likewise find the Medina case, relied upon by petitioner, to be inappropriate. The facts
distinctly show that the complaint filed by the owners of the property before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 47, was for unlawful detainer. It was the action resorted to by the
plaintiffs after advising the defendant (the lessee of the premises in question) that a member of
the family, Dr. Igama, urgently needed the house and after repeated demands to vacate made on
the lessee proved to be unsuccessful. All these incidents, from notification to the filing of the
complaint dated May 16, 1985, transpired within a period of six (6) months. Indeed, the factual
background of this case is a classic illustration of an action for unlawful detainer. Verily, the
facts are therefore diametrically opposite to the facts or case at bar.

Petitioner has therefore no legal basis to insist that the present case is similar to the Bernabe and
Medina cases and from which this Court should base its findings and conclusions. The doctrine
laid down in Tenorio vs. Gomba is still controlling. In that case the Court ruled that courts of first
instance have jurisdiction over all actions involving possession of land except forcible entry and
illegal datainer, and therefore the lower court has jurisdiction over the action alleged in the
appellant's complaint because it is neither of illegal detainer nor of forcible entry. 34

Petitioner maintains that her leasehold right as a tenant of the subject premises had been settled
in Civil Case No. 5456, an action for consignation, which she won before the Metropolitan Trial
Court and affirmed on appeal by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109. Said court
ruled that the latter is a tenant of the site or premises in question and that she cannot be ejected
therefrom, even on the assumption that her house and pig pen are allegedly standing on a right of
way. She claims that pursuant to Section 49 (b) (now Section 47) Rule 39, Rules of Court, the
issue of tenancy in said case is now conclusive between her and private respondent with respect
to the subject premises in question.

Petitioner's contention is devoid of merit.

Sec. 49 (now Section 47), provides that:

Sec. 49. Effects of Judgments. - the effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court or
judge of the Philippines having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as
follows:

(a) xxx xxx xxx

(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to
any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties
and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity;
The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought not
be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once, that when the right or fact has been
judicially determined, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. 35

Thus, for res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action the following requisites must
concur: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and, (4)
there must be between the first and second actions; (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of subject
matter; and (c) identity of cause of action. 36

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first three (3) requirements and the identity of the
subject matter. The only issues remaining are whether as between Civil Case No. 5456 and Civil
Case No. 7785, there is identity of parties and of causes of action in Civil Case No. 5456 to bar
the institution of Civil Case No. 7785.

There is identity of parties. The record shows that the parties in Civil Case No. 5456 are
petitioner as plaintiff while the defendants were UCRTC, the spouses Meliton and Efremia
Carisima and Rosario de Jesus. Private respondents-spouses Fidel and Evelyn Benolirao acquired
lot 666-H from UCRTC and are therefore the successors-in-interest of UCRTC by title
subsequent to the commencement and termination of the first action. As such, private
respondents merely stepped into the shoes of UCRTC and acquired whatever capacity and title
the former had over the same property or subject matter of the action. Indeed, there is actual, if
not substantial, identity of parties between the two actions. 37

There is however, no identity of causes of action in both cases. In the case of Garcia vs. Court of
Appeals, 38 this Court held that the test of identity of causes of action lies not in the form of an
action but on whether the same evidence would support and establish the former and the present
causes of action. Petitioner's complaint in Civil Case No. 5456 is an action for consignation of
rentals while Civil Case No. 7785 is an action for recovery of possession.

In other words, the issue in Civil Case No. 5456 is whether or not consignation of rentals is
proper under the circumstances obtaining in that case. Private respondents action for recovery of
possession requires them to present evidence of their claim or title to the subject premises and
their right to possess the same from petitioner. Stated conversely, the evidence in Civil Case No.
5456 is entirely different to that in Civil Case No. 7785. Thus, the decision in Civil Case No.
5456 does not in any way affect nor bar Civil Case No. 7785.

Indeed, the Court noted that the parties had been at odds since 1987 when petitioner initiated
Civil Case No. 5456, and then Civil Case No. 7749. Private respondents' predecessor UCRTC
likewise initiated Civil Case No. 6652 and the present case under appeal, Civil Case No. 7785,
all because of the use of a right of way and an encroachment of only 4.1 meters of the subject
premises. At some point in time, all these squabbles must end. Thus, the respondent court stated
that:
It is true that it is the purpose and intention of the law that courts should decide all questions
submitted to them "as truth and justice require", and that it is greatly to be desired that all
judgments should be so decided; but controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of
sound practice in the courts demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgment of the courts
determining controversies submitted to them should become final at some definite time fixed by
law. 39

In passing, We reiterate the time-honored doctrine that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals
are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court, and the Court, will not normally disturb
such factual findings unless the findings of the court are palpably unsupported by the evidence or
unless the judgment itself is based on misapprehension of facts. 40 In this case, We find the said
decision to be totally supported by the evidence on record.

Based on the foregoing premises, it is unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised in the
petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV NO. 39251 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Melo, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1 Decided by the First Division, Court of Appeals composed of the Honorable Associates Justice
Justo P. Torres, Jr., Ponente and Chairman of the Division (now retired Justice of the Supreme
Court); Honorable Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pardo, Senior Member and Honorable
Associate Justice Corona Ibay-Somera, Junior Member.

2 Exhibit "D", Civil Case No. 6652, Letter dated November 13, 1982.

3 Deed of Absolute Sale, Annex "A", pp. 1-2, Folder of Exhibits.

4 ENTRY NO. 205154/T-17291-RIGHT OF WAY-GRANTED: By the registered owner herein

covering a portion of the land herein as shown and marked in the subdivision Plan LRC Psd-
158391 from points 1 to 14, of lot 666-H with the width of 3,12 meters as an access road to and
from the existing road for the benefit and use of owners of Lot-666-I to 666-H of said
Subdivision Plan. Doc. No. 434, Page No. 88, Book No. 9352, Series of 1980, Julian Florentino.
Date of Instrument - December 11, 1980; Date of Inscription - December 12, 1980 at 10:25 a.m.

5 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 114, Pasay City, pp. 13-18, ibid.

6 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City, pp. 25-28, Folder of Exhibits.
7 Deed of Absolute Sale, Annex "A", pp. 1-2, ibid.

8 Entry No. 89-105751/17291 - PORTION SALE - in favor of SPS. FIDEL and EVELYN
BENOLIRAO, covering an area of ONE HUNDRED TWELVE (112) SQUARE METERS for
the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (50,000.00), other conditions set forth in Doc. No. 08,
Page 15, Block VI, Series of 1989 of the Not. Register for Pasay City, Jeremias L. de Jesus,
dated May 5, 1989. Date of Inscription, May 19, 1989 - 1:35 p.m.

9 Complaint, Civil Case No. 6652, Exhibits "I", pp. 19-24, ibid.

10 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 114, Pasay City, penned by the then Judge
Fermin A. Martin, Exhibit "H", pp. 13-18, Folder of Exhibits.

11 par. 3, ibid.

12 Letter of Demand, page 11, Exhibits "F", ibid.

13 Complaint, pages 5-9, Original Record.

14 Answer with Special Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim., pages 14-19, Ibid.

15 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, pp. 45-66, CA rollo.

16 Appellant's Brief, pp. 15-42, CA Rollo, CA G.R. CV No. 39251.

17 Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 64-70 ibid.

18 Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 72-85, ibid.

19 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, page 87, ibid.

20 148 SCRA 113.

21 181 SCRA 837.

22 Caparros vs. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 758 (1989); Ganadin vs. Ramos, 99 SCRA 613,
621 (1973); Fuentes vs. Bautista, 53 SCRA 420 (1969); Simpao, Jr. vs. Lilles, 40 SCRA 180
(1971); Vencilao vs. Camarenta, 29 SCRA 473 (1969).

23 Banayos vs. Susana Realty Inc., 71 SCRA 557 (1976).

24 Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 108 (1995).

25 36 A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and Detainer, Sec 39, p. 2002; Ind. - Boxley vs. Collins, 4 Blackf,
320; Me. - Treat vs. Brent., 51 Me. 478.
26 Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals, supra; Accion reivindicatoria - An action for ejectment
wherein the plaintiff sets up title in himself and prays that he be declared the owner, and given
possession thereof. [Ledesma vs. Marcos, 9 Phil. 618 (1908)].

27 237 SCRA 565 (1994).

28 23 SCRA 183 (1968).

29 71 SCRA 557 (1976).

30 Ocular Inspection Report, September 10, 1991, pp. 45-48, Original Record.

31 Javier vs. Veridiano 11, supra.

32 Bernabe vs. Luna, supra.

33 Ibid.

34 81 Phil. 54 (1948).

35 Sarabia vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 2 SCRA 54 (1961).

36 Ipekdjian Mercjandising Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 9 SCRA 72 (1963); Mangoma vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., 241 SCRA 21 (1995); Guevarra vs. Benito, 247 SCRA 570, 573 (1995).

37 Mendiola vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 492 (1996); Comilang vs. Bautista, 21 SCRA 486,
491 (1967); Penalosa vs. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303, 323 (1912).

38 14 SCRA 721 (1965); Guevarra vs. Benito, et al., ibid.

39 Decision of the Court of Appeals, supra.

40 Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 303; Mallari vs. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA
456.

SPOUSES ELEGIO* CAEZO and G.R. No. 170189

DOLIA CAEZO,
Petitioners, Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

NACHURA,
BERSAMIN,**

* Eligio in some parts of the Records.

** Designated additional member per Special Order No. 882 dated 31 August 2010.
 - versus - ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

SPOUSES APOLINARIO and Promulgated:

CONSORCIA L. BAUTISTA,
Respondents. September 1, 2010

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

G.R. No. 170189 is a petition for review1[1] assailing the Decision2[2]

promulgated on 17 October 2005 by the Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 75685. The appellate court granted the appeal filed by the Spouses
Apolinario and Consorcia L. Bautista (spouses Bautista) and dismissed the
complaint for the issuance of a writ of demolition with damages filed by the
Spouses Elegio and Dolia Caezo (spouses Caezo) without prejudice to the filing of
the appropriate action with the proper forum. In its Decision3[3] on Civil Case No.

1[1] Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

2[2] Rollo, pp. 50-54. Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Conrado
M. Vasquez, Jr. and Vicente Q. Roxas, concurring.
3[3] Id. at 39-41. Penned by Judge Amalia F. Dy.
MC-00-1069 dated 25 March 2002, Branch 213 of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City (trial court) rendered judgment in favor of the spouses Caezo.
The trial court also ordered the issuance of a writ of demolition directing the
removal of the structures built by the spouses Bautista on the portion of the land
belonging to the spouses Caezo.

The Facts

The appellate court narrated the facts as follows:

Spouses Elegio and Dolia Caezo (hereafter appellees) are the registered owner[s] of a
parcel of land with an area of One Hundred Eighty Six (186) square meters, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 32911.

Spouses Apolinario and Consorcia Bautista (hereafter appellants) are the registered
owners of a parcel of land, containing an area of One Hundred Eighty One (181) square meters,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 31727. Both parcels of land are located at
Coronado Heights, Barangka Ibaba, Mandaluyong City and registered with the Registry of Deeds
of Mandaluyong City. Appellants lot is adjacent to that of appellees [sic].

Sometime in 1995, appellees started the construction of a building on their lot. During the
construction, appellees discovered that their lot was encroached upon by the structures built by
appellants without appellees knowledge and consent.
 The three (3) surveys conducted confirmed the fact of encroachment. However, despite
oral and written demands, appellants failed and refused to remove the structures encroaching
appellees lot.

Attempts were made to settle their dispute with the barangay lupon, but to no avail.
Appellees initiated a complaint with the RTC for the issuance of a writ of demolition.

For failure to file an Answer within the extended period granted by the court, appellants
were declared in default. Appellees were allowed to present their evidence ex parte before an
appointed commissioner. Thereafter the RTC rendered the assailed decision in the terms earlier
set forth.4[4]

The spouses Caezo filed their complaint for the issuance of a writ of
demolition with damages on 13 April 2000. In an Order dated 15 August 2000, the
trial court declared the spouses Bautista in default for failure to answer within the
reglementary period. The Public Attorneys Office, which represented the spouses
Bautista at the time, filed a Motion to Admit Answer dated 15 June 2000. The trial
court denied the motion in its Decision.

The Trial Courts Ruling

On 25 March 2002, the trial court promulgated its Decision in favor of the
spouses Caezo. The trial court found that the spouses Bautista built structures
encroaching on the land owned by the spouses Caezo. The spouses Bautista also
refused to remove the structures and respect the boundaries as established by the
various surveyors. A referral to the Barangay Lupon failed to settle the controversy

4[4] Id. at 51-52.

amicably. The trial court thus ruled that the spouses Bautista are builders in bad
faith, such that the spouses Caezo are entitled to an issuance of a writ of demolition
with damages.

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:

IN VIEW WHEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendants. Let a writ of demolition be accordingly issued directing the removal/demolition
of the structures built by the defendants upon the portion of land belonging [to] the plaintiffs at
the formers expense.

Further,

1. the defendant is ordered to pay P50,000.00 (Philippine Currency) as and

by way of moral damages[; and]

2. [t]he defendant is hereby ordered to pay P30,000.00 as and by way of

attorneys fees.

SO ORDERED.5[5]

The spouses Bautista filed a notice of appeal dated 29 April 2002 before the
appellate court.

5[5] Id. at 41.

 The Appellate Courts Ruling

On 17 October 2005, the appellate court rendered its Decision which

reversed the 25 March 2002 Decision of the trial court. The appellate court ruled
that since the last demand was made on 27 March 2000, or more than a year before
the filing of the complaint, the spouses Caezo should have filed a suit for recovery
of possession and not for the issuance of a writ of demolition. A writ of demolition
can be granted only as an effect of a final judgment or order, hence the spouses
Caezos complaint should be dismissed. The spouses Caezo failed to specify the
assessed value of the encroached portion of their property. Because of this failure,
the complaint lacked sufficient basis to constitute a cause of action. Finally, the
appellate court ruled that should there be a finding of encroachment in the action
for recovery of possession and that the encroachment was built in good faith, the
market value of the encroached portion should be proved to determine the
appropriate indemnity.

The dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The complaint

filed by plaintiffs-appellees is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of the
appropriate action with the proper forum.
 SO ORDERED.6[6]

Issues

The spouses Caezo enumerated the following grounds to support their

Petition:

I. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in granting the petition of
the [spouses Bautista] and reversing the Decision of the Court a quo; [and]

II. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in stating that the
petitioners should have filed recovery of possession and not writ of
demolition.7[7]

The Courts Ruling

The petition has merit.

6[6] Id. at 54.

7[7] Id. at 11.
 The present case, while inaccurately captioned as an action for a Writ of
Demolition with Damages is in reality an action to recover a parcel of land or an
accion reivindicatoria under Article 434 of the Civil Code. Article 434 of the Civil
Code reads: In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the
plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the
defendants claim. Accion reivindicatoria seeks the recovery of ownership and
includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi brought in the proper regional trial court.
Accion reivindicatoria is an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a
parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession.8[8]

In order that an action for the recovery of title may prosper, it is

indispensable, in accordance with the precedents established by the courts, that the
party who prosecutes it must fully prove, not only his ownership of the thing
claimed, but also the identity of the same.9[9] However, although the identity of
the thing that a party desires to recover must be established, if the plaintiff has
already proved his right of ownership over a tract of land, and the defendant is
occupying without right any part of such tract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to
establish the precise location and extent of the portions occupied by the defendant
within the plaintiffs property.10[10]

The spouses Caezo were able to establish their ownership of the encroached
property. Aside from testimonial evidence, the spouses Caezo were also able to

8[8] See Javier v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. 48050, 10 October 1994, 237 SCRA 565.
9[9] Salacup v. Rambac, 17 Phil. 22, 23 (1910).
10[10] ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, 2 COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES 72 (1998). Citations omitted.
present documentary and object evidence which consisted of photographs,11[11]
transfer certificates of title,12[12] and a relocation survey plan.13[13]

The relocation survey plan also corroborated Elegio Caezos testimony on

the reason for the spouses Bautistas attitude regarding the encroached property.
The relocation survey plan showed that the spouses Bautistas property encroached
upon that of the spouses Caezo by 0.97 centimeters, while the spouses Bautistas
property was encroached upon by 1.01 centimeters by another landowner. Elegio
Caezo testified thus:

Q I am showing you a survey plan of lot 13. Can you please tell us what is this survey
plan?

A That is the survey plan of the surveyor whom we hired sir.

Q Can you please point to us where in this plan is your property indicated?

A This is our property, sir.

Q The witness, your Honor, is pointing to Lot 13 indicated in the survey plan. How
about the property of the defendants?

A The defendants property is this, sir.

Q The witness, your Honor, is pointing to Lot 14 indicated in the survey plan. Now,
Mr. Witness, you said that the defendants wanted you to recover that portion of your property

11[11] Records, pp. 14-18.

12[12] Id. at 9-10.
13[13] Id. at 11.
encroached on from the property adjacent to theirs. Please illustrate to us by
referring to this survey plan what the defendants meant?

A The defendants want us to get the portion they had encroached on from Lot 15 because,
according to them, Lot 15 also encroached on their lot, sir.

Q The witness, your Honor, is pointing to Lot 15 indicated in the plan. What happened
next?

A We told them that this is not possible because Lot 15 is not adjacent to our property, sir.

Q What did the defendants do?

A The defendants still refused to remove their structure, sir.

Q So, what happened?

A We filed a complaint against the defendants before the Office of the Barangay Captain
of Barangay Barangka, Ibaba, sir.

Q What happened in the Barangay?

A The Barangay council tried to settle the matter amicably between us. However, no
settlement was reached, sir.

Q While in the barangay, did you offer anything to the defendants in order to settle the
case?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was it?

A We offered that if the defendants will remove the structures, we are willing to
shoulder half of the expenses for the removal.
Q What did the defendants say to this?

A They refused our offer and insisted on their previous position that we get our portion
from Lot 15, sir.

Q What did the Barangay do after failing to settle the case?

A The Barangay issued a Certification to File Action, sir.14[14]

Given the efforts made by the spouses Caezo to settle the present issue prior
to the filing of a Complaint, the trial court was justified in ruling that the spouses
Bautista were in default and in not admitting their Answer. The Complaint was not
the spouses Bautistas first encounter with the present issue. Moreover, the spouses
Bautista failed to file their Answer even after the expiry of the motion of extension
granted to them.15[15]

The testimony and the relocation survey plan both show that the spouses
Bautista were aware of the encroachment upon their lot by the owner of Lot 15 and
thus they made a corresponding encroachment upon the lot of the spouses Caezo.
This awareness of the two encroachments made the spouses Bautista builders in
bad faith. The spouses Caezo are entitled to the issuance of a writ of demolition in

14[14] Id. at 68-71.

15[15] Id. at 47.
their favor and against the spouses Bautista, in accordance with Article 450 of the
Civil Code.16[16]

We affirm the awards made by the trial court in its Decision:

x x x Considering the length of time when [the spouses Caezo] were deprived of beneficial use
on the subject portion of land owned by them, the [spouses Bautista] are likewise liable to pay
P30,000.00 (Philippine Currency) in accordance with Article 451 of the Civil Code.

With respect to the prayer for the award of P50,000.00 (Philippine Currency) as moral
damages, the court decides to give due course to it in view of the fact that the [spouses Caezo]
satisfactorily proved the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal relation to
[the spouses Bautistas] acts. There was bad faith on the part of the [spouses Bautista] when they
built the structures upon the land not belonging to them. This wrongful act is the proximate
cause which made the [spouses Caezo] suffer mental anguish, sleepless nights and
serious anxiety. The [spouses Caezo] positively testified about these matters.

As regards the prayer for exemplary x x x damages, no sufficient evidence were adduced
which would warrant and justify this court to award the same. The prayer for attorneys fees
however, is found meritorious hence, the same is hereby granted.17[17]

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75685 promulgated on 17 October 2005 is SET

16[16] Article 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith
may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace
things in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may
compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.
17[17] Rollo, p. 40.
ASIDE and the dispositive portion of the Decision of Branch 213, Regional Trial
Court of Mandaluyong City promulgated on 25 March 2002 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. A writ of demolition of the encroaching structures should be
issued against and at the expense of Spouses Apolinario and Consorcia L. Bautista
upon the finality of this judgment. Spouses Apolinario and Consorcia L. Bautista
are further ordered to pay Spouses Elegio and Dolia Caezo P30,000 as actual
damages; P50,000 as moral damages; and P30,000 as attorneys fees. The interest
rate of 12% per annum shall apply from the finality of judgment until the total
amount awarded is fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION
 Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

DELFIN LAMSIS, MAYNARD G.R. No. 173021

MONDIGUING, JOSE VALDEZ,
JR. and Heirs of AGUSTIN KITMA,
represented by EUGENE KITMA,
Present:
Petitioners, CORONA, C. J., Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
 - versus - DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.

MARGARITA SEMON DONG-E, Promulgated:

Respondent. October 20, 2010

x--------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.

There is laches when a party is aware, even in the early stages of the proceedings,
of a possible jurisdictional objection, and has every opportunity to raise said objection,
but fails to do so, even on appeal.

This is a Petition for Review18[1] assailing the March 30, 2006 Decision19[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78987 as well as its May 26, 2006

18[1] Rollo, pp. 11-24.

19[2] CA rollo, pp. 124-133; penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De los Santos and concurred in by Associate
Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Arturo G. Tayag.
Resolution20[3] which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. The dispositive
portion of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED for

lack of merit and the judgment dated January 8, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City in Civil Case No. 4140-R is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.21[4]

Factual antecedents

This case involves a conflict of ownership and possession over an untitled parcel
of land, denominated as Lot No. 1, with an area of 80,736 square meters. The property is
located along Km. 5 Asin Road, Baguio City and is part of a larger parcel of land with an
area of 186,090 square meters. While petitioners are the actual occupants of Lot No. 1,
respondent is claiming ownership thereof and is seeking to recover its possession from
petitioners.

According to respondent Margarita Semon Dong-E (Margarita), her familys

ownership and occupation of Lot No. 1 can be traced as far back as 1922 to her late
grandfather, Ap-ap.22[5] Upon Ap-aps death, the property was inherited by his children,
who obtained a survey plan in 1964 of the 186,090-square meter property, which

20[3] Id. at 153.

21[4] CA Decision, p. 10; id. at 133.
22[5] Records, p. 100.
included Lot No. 1.23[6] On the same year, they declared the property for taxation
purposes in the name of The Heirs of Ap-ap.24[7] The 1964 tax declaration bears a
notation that reads: Reconstructed from an old Tax Declaration No. 363 dated May 10,
1922 per true of same presented.25[8]

The heirs of Ap-ap then executed, for a P500.00 consideration, a Deed of

Quitclaim26[9] on February 26, 1964 in favor of their brother Gilbert Semon (Margaritas
father).

Sometime between 1976 and 1978,27[10] Gilbert Semon together with his wife
Mary Lamsis, allowed his in-laws Manolo Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma, to stay on a
portion of Lot No. 1 together with their respective families.28[11] They were allowed to
erect their houses, introduce improvements, and plant trees thereon. When Manolo
Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma died sometime in the 1980s, their children, petitioners
Delfin Lamsis (Delfin) and Agustin Kitma (Agustin), took possession of certain portions
of Lot No. 1. Delfin possessed 4,000 square meters of Lot No. 1, while Agustin occupied
5,000 square meters thereof.29[12] Nevertheless, the heirs of Gilbert Semon tolerated the
acts of their first cousins.

23[6] Id. at 276.

24[7] Id. at 277.
25[8] Exhibit B-1; id. at the back of p. 277.
26[9] Id. at 100 and 297.
27[10] Id. at 101.
28[11] Id.
29[12] Id. at 102-103.
 When Gilbert Semon died in 1983,30[13] his children extrajudicially partitioned
the property among themselves and allotted Lot No. 1 thereof in favor of
Margarita.31[14] Since then, Margarita allegedly paid the realty tax over Lot No.
132[15] and occupied and improved the property together with her husband; while at the
same time, tolerating her first cousins occupation of portions of the same lot.

This state of affairs changed when petitioners Delfin and Agustin allegedly began
expanding their occupation on the subject property and selling portions thereof.33[16]
Delfin allegedly sold a 400-square meter portion of Lot No. 1 to petitioner
Maynard34[17] Mondiguing (Maynard) while Agustin sold another portion to petitioner
Jose Valdez (Jose).35[18]

With such developments, Margarita filed a complaint36[19] for recovery of

ownership, possession, reconveyance and damages against all four occupants of Lot No.
1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 4140-R and raffled to Branch 59. The complaint prayed for the annulment of
the sales to Maynard and Jose and for petitioners to vacate the portions of the property

30[13] Id. at 99.

31[14] Id. at 102 and 300-301.
32[15] There were two tax receipts in the name of Margarita Semon available in the records. One is dated 12-20-
1990 (id. at 293), while the other is dated 4-22-1991 (id. at 292).
33[16] Id. at 103-104.
34[17] Sometimes spelled as Menard in some parts of the records.
35[18] Records, p. 105.
36[19] Id. at 99-109. Upon petitioners motion (id. at 62-64), the original complaint was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction since the value of the property (at P500 and improvements valued at P200) did not meet the
jurisdictional amounts for the RTC (Order dated February 3, 1999; id. at 69-70). The respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration and to admit the amended complaint (id. at 71-87), which motion was granted by the trial
court (id. at 98).
which exceed the areas allowed to them by Margarita.37[20] Margarita claimed that, as
they are her first cousins, she is willing to donate to Delfin and Agustin a portion of Lot
No. 1, provided that she retains the power to choose such portion.38[21]

Petitioners denied Margaritas claims of ownership and possession over Lot No. 1.
According to Delfin and Agustin, Lot No. 1 is a public land claimed by the heirs of
Joaquin Smith (not parties to the case).39[22] The Smiths gave their permission for
Delfin and Agustins parents to occupy the land sometime in 1969 or 1970. They also
presented their neighbors who testified that it was Delfin and Agustin as well as their
respective parents who occupied Lot No. 1, not Margarita and her parents.

Delfin and Agustin also assailed the muniments of ownership presented by

Margarita as fabricated, unauthenticated, and invalid. It was pointed out that the Deed of
Quitclaim, allegedly executed by all of Ap-aps children, failed to include two Rita
Bocahan and Stewart Sito.40[23] Margarita admitted during trial that Rita Bocahan and
Stewart Sito were her uncle and aunt, but did not explain why they were excluded from
the quitclaim.

According to Maynard and Jose, Delfin and Agustin were the ones publicly and
openly in possession of the land and who introduced improvements thereon. They also

37[20] Id. at 107-108.

38[21] Id. at 103.
39[22] TSN Folder, pp. 116-117 and 140.
40[23] Records, pp. 142-146.
corroborated Delfin and Agustins allegation that the real owners of the property are the
heirs of Joaquin Smith.41[24]

In order to debunk petitioners claim that the Smiths owned the subject property,
Margarita presented a certified copy of a Resolution from the Land Management Office
denying the Smiths application for recognition of the subject property as part of their
ancestral land.42[25] The resolution explains that the application had to be denied
because the Smiths did not possess, occupy or utilize all or a portion of the property x x x.
The actual occupants (who were not named in the resolution) whose improvements are
visible are not in any way related to the applicant or his co-heirs.43[26]

To bolster her claim of ownership and possession, Margarita introduced as

evidence an unnumbered resolution of the Community Special Task Force on Ancestral
Lands (CSTFAL) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
acting favorably on her and her siblings ancestral land claim over a portion of the
186,090-square meter property.44[27] The said resolution states:

The land subject of the instant application is the ancestral land of the herein
applicants. Well-established is the fact that the land treated herein was first declared for
taxation purposes in 1922 under Tax Declaration No. 363 by the applicants grandfather
Ap-Ap (one name). Said application was reconstructed in 1965 after the original got lost
during the war. These tax declarations were issued and recorded in the Municipality of

41[24] Id. at 138-141.

42[25] Id. at 309-310.
43[26] Id. at 309.
44[27] The Heirs of Ap-ap applied for a certificate of ancestral land claim over the 186,090 square meters but the
CSTFAL approved their claim over 110,342 square meters only (id. at 505).
Tuba, Benguet, considering that the land was then within the territorial jurisdiction of the
said municipality. That upon the death of declarant Ap-Ap his heirs x x x transferred the
tax declaration in their name, [which tax declaration is] now with the City assessors
office of Baguio.

The land consisting of four (4) lots with a total area of ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND NINETY (186,090) SQUARE METERS, is covered by
Psu-198317 duly approved by the Director of Lands on October 4, 1963 in the name of
Ap-Ap (one name). In 1964, the same land was the subject of a petition filed by Gilbert
Semon, as petitioner, before the Court of First Instance of the City of Baguio in the
reopening of Judicial Proceedings under Civil Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 for the
registration and the issuance of Certificate of Title of said land. The land registration case
was however overtaken by the decision of the Supreme Court declaring such judicial
proceedings null and void because the courts of law have no jurisdiction.

It has been sufficiently substantiated by the applicants that prior to and at the time
of the pendency of the land registration case and henceforth up to and including the
present, the herein applicants by themselves and through their predecessor-in-interest
have been in exclusive, continuous, and material possession and occupation of the said
parcel of land mentioned above under claim of ownership, devoting the same for
residential and agricultural purposes. Found are the residential houses of the applicants as
well as those of their close relatives, while the other areas planted to fruit trees, coffee and
banana, and seasonal crops. Also noticeable therein are permanent stone and earthen
fences, terraces, clearings, including irrigation gadgets.

On the matter of the applicant[s] indiguinity [sic] and qualifications, there is no

doubt that they are members of the National Cultural Communities, particularly the Ibaloi
tribe. They are the legitimate grandchildren of Ap-Ap (one name) who lived along the
Asin Road area. His legal heirs are: Orani Ap-Ap, married to Calado Salda; Rita Ap-Ap,
married to Jose Bacacan; Sucdad Ap-Ap, married to Oragon Wakit; and Gilbert Semon,
a former vice-mayor of Tuba, Benguet, [who] adopted the common name of their father
Semon, as it is the customary practice among the early Ibalois. x x x

On the matter regarding the inheritance of the heirs of Ap-Ap, it is important to

state [that] Gilbert Semon consolidated ownership thereof and became the sole heir in
1964, by way of a Deed of Quitclaim executed by the heirs in his favor. As to the
respective share of the applicants[] co-heirs, the same was properly adjudicated in 1989
with the execution of an Extrajudicial Settlement/ Partition of Estate with Waiver of
Rights.

With regard to the overlapping issue, it is pertinent to state that application No.
Bg-L-066 of Thomas Smith has already been denied by us in our Resolution dated
November 1997. As to the other adverse claims therein by reason of previous
conveyances in favor of third parties, the same were likewise excluded resulting in the
reduction of the area originally applied from ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX
THOUSAND NINETY (186,090) SQUARE METERS, more or less to ONE
 HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FORTY TWO (110,342)
SQUARE METERS, more or less. Considering the foregoing developments, we find no
legal and procedural obstacle in giving due course to the instant application.

Now therefore, we hereby [resolve] that the application for Recognition of

Ancestral Land Claim filed by the Heirs of Gilbert Semon, represented by Juanito
Semon, be granted [and] a Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim (CALC) be issued to the
herein applicants by the Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
Visayas Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City, through the Regional Executive Director,
DENR-CAR, Diego Silang Street, Baguio City. The area of the claim stated herein above
is however subject to the outcome of the final survey to be forthwith executed.

Carried this 23rd day of June 1998.45[28]

The resolution was not signed by two members of the CSTFAL on the ground that the
signing of the unnumbered resolution was overtaken by the enactment of the Republic
Act (RA) No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA). The IPRA
removed the authority of the DENR to issue ancestral land claim certificates and
transferred the same to the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).46[29]
The Ancestral Land Application No. Bg-L-064 of the Heirs of Gilbert Semon was
transferred to the NCIP, Cordillera Administrative Region, La Trinidad, Benguet and re-
docketed as Case No. 05-RHO-CAR-03.47[30] The petitioners filed their protest in the
said case before the NCIP. The same has been submitted for resolution.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court48[31]

45[28] Id. at 504-506.

46[29] Testimony of Guillermo S. Fianza (Chairman of CSTFAL), p. 263; testimony of Alfonso P. Aroco (Member of
the CSTFAL), pp. 297-306.
47[30] In the Matter of Application for Recognition of Ancestral Land Claim over a Parcel of Land Located at Res.
Sec. L Km. 5, Asin Road, Baguio City: Heirs of Gilbert Semon, represented by Juanito Semon, applicant, Delfin
Lamsis, et al. Protestants, Peter Sito, Protestant-Intervenor (rollo, pp. 169-173).
48[31] Records, pp. 644-653. Penned by Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes.
 After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court found
that it preponderates in favor of respondents long-time possession of and claim of
ownership over the subject property.49[32] The survey plan of the subject property in the
name of the Heirs of Ap-ap executed way back in 1962 and the tax declarations thereafter
issued to the respondent and her siblings all support her claim that her family and their
predecessors-in-interest have all been in possession of the property to the exclusion of
others. The court likewise gave credence to the documentary evidence of the transfer of
the land from the Heirs of Ap-ap to respondents father and, eventually to respondent
herself. The series of transfers of the property were indications of the respondents and her
predecessors interest over the property. The court opined that while these pieces of
documentary evidence were not conclusive proof of actual possession, they lend
credence to respondents claim because, in the ordinary course of things, persons will not
execute legal documents dealing with real property, unless they believe, and have the
basis to believe, that they have an interest in the property subject of the legal documents x
x x.50[33]

In contrast, the trial court found nothing on record to substantiate the allegations of
the petititioners that they and their parents were the long-time possessors of the subject
property. Their own statements belied their assertions. Petitioner Maynard and Jose both
admitted that they could not secure title for the property from the Bureau of Lands
because there were pending ancestral land claims over the property.51[34] Petitioner
Agustins Townsite Sales Application over the property was held in abeyance because of

49[32] Decision, p. 5; id. at 648.

50[33] Id. at 6; id. at 649.
51[34] Id. at 6-7; id. at 650-651.
respondents own claim, which was eventually favorably considered by the
CSTFAL.52[35]

The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

the [respondent] and against the [petitioners]

(1) Declaring the transfer of a portion of Lot 1 of PSU 198317 made by the
[petitioner] Delfin Lamsis to Menard Mondiguing and Jose Valdez, Jr. null and void;

(2) Ordering the [petitioners] Delfin Lamsis, Agustin Kitma, Menard

Mondiguing and Jose Valdez, Jr., to vacate the area they are presently occupying that is
within Lot 1 of PSU 198317 belonging to the [respondent] and to surrender possession
thereof to the [respondent];

(3) To pay [respondent] attorneys fees in the amount of P10,000.00; and

(4) To pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.53[36]

It appears that no motion for reconsideration was filed before the trial court.
Nevetheless, the trial court issued an Order54[37] allowing the petitioners Notice of
Appeal.55[38]

52[35] Id. at 9-10; id. at 652-653.

53[36] Id. at 10; id. at 653.
54[37] Records, p. 656.
55[38] Id. at 655.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals56[39]

The sole issue resolved by the appellate court was whether the trial court erred in
ruling in favor of respondent in light of the adduced evidence. Citing the rule on
preponderance of evidence, the CA held that the respondent was able to discharge her
burden in proving her title and interest to the subject property. Her documentary evidence
were amply supported by the testimonial evidence of her witnesses.

In contrast, petitioners only made bare allegations in their testimonies that are
insufficient to overcome respondents documentary evidence.

Petitioners moved for a reconsideration57[40] of the adverse decision but the

same was denied.

Hence this petition, which was initially denied for failure to show that the CA
committed any reversible error.58[41] Upon petitioners motion for
reconsideration,59[42] the petition was reinstated in the Courts January 15, 2007
Resolution.60[43]

56[39] CA rollo, pp. 124-133.

57[40] Id. at 134-144.
58[41] Resolution dated August 23, 2006 (rollo, p. 153).
59[42] Id. at 159-167.
60[43] Id. at 179.
Petitioners arguments

Petitioners assign as error the CAs appreciation of the evidence already affirmed
and considered by the trial court. They maintain that the change in the presiding judges
who heard and decided their case resulted in the appreciation of what would otherwise be
inadmissible evidence.61[44] Petitioners ask that the Court exempt their petition from the
general rule that a trial judges assessment of the credibility of witnesses is accorded great
respect on appeal.

To support their claim that the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling in favor of
respondent, they assailed the various pieces of evidence offered by respondent. They
maintain that the Deed of Quitclaim executed by the Heirs of Ap-ap is spurious and lacks
the parties and witnesses signatures. Moreover, it is a mere photocopy, which was never
authenticated by the notary public in court and no reasons were proferred regarding the
existence, loss, and contents of the original copy.62[45] Under the best evidence rule, the
Deed of Quitclaim is inadmissible in evidence and should have been disregarded by the
court.

61[44] Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 18-19; id. at 233-234.

62[45] Id. at 19-20; id. at 234-235.
 Respondent did not prove that she and her husband possessed the subject property
since time immemorial. Petitioners argue that respondent admitted possessing and
cultivating only the land that lies outside the subject property.63[46]

Petitioners next assail the weight to be given to respondents muniments of

ownership, such as the tax declarations and the survey plan. They insist that these are not
indubitable proofs of respondents ownership over the subject property given that there are
other claimants to the land (who are not parties to this case) who also possess a survey
plan over the subject property.64[47]

Petitioners then assert their superior right to the property as the present possessors
thereof. They cite pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code which presume good faith
possession on the part of the possessor and puts the burden on the plaintiff in an action to
recover to prove her superior title.65[48]

Petitioners next assert that they have a right to the subject property by the
operation of acquisitive prescription. They posit that they have been in possession of a
public land publicly, peacefully, exclusively and in the concept of owners for more than
30 years. Respondents assertion that petitioners are merely possessors by tolerance is
unsubstantiated.66[49]

63[46] Id. at 27; id. at 242.

64[47] Id. at 27-30; id. at 242- 245.
65[48] Id. at 34-35; id. at 249-250.
66[49] Id. at 38-41; id. at 253-356.
 Petitioners also maintain that the reivindicatory action should be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction in light of the enactment of the IPRA, which gives original and
exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving ancestral lands and domains to the
NCIP.67[50] They assert that the customary laws of the Ibaloi tribe of the Benguet
Province should be applied to their dispute as mandated by Section 65, Chapter IX of RA
8371, which states: When disputes involve ICCs/IPs,68[51] customary laws and
practices shall be used to resolve the dispute.

In the alternative that jurisdiction over an accion reivindicatoria is held to be

vested in the trial court, the petitioners insist that the courts should dismiss the
reivindicatory action on the ground of litis pendentia.69[52] They likewise argue that
NCIP has primary jurisdiction over ancestral lands, hence, the courts should not interfere
when the dispute demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring
special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal x x x In cases
where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate
unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special competence.70[53] The courts should
stand aside in order to prevent the possibility of creating conflicting decisions.71[54]

Respondents arguments

67[50] Id. at 14; id. at 229.

68[51] Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples.
69[52] Petitioners Memorandum, p. 14; rollo, p. 229.
70[53] Id. at 15; id. at 230.
71[54] Id. at 17; id. at 232.
 Respondent opines that the appellate court did not commit any reversible error in
affirming the trial courts decision. The present petition is a mere dilatory tactic to frustrate
the speedy administration of justice.72[55]

Respondent also asserts that questions of fact are prohibited in a Rule 45

petition.73[56] Thus, the appreciation and consideration of the factual issues are no
longer reviewable.74[57]

The issue of lack of jurisdiction is raised for the first time in the petition before this
Court. It was never raised before the trial court or the CA. Thus, respondent insists that
petitioners are now barred by laches from attacking the trial courts jurisdiction over the
case. Citing Aragon v. Court of Appeals,75[58] respondent argues that the jurisdictional
issue should have been raised at the appellate level at the very least so as to avail of the
doctrine that the ground lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings even on appeal.76[59]

Respondent maintains that there is no room for the application of litis pendentia
because the issues in the application for ancestral land claim are different from the issue
in a reivindicatory action. The issue before the NCIP is whether the Government, as
72[55] Respondents Memorandum, p. 8; id. at 205.
73[56] Id. at 8; id. at 205.
74[57] Id. at 11-12; id. at 208-209.
75[58] 337 Phil. 289 (1997).
76[59] Respondents Memorandum, p. 9; rollo, p. 206.
grantor, will recognize the ancestral land claim of respondent over a public alienable
land; while the issue in the reivindicatory case before the trial court is ownership,
possession, and right to recover the real property.77[60]

Given that the elements of lis pendens are absent in case at bar, the allegation of
forum-shopping is also bereft of merit. Any judgment to be rendered by the NCIP will
not amount to res judicata in the instant case.78[61]

Issues

The petitioners present the following issues for our consideration:

1. Whether the appellate court disregarded material facts and circumstances in

affirming the trial courts decision;

2. Whether petitioners have acquired the subject property by prescription;

77[60] Id. at 10-11; id. at 207-208.

78[61] Id. at 13; id. at 210.
 3. Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to decide the case in light of the
effectivity of RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 at the time that the
complaint was instituted;

4. If the trial court retains jurisdiction, whether the ancestral land claim pending
before the NCIP should take precedence over the reivindicatory action.79[62]

Our Ruling

Whether the appellate court disregarded

material facts and circumstances in affirming
the trial courts decision

Both the trial and the appellate courts ruled that respondent has proven her claims
of ownership and possession with a preponderance of evidence. Petitioners now argue
that the two courts erred in their appreciation of the evidence. They ask the Court to
review the evidence of both parties, despite the CAs finding that the trial court committed
no error in appreciating the evidence presented during trial. Hence, petitioners seek a
review of questions of fact, which is beyond the province of a Rule 45 petition. A
question of fact exists if the uncertainty centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts.80[63] Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded
probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether the proofs on one

79[62] Petitioners Memorandum, p. 10; id. at 225.

80[63] New Regent Sources, Inc. v. Tanjuatco, Jr., G.R. No. 168800, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 329, 335.
side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue,
are without doubt questions of fact.81[64]

Since it raises essentially questions of fact, this assignment of error must be

dismissed for it is settled that only questions of law may be reviewed in an appeal by
certiorari.82[65] There is a question of law when there is doubt as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts. Questions of law can be resolved without having to re-examine the
probative value of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being
admitted.83[66] The instant case does not present a compelling reason to deviate from
the foregoing rule, especially since both trial and appellate courts agree that respondent
had proven her claim of ownership as against petitioners claims. Their factual findings,
supported as they are by the evidence, should be accorded great respect.

In any case, even if petitioners arguments attacking the authenticity and

admissibility of the Deed of Quitclaim executed in favor of respondents father are well-
taken, it will not suffice to defeat respondents claim over the subject property. Even
without the Deed of Quitclaim, respondents claims of prior possession and ownership
were adequately supported and corroborated by her other documentary and testimonial
evidence. We agree with the trial courts observation that, in the ordinary course of things,
people will not go to great lengths to execute legal documents and pay realty taxes over a

81[64] Paterno v. Paterno, G.R. No. 63680, March 23, 1990, 183 SCRA 630, 636.
82[65] Heirs of Clemente Ermac v. Heirs of Vicente Ermac, 451 Phil. 368, 377 (2003).
83[66] New Regent Sources, Inc. v. Tanjuatco, Jr., supra.
real property, unless they have reason to believe that they have an interest over the
same.84[67]

The fact that respondents documents traverse several decades, from the 1960s to
the 1990s, is an indication that she and her family never abandoned their right to the
property and have continuously exercised rights of ownership over the same.

Moreover, respondents version of how the petitioners came to occupy the property
coincides with the same timeline given by the petitioners themselves. The only difference
is that petitioners maintain they came into possession by tolerance of the Smith family,
while respondent maintains that it was her parents who gave permission to petitioners.
Given the context under which the parties respective statements were made, the Court is
inclined to believe the respondents version, as both the trial and appellate courts have
concluded, since her version is corroborated by the documentary evidence.

Whether petitioners have acquired the subject

property by prescription

Assuming that the subject land may be acquired by prescription, we cannot accept
petitioners claim of acquisition by prescription. Petitioners admitted that they had
occupied the property by tolerance of the owner thereof. Having made this admission,

84[67] Decision, p. 6; records, p. 649.

they cannot claim that they have acquired the property by prescription unless they can
prove acts of repudiation. It is settled that possession, in order to ripen into ownership,
must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Possession not in
the concept of owner, such as the one claimed by petitioners, cannot ripen into ownership
by acquisitive prescription, unless the juridical relation is first expressly repudiated and
such repudiation has been communicated to the other party. Acts of possessory character
executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of
acquisitive prescription. Possession by tolerance is not adverse and such possessory acts,
no matter how long performed, do not start the running of the period of
prescription.85[68]

In the instant case, petitioners made no effort to allege much less prove any act of
repudiation sufficient for the reckoning of the acquisitive prescription. At most, we can
find on record the sale by petitioners Delfin and Agustin of parts of the property to
petitioners Maynard and Jose; but the same was done only in 1998, shortly before
respondent filed a case against them. Hence, the 30-year period necessary for the
operation of acquisitve prescription had yet to be attained.

Whether the ancestral land claim pending

before the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP) should take precedence over
the reivindicatory action

85[68] Esguerra v. Manantan, G.R. No. 158328, February 23, 2007, 516 SCRA 561, 572-573.
 The application for issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title pending
before the NCIP is akin to a registration proceeding. It also seeks an official recognition
of ones claim to a particular land and is also in rem. The titling of ancestral lands is for
the purpose of officially establishing ones land as an ancestral land.86[69] Just like a
registration proceeding, the titling of ancestral lands does not vest ownership87[70] upon
the applicant but only recognizes ownership88[71] that has already vested in the
applicant by virtue of his and his predecessor-in-interests possession of the property since
time immemorial. As aptly explained in another case:

It bears stressing at this point that ownership should not be confused with a certificate
of title. Registering land under the Torrens system does not create or vest title
because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely
an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein.
Corollarily, any question involving the issue of ownership must be threshed out in a
separate suit x x x The trial court will then conduct a full-blown trial wherein the parties
will present their respective evidence on the issue of ownership of the subject properties
to enable the court to resolve the said issue. x x x89[72] (Emphasis supplied)

Likewise apropos is the following explanation:

The fact that the [respondents] were able to secure [TCTs over the property] did not
operate to vest upon them ownership of the property. The Torrens system does not create
or vest title. It has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership x x x If the

86[69] Section 7 (c), Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as The
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997.
87[70] Heirs of Clemente Ermac v. Heirs of Vicente Ermac, supra note 64 at 377; Amoroso v. Alegre, Jr., G.R. No.
142766, June 15, 2007, 524 SCRA 641, 653-655; Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 387
Phil. 283, 295 (2000); Heirs of De Guzman Tuazon v. Court of Appeals, 465 Phil. 114, 126 (2004); Heirs of Dela
Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 652, 660-661 (1998).
88[71] Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 107, 118 (1999); Spouses Rosario v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil 729,
748 (1999); Heirs of De Guzman Tuazon v. Court of Appeals, supra.
89[72] Heirs of De Guzman Tuazon v. Court of Appeals, supra note 70 at 126-127.
 [respondents] wished to assert their ownership, they should have filed a judicial
action for recovery of possession and not merely to have the land registered under their
respective names. x x x Certificates of title do not establish ownership.90[73] (Emphasis
supplied)

A registration proceeding is not a conclusive adjudication of ownership. In fact, if

it is later on found in another case (where the issue of ownership is squarely adjudicated)
that the registrant is not the owner of the property, the real owner can file a reconveyance
case and have the title transferred to his name.91[74]

Given that a registration proceeding (such as the certification of ancestral lands) is

not a conclusive adjudication of ownership, it will not constitute litis pendentia on a
reivindicatory case where the issue is ownership.92[75] For litis pendentia to be a ground
for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties,
or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c)
the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any
judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
90[73] Heirs of Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, supra note 70.
91[74] The Land Registration Act as well as the Cadastral Act protects only the holders of a title in good faith and
does not permit its provisions to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or that one should enrich
himself at the expense of another. The above-stated Acts do not give anybody, who resorts to the provisions
thereof, a better title than he really and lawfully has. If he happened to obtain it by mistake or to secure, to
the prejudice of his neighbor, more land than he really owns, with or without bad faith on his part, the
certificate of title, which may have been issued to him under the circumstances, may and should be cancelled
or corrected. Angeles v. Samia, 66 Phil. 444, 449 (1938). Citations omitted.
The Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA Law likewise provides for cancellation of illegally
acquired titles and reconveyance to the rightful ICCs/IPs (Section 9, Part I, Rule VIII).
92[75] An accion de reivindicatoria x x x is a suit to recover possession of a parcel of land as an element of
ownership. It is an action whereby the plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of
its full possession. The judgment in such a case determines the ownership of the property and the awards the
possession of the property to the lawful owner. Amoroso v. Alegre, Jr., supra note 70 at 653.
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.93[76] The third element is
missing, for any judgment in the certification case would not constitute res judicata or be
conclusive on the ownership issue involved in the reivindicatory case. Since there is no
litis pendentia, there is no reason for the reivindicatory case to be suspended or dismissed
in favor of the certification case.

Moreover, since there is no litis pendentia, we cannot agree with petitioners

contention that respondent committed forum-shopping. Settled is the rule that forum
shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.94[77]

Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to

decide the case in light of the effectivity of RA
8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
1997 at the time that the complaint was
instituted

For the first time in the entire proceedings of this case, petitioners raise the trial
courts alleged lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter in light of the effectivity95[78]
of the IPRA at the time that the complaint was filed in 1998. They maintain that, under
the IPRA, it is the NCIP which has jurisdiction over land disputes involving indigenous
cultural communities and indigenous peoples.

93[76] City of Caloocan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145004, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 45, 55-56.
94[77] Development Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses Gatal, 493 Phil. 46, 53 (2005).
95[78] Effective November 22, 1997.
 As a rule, an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time
of the proceedings. This is because jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties or vested
by the agreement of the parties. Jurisdiction is vested by law, which prevails at the time
of the filing of the complaint.

An exception to this rule has been carved by jurisprudence. In the seminal case of
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,96[79] the Court ruled that the existence of laches will prevent a
party from raising the courts lack of jurisdiction. Laches is defined as the failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.97[80] Wisely,
some cases98[81] have cautioned against applying Tijam, except for the most
exceptional cases where the factual milieu is similar to Tijam.

In Tijam, the surety could have raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction in the trial
court but failed to do so. Instead, the surety participated in the proceedings and filed
pleadings, other than a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. When the case reached
the appellate court, the surety again participated in the case and filed their pleadings
therein. It was only after receiving the appellate courts adverse decision that the surety
awoke from its slumber and filed a motion to dismiss, in lieu of a motion for

96[79] 131 Phil. 556 (1968).

97[80] Id. at 563.
98[81] Figueroa v. People, G.R. No. 147406, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 63; Calimlim v. Ramirez, 204 Phil. 25 (1982).
reconsideration. The CA certified the matter to this Court, which then ruled that the
surety was already barred by laches from raising the jurisdiction issue.

In case at bar, the application of the Tijam doctrine is called for because the
presence of laches cannot be ignored. If the surety in Tijam was barred by laches for
raising the issue of jurisdiction for the first time in the CA, what more for petitioners in
the instant case who raised the issue for the first time in their petition before this Court.

At the time that the complaint was first filed in 1998, the IPRA was already in
effect but the petitioners never raised the same as a ground for dismissal; instead they
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the value of the property did not meet the
jurisdictional value for the RTC. They obviously neglected to take the IPRA into
consideration.

When the amended complaint was filed in 1998, the petitioners no longer raised
the issue of the trial courts lack of jurisdiction. Instead, they proceeded to trial, all the
time aware of the existence of the IPRA as evidenced by the cross-examination99[82]
conducted by petitioners lawyer on the CSTFAL Chairman Guillermo Fianza. In the
cross-examination, it was revealed that the petitioners were aware that the DENR,
through the CSTFAL, had lost its jurisdiction over ancestral land claims by virtue of the
enactment of the IPRA. They assailed the validity of the CSTFAL resolution favoring

99[82] TSN Records, pp. 234-286.

respondent on the ground that the CSTFAL had been rendered functus officio under the
IPRA. Inexplicably, petitioners still did not question the trial courts jurisdiction.

When petitioners recoursed to the appellate court, they only raised as errors the
trial courts appreciation of the evidence and the conclusions that it derived therefrom. In
their brief, they once again assailed the CSTFALs resolution as having been rendered
functus officio by the enactment of IPRA.100[83] But nowhere did petitioners assail the
trial courts ruling for having been rendered without jurisdiction.

It is only before this Court, eight years after the filing of the complaint, after the
trial court had already conducted a full-blown trial and rendered a decision on the merits,
after the appellate court had made a thorough review of the records, and after petitioners
have twice encountered adverse decisions from the trial and the appellate courts that
petitioners now want to expunge all the efforts that have gone into the litigation and
resolution of their case and start all over again. This practice cannot be allowed.

Thus, even assuming arguendo that petitioners theory about the effect of IPRA is
correct (a matter which need not be decided here), they are already barred by laches from
raising their jurisdictional objection under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The
March 30, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78987 and its
May 26, 2006 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration are AFFIRMED.
100[83] Appellants Brief, p. 17; CA rollo, p. 63.
 SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

 JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice