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DOI: 10.1111/ejop.

12192

Synthetic Evidence and Objective Identity: The


Contemporary Significance of Early Husserl’s
Conception of Truth
Lambert Zuidervaart

Abstract: This essay explores Edmund Husserl’s significance for contemporary


truth theory. Focusing on his Logical Investigations (1900/1901), it argues that
early Husserl’s conception of truth unsettles a common polarity between epistemic
and nonepistemic approaches. Unlike contemporary epistemic conceptions of
truth, he gives full weight to “truth makers” that have their own being: objective
identity, perceptible objects, and states of affairs. Yet, unlike contemporary
nonepistemic conceptions, he also insists on the intentional givenness of such truth
makers and on the complexity of the experiences within which propositional truth
claims arise. To develop this argument, the essay explains how early Husserl’s
conception of truth builds on his phenomenology of intentional experience and
knowledge. By emphasizing an objective identity between what is signitively
meant and intuitively given, Husserl’s approach provides a way to resituate prop-
ositional truth within a broader and more dynamic conception of truth.

Our right to a more expansive interpretation of these concepts [of being


and truth] is unassailable.—Edmund Husserl1
Debates about whether Edmund Husserl has an epistemic conception of
truth have decisively shaped Anglo-American interpretations of his Logical In-
vestigations. These debates revolve around the following question: Does Husserl
think the truth of a proposition depends on whether someone is or could be jus-
tified in believing or asserting the proposition? Philosophers who affirm that
propositional truth depends on discursive justification to some significant
degree have what is called an epistemic conception of truth. Philosophers
who deny this have a nonepistemic conception. This question is especially
prominent in discussions of how Husserl’s theory of evidence relates to his
conception of truth.
These discussions presuppose a more comprehensive divide among those who
interpret Husserl as an epistemologically motivated idealist, those who read him
as a realist, and those who argue that he moved from the realism (whether Pla-
tonic or not) of his early Logical Investigations (1900/1901) to the idealism of his
later Ideas I (1913), Cartesian Meditations (1931), and other writings. A survey of
Anglo-American Husserl scholarship in the past 50 years would show how

[Correction added on 27 February 2018, after first online publication: An abstract has been
added.]

European Journal of Philosophy 26:1 ISSN 0966-8373 pp. 122–144 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Synthetic Evidence and Objective Identity 123

deeply this divide over realism versus idealism has channeled the reception of
Husserl’s discussion of ‘truth’ in the Logical Investigations. Louis Dupré, for exam-
ple, reads Husserl as a lifelong idealist: ‘If by idealism one understands an epis-
temological position in which truth is entirely immanent [to consciousness],
then the Logical Investigations are as idealistic as his later works’ (Dupré 1964:
354). Dallas Willard, by contrast, reads Husserl’s Logical Investigations as realist,
even though Willard thinks Husserl’s quest for a rigorously scientific philosophy,
which motivates such realism, was bound to fail: ‘If there are minds with true as-
sumptions or beliefs about the objects of “experience,” then those objects must ex-
ist, and insofar there is of necessity a “world.” The world’s existence is therefore
relative to truth, but not to minds; and … truth itself is for Husserl independent
of minds’ (Willard 1984: 237).
More recently, Lee Hardy has argued that, both in the Logical Investigations and
in later writings, Husserl’s philosophy of the physical sciences was realist with re-
spect to theories and theoretical entities—and with respect to truth—even though
he was an instrumentalist with respect to scientific laws and their objects: ‘Husserl
was indeed an instrumentalist, but … his instrumentalism is restricted to an inter-
pretation of scientific laws, not theories. His phenomenology is in fact consistent
with a realistic construal of scientific theories’ (Hardy 2013: 4). In making this argu-
ment, Hardy rejects interpretations of Husserl’s phenomenology as a type of ‘meta-
physical idealism’,2 and he relies heavily on a Fregean interpretation of the later
Husserl’s conception of the noema.3
Such interpretations help indicate the potential relevance of Husserl’s work for
contemporary debates in Anglo-American truth theory.4 Yet, they also occlude the
challenges his work raises to the framework of these debates. These challenges
make up the deeper significance of his work—as I aim to show, focusing on the
conception of truth in Husserl’s Logical Investigations.5 First I comment on Hardy’s
interpretation and preview Husserl’s concept of truth as objective identity (sections
1–2). Next, I reconstruct early Husserl’s conception of evidence and truth in con-
nection with his account of intuitive fulfillment (sections 3–4).6 And then, I propose
a different framework for understanding Husserl’s conception (section 5), empha-
sizing not the relation between propositional truth and the discursive justification
of beliefs but instead the relation between synthetic knowledge and objective
identity.

1. Propositional Truth

Lee Hardy begins by pointing to a necessary correlation between truth and


existence in Husserl’s conception of truth: ‘If a proposition is true, then the
corresponding state of affairs obtains; if a state of affairs obtains, then the
corresponding proposition is true’ (Hardy 2013: 79). Yet, Husserl also posits a
close connection between truth and evidence, leading some commentators to
argue, in effect, that Husserl has an epistemic conception of propositional truth.
Specifically, such commentators, whom Hardy opposes, argue that for Husserl a
proposition is true if and only if it is evident, in the sense that the corresponding

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124 Lambert Zuidervaart

state of affairs is perceptually given.7 On this epistemic construal, propositional


truth hinges on the perceptual givenness of a state of affairs, not on its existence.
Moreover, Hardy also argues, this construal ‘commits Husserl to a form of
idealism’ understood as ‘the claim that the existence of things is somehow
dependent upon states of consciousness’ such as conscious perception (Hardy
2013: 81).
Hardy’s alternative reading, which allows Husserl to maintain a nonepistemic
conception of truth, is to regard evidence as the necessary and sufficient condition
for justified belief and not for truth as such: ‘Evidence does not make a proposition
true. But it does make us justified in believing it is true’ (Hardy 2013: 82). This
reading allows Husserl to be a realist concerning theoretical entities, which can ex-
ist even though they cannot be perceptually given.8
To develop this interpretation and to reject epistemic construals of Husserl’s
conception of truth, Hardy makes three crucial moves. First, he distinguishes be-
tween ‘monothetic’ and ‘synthetic’ concepts of evidence in Husserl’s work and
claims that the synthetic concept is ‘a nonstarter’ (Hardy 2013: 89). Whereas
monothetic evidence pertains to a single act ‘whereby an object or state of
affairs is intuitively given’ (Hardy 2013: 85)—for example, an act of sensuous
perception—synthetic evidence pertains to a coinciding between two
qualitatively distinct acts whereby an intuitively empty signitive intention is in-
tuitively fulfilled. Next, focusing on the monothetic concept, Hardy argues that
Husserl posits a correlation not between the truth of propositions and actual or
occurrent cases of evidence but rather between propositional truth and ‘the
ideal possibility of evidence’, where ideal possibility means that ‘the actual
occurrence of evidence’ is ideally possible ‘in some possible consciousness’
(Hardy 2013: 90, 93). Then Hardy claims that, on ‘Husserl’s mature theory of
evidence’ (presumably in writings subsequent to the Logical Investigations), ‘all
occurrent cases of evidence are fallible’ and hence incapable of guaranteeing
propositional truth: ‘Given that every occurrent case of evidence is necessarily
inadequate, it is not true that if p is evident, p is true’. At most, occurrent cases
of evidence make us ‘justified in believing’ that the corresponding propositions
are true (Hardy 2013: 93–7).
With these moves, Hardy clarifies the issues at stake in the Logical Investigations
with respect to evidence and truth. Contrary to Hardy’s interpretation, however, I
regard the synthetic concept of evidence as central to early Husserl’s conception of
truth, and I do not consider it a ‘nonstarter’. Moreover, Hardy’s proposed idealiza-
tion of actual evidence tends to undermine the clear sense in which Husserl
regards truth as more than simply propositional, a tendency that characterizes
most Fregean interpretations of Husserl’s theory of intentionality.9 Although I
share Hardy’s view that the early Husserl does not have an epistemic conception
of truth, I believe the conception proposed in the Logical Investigations points be-
yond the epistemic/nonepistemic polarity in contemporary truth theory. A first
step toward explaining this belief, as well as my reservations about Hardy’s inter-
pretation, is to consider the concept of truth as objective identity in Husserl’s Sixth
Investigation.

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Synthetic Evidence and Objective Identity 125

2. Truth as Objective Identity

Like Hardy and Elisabeth Ströker, I agree that ‘Husserl is not proposing a theory of
truth simpliciter; rather, he is conducting a phenomenological clarification of the
sense of truth’. Yet, ‘the question of the sense of truth’ is not simply, as Hardy puts
it, ‘the question of how, in the course of experience, a proposition comes to acquire
the status of being true for us’ (Hardy 2013: 96).10 Certainly, the truth of proposi-
tions for us is part of the question. But it is only part, and three of the four concepts
of truth laid out in Investigation Six are not about propositional truth per se. In-
deed, as Ströker points out, the decisive concept there is not the truth of proposi-
tions but the truth of objective being. Moreover, this concept ‘differs essentially
from the usual concept of truth in the sense of the old theory of adequation, which
defines the truth of propositions, a more precise form of which today dominates
the discussion of truth in the analytic theory of science. As Husserl understands
it, “true” is not a predicate of judgment, but a predicate of the state of affairs’
(Ströker 1987: 38).11
The concept of truth Ströker has in view here is the first of four that Husserl de-
scribes and endorses, namely, truth as the objective correlate to the synthetic act of
‘evidence’. I label this first concept of truth as (1) objective identity, to distinguish it
from the other three closely related concepts of truth as (2) inter-active coincidence
(i.e., what Husserl means by evidence in the strict sense), (3) intuitive fullness, and
(4) signitive correctness. Only the fourth of these maps onto standard notions of
propositional truth, although its extension is wider than such notions.
When he calls truth as identity, the ‘objective correlate’ of evidence—i.e., of ev-
idence in its ‘epistemologically precise sense’ as ‘the act of [the] most perfect synthesis
of fulfillment’ (LU II.2, 651; LI 2, 263, tm)—Husserl, as I read him, does not make
any claims about whether evidence either justifies true belief (Hardy) or guaran-
tees propositional truth (epistemic construals). Husserl’s claim is that truth as iden-
tity is the state of being to which an objectifying act of knowledge must be
adequate. Depending on the nature of the act, it must be adequate either to the
‘state of affairs’ (Sachverhalt) the act signitively identifies or to the objective ‘iden-
tity’ (Identität) the act synthetically posits. Whereas a state of affairs is the objective
correlate to signitive acts in which we assert propositions—what I shall call
‘signitive identifications’—an objective identity is the correlate to an act of syn-
thetic identification in which signitive and intuitive acts coincide. In such synthetic
acts, when they are completely adequate, we ‘experience’ truth as objective iden-
tity, he says.
Leaving aside truth as a state of affairs for now, we can ask what it means to ex-
perience truth as objective identity. Such experience does not necessarily mean that
we propositionally grasp this truth when we synthetically posit identity, for such
positing need not be propositional. This is an obvious implication of the reserva-
tion Husserl had expressed earlier in the Addendum to §8 in Investigation Six
(LU II.2, 569–70; LI 2, 208) and mentions once again when he presents the concept
of truth as objective identity (LU II.2, 652; LI 2, 263). In what Husserl calls a nom-
inal act one can correctly name or refer to a perceived object (e.g., ‘This house’) and

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126 Lambert Zuidervaart

thereby experience the identity between the object as perceived and the object as
signified—i.e., experience truth as objective identity—without one’s engaging in
a relational act—an ‘act of relational identification’ (LU II.2, 569; LI 2, 208)—that, typ-
ically, would be propositional (e.g., ‘This is a house’). Because the act of ‘evidence’
need not be relational or propositional, to call truth as identity the ‘objective corre-
late’ of evidence is not to make or imply a claim about what justifies or guarantees
propositional truth, for truth as objective identity can be experienced, in an act of
evidence, in a pre-propositional way.12
To explicate this relation between synthetic evidence and truth as objective iden-
tity, one needs to reconstruct pertinent elements in the phenomenology of knowl-
edge that Husserl develops before he discusses the concepts of evidence and
truth. Only after analyzing intentional experiences and their ‘contents’ in Investi-
gation Five, and distinguishing intuitive acts from merely signitive acts in Investi-
gation Six, does Husserl land on his account of evidence and truth (Chapter 5 in
the Sixth Investigation). And then, he enriches this account in a section on ‘Sense
and Understanding’, where he lays out his theory of categorial intuition. Let me re-
view some of the preparatory moves Husserl makes in Investigations Five and Six,
focusing on his accounts of meaning-fulfillment and intuitive fullness as constitu-
ents of cognitive synthesis.13

3. Cognitive Synthesis

According to Husserl, to assert a proposition requires the use of linguistic expres-


sions that have meaning. Already in Investigation One, he had explained what
such linguistic meaning involves.14 It involves someone’s intentionally employing
linguistic expressions to say something about the objects to which one refers. By it-
self, however, such use of linguistic expressions does not give us full cognitive ac-
cess to the intended objects. The linguistically expressed meaning needs to be
fulfilled through acts of perception or imagination or both. Accordingly, Husserl
draws a fundamental distinction between meaning-conferring acts
(bedeutungsverleihende Akte) and meaning-fulfilling acts (bedeutungserfüllende Akte),
between meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment (LU II.1, 44; LI 1, 192).

3.1. Meaning and Fulfillment

To account for the relationship between meaning and fulfillment, Husserl intro-
duces a comprehensive distinction between two sorts of objectifying acts: between
signitive acts and intuitive acts. The constant theme of early Husserl’s epistemol-
ogy is the distinction between signitive and intuitive acts, and their coincidence
in synthetic acts of fulfillment that provide ‘the synthesis of knowing [Synthesis
des Erkennens]’. All signitive and intuitive acts aim at a ‘unity of fulfillment’, he
claims, whether as a ‘unity of identification’ or, more narrowly, as a ‘unity of
knowledge’ to which ‘objective identity corresponds as the intentional correlate’
(LU II.2, 582–6; LI 2, 216–18, tm).15 So, knowledge is the overriding goal of

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Synthetic Evidence and Objective Identity 127

objectifying acts. Given Husserl’s concept of truth as objective identity, we can also
say that, in principle, objectifying acts aim at truth.
Husserl’s ‘phenomenological elucidation of knowledge’ in the Sixth Investiga-
tion begins with the example of a relational act, namely, a judgment of perception
(Wahrnehmungsurteil) such as is expressed in the words ‘There flies a blackbird’. He
concludes from this example that the expressed meaning (Bedeutung) lies not in the
act of perception but in the expressive act of making this judgment. Yet, to yield
knowledge, the two acts must mutually coincide in ‘the unity of fulfillment’ (LU
II.2, 556; LI 2, 199). A similar pattern obtains for nominal expressions and mean-
ing-intentions. First, Husserl considers examples of a ‘static unity’ between
signitive and intuitive acts, such the use of the word ‘inkpot’ to name a directly
perceptible object (LU II.2, 558–65; LI 2, 201–6). Then he turns to a ‘dynamic unity’
between the act of pure meaning (der Akt des puren Bedeutens) and the act of render-
ing something intuitive (der veranschaulichende Akt). Dynamic unity occurs when a
nominal expression first functions symbolically or signitively,16 and then a corre-
sponding perception or imagination comes to accompany it.
In such cases of dynamic unity, the phenomenology of fulfillment becomes
completely apparent: by itself, the signitive act is an act of meaning-intention; only
in conjunction with the corresponding intuitive act, in which the object is given,
does the signitively intended meaning get fulfilled. From the standpoint of the
intended object, we can speak of a (potential) knowledge of the object. From the
phenomenologically preferable standpoint of the two coinciding acts, we can
speak of a fulfillment of the meaning-intention (LU II.2, 566–7; LI 2, 206–7). On
the object side, there is a more or less complete objective identity. On the act side,
there is a more or less complete fulfillment that is simultaneously an experience of
identity, an act of identification (LU II.2, 567–9; LI 2, 207–8). The same relation-
ships, albeit with a higher degree of complexity, are in effect for relational and
propositional acts such as judgments and assertions.
These relationships are not additive, however, as if the object as synthetically
intended were added to the object as intuited and the object as signified. No, objective
identity is ‘there from the start as … unexpressed, unconceptualized experience’ and
is not dragged in later ‘through comparative, cogitatively mediated reflection’. Nev-
ertheless, the act of identification or fulfillment is a distinct act, not to be equated with
either the act of signification or the act of intuition. This is so because the objective
identity, more or less complete, ‘corresponds to the act of fulfillment’, and not to either
the signitive or the intuitive act (LU II.2, 568; LI 2, 207–8, tm).
Like signitive acts, perceptual acts also seek fulfillment, through what Husserl
calls ‘the synthesis of thingly identity [sachliche Identität]’. Although every single
perception of a particular object will be ‘a mixture of fulfilled and unfulfilled inten-
tions’, he says, all perceptual syntheses of fulfillment aim to be ‘identifications’—to
identify ‘self-appearances [Selbsterscheinungen] of an object with self-appearances
of the same object’ (LU II.2, 590–1; LI 2, 221, tm).
A similar dynamic between partial adumbrations and ideal synthesis charac-
terizes acts of imagination, which typically employ images (Bilder) that must, in
some important way, resemble the appearance of the object imagined.17 In this

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128 Lambert Zuidervaart

way, acts of perception and imagination have a ‘mutual affinity’


(Zusammengehörigkeit) both to one another and to the object itself (Sache selbst).
Such affinity distinguishes intuitive acts from acts that have a signitive intention,
where sign and signified ‘have nothing to do with one another’ (LU II.2, 591; LI 2,
221–2).

3.2. Intuitive Fullness

Acts of fulfillment display different degrees of fullness, however, just as correlative


acts of knowledge display different degrees of perfection (Vollkommenheit). Hence,
when he turns to the gradations of knowledge (Erkenntnisstufen), Husserl intro-
duces ‘fullness’ as a third component alongside the quality and matter of objectify-
ing acts. We cannot explain differences in degrees of fulfillment via either the
quality or the matter of acts, he says: these differences can occur between two or
more acts that have the very same quality and matter and aim at the same object.
Rather, we must trace differences in the degree of fulfillment—and in degrees of
epistemic perfection—back to the relative ‘fullness’ (Fülle) of the intuitive act. Be-
cause only intuitions can have fullness, we can say of signitive intentions that they
are ‘in themselves “empty”’. They merely point to (hinweisen) the object, and ‘they
“are in need of fullness”’. They receive such fullness only insofar as they are ren-
dered intuitive within acts of identification and fulfillment (LU II.2, 607, LI 2,
233, tm). Accordingly, we must regard fullness as a new and third ‘moment’ of
the intuitive act, in addition to the act’s quality and matter, although as a comple-
tion (Ergänzung) of the act’s matter (LU II.2, 600–1, LI 2, 229).18
There is an important difference, however, in the types of fullness achieved by
acts of imagination and perception, respectively. Whereas the fullness of an imag-
inative presentation—an analogical representation (analogische Repräsentation), in
Husserl’s technical vocabulary—depends on how many of the presented object’s
features (Merkmale) it accommodates and how closely it resembles them, the fullness
of a perceptual presentation—Präsentation, in Husserl’s technical vocabulary—de-
pends on the extent to which it grasps the thing itself (Selbsterfassung) and presents
the thing’s objective moments (Selbstdarstellung) (LU II.2, 608; LI 2, 234). Neverthe-
less, whether as imaginatively or perceptually apprehended, the purely intuitive
contents of intuitive acts ‘point unambiguously’ to the object’s ‘definitely corre-
sponding contents’, presenting (darstellende) these intuitive contents ‘in imagina-
tive or perceptual adumbrations [Abschattungen]’. Husserl calls such intuitively
apprehended intuitive contents the ‘intuitive substance (Gehalt) of the act’, to the ex-
clusion of all signitive components (LU II.2, 609–10; LI 2, 235, tm).
Yet, even the intuitive substance of a pure perception is not identical with the
object itself. It may still be a ‘mere’ perception: ‘it need not attain the ideal of
adequation, where the presenting [darstellende] content is simultaneously the pre-
sented [dargestellte] content’. Thus, like pure imagination, pure perception admits
of ‘differing degrees of fullness’ with respect to the same intentional object: there
can be potentially more to be perceived or more exactness to be achieved (LU
II.2, 613–14; LI 2, 237–8, tm).

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Synthetic Evidence and Objective Identity 129

The differing degrees of fullness pertain to an intuition’s extent or richness (the


relative completeness with which the content of the object gets perceptually pre-
sented or imaginatively represented), its liveliness [how closely the presentation
or representation approximates (Annäherung) the object’s corresponding moments
of content], and its substantial reality or substantiality (Realitätsgehalt) (the relative
number of the presenting or representing contents). Ideally, perception would have
maximal richness, liveliness, and substantiality—it would be ‘the self-apprehen-
sion [Selbsterfassung] of the full and whole object’ (LU II.2, 614; LI 2, 238, tm), in
conjunction with synthetic acts of identification in which signitive intentions can
find fulfillment. Relative fullness accrues to intuitive contents within their role in
a possible fulfillment-synthesis.19
What, then, is the relationship between the fullness of intuitive contents, on the
one hand, and what Husserl describes as the ‘matter’ (die Materie) of objectifying
acts? An act’s matter is what makes the act intend ‘exactly this object in exactly this
manner, i.e., in exactly these articulations and forms and with special reference to
exactly these features [Bestimmtheiten] or relationships’ (LU II.2, 617; LI 2, 240, tm).
Matter is what allows qualitatively different acts, such as signitive and intuitive
acts, intend the same with respect to the object. Whether, for example, one believes
that the tree is green or simply asserts this without believing it or simply perceives
the tree as green without either believing or asserting, the intended greenness of
the tree is a matter that all of these acts have in common. Hence, in the context
of a wholly unified act of identification, matter is what serves in the coinciding acts
‘as the basis for identification [als Fundament der Identifizierung]’ (LU II.2, 618; LI 2,
241, tm). The fullness of intuitive contents, by contrast, is the degree to which the
matter of an intuition is adequate to the content of the object that an intuition pre-
sents or represents. Moreover, intuitive fullness is what allows signitive acts not
simply to intend an object and have this signitive intention fulfilled but to have this
fulfillment be more or less adequate to the object.20
From an epistemic perspective, then, we can distinguish between adequate and
inadequate intuitions (Anschauungen) of an object, as well as between complete
(vollständig) and defective (lückenhaft) intuitions in the context of fulfillment.21 Sim-
ilarly, an object meant in a signitive act can be rendered intuitive
(Veranschaulichung) in either an adequate or an inadequate fashion. In the case of
adequately intuitioned (signitive) meanings that are complex, either all of the
meaning’s parts receive fulfillment ‘through corresponding parts of the fulfilling
intuition’ or the fulfilling intuition itself, in all of its corresponding parts, is intrin-
sically adequate to the object. If we have both, then our intuitional rendering is ‘ob-
jectively complete’ LU II.2, 627–30; LI 2, 246–8, tm).22
To summarize: Early Husserl’s accounts of truth as objective identity and of
evidence as a synthetic act presuppose a phenomenology of fulfillment and
fullness that refuses to divorce propositional truth from a more comprehensive
cognitive synthesis.23 This cognitive synthesis involves both unity between
qualitatively distinct objectifying acts—i.e., between signitive and intuitive
acts—and gradations in the adequacy with which an intuitive act presents or
represents the object of cognition. One needs to keep his account of cognitive

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130 Lambert Zuidervaart

synthesis in mind in order to make sense of the relation early Husserl posits
between synthetic evidence and objective truth.

4. Evidence and Truth

The background we have canvassed, culminating in the notion of intuitive ade-


quacy, lays extensive groundwork for the Sixth Investigation’s relatively brief
chapter on evidence and truth (Chapter 5). Husserl regards adequation, properly
understood, as the ideal of knowledge, which itself arises in intentional experience
that involves signitive and intuitive objectifying acts.

4.1. Adequation and Evidence

We need to distinguish between two types of adequation as an ideal, however.


First there is the (ideal of) adequation between the act of intuition and an object
that is imagined, perceived, or both imagined and perceived. Strictly speaking,
only intuitive acts can have fullness, to a greater or lesser degree, depending on
the completeness, precision, and number of their adumbrations—i.e., depending
on the richness, liveliness, and substantiality of their intuitive contents. Moreover,
among intuitive acts, only perceptions can be completely adequate to their
intended object: whereas the images of imagination make the object indirectly
present (Vergegenwärtigen), only perception can make it directly present
(Gegenwärtigen, Präsentieren). This is so even though our perceptions, for the most
part, are mere perceptions.24 The content of perception, even when it offers an ap-
pearance, counts for us as being identical with the thing itself, thanks to the percep-
tion’s relative fullness and the directness with which it presents the object. The
ideal of adequation for the fullness of perceptual adumbrations is the object’s ‘ab-
solute self … for every presented element of the object’ (LU II.2, 647; LI 2, 260).
The second type of adequation pertains to acts of fulfillment where intuitive
and signitive intentions coincide. Such acts achieve adequation ‘when the signi-
fied objectivity [die bedeutete Gegenständlichkeit] is in the strict sense given in the in-
tuition, and is given exactly as what it is thought and meant’. Every intellectual
(gedankliche) intention finds its ‘final fulfillment’ (letzte Erfüllung) when the intui-
tion in its fulfilling function no long implies any ‘unsatisfied intentions’ (LU
II.2, 648; LI 2, 261, tm). Further, this second type of adequation depends on the
first: only the intuition’s adequation to the object offers the final (letzte) fulfillment
of the intention that terminates in it, for only it does not need any further
fulfillment.
Accordingly, the ideal of adequation would be completely met when fulfillment
increases to the point that ‘the complete and entire intention has reached … an ul-
timate and final fulfillment’. In such a fulfillment, the intuitive substance (Gehalt) is
‘the absolute sum of possible fullness; the intuitive representative is the object it-
self, just as [so wie] it is in itself’.25 When this occurs, ‘the objective element [das
Gegenständliche] is actually “present” [“gegenwärtig”] or “given” [“gegeben”] exactly

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Synthetic Evidence and Objective Identity 131

as what it is intended; no partial intention is further implied that would lack fulfill-
ment’ (LU II.2, 647; LI 2, 260–1, tm).26
This account of adequation provides the basis for Husserl’s notion of evidence
(Evidenz), which he regards as the ideal synthetic act of identification. In a loose
sense, he says, we can use the term ‘evidence’ to refer to any act of identification
where a positing intention, especially an affirmation or declaration (Behauptung),
receives confirmation (Bestätigung) through a perception that corresponds to it
and is completely adapted to it (vollangepasste Wahrnehmung). In the strict sense,
however—in ‘the epistemologically precise sense’—evidence concerns ‘the ideal
of adequate perception, of the complete self-appearance of the object’ within an
act of fulfillment. Evidence in this strict sense concerns the act of ‘the most com-
plete [vollkommensten] fulfillment-synthesis, which gives the intention, e.g. the in-
tention of judgment, the absolute fullness of content, that of the object itself. The
object is not merely meant, but rather it is in the strictest sense given, given just
as it is meant and made one with the meaning [in eins gesetzt mit dem Meinen]’.
As the objectifying, identifying, and most complete synthesis of coincidence
(Deckungssynthesis), evidence has its objective correlate in ‘being [Sein] in the
sense of truth’ or, more simply, ‘truth’—in at least one sense of the term (LU
II.2, 651; LI 2, 263, tm).
Before we (re)turn to this concept of truth as objective identity, it is important to
elaborate what Husserl means by evidence in the strict sense, to which truth as ob-
jective identity is the ‘objective correlate’. As I read him, Husserl here proposes a
synthetic concept of evidence as an ideal guiding all acts of knowing. He does
not have in view either occurrent cases of evidence or the mere possibility of evi-
dence. Nor does he regard evidence primarily as the basis for discursively justify-
ing beliefs. Evidence in its strict sense is the operative ideal of complete adequation
that obtains both within and for synthetic acts of identification and fulfillment. As
we have seen, such adequation is intuitive in a double sense: it involves both the
relative fullness of intuition with respect to the intended object and the degree to
which a signitive intention is intuitively fulfilled. Such adequation is not simply ac-
tual, insofar as it cannot be equated with the occurrence of particular synthetic acts
that aim to be adequate. Nor is it merely possible, for it provides the sense for all
acts that aim at knowledge.
Moreover, although we can loosely speak of perceptual acts or previous percep-
tions that confirm propositional claims as ‘evidence’ or ‘evident’, evidence in this
loose (monothetic) sense is itself governed by evidence in the strict (synthetic)
sense. For the cognitive sense of both perceptual acts and propositional claims is
anchored in synthetic acts whose operative ideal is evidence in the strict sense. Ac-
cordingly, evidence in the strict sense should not be regarded primarily as a basis
for justifying propositional truth claims. Nor, for that matter, can truth as objective
identity be reduced to evidence. Instead, as Husserl asserts, evidence as ideal syn-
thesis and truth as objective identity are correlative. In other words, they are simul-
taneously in effect as the twinned ideal of adequation that governs synthetic
knowledge, such that we cannot make sense of one without making sense of the
other.

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132 Lambert Zuidervaart

4.2. Four Concepts

By the same token, Husserl’s concept of truth as objective identity is not a concept
of propositional truth. As I mentioned earlier, Husserl distinguishes among four
concepts of truth: as objective identity, as inter-active coincidence, as intuitive full-
ness, and as signitive correctness. The first and third pertain to what I label the ‘ob-
ject side’ of intentional acts of objectification.27 The other two pertain to what I
label the ‘subject side’ of such acts. His account moves back and forth between ob-
ject side and subject side.
The first concept—objective identity—concerns the objective correlate to acts of
identification and fulfillment. Truth in this sense is either the state of affairs
(Sachverhalt) that correlates with a signitive identification or the objective identity
(Identität) that correlates with a coinciding synthetic identification (Korrelate einer
deckenden Identifizierung). Objective identity would be the complete agreement
(Übereinstimmung) between the signitively meant and the intuitively given object.
When we perform a synthetic and fulfilled identification, we experience this objec-
tive agreement in the act of synthetic evidence (LU II.2, 651–2; LI 2, 263).
Importantly, as Husserl immediately indicates, such experience can occur in a
pre-reflective manner: we can intentionally experience the truth as correlated ob-
jective identity without signitively objectifying the identity we have experienced.
‘Pre-reflective’ here does not mean pre-conscious or unintentional or pre-
signitive. Plainly, the experience of objective identity is conscious and inten-
tional, and it involves a signitive dimension. Rather, pre-reflective means that
the identity presents itself directly to the synthetic act and does not need to
present itself as a ‘state of affairs’ about which one makes a propositional claim.
As Husserl puts it, this synthetic act, this act of evidence, in which truth as ob-
jective identity is experienced, need not be the perception (Wahrnehmung) or ad-
equate perception of truth as objective identity, taking perception in a broad
sense that includes what he later discusses as ‘categorial intuition’. To perceive
the objective agreement between the signitively meant and perceptually given
object would require its own act of objectifying interpretation (Auffassung) (LU
II.2, 652; LI 2, 263–4).
Perhaps the following example illustrates what Husserl means. Let us say I
judge a house to be green on the basis of perceiving it as a green house and my
judging and perceiving completely coincide. In this case, I can experience the ob-
jective agreement between the house as judged and the house as perceived—I
can signitively-intuitively and truly know ‘This house is green’, without needing
to assert successfully ‘It is true that this house is green’. If I successfully say
concerning a perceived object ‘This house is green’, I experience the house’s indeed
being green, just as I said—I experience truth as objective identity. If you then ask
me what I just experienced, I might reply ‘that this house is green, just as I said’. In
this second experience—the experience in which I make a reply—the original ob-
jective identity presents itself as a state of affairs about which propositional claims
can be made. I am no longer directly intending the object but intending something
about the object as originally intended. According to Husserl, I can experience the

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Synthetic Evidence and Objective Identity 133

truth as objective identity—the house’s being green as I said—without necessarily


experiencing this truth as a state of affairs—that the house as meant is identical
with the house as perceived.
The second concept of truth, a subject-sided concept, concerns a unity of coinci-
dence (Deckungseinheit) between qualitatively different acts that must occur when
we experience truth as objective identity. This unity is what Husserl means by ev-
idence in the strict sense, and it is what I have labeled ‘inter-active coincidence’.
The agreement here occurs not between the object as meant and the object as intu-
itively given but between the epistemic essence of the signitive act and the episte-
mic essence of the intuitive act. Because this agreement is not between the concrete
acts but between their epistemic essences, Husserl describes this concept of truth as
‘the idea that belongs to the act-form’ of evidence: this concept has to do with ‘the
ideal relationship … between the epistemic essences of the coinciding acts’. Thus,
for example, my act of synthetic identification with respect to the house’s being
green would be true in this sense if the semantic-epistemic essence of my signify-
ing with words ‘This house is green’ coincided with the intuitive-epistemic essence
of my act of perceiving the house as being green. Although, when I perform this
synthetic act, the coinciding of the actual signitive and intuitive acts is contingent,
their coinciding has an ‘ideal essence’, namely, ‘the Idea of absolute adequation as
such’ (LU II.2, 652; LI 2, 264, tm). In other words, the contingent act of evidence is
governed by the idea of (subject-sided) truth. Evidence in the strict sense is nothing
other than truth as ideal inter-active coincidence.
Returning to the object side, Husserl introduces a third concept of truth, one that
concerns the fullness of the intuited object in which the synthetic act finds fulfill-
ment. Here, we can say the object itself is true, insofar as it is indeed given intui-
tively just as it is signitively meant. Hence, for example, if I find complete
fulfillment for my intentional act of identifying the house as green, then the per-
ceived object, insofar as it provides ‘ideal fullness’ for this intention, is true (LU
II.2, 652; LI 2, 264).
This third concept, a concept of truth on the object side, points in turn to a fourth
concept, another subject-sided concept, namely, the truth of a signitive intention.
As a terminological marker for this specific sense of truth on the subject side, Hus-
serl introduces the term ‘Richtigkeit’—‘rightness’, in Findlay’s translation, and
‘correctness’, in my own rendering. Our signitive intention can be true—i.e., cor-
rect—with respect to the identified object. It can be adequate to its true object.
Again we are dealing with the idea of truth, namely, as ‘the correctness of the in-
tention’s epistemic essence in specie’ (LU II.2, 653; LI 2, 264, tm). This fourth con-
cept of truth is particularly relevant for understanding traditional conceptions of
propositional truth, such as Aristotle’s formulation ‘to say of what is that it is,
and of what is not that it is not, is true’.28 According to Husserl, an asserted prop-
osition is true—correct (richtig)—if it ‘“directs” itself to [richtet sich nach] the thing
itself, it says that it is so, and it really is so’. All such propositions are governed by
the ‘ideal possibility’ that a proposition having a certain content (ein Satz solcher
Materie) can find complete fulfillment, can find ‘the most rigorous adequation’ to
the true object (LU II.2, 653; LI 2, 264).

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134 Lambert Zuidervaart

Hence, Husserl identifies four interrelated concepts of truth as the ideal of


adequation. In my own terms, those related to the object side (the first and third
concepts), which have to do with the truth of what contemporary philosophers call
‘truth makers’, pertain to epistemic object functions: states of affairs, objective
identity between the signitively meant and the intuitively given, and the fullness
with which the object is intuitively given when signitively meant. The concepts re-
lated to the subject side (the second and fourth concepts), which pertain more or
less to the truth of what contemporary philosophers call ‘truth bearers’, single
out what I would call epistemic subject functions: the ideal coinciding between
signitive and intuitive acts, and the correctness of a signitive intention with respect
to the intended object (i.e., the object identified). In other words, early Husserl’s
conception of truth distinguishes four sites of adequacy: adequacy between object
functions (identity), adequacy between subject functions (coincidence), adequacy
of the object as given for the intention (fullness), and adequacy of the intention
for the given object (correctness).

4.3. Objective Identity and Propositional Correctness

The relation between Husserl’s first and fourth concepts is especially important in
light of contemporary debates about whether Husserl has an epistemic conception
of truth. Husserl himself explores this relation in some detail, first to secure his dis-
tinction between truth as objective identity and truth as propositional correctness,
and then to show how his approach can accommodate standard conceptions that
restrict truth to propositional correctness.
Husserl secures his distinction from two interrelated angles, namely, from the
object side and from the subject side. He begins from the object side, insisting that
we should not confuse objective identity with what I would term predicative iden-
tity—something’s predicatively identified being such and such. In Husserl’s own
language, we should not confuse ‘being’ in the ‘first, objective sense of truth’ with
‘the being of the copula of the “affirmative” categorical assertion [Aussage]’ (LU
II.2, 653; LI 2, 264, tm)—for example, the being indicated by ‘is’ in the assertion
‘This house is green’. Whereas, in synthetic acts of identification, identity pertains
to the complete coincidence (totale Deckung) between the object functions in ques-
tion—between the meant object and the object intuited—the ‘is’ of an assertion
usually indicates only a partial identity: the assertion usually picks out and means
only one feature or one set of features (greenness, for example), and, to count as
knowledge, it requires intuitive fulfillment that the assertoric act cannot itself pro-
vide. Even if ‘is’ were to indicate a total identification—if, for example, an assertion
about the house mentioned all of the relevant features—predicative identity would
not be the same as the synthetically intended identity of the object. Even in such
cases, being as objective identity is ‘experienced but not expressed’, and it ‘never
coincides with the being meant and experienced in the “is” of the assertion’ (LU
II.2, 653; LI 2, 264, tm).
This distinction between objective identity and predicative identity is reinforced
when one considers the subject side of truth—truth as inter-active coincidence

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Synthetic Evidence and Objective Identity 135

between signitive and intuitive acts. The assertoric ‘is’ expresses a predicative iden-
tity. It expresses an agreement (Übereinstimmung) between the subject and predi-
cate of the assertion itself. But the assertoric ‘is’ does not, in and of itself, express
the coincidence between a signitive (specifically assertoric) act and an intuitive
(specifically perceptual) act that nevertheless is required in order for the act of as-
sertion to achieve interactively coincident truth. Such subject-sided, inter-active co-
incidence ‘is plainly not asserted’, and, unlike predicative identity, it ‘does not
belong objectively [gegenständlich] to the asserted state of affairs [zum beurteilten
Sachverhalt]’. We can, of course, successfully make an assertion about the subjective
coincidence required for a particular assertion to be true. But then, this new asser-
tion about subjective coincidence as a state of affairs will itself require an act of
truth whose coinciding acts are not (yet) objectified. At each step, Husserl says,
we must distinguish between ‘the objectified and the not-objectified state of affairs’
(LU II.2, 653–4; LI 2, 264–5, tm). In other words, we must distinguish between what
is asserted and what allows the act of assertion to be true, which latter always nec-
essarily includes a non-assertoric and intuitive act as well as a coincidence between
assertoric and intuitive acts. Or, to make the same point from the object side, one-
dimensional predicative identity is not the same as multidimensional objective
identity.
Nevertheless, Husserl’s approach can accommodate narrower conceptions of
truth. The standard narrower accounts restrict truth to judgments (Urteile) and
propositions (Sätze) or to ‘their objective correlates, to states of affairs
[Sachverhalte]’. Claiming an ‘unassailable right’ to a more expansive (allgemeinere)
account, Husserl says ‘the very nature of the case demands that the concepts of
truth and falsehood should, in the first instance at least, be cast so widely as to en-
compass the whole sphere of objectifying acts’ (LU II.2, 654–5; LI 2, 265, tm). In
other words, the concept of truth should encompass, at a minimum, signitive
and intuitive acts, acts of identification and fulfillment, and the objective correlates
of these acts.
Hence, for example, both acts of naming and acts of asserting can be true, and
not only states of affairs but also other intended objects can be true. Even if we
agree to limit ‘truth’ (Wahrheit) to objectifying acts themselves and reserve the term
‘being’ (Sein) or ‘being-true’/‘truly-being’ (Wahrhaft-sein) for their objective corre-
lates (LU II.2, 655; LI 2, 265–6), truth would still encompass more than proposi-
tional correctness, and being would encompass more than asserted states of
affairs. Propositional correctness is a narrower concept of truth. It pertains to typ-
ically relational acts—as distinct, for example, from a nonrelational act of naming
—that are among many possible acts of signification. Propositional correctness pri-
marily pertains to acts of judging, asserting, and the like—to constative acts, to use
a term borrowed from speech act theory. Similarly, states of affairs are not the same
as the intuited object that is meant in an act of assertion, nor are they to be equated
with the fullness of the intuited object in which the synthetic act of identification
finds fulfillment. When the object is a sensuously perceived object, such fullness
is not a state of affairs, for states of affairs are objective correlates to assertoric acts
and not to acts of sensuous perception.29

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136 Lambert Zuidervaart

Even the narrower concept of truth that Husserl proposes, once he has phenom-
enologically secured his wider conception, goes beyond the common understand-
ing of truth as the correspondence between propositions and facts or states of
affairs. His narrower concept identifies truth as ‘the ideal adequation of a relational
act to the corresponding adequate perception of a state of affairs [an die zugehörige
adequate Sachverhaltwahrnehmung]’ (LU II.2, 655; LI 2, 266, tm). In other words,
truth and falsity do not pertain simply to propositions or beliefs but to the entire
range of objectifying relational acts that have signitive meaning. Moreover, that
to which such an act must be adequate is not an empirical fact. It is instead the per-
ception of a state of affairs. This perception, strictly speaking, cannot occur sensu-
ously but only via categorial intuition, which itself must be adequate—i.e., it must
attain the requisite degree of (categorially) intuitive fullness. The understanding of
truth as a proposition/fact correspondence is too narrow to do justice to the phe-
nomenology of propositional correctness, and it leaves out the objective identity
and subjective coincidence that provide the wider context within which correct
propositions can contribute to true knowledge.30

5. Early Husserl’s Significance

The phenomenology of evidence and truth in Husserl’s Logical Investigations places


in question the framework of debates about whether or not he has an epistemic
conception of truth. For his early work does not regard evidence in the strict sense
as what justifies belief, and it does not restrict truth to propositions. Indeed, on my
reading, the productive potential of early Husserl’s conception of truth is to pro-
vide an alternative to contemporary frameworks in truth theory. Unlike contempo-
rary epistemic conceptions of truth, he gives full weight to ‘truth makers’ (i.e.,
perceptible objects, objective identity, and states of affairs) that have their own be-
ing. Yet, unlike contemporary nonepistemic conceptions, he also insists both on the
intentional givenness of such truth makers and on the phenomenological complex-
ity of the intentional experience within which propositional truth claims arise. For
Husserl, the truth (correctness) of propositions cannot be divorced from relations
between intentional acts and intentional objects, as some nonepistemic conceptions
seem to hold. Neither, however, can it be reduced to the justifiability or warranted
assertibility of propositional claims, as occurs in various epistemic conceptions of
truth. Early Husserl’s conception can challenge the framework of debates in which
one must have either an epistemic or a nonepistemic conception of truth.
Hence, despite my admiration for Lee Hardy’s illuminating reconstruction of
Husserl’s philosophy of the physical sciences, I do not find it fruitful to regard
Husserl’s early conception of truth as non-epistemic. In questioning such a read-
ing, however, I also find it unfruitful to regard it as an epistemic conception.
Hardy’s non-epistemic interpretation of Husserl rejects the synthetic concept of ev-
idence in the Logical Investigations. To support his rejection, Hardy appeals to Ernst
Tugendhat’s claim that a ‘difficulty’ in the synthetic concept led Husserl to aban-
don it in favor of a monothetic concept in Ideas I and later writings. On the

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monothetic concept, ‘the signitive act passes over into the intuitive act’, such that
these two acts do not need first to be ‘distinguished and then identified’, as pur-
portedly would occur in a synthetic act of evidence.31 According to Tugendhat,
the ‘normal act of evidence’ does not involve such a reflective awareness of two
distinct acts and their agreement. That’s why Tugendhat appears to attribute
greater plausibility to the later monothetic concept, on which the act of evidence
is simply ‘the fulfilled, intuitive act itself’ (Tugendhat 1970: 94).32
Yet, the purported difficulty with the synthetic concept of evidence stems not
from Husserl’s account but from his interpreters’ confusing different levels of anal-
ysis. Certainly, to account for what occurs in evidence as an act of synthetic iden-
tification, Husserl needs to distinguish between two acts (signitive and intuitive)
and postulate their agreement within an act of fulfillment. This does not mean,
however, that someone who carries out a synthetic act of evidence must, while car-
rying it out, consciously distinguish and relate these acts. They all happen simulta-
neously as part of the same intentional whole, such that one directly experiences
truth as objective identity without reflecting on the components of this experience
or on the components of the objective identity experienced. I simultaneously per-
ceive this house as green and say it is green, for example, and my acts of perception
and signification coincide, without my having to say to myself, ‘Now I am not only
perceiving this house but also saying it is green, and my distinct acts of perception
and signification synthetically coincide’. Further, the objective identity I experience
on this occasion is more like a Gestalt than a state of affairs: all at once the object
presents itself as green, just as I say. Of course, if you claim the house is not green,
then I might wonder whether I had misperceived or misspoken, and in such won-
dering, I could begin to distinguish my act of perception from my act of significa-
tion, which indeed are distinct. In the initial experience, however, I would not need
to be consciously aware of this distinction. As Husserl says in his explication of
meaning-fulfillment, the relationships between perception and signification in this
initial experience are not additive. Rather, the objective identity presents itself in an
‘unexpressed, unconceptualized experience’ and is not dragged in later ‘through
comparative, cogitatively mediated reflection’ (LU II.2, 568; LI 2, 207, tm).
Moreover, while it is so, as Hardy says, that the synthetic act of evidence will
never present ‘the truth’ or ‘the verifying state of affairs’ for a ‘particular proposi-
tion under explicit consideration’, the reason for this is not that the act presents ‘the
truth of a more complex, unexpressed proposition’ (Hardy 2013: 89). Rather, the
reason is that the synthetic act of evidence is pre-reflective and holistic. It can be
analyzed and can be rendered explicit in propositional language, but it need not
be thematized in this way in order to be an experience of truth as objective identity.
The role of synthetic evidence with respect to propositional correctness is not to
verify the truth of a proposition but both to make it possible for a correct proposi-
tion to contribute to true knowledge and to allow the truth of the intuited object—
the truth of die Sache, as Tugendhat puts it—to have a purchase on the proposition.
The concept of synthetic evidence is not a wrongheaded account of monothetic ev-
idence, but a phenomenological description of what makes monothetic evidence
possible.

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138 Lambert Zuidervaart

My defense of the early Husserl on this topic assumes, as he does, that truth in-
cludes more than propositional truth, that it has both a subject side and an object
side, and that, in his words, it requires the synthesis of fulfillment between
signitive and intuitive acts whose ideal is synthetic evidence. To count as a case
of evidence, the monothetic ‘passing over’ (übergehen, in Tugendhat’s formulation)
of the signifying act into the intuitive act, when a particular proposition ‘directs it-
self’ to an intuitively given object, must be guided by the ideal of synthetic
evidence.
Further, the experience of truth need not be propositional, although it often is.
Husserl specifically points to nominal acts, such as are expressed in the use of
names and definite descriptions, as signitive acts that are not propositional but
can be intuitively fulfilled or disappointed. We can use the right name or the
wrong name or a name that is not quite right but not entirely wrong. Moreover,
we can do this without necessarily making a propositional truth claim. As
Tugendhat points out, Husserl emphasized the possible truth of nominal acts be-
cause that allowed him to attach truth to ‘the complete grasp [Erfassung] of the
object’ rather than to the confirmation or verification (Bestätigung) of proposi-
tional claims. In this way, Husserl could incorporate intuitive fulfillment and ob-
ject-sided truth (Wahrheit der Sache) into the problematic of truth
(Wahrheitsproblematik) (Tugendhat 1970: 98–9).
Tugendhat is of two minds about Husserl’s assigning truth capacity to nominal
acts. On the one hand, Tugendhat applauds it for expanding the conception of
truth beyond the truth of propositions toward object-sided truth or the truth of
the matter (Wahrheit der Sache). Concern about the truth of the matter is normal
‘in life as in science’, he says, when, for example, we ask historically about the truth
of an event, about what truly happened (die Wahrheit eines Geschehens). On the
other hand, Tugendhat faults Husserl for not distinguishing sufficiently between
the truth of nominal acts and the truth of propositional acts. Only propositional
acts, because they raise a claim to truth, can prove to be false. An act of naming
or of assigning a definite description does not raise a truth claim, even though it
might suggest one. According to Tugendhat, Husserl fails to account for the ab-
sence of a concept of falsity in the case of nominal acts. Thereby Husserl also fails
to distinguish sufficiently between the truth of propositions (die Wahrheit
vorgegebener Setzungen) and the truth of the matter (die Wahrheit der Sache)
(Tugendhat 1970: 99–100).
Be that as it may, Tugendhat’s main point, which I endorse, is that the signifi-
cance of early Husserl’s conception of truth lies in the possibilities it opens up
rather than in the results it delivers.33 One possibility is to give greater weight to
the nonpropositional elements in what Husserl calls ‘the experience of truth’ and
to consider how propositional truth arises within and from such experience. A sec-
ond possibility is to work out a more dynamic account of the relations between
subject-sided and object-sided truth, between what Husserl calls ‘synthetic acts
of fulfillment’ and ‘true being’ or ‘objective identity’ or what Tugendhat calls ‘the
truth of the matter’. In such a dynamic account, the two sides would be correlates,
as Husserl says, but their correlation could involve mutually imbricated processes

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Synthetic Evidence and Objective Identity 139

of discovery and disclosure that go beyond merely intuitive fulfillment.34 A third


possibility, which I have indicated from the outset, is to point contemporary truth
theory beyond the polarity between either epistemic or nonepistemic conceptions
of truth.35 The deeper significance of early Husserl’s conception of truth lies in
its potential to unsettle the framework of contemporary debates by resituating
propositional correctness within a broader and more dynamic conception of
truth.36

Lambert Zuidervaart
Institute for Christian Studies
Canada
lambertz@icscanada.edu

NOTES

1
LU II.2, 654–5; LI 2, 265, tm. Citations from Edmund Husserl’s Logische
Untersuchungen use the abbreviation LU and are from volumes 18 and 19 of Husserliana. Vol-
ume 18 contains LU volume I, cited here as LU I. Volume 19 contains LU volume II and has
two parts, cited here as LU II.1 and LU II.2, respectively. Volume I originally appeared in
1900; Volume II, in 1901. The revised edition of volumes I and II.1 appeared in 1913; the ‘par-
tially revised’ edition of volume II.2, in 1921. These revised editions are translated by J.N.
Findlay as Logical Investigations, cited here as LI. Citations provide first the German and then
the English volume and pagination; ‘tm’ after a citation indicates that I have modified the
translation, including frequent removal of Husserl’s italics. The following changes occur
without indication, however: I use the American spellings for ‘fulfill(s)’, ‘fulfillment’, and
‘fullness’ and translate ‘Erkennen’ as ‘knowledge’ (rather than Findlay’s ‘recognition’),
‘Veranschaulichung’ as ‘rendering intuitive’ or ‘intuitional rendering’ (Findlay: ‘intuitive il-
lustration’), and ‘Evidenz’ as ‘evidence’ (Findlay: ‘self-evidence’).
2
Hardy (2013: 164–5) says such interpretations ascribe ‘two interrelated core claims’
to Husserl’s phenomenology: (1) that ‘the existence of things is dependent upon, or relative
to, consciousness’, and (2) that ‘things are nothing other or more than intentional formations
of transcendental consciousness’. The interpreters Hardy opposes on this score include
Philipse (1995), Gurwitsch (1967), and De Boer (1972)—see Hardy (2013: 176–8, 187–9).
3
In particular, he relies on Smith and McIntyre (1982) and Mohanty (1985)—see
Hardy (2013: 180–91).
4
The most complete anthology of Anglo-American truth theory is Lynch (2001). Put-
nam (1981: 49–74) offers a highly influential statement of the contrasts between epistemic
and nonepistemic conceptions of truth, which he frames as a contrast between internalism
(or ‘internal realism’) and externalism (or ‘metaphysical realism’) with respect to truth. In
proposing a minimal ‘alethic realism’, Alston (1996) devotes two chapters to refuting
Putnam’s ‘antirealist’ arguments, prior to critically assessing the ‘epistemic conceptions of
truth’ proposed by Putnam and others. For a detailed examination of the issues at stake in
these debates, see Chapter 7, ‘Truth and Justifiability’, in Künne (2003: 375–453).
5
This is one illustration of Stephen Crowell’s more expansive claim that, in light of
new research based on Husserl’s Nachlass, his phenomenology ‘has far more to contribute
to contemporary debates—in epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind,

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140 Lambert Zuidervaart

and social ontology, for instance—than the traditional picture [of Husserl’s phenomenology]
might lead one to suspect’ (Crowell 2009: 10).
6
I use the term ‘early’ to refer to Husserl’s conception of truth in the Logical Investiga-
tions. His most important later writings on this topic, which I do not discuss, are Husserl
(1969) and the posthumous Husserl (1973).
7
Among the commentators discussed by Hardy who give an epistemic construal and
who seem to reduce truth to evidence are Patzig (1977) and Pietersma (1977).
8
Hardy devotes a separate chapter (Chapter 4) to the question of how, according to
Husserl, we can be justified in believing that theoretical entities exist despite their lack of
perceptual givenness. I do not have space here to take up Hardy’s provocative discussion.
9
The clearest comprehensive statement of a Fregean interpretation is by David
Woodruff Smith, who succinctly sets out the contrasts between his own ‘West Coast’ medi-
ating-sense model of the noema—which he says ‘is key to the so-called “Fregean” model of
intentionality’ (Smith 2007: 307)—and three other models: the intentional object model (e.g.,
Roman Ingarden), the neo-phenomenalist model (e.g., Aron Gurwitsch), and the bracketed
object model, also known as the ‘East Coast’ alternative to the West Coast model. For a com-
prehensive statement of the anti-Fregean, East Coast model, see Drummond (1990). The cen-
tral issue between the West Coast and East Coast alternatives is whether later Husserl’s
‘noema’ is the ideal sense of an act that ‘mediates the intentional relation between the act
and the object (if such object exist)’, as Smith (2007: 307) puts it, an interpretation that
models the noema along the lines of Frege’s understanding of the sense (Sinn) via which lin-
guistic expressions refer. Or is the noema the intended object as it is intended and when con-
sidered within the phenomenological attitude (in distinction from the natural attitude), as
John Drummond and others hold. Although I do not take an argued stance on these alterna-
tives in this paper, which focuses on the early Husserl, I agree with Dan Zahavi that ‘the
noema-interpretation one adheres to has ramifications for one’s interpretation of Husserl’s
theory of intentionality, as well as for one’s general understanding of his phenomenological
project’ (Zahavi 2003: 58)—including, I would add, early Husserl’s conception of truth. Like
Zahavi, I find my sympathy lies with the East Coast interpretation. See Zahavi (2003: 57–66)
for an illuminating summary of the West Coast/East Coast debate and for several reasons
why he prefers the anti-Fregean, East Coast interpretation.
10
See also Ströker (1987: 34).
11
Ströker finds support for this interpretation in Tugendhat (1970).
12
Patzig (1977) completely misses this pre-propositional sense of the ‘experience of
truth’, perhaps because, as Ströker points out, he ‘relies primarily on certain passages of
the Logical Investigations that do not sufficiently reflect the Sixth Logical Investigation’
(Ströker 1987: 168n1). In fact, Patzig focuses almost exclusively on volume 1 of the Logical
Investigations.
13
This review assumes and adds to the summary of Husserl’s phenomenology of in-
tentional experience and objectifying acts in Zuidervaart (2016: 162–3).
14
I discuss this account of linguistic meaning in Zuidervaart (2016: 160–2). Peter Si-
mons (1995) provides an exceptionally lucid and succinct explanation of the account of lin-
guistic meaning in the Logical Investigations and its permutations in Husserl’s later writings.
Especially valuable is the care with which Simons distinguishes early Husserl’s theory of
meaning and reference from Frege’s theory as well as later Husserl’s conception of the
noema from Frege’s notion of sense, for example, in Frege (1980). Such distinctions are cru-
cial if one wants to understand the continuity between early Husserl’s emphasis on intuitive
fulfillment and fullness and the much later attempt in Husserl (1973) to show, ‘by contrast
with most analytic philosophers, … that there is articulate experience which is prior to

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Synthetic Evidence and Objective Identity 141

predication and on which predication and judgement ride’ (Simons 1995: 129–30). Although
I cannot develop the point here, the notion of articulate pre-predicative experience strikes
me as one promising way to avoid the impasse between epistemic and nonepistemic con-
ceptions of truth.
15
The flip side to fulfillment is frustration (Enttäuschung), and the reverse of identifi-
cation is conflict (Widerstreit). Yet, for Husserl, frustration and conflict are neither non-syn-
thetic nor anti-synthetic: ‘the experience of conflict institutes [setzt in] relations and unity:
it is a form of synthesis’ (LU II.2, 575; LI 2, 212; tm).
16
Husserl indicates in a footnote that from here on he will use the terms ‘significa-
tive’, ‘signitive’, and ‘symbolic’ interchangeably to talk about acts of meaning-intention
and meaning-conferral (LU II.2, 567; LI 2, 356n5). I follow this usage. John Drummond
points out, however, that in later works Husserl distinguishes between significative inten-
tions and signitive intentions. Whereas significative intentions ‘belong to objectifying acts’,
signitive intentions belong to ‘expressive acts’. ‘The former present an object with a certain
significance, whereas the latter are the intentions belonging to the act expressing in words
the sense belonging to the objectifying act’. This refinement, which is connected to Husserl’s
introducing the notion of a ‘noematic sense’, clarifies somewhat the relation between acts of
meaning-intention and language usage. See the entry on ‘Objectifying Act’ in Drummond
(2008: 150–1).
17
Early Husserl’s account of images and imagination is fairly traditional. He does not
take up issues of creative imagination (e.g., Immanuel Kant’s account of productive imagi-
nation as a source of ‘aesthetic ideas’), and he clearly would have had serious disagreements
with Nelson Goodman’s anti-mimetic account of pictorial representation. See, for example,
Goodman (1968: 3–43).
18
My summary omits Husserl’s sophisticated discussion of gradations among medi-
ate fulfillments, mediate presentations (mittelbare Vorstellungen), and presentations of pre-
sentations (Vorstellungsvorstellungen). Two points are important to take away from this
discussion. First, every mediate fulfillment eventually ends in an immediate intuition (LU
II.2, 602; LI 2, 230). Second, the authentic intuitional rendering (eigentliche Veranschaulichung)
of a signitive intention occurs only when a coincidence occurs between the matters of the
signitive and intuitive acts in question, ‘so that the intuitively appearing object itself comes
to the fore [dasteht] as the object intended in the [act of] meaning’. Only in such cases of au-
thentic Veranschaulichung is the thought ‘realized in the manner of perception or illustrated
in the manner of imagination’ (LU II.2, 605–6; LI 2, 232, tm).
19
Not every such synthesis involves an increase in fullness, however, insofar as ‘par-
tial fulfillment and partial emptying [Entfüllung] can go hand in hand’. That is why we must
distinguish between acts of ‘mere identification’ and acts of fulfillment: acts of identification
can lack fulfillment because the synthesized acts lack any fullness, or identification can in-
volve a fulfillment together with simultaneous emptying, such that no emphatic and pure
consciousness of an increase in fulfillment occurs (LU II.2, 616; LI 2, 239–40, tm).
20
I leave aside the additional refinements that Husserl introduces in order to fill in
the structure of objectifying acts. If I understand him correctly, he replaces his initial con-
cepts of ‘matter’ and (intuitive) ‘content’ with the notion of an act’s ‘representation’
(Repräsentation) and then distinguishes among the representation’s interpretative form, in-
terpretative sense, and interpretative content, all of which are distinct from the intentional
object as such, which is the object of interpretation (Gegenstand der Auffassung) (LU II.2,
621–2; LI 2, 242–3). Only by taking this entire structure into account, Husserl says, can we
adequately describe the phenomenological differences between signitive and intuitive acts
of objectification as well as their relationships within acts of identification and fulfillment.

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142 Lambert Zuidervaart
21
Husserl also distinguishes between intuitions that have simple and complex rela-
tions to their objects, either of which can be adequate or inadequate (LU II.2, 627–8; LI 2,
247–8).
22
I omit Husserl’s brief but instructive use of this distinction (between adequate and
objectively complete intuitional rendering) to account for cases where the intuitional render-
ing conflicts with a signitive meaning and the signitive meaning is at least partially frus-
trated. See LU II.2, 630–1; LI 2, 248–9. I also pass over Husserl’s discussion of the
possibility and impossibility of meanings in Chapter 4, titled ‘Verträglichkeit und
Unverträglichkeit’, even though it is important for his philosophy of logic and has implica-
tions for the (im)possibility of a dialectical logic. Although Findlay translates
‘Verträglichkeit’ as ‘consistency’, ‘compatibility’ (the term Findlay uses to translate
‘Vereinbarkeit’) is closer to what Husserl has in mind. He intends to lay out a conception
of meanings in their (ideal) compatibility or incompatibility with an ‘objectively complete
Veranschaulichung’, and that is a different matter from logical consistency or inconsistency.
23
Willard (1995) rightly emphasizes the importance of the synthesis of fulfillment
and its place in the development of early Husserl’s phenomenology, although I do not think
Willard gives sufficient weight to the concept of intuitive fullness in the Logical Investigations.
24
Husserl says that, for the most part, a perception does not offer a genuine presence
(ein wahrhaftes Gegenwärtigensein) but only a present appearance (ein gegenwärtig Erscheinen),
in which the object’s presence—the objective presence (die gegenständliche Gegenwart)—dis-
plays various degrees (Abstufungen). For the perceiver, a perception’s variegated fullness
counts (gilt uns) as the ‘definitive presentation [endgültige Präsentation] of the corresponding
objective element: [this fullness] offers itself [gibt sich] as identical with [the objective ele-
ment], not as a mere representative [Repräsentant] but as [the objective element itself] in
the absolute sense’ (LU II.2, 646–7; LI 2, 260, tm). If the reader compares my summary of this
passage with Findlay’s translation at LI 2, 260, many departures from his word choices will
become apparent. I have tried to capture some of the overlap and resonances among
Husserl’s German terms.
25
Findlay’s translation omits the next sentence, which says that in such a case the
representing and the represented content are identical: ‘Repräsentierender und
repräsentierter Inhalt sind hier identisch eines’ (LU II.2, 647).
26
This account of adequation, which regards perceptions as the site for the final
fulfillment of all objectifying intentions, prompts a possible objection. How can universal
conceptual intentions and analytically correct assertions find final fulfillment in percep-
tion, given Husserl’s treatment of sensuous perception as being directed at what is ‘indi-
vidually singular’ (das individuell Einzelne)? At a minimum, would not imagination need to
be the site of final fulfillment for such intentions? Husserl acknowledges the potential
problem here, but he defers a solution until later, when he will expand the concepts of
perception and intuition to include the nonsensuous elements of categorial intuition
(LU II.2, 649–50; LI 2, 261–2)—see the discussion of categorial intuition in Zuidervaart
(2016: 170-3).
27
Husserl uses the phrase ‘die gegenständliche Seite der Akte’ (LU II.2, 654; LI 2,
265). Because the term ‘objective’ can be misleading in this context, I have decided to use
the term ‘object side’ instead.
28
Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book IV, 1011b 26–7.
29
In this sense, the passage about Husserl’s first concept of truth that I quoted
earlier from Ströker (1987: 38) is too restrictive: Husserl understands ‘true’ as a predi-
cate of an objective identity, not simply, in Ströker’s words, ‘as a predicate of the state
of affairs’.

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Synthetic Evidence and Objective Identity 143
30
In line with this, Husserl suggests two different ways to understand the domain of
judgment (Urteil). A broad understanding would equate it with positing (and objectifying)
acts in general (setzende Akte überhaupt), which could be either assertoric or non-assertoric
and to which broad concepts of (subject-sided) truth and falsity would apply. A narrow un-
derstanding would restrict judgment to the assertion and its possible fulfillments—i.e., to
certain relational positing acts—for which narrower concepts of truth and falsity would ap-
ply (LU II.2, 655; LI 2, 266). Misleadingly, Findlay translates setzende as ‘assertive’ rather than
‘positing’ in this passage.
31
Hardy (2013: 215n14), summarizing Tugendhat (1970: 94).
32
Tugendhat (1970: 95) adds that this approach to evidence would make the third
concept of truth (as intuitive fullness) more fundamental and more comprehensive than
the first and fourth concepts (as objective identity and signitive correctness).
33
‘Die Bedeutung von Husserls Analysen liegt nicht in Resultaten, auf die
unmittelbar aufzubauen ware, sondern in den neu auszuarbeitenden Möglichkeiten, die
sie eröffnen’ (Tugendhat 1970: 101). I take up Tugendhat’s reading of Husserl and Heidegger
at greater length in Zuidervaart (2017).
34
I discuss what this account includes, and how it responds to the epistemic/non-ep-
istemic debate, in the conclusion (Chapter 8) to Zuidervaart (2017).
35
In moving beyond the epistemic/nonepistemic polarity, one can also challenge the
underlying assumption that individuals, not communities or collectives, are the primary ep-
istemic subjects who underwrite propositional truth claims. Although the early Husserl
seems to share this assumption, one can find seeds in his Logical Investigations for the growth
of his later conception of intersubjective epistemic commonality. See in this connection
Schmid (2012).
36
Much of this paper appears as Chapter 6 in my book Truth in Husserl, Heidegger, and
the Frankfurt School: Critical Retrieval (forthcoming, Spring 2017) and is reprinted here with
permission from The MIT Press. I presented a precursor to this paper in the Philosophy De-
partment Colloquium at Calvin College in March 2014 and received helpful comments
there. I wish to thank Lee Hardy, Andrew Spear, and an anonymous European Journal of Phi-
losophy referee for their astute remarks on subsequent drafts.

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© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd