Professional Documents
Culture Documents
POE-
LLAMANZARES, petitioner v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO, respondents.
Promulgated:
April 5, 2016
x------------------------------------------------------o/JF\-t'~-~~-------x
DISSENTING OPINION
BRION,J.:
I. INTRODUCTION
\ ;
I.A. The Court's Ruling on Reconsideration
After the Court's main ruling in this case was announced and
promulgated, a lot of questions were raised about the meaning, significance,
and impact of our Decision. A particular question asked was - did the Court
declare Grace Poe qualified to run for the Presidency? A running debate in
fact ensued in the media between Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes A. Sereno and
Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio on whether the Court, under the
ruling and the Justices' votes, effectively declared Grace Poe a' natural-born
citizen of the Philippines.
• the qualifications for the Presidency as the highest office in the land;
• the Court itself that the public relies upon as the Guardian of the
Constitution and the Gatekeeper in ensuring that grave abuse of
discretion does not exist in the public service and in governance; ·and,
last but not the least,
!, l1
See the following website a1ticles: "IBP: SC failed to resolve the heart of 'roe;s case" in'
. \.V\Vw.mb.com/ibp-sc-failed-to-resolve-the-heart-of-poes-case; "IBP Raises Questions on Poe SC Ruling" in
www.tribune.net.ph/headlines/ibp-raises-questions-on-poe-sc-ruling; "Supreme Court Resolved Nothing on
Poe, says IBP" in www. Malay.com.ph/business-news/news/supreme-court-resolved-nothing-poe-says-ibp;
"SC did not rule on Poe's Eligibility" in www.manilatimes.net/sc-did-not-rule-on-poes-eligibility/25t046/
2
Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 21, 2016; Manila Times, April 7, 2016; Manila Bulletin, April 7,
2016
.1
Tribune, April 2, 2016
See: "More lawyers score SC for letting Poe run" in newsinfo.inquirer.net/777752/more-hiwyers-
sco rc-sc- for-le tti ng-poe-ru n.
See also: "SC Ruling on Poe hints looming constitutional crisis-lawyer's group;
I •
• the exercise of the sovereignty of our people through the ballot and
their right to have the ultimate say on matters of sovereignty and
governance.
Indeed, this was a very strange stance coming from the Members of a
Court whose Decision has been questioned by different sectprs for the
confusion it sowed, and whose avowed mission, among others, i& to educate
the bench, the bar, and members of the public on matters of law. It should
not be forgotten, too, that the Court has been entrusted with the care,
interpretation, and application of the Constitution.
The least that a responsible and conscientious Court can do. when
faced with questions relating to the Constitution is to honor this trustthrough
competent, capable, and principled performance of its duties, particularly
those touching on constitutional issues and its relationship with .the public it
serves. That this approach did not take place shall, I am sure, lead to more
questions about the Court.
Under these circumstances, I can only conclude that this Court has not
fully discharged its sworn duty in ruling on this case. I give credit though to
the present movants, among them the COMELEC itself, who, despite the
ruling they received from this Court, have been very careful in their
language to describe the errors thal they attribute to the majority's nt'ling.
Their careful use of words, though, could not hide what they felt about the
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challenged ponencia: that the Court itself has committed what. the C,ourt
would call "grave abuse of discretion" had it been reviewi11g a low~r
court ruling in a Rule 65 petition.
I do not and cannot begrudge the movants this feeling as I too ff1ttl t~at
the Court has once again overstepped the bounds allowed us. as, raJlib,le
human beings entrusted with a trust sacred to the nation. It is in this spirit
that I write this Opinion - to do my duty to "settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforcea,ble and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, " even if this abuse had been
committed by the Court itself.
This is not to say that, when so questioned, the Court ~~st al~ays
yield to the challenge/s made, and respond by retracting or retracing o,ur
steps. This is not the way of a responsible magistrate; ours is the duty that
calls for a well-considered appreciation of the exact issues before us, as well
as the duty to rule justly and fairly on these issues based on the evidence
before us and on the competent, reasonable, and logical application .of law
and jurisprudence, all in accordance with the rule of law.
I'
' f • I
The Court, through the ponencia of Justice Jose P. Perez, granted the
petition with the support of nine (9) Justices and with six (6) Justices in
dissent.
Five (5) of the six (6) dissenting Justices wrote their separate dissents,
but Justice Mariano C. del Castillo did not also rule on the citizenship issue
(thus, only five [5] Justices dissented on the citizenship issue). All of the
dissenting Justices ruled that the COMELEC had the requisite jurisdiction to
rule on the cancellation of CoC issue, as against the majority's ruling that
the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction, as expressed in the ponr;ncia.
. \
Dissenting Opinion 6 G.R. Nos. 221697 and.221698~700
The Court, though Supreme, cannot simply disregard the clear terms
of the Constitution and the laws, or at its whim, change or abandon its past
rulings which have become part of the law of the land, or without reason,
refuse to take into account standard norms of interpretation and application
of the laws. These, unfortunately, were what the Court majority, generally
did in its ruling in the present case. It acted outside the di~crefion the
Constitution, the laws, and ordinary reason allow it: ·
• when it rashly ruled that the COMELEC did nqt have the
jurisdiction to cancel Poe's CoC and thereafter illogically and
unreasonably declared Poe qualified to be a candidate for the
Presidency, the ponencia thereby disregarded:
Sadly, I find that the legal bases used by the majority;. have: ,been
grossly and glaringly inconsistent as well as inadequate to 'support its
conclusions. These defects will inevitably impact on the present
jurisdiction of the COMELEC, on the cases it has decided, and on the
jurisprudence on the interpretation and application of constitutional
prov1s10ns.
I am not unaware that the majority may have considered ,vµ.lues. th.at
allegedly apply to Poe's case, among them, the need to empowe,i:.fpµndlings
in their exercise of civil and political rights reserved for Philippine pitizens,
and their assessment and belief that Poe is the best candidate to run the
country in the next six years.
III. DISCUSSIONS
In applying the law, the unvarying first step is to determine what is the
Court's or any tribunal's jurisdiction over or authority to intervene in the
case; this determination dictates the approach in the consideration of the case
before it. In the course of reviewing a case, tools of construction may be
used, which tools invariably command that above everything e;lse, what is
written in law should be respected and upheld. We then further pursue the
rule of law through the established procedure we observe in the petitio,ns
Dissenting Opinion 9 G.R. Nos. 221697 and 221698:.. 700
before us, and through our practice of applying the law to the parties, taking
care that its interpretation and application are even for all persons, regardless
of power, riches, or fame they may have.
(1) the COMELEC did not have the authority to rule <;m Poe's
citizenship and residency qualifications as these qualifications have
not yet been determined by the proper authority;
'!
See pp. 17-18 of the ponencin.
JO
595 Phil. 449 (2008).
II
G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 300.
12
Sec p. 19 of the ponencia.
''
Dissenting Opinion 11 G.R. Nos. 221697 and 221698-700
The ponencia thus read Fermin and the 2012 Rules of Procedure to
mean that there is no authorized proceeding to determine the qualifications
of a candidate before the candidate is elected, 14 and that a CoC "cannot be
cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false representations regarding
his or her qualifications without a prior authoritative finding thaf he or she is
not qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure tJ'y which the
falsity of the representation can be found. The only exception that can be
conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity
1
and judicial confessions." 15
I disagree with both the results and the approach the ponencia made in
ruling on the COMELEC jurisdiction issue. To my mind, it effectively read
a complex issue from one very narrow perspective and ruled on the basis
of that perspective. Worse, its reading of the law and jurisprudence under its
chosen perspective was not even legally correct.
I shall answer the two points the ponencia raised and in the process
discuss the considerations that a responsible ruling should have made.
Had the Constitution in its totality been read, the ponehcia would
have seen that under our constitutional scheme and structure, the
COMELEC is an independent commission - an agency with a task all its
own that it must undertake and deliver to the Filipino people in the .exercise
of its reasonable discretion.
11
Sec p. 20 of the ponencia.
See pp. 20 - 21 of the ponencia.
J_<
Ibid.
Dissenting Opinion 12 G.R. Nos. 221697 and 221698-700
those of the President and the Vice-President, all fall within the.jurisdiction
of the SET, the HRET, and the PET, respectively, and that the ·a4thority to
rule has been withheld from the COMELEC under the Constitution·. '
Thus, all matters, except only the right to vote and those given
elsewhere by law, are within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC' before
elections. 17 This jurisdiction includes the authority to rule on the
cancellation of CoCs filed before it under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC). 18 Clearly established jurisprudence has supported the
validity of Section 78 by ruling that the COMELEC indeed has the authority
to cancel COCs based on the false material representation made in their
CoCs. A representation on citizenship or residency is material because they
16
G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013.
17
See Article IX-C, Section 2 of the 1997 Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and
Section 78 (as well as Section 69) of the OEC.
rn Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on
the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later .than fifte~n days
before the election. [emphases and underscoring suppliedl
I '
involve the qualifications of the candidate, and any falsity on either matter is
ground for the cancellation of a CoC.
Interestingly, this was the basis of the ponente 's own ruling in the
Ongsiako-Reyes case when he upheld the COMELEC 's cancellation of
Ongsiako-Reyes' CoC on the ground that she was a naturalized American
citizen and had not resided in the Philippines for the requisite period.
In the present case, the ponencia now surprisingly and without any
reasonably acceptable legal basis holds that the COMELEC .h'as. no
jurisdiction to rule on a CoC cancellation on the basis of citizenship
and/or residency. Coming as this ruling does in a presidential election
where an allegedly non-Filipino and survey-leading candidate would be
favored, this is a flip-flop of far-reaching proportions that the ponencia
should have fully explained.
'"
20
595 Phil. 449, 465-67 (2008).
G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014.
21
G.R. No. 165983, April 24, 2007.
Dissenting Opinion 14 G.R. Nos. 221697 and 221698-700
The ponencia disregarded the following cases - shown in· the table
below - where the Court previously recognized the COMELEC's
jurisdiction to cancel candidates' CoCs for false material repn!senta'ti,on .·in
their eligibility for office. '
(Cases involving Section 78 since the year 2012 - the year the COMELEC
amended its Rules of Procedure.)
Cerafica v. Perez, J. En Banc The Court held that the Comelec gravely
Comelec, G.R. No. abused its discretion in . holding that
205136 Kimberly did not file a valid , CoC and
December 2, 2014 subsequently cannot be subst.ituted by
22
Supra note 24.
Dissenting Opinion 15 G.R. Nos. 221697 and 221698-700
Notably, the writers of these tabulated cases, other than Justice Jose P.
Perez, are the two highest ranking Justices of this Court - Chief Justice Ma.
Lourdes P. A. Sereno and Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio.
Significantly, Chief Justice Sereno herself joined the ponencia.
The sad part in the present Grace Poe ruling is that the ponencia
did not clearly and convincingly reason out why the case of Grace Poe
should be differently treated. This kind of treatment gives a
mischievous mind the opportunity to ask -
In other words, the COMELEC can conduct its own inquiry ·regarding
citizenship, separate from and independently of the proceedings:·9f fhe .PET,,
SET, or HRET. As a means necessary in the granted power to can.cel CoCs,. 1
the COMELEC is given the means to carry this power. into effect,
particularly the power, even if only preliminarily and for the purpos~ only of
the cancellation proceedings, to delve into the eligibility aspept tha~ is· at
issue.
See Go, Sr. v. Ramos, 614 Phil. 451, 473 (2009). See also Moy Ya Lim Yao vt:Co~missicmer of
Immigration, No. L-21289, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 292, 367; Lee v. Commissioner oflmm(gration, No.
L-23446, December 20, 1971, 42 SCRA 561, 565; Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Del~ R,osa, G.R. Nos.
95612-13, May 31, 1991, 197 SCRA 854, 877-878. .
' '
I
That these bodies havtt separate, distinct, and different ju~isdictions
mean that none of them has the authority nor the ascendancy over the
others, with each body s~preme in its own sphere of authority.
Conversely, these bodies haV,e no ascendancy to rule upon issues outside
I
their respective specific authority, much less the authority to bind other
bodies on matters outside the~r respective jurisdictions. (The only exception
to this statement would be ~he PET where the members of the , Supreme
Court themselves are the Members, but whether their rulings as PET are
doctrinal is not a settled mat~er.) The decision of the PET, SET~ oi HRET,
with their specific jurisdibions to resolve contests involving the
qualifications of the President, Vice-President, Senators, or the House of
Representative Members, qoes not have the authority. to bind the
COMELEC, another constitutional body with a specific mission and
jurisdiction of its own. Only! the ruling of this Court can have/his. effect,.
and only because under the f;onstitution and by law, its rulings form part
24 I
of the law of the land. ·
The PET was a statutory creation that came into existence in. 1957 in
1
response to the perceived absence of any tribunal that could _rule on
presidential and vice-presidential election controversies. It firmly' became a
constitutional body under the 1987 Constitution with the Justice's of the
Supreme Court as Members.. Presently, this Court, sitting en bane, is the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the President or Vice-President.
The grant of jurisdiction to the PET is exclusive but at the. same time,
limited. The constitutional phraseology limits the PET's jurisdicdon to
election contests which can only contemplate a post-election and post-
proclamation controversy 25 since no "contest" can exist before a winner is
proclaimed. Understood in this sense, the jurisdiction of the members of the
Court, sitting as PET, does not pertain to Presidential or Vice-Presidential
candidates but to the President (elect) and Vice-President (elect).
2-1
Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 8.
25
Tecson v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004, 424 SCRA.277; Macalintal
v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA 783.
Dissenting Opinion 18 G.R. Nos. 221697 and 2'21698-700
·! .
'i '
:
Thus, if this Court would deny the COMELEC the power to cancel
CoCs of presidential candidates simply because the COMELEC. thereby
effectively passes upon the qualifications of a Presidential candidate· and on
the ground that this power belongs to the PET composed of the Members of
this Court, we shall self-servingly expand the limited power grante,d to this
Court by Article VII, Section 4, at the expense of limiting. the powers
explicitly granted to an independent constitutional commission . .The, Court
would thus commit an unconstitutional encroachment on the COMELEC's' . .
powers.
cancellation proceeding, while the other, G.R. No. 161434, invoked the
Court's jurisdiction as PET.
In contrast, the G.R. No. 161434 petition argued that the 1·~.0ME'LEC
had no jurisdiction to decide a Presidential candidate's eligibility/as this
could only be decided by the PET. It then invoked the Court's jurisdiction
in its role as PET, to rule on the challenge to FPJ's eligibility.
; '
The Court dismissed both petitions, but for different reasons. The
Court dismissed G.R. No. 161824 for failure to show grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC. G.R. No. 161434 wa.s· dism,issed
1 1
The difference in the reasons for the dismissal of the two, petitio;ns in
effect affirmed the COMEL,EC's jurisdiction to determine a Presidential
candidate's eligihilitv in a pre-election proceeding through the medium
Section 78. It also clarified that while the PET also has jurisdiction over
the questions of eligibility, its jurisdiction begins only after a President has
been proclaimed.
Thus, the two Tecson petitions, read in relation with qne qn9ther,
stand for the proposition that the PET has jurisdiction over challenges' to a
proclaimed President's eligibility, while the COMELEC has Jurisdiction
over CoC cancellation proceedings, filed prior to the proch1matioi;i, of a
President and which may involve the eligibility and qualificatiOns . of , . I
presidential candidates.
'I, ' I
t:
.. : . . !
Unfortunately, the ponencia did not fully grasp the legal significance
of these cases and the cited portions when it cited them as authority for the
view that there is no "authorized proceeding for determining before
elections the qualifications of a candidate. "
Had the ponencia fully understood Fermin, it would have '~ealized' that
this case is not a direct authority for the proposition he wished :to .·establish.
Rather than negate the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in a .. ,Section 78
proceeding, Fermin - like Tecson - in fact recognized the Cp~ELEC's
authority in these proceedings. The cited case, too, is zjot ·ab9µt a 1
candidate's qualification for the office he is running for, but ab()l!t. a Sec;:tion
68 petition for disqualification and a Section 78 petition to deny:due cou~se
or to cancel a CoC (which was the petition that the COMELECrµled1upon
in the present Grace Poe case).
"
~· t '
The Local Government Code (LGC) also carries its own "disqualification"
provision that carries a similar signification.
i
concluded that the petition involved in the case was a petition for
cancellation of CoC, not a petition for disqualification, and held that it had
been filed out of time. It furthermore ruled that a candidate's )neligibiHty
(based on lack of residence) i.s not a ground for a Section 68 prqceeding for
disqualification, despite a CQMELEC rule including the lack of·residence,in
the list of grounds for a petition for disqualification. . ,
These were the clear thrusts of Fermin, not the ponencia ;s partially
correct but misunderstood statement that there is no i·authorized
proceeding for determining before elections the qualifications of a
candidate." To be sure, Fermin does not divest the COMELEC of its
authority to determine a can;didate's eligibility in the course 'c;if resolving
Section 78 petitions.
Thus, Fermin in fact affirms that the COMELEC can entertain and rule on a
pre-election proceeding that shall pass on the eligibility or qualification' O:f a
i ' '
JI
Id.
Dissenting Opinion 22 G.R. Nos. 221697 and 221698-700
for a time-consuming eligibility proceeding; and, the policy under the .OEC,~
of not authorizing any inquiry into the qualifications of candipate.s unless,
they have been elected.
To stress the obvi<;ms, what is involved in the present Grace ,Poe case
is a CoC cancellation pr16ceeding, not the direct ineligibility prwtc;eding ithat
the COMELEC cannot undertake before elections. To recall Fermin, this
direct ineligibility proceeding is available only post-election and. tht1' rp.edii,m
is a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC (or the, PET for
1
the President-elect).
In sum, the arguments and cited quotations in the Grace Poe ponencia
are not really authorities for its claim regarding COMELEC jurisdiction. If
they tell us anything at all, they betray the ponencia 's confusion'1n its U:se of
technical election terms, particularly in the concepts of "qualifications,"
"disqualifications" and "ineligibility"
Dissenting Opinion 23 G.R. Nos. 221697 and.2.21698-700
But whatever may be. the cause of the ponencia 's confus'ion, the
ultimate result should be, the recognition that the con~lusion on
COMELEC jurisdiction has no solid support from.1 its'· cited
constitutional provisions and cited jurisprudence.
Taking off from the quotations from Justice Mendoza in Fermin and
Romualdez-Marcos, the ponencia jumps into his arguments regarding
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to be exact, Rules 23 and 25 of the 2012
Rules of Procedure. Rule 23 provides:
To fully understand Rule 23, :its statutory basis - Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code - must be appreciated. Section 78 provides:
shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days. ·
before the election. [underscoring supplied] ;
i
In these clear terms, tpe law Jays down the rule that the grou.nd ,for
cancellation should be a FALSITY with respect to a material representation
required under Section 74 of the OEC. What is "material" has . ·been the
subject of the ruling of this Court in 1999 in Salcedo II v. COMELEC'Where
we held: 32 '
G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 447. 459.
1
fr
the Republic of the Philippines, and must be initiated within ten days after
the proclamation of the election results. Under section 253, a candidate;is 1.
xx xx
xx xx .··•.· \
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Thus, the first paragraph of Rule 23 simply confirms what. Section '73
of the OEC provides with respect to the denial of due course or to the 1
cancellation of a CoC. A striking feature of this Rule is that:iif t;- does not
provide for the limitation that the COMELEC cannot rnle under
Section 78 when the representation cited touches on the qual,fiqation or
eligibility of a candidate. In fact, the Rule implicitly speaks eligibility of
as Section 74 of the OEC to which Section 78 refers, contains the
qualification requirements that a candidate should state in his or her CoC.
At the risk of repetition, the ponencia in this case read Fef171in·and the
2012 Rules of Procedure to mean that there is no authorized prq,ceeding to
Dissenting Opinion 25 G.R. Nos. 221697 and 221698-700
Under the first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 25, the above statement
from the ponencia is not tbtally wrong as it merely paraphrases tnis'
paragraph. Where the ponenCia grossly erred was in its ruling, appa~ently
based on its combined reading of Rules 23 and 25, that a CoC, "cann9t be'
' J ·,) I
Read side by side and read in relation with one another, E~le~ .23 and
25 complement one another, with one (Rule 23) providing •· •. for.. the
Cancellation of CoC, wliile the other (Rule 25) proy~d)q.g for.
Disqualification. These Rules provide that the grounds partic.~ular tp one1
cannot be cited in a petitioff for the other, under pain of disIT1iss(:1.1, of, the,
petition filed. In clearer terms, CoC cancellation petition can. only cjte.
falsities in the material representations mentioned under Section 74
of the'
OEC, not any ground for disqualification under Section 68 or Section 12 of
the OEC or Section 40 of the LGC.
'
CoC, not a petition for disqualification, and held that it had been,filed out of
time. '. • · ' ·
i.'t
That would not have been a bad reasoning for a legal· -Iaytnan
.·and
should at least be a reasoning track that should not escape the' Supreme
Court itself. What the consequences and implications of this reasoning and
conclusion, of course, cannot usually be expected from the ordirtary layman
as these consequences may already require legal training to sort out.
' '
Thus in a Rule 65 review~ the Court, if it finds that the tribunal below
committed grave abuse of discr~tion in its appreciation of the facts or in its
reading, interpretation, or application of the law, simply declares the
challenged ruling null and void for having been rendered without
jurisdiction; it may act, too, on 1the incidental relief that the petitioner might
have asked for. The Court does not review the merits of the case in order
I
to issue a ruling on what the correct facts and applicable law should be.
As explained by Justice Herrer~, certiorari is a corrective and· supervisory
remedy that cannot be broadeneU to review the intrinsic correctness or merits
of the lower tribunal's decision. 37
i ) .
' l !
In the present case, Grace Poe notably prayed o~ly ,for tqe
nullification of the COMELEC rulings, for incidental reliefs, artd '"other
reliefs, just and equitable." But even the usual course in the .review and.
consideration of the case from the prism of a certiorari petition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court did not take place.
While the Court majority did indeed find the challenged COMELEC
ruling void, its basis was not the consideration of the COMELEC's
findings of facts and law, but its interpretation that the CO¥;E~EC did
not have the authority to rule on citizenship and residency qu,~~l(ications.
as these qualifications had not yet been determined by the proper au:tt1dritfos;
and do not involve self-evident facts of unquestioned or unque~tiCm;ib,1e:'
veracity from which the falsity of representations could :have. 'J?een.
determined. Without these prior findings, the Court majority r,~asqnC:d qut
, I I I' I l
that the COMELEC had no basis to rule that Poe's representations are' false. :
• What was there for the Court to review so that it could make a binding
ruling on citizenship and residency if the COMELEC .findings on
these issues were null and void because the COMELECI in the first
place had no authority to render a valid decision?
• Does the Court have the jurisdiction or authority under o~r ~C\ws, on_.
its own, to pass upon the qualifications or eligibility ~f ?~n,dtqate~.
before elections? .. · ,.
If not, what then were the citizenship and residency rulil1gs' that the
Court's majority used as basis to declare that Poe is qua'.lified, to tun
for the Presidency? · '· ' '
'
• To pursue this line of thought further, no legal bar now exists for a
qualified petitioner to question the qualification of Grace Poe after
elections in the event that she should win. 1
·
not this Court be a direc~ party to the skewing of the re~ults of the
2016 elections? Had her ;disqualification been known e~rly on, then.
those who voted for her could have voted for their second ·preferences
and the wasted votes for Poe could have made the difference· in the
results of the 2016 elections.
These are only some of th~ questions that the ponencia 's illogic raises
and many more will be raised in the discussions below. But to/go back to
the situation before us, what is clear to me is that the majority used the
I
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time 1of the
adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who/be'fore '. ·
the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in " ·
the Philippine Islands. :
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and~ upon ·
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with Jaw. [emphas~s 1,md . ·
underscoring supplied] ·
On the other hand, Article VII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution under
which the 2016 elections will be held, requires:
and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election,. and a
resident of the Philippines fbr at least ten years immediately preceding .i
such election. [emphasis and underscoring supplied]
foundling (so that an appeal to ~he constitutional text would not/flvqr her),
not surprisingly, did not focus ion nor examine at all the constitutional
text; instead, it \\:'ent directly to the consideration of the con~titutional
1
deliberations. It thus bypassed and disregarded the best and most ·accurate
standard in considering Grace Pde's citizenship. ·
'. l'
Under its terms and the jurisprudence that has developed, qitizepship
under the 1935 Constitution is determined through parentage, i.e, throu~h
1
forgotten is Article VII, Section 2 whose full terms are also quoted above.
The constitutional qualifications for the Philippine Presidency. are couched
in the negative; that is, "No per$on may be elected to the office'.of President
a
or Vice-President, unless he be natural-born citizen of the Philippines ... "
I .
This negative phrasing h~d not been coincidental, but was deliberate,
under the interpretative view that provisions couched in the negative are
mandatory and connote an absolµte command. These negative provisions are
intended to operate with universal force and permit no exceptions, ~and 'in
this sense, command absolute certainty. Thus, when the Coristitutiori
requires that a person be a natural-born Filipino citizen to be ab1e, to run for
and become president, it requires absolute certainty of citizenship.· ·
For the above reason, I cannot agree with the ponencia 's use of
statistics to create a presumption of Philippine citizenship. (These
statistics, incidentally, had not been marked as evidence, no( were;,· th~if:
sources verified.) The ponencia claims that the statistical probability' 'that
Poe could have been born to a foreigner is 99.83%, given that the :total
number of foreigners in the Philippines from 1965 to 1975 w"s' 1,5,986~
while the total number of Filipinos at that time was 10,558,278. ' :" •
·,.
I .
..
Dissenting Opinion 33 G.R. Nos. 221697 and 221698~ 700
characteristic mostly found from those bearing foreign ancestry but not from
those whose ancestry is lndo-Malay. '
In this list, Paragraphs (1) and (2) need not obviously be: co:nsidered
as they refer to persons who were already born at the time of theiadoptio'n of
the 1935 Constitution. Petitioner Poe was born only in 1968. Paragraph
40
As discussed at page 9, Jurisprudence has established three principles qf constitutional
construction: first, verba legis non est recedendum from the words of the statute there should .be ,no.
departure; second, when there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima the words of the Constitution .should be'
interpreted based on the intent of the framers; and third, ut magis valeat quam pereat · fhe Constitution
must be interpreted as a whole. . . ,
41
Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment Through Alternative Legal Services, Inc. v. ,Power
Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation, G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2p12, 6821. SCRA
602, 649.
Dissenting Opinion 34 G.R. Nos. 221697 anci 221698-700
@, on the other hand and except under the terms mentioned belQ~, \does not
also need to be included for being immaterial to the facts ad~ lhe issues
1
posed in the present case. · '
··l : . . . . . '
Thus, we are left with paragraphs (3) and (4) whichr;~espedively
refer to a person's father and mother. Either or both parents of child must a
be Philippine citizens at the time of the child's birth so that the .child can
claim Philippine citizenship under these paragraphs. 42 •· · . · '
1
' ; '. \ ~ ; 1
l
' ' , I '
As the list does not include foundlings, then they are not :includ.eo
among those constitutionally-granted or recognized to be Philippine citize.ns I ·.· ! ' !
except to the extent that they fall under the coverage of paragraph5,, i.e., if
they choose to avail of the opportunity to be naturalized. Estal?Ji:sl;ttiQ.r,ules
of legal interpretation tell us that nothing is to be added to w.hqt; th~1 text
states or reasonably implies; a matter that is not covered is to be treated.as
not covered. 44
To address the position that petitioner Poe raised in this Gase: the fact
that the 1935 Constitution did not provide for a situation where l;>oth parents
are unknown (as also the case in the current 1987 Constituti6n) does not
mean that the provision on citizenship is ambiguous witfr respect to
42
This is also the prevailing rule under Section 1(2), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution.
43
Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, 73 Phil. 307 (1941); Talaroc v. Uy, 92 Phil. 52 (1952); Tecson
v. Commission on Elections, 468 Phil 421 (2004). ,
44
A Scalia and B. Garner. Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012 edn.), p. 93.
4
~ CA No. 473.
Dissenting Opinion 35 G.R. Nos. 221697 and 22t698-700
foundlings; it simply means that the constitutional provision on, ci~izenship ' \ ! ·: . ''
based on blood or parentage has not been made availablet . u~der " ; '
the ~
Constitution but the provision must be read in its totality so tha,t .we, must
\" '· ' ' '•
look to other applicable provision that are available, which in ~hi~ case i~
paragraph (5) as explained above. • .'.' ; · . · .•
Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. III, p. 281) which in this c,ase, is.
Dissenting Opinion 36 G.R. Nos. 221697 and 221698-700
:
,'ll
I
unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the proposed
amendment. 46
In saying this, Aruego also recounted that many, if not ITIOSt, of the
majority of those who voted against the inclusion of foundlings iri· t·h~i'1935 1
Yet, under the ponencia 's view, the Constitution gives foundlings
Philippine citizenship from birth, while the other category of chiidre.n. that
had been included in the proposal were eventually given a lesser, inchoate
right to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
The ponencia's ruling therefore does not only disregard the distinction
of citizenship based on the father or the mother under the 1935 Constitution;
it also falsifies what the records signify and thereby unfairly treats the
children of Filipino mothers under the 1935 Constitution who, although able
to trace their Filipino parentage, must yield to the higher categorization that
the ponencia wants to accord to foundlings who do not enjoy simpar roots.
All these are brought up as they show that the ponencia, even in \ !, i
46
See p. 26 of the ponencia, citing 1 Jose M. Aruego, The Framing of the Phi1ippil}e Constitution
209 (1949).
Dissenting Opinion 38 G.R. Nos. 221697 and 221698-700
In the same way that the ponencia misinterpreted and twisted the
Constitution and its proceedings, as well as the established constitutional
jurisprudence, so did it read international law and the treaties it invo~ed,.
,.,! I .'
. The method thr~ugh. whi~h the State complies with ~h!~ opli~~~ion
vanes and depends on its discret10n. Of course, the automatic ~nd outnght
grant of citizenship to children in danger of being stateless is· dne of t.he
means by which this treaty obligation may be complied with." . But the
treaties allow other means of compliance with their obligations short of the
immediate and automatic grant of citizenship to stateless child~.en found in
their territory. :·
This view finds support from the history of the provisibn "right• to
acquire nationality" in the ICCPR. During the debates that led to the
formulation of this provision, the word "acquire" was inserted.in, the .·qraft,
and the words ''from his birth" were deleted. This change shows the intent
of its drafters to, at the very least, vest discretion on the State wlth:r~s'r>'~ct to
the means of facilitating the acquisition of citizenship. ·1
47
See: M. Dellinger. "Something is Rotten in the State of Denmark: The Deprivation of' Democratic
Rights by Nation States Not Recognizing Dual Citizenship" 20 Journa.l of Transnational Law & Pqlicy41;
61 (2010-2011). .. '
48
See: M. Bussuyt. "Guide to the"Travaux Preparatoires" of the International Covenant qn.Civil and
Political Rights" Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (1987). .
4
f) See; Separate Opinion of CJ Puno in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 104, at 577.
' '
treaties, such as the ICCPR and the International Covenant on· Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 50 Thus, the Philippines is 'not legally-
oblig:.i[ed to comply with the provisions of the UDHR per se. It signed the
UDHR because it recognizes the rights and values enumerated in the UDHR;
this recognition led it to sign both the ICCPR and the ICESCR. 51 '
Article 15.
00
See: J. von Bemstorff "The Changing Fortunes of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
Genesis and Symbolic Dimensions of the Tum to Rights in International Law" 19(5) European Journal of
International Law 903, 913-914 (2008).
~1 See: Secretary ofNational Defense v. Manalo, 589 Phil. 1, 50-51 (2008) and Separate Opinion of
CJ Puno in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, supra Nole 104 at 577.
Dissenting Opinion 41 G.R. Nos. 221697 and 221698-700
foundlings are born of citizens of the country where they are fo'und - to be
very disturbing. The very nature of generally-accepted principles of
international law is inconsistent with and thus inapplicable to; 'the State's
sole and sovereign prerogative to choose who may or may not be its citizens,
and how the choice is carried out.
In contrast, States have the inherent right to decide who ~.W?X 9r.maYi
not be its citizens, including the process through which citizenship m~y be
acquired. The application of presumptions, or inferences of the.'.existel1ce of
a fact based on the existence of other facts, is part of this process of
determining citizenship.
Indeed, a State exercises personal supremacy over its nationals 'I <
whereve~ ~hey may be. The right to determine who these natiqi,l~l~ :a~e i§/i
pre-reqms1te of a State's personal supremacy, and therefore of sqve~e~gnty. 5 ! ' ! . ., .
It is not for International Law, but for Municipal Law to determine \;\'ho is, .
and who is not considered a subject. 56 '. · ,
Given that the State's right to determine who may be its nationa1s (as
well as how this determination is exercised) is inextricably linkt?d :~o .Its
sovereignty, I cannot see how it can properly be the subj~ct of' state
consensus or norm dictated by the practice of other States.
Note that treaty obligations that a State enters into in.volving. the
determination of its citizens has the express consent of the State; under
Philippine law, this obligation is transformed into a municipal la~ oriq:::)t,is
ratified by the Executive and concurred in by the Senate. '·
In this light, I am also appalled with the way the ponencia used
the Philippines' signature in the UDHR as basis to conclude that the
That the Philippines has recognized that everyone has a right •to
nationality does not translate to a specific obligation to provide q~tizenship to
foundlings under the Constitution. To reiterate, our recognition of this
principle under the UDHR, even if considered binding on the Philippines,
does not bind us to a specific means by which this principle shall be applied
in our legal system. The measure and means of application is still subject to,
and must be in conformity with, the fundamental law governing our. country;
this is a decision for our policymakers, not for this Court, to make.
: '
Dissenting Opinion 44 G.R. Nos. 221697 an'd 221698-700
,l • 4
A legal norm requires the concurrence of two elements bef9re it, may
be considered as a generally accepted principle of internation,ftl. la~: the
established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of ~ta~es;. and a
psychological element known as the opinio juris sive necessita.tes (opinion.
as to law or necessity). 60 Implicit in the latter element is the b~li~( that the
practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law re.qiiiripgjt• ,
. I, \
In the usual course, this process passes through the courts' as they
render their decisions in cases. As part of a court's function of de'tertnining,
the applicable law in cases before it (including the manner a law should be
read and applied), the court has to determine the existence of a' generally.
'
I~
' \
On the other hand, the presumption that the parents of fou.ndling~ are
citize11s of the place where they are found (as found in the 1961' Convention
on the Reduction of Statelessness) could have bestowed the '.~tatus of a
natural-born Philippine citizen to Poe, save for the fact that this pre~um,ption
is antithethical to the distinction made by the 1935 Consdtution ""
on \
citizenship derived from the mother and citizenship derived from the father.
\
.f ' ' ·I
. '
''
Since Poe could not factually show that either of her parents is a
Philippine citizen, the COMELEC concluded that the original :petitioners
are correct in their position and that they have discharged their original
burden to prove that Poe is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines:.: To.
arrive at its conclusion, the COMELEC considered and relied o.n the,' terms
of the 1935 Constitution. ·
.' .
Dissenting Opinion 49 G.R. Nos. 221697 and 221698-700
The same process was repeated with respect to the residency issue,
after which, the COMELEC ruled that Poe committed false repr,esentations
as, indeed, she is not a natural-born Philippine citizen and had not resided in
the country, both as required by the Constitution. · ; .,
From the substantive perspective, too, a sovereign State ~a? fh~. ,~ight
to determine who its citizens are. 65 By conferring citizenship on a.person, the
State obligates itself to grant and protect the person's rights. In this light apd
as discussed more fully below, the list of Filipino citizen~·: urid~r, the
Constitution must be read as exclusive and exhaustive.
Thus, this Court has held that any doubt regarding citizens.hip must be
resolved in favor of the State. 66 In other words, citizenship;; cannot be
presumed; the person who claims Filipino citizenship must prove that he
or she is in fact a Filipino. 67 It is only upon proper proof 'that a claimant
can be entitled to the rights granted by the State. 68 ' · '
This was the Court's ruling in Paa v. Chan 69 where.· this Court
categorically ruled that it is incumbent upon the person who claims
Philippine citizenship, to prove to the satisfaction of the court th'at , he
I
is 1
really a Filipino. This should be true particularly after pn;:>bf tha~ the
claimant has not proven (and even admits the lack of proven) Filipino
parentage. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the .claimant of
65
Alexander Marie Stuyt, The General Principles of Law as Applied by International Tribunals to
Disputes on Attribution and Exercise of State Jurisdiction (2013), p. 101. ·
66
Gov. Ramos, 614 Phil. 451 (2009).
67
Ibid. '.
68
J. Bernas SJ, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines A Commentary, I" edition
p 9
987), p. 500, citing Justice WruTen's dissenting opinion in Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 ( 1958).
' Paa v. Chan, 128 Phil. 815 (1967).
Dissenting Opinion 50 G.R. Nos. 221697 and 221698-700
The Court further explained that the exercise by a person of the rights
and/or privileges that are granted to Philippine citizens is not conclusive
proof that he or she is a Philippine citizen. A person, otherwise :disqualified
by reason of citizenship, may exercise and enjoy the right or privilege .of a.
Philippine citizen by representing himself to be one. 70
1
•
In the present case, the private respondents sought the ca;°'cel,lation .of
Poe's CoC based on the false representations she allegedly made' regarding
her Philippine citizenship, her natural-born status, and her. period of
residence. These are all material qualifications as they are required by the
Constitution itself.
71!
Ibid.
71
G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 447, 459.
~ \ '
J •
72
Salcedo III cited Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec, which provided
that:
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of
candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not and
individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification
requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or
appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be 'plainly ·
ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement
in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her
disqualification. [italics supplied]
Corollary thereto, it must be noted that the deliberateness' 'of the '
misrepresentation, much less one's intent to defraud, is of. bare
significance in a Section 78 petition as it is enough that the person's
declaration of a material qualification in the CoC be false. Ip this ,
relation, jurisprudence holds that an express finding that the person
committed any deliberate misrepresentation is of little consequence' in the
determination of whether one's CoC should be deemed cancelled or not. .
What remains material is that the petition essentially seeks to deny due
course to and/or cancel the CoC on the basis of one's ineligibility and that
the same be granted without any qualification. [emphasis, italics, and
underscoring supplied] ! ' .
' ! •
72
G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 300, 326.
7;,
706 Phil. 534 (2013).
74
Id. at551.
75
G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 300, 392-400.
76
595 Phil. 449 (2008).
Dissenting Opinion 52 G.R. Nos. 221697 and 221698-700
The Court held that the statement in Romualdez-Marcos Coe does 's
not necessarily disqualify her because it did not reflect the necessary
residence period, as the actual period of residence shows her. compliance
with the legal requirements. The statement "[t]he said statement becomes
material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mi;lead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible" should thus
. be understood in the context of a disqual(fication
., '
Viewed from this perspective, the element of "deliberat~ intent to ! I ' '
Note, at this point, that the Coe must contain the candidate"s
representation, under oath, that he or she is eligible for the office aspired
for, i.e., that he or she possesses the necessary eligibilities at the. time he or
she filed the CoC. This statement must have also been considered to be true , i
. :. l i
xx xx
'
k. legal residence, giving the exact address and the number of years
residing in the Philippines xx x;
xx xx ;
''
xx xx
t. that the facts stated in the certificate are true and correct to the bestpf
the aspirant's knowledge; ·
xx xx
The COMELEC thus found it unconvincing that Poe woQld not .have
known how to fill up a pro-forma CoC, much less commi(' an "hones.~
mistake" in filling it up. (Interestingly, Poe never introduced any evidence
explaining her "mistake" on the residency issue, thus rendering it highly
suspect.)
ten years prior to, the May 9, 2016 elections. Poe's CoC when she ran for
the Senate in the May 2013 national elections, however, shows that she then
admitted that she had been residing in the Philippines for only .six years
and six months. Had she continued counting the period of her ,reside~ce
based on the information she provided in her 2012 CoC, she·. would have
been three months short of the required Philippine residence of ten years.
Instead of adopting the same representation, her 2015 CoC shows that she
has been residing in the Philippines from May 24, 2005, and has thus been
residing in the Philippines for more than ten years.
First, at the time Poe executed her 2012 CoC, she was alreddy'a.hi~h~
ranking public official who could not feign ignorance regarding the
requirement of establishing legal domicile. She also presumably had a team
of legal advisers at the time she executed this CoC as she was then the Chair
of the Movies and Television Review and Clarificatory Board:. (MTRCB).
She also had experience in dealing with the qualifications for the presidency,
considering that she is the adoptive daughter of a former :'',presidential
candidate (who himself had to go to the Supreme Court becaus~ of his own
qualifications).
I ;
Second, Poe's 2012 CoC had been taken under oath and'c'an i·''
thus.be 'II ' ' :
That her 2012 CoC complies with the ruling in Japzon v. 'Comelec, 71 a
2009 case requiring Philippine citizenship prior to estabfishihg .t legal
domicile in the Philippines, indicates Poe's knowledge of this requirement'.
Under these facts and reasons, could the COMELEC have acted with
grave abuse of discretion? Obviously, if reason would be the norm,)t did
not , r.
77
G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2002, 576 SCRA 331.
Dissenting Opinion 57 G.R. Nos. 221697 and 221698-700
Philippine citizens "those who are citizens of the Philippine~ from 'birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship."
The first is that found in Bengzon and in other cases with similar
rulings: that "[a] person who at the time of his birth is a ,citizen o( a
particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof." Even i(the natural-
born citizen subsequently loses Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a
foreign country, as long as he or she renounces such foreign citizepship, he
or she will regain such natural-born citizen status.
7X
This signifies that the HRET ruling could have been legally incorrect but was left untouched by
the Court because the error did not amount to a grave abuse of discretion, see Bengzon: v. HRET, supra
Note I at 651-652, and Romy's Freight Service v. Castro, 523 Phil. 540, 546 (2006).
i ,,
I believe that the second view espouses the true intenr of the
Constitution. The use of the word "from" indicates the Constitutional ;intent ' '
7'J
Webster's Third New International Dictionary Of The English Language Unabridge~ (1993), P·j
913.
80
Webster's Third New International Dictionary Of The English Language Unabridged (1993 ), p.
136.
Dissenting Opinion 59 G.R. Nos. 221697 and 221698-700
' I
' I
'
(2) By repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corp: Provided,
That a woman who lost her citizenship by reason of her marriage Jo an
alien may be repatriated in accordance with the provisions of this Act
after the termination of the marital status; and
81
Section 2 of CA 63. i
82
Otherwise known as "An act providing for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by persons who
lost such citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces iofl the· United
States, promulgated on June 18, 1960. '· ' ·
Dissenting Opinion 60 G.R. Nos. 221697 arid 221698-700
United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United
States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic pf t.he
Philippines and registering the same with the Local Civil Registry in the
place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath o.f
allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship. [emphases
supplied] ·· · ·
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. - A Filipino citizen may lose ~is
citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events: :.·. 1
xxx
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armfid
forces of a foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of service ·1
xxx
"i
Even RA No. 2630 recognizes that those who avail of its repatriation
process are NOT Philippine citizens, viz:
Under these legal realities, the RA No. 2630 process (like the RA No.
9225 process) is simply a citizenship-acquisition mode that addresses a
specific class offoreigners and non-Filipinos who are required to show
their links to the Filipino nation before they may acquire Philippine
citizenship. Presumably, former Philippine citizens who wish to become
Philippine citizens once again already possess these ties, and thus.had1 been
provided with a more expeditious process of citizenship acquisition. In the
same manner, a foreigner who acquires Philippine citizenship th.rough, a
direct act of Congress would have presumably been examined Q,.Y ,qongress
for ties to the Filipino nation.
. ,I '
Republic. The second, on the other hand, applies to foreigners. who, haye
secured a legislative grant of citizenship.
i '
; i
The second way is via the argument the ponencia poses:~ tha(Poe is
voluminous residency evidence is undisputed but COMELE(; .refused' to
consider that her domicile had been changed as of May 24,: 26os: The
ponencia apparently intended to claim grave abuse of discretion ,bq,sed on ,the
l
appreciated on the basis of the applicable law, hence it was. rash fp.r the
ponencia to claim that Poe had been "domiciled" in the Philipp1nes slrn;e 24
May 2005 since "domicile" is a legal term that connotes a phys,ical evidence
characterized by the applicable Jaw. '
The physical evidence that perhaps had not been disputed is. th,a,t Poe
had "physically stayed" in the Philippines since May 24, 2005; .wheth.yr this
stay amounted to "domicile" in the Philippines is another matter. ~s by law
and jurisprudence, certain requisites have to be fulfilled before domicile can
be changed or established in a new place. But the failure to characterize the
undisputed stay as "domicile" can in no way b,e considered grave abuse of
discretion.
Thus, as Poe stood when she returned to the Philippines in 2005, sQe
was a foreigner domiciled in the U.S. and who was aspiring, to, retu,rn to
" " ,, I
Philippine citizenship; she was also a foreigner who was temp9rarily)n. th,e
Philippines but who wanted to slay permanently as a citizen. These twO
objectives related to two separate acts and involve two separate 'concepts that
at some point are related with one another.
Poe resists these rulings and insists that she established her legal
residence in the Philippines beginning May 24, 2005, i.e., even; before the
BID Order, declaring her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, was issued
on July 18, 2006. i ' ·
" ... petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her arrival on May
24 2005 and her return to the Philippines everytime she travelled ab'road;
email correspondences starting in March 2005 to September 2006with a
freight company to arrange for the shipment of their househol~· items
weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; email with the ·
Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to
the Philippines; school records of her children showing enrolment in
Philippine schools starting June 2005 and for succeeding years; .ta:x ..
identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; tiqes for .
condominium and parking slot issued in February 2006 and .their
confirming request for change of address; final settlement from the First ·.
American Title Insurance Company showing sale of their U.S. hom,e on 27 ..
April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to '11Je. U.S~ ..
Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had been a Philippine resident ·
since May 2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the, return
of petitioner on May 24, 2005 and that she and her family stayed with ,
affiant until the condominium was purchased); and Affidavit from·'
petitioner's husband (confim1ing that the spouses jointly decided to ·
relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. \
only to finish some work and to sell the fami1y home)." ·
Following this line of thought, Poe could only begin establishing her
domicile in the Philippines on July 18, 2006, the date the BID granted her
petition for reacqujsition of Philippine citizenship.
I i • !.·l
Furthermore, an exhaustive review of the evidence Poe presented to
support her view shows that as of May 24, 2005, Poe had not complied
with the requirements for establishing a new domicile of chQice. This is
discussed as a separate topic below.
86
See Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, 318 Phil. 329 (1995).
' .
Dissenting Opinion 66 G.R. Nos. 221697 and 22i698-700
Art. 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of· civil
obligations, the domicile of natural persons is the place of their habituai:
residence. (40a)
Art. 51. When the law creating or recogmzmg them, or any other
provision does not fix the domicile of juridical persons, the same shall be
understood to be the place where their legal representation is established
or where they exercise their principal functions. (4la) [emphases supplied]
On the other hand, we generally reserve the use of the term. residence
as domicile for purposes of exercising political rights. Jurispmdel)ce has
long established that the term "residence" in election Jaws is synonymou;;
with domicile. When the Constitution or the election laws . speak of
residence, it refers to the legal or juridical relation between a person and a
place - the individual's permanent home irrespective ofphysicalpr;esence.
87
Thus, for purposes of determining venue for filing personal actions, we look to the ~i:;tual address:
of the person or the place where he inhabits, and noted that a person can have more than one r~side~c~. We
said this in light of the purpose behind fixing the situs for bringing real and personal civil acti6ns, whie;h is
to provide rules meant to attain the greatest possible convenience to the party litigants by taking into
consideration the maximum accessibility to them i.e., lo both plaintiff and defendant, not only to one·~··· the
other of the courts of justice. . :
•:
Dissenting Opinion 67 G.R. Nos. 221697 and 221698-700
residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with
such purpose.
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The intent to re11)ain:in',or :at
the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; th:e cha~ge of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the
new domicile must be actual. 88 ' f i '
Jurisprudence, too, has laid out three basic foundational rules in the
consideration of residency issues, namely: .. ,
' ' ~
First, a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; . ', ~' '
i i
f .. " '~ i
It is the sovereign Filipino people (i.e., the citizens through whom the
State exercises sovereignty, and who can vote and parUcipa/e . in
governance) who shall establish the Government of the country (i.e. one
of the purposes why citizens get together and collectively act), and they
themselves ordain and promulgate the Constitution (i.e., tf1re, r;itiit;ns
themselves directly act, not anybody else). ,,
. \
' I
91
See: Sections 4, 5, 6 & 8 of R.A. No. 9189. .,
92
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. - x x x Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a
foreign country shaJI not be qualified to run for any elective office under this code, unless s~id person has
waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws. ·
Dissenting Opinion 69 G.R. Nos. 221697 and.22169~-700
In the same light, an alien who has been granted a permanent resident
visa in the Philippines does not have the right of suffrage in the Philippines,
and this should include the right to establish legal domicile for purposes of
election laws. An alien can reside in the Philippines for a long time, but ·his
stay, no matter how lengthy, wiJJ not aJJow him to participate in o'ur' political
processes.
'j' '
• The right to RE-ESTABLISH domicile in the
Philippines mav be exercised only after reacquiring 1
•• ·
,: ,I
9J
434 Phil. 861 (2002).
Dissenting Opinion 70 G.R. Nos. 221697 and,2Zl698-700
94
Entitled "An Act To Provide For The Acquisition Of Philippine Citizenship By, Naturalization,
And To Repeal Acts Numbered Twenty-Nine Hundred And Twenty-Seven And Thirty-Fam Hundred and
Forty-Eight", enacted on June 17, 1939. ::.. ·
CA No. 63, as worded, provides that the procedure for re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
naturalization shall be in accordance with the procedure for naturalization under Act No.· 2927 (or The
Naturalization Law, enacted on March 26, 1920), as amended. CA No. 473, however, repealed Act No.
2927 and 3448, amending 2927.
95
Entitled "An Act Making Additional Provisions for Naturalization", enacted on June, 16, 1950.
96
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAVE
LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF NATURAL BORN
FILIPINOS. Approved on October 23, 1995.
Prior to RA No. 8171, repatriation was governed by Presidential Decree No. 725, enacted on June
5, 1975. Paragraph 5 of PD No. 725 provides that: "l} Filipino women who lost their. P,hilippine
citizenship by marriage to aliens; and (2) natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine cjtizen~hip
may require Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee oil
Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are approved, taking•the
necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon
cancel their certificate ofregistration. " Note that the repatriation procedure under PD No. 725 is similar to
the repatriation procedure under Section 4 of CA No. 63.
97
See Section 3 of RA. No. 9225. It pertinently reads:
with Jaw" as provided under the 1935, the 1973, and the 1935 C~nstitution~.
"(.
xx xx
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship. upon
taking the aforesaid oath. [emphases supplied] ·
98
G.R. No. L-22041, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA 147.
Dissenting Opinion 72 G.R. Nos. 221697 and, 221698-700
Note that the permanent residence requirement under CA, No. 473
does not provide the applicant alien with the right to participate in the
country's political process, and should thus be distinguished from domicile
in el11ction laws. , ,
99
434 Phil. 861, 873-875 (2002).
Dissenting Opinion 73 G.R. Nos. 221697 and 221698.:700
i'
To recapitulate, the Court in these three cases held that the candidates
therein could have established their domicile m the Philippines, ortly after
reacquiring their Philippine citizenship.
!Oil
434 Phil. 861, 873 (2002).
1()1
596 Phil. 354, 369-370 (2009).
! '
;
I .
I found then, as I still do now, that the COMELEC did not gravely
abuse its discretion in concluding that Poe has not yet complied with the ten-
year residence requirement and materially misrepresented her co.mpliance in
her CoC.
102
G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 201.'i.
Dissenting Opinion 75 G.R. Nos. 221697 and 221698-700
On May 24, 2005, Poe and her family's home was still in the U.S. as
they sold their U.S. family home only on April 27, 2006. ·. They · also
officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of their change of their U.S.
address only in late March 2006. Lastly, as of this date (May 24, 2005),
Poe's husband was still in the U.S. and was a U.S. legal resident.
I
L': .1
Taken together, these facts show that as of May 24, 2005, Poe: had. not
completely abandoned her domicile in the U.S.; she had not est.~blished the
necessary animus 11ron-revertendi.
Note, too, that Poe's travel documents between May 24, ,2005 and
July 18, 2006 strongly support this conclusion. During this period, she
travelled to and from the Philippines under a balikbayan visa with a, fixed
period of validity, indicative that her stay in the Philippines during this
period was temporary.
While it is not impossible that she could have entered the Philippines
under a balikbayan visa with the intent to eventually establish .domicile in
~
Dissenting Opinion 76 G.R. Nos. 221697 and:221698-700
the Philippines, her return to the U.S. several times while she was ~t~ying
in the Philippines under a temporary visa prevents me from: a'greeillg to
this possibility. 1
••
On the contrary, Poe's acts of leaving the Philippines for the U~S. as
an American citizen who had previously stayed in the Philippi~es under a
temporary visa is an indication of her animus revertendi to the U.'S., her old
domicile.
Notably, between Poe's arrival on May 24, 2005 and her acquisition
of Philippine citizenship, Poe made four trips to and from the U.S. in a span
of one year and two months; this frequency over a short period of time
indicates and supports the conclusion that she had not fully abandoned her
domicile in the U.S. during this period.
To reiterate for the sake of clarity, at the time Poe claims; ta. have
established her residence in the Philippines, she still had properties in the.
U.S., including her family home. They also officially informed the U;S).
Postal Service of their change of their U.S. address only in late March 2006.,
She was also still an alien, a temporary visitor in the Philippines under a
Balikbayan visa, and thus could not have been a resident.
Thus, the COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of distretipn When,
it considered Poe's evidence and concluded that Poe had not yet establish
her animus non-revertendi as of her claimed date of May 24, 2005.
10.1
In her Memorandum, Poe admitted to owning two (2) houses in the U.S. up to .this day, one
purchased in 1992 and the other in 2008. She, however, claims to no longer .reside in them. ·
Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 278-279.
Dissenting Opinion 77 G.R. Nos. 221697 and 221698-700
i "
The ruling, too, may affect the results of the coming election as this
development shall surely affect the people's choice of candidate .. ·A wdrse
effect, that we can hope will not transpire, is a Poe electoral vi~tory ~mc;l
continuing and pestering problems and uncertainty about the finalelectoral , : Ii, , , ..
Notably, the· COMELEC has already printed close to·, .50 million
ballots as of April 2, 2016. Section 78 cases pending reconsideratfon before
the COMELEC, which prior to the Poe-Llamanzares ruling could have been
dismissed summarily, could now be granted. If this would be the case, how
then, could the names of these candidates be included in the CoC?
short time period as the COMELEC Rules of Procedure providdL: · ,i , ;'' ' :
Dissenting Opinion 78 G.R. Nos. 221697 and 221698-700
AJI these wquld not be easy to sort out. In the meanwhile, life 'goes
on, hopefully with bliss despite the uncertainties that this Courfhas injected.
into our electoral exercise and in the power of a supposedly independent
comm1ss10n.
For all the above reasons, particularly the almost total lack of legal
and factual basis of the challenged ponencia, I vote to grant the motions for
reconsideration.