Scribd Logo
Upload

Welcome to Scribd!

  • Econ 233 - Quiz 4

    Uploaded by

    Younas Khan
    47 views6 pages
    1. This document is a quiz for a game theory class covering bargaining games, repeated games, and Nash equilibria. It contains 3 questions analyzing strategic interactions between players in simultaneous and repeated games. 2. The first question analyzes the subgame perfect equilibria of bargaining games with different numbers of stages and discount factors. The second question examines the pure strategy Nash equilibria and subgame perfect equilibria of a 2-stage simultaneous game. The third question considers repeated plays of a stage game and the conditions needed to sustain cooperative outcomes. 3. Students are asked to find and characterize equilibria, analyze strategy profiles, and determine whether cooperative outcomes can be sustained

    Original Description:

    Original Title

    Econ+233+-+Quiz+4.docx

    Copyright

    © © All Rights Reserved

    Available Formats

    DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd

    Did you find this document useful?

    Is this content inappropriate?

    Report this Document
    1. This document is a quiz for a game theory class covering bargaining games, repeated games, and Nash equilibria. It contains 3 questions analyzing strategic interactions between players in simultaneous and repeated games. 2. The first question analyzes the subgame perfect equilibria of bargaining games with different numbers of stages and discount factors. The second question examines the pure strategy Nash equilibria and subgame perfect equilibria of a 2-stage simultaneous game. The third question considers repeated plays of a stage game and the conditions needed to sustain cooperative outcomes. 3. Students are asked to find and characterize equilibria, analyze strategy profiles, and determine whether cooperative outcomes can be sustained

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    47 views6 pages

    Econ 233 - Quiz 4

    Uploaded by

    Younas Khan
    1. This document is a quiz for a game theory class covering bargaining games, repeated games, and Nash equilibria. It contains 3 questions analyzing strategic interactions between players in simultaneous and repeated games. 2. The first question analyzes the subgame perfect equilibria of bargaining games with different numbers of stages and discount factors. The second question examines the pure strategy Nash equilibria and subgame perfect equilibria of a 2-stage simultaneous game. The third question considers repeated plays of a stage game and the conditions needed to sustain cooperative outcomes. 3. Students are asked to find and characterize equilibria, analyze strategy profiles, and determine whether cooperative outcomes can be sustained

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    of 6

    ECON 233 – Introduction to Game Theory

    Quiz 4

    NAME:

    ROLL NO.:

    Date: 20th July 2017


    Total Marks: 25
    Time: 40 minutes

    1. Consider the Bargaining game studied in class, where both players face the same discount
    factor, 𝛿.
    a. What are the SPE payoffs if the game has 4 stages i.e. player 1 offers twice, and player 2
    offers 2? Draw the Extensive Form of the game in your answer. (4 marks)
    b. Is your answer to a. the only Nash Equilibrium of this game? Explain. (2 marks)
    c. Suppose that both players different discount factors, 𝛿1 and 𝛿2 . Where 𝛿1 > 𝛿2 , on the
    axes below, show the outcome of a 2-stage game graphically. (You do not have to give
    actual values). (2 marks)

    𝑢2

    𝑢1
    2. Consider the following simultaneous game

    L M R
    A 5,3 3,1 1,2
    B 0,4 4,7 6,5

    a. Find the Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria of this game. (1 mark)

    Assume this is the stage game for a repeated game with T = 2.

    b. Based on your answer to part a., state SPE’s consisting of stage game pure strategy NE’s.
    (2 marks)
    c. Is it possible to have an SPE strategy where the players play (B,R) in the first stage. Why or
    why not? If so, state the strategy and prove that it is indeed and SPE. (3 marks)
    d. Is it possible to have an SPE strategy where the players play (A,M) in the first stage. Why or
    why not? If so, state the strategy and prove that it is indeed and SPE. (3 marks)
    e. Suppose the T = 3. Is it possible to sustain an SPE where (B,R) is played in two of the three
    stages? (2 marks)
    3. Consider the following stage game

    C D
    C 3,3 0,4
    D 4,0 1,1

    a. Find the Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria of this game. (1 mark)


    b. Suppose it is a repeated game with T = 2. Is it possible to have an SPE strategy
    where the players play (C,C) in the first stage. Why or why not? If so, state the
    strategy and prove that it is indeed and SPE. (2 marks)
    c. Suppose the game is played for an infinite number of times with players facing a
    discount factor of 𝛿. If both players are using a grim-trigger strategy, what would it
    take for players to be able to sustain (C,C) in SPE. (3 marks)

    You might also like