MANDATORY

AND DIRECTORY
STATUTES
 IMPORTANCE OF
CLASSIFICATION
-to classify what effect is
to be given to the
mandate of the statutes.
Mandatory and Directory Statutes in GENERAL:

MANDATORY- contains word of command or prohibition, to which

a person has no choice but to obey

DIRECTORY- operates to confer discretion upon a person, namely

to act according to the dictates of their own judgment and
conscience and not controlled by the judgment of others
 When statute is mandatory or directory

• No absolute test
• Final arbiter- legislative intent
• Legislative intent does not depend on the form of the statute; must be given
to the entire statute ( its object, purpose, legislative history, and to other
related statutes
 Test to determine nature of statute

• Test is to ascertain the consequences that will follow in case what the statute
requires is not done or what it forbids is performed
• Does the law give a person no alternative choice?
ans: if yes, then it is mandatory
• Depends on the effects of compliance
• Statutes couched in mandatory form but compliance is merely directory in
nature
• Language used
-Generally mandatory –command words
*Shall or Shall not Generally “shall” and “must” is mandatory in
*Must or Must not nature.
*Ought or Ought not
*Should or Should not
*Can or Cannot
-Generally directory-permissive words
*May or May not Generally “May” is directory in nature.
 MARCELINO VS. CRUZ

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent judge failed to comply with the provisions of
Section II, Article X of the 1973 constitution, in filing the decision within the
given period of 3 months, equivalent to 90 days.
2. Whether or not Section II, Article X of the 1973 Constitution is mandatory in
character or merely directory.
3. Whether or not jurisdiction of the court over the unresolved criminal case
was lost due to non-compliance by respondent judge with the above
mentioned provision.
 RULING:
• On nov.28, 1973, or eighty five (85) days from Sept. 4, 1975, the date on the case was deemed submitted for
decision, in the above mentioned criminal case. Thus, respondent judge was able to render decision within
the three-month period prescribed by the Constitution.
• The established rule is that “constitutional provisions are to be construed as mandatory, unless by express
provision or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest. Supreme court believed that the
above mentioned provision falls within the exception rather than the general rule, citing the case of
Albemarel Oil & Gase Co. vs Morris, which declares that the constitutional provisions are directory, and not
mandatory, where they refer to matters merely procedural.
• Exceeded or not, a decision rendered by an inferior court outside of the 90-day period is not void for loss of
jurisdiction. To hold that non-compliance by the courts with the aforesaid provision would result in loss of
jurisdiction, would make the courts, through which conflicts are resolved, the very instruments to foster
unresolved cases by reason merely of having failed to render a decision within the allotted term.
• The petition was dismissed and the Restraining order issued by the Supreme Court is lifted however, since
respondent judge is already deceased, his successor is ordered to decide the Criminal Case on the basis of
the record thereof within 90 days from the time the case was raffled to him.
• Prospective Statute- is a statute which operates upon acts and
transactions which have not occurred when the statute takes effect,
that is, which regulates the future.
• Retroactive Statute- is one which takes away or impairs vested rights
acquired under existing laws, or creates new obligations, imposes
new duties , or attaches new disabilities in respect of transaction
already past.
• PENAL STATUTES- as a rule are applied prospectively. Felonies and misdemeanors are
punished under the laws in force at the time of their commission. (Art. 366, RPC)
(Art. 366. Application of laws enacted prior to this Code. — Without prejudice to the provisions
contained in Article 22 of this Code, felonies and misdemeanors, committed prior to the date of
effectiveness of this Code shall be punished in accordance with the Code or Acts in force at the time
of their commission).
However, as an exception, it can be given retroactive effect if it is favorable to the accused
who is not a habitual criminal. ( Art. 22, RPC)
(Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they
favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of
Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same.)
• PROCEDURAL LAWS ARE RETROSPECTIVE - Statutes regulating the procedure of the
Court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undermined at the time of
their passage. However, Rules of Procedure should not be given retroactive effect it it would
result in great injustice and impair substantive right.
Procedural provisions of the Local Government Code are retrospective.
• CURATIVE STATUTES- they are those which undertake to cure errors and irregularities
and administrative proceedings, and which are designed to give effect to contracts and
other transactions between private parties which otherwise would fail of producing their
intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with
some technical requirement. They are therefore retroactive in nature.
 PERALTA VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the (a) creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction
and of the (b) summary procedure adopted for that court is valid.

2. Whether or not the sentence with imprisonment during the Japanese military occupation is
valid.

3. If valid, the effect on said punitive sentence of the reoccupation of the Philippines and the
restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government.
 RULING:
As to the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction
by Ordinance No. 7, the only factor to be considered is the authority of the legislative
power which promulgated said law or ordinance. It is constitutional, since the criminal
jurisdiction established by the invader is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in
the usages of nations. It is merely a governmental agency. The sentence rendered, likewise,
is good and valid since it was within the power and competence of the belligerent
occupant to promulgate Act No. 65. All judgments of political complexion of the courts
during Japanese regime ceased to be valid upon reoccupation of the Islands, as such, the
sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must be
considered as having ceased to be valid.
• 1. VALID. As to the validity of the (a) creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive criminal jurisdiction by
ordinance no. 7, the only factor to be considered is the authority of the legislative power which promulgated said
law or ordinance. It is well established in International Law that "The criminal jurisdiction established by the
invader in the occupied territory finds its source neither in the laws of the conquering or conquered state, — it is
drawn entirely form the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. The authority thus derived can be
asserted either through special tribunals, whose authority and procedure is defined in the military code of the
conquering state, or through the ordinary courts and authorities of the occupied district." (Taylor, International
Public Law, p. 598.) The so-called Republic of the Philippines, being a governmental instrumentality of the
belligerent occupant, had therefore the power or was competent to create the Court of Special and Exclusive
Criminal Jurisdiction. No question may arise as to whether or not a court is of political complexion, for it is mere
a governmental agency charged with the duty of applying the law to cases falling within its jurisdiction. Its
judgments and sentences may be of political complexion, or not depending upon the nature or character of the
law so applied. There is no room for doubt, therefore, as to the validity of the creation of the court in question.
• With respect to the Summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, and followed in the trial of the case which
resulted in the conviction of the herein petitioner, there is also no question as to the power or competence of the
belligerent occupant to promulgate the law providing for such procedure. For "the invader deals freely with the
relations of the inhabitants of the occupied territory towards himself
2. VALID. The validity of the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction which imposes life imprisonment upon the herein petitioner, depends upon the
competence or power of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65 which punishes the
crime of which said petitioner was convicted. It was within the power and competence of the
belligerent occupant to promulgate, through the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of
the Philippines, Act No. 65 of the said Assembly, which penalizes the crimes of robbery and
other offenses by imprisonment ranging from the maximum period of the imprisonment
prescribed by the laws and ordinances promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic
as minimum, to life imprisonment or death as maximum. Although these crimes are defined in
the Revised Penal Code, they were altered and penalized by said Act No. 65 with different and
heavier penalties, as new crimes and offenses demanded by military necessity, incident to a
state of war, and necessary for the control of the country by the belligerent occupant, the
protection and safety of the army of occupation, its support and efficiency, and the success of its
operations.
It is, therefore, evident that the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive
Criminal Jurisdiction against the petitioner, imposing upon him the penalty of life
imprisonment, was good and valid, since it was within the admitted power or competence of
the belligerent occupant to promulgate the law penalizing the crime of which petitioner was
convicted.
3. The principle of postliminy upon sentences of the tribunals continued or created by the
belligerent occupant, opines "that judicial acts done under this control, when they are not of a
political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the
continuance of his control, and the various acts done during the same time by private persons
under the sanction of municipal law, remain good. Political acts on the other hand fall through as
of course, whether they introduce any positive change into the organization of the country, or
whether they only suspend the working of that already in existence. The execution also of
punitive sentences ceases as of course when they have had reference to acts not criminal by the
municipal law of the state, such for example as acts directed against the security or control of
the invader."  The punitive sentence under consideration, although good and valid during the
military occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces, ceased to be good and valid ipso
facto upon the reoccupation of these Island and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth
Government.
The writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby granted and it is ordered that the petitioner be
released forthwith, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
 FILOTEO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
ISSUE:

(1)  Are the written statements, particularly the extra-judicial confession executed by the
accused without the presence of his lawyer, admissible in evidence against him?

(2)  Were said statements obtained through torture, duress, maltreatment and intimidation and
therefore illegal and inadmissible?

(3)  Was petitioner's warrantless arrest valid and proper?

(4)  Is the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to find the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt?
1) First Issue:  Uncounselled Waiver

• On the merits of the petition, we find that the pivotal issue here is the admissibility of petitioner's
extrajudicial confession which lays out in detail his complicity in the crime.
• Pursuant to the above doctrine, petitioner may not claim the benefits of the Morales and Galit
rulings because he executed his extrajudicial confession and his waiver to the right to counsel on
May 30, 1982, or before April 26, 1983.  The prospective application of "judge-made" laws was
underscored in Co vs. Court of Appeals where the Court ruled thru Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa
that in accordance with Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides that “Judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines,"
and Article 4 of the same Code which states that “Laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the
contrary is provided," the principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, shall apply
to judicial decisions, which, although in themselves are not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what
the law means.
• Petitioner's contention that Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution should be given retroactive
effect for being favorable to him as an accused, cannot be sustained. 

2) The Second Issue:  Confession Extracted Through Torture?

His extrajudicial confession is presumed to have been voluntarily made, in the absence of conclusive
evidence showing that petitioner's consent in executing the same had been vitiated.
• NO
3) The Third Issue: Illegal Arrest?
Appellant is thus estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest...

4) The Fourth Issue:  Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence

• Having already ruled on the admissibility of petitioner's confession, this Court holds that the full
force of the totality of the prosecution's evidence proves his guilt well beyond reasonable doubt. 
Weighing heavily against the defense is the well-settled doctrine that findings of facts of the trial
courts -- in this case, the Sandiganbayan itself -- particularly in the assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, is binding upon this Court, absent any arbitrariness, abuse or palpable error.
 • COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 65
• In act to declare that public act numbered five hundred and twenty-one, known as "carriage of goods by sea act,"
enacted by the seventy-fourth congress of the united states, be accepted, as it is hereby accepted by the national
assembly
• The pertinent provision of Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution reads as follows:
"No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.  Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights.  No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him.  Any confession obtained in violation of
this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.“
• In comparison, the relevant rights of an accused under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution are, inter alia, as follows:
"(1)  Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.  If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one.  These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2)  No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. 
Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3)  Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4)  The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices and their families."  (underscoring supplied.  Obviously, the 1973
Constitution did not contain the right against an uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel which is provided under
paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, above underscored.)