C Examination of Witnesses

Exam inat io n of Witnesse s
Open Court Examination

1. Section 1 of Rule 132 provides for the
examination of the witness in open court and
unless the question calls for a different mode,
the answer of the witness shall be given orally.
This method allows the court the opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witness and also
allows the adverse party to cross-examine the
witness.
2. There are however, testimonies which need
not be given in open court. Under the Rules
of Summary Procedure, the affi davits of the
parties shall constitute the direct testi•
monies of the witnesses who executed the
same (Section 15, Rule on Summary
Procedure). In civil cases, the parties are
merely required to submit the affi davits of
their witnesses and other pieces of evidence
on the factual issues, together with their
position papers, setting forth the law and the
facts relied upon (Section 9, Rule on
Summary Procedure).
3. Like• wise, depositions need not be taken in
open court. They may be taken before a
notary public (Section 10, Rule 23) or before
any person authorized to administer oaths
(Section 14, Rule 23).
4. In a criminal case, either party may utilize
the testimony of a witness who is deceased,
out of the country, or one who is
unavailable or unable to testify despite the
exercise of due diligence, even if the
testimony was one used in another case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative,
provided the said proceeding involved the
same parties and subject matter and the
adverse party had the opportunity to cross-
examine the witness (Section l[f], Rule 115,
Rules of Court).
5. Under the Jud. Aff. Rule, the Jud. Aff shall take
the place of direct testimonies of witnesses.
Oath or Affirmation
1. The witness must take either an oath or an
affirma• tion but the option to take an
oath or an affirmation (Section 1, Rule 132,
Rules of Court) is given to the witness and
not to the court.
2. An oath is an outward pledge made under
an imme• diate sense of responsibility to
God or a solemn appeal to the Supreme
Being in attestation of the truth of some
statement (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th
966). An affirmation is a substitute for
an oath and is a solemn and formal
declaration that the witness will tell the
truth 55).(The Bar Series)
3. Where the witness refuses to take an oath

or give any affirmation, the testimony
may be barred (U.S. v. Fowler, 181 [5th
Cir.
The rule requiring an oath or an affirmation is satis•

fied when the court takes pains to impress on the
witness the need to testify truthfully and the
witness said he would (U.S.
v. 855 F.2d 944 [2nd Cir. No special
wording is necessary for an affi rmation, provided
that the language used is designed to impress
upon the individual the duty to tell the truth (U.S.
v. Kalaydjian, 784 53 [2d Cir. It may be
an abuse of the court's discretion to require the use
of the words or "affirm" in the oath if the
language would violate the witness's religious
beliefs where the witness could otherwise testify
truthfully v. State of Idaho, 778 F.2d 1397 [4th
Cir. It is an abuse of discretion to refuse to
allow the accused to testify pursuant to an oath
which he had drafted by which he swore to testify
honestly (U.S. v. Ward, [9th Cir,
Examination of Witnesses and Record of

Proceedings
The examination of witnesses presented in a

trial or hearing shall be done in open court and
under oath or affi rma• tion. The answers of the
witness shall be given orally except if: (a ) the
witness is incapacitated to speak, or (b ) the
question calls for a different mode of (Section
1, Rule 132, Rules of Court).
Bar 1978
After the accused himself had testified in his defense
in a murder case, the trial judge, over the objection of
the fiscal, allowed the defense counsel to file and
merely sub• mit the affidavits of the other witnesses
of the accused in lieu of their direct testimony but
subject still to cross- examination by the prosecution.
The fiscal thus filed with the Supreme Court a petition
for certiorari and prohibi• tion to nullify the order of
the trial court judge allowing such a procedure.
Should said petition be granted?
The petition should be granted. The provisions of the

Rules of Court require that the examination of the
witnesses shall be done in open court and their
answers be given orally, not in writing unless the
exceptions men• tioned therein apply, to wit: (a) the
witness is incapacitat• ed to speak, or (b) the
questions calls for a different mode of answer (Section
1, Rule 132, Rules of Court). None of the exceptions
apply to the case under consideration. The court
therefore, acted in excess of jurisdiction amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when it allowed the presentation
of the affidavits without an oral examination of the
wit• ness.
2. Th e questions propounded to a witness and

his an• swers thereto shall be recorded. Also to be
recorded are the statements made by the judge,
any of the parties or any of the counsels. In fact,
the entire proceedings of the trial or hearing must
be recorded. Th e recording may be by shorthand,
steno- type or any means of recording found
suitable by the court (Section 2, Rule 132, Rules
of Court).
3. The official stenographer, stenotypist or

recorder shall make a transcript of the record of
the proceedings and shall be certified by him as
correct. The transcript so prepared and certified
shall be deemed prima facie a correct statement
of such proceedings (Section 2, Rule 132, Rules
of Court).
Rights and Obligations of a Witness
1 . As a rule, a witness has an obligation to

answer questions, although his answer may
tend to establish a claim against him (Section
Of course, there are questions which he is
not bound to answer. This is because a
witness has certain rights like: (a ) Not to
give an answer that will tend to subject him to
a penalty for an offense; (b) To be protected
from irrelevant, improper, or in• sulting
questions, and from harsh or insulting
demeanor; (c) No t to be examined except
only as to matters pertinent to the issue; (d)
No t to detained longer than the interest of
justice requires; and (e ) No t to give an
answer which will tend to de• grade his
reputation, unless it be the very fact at issue
or to a fact from which the fact in issue
would be presumed (Section 3, Rule 132,
Rules of Court).
2 . Foremost among the rights of a witness is the

right not to give an answer that will subject
him to a penalty, un• less otherwise
provided by law (Section 3[4], Rule 132,
Rules of Court). This provision in the Rules of
Court gives meaning to the right of a person
against self-incrimination (Art. Sec 17,
Constitution of the Philippines).
Note however, that under Republic Act No . 6981

(Wit • ness Protection, Security and Benefit Act) , a
witness admitted into the witness protection
program cannot refuse to testify or give evidence
or produce books, documents, records or writ• ings
necessary for the prosecution of the offense or
offenses for which he has been admitted on the
ground of the right against self-incrimination
(Section 14, 6981).
Bar 2005
Under Republic Act No. 8353, one may be
charged with and found guilty of qualified rape if he
knew on or before the commission of the crime that
he is af• flicted with Human Deficiency Virus
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or
any other sexually transmissible disease and the virus
or disease is transmitted to the victim.
Under Section 17(a) of Republic Act No. 8504, the
court may compel the accused to submit himself to a
blood test where blood samples would be extracted
from his veins to determine whether he has
Are the rights of the accused to be presumed
innocent of the crime charged, to privacy, and against
self-incrimination violated by such compulsory
testing? Explain.
(c)
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
C — Examination of
answer:
The rights of the accused are not violated by such
testings. This is a settled rule. There is no
testimonial compulsion involved by extracting blood
from the accused for testing purposes (Tijing v.
Court Appeals, 354 SCRA 17). There is hence, no
violation of the right to privacy and the right to be
presumed innocent.
Ba r 2004
At the scene of a heinous crime, police recovered a
man's shorts with blood stains and strands of hair.
Shortly afterwards, a warrant was issued and police
arrested the suspect, AA . During his detention, a
medical technician extracted blood sample from his
finger and cut a strand from his hair, despite AA's
objections.
During AA's trial for rape and murder, the prosecu•
tion sought to introduce DN A evidence against AA ,
based on forensic matching of the materials found at
the crime scene and AA's hair and blood samples.
AA's counsel ob• jected, claiming that DN A
evidence is inadmissible be• cause the materials
taken from AA were in violation of his constitutional
right against self-incrimination as well as his right
of privacy and personal integrity.
Should the DN A evidence be admitted or not?
Suggested answer:
The DN A evidence should be admitted. The right
against self-incrimination applies only to testimonial
evi• dence. Extracting blood samples and cutting
strands of hair do not involve testimonial
compulsion but purely me• chanical acts which
neither requires discretion or reason• ing (Tijing v.
Court of Appeals, 354 SCRA 17).
Bar
A was accused of having raped X. Rule on the
admis•
sibility of the following pieces of evidence: (1)
314 EVIDENCE
(The Bar Lectures Series)
(2) a pair of short pants allegedly left by A at the crime

which the court, over the objection of A, required him
to put on, and when he did, it fit him well.
Suggested
The pair of short pants may be considered as circum•
stantial evidence when taken with other
circumstances. No valid objection may be interposed
over the order of the court to put on the pair of pants.
The right against self-in• crimination does not apply to
a physical and mechanical act. It applies only to
testimonial compulsion which is not the case under
the facts.
3 . Aside from the right against self-

incrimination, a witness likewise has the right
against being degraded. This refers to his
right not to give an answer that will degrade
him. However, even if the answer is
degrading to his reputation, he must answer
the question if the degrading answer: (a ) is
the very fact in issue; or (b) refers to a fact
from which the fact in issue would be
presumed (Section 3[5], Rule 132, Rules of
Court).
But a witness must answer to the fact of his

previous final conviction for an offense
4 . If the witness is the accused, he may totally

refuse to take the stand. A mere witness
cannot altogether refuse to take the stand.
Before he refuses to answer, he must wait
for the incriminating question (Bagadiong v.
Gonzales, 94 SCRA 906).
5 . Counsel must always come to the aid of his

wit• ness being subjected to intimidation,
harassment and embar• rassment. Such acts
are objectionable and a timely objection
should be raised.
Examination of a Child Witness

1. The examination of a child witness presented
in a hearing or any proceeding shall be done
in open court. Th e answer of the witness shall
be given orally, unless the witness
is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a
different mode of answer (Section 8, Rule on
Examination of A Child Witness).
The examination in this provision does not refer to

the competency examination of the child pursuant
to Section 6 of the same rule, but to a situation
where the child is already in court. Under
Section 6(c), only specified persons are allowed to
attend the competency examination of the child and
is obviously not an open court examination.
When the child is testifying, the court may exclude

the public and persons who do not have a direct
interest in the case, including members of the
press. The order shall be made if the court
determines on the record that to testify in open
court would cause psychological harm to him, hinder
the ascer• tainment of truth, or result in his inability
to effectively com• municate due to mbarrassment,
fear or timidity. The court may also proprio
exclude the public from the courtroom if the
evidence to be produced during trial is of such
character as to be offensive to decency or public
morals. The court may also, on motion of the
accused, exclude the public from trial, except court
personnel and the counsel of the parties 23,
The court may also order that persons attending

the trial shall not enter or leave the courtroom during
the testimony of the child (Section 24,
2. Whe n a child does not understand the English or

Fil• ipino language or is unable to communicate
in said languages due to his developmental
level, fear, shyness, disability, or other similar
reason, an interpreter whom the child can un•
derstand and who can understand the child may
be appointed by the court, motu proprio or upon
motion, to interpret for the child (Section 9[a],
Being another witness in the same case or
a member of the family of the child is not in itself
a disqualification. Such a person may be an
interpreter if he is the only one who can serve as
interpreter. If the interpreter is also a witness,
he shall testify ahead of the child (Section 9[b],
3. If the court determines that the child is unable to

un• derstand or respond to questions asked, the
court may, motu proprio or upon motion, appoint
a facilitator. The facilitator may be a child
psychologist, psychiatrist, social worker, guid•
ance counselor, teacher, religious leader, parent,
or relative (Section 10,
4. A child testifying at a judicial proceeding or

making a deposition shall have the right to be
accompanied by two or more persons of his own
choosing to provide him emotional support. Said
support persons shall remain within the view
of the child during his testimony. One of the
support persons may even accompany the child
to the witness stand and the court may also
allow the support person to hold the hands of
the child or to take other appropriate steps to
provide emo• tional support to the child in the
course of the proceedings but the court shall
instruct the support persons not to prompt,
sway, or influence the child during his
testimony (Section 11,
The support person may be another witness but the

court shall disqualify him if it could be suffi ciently
established that the attendance of such support
person pose a substantial risk of influencing or
affecting the content of the testimony of the child. If
the support person who is also a witness is allowed
by
the court, he shall testify ahead of the child
(Section
5. An application for the child may be made for the

tes• timony of the child to be taken in a room
outside the courtroom and to be televised to the
courtroom by live-link television. The
application may be made by the prosecutor,
counsel or guardian ad litem at least five (5 )
days before the trial date.
The court may order that the testimony of the child
be taken by live-link television if there is a
substantial likelihood that the child would suffer
trauma from testifying in the pres• ence of the
accused, his counsel or the prosecutor as the case
may be. The trauma should be of a kind which would
impair the completeness or truthfulness of the
testimony of the child (Section Bar
2006).
61
C — Examination of Witnesses
If the child is testifying by live-link television and it
is necessary to identify the accused at trial, the
court may al• low the child to enter the
courtroom for the limited purpose of identifying
the accused, or the court may allow the child to
identify the accused by observing his image of the
latter on a television monitor (Section
6. Th e testimony of the child shall be preserved

on vid• eotape, digital disc, or other similar
devices which shall be made part of the court
record and shall be subject to a protec• tive
order (Section 25[h],
7. To shield the child from the accused, the court

may allow the child to testify in such a
manner that the child can• not see the
accused by testifying through one-way
mirrors, and other devices (Section 26,
8. Reports regarding a child shall be confidential

and kept under seal. Except upon written
request and order of the court, a record shall
only be released to the following:
Members of the court staff for
administrative
62
u C — Examination of Witnesses
s
e 1) Th
; e
2 prose
cuting
attorn
ey;
)
Defen
se
couns
el;
3)Th e
guardi
an ad
litem;
4)Age
nts of
invest
igatin
g law
enforc
ement
agen•
63
cies; and
6)Other persons as determined by the court (Sec•
tion 31,
9. Whoever publishes or causes to be published

in any format the name, address, telephone
number, school, or other identifying
information of a child who is or is alleged to be
a victim or accused of a crime or a witness
thereof, or an im• mediate member family of
the child shall be liable to the con• tempt
power of the court
10. Where a youthful offender has been

charged before any city or provincial
prosecutor or before any municipal judge and
the charges have been dropped, all the records
of the case shall be considered as privileged
and may not be disclosed di• rectly or
indirectly to anyone for any purpose
whatsoever. If he is charged and acquitted or
the case is dismissed, the re• cords are also
privileged as a rule (Section
11. The youthful offender who fails to

acknowledge the case against him or to recite
any fact related thereto in re• sponse to any
inquiry made to him for any purpose, shall not
be held under any provision of law to be guilty
of perjury or of concealment or
misrepresentation (Section 31[g],
Kinds of Examinations
1. Direct examination — This is the examination-

in- chief of a witness by the party presenting
him on the facts relevant to the issue (Section
5, Rule 132, Rules of Court). It is actually a
procedure for obtaining information from one's
own witness in an orderly fashion. It is
information which counsel wants the court to
hear. The purpose is to elicit facts about the
client's cause of action or defense.
64
2. Cross-examination — This is the examination of
the witness by the adverse party after said
witness has given his testimony on direct
examination. As a rule, the scope of the cross-
examination is not confined to the matters
stated by the witness in the direct
examination. Thus, under the Rules of Court,
an objection that the question in the cross-
examina• tion is on a matter not touched upon
by the witness in his testimony will seldom be
sustained provided the question cov• ers
matters allowed to be asked by wa y of cross-
examination. This is because the rule allows
questions designed to test the accuracy and
truthfulness of the witness, his freedom from
in• terest and bias, or the reverse, and to
elicit all important facts bearing upon the
issue (Section 6,
Although Section 6 of Rule 132 allows the cross-

examiner a wide latitude in asking his questions, this
provision mere• ly states a general rule. Where the
witness is an unwilling or a hostile witness as so
declared by the court, he may be cross-examined only
as to the subject matter of his examina-
tion-in-chief (Section 12, Th e same limited
scope of a cross-examination is imposed upon the
cross examiner where the witness examined is an
accused because he is subject to cross-examination
on matters covered by the direct examina• tion
(Section l[d], Rule 115, Rules of Court).
Cross-examination has two basic purposes,

namely: (a ) To bring out facts favorable to
counsel's client not established by the direct
testimony (Jackson v. Feather River Water Co., 1859
14 C 18); and (b) To enable counsel to impeach or to
im• pair the credibility of the witness (Kelly v.
Bailey 1961 189 CA2d CR 448).
3. Re-direct examination — This examination is

con• ducted after the cross examination of the
witness. The party who called the witness on
direct examination may re-examine the same
witness to explain or supplement his answers
given during the cross-examination. It is the
65
examination of a wit• ness by the counsel
who conducted the direct examination af• ter
the cross-examination. In redirect
examination the counsel may elicit testimony
to correct or repel any wrong impression or
inferences that may have been created in the
cross-exami• nation. It may also be an
opportunity to rehabilitate a wit• ness
whose credibility has been damaged. In its
discretion, the court may even allow questions
on matters not touched in the cross-
examination (Section 7, Rule 132, Rules of
Court).
4. Re-cross examination — This is the examination

conducted upon the conclusion of the re-direct
examination. Here the adverse party may
question the witness on matters stated in his
re-direct examination 8,
Death or Absence of a Witness
1. If the witness dies before his cross-examination is

over, his testimony on the direct may be stricken
out only with respect to the testimony not
covered by the cross-examination. The absence
of the witness is not enough to warrant striking
out his testimony for failure to appear for further
cross-ex• mination where the witness has
already been sufficiently cross-examined, and
the matter on which cross-examination is
sought is not in controversy (People v.
99 SCRA 92).
2. If the witness was not cross-examined

because of causes attributable to the cross-
examining party and the wit• ness had always
made himself available for cross-examina•
tion, the direct testimony of the witness shall
remain in the record and cannot be ordered
stricken off because the cross- examiner is
deemed to have waived the right to cross-
examine the witness (De la Paz v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 154 SCRA 65).
66
Recalling a Witness
If a witness has been examined by both sides, the
witness cannot be recalled without leave of court.
Recalling a witness is a matter of judicial discretion.
In the exercise of its discre• tion, the court shall be
guided by the interests of justice (Sec• tion 9, Rule
132, Rules of Court).
Leading Questions
1. A leading question is one that is framed in
such a way that the question indicates to the
witness the answer de• sired by the party
asking the question. In the words of Section
10 of Rule 132, it is a question
suggests to the witness the answer which the
examining party
2. Leading questions are not appropriate in

direct and re-direct examinations particularly
when the witness is asked to testify about a
major element of the cause of action or de•
fense. Leading questions are allowed in cross
and re-cross ex• aminations. In fact, leading
questions are the types of ques• tions that
should be employed in a cross-examination.
Such questions enable the counsel to get the
witness to agree with his client's version of
the facts. Most lawyers will agree that a
"why" question should not be asked in cross-
examination. This kind of question allows a
witness to explain his or her po• sition,
emphasize key points of harmful testimony
and control the pace and scope of the
examination. It invites the witness to
deliver an unwanted in the
courtroom. Short and leading questions will
help control the witness.
3. Leading questions are however, allowed in a

direct examination in the following instances:
(a ) on preliminary matters; (b) when the
witness is ignorant, or a child years,
or is feeble-minded or a deaf-mute and there
is diffi• culty in getting direct and intelligible
answers from such wit• ness; (c) when the
witness is a hostile witness; or (d) when the
67
witness is an adverse party, or when the
witness is an officer, director, managing
agent of a corporation, partnership or
association which is an adverse party (Section
Leading Questions to a Child Witness
As to a child witness, Section 10, Rule 132 of the

Rules of Court should be deemed modified by
Section 20 of the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness. Under the latter rule, the court may allow
leading questions in all stages of examination of a
child under the condition that the same will further
the interest of justice. Under the Rules of Court, a
leading ques• tion may be asked of a child only if
there is difficulty of elicit• ing from said child a
direct and intelligible answer (Section 10[c], Rule
Illustrations
The following examples of leading questions in a direct
examination may be illuminating:
Illustration No. 1
The case is a collection case. The defendant contends
that the debt has been paid. He calls a witness to
testify to the fact of payment.
While the plaintiff and the defendant were
engaged in a conversation on the date and time you
men• tioned, did you see the defendant deliver fifty
thou• sand pesos to the plaintiff? (The Bar Series)
The question is objectionable on the ground that it is

lead• ing. Here the examiner obviously wants the
witness to
ly testify that money was delivered by the defendant
to the plaintiff in his presence. The question could
have been properly framed in this manner: "What have
you observed if any, while the plaintiff and the
defendant were engaged in a conversa• tion?"
Illustration No . 2
The fact situation is a robbery case. The accused
claims innocence and that a couple of hours after the
alleged robbery, he is arrested by the police while in
68
the park with his children. The defense counsel calls
the accused to the stand.
What were you doing in the park?
A: I was taking a stroll with my two
adolescent chil• dren.
While you were in the park with your children,
the police officers arrived to arrest you, is that true?
The question is leading. It suggests the next event
which the witness should testify to. The attorney could
convert the question into a non-leading one by taking
the suggestive ele• ment out of the question. Thus,
"What happened if any, while you and your children
were at the park?"
Misleading Questions
A misleading question is one which assumes
as true a fact not yet testified to by the witness, or
contrary to that which he has previously stated. It
is not allowed (Section 10, Rule 132, Rules of
Court) in any type of examination.
2. Consider this illustration:
Counsel: testified that you and the accused were

in a car bound for Baguio City. How fast were you
driving?"
This question is objectionable as misleading where

there was no previous testimony from the witness that
he was driv• ing the car. The question assumes a
fact not yet in evidence.
— Impea chm en t of a Witness
1. Impeachment is basically a technique

employed usually as part of the cross-
examination to discredit a witness by
attacking his credibility. Destroying credibility
is vital be• cause it is linked with a
ability and willingness to tell the truth.
2. Th e rules enumerate certain guideposts in

impeach• ing a witness:
a) Th e impeachment of a witness is to be done

by the party against whom the witness is called
(Section Rule 132, Rules of Court).
69
b) Subject to certain exceptions, the party

produc• ing the witness is barred from impeaching
his own wit• ness (Section 12,
Thus, if D calls W as his witness, D is not
allowed to impeach the credibility of W. It is the
adverse party, P against whom W was called, who
is ac• corded the privilege of impeaching W.
c) By way of exception to the immediately

preced• ing rule, if the witness is unwilling or
hostile, the party calling him may be allowed
by the court to impeach the witness. But it is
not for the party calling the witness to make a
determination that the witness is unwilling or
hostile. Whether or not a witness is hostile, is
addressed to judicial evaluation and the
declaration shall be made only if the court is
satisfied that the witness possesses an interest
adverse to the party calling him or there is
adequate showing that the reluctance of the
witness is unjustified or that he misled the party
into calling him as a witness (Section 12,
A party may be also be allowed to impeach

his own witness when said witness is an adverse
party or is an officer, director, or managing agent of
a corporation, partnership or association which is an
adverse party (Section 12,
d) It is improper for the party calling the witness

to present evidence of the good character of his own
witness.
The same is allowed only if the character of the
witness has been impeached (Section 14,
Thus, evidence of the good character of the witness
is allowed only to rebut the evidence offered to
impeach the witness's character. If he has been
impeached, then he can be rehabilitated by
evidence of his good character.
How to Impeach a Witness

1. Section 11 of Rule 132 specifies the manner of
im• peaching the witness of the adverse
party. It declares:
70
"Section Impeachment of adverse party's wit• ness. — A

witness may be impeached by the party against whom he
was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his
general reputation for truth, hon• esty, or integrity is bad, or
by evidence that he has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by evidence
of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by
the examination of the witness, or the record of the
judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense."
2. Under the above rule, a witness may be

impeached through the following modes:
a) By contradictory evidence;
b) By evidence that his general reputation for
truth, honesty and integrity is bad; or
c) By evidence that he has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his present
testimony (Sec• tion 11, Rule 132, Rules of
Court).
3. A witness cannot be impeached by evidence

of par• ticular wrongful acts except evidence
of his final conviction of an offense as
disclosed by his examination or by the record
of the judgment (Section 11, Thus, the
witness cannot be impeached by enumerating
in court specific wrongful acts he had
committed.
4. An unwilling or hostile witness so declared by

the court or the witness who is an adverse
party cannot be im• peached by evidence of
his bad character (Section 12,
Impeachment by Contradictory Evidence
Ever y ethical trial lawyer will tell us that one

basic rule in impeaching a witness by contradictory
evidence is the observance of fairness. Fairness
demands that the impeach• ing matter be raised
in the cross-examination of the witness sought to
be impeached by allowing him to admit or deny a
matter to be used as the basis for impeachment by
contradic• tory evidence. Normall y the basis of
71
this mode of impeach• ment is a declaration made
by the witness in his direct testi• mony. Th e cross-
examiner's intention is to show to the court that
there wer e allegations made by the witness that
do not correspond to the real facts of the case.
This mode of impeachment may also be used to
contradict conclusions made by expert witnesses
during their testimo• nies. Usually the adverse party
may also call another expert to testify to a contrary
conclusion.
Illustration
Witness A testifies on direct that he was barely five
me• ters away from where the accused D fired a shot
at the victim,
V. The defense counsel has reliable information that at
the time the shooting took place, Witness A was
standing as a wit• ness in a wedding of his friend,
Witness B in a place a hundred miles away. The
defense counsel now asks:
You testified that you were present when D shot
V, is that right?
Perfectly right, Sir!
Isn't it true that at the time of the alleged
shooting of V by D, you were in a wedding of your
friend miles and miles away?
A: That isn't true. Sir. Absolutely not.
Because Witness A denied his being in a friend's

wedding at the time of the incident, the defense
counsel now has the chance to prove the contrary by
a contradictory evidence. He can do so by calling
Witness B or any other witness to testify on the
whereabouts of Witness B on the relevant date
and time. An expert witness may likewise be
contradicted by pre• senting another expert with
contrary opinions.
Impeachment by Prior Inconsistent Statements

1. Prior inconsistent statements are
statements made by a witness on an earlier
occasion which contradict the state• ments he
makes during the trial. In the words of
Section 13 of Rule they are "statements
that he has made at other times inconsistent
72
with his present These state•
ments are admissible to impeach the
credibility of the witness making them.
Impeachment by a prior inconsistent
statement is the most commonly used method
because of its simplicity and the impact it
makes when properly used. Th e relevant
rule provides:
"Section 13 How witness impeached by evidence of

inconsistent statements. — Before a witness can be
impeached by evidence that he has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the
statements must be related to him, with the circumstanc• es
of the times and places and the persons present, and he
must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so,
allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they
must be shown to the witness before any question is put to
him concerning them."
2. Effectively impeaching a witness by prior

inconsis• tent statements requires laying the
proper foundation for the impeachment.
Laying the foundation, commonly referred
to as "laying the predicate" is a preliminary
requirement before the impeachment process
prospers. Th e elements of this foun• dation
are clearly spelled out in Section 13 of Rule
132. These are:
a) Th e alleged statements must be related

to the witness including the circumstances
of the times and places and the persons
present. If the statements are in writing
they must be shown to him;
b) He must be asked whether he made

such state• ments and also to explain them if
he admits making those statements.
3. The mere presentation of the prior

declarations of the witness without the same
having been read to him while testifying in
court is insuffi cient for the desired
impeachment of his testimony if he was not
73
given the ample opportunity to explain the
supposed discrepancy. This rule is founded
not only upon common sense but is essential
to protect the char• acter of the witness
(People v. De Guzman, 288 SCRA 346, 354).
4. To achieve a dramatic effect, the first step in

setting up the prior inconsistent statement
would actually be to ask the witness to
repeat or reaffi rm his most recent
statement. The second step would be to relate
to the witness his prior inconsistent
statement and at the same time "building
or highlighting the contradictory
utterance by relating to the wit• ness the
circumstances of time, persons and place.
Then the witness is asked whether or not, the
statements were made (Section 13, Rule
The underlying purpose for laying the predicate is to

al• low the witness to admit or deny the prior
statement and af• ford him an opportunity to explain
the same. Non-compliance with the foundational
elements for this mode of impeachment will be a
ground for an objection based on "improper impeach•
ment." Over a timely objection, extrinsic evidence of a
prior inconsistent statement without the required
foundation is not admissible.
Illustration No. 1
The case is a robbery case. The accused has Oriental
fea• tures and is five feet and three inches tall.
The prosecution
witness is one who allegedly saw the culprit come out
of the crime scene.
Mr. A, you testified on direct examination that the
man you saw come out of the burglarized store had
Oriental features and was a little over five feet Is
that correct?
Yes, Sir.
Are you certain of your description of the man?
A: Very certain, Sir.
And when was this?
On February 15, 2005, around 9:30 in the
evening.
74
That was the date and time of the burglary.
Do you recall having seen SP04 Morales outside
the burglarized store at around 10:00 of the same
day and night?
A: I do, Sir. He spoke to me that night and asked me
what I saw.
And that was only ten minutes from the time you
saw the man. Is that correct?
A: That is correct, Sir.
And at that time, everything was still fresh in
your mind. Right?
You're absolutely right, Sir.
Do you recall telling SP04 Morales that you
cannot give an accurate description of the man who
came out of the burglarized store because he was
wearing a bonnet over his face, had a pair of gloves
on and was wearing dark long sleeves?
At this point the witness gets boxed in, and his

credibility starts crumbling no matter how he responds
to the question asking him to affirm or deny the prior
inconsistent statement. If the witness admits the
prior inconsistent statement, the rule requires that
he be allowed to explain them. Often, it is difficult to
explain inconsistent statements and would require:
a) Th e alleged statements must be related to

the witness including the circumstances of the
times and places and the persons present. If
the statements are in writing they must be shown
to him;
b) He must be asked whether he made
such state• ments and also to explain them if he
admits making those statements.
The mere presentation of the prior declarations of

the witness without the same having been read to
him while testifying in court is insuffi cient for the
desired impeachment of his testimony if he was not
given the ample opportunity to explain the
supposed discrepancy. This rule is founded not
only upon common sense but is essential to protect
the char• acter of the witness (People v. De
Guzman, 288 SCRA 346, 354).
75
To achieve a dramatic the first step in setting
up the prior inconsistent statement would actually
be to ask the witness to repeat or reaffi rm his
most recent statement. The second step would be
to relate to the witness his prior inconsistent
statement and at the same time "building or
highlighting the contradictory utterance by relating
to the wit• ness the circumstances of time, persons
and place. Then the witness is asked whether or
not, the statements were made (Section 13, Rule
The underlying purpose for laying the predicate is to

al• low the witness to admit or deny the prior
statement and af• ford him an opportunity to explain
the same. Non-compliance with the foundational
elements for this mode of impeachment will be a
ground for an objection based on "improper impeach•
ment." Over a timely objection, extrinsic evidence of a
prior inconsistent statement without the required
foundation is not admissible.
Illustration No. 2
The case is a robbery case. The accused has Oriental
fea• tures and is five feet and three inches tall.
The prosecution
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE 331
D — Impeachment of a Witness
After making sure that the contents of the
written statement were correct, you signed the
statement. Is that correct?
A: That is correct, Sir.
I am showing you a three-page statement
entitled "Sinumpaang Salaysay." Is this the statement
you signed before Detective Rosales?
It is, sir.
At the end of the last page is a name and
signature over the name. Is that your name and
signature?
They are, Sir.
Counsel will now ask that the statement be marked
as an exhibit including the name and signature of
witness. Then counsel will call the attention of the
witness to the relevant paragraph of her signed
statement. The reading of the prior inconsistent
statement must be verbatim, not a mere summary as:
In paragraph 13 of this Salaysay," you
stat• ed, and I quote.
Impeachment by Showing Bad Reputation
1. Whe n a witness testifies, he puts his

credibility at issue because the weight of his
testimony depends upon his credibility. One
way to impair his credibility is by showing a
not so pleasing reputation. Hence, the
prevailing rule allows his impeachment by
evidence that he has a bad general repu•
tation.
2. No t every aspect of a person's reputation

may be the subject of impeachment.
Evidence of reputation for the purpose of
impeachment should refer only to the
following specific aspects: (a ) for truth; (b) for
honesty; or (c) for integ• rity (Section 11,
Rule 132, Rules of Court). These are aspects
of a person's reputation that are relevant
to his credibility. He cannot be impeached for
his reputation on other grounds. Thus, it
would be improper for a witness to be
impeached Dbe• cause of

— Impeachment ofa Witness
his reputation for
being troublesome and abrasive.
Example: Mr . W is called by the prosecution to
testify that it was indeed the accused who picked
the pocket of the victim when the latter
accidentally tripped by the sidewalk. Th e defense
later presents Mr . D, a neighbor of Mr . W for thirty
(30) years, who testifies that Mr . W has a
reputation in the community for telling lies. Th e
testimony of Mr . D is an impeaching testimony to
discredit Mr . W. Mr . D, who has tes• tified on the
reputation of Mr . W, may be cross-examined like
any witness. He may be asked on cross-
examination about the extent of his familiarity with
the witness who is being im• peached, together
with any prejudice and biases he may have against
the witness or his stake and interest in the
case.
No Impeachment by Evidence of Bad Character but

by Bad Reputation
1. It should be noted that Section does not

allow im• peachment by evidence of bad
character but by bad reputa• tion.
2. "Character" is made up of the things an

individu• al actually is and does, whereas
"reputation" is what people think an individual
is and what they say about him (Mcnaulty v.
State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 317. 135 S.W.2d 987,
989; James v. state ex Loser, 24
453, 145 S.W.2d 1026, 1033 cited in
Black's Law Dictionary, 1172). Hence, a person's
repu• tation is not necessarily his character
and vice versa.
Evidence of Good Character of the Witness
1. Be it noted too that the party calling a witness,

can• not initiate proof of his good character.
Thus, if the plaintiff in a civil case presents Mr.
W to testify on a vehicular collision, the
counsel is not allowed to ask questions
tending to show the good character or
reputation of the Any question to that
effect can be validly objected to as "improper
D — Impeachment
character evidence." of a Witnessa witness is
Because
presumed to be truthful and of good
character, the party presenting him does not
have to prove he is good because he is
presumed to be one. It is only after his
character has been attacked, can he prove
his being good. He must first be discredited
before his reputation or character can be
bolstered. This basic procedural rule is sup•
ported by the provisions of Section 14 of Rule
132:
"Section 14. Evidence of good character of witness.

— Evidence of the good character of a witness is not ad•
missible until such character has been impeached."
2. The rule that bars evidence of the good

character of the witness who has not yet been
impeached has reference only to a mere
witness. It does not refer to an accused in a
criminal case. In a criminal case, the accused
may prove his good moral character relevant
to the offense charged even be• fore his
character is attacked (Section Rule 130,
Rules of Court). However, the prosecution
cannot initiate proof of the bad character of
the accused. It can only do so by wa y of
rebut• tal (Section 51[2], This means
that the prosecution can prove the bad
character of the accused only if the latter
had first presented evidence of his good
character.
No Impeachment by Evidence of Particular Wrongful

Acts
1. Consider this example: Th e case is a criminal

pros• ecution for robbery. Th e defense is
presenting its evidence-in- chief and calls its
first witness who is called to impeach the
primary witness of the prosecution. Th e
defense counsel asks a series of questions to
show specific instances of misconduct of the
prosecution witness.
Do you knowDthe
— Impeachment of a Witness
prosecution witness?
I do.
Q: How did you come to know him?
A: Two years ago, he robbed me of my wallet at
gun point.
Was that incident the first time you came to
know the prosecution witness?
No Sir.
Why do you say so?
Prior to my being robbed by him, he stole the cara-
bao of my neighbor.
2. Is this line of questioning

Certainly it is. A witness cannot be impeached
by evidence of particular wrong• ful acts
(Section Rule 142, Rules of Court). Just as a
witness cannot testify on specific acts of
misconduct committed by the witness being
impeached, the latter cannot also be
examined on particular wrongful acts done by
him. To do so would be a contravention of the
tenor of Section 11 of Rule 132.
He can nevertheless, be impeached as to his bad

reputa• tion for truth, honesty or integrity. Thus:
Q: How long have you known the prosecution

witness?
Since childhood, Sir.
How well do you know him?
Very well, Sir.
Why do you say so?
A We studied in the same school since nursery school
until we both graduated from college. We were also
neighbors since childhood.
What can you say about his reputation?
Terrible, Sir. He is dishonest and untruthful.
This line of questioning does not violate the rules

on im• peachment. This is not an impeachment by
evidence of spe• cific wrongful conduct which is
barred, but an impeachment by evidence of bad
reputation.
3. As earlier mentioned, Section 11 of Rule 132

disal• lows the impeachment of a witness by
evidence of his particu• lar wrongful acts.
There is however, a particular wrongful act

that is admissible in evidence under the same
section — his prior conviction of an offense.
This prior conviction of the wit• ness is shown
through either of two ways: (a ) by his exami•
nation, i.e., by
D — cross-examining
Impeachment of a Witness him, or (b) by
presenting the record of his prior conviction.
Examining another witness to elicit from his lips the
pri• or conviction of another witness is not the
correct procedure unless the witness is one who is
competent (like an official custodian of records) to
present in court the record of convic• tion. The rule is
clear on this. It should be by "the examination of the
witness." This witness is the one whose prior
conviction is the subject of inquiry.
Exclusion and Separation of Witnesses

The judge may exclude a witness who at the
time of exclusion is not under examination so that
he may not hear the testimony of other witnesses
(Section 15, Rule 132, Rules of Court).
2. The judge may cause the witnesses to be kept
sepa• rate and to be prevented from conversing
with one another until all shall have been
examined
Impeachment of the Adverse Party as a Witness

That the witness is the adverse party does not
necessarily mean that the calling party will not be
bound by the former's testimony. The fact remains
that it was at his instance that his adversary was
put on the witness stand. He is not bound only in
the sense that he may contradict him by
introducing other evidence to prove a state of facts
contrary to what the witness testifies. Unlike an
ordinary witness, the calling par• ty may impeach
an adverse witness in all respects as if he had been
called by the adverse party, except by evidence
of his bad character. Under a rule permitting the
impeachment of an adverse witness, although the
calling party does not vouch for the
veracity, he is nonetheless bound by his testi• mony
if it is not contradicted or remains unrebutted
v. Chua, G.R. No. 160855, April 16, 2008).
When the Witness May Refer to a Memorandum

1. During his testimony, in order to refresh his
memory, a witness may refer to a
memorandum or to anything written or recorded
by himself or written or recorded by someone
act• ing under his direction. Such memorandum
should have been written at the time the fact
occurred or immediately there• after or at any
time when the event or fact was fresh in his
memory. It is necessary too that the witness
affirm that the fact was correctly written or
recorded. Also, the memorandum must be
produced and may be inspected by the adverse
party (Section 16, Rule 132, Rules of Court).
2. The witness may testify from the

memorandum, writing or record, although he
has no more recollection of the facts written
therein as long as he swears that the
memoran• dum, writing or record correctly
stated the fact or transac• tion when the
recording was This type of evidence
must however, be received with caution
E. ADMISSIONS, CONFESSIONS and the Res Inter

Alios Acta Rule (RULE 130)
"SECTION Admissions of a party. — The act,

declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against the offeror.
Sec. 27. Offer of compromise is not admissible. —

cases, an offer of compromise is not an admis• sion
of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence
against the offeror.
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-

offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by
law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the
ac• cused may be received in evidence as an implied
admis• sion of guilt.
A plea of guilty later withdrawn, or an unaccepted offer

of a plea of guilty to a lesser offense, is not ad• missible
in evidence against the accused who made the plea or
offer.
An offer pay or the payment of medical, hospital or

other expenses occasioned by an injury is not admis•
sible in evidence as proof of civil or criminal liability for
the injury.
Sec. 28. Admission by third-party. — of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission
of another, except as hereinafter provided.
Sec. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. — The act or

declaration of a partner or agent of the party with• in
the scope of his and during the existence of the
partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against
such party after the partnership or agency is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration. The same
rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner,
joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the
party.
Sec. 30. Admission conspirator. — The act or

declaration of a conspirator relating to conspiracy and
during its existence, may be given in evidence against by silence
the after the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration.
Sec. 31 Admission — Where one de• rives title to

property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of
the latter, while holding the title, in rela• tion to the
property, is evidence against the former.
Sec. 32. Admission tyjjlence. — An act or decla• ration

made in the presence and within the hearing or
observation of a who does or says nothing when the
act or declaration is such as naturally to call for ac• tion
or comment if not true, and when proper and pos• sible
for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him.
(The Bar Series)
33. Confession. — The declaration of an ac• cused

acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of
any offense necessarily therein, may be given
in evidence against him.
Sec. 34. Similar acts as evidence. — Evidence that one

did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he or did not do the
same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be
received a specific intent or knowledge, identity,
plan system, scheme, habit, custom, usage, and the
like.
Sec. 35. Unaccepted offer. — An offer in writing to pay

a particular of money or to deliver a written
instrument or specific personal property is, if rejected
without valid cause, equivalent to the actual
production and tender of the money, instrument or
property."
Concept of Admissions and Confessions

An admission is an act, declaration or omission
of a party as to a relevant fact (Sec. 26, Rule 130,
Rules of Court). It is a voluntary acknowledgment
made by a party of the exis• tence of the truth of
certain facts which are inconsistent with his
claims in an action (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th
44).
In a confession, there is an acknowledgement of
guilt; in an admission, there is merely a statement
of fact not involving an acknowledgement of
guilt or of the criminal in• tent to commit the
offense with which one is charged (Ladiana
v. People, 393 SCRA 419).
2. A confession is the declaration of an accused

ac• knowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or
of any offense necessarily included therein (Sec. 33,
Rule 130, Rules of Court; Tracy's Handbook, 62
242). It is a statement by the ac• cused that he
engaged in conduct which constitutes a crime
(29A Am Jur 2d, Evidence, §708). Hence, when a
person de• clares in his Counter-Affi davit that he
performed an act like shooting the victim but
denies that he did so with criminal intent
because the shooting was done in self-defense,
the dec• laration is merely an admission and not
a confession (Ladiana
v. People, 393 SCRA 419).
3. An admission in a general sense includes

confes• sions, the former being a broader
term because accordingly, a confession is also
an "admission by the accused of the fact
charged against him or of some fact essential
to the charge" (4 Wigmore, Sec. 1050). A
confession is a specific type of admis• sion
which refers only to an acknowledgment of
guilt. As used, the term admission refers to
acknowledgment of facts which although may
be incriminating, falls short of an admission of
guilt.
4. An admission may be implied like an admission
by silence. A confession cannot be implied. It
should be a direct and positive
acknowledgment of guilt because Sec. 33 of
Rule 130 describes a confession as a
unlike an admis• sion which is
described not only as a "declaration" but also
as an "act" or an (Sec. 26, Rule
Applied to a criminal case, a confession is an ac•

knowledgment in express terms, by a party in a
criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged,
while an admission is a state• ment by the accused,
direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue, and
tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to
prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is
something less than a confession, and is but an
acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance
which in itself is insufficient to authorize a
conviction, and which tends only to establish the
ultimate fact of guilt (San Vicente v. People, 392
SCRA 610 citing People v. 378 SCRA 281). A
confession is an acknowledgment, in express
terms, of his guilt of the crime charged (People v.
Buntag, 427 SCRA 180). It is a declaration made
at any time by a person, voluntarily and without
compulsion or induce• ment, stating or
acknowledging that he had committed or par•
ticipated in the commission of a crime (People v.
Satorre, 408 SCRA 642).
Distinguished from Declarations Against

Interest
An admission is oftentimes confused with a declaration
against interest. They are however distinct from each
other:
To be admitted as a declaration against interest, the

declarant must be dead or unable to testify (Sec. 38,
Rule 130, Rules of Court); an admission is admissible
even if the person making the admission is alive
and is in court;
A declaration against interest is made before
the controversy arises; an admission is made at
any time, even during the trial;
A declaration against interest is made against
one's pecuniary or moral interest; an admission
is admissible as long as it is inconsistent with his
present claim or defense and not be against
one's pecuniary or moral interest;
A declaration against interest is admissible even
against third persons; an admission is admissible
only against the party making the admission;
) A declaration against interest is an exception
to the hearsay rule; an admission is not, and is
admissible not as an exception to any rule.
Effects of Admissions
An admission by a party may be given in evidence
against him (Sec. 26, Rule 132, Rules of Court). Hi
s admission is not admissible in his favor,
because it would be self-serv• ing evidence.
Declarations of a party favorable to himself are not
admissible as proof of the facts asserted (Cole
v. Ralph, 252 US 286, 64 L Ed 567, 40 SC Ct 312,
USTC 312a, 3 AFTR 3051; State v. Warren, 242
Iowa 1176, 47 NW2d 221; Jones v. Dugan, 124 Md.
346, 350, A. 775).
Under Rule 130, Section 26, the act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be
given in evi• dence against him. This rule is based
on the notion that no man would make any
declaration against himself, unless it is true
(Republic v. Bautista, G.R. No. 169801, September
11, 2007).
of Admissions and Confessions

1. admission may be express or implied. An
express admission is a positive statement or
act. An implied admis• sion is one which
may be inferred from the declarations or
acts of a person. A confession cannot be
implied. It must be a positive
acknowledgment of guilt and cannot be
inferred. Sec. 33 of Rule 130 refers to a
confession as a which connotes an
affi rmative statement from the person
making the confession.
2. An admission may be judicial or extrajudicial.

An admission is judicial when made in the
course of a judicial proceeding. An admission
is extrajudicial when made out of court or
even in a proceeding other than the one
under con• sideration (Perry v. Simpson,
Conn. 313). A confession may be also
judicial or extrajudicial for the same
reasons Am
. An admission may also be adoptive. This

admission occurs when a person manifests his
assent to the statements of another person. Th e
admission may be received in evidence if it can be
shown that a party adopted the statements as his
own (Fed. Evid.R. Black's Law
Dictionary, 5th 44).
) A party may, by his words or conduct, volun•

tarily adopt or ratify another's statement.
Where it ap• pears that a party clearly and
unambiguously assented to or adopted the
statements of another, evidence of those
statements is admissible against him. This is the
essence of the principle of adoptive admission.
An adoptive admission is a party's reaction to a

state• ment or action by another person when it
is reasonable to treat the party's reaction as an
admission of something stated or implied by the
other person. By adoptive admis• sion, a third
person's statement becomes the admission of the
party embracing or espousing it. Adoptive admission
may occur when a party:
a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral
statement made by another;
b) hears a statement and later on essentially
repeats it;
c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the as•
sertion of another;
d) replies by way of rebuttal to some
specific points raised by another but
ignores further points which he or she has
heard the other make; or
e) reads and signs a written statement
made by another (Republic v. Kenrick
Corpo• No. 149576,
August 8, 2006).
Examples of adoptive admissions are the alleged

admis• sions made by President Estrada when his
options had dwin• dled when, according to the
Angara Diary, the armed forces withdrew its support
from him as President and Commander- in-Chief.
Thus, Executive Secretary Angara had to allegedly
ask Senate President Pimentel to advise petitioner
to consider the option "dignified exit or
resignation." President Estrada did not object to
the suggested option but simply said he could
never leave the country. According to the Court, his
silence on this and other related suggestions can be
taken as adoptive admissions by him (Estrada v.
Desierto, 356 SCRA 108).
Besides, he had several opportunities according to

the Court, to object to the admissibility of the
diary, but did not do so seasonably. It is too late in
the day to object to raise his objections in an
omnibus motion. Th e Angara Diary said the Court
also contains direct statements of the President
which could be categorized as admissions of a party
like: (a ) his pro• posal for a snap election in which
he would not participate; (b) his statement that he
would leave by Monday if the second envelope
would be opened by Monday; and (c) statements
like: Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado
nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape,
bureaucracy, intriga. I just want to clear my
name, then I will go." These words were
taken by the Court as admissions indicative of his
resignation from
JUDICIA L NOTIC E AN D ADMISSION S
Admissions, Confessions and the Res Inter Alios Acta Rule
To rebut the argument that the diary of Angara is not the

diary of the former president and thus, could not be admis•
sible against him, the Court declared:
argument overlooks the doctrine of adoptive admission. An

adoptive admission is a party's reaction to a statement or
action by another person when it is rea• sonable to treat the
party's reaction as an admission of something stated or
implied by the other person (Estrada v. Desierto,
Effect of Extrajudicial Confession of Guilt; Corpus Delicti

1. Whil e a judicial confession may sustain a conviction,
an extrajudicial confession is not sufficient for
conviction. The rule requires that the confession
be corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti (Sec.
2. Corpus delicti is the of the or the offense

(People v. Strook, 347 460, 170 N.E. 821). Strictly
speak• ing, it means the actual commission of the
crime and someone criminally responsible therefor
(People v. 84 Cal App. 99, 257 583 cited
by Underhill, Criminal Evidence, §34). It is the
substance of the crime; the fact that a crime has
actu• ally been committed (People v. Gutierrez, 258
SCRA 70; People v. De Leon, G.R. No. 180762,
March 4, 2009).
Corpus delicti has two elements: (1) proof of the occur•

rence of a certain event example, that a man has
died or a building has been burned; and (2) some person's
criminal responsibility for the act (People v. Boco, 309
SCRA 42; People v. Base, 329 SCRA 158).
3. Corpus delicti, and all the elements thereof, may be

proved by circumstantial evidence but such proof
must be con• vincing and compatible with the nature
of the case (Underhill, Criminal Evidence, §37).
4. While an extrajudicial confession will not be suffi•

cient for conviction unless corroborated by evidence
corpus delicti (Sec. 3, Rule 133, Rules of Court), a
judicial confession will support conviction without
proof of corpus delicti independent of the judicial
confession
Admissions, (State
Confessions v.
and Dena, N.Acta
the Res Inter Alios Mexico,
Rule 479, 214,
583).
5. In the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs,

it is not enough to prove that the transaction took
place and that the buyer and seller were identified.
The corpus delicti must be offered in evidence. Here
the corpus delicti is the ille• gal drug. To prove the
corpus delicti, a special procedure must be
followed. The police officer should comply with the
proper procedure in the custody of the seized
drugs. After seizure and confiscation, the drugs
must be physically inventoried and photographed
in the presence of the accused, and or his
who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. Th e
failure to comply with such a requirement raises a
doubt whether what was submitted for laboratory
examination and presented in court were the ones
actually recovered from the accused. Failure of the
officer to comply with this procedure negates the
presump• tion that official duties have been
performed (People v. Naza- reno, G.R. No. 174771,
September 11, 2007; People v. Santos,
G.R. No. 175593, October 17, 2007; People v.
G.R. No. 171310, July 9, 2008; People v. Magat, G.R. No.
179939, September 29, 2008; People v. Cruz, G.R.
No. 181545, October 8, 2008).
6. In theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely: (1 )

that the property was lost by the owner, and (2 )
that it was lost by felonious (Gulmatico v.
People, G.R. No. 146296, October 15, 2007).
7. The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession

of firearms is the accused's lack of license or permit
to possess or to carry the firearm, as possession
itself is not prohibited by law(Sayco v. People, G.R.
No. 159703, March 3, 2008).
8. The accused in one case argues that inasmuch as

there is no conclusive evidence of the death of the
deceased be• cause his body was never found,
neither was the place where he is supposed to
have been buried indicated, hence, corpus delicti
was not established.
Th e Court ruled that it is not necessary to recover the

body or to show where it can be found in a case of murder
or homicide. There are cases like death at sea, where
the finding or the recovery of the body is impossible. It is
enough that the death and the criminal agency causing it
be proven. Quoting Wharton on Criminal Evidence, Vol .
2, Sec. 871, pp. 1505-1506, the Supreme Court also held
that by the weight of authority, it is a rule now
established that the element of death in the cor• pus
delicti may be established by circumstantial evidence. To
establish the corpus delicti by circumstantial evidence,
facts are admissible to show the impossibility of
rescue, as at sea, to show the existence and extent of
wounds, and deceased's condition of health; and to show
that the wound was sufficient to cause death and that the
party was reported dead. Death is sufficiently shown by
the testimony of a witness that he saw the flash and
heard the report, and that the deceased fell to the
ground, declaring that he was shot and that the accused
shot him (People v. Sasota, 91 Phil. People v.
Agsunod, Jr., 306 SCRA 612).
Drawing from the early case of Sasota the Court ruled

that in a case of murder or homicide, it is not necessary to
recover the body of the victim or show where it can be
found. It is enough that the death and the criminal agency
causing death is proven. In the Sasota case, the
prosecution witnesses saw the four (4) armed accused
forcibly took the victim from his house to a lake, beat him
up all the way to the boat. While sailing, the accused
continued ill-treating the victim until the latter died. The
body of the victim was never found (Also cited in People
v. Roluna, G.R. No. 101797, March 24, 1994).
In People v. Ansang (93 Phil. 44), the appellant while rid•

ing on a ignited home-made bombs and threw them
at the victims in another boat. While the parts of the boat
were later found, the passengers were never seen again.
Holding that the corpus delicti was shown by the facts and
that the victims died, the Court convicted the appellant of
multiple murder.
9. Please refer po sa latest na Riano. Powerful .

10. The rule

Admissions, on extrajudicial
Confessions and the Res Inter Aliosconfession
Acta Rule in the Rules
of Court must be considered together with
applicable constitu-
tional and substantive laws which must be complied

with for the confession to be admissible. For instance,
Sec. 2(d) of Re• public Act 7438 (Act Defining Certain
Rights of Persons, Ar • rested, Detained or Under
Custodial Investigation), provides:
extrajudicial confession made by a person ar•

rested, detained, or under custodial investigation
shall be in writing and signed by such person in the
presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence,
upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of
the parents, older brothers and sisters, his spouse,
the municipal mayor, the munici• pal judge, district
school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel
as chosen by him; otherwise, such extraju• dicial
confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any
proceeding."
Bar 2006
What are the requirements in order that an admis•
sion of guilt of an accused during a custodial
investigation be admitted in evidence?
Suggested answer:
Any extrajudicial confession made by a person
arrested, detained, or under custodial investigation
shall be in writing and signed by such person in the
presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence,
upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of
the parents, older brothers and sisters, his spouse,
the municipal mayor, the munici• pal judge, district
school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel
as chosen by him; otherwise, such extraju• dicial
confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any
proceeding (Sec. 2[d], No. 7438).
The confession must be corroborated by evi• dence of
corpus delicti (Sec. 3, Rule 133, Rules of Court).
Bar 2008
The mutilated cadaver of a woman was discovered
near a creek. Due to witnesses attesting that he was
the last person seen with the woman when she was
still alive,
was arrested within five (5) hours after the

discov• ery of the cadaver and brought to the police
station. The crime laboratory determined that the
woman had been raped.
While in police custody, Carlito broke down in the
presence of an assisting counsel and orally confessed
to the investigator that he had raped and killed the
woman, detailing the acts he had performed up to his
dumping of the body near the creek. He was
genuinely remorseful. During the trial, the state
presented the investigator to testify on the oral
confession of Carlito. Is the oral confes• sion
admissible as evidence of guilt?
answer:
The oral confession is not admissible as evidence of
guilt. The confession is in the nature of an
extrajudicial confession before an investigator while
under custodial investigation. Hence, the statutory
provisions under R.A. No. 7438 (Sec. will have to
be complied with. Under said law, any extrajudicial
confession made by a person arrested, detained, or
under custodial investigation shall be in writing and
signed by such person in the presence of his counsel.
An oral confession does not comply with the
mandatory provisions of the law. Under R.A. No.
7438, the confession is inadmissible in evidence in
any proceed• ing (Sec. 2[d], R.A. No. 7438).
11. Th e above rights refer to an

extrajudicial confession of a person arrested,
detained or is under custodial investiga• tion
because a confession made by the accused
before he is placed under custodial
investigation need not comply with the
above.
If he talks to a person in a private meeting with for

in• stance, a municipal mayor spontaneously, fully
and volun• tarily confessing the crime to his
commission of a crime, the constitutional
requirements in a custodial investigation do not
apply. When the accused talked to the mayor as a
confi• dant and not as a law enforcement officer,

the uncounselled confession did not violate his
constitutional rights. Constitu-

tional procedures on custodial investigation do not
apply to spontaneous statements, not elicited through
questioning by authorities, but given in an ordinary
manner whereby the ac• cused orally admitted having
committed the crime. Hence, such confession is
admissible in evidence against him, even when he did
so without the assistance of counsel (People v. Cabiles,
284 SCRA 199).
12. Custodial investigation has been

described as one which involves any
questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken
into custody or other• wise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. It is
only after the investigation ceases to be a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime and
begins to focus on a particular suspect, the
suspect is taken into custody, and the police
car• ries out a process of interrogations that
lend itself to elicit• ing incriminating
statements, that the rule begins to operate
(Aquino v. G.R. No. 147782, June 25,
2008).
Note that Republic Ac t No . 7438 (Sec. has
extended the meaning of to
include the practice of issuing an invitation to a
person who is investigated in con• nection with an
offense he is suspected to have committed.
13. Voluntary admissions made by the

accused such as his possession of a firearm
used in the commission of a crime and the
subsequent surrender of the firearm at a
time when he was already under custodial
investigation are not admis• sible against the
accused. At the time the admissions wer e
made, the police had already begun to focus
on the accused and were carrying out the
process of interrogations that was lending
itself to eliciting incriminating statements and
evi• dence. The investigation thus was no
longer a general inqui• ry into an unsolved
crime as the accused was already being held
as a suspect for the alleged killing of the
victims. Con•
Admissions, sequently,
Confessions theAlios
and the Res Inter rights
Acta Ruleof a person
under custodial investiga• tion, including the
right to counsel, have already attached in
his favor. An y waiver of these rights should be
in writing and undertaken with the assistance
of counsel. Admissions under custodial
investigation without the assistance of
counsel are barred as evidence. The records
do not disclose any indication that the
accused had waived his right to counsel,
hence, his admissions are inadmissible against
him. A suspect's confes• sion, whether verbal
or non-verbal, when taken without the
assistance of counsel without a valid waiver of
such assistance regardless of the absence of
such coercion, or the fact that it had been
voluntarily given, is inadmissible in evidence,
even if such confession were gospel truth
(People v. 432 SCRA 1).
Admission by Silence
1. Admission by silence as expressed in Sec. 32
of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
"SECTION 32. Admission by silence. — An act or declaration

made in the presence and within the hear• ing or
observation of a party who does or says noth• ing when the
act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or
comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him
to do so, may be given in evidence against him."
2. Admission by silence has been traditionally

received even in common law as admissible
evidence. The usual pattern for its
admissibility involves a statement by a person
in the presence of a party to the action,
criminal or civil. The state• ment contains
assertions against the party, which, if
untrue would be sufficient cause for the party
to deny. His failure to speak against the
statement is admissible as an admission.
Suppose upon seeing a policeman, a bystander, in

the presence of other people, points to a man and
accuses him as the killer of another man found
dead the night before. The man pointed at does not
respond. He does
Admissions, not deny
Confessions the
and the Res accusation.
Inter Alios Acta Rule His
failure to respond may be given in evidence
against him. The idea of the rule on admission by
silence is that if an ac• cusation is made, and a
reasonable person would have denied the same if it
were false, the failure to deny the accusation by
the person accused may be construed as an
implied admission of the truth of the accusation and
may be given in evidence against him.
3. Not every silence is an implied admission. For

in• stance, the silence of a person under
investigation for the com• mission of an
offense should not be construed as an
admission by silence because of constitutional
reasons (Sec. 2[b], R.A. 7438).
4. For silence to be deemed an admission, it is

neces• sary: (a) that he heard and understood
the statement; (b) that he was at liberty to
make a denial; (c) that the statement was
about a matter affecting his rights or in which
he was inter• ested and which naturally calls
for a response; (d ) that the facts were
within his knowledge; and (e ) that the fact
admit• ted from his silence is material to the
issue (People v. Paragsa, 84 SCRA 105).
Thus, in one case, despite the many

opportunities giv• en to the respondent, he refused
to comment and present his side. The gravity of
the charges and the weight of the evidence against
him would have prompted an innocent man to
come out and clear his name. However, he opted to
maintain his silence. His silence can easily be
interpreted as an admission of guilt (Ortiz v. De
Guzman, A.M. No. February 16, 2005;
Office of the Court Administrator v. Bernardino, 450
SCRA 88).
Res Inter Alios Branches
1. The expression if fully expressed reads: res

inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet which
literally means that "things done between
strangers ought not to injure those who are
not parties to them" (Black's Law Dictionary,
5th Admissions,
1178; Dynamic
Confessions Signmaker
and the Res Inter Alios Acta Rule Outdoor
Advertising Services, Inc. v. Potongan, 461
SCRA 328).
2. The res inter alios acta rule has two

branches, name•
ly:
a) The rule that the rights of a party cannot
be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another (Sec. 28, Rule 130,
Rules of Court).
b) The rule that evidence of previous conduct
or similar acts at one time is not admissible
to prove that one did or did not do the same
act at another time (Sec. 34, Rule 132, Rules
of Court).
3. Th e provisions on res inter alios acta read:
"SECTION 28. Admission by third party. — The rights

of a third party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration or omission of another, except as
hereinaf• ter provided."
"Sec. 34. Similar acts as evidence. — Evidence that

one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is
not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the
same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be
re• ceived to prove a specific intent or knowledge,
identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or
usage, and the like."
4. Th e first branch is a very simple and logical

rule which holds that whatever one says or
does or omits to do should only affect him but
should not affect or prejudice oth• ers. In other
words, both common reason and fairness
demand that a man's actions and declarations
should affect him alone and should not affect
if X makes a statement before the
media admitting his participation in a previous
murder, his statement is admissible against
him under Sec. 26 of Rule 130. Th e rest of his
statement pointing to Y and Z as co-
participants in the murder are not admissible
against Y and Z under the first branch of the
res inter alios acta rule in Sec. 28 of Rule 130.
Under this rule, the statement of X should not
affect or prejudice Y and Z.
5. The above rule has reference only to

declarations. Hence, statements
made in open court by a wit• ness
implicating persons aside from his own
judicial admis• sions, are admissible as
declarations from one who has per• sonal
knowledge of the facts testified to.
Admissions, Confessions and Inter Alios Acta Rule
Bar 2003
X and Y were charged of murder. Upon application of
the prosecution, Y was discharged from the
information to be utilized as a state witness. The
prosecutor presented Y as witness but forgot to state
the purpose of his testimo• ny much less offer it in
evidence. Y testified that he and X conspired to kill the
victim but it was X who actually shot the victim. The
testimony of Y was the only material evi• dence
establishing the guilt of X. Y was thoroughly cross-
examined by the defense counsel. After the
prosecution rested its case, the defense filed a motion
for demurrer to evidence based on the following
grounds:
(a)
(b) Ys testimony is not admissible against X pur•
suant to the rule on res inter alios acta.
Rule on the motion for demurrer.
Suggested answer:
(a)
(b) The demurrer should be denied. The reliance on
the rule on res inter alios acta is misplaced. The rule
applies only to extrajudicial declarations and not to
state• ments made in open court. Y testified as a
witness and was in fact, cross-examined.
Exceptions to the Res Inter Alios Acta Rule (first

branch)
1. The first branch of the rule admits of certain
excep• tions, to wit:
a) admission by a co-partner or agent (Sec.
29, Rule 130);
b) admission by a co-conspirator (Sec. 30, Rule
130); and
c) admission by privies (Sec. 31, Rule 130).
2. The basis for admitting the above admissions is

that the person making the statement is under
the same circum• stances as the person
against whom it is offered. Such cir-
cumstances giv e him substantially the same

interest and the same motive to make a statement
about certain matters (4 Sec. 1080a,
140).
Admissions by a Co-partner or Agent

1. An agent performs some service in
representation or on behalf of his principal
(Art. 1868, Civil Code of the Philippines). Th e
agent therefore, is in legal contemplation, a
mere extension of the personality of the
principal and unless the agent acts in his own
name, the principal must comply with all the
obligations which the agent may have
contracted within the scope of his authority
(Art. 1883; Art 1910, Civil Code of the
Hence, whatever is said by an agent
to a third person, during the course of the
agency and within the scope of his actual or
apparent authority, relative to the business
contemplated by the agency, is for legal
purposes also the statement of the principal
and is therefore, admissible against said
principal Am Jur 29, Evidence, §815 citing
Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229,
62 L Ed
260, 38 S Ct 65).
Th e relationship among partners is on the same

footing with the relationship of an agent to his
principal. Both the contracts of agency and
partnership involve fiduciary re• lationships. Under
the law (Art. 1818, Civil Code of the Phil• ippines),
every partner is an agent of the partnership for the
purpose of its business and the act of the partner
in carrying out the usual course of business binds
the partnership as a rule. Hence, under the same
principle governing an agency, the declarations of
a partner may be admissible against the other
partners or the partnership.
2. However, not every declaration or act made or

done by a partner or agent is admissible
against the other partners or the principal. For
the admission of a co-partner or agent to be
admissible, the following requisites must
concur:
a) ) The declaration or act of the partner and

agent must have been made or done within
the scope of his au• thority;
b) The declaration or act of the partner and agent

must have been made or done during the
existence of the partnership or agency (while
the person making the dec• laration was still a
partner or an agent); and
The existence of the partnership or agency is
proven by evidence other than the declaration or act
of the partner and agent (Sec. 29, Rule 130,
Rules of Court).
3. An y declaration made before the partnership

or agency existed, or those made after, are not
admissible against the other partners or the
principal but remains admissible against the
partner or agent making the declaration. It is
also necessary for the application of the
exception that the proof of the agency or
partnership be from a source independent of
the declaration made by the partner or
agent.
Thus, if after the partnership is dissolved and

liquidated, A A , a former partner in AB C
Partnership, admits before a police investigator that
he and his partners were engaged in smuggling
highly dutiable imported cigarettes while the part•
nership was operating a buy and sell business, the
extraju• dicial declarations of AA are not admissible
against BB and CC, his former partners. His
declarations are nevertheless, admissible against
him.
4. The above rules also apply to the

declarations or acts of a joint owner, joint
debtor, or other persons jointly in• terested
with the party (Sec. 29, Rule 130, Rules of
Court).
Admissions by a Co-conspirator
1. A conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it (Art. 8, Revised Penal Code). Once
the con• spiracy is proven, the act of one is
the act of all. Th e statement therefore of one,
may be admitted against the other co-con•

spirators as an exception to the rule of res
inter alios acta.
2. Assume that two months after a successful

bank robbery, A was arrested as a direct
participant in the crime.
During a television interview, he admitted his

participation in the robbery. He also implicated B and C
as his other compan• ions in planning and executing
the robbery. Is his statement admissible? Th e
statement is admissible as to him (Sec. 26, Rule
130) but not as to B and C (Sec. 28, Rule 130).
To be admissible against B and C, the following must

concur:
a) Th e declaration or act be made or done
during the existence of the conspiracy;
b) Th e declaration or act must relate to the
con• spiracy; and
c) Th e conspiracy must be shown by evidence oth•
er than the declaration or act (Sec. 30, Rule 130,
Rules of Court).
Observe that the declaration of A was made long

after the conspiracy was over. It then was no
longer made during the existence of the
conspiracy. In fact, at the time of the dec• laration,
A was no longer a co-conspirator. Even assuming
that the conspiracy can be proven by independent
evidence and even if his statement was related to
the conspiracy, the declaration is not admissible as
an exception to the rule res inter alios acta.
Incriminating declarations of co-conspirators made

in the absence of or without the knowledge of the
others after the conspiracy has come to an end is
inadmissible (US v. Ner- NY] 862 F2d 967, 27 Fed
Rules Evidence Serv 271;
Am Jur, Evidence, § 838).
The arrest of the declarant is often found to

terminate the participation in the
conspiracy so that the declarant's post arrest
statements do not qualify as admis• sible co-
conspirator statements Jur, Evidence, §840).
An extrajudicial confession made by an accused is
admissibleAdmissions,
against Confessions and the Res Inter Alios Acta Rule
him but not admissible against
his co-accused who took no part in the confession
US, 156 US 51). An ex• trajudicial confession is
binding only upon the confessant and
is not admissible against his co-accused (People v.

Raquel, 265 SCRA 248). As against the latter, the
confession is hearsay (People v. 256 SCRA
52).
Bar 1991
During custodial investigation at the Western Police
District, Mario Margal was informed of his
constitutional right to remain silent and to have
competent and inde• pendent counsel. He decided to
waive his right to counsel and proceeded to make a
statement admitting commis• sion of a robbery. In
the same statement, he implicated Antonio Carreon,
his co-conspirator in the crime.
(a)
(b) Is it (the testimony of Mario Margal) admis• sible
against Carreon as an exception to the res inter alios
acta rule?
Suggested answer:
It is not admissible against Carreon. To be admis• sible
against Carreon, the following requisites must con•
cur:
The declaration or act be made or done during the
existence of the conspiracy;
The declaration or act must relate to the con• spiracy;
and
The conspiracy must be shown by evidence oth• er
than the declaration or act (Sec. 30, Rule 130, Rules
of Court).
Assuming that the conspiracy may be shown by evi•
dence other than the extrajudicial statement of
Margal, the same was made by him after the
conspiracy had al• ready ceased.
3. The rule requiring the concurrence of the

above ele• ments does not apply when the co-
accused takes the witness stand and repeats
his extrajudicial confession as a witness.
The declarations referred to under Sec. 30
of Rule 130 are
merely extrajudicial statements or declarations. When

he tes• tifies as a witness, his statements become
judicial and are ad• missible not only against him but
also against his co-accused. This is because the
statements by witnesses in open court are admissible
as testimonies of a person based on his personal
perceptions and knowledge pursuant to Sec. 36 of Rule
130, Rules of Court.
4. Jurisprudence holds that the general rule is

that the ex• trajudicial confession or
admission of one accused is admis• sible only
against the said accused but is inadmissible
against the other accused. However , if the
declarant/admitter repeats in court his
extrajudicial confession during trial and the
oth• er accused is accorded the opportunity to
cross-examine the admitter, such confession
or admission is admissible against both
accused. Th e erstwhile extrajudicial
confession or admis• sion when repeated
during the trial is transposed into judicial
admissions (People v. Buntag, 427 SCRA
180).
5. Th e Supreme Court also held in one case that

a dis• tinction must be made between an
extrajudicial and judicial confession. An
extrajudicial confession may be given in evi•
dence against the confessant but not against
his co-accused since the latter are not
afforded the opportunity to cross-exam• ine
him. A judicial confession is admissible against
the declar• ant's co-accused since the
latter are afforded the opportunity to cross-
examine the former. Sec. 30 of Rule
applies only to extrajudicial admissions and
not to testimonies at trial where the party
adversely affected has the opportunity to
cross-ex• amine the declarant (People v.
Palijon, 343 SCRA 486). When the extrajudicial
admission of a conspirator is confirmed at the
trial, it ceases to be hearsay. It becomes
instead a judicial admission, being a testimony
of an eyewitness admissible in evidence
against those it implicates. Here, the
Admissions, Confessions
extrajudicial confessionand the Res
wasInter Alios Acta Rule by him in
affirmed
open court during the trial. Thus, such
confession already partook of judicial
admission (Abay, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 165896,
September 19, 2008).
An extrajudicial confession by an accused implicating
another, may not be utilized unless repeated in
open court, or when there is an opportunity for the co-
accused to cross- examine the confessant on his
extrajudicial statements. It is considered hearsay as
against said co-accused under the res
whichalios acta rule,
ordains that the rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of an•
other (People v. Janson, 400 SCRA 584).
6. Assuming that the statement relating to the

con• spiracy was made by a conspirator during
the existence of the conspiracy, for the
statement to be admitted, the extrajudicial
statements of the co-conspirator must be
proven by evidence other than the
admission (Sec. 30, Rule 130, Rules of
Court; US v. Or] 998 F2d 1491; 29A
Am Jur 2d, §847). If the only evidence of the
conspiracy is the extra• judicial declaration
of the declarant, the statements are not
admissible against the others.
In a case, accused-appellant was indicted for par•

ricide for allegedly killing his father in conspiracy
with two other persons who are brothers and also
his co-accused in a separate information for
murder. The prosecution, presented as its witness
among others, the accused-appellant's wife. It
also presented the affi davits containing the extra-
judicial con• fessions of the other co-accused who
pointed to the accused- appellant as involved in the
crime. Th e extra-judicial confes• sions were made
after the crime was consummated. Th e two
brothers were, however, not presented by the
prosecution on the witness stand.
In indicting accused-appellant, the prosecution
relied heavily on the affi davits executed by the two
other accused. The Solicitor General, in advocating
the admissibility of the sworn statements of the
brothers, cites Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court which provides that act or declara•
Admissions, Confessions
tion of a conspirator and the Res
relating toInter
theAliosconspiracy
Acta Rule and
during its existence, may be given in evidence
against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration."
The Court held that the inapplicability of the provision
relied upon was clearly apparent. Th e confessions
were made
after the conspiracy had ended and after the

consummation of the crime. Hence, it cannot be
said that the execution of the affi davits wer e acts
or declarations made during the conspira• cy's
existence (People v. Jr., 297 SCRA 1).
7. Th e res inter alios acta rule provides that the

rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an
act, declaration, or omis• sion of another.
Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is
binding only upon the confessant and is not
admissible against his co-accused. Th e
reason for the rule is that, on a principle of
good faith and mutual convenience, a man's
own acts are binding upon himself, and are
evidence against him. So are his conduct
and declarations. Ye t it would not only be
rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly
unjust, that a man should be bound by the
acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a
party ought not to be bound by the acts of
strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct
be used as evidence against him.
Th e rule on admissions made by a conspirator is an

ex• ception to the foregoing rule but in order for
such admission to be admissible against a co-
accused, Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
requires [among others], that there must be
independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial
confession to prove conspiracy. If apart from the
extrajudicial confession of the confessant no other
evidence of the alleged participation of the
accused in the conspiracy was presented by the
prosecu• tion, the culpability of the accused
not be sufficiently es• tablished (People v. Guittap,
G.R. No. 144621, May 9, 2003).
Admission by Privies
1. "Privies" are persons who are partakers or
have an interest in any action or thing, or any
relation to another (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th
1077). Exam ples : (a) A les• sor and his
lessee, a grantor and a grantee; an assignor
and an assignee are privies in an estate or a

contract; (b) An executor or an administrator
and the estate of the deceased are privies in
representation; or (c) An heir and his
ascendant are privies in blood or succession.
2. Z inherits a house and lot from his father X.

Assume that X, father of Z, while the former
was alive sold the proper• ty and openly told
his acquaintances, that the same lot where
his house stood had already been sold to Y. Is
this declaration by X necessarily admissible
against Z, the sole heir of Y? It is not,
because the statement was made after X
held his title to the land. For an admission
of a predecessor-in-interest to be admissible
against the successor-in-interest, the
following requisites must be present:
a) There must be an act, declaration or an

omis• sion by a predecessor-in-interest;
b) The act, declaration or omission of the
predeces• sor must have occurred while he
was holding (not after) the title to the
property;
c) The act, declaration or omission must be in re•
lation to the property (Sec. 31, Rule 130,
Rules of Court).
3. Accordingly, when the former owner of the property
made the declaration after he ceased to be the owner of the
property, the rule on admission by privies does not apply and
what applies is the general rule that the rights of a party can•
not be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another

(Gevero v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 189
SCRA 201).
Offer of Compromise in Civil Cases

In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an
admission of any liability, and is not an admission
against the offeror (Sec. 27, Rule 130, Rules
Court).
Offer of Compromise in Criminal Cases

1. An offer of compromise by the accused may be
re• ceived in evidence as an implied

admission of guilt (Sec. 27, Rule Rules of
Court). E x a m p l e : Although the marriage of
the accused in a rape case extinguishes the
penal action (Alonte v. Savellano, Jr., 287
SCRA 245), an offer of marriage is, generally,
speaking, an admission of guilt (People v.
SCRA 621).
2. There is no implied admission of guilt if the

offer of compromise is in relation to: (a )
quasi-offenses (criminal negligence); or (b ) in
those cases allowed by law to be compro•
mised (Sec. 27, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
Ba r 1989
Pedro was charged with homicide for having hacked
Ramon to death. Before the case could be tried, the
heirs of Ramon sought out Pedro and discussed with
him the possibility of settlement of the case. Pedro
agreed to a settlement. When the heirs asked how
much he was will• ing to pay, Pedro offered
which the heirs accept• ed. Is the agreement to settle,
as well as the offer to pay P30,000 by Pedro,
admissible in evidence against him as an implied
admission of guilt?
answer:
The evidence is admissible. Under the Rules of Evi•
dence, except those involving quasi-offenses or those
al• lowed by law to be compromised, an offer of
compromise in a criminal case may be received in
evidence as an ad• mission of guilt. Homicide is
neither a quasi-offense nor one of those cases allowed
by law to be compromised 24, Rule 130, Rules of
Court).
Ba r 2008
Bembol was charged with rape. Bembol's father, Ra-
approached Artemon, the victim's father, during
the preliminary investigation and offered million to
Arte• mon to settle the case. Artemon refused the
offer.
During the trial, the prosecution presented Ar• temon
to testify on Ramil's offer to settle admissible in
evidence?
Suggested answers:
The offer of Artemon is not admissible in evi• dence
against Bembol as an implied admission of guilt.
To be an implied admission of guilt the offer must be

"an offer of compromise by the (Sec. 27, Rule
130, Rules of Court). The facts of the case do not
indicate that it was Bembol, the accused who made the
offer.
(b)
Plea of Guilty Later Withdrawn

The Rules of Criminal Procedure (Sec. 2 of Rule 116),
allows the accused, at arraignment, to plead guilty
to a lesser offense with the consent of the offended
party and the pros• ecutor provided that lesser
offense is necessarily included in the offense
charged. He may also plead guilty to a lesser offense
even after arraignment after withdrawing his plea
of not guilty.
In case the accused withdraws his guilty plea, that
plea of guilty later withdrawn, is not admissible in
evidence against the accused who made the plea
(Sec. 27, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
An Unaccepted Plea of Guilty to a Lesser Offense

If the plea of guilty to a lesser offense is not
accepted, the rule does not provide for an adverse
consequence of the unac• cepted plea. On the
contrary, the rule provides that an unac• cepted
plea of guilty to a lesser offense, is not
admissible in evidence against the accused who
made the plea or offer (Sec. 27, Rule 130, Rules of
Court).
An Offer to Pay or the Payment of Medical, Hospital or

Other Expenses
An offer to pay or the payment of medical, hospital
or other expenses occasioned by an injury is not
admissible in evidence as proof of civil or
criminal liability for the injured party (Sec. 27,
Rule 130, Rules of Court). In other jurisdic• tions,
this act of rendering aid is sometimes called the
Samaritan rule." The phrase is used to refer to
the rendering of voluntary aid to a suffering
person.
Admissions, Confessions and the Res Inter Alios Acta
Subsequent Remedial Measures

Assume that PP , while negotiating the stairs from
the lobby of a hotel to his third floor room, slipped
and fell from the stairs and sustained head injuries.
Th e hotel owner, upon learning of the accident,
immediately ordered the mainte• nance
department of the hotel to install a non-slippery
mate• rial on every step of the stairway. In an
action for damages against the hotel owner by PP ,
may the latter introduce evi• dence of the
subsequent remedial measures taken to prove an
admission by the defendant of the hazardous
condition of the stairway at the time of the
incident?
No direct legal provision in this jurisdiction

addresses the question as it is. It is however,
interesting to observe that the S. Federal Rules
of Evidence (FR E ) in Rule 407 thereof, prohibits
the admission of evidence of subsequent
remedial measures when offered to prove the
negligence of the defen• dant. Evidence of such
measures may however, be admissible to prove
some other purpose like the fact that the defendant
had ownership of the hotel or control over the same
and all the fixtures therein.
Accordingly the rule is based on the policy of
encouraging potential defendants to remedy
hazardous conditions without fear that their actions
will be used as evidence against them (Pau v.
Park [CA9 928 F2d, 880). To adopt the
contrary rule would discourage owners from
improving the condition causing the injury because
of their fear of the evi• dential use of such
improvement to their disadvantage (Wer• ner v.
Upjohn Co. [CA4 MD] 628 F2d, 848; 29 Am Jur 2d §463-
464).
The rule (FR E 407) provides that:

after an event, measures are taken which, if taken
previously, would have made the event less likely to
occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not ad•
missible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in
con• nection with the event. This rule does not require
Admissions,
the ex• clusion of Confessions
evidence and the
of Res Inter Alios Acta measures
subsequent
when offered
Admissions, Confessions and the Res Inter Alios Acta

for another purpose, such as proving ownership,
control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if
controverted, or impeachment." (FRE Rule 407)
Evidence of Similar Conduct (second branch).
1. The general rule is that the law will not

consider evi• dence that a person has done a
certain act at a particular time as probative of a
contention that he has done a similar act at
another time. This is the rule of res inter alios
acta found in Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, as amended. A similar conduct which does
not even sufficiently establish a plan or scheme is
not admissible v. People, G.R. No. May 9,
2000; Espinosa v. 331 SCRA
538).
2. Assume that Mr . X is accused of physical
injuries.
Is evidence that in the past he committed several acts
con• stituting physical injuries admissible to prove his
propensity for committing such acts or that he acted
in conformity with his past acts? Answer: Th e
evidence is not admissible for the purpose for which it
is offered. Sec. 34 of Rule 130 clearly pro• vides:
"SECTION 34. Similar acts as evidence. — Evi• dence that

one did or did not do a certain thing at one time, is not
admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or a
similar thing at another time but it may be received to prove
a specific intent or knowledge, iden• tity, plan, system,
scheme, habit, custom or usage and the like."
3. The above provision constitutes the second

branch of the res inter alios acta rule as
previously mentioned.
The rule prohibits the admission of the so-called
sity which is evidence that tends
to show that what a person has done at one time
is probative of the contention that he has done a
similar act at another time.
4. Evidence of similar acts or occurrences

compels the defendant to meet al• legations
that Admissions,
are not mentioned
Confessions inAlios
and the Res Inter theActa complaint,
confuses
him in his defense, raises a variety of relevant issues,

and diverts the attention of the court from the
issues immediate• ly before it. Hence, the evidentiary
rule guards the practical inconvenience of trying
collateral issues and protracting the trial and prevents
surprise or other mischief prejudicial to liti• gants
(Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 239).
Under Sec. 34 of Rule 130, although the accused has

pre• viously been charged with and convicted of
similar offenses, the trial court commits an error if it
considers such circum• stance for the purpose of
showing that he was likely to commit the crimes
charged in the indictment. Evidence of collateral
offenses must not be received as substantive evidence
of the offenses on trial (People v. Santos, G.R.
No. 175593, October
5. Under the same rule, in an action to collect a

sum of money, evidence that the debtor had
contracted debts with various persons in the
past and had not paid such debts de• spite
demand, is not admissible to show that the
debtor did not pay his obligation to the
plaintiff in the present case. In a similar
vein, evidence that Jose was cleared of a
previous charge of robbery or that he was
never involved in any robbery in the past is
not admissible to prove that he could not have
committed the robbery for which he is
presently charged. The rule enunciated in Sec.
34 of Rule 130 is also founded on plain
common sense. To argue that a person did or
did not commit an act because he did or did
not commit a similar thing in the past is
certainly non sequitur.
When Evidence of Similar Acts or Previous Conduct is

Ad• missible
1. Evidence of similar acts is admissible for
any of the following purposes:
a. specific intent;
b. knowledge;

c. identity;
d. plan;
e. system;
f. scheme;
g. habit;
h. custom;
i. usage; and the like (Sec. 34, Rule 130,
Rules of Court).
2.Evidence of similar acts may frequently become

rel• evant, especially in actions based on fraud
and deceit, because it sheds light on the state
of mind or knowledge of a person, his motive or
intent, or they may uncover a scheme, design or
plan (Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 239).
3. The admissibility of similar acts or previous

conduct would depend on the purposes for
which such acts or conduct are offered.
For example, evidence of the other similar crimes,

acts or wrongs previously committed by the
accused are admissible to show that the offense
for which he is currently charged and his prior
similar acts show the or "handiwork" of
the accused, or because of identical modus
operandi. In other words, the similar acts may be
offered to show that they share distinctive features
as the offense for which the accused is currently
charged with but the evidence cannot be offered to
show that the accused is likely to be guilty of the
charge for having committed the same or similar
acts before his pres• ent indictment. The rule is:
Th e past acts of the accused are inadmissible to
prove that he acted in conformity with such
previous
15

C Examination of Witnesses

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

C Examination of Witnesses

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Exam inat io n of Witnesse s

Open Court Examination

3. Where the witness refuses to take an oath

The rule requiring an oath or an affirmation is satis•

Examination of Witnesses and Record of

The examination of witnesses presented in a

The petition should be granted. The provisions of the

2. Th e questions propounded to a witness and

3. The official stenographer, stenotypist or

Rights and Obligations of a Witness

1 . As a rule, a witness has an obligation to

2 . Foremost among the rights of a witness is the

Note however, that under Republic Act No . 6981

(2) a pair of short pants allegedly left by A at the crime

3 . Aside from the right against self-

But a witness must answer to the fact of his

4 . If the witness is the accused, he may totally

5 . Counsel must always come to the aid of his

Examination of a Child Witness

The examination in this provision does not refer to

When the child is testifying, the court may exclude

The court may also order that persons attending

2. Whe n a child does not understand the English or

3. If the court determines that the child is unable to

4. A child testifying at a judicial proceeding or

The support person may be another witness but the

5. An application for the child may be made for the

6. Th e testimony of the child shall be preserved

7. To shield the child from the accused, the court

8. Reports regarding a child shall be confidential

9. Whoever publishes or causes to be published

10. Where a youthful offender has been

11. The youthful offender who fails to

1. Direct examination — This is the examination-

Although Section 6 of Rule 132 allows the cross-

Cross-examination has two basic purposes,

3. Re-direct examination — This examination is

4. Re-cross examination — This is the examination

Death or Absence of a Witness

1. If the witness dies before his cross-examination is

2. If the witness was not cross-examined

2. Leading questions are not appropriate in

3. Leading questions are however, allowed in a

Leading Questions to a Child Witness

As to a child witness, Section 10, Rule 132 of the

The question is objectionable on the ground that it is

Counsel: testified that you and the accused were

This question is objectionable as misleading where

— Impea chm en t of a Witness

1. Impeachment is basically a technique

2. Th e rules enumerate certain guideposts in

a) Th e impeachment of a witness is to be done

b) Subject to certain exceptions, the party

c) By way of exception to the immediately

A party may be also be allowed to impeach

d) It is improper for the party calling the witness

How to Impeach a Witness

"Section Impeachment of adverse party's wit• ness. — A

2. Under the above rule, a witness may be

3. A witness cannot be impeached by evidence

4. An unwilling or hostile witness so declared by

Impeachment by Contradictory Evidence

Ever y ethical trial lawyer will tell us that one