G.R. No.

L-41958 July 20, 1982

DONALD MEAD, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MANUEL A. ARGEL in his capacity as Presiding Judge in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXV and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon & Reyes & Associates for petitioner.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Acting Solicitor General Hugo Gutierrez, Jr., Asst. Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez and Solicitor
Mariano M. Martinez for respondents.

VASQUEZ, J.:

The issue posed for determination in this case is whether or not a Provincial Fiscal has the authority to file an information for a violation of
Republic Act No. 3931, entitled "An Act Creating a National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission."

On March 11, 1975, petitioner Donald Mead and a certain Isaac Arivas were charged by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal with a violation of
Section 9, in relation to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3931, under an information reading as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of August, 1972, and for some time prior and subsequent thereto, in the municipality of Malabon, province of
Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the president and the general
manager, respectively, of the Insular Oil Refinery Co. (INSOIL) a corporation duly organized in accordance with existing laws, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drain or
otherwise dispose into the highway canal and/or cause, permit, suffer to be drained or allow to seep into such waterway the industrial and
other waste matters discharged due to the operation of the said Insular Oil Refinery Co. so managed and operated by them, thereby
causing pollution of such waterway with the resulting damage and/or destruction to the living plants in the vicinity and providing hazard to
health and property in the same vicinity.

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. C-5984-75 and it was subsequently assigned to Branch XXXV of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Caloocan City) presided over by the respondent Judge.

On August 11, 1975, petitioner Donald Mead, one of the accused in the criminal case, filed a motion to quash on the grounds that the trial
court has no jurisdiction and that the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal has no legal personality to file the above-quoted information. The motion to
quash was denied by the respondent Judge in an Order dated September 5, 1975. A Motion For Reconsideration filed by the petitioner was
also denied by the respondent Judge in his Order of November 10, 1965. Hence, this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to annul
the said orders of the respondent Judge who allegedly acted in excess of or without jurisdiction in issuing the same.

In Our Resolution dated November 28, 1975, the respondents were required to comment on the petition and a temporary restraining order
was issued to enjoin the respondent Judge from enforcing his questioned orders until otherwise directed by this Court.

It is the principal contention of the petitioner that the National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission (hereinafter referred to as the
"Commission") as created under Republic Act No. 3931 has the exclusive authority to determine the existence of "pollution" before a criminal
case can be filed for a violation of the said law; and that it has the exclusive authority to prosecute violations of the same. Petitioner further
avers that the Commission not having finally ruled that the petitioner has violated Republic Act No. 3931, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal lacks
the authority to prosecute the petitioner for a violation of said law.

The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that while Republic Act No. 3931 grants the power and duty to the Commission to investigate
and prosecute violations of Republic Act No. 3931, such grant of power and authority is not exclusive, and does not deprive fiscals and other
public prosecutors of their authority to investigate and prosecute violations of the said law committed within their respective jurisdictions.

Before discussing the main issue on its merits, We deem it necessary to resolve a procedural question raised by the respondents in support of
their prayer that the instant petition should not be entertained. Respondents advert to the rule that when a motion to quash filed by an
accused in a criminal case shall be denied, the remedy of the accused- movant is not to file a petition for certiorari or mandamus or
prohibition, the proper recourse being to go to trial, without prejudice to his right to reiterate the grounds invoked in his motion to quash if an
adverse judgment is rendered against him, in the appeal that he may take therefrom in the manner authorized by law. (Mill vs. People, et al.,
101 Phil. 599; Echarol us. Purisima, et al, 13 SCRA 309.)

There is no disputing the validity and wisdom of the rule invoked by the respondents. However, it is also recognized that, under certain
situations, recourse to the extraordinary legal remedies of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus to question the denial of a motion to quash is
considered proper in the interest of "more enlightened and substantial justice", as was so declared in "Yap vs. Lutero", G.R. No. L-12669, April
30, 1969, 105 Phil. 3007:

However, were we to require adherence to this pretense, the case at bar would have to be dismissed and petitioner required to go through
the inconvenience, not to say the mental agony and torture, of submitting himself to trial on the merits in Case No. 16443, apart from the
expenses incidental thereto, despite the fact that his trial and conviction therein would violate one of this constitutional rights, and that, an
appeal to this Court, we would, therefore, have to set aside the judgment of conviction of the lower court. This would, obviously, be most
unfair and unjust. Under the circumstances obtaining in the present case, the flaw in the procedure followed by petitioner herein may be
overlooked, in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice.

To the same effect is the pronouncement in "Pineda and Ampil Manufacturing Co., vs. Bartolome, et al.," 95 Phil., 930938, expressed as
follows:

While a denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was held not to be a proper basis for a petition for certiorari [Nico vs. Blanco, 46
Off. Gaz., Supp. (1) 88; 81 Phil., 2131, or an appeal not certiorari is the proper remedy for correcting an error which a lower court may commit
in denying a motion to set aside a judgment, or in setting aside an order of dismissal, [Rios vs. Ros et al., 45 Off. Gaz. (No. 3), 1265; 79 Phil. 243;
Santos vs. Pecson, 45 Off. Gaz. (No. 3), 1278; 79 Phil.754] however, in some instances, the Supreme Court has departed from the general rule
and has entertained the writ notwithstanding the existence of an appeal. Thus, in one case the Supreme Court took cognizance of a
petition for certiorari notwithstanding the fact that the accused could have appealed in due time when it found that the action was
necessary to promote public welfare and public policy (People vs. Zulueta, 89 Phil. 880). In another case, a petition for certiorari to annul an
order of the trial judge admitting an amended information was entertained although the accused had an adequate remedy by appeal
"inasmuch as the Surplus Property cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the
consideration thereof. (People vs, Zulueta, supra. Citing Arevalo vs. Nepomuceno, 63 Phil., 627.) And still in another case, the writ was
entertained where the appeal was found not to be adequate remedy, as where the order which is sought to be reviewed is merely of
interlocutory or peremptory character, and the appeal therefrom can be interposed only after final judgment and may therefore be of no
avail. (Rocha vs. Crossfield, 6 Phil., 355; Leung Ben vs. O'Brien, 38 Phil., 182. See also Mendoza vs. Parungao, 49 Phil., 271; Dais vs. Court of First
Instance, 51 Phil., 36).

For analogous reasons it may be said that the petition for certiorari interposed by the accused against the order of the court a quo denying
the motion to quash may be entertained, not only because it was rendered in a criminal case, but because it was rendered, as claimed,
with grave abuse of discretion, as found by the Court of Appeals, it would be indeed unfair and unjust, if not derogatory of their
constitutional right, to force the accused to go to trial under an information which, in their opinion, as was found, accuses them of multiple
offenses in contravention of law. And so, in our opinion, the respondent court did not err in entertaining the petition for certiorari instead of
dismissing it, as claimed.

The motion to quash filed by the accused in Yap vs. Lutero was on the ground of double jeopardy. In Pineda vs. Bartolome, the ground
invoked was duplicity of offenses charged in the information. In the case at bar, the petitioner assails the very jurisdiction of the court
wherein the criminal case was filed, Certainly, there is a more compelling reason that such issue be resolved soonest, in order to avoid the
court's spending precious time and energy unnecessarily in trying and deciding the case, and to spare the accused from the
inconvenience, anxiety and embarrassment, let alone the expenditure of effort and money, in undergoing trial for a case the proceedings in
which could possibly be annuled for want of jurisdiction. Even in civil actions, We have counselled that when the court's jurisdiction is
attacked in a motion to dismiss, it is the duty of the court to resolve the same as soon as possible in order to avoid the unwholesome
consequences mentioned above.

It is also advanced that the present petition is premature, since respondent court has not definitely ruled on the motion to dismiss, nor held
that it has jurisdiction, but only argument is untenable. The motion to dismiss was predicated on the respondent court's lack of jurisdiction to
entertain the action, and the rulings of this Court are that writs of certiorari or prohibition, or both, may issue in case of a denial or deferment
of action on such a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

If the question of jurisdiction were not the main ground for this petition for review by certiorari, it would be premature because it seeks to
have a review of an interlocutory order. But as it would be useless and futile to go ahead with the proceedings if the court below had no
jurisdiction this petition was given due course.' (San Beda vs. CIA 51 O.G. 6636, 5638).

While it is true that action on a motion to dismiss may be deferred until the trial and an order to that effect is interlocutory, still where it clearly
appears that the trial judge or court is proceeding in excess or outside of its jurisdiction, the remedy of prohibition would lie since it would be
useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. (Philippine International Fair, Inc., et al., vs. Ibanez, et al, 50 Off. Gaz. 1036;
Enrique vs. Macadaeg, et all 47 Off. Gaz. 1207; see also San Beda College vs. CIR, 51 Off. Gaz. 5636.) (University of Sto. Tomas vs. Villanueva,
L-13748, 30 October 1959.) (Time, Inc. vs. Reyes, 39 SCRA, pp. 315-316.)

An additional factor that induced Us to entertain the instant petition is the obvious merit We find in the same. Our reading of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 3931 has convinced Us that the clear legislative intention is to vest in the Commission the exclusive authority to determine
the existence of "pollution" penalized thereunder and to prosecute violations of said law.

The information filed against the herein petitioner charges him with a violation of Section 9, in relation to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3931.
More specifically, it alleges that the petitioner, with his co-accused Isaac Arivas, "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drain or otherwise
dispose into the highway canal and/or cause, permit, suffer to be drained or allow to seep into such waterway the industrial and other
waste matters discharged due to the operation of the said Insular Oil Refinery Co. so managed and operated by them, thereby causing
pollution of such waterway with the resulting damage and/or destruction to the arriving plants in the vicinity and providing hazard to health
and property in the same vicinity."

Section 9 in its first paragraph, supposedly the criminal act being imputed to the petitioner, reads as follows:

SEC. 9. Prohibitions. — No person shall throw, run, drain, or otherwise dispose into any of the water and/or atmospheric air of the Philippines,
or cause, permit, suffer to be thrown, run, drain, allow to see or otherwise dispose into such waters or atmospheric air, any organic or
inorganic matter or any substance in gaseous or liquid form that shall cause pollution of such waters or atmospheric air.

It will be noted from the above-quoted provision that the prohibited act is to throw, run, drain or otherwise dispose into any of the water
and/or atmospheric air of the Philippines, any organic or inorganic matter or substance "that shall cause pollution of such waters or
atmospheric air." Stated in simpler terms, the offense allegedly committed by the petitioner was the act of causing pollution of a waterway
(highway canal).

The term "pollution" as used in the law is not to be taken in its ordinary signification. In Section 2, paragraph (a), of Republic Act No. 3931,
"pollution" is defined in these words:

(a) Pollution' means such alteration of the physical, chemical and/or biological properties of any water and/or atmospheric air of the
Philippines, or any such discharge of any liquid, gaseous or solid substance into any of the waters and/or atmospheric air of the country as
will or is likely to create or render such waters and/or atmospheric air harmful or detrimental or injurious to public health, safety or welfare, or
to domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural, recreational or other legitimate uses, or to livestock, wild animals, birds, fish or of her aquatic
life.

The power to determine the existence of pollution is vested by the law in the Commission. Section 6, among others, gives the Commission the
authority to "determine whether a pollution exists in any of the waters and/or atmospheric air of the Philippines." (Section 6(a), No. 1); to "hold
public hearings, ... make findings of facts and determinations all with respect to the violations of this Act or orders issued by the Commission."
(Ibid., No. 3); to "institute or cause to be instituted in the court of competent jurisdiction legal proceedings to compel compliance with the
provisions of this Act" (Ibid, No. 5); and, "after due notice and hearing, revoke, suspend or modify any permit issued under this Act whenever
modifications are necessary to prevent or abate pollution of any water and/or atmospheric air of the Philippines." (Ibid., No. 7.) Section 8
contains explicit provisions as to the authority of the Commission to determine the existence of pollution and to take appropriate court
actions to abate or prevent the same. It provides:
SEC. 8. Proceedings before the Commission . — The Commission may, on its own motion, or upon the request of any person, investigate or
may inquire, in a manner to be determined by it, as to any alleged act of pollution or the omission or failure to comply with any provisions of
this Act or any order of this Commission.

Whenever it appears to the Commission, after investigation, that there has been a violation of any of the provisions of this Act or any order of
the Commission, it may order whoever causes such violation to show cause before said Commission why such discharge of industrial wastes
or any waste should not be discontinued. A notice shall be served on the offending party directing him or it to show cause before the
Commission, on a date specified in such notice, why an order should not be made directing the discontinuance of such violation. Such
notice shall specify the time and the place where a public hearing will be held by the Commission or its authorized representatives, and
notice of such hearing shall be served personally or by registered mail, at least ten days before said hearing; and in the case of a
municipality or corporation such notice shall be served upon the major or president thereof. The Commission shall take evidence with
reference to said matter and may issue an order to the party responsible for such violation, directing that within a specified period of time
thereafter, such violation be discontinued unless adequate sewage works or industrial wastes disposal system be properly operated to
prevent further damage or pollution.

No investigation being conducted or ruling made by the Commission shall prejudice any action which may be filed in court by any person in
accordance with the provisions of the New Civil Code on nuisance. On matters, however, not related to nuisance, no court action shall be
initiated until the Commission shall have finally ruled thereon and no order of the Commission discontinuing the discharge of waste shall be
stayed by the filing of said court action, unless the court issues an injunction as provided for in the Rules of Court.

The last paragraph of the above-quoted provision delineates the authority to be exercised by the Commission and by the ordinary courts in
respect of preventing or remedying the pollution of the waters or atmospheric air of the Philippines. The provision excludes from the authority
of the Commission only the determination of and the filing of court actions involving violations of the New Civil Code on nuisance. It is
expressly directed that on matters not related to nuisance "no court action shall be initiated until the Commission shall have finally ruled
thereon." This provision leaves little room for doubt that a court action involving the determination of the existence of pollution may not be
initiated until and unless the Commission has so determined the existence of what in the law is considered pollution.

It may not be argued that the above-cited provision refers only to the filing of civil actions, and not to criminal cases as is the one herein
involved, there being no basis either in the context in law nor from a consideration of the purpose behind the enactment of the same upon
which such a distinction may be made. Indeed, respondents do not seriously question that the court action contemplated in the last
paragraph of Section 8 includes criminal proceedings. Respondents merely aver that the aforementioned grant of authority to the
Commission is not exclusive of the power of Fiscals to file criminal actions for a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3931.

We are likewise not in accord with the view that the law intended to give concurrent authority to the Commission and Fiscals to prosecute
violations of Republic Act No. 3931. It is true that there is no provision expressly declaring that the authority vested in the Commission to
prosecute violations of Republic Act No. 3931 is exclusive. Using the same logic, there is neither a provision declaring such authority to be
concurrent or may be exercised jointly with Fiscals. The absence of an explicit declaration as to the exclusive authority of the Commission to
prosecute violations of the subject law does not detract from the clear intention to make it so, as gathered from the philosophy of the law
itself and as gleaned from several provisions of the same. It is clearly deducible from the provision of Section 8 expressly declaring that no
court action shall be initiated, except those related to nuisance, until the Commission shall have finally ruled on the alleged act of pollution;
and also from Section 6(a), No. 5, which authorizes the Commission to "initiate or cause to be instituted in a court of competent jurisdiction
legal proceedings to compel compliance with the provisions of this Act."

As may be seen from the law, the determination of the existence of pollution requires investigation, public hearings and the collection of
various information relating to water and atmospheric pollution. (Sections 6, 7, and 8.) The definition of the term "pollution" in itself connotes
that the determination of its existence requires specialized knowledge of technical and scientific matters which are not ordinarily within the
competence of Fiscals or of those sitting in a court of justice. It is undoubtedly in recognition of this fact that in Section 4 of the law, it is
provided that "the basic personnel necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be engineers, chemists, biochemists, physicists, and
other technicians"; and required in Section 3 that the Chairman of the Commission shall be the Chairman of the National Science
Development Board, one of the part-time commissioners shall be a recommendee of the Philippine Council of Science and Technology,
and one of the two full-time commissioner shall be a sanitary engineer.

The vesting of authority in an administrative body to determine when to institute a criminal action for a violation of the law entrusted to it for
administration or enforcement, to the exclusion of the regular prosecution service of the government, is not new in this jurisdiction. It is
recognized in Yao Lit vs. Geraldez et al., 106 Phil. 545 which upheld the exclusive authority of the Commissioner of Immigration' to investigate
and impose administrative fines upon violators of the provisions of Republic Act No. 751 for the reason that said official "has better facilities
than the prosecuting officials to carry out the provisions of the said Act, the former official being the keeper of the records pertaining to
aliens." The same principle has been recognized with respect to the prosecutions of violations of the Anti-Dummy Law (Republic Act No.
1131.) In holding that the City Fiscal of Manila has no authority to prosecute such violations independently of the Anti-Dummy Board, it was
said:

Were the city fiscal or the provincial fiscals who have the power or right to prosecute violations of all laws and ordinances allowed to
prosecute violations of the Anti- Dummy Board, there would be no order, concert, cooperation, and coordination between the said
agencies of the government. The function of coordination which is entrusted to the Anti-Dummy Board is evident from all the above-quoted
provisions of Republic Act No. 1130. There can be no coordination as envisioned in the law unless the Anti-Dummy Board be given the power
to direct and control the city fiscal in the prosecutions of the violations of the Anti-Dummy Law. (Rollo, p. 118; 5 SCRA 428,433.)

In R. B. Industrial Development Co., Ltd. vs. Enage (24 SCRA 365) involving the authority of the Bureau of Forestry over the management and
use of public forests and the transfer of licenses for the taking of forest products, this Court has made this pronouncement:

A doctrine long recognized is that where the law confines in an administrative office the power to determine particular questions or matters,
upon the facts to be presented, the jurisdiction of such office shall prevail over the courts. (p. 124, Rollo.)

It is our considered view that the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal lacked the authority to file the information charging the petitioner with a violation of
the provisions of Republic Act No. 3931 there being no prior finding or determination by the Commission that the act of the petitioner had
caused pollution in any water or atmospheric air of the Philippines. It is not to be understood, however, that a fiscal or public prosecutor may
not file an information for a violation of the said law at all. He may do so if the Commission had made a finding or determination that the law
or any of its orders had been violated. In the criminal case presently considered, there had been no prior determination by the Commission
that the supposed acts of the petitioner had caused pollution to any water of the Philippines. The filing of the information for the violation of
Section 9 of the law is, therefore, premature and unauthorized. Concommittantly, the respondent Judge is without jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the offense charged therein.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the questioned Orders of the respondent Judge are hereby annuled and set aside. The
respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss Criminal Case No. 5984-75 for lack of jurisdiction. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 93891 March 11, 1991

POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD, petitioner

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SOLAR TEXTILE FINISHING CORPORATION, respondents.

Oscar A. Pascua and Charemon Clio L. Borre for petitioner.

Leonardo A. Aurelio for respondent Solar Textile Finishing Corp.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

Petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board ("Board") asks us to review the Decision and Resolution promulgated on 7 February 1990 and 10 May
1990, respectively, by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G R. No. SP 18821 entitled "Solar Textile Finishing Corporation v. Pollution Adjudication
Board." In that Decision and Resolution, the Court of Appeals reversed an order of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 77, in Civil
Case No. Q-89-2287 dismissing private respondent Solar Textile Finishing Corporation's ("Solar") petition for certiorari and remanded the case
to the trial court for further proceedings.

On 22 September 1988, petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its
wastewater pollution source installations which were discharging untreated wastewater directly into a canal leading to the adjacent
Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The Order signed by Hon. Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., as Board Chairman, reads in full as follows:

Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation with plant and place of business at 999 General Pascual Avenue, Malabon, Metro Manila is
involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with wastewater of about 30 gpm. being directly discharged untreated into the sewer.
Based on findings in the Inspections conducted on 05 November 1986 and 15 November 1986, the volume of untreated wastewater
discharged in the final out fall outside of the plant's compound was even greater. The result of inspection conducted on 06 September 1988
showed that respondent's Wastewater Treatment Plant was noted unoperational and the combined wastewater generated from its
operation was about 30 gallons per minute and 80% of the wastewater was being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the
Tullahan-Tinejeros River by means of a by-pass and the remaining 20% was channelled into the plant's existing Wastewater Treatment Plant
(WTP). Result of the analyses of the sample taken from the by-pass showed that the wastewater is highly pollutive in terms of Color units, BOD
and Suspended Solids, among others. These acts of respondent in spite of directives to comply with the requirements are clearly in violation
of Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 984 and Section 103 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations and the 1982 Effluent Regulations.

WHEREFORE, pursuant to Section 7 of P.D. 984 and Section 38 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations, respondent is hereby ordered to
cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installation and discharging its untreated wastewater directly into the canal
leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River effective immediately upon receipt hereof and until such time when it has fully complied with all the
requirements and until further orders from this Board.

SO ORDERED.1

We note that the above Order was based on findings of several inspections of Solar's plant:

a. inspections conducted on 5 November 1986 and 12 November 1986 by the National Pollution Control Commission ("NPCC"), the
predecessor of the Board ;2 and

b. the inspection conducted on 6 September 1988 by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR").

The findings of these two (2) inspections were that Solar's wastewater treatment plant was non-operational and that its plant generated
about 30 gallons per minute of wastewater, 80% of which was being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-
Tinejeros River. The remaining 20% of the wastewater was being channeled through Solar's non-operational wastewater treatment plant.
Chemical analysis of samples of Solar's effluents showed the presence of pollutants on a level in excess of what was permissible under P.D.
No. 984 and its Implementing Regulations.

A copy of the above Order was received by Solar on 26 September 1988. A Writ of Execution issued by the Board was received by Solar on
31 March 1989.

Meantime, Solar filed a motion for reconsideration/appeal with prayer for stay of execution of the Order dated 22 September 1988. Acting
on this motion, the Board issued an Order dated 24 April 1989 allowing Solar to operate temporarily, to enable the Board to conduct another
inspection and evaluation of Solar's wastewater treatment facilities. In the same Order, the Board directed the Regional Executive Director of
the DENR/ NCR to conduct the inspection and evaluation within thirty (30) days.

On 21 April 1989, however, Solar went to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, on petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction against the Board, the petition being docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2287.

On 21 July 1989, the Regional Trial Court dismissed Solar's petition upon two (2) grounds, i.e., that appeal and not certiorari from the
questioned Order of the Board as well as the Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and that the Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar
to operate temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and academic.

Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals which, in the Decision here assailed, reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial
court and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. In addition, the Court of Appeals declared the Writ of Execution null and
void. At the same time, the Court of Appeals said in the dispositive portion of its Decision that:

. . .. Still and all, this decision is without prejudice to whatever action the appellee [Board] may take relative to the projected 'inspection and
evaluation' of appellant's [Solar's] water treatment facilities.3
The Court of Appeals, in so ruling, held that certiorari was a proper remedy since the Orders of petitioner Board may result in great and
irreparable injury to Solar; and that while the case might be moot and academic, "larger issues" demanded that the question of due process
be settled. Petitioner Board moved for reconsideration, without success.

The Board is now before us on a Petition for Review basically arguing that:

1. its ex parte Order dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of Execution were issued in accordance with law and were not violative
of the requirements of due process; and

2. the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are not the proper subjects of a petition for certiorari.

The only issue before us at this time is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the ground that Solar had been
denied due process by the Board.

Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an
establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which
exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board). Petitioner Board contends that the reports before it
concerning the effluent discharges of Solar into the Tullahan-Tinejeros River provided prima facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5
of the 1982 Effluent Code.

Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the effluents
discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life." In the instant case, according to
Solar, the inspection reports before the Board made no finding that Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat.

The Court is not persuaded by Solar's contention. Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner Board to issue ex parte cease and desist
orders under the following circumstances:

P.D. 984, Section 7, paragraph (a), provides:

(a) Public Hearing. . . . Provided, That whenever the Commission finds prima facie evidence that the discharged sewage or wastes are of
immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life, or exceeds the allowable standards set by the
Commission, the Commissioner may issue an ex-parte order directing the discontinuance of the same or the temporary suspension or
cessation of operation of the establishment or person generating such sewage or wastes without the necessity of a prior public hearing. The
said ex-parte order shall be immediately executory and shall remain in force until said establishment or person prevents or abates the said
pollution within the allowable standards or modified or nullified by a competent court. (Emphasis supplied)

We note that under the above-quoted portion of Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984, an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued by the
Board (a) whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to
animal or plant life," or (b) whenever such discharges or wastes exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." On the one hand, it is
not essential that the Board prove that an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life" exists before an
ex parte cease and desist order may be issued. It is enough if the Board finds that the wastes discharged do exceed "the allowable
standards set by the [NPCC]." In respect of discharges of wastes as to which allowable standards have been set by the Commission, the
Board may issue an ex parte cease and desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding such allowable
standards. Where, however, the effluents or discharges have not yet been the subject matter of allowable standards set by the Commission,
then the Board may act on an ex parte basis when it finds at least prima facie proof that the wastewater or material involved presents an
"immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare or to animal or plant life." Since the applicable standards set by the Commission
existing at any given time may well not cover every possible or imaginable kind of effluent or waste discharge, the general standard of an
"immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life" remains necessary.

Upon the other hand, the Court must assume that the extant allowable standards have been set by the Commission or Board precisely in
order to avoid or neutralize an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life.''

Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 19824 sets out the maximum permissible levels of physical and chemical substances which effluents
from domestic wastewater treatment plants and industrial plants" must not exceed "when discharged into bodies of water classified as Class
A, B, C, D, SB and SC in accordance with the 1978 NPCC Rules and Regulations." The waters of Tullahan-Tinejeros River are classified as inland
waters Class D under Section 68 of the 1978 NPCC Rules and Regulations5 which in part provides that:

Sec. 68. Water Usage and Classification. — The quality of Philippine waters shall be maintained in a safe and satisfactory condition
according to their best usages. For this purpose, all water shall be classified according to the following beneficial usages:

(a) Fresh Surface Water

Classification
xxx xxx xxx

Best usage
Class D
For agriculture, irrigation, livestock watering and industrial cooling and processing.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphases supplied)

The reports on the inspections carried on Solar's wastewater treatment facilities on 5 and 12 November 1986 and 6 September 1988 set forth
the following Identical finding:

a. For legal action in [view of] implementing rules and regulations of P.D. No. 984 and Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982.6

Placing the maximum allowable standards set in Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982 alongside the findings of the November 1986
and September 1988 inspection reports, we get the following results:
"Inland
Waters
(Class C & D7

November
1986
Report8
Station 1 September
1988
Report9
Station 1
a) Color in
platinum
cobalt
units 100 a) Color units
(Apparent
Color) 250 125
b) pH 6-8.5 b) pH 9.3 8.7
c) Tempera-
ture in °C40 c) Temperature
(°C)
d) Phenols in
mg.1 0.1 d) Phenols in
mg./1.
e) Suspended
solids in
mg./1. 75 e) Suspended
solids in
mg./1. 340 80
f) BOD in
mg./1. 80 f) BOD (5-day)
mg./1 1,100 152
g) oil/Grease
in mg./1. 10 g) Oil/Grease
mg./1.
h) Detergents
mg./1." 5 h) Detergents
mg./1. MBAS 2.93
i) Dissolved
oxygen, mg./1. 0
j) Settleable
Matter, mg./1. 0.4 1.5
k) Total Dis
solved Solids
mg./1. 800 610
l) Total Solids 1,400 690
m) Turbidity NTU / ppm, SiO3 70
The November 1986 inspections report concluded that:

Records of the Commission show that the plant under its previous owner, Fine Touch Finishing Corporation, was issued a Notice of Violation
on 20 December 1985 directing same to cease and desist from conducting dyeing operation until such time the waste treatment plant is
already completed and operational. The new owner Solar Textile Corporation informed the Commission of the plant acquisition thru its letter
dated March 1986 (sic).

The new owner was summoned to a hearing held on 13 October 1986 based on the adverse findings during the inspection/water sampling
test conducted on 08 August 1986. As per instruction of the Legal Division a re- inspection/sampling text should be conducted first before an
appropriate legal action is instituted; hence, this inspection.

Based on the above findings, it is clear that the new owner continuously violates the directive of the Commission by undertaking dyeing
operation without completing first and operating its existing WTP. The analysis of results on water samples taken showed that the untreated
wastewater from the firm pollutes our water resources. In this connection, it is recommended that appropriate legal action be instituted
immediately against the firm. . . .10

The September 1988 inspection report's conclusions were:

1. The plant was undertaking dyeing, bleaching and rinsing operations during the inspection. The combined wastewater generated
from the said operations was estimated at about 30 gallons per minute. About 80% of the wastewater was traced directly discharged into a
drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros river by means of a bypass. The remaining 20% was channeled into the plant's existing
wastewater treatment plant (WTP).

2. The WTP was noted not yet fully operational- some accessories were not yet installed.1âwphi1 Only the sump pit and the
holding/collecting tank are functional but appeared seldom used. The wastewater mentioned channeled was noted held indefinitely into
the collection tank for primary treatment. There was no effluent discharge [from such collection tank].

3. A sample from the bypass wastewater was collected for laboratory analyses. Result of the analyses show that the bypass
wastewater is polluted in terms of color units, BOD and suspended solids, among others. (Please see attached laboratory resul .)11

From the foregoing reports, it is clear to this Court that there was at least prima facie evidence before the Board that the effluents
emanating from Solar's plant exceeded the maximum allowable levels of physical and chemical substances set by the NPCC and that
accordingly there was adequate basis supporting the ex parte cease and desist order issued by the Board. It is also well to note that the
previous owner of the plant facility Fine Touch Finishing Corporation had been issued a Notice of Violation on 20 December 1985 directing it
to cease and refrain from carrying out dyeing operations until the water treatment plant was completed and operational. Solar, the new
owner, informed the NPCC of the acquisition of the plant on March 1986. Solar was summoned by the NPCC to a hearing on 13 October
1986 based on the results of the sampling test conducted by the NPCC on 8 August 1986. Petitioner Board refrained from issuing an ex parte
cease and desist order until after the November 1986 and September 1988 re-inspections were conducted and the violation of applicable
standards was confirmed. In other words, petitioner Board appears to have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the
applicable standards vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive
effluents into the Tullahan- Tinerejos River, presumably loath to spend the money necessary to put its Wastewater Treatment Plant ("WTP") in
an operating condition.

In this connection, we note that in Technology Developers, Inc. v. Court of appeals, et al.,12 the Court very recently upheld the summary
closure ordered by the Acting Mayor of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, of a pollution-causing establishment, after finding that the records showed that:

1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining whether there is a pollution of the environment
that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially addressed to the then National Pollution Control Commission
of the Ministry of Human Settlements, now the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue
of his police power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate
measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from the emission in the operation of the
business.

2. The Acting Mayor, in a letter of February l6, 1989, called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant
whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health of the residents in the area," so that petitioner was
ordered to stop its operation until further orders and it was required to bring the following:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Region III-Department of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution permit. (Annex A-2, petition)

3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan,
directed to the Provincial Governor through channels (Annex A-B, petition).. . .

4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made by Marivic Guina who in her report of
December 8, 1988 observed that the fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air
pollution device has been installed. (Annex A-9, petition)

xxx xxx xxx

6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then National Pollution Control Commission on
December 15,1987, the permit was good only up to May 25,1988 (Annex A-12, petition). Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or
validate its permit much less to install any device to control the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the
community."

In the instant case, the ex parte cease and desist Order was issued not by a local government official but by the Pollution Adjudication
Board, the very agency of the Government charged with the task of determining whether the effluents of a particular industrial
establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions.

Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented precisely because stopping the
continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait
until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential
appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. The relevant pollution control statute and
implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health,
and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police
power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting
vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. The Board's ex parte Order and Writ of Execution would,
of course, have compelled Solar temporarily to stop its plant operations, a state of affairs Solar could in any case have avoided by simply
absorbing the bother and burden of putting its WTP on an operational basis. Industrial establishments are not constitutionally entitled to
reduce their capitals costs and operating expenses and to increase their profits by imposing upon the public threats and risks to its safety,
health, general welfare and comfort, by disregarding the requirements of anti- pollution statutes and their implementing regulations.

It should perhaps be made clear the Court is not here saying that the correctness of the ex parte Order and Writ of Execution may not be
contested by Solar in a hearing before the Board itself. Where the establishment affected by an ex parte cease and desist order contests the
correctness of the prima facie findings of the Board, the Board must hold a public hearing where such establishment would have an
opportunity to controvert the basis of such ex parte order. That such an opportunity is subsequently available is really all that is required by
the due process clause of the Constitution in situations like that we have here. The Board's decision rendered after the public hearing may
then be tested judicially by an appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance with Section 7(c) of P.D. No. 984 and Section 42 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations. A subsequent public hearing is precisely what Solar should have sought instead of going to court to
seek nullification of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution and instead of appealing to the Court of Appeals. It will be recalled the at the
Board in fact gave Solar authority temporarily to continue operations until still another inspection of its wastewater treatment facilities and
then another analysis of effluent samples could be taken and evaluated.

Solar claims finally that the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy as the questioned Order and Writ of Execution issued by the Board
were patent nullities. Since we have concluded that the Order and Writ of Execution were entirely within the lawful authority of petitioner
Board, the trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial
court to the Court of Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal.

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is given DUE COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 7 February 1990 and its
Resolution dated 10 May 1990 in A.C.-G.R. No. SP 18821 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Order of petitioner Board dated 22 September 1988 and
the Writ of Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court dated 21 July 1989, are hereby REINSTATED, without prejudice to the right of
Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing before the Board.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 94759 January 21, 1991

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. NARCISO T. ATIENZA as Presiding Judge, Bulacan, RTC, and HON. VICENTE CRUZ, Acting Mayor and the
MUNICIPALITY OF STA. MARIA, BULACAN, respondents.

Diosdado P. Peralta for petitioner.

GANCAYCO, J.:

The authority of the local executive to protect the community from pollution is the center of this controversy.

The antecedent facts are related in the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:

Petitioner, a domestic private corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of charcoal briquette, received a letter dated February
16, 1989 from private respondent acting mayor Pablo N. Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the operation of the petitioner's plant located at
Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, until further order. The letter likewise requested Plant Manager Mr. Armando Manese to bring with him to the
office of the mayor on February 20, 1989 the following: a) Building permit; b) Mayor's permit; c) Region III-Pollution of Environment and
Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit; and of other document.

At the requested conference on February 20, 1989, petitioner, through its representative, undertook to comply with respondent's request for
the production of the required documents. In compliance with said undertaking, petitioner commenced to secure "Region III-Department of
Environmental and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit," although among the permits previously secured prior to the operation of
petitioner's plant was a "Temporary Permit to Operate Air Pollution Installation" issued by the then National Pollution Control Commission (now
Environmental Management Bureau) and is now at a stage where the Environmental Management Bureau is trying to determine the correct
kind of anti-pollution devise to be installed as part of petitioner's request for the renewal of its permit.

Petitioner's attention having been called to its lack of mayor's permit, it sent its representatives to the office of the mayor to secure the same
but were not entertained.

On April 6, 1989, without previous and reasonable notice upon petitioner, respondent acting mayor ordered the Municipality's station
commander to padlock the premises of petitioner's plant, thus effectively causing the stoppage of its operation.

Left with no recourse, petitioner instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injunction against private
respondent with the court a quo which is presided by the respondent judge. In its prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, it alleged therein that the closure order was issued in grave abuse of discretion.

During the hearing of the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on April 14, 1989, herein parties adduced their
respective evidences. The respondent judge, April 19, 1989, found that petitioner is entitled to the issuance of the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, hence, it ordered as follows:

In view of the foregoing, upon petitioner's posting of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00 to answer for such damages that respondents may
sustain should petitioner eventually be found not entitled to the injunctive relief hereby issued, let a PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION
issue ordering the respondent Hon. Pablo N. Cruz, and other person acting in his behalf and stead to immediately revoke his closure order
dated April 6, 1989, and allow petitioner to resume its normal business operations until after the instant case shall have been adjudicated on
the merits without prejudice to the inherent power of the court to alter, modify or even revoke this order at any given time.

SO ORDERED.

The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued on April 28, 1989, upon petitioner's posting a bond in the amount of P50,000.00.

Private respondent filed his motion for reconsideration dated May 3, 1989. Said motion for reconsideration was heard on May 30, 1989.
Petitioner's counsel failed to appear and the hearing proceeded with the Provincial Prosecutor presenting his evidence. The following
documents were submitted:

a) Exhibit "A", Investigation report on the Technology Developers Inc., prepared by one Marivic Guina, and her conclusion and
recommendation read:

Due to the manufacturing process and nature of raw materials used, the fumes coming from the factory may contain particulate matters
which are hazardous to the health of the people. As such, the company should cease operating until such a time that the proper air
pollution device is installed and operational.

b) Exhibits "B", "B-1", "B-2", three (3) sheets of coupon bond containing signatures of residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan;

c) Exhibit "B-3", a letter addressed to Hon. Roberto Pagdanganan Governor of the Province of Bulacan, dated November 22, 1988,
complaining about the smoke coming out of the chimney of the company while in operation.

Reassessing all the evidence adduced, the lower court, on June 14, 1989, issued an order (a) setting aside the order dated April 28, 1989,
which granted a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and (b) dissolving the writ consequently issued.

A motion for reconsideration dated July 6, 1989 was filed by petitioner. Said motion drew an opposition dated July 19, 1989 from private
respondent.

Resolving the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the respondent judge issued an order dated August 9, 1989, denying said motion for
reconsideration.1
Hence a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals seeking to annul and
set aside (a) the order issued by the trial court on June 14, 1989, setting aside the order dated April 28, 1989, and (b) the order of August 9,
1989, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the order of June 14, 1989. In due course the petition was denied for lack of merit by
the appellate court in a decision dated January 26, 1990.2 A motion for reconsideration thereof filed by petitioner was denied on August 10,
1990.

Thus, the herein petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court. Six errors are alleged to have been committed by the appellate court
which may be synthesized into the singular issue of whether or not the appellate court committed a grave abuse of discretion in rendering its
question decision and resolution.

The petition is devoid of merit.

The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial
court and its action shall not be disturbed on appeal unless it is demonstrated that it acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or
otherwise, in grave abuse of its discretion. By the same token the court that issued such a preliminary relief may recall or dissolve the writ as
the circumstances may warrant.

To the mind of the Court the following circumstances militate against the maintenance of the writ of preliminary injunction sought by
petitioner:

1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining whether there is a pollution of the environment
that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially addressed to the then National Pollution Control Commission
of the Ministry of Human Settlements, now the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virture
of his police power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate
measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from the emissions in the operation of the
business.

2. The Acting Mayor, in a letter of February 16, 1989, called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant
whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health of the residents in the area," so that petitioner was
ordered to stop its operation until further orders and it was required to bring the following:

(1) Building permit;

(2) Mayor's permit; and

(3) Region III-Department of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution permit.3

3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan,
directed to the Provincial Governor through channels.4 The alleged NBI finding that some of the signatures in the four-page petition were
written by one person,5 appears to be true in some instances, (particularly as among members of the same family), but on the whole the
many signatures appear to be written by different persons. The certification of the barrio captain of said barrio that he has not received any
complaint on the matter6 must be because the complaint was sent directly to the Governor through the Acting Mayor.

4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made by Marivic Guina who in her report of
December 8, 1988 observed that the fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air
pollution device has been installed.7

5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta. Maria, but instead presented a building permit issued by
an official of Makati on March 6,1987.8

6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then National Pollution Control Commission on
December 15, 1987, the permit was good only up to May 25, 1988.9 Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit
much less to install any device to control the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the community.

All these factors justify the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction by the trial court and the appellate court correctly upheld the
action of the lower court.

Petitioner takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge investment in this dollar-earning industry.1âwphi1 It must be stressed
however, that concomitant with the need to promote investment and contribute to the growth of the economy is the equally essential
imperative of protecting the health, nay the very lives of the people, from the deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 74816 March 17, 1987

ERNESTO R. RODRIGUEZ, JR., ERNESTO LL. RODRIGUEZ III, SACHA DEL ROSARIO, JOSE P. GENITO, ZENAIDA Z. RODRIGUEZ, and ENECERIO
MONDIA, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DAYTONA CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

Pelaez, Adriano & Gregorio Law Office for petitioners.

Balgos & Perez Law Office for respondents.

PARAS, J.:

Before Us is a petition to review by certiorari 1) respondent court's decision which sets aside the order of default rendered by the trial court
and 2) respondent court's resolution dated April 18, 1986 denying petitioners' (plaintiffs-appellees' therein) motion for extension of time to file
motion for reconsideration of its decision. 1

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Plaintiffs (petitioners herein) filed on December 16, 1980, an action for abatement of a public nuisance with damages against defendant
(private respondent herein). After being granted four (4) extensions of time to file an answer, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on
February 27, 1981 upon the ground that the lower court has no jurisdiction to hear the instant case and for lack of cause of action. However,
the motion was denied by the court on April 3, 1981, a copy of which decision was received by the defendant on April 23, 1981. On May 5,
1981 defendant filed a motion for reconsideration which motion was denied on July 7, 1981.

Instead of filing an answer, petitioner filed with Us in G.R. No. 57593, Daytona Construction & Development Corporation vs. Rodriguez, et al. a
motion for extension of time to file a petition for review, but it never filed one, prompting Us to issue a resolution dated October 5, 1981
informing the parties and the trial court that no petition for review was filed within the period that expired on August 15, 1981.

Upon motion of plaintiffs, the court declared the defendant in default on November 4, 1981, and authorized the plaintiffs to present
evidence ex-parte. Upon learning of the said order, the defendant on November 9, 1981 filed a motion to set aside the order of default and
a motion to admit answer with counterclaim which motions were denied by the lower court in an order dated November 23, 1981.

On June 30, 1982, the court a quo rendered judgment for the plaintiffs and against defendant, its dispositive portion reading as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Declaring the operation of the cement hatching plant of the defendant corporation as a nuisance and ordering its permanent
closure;

2. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr. the amount of P250,000.00 as moral damages and the amount of
P5,000.00 as nominal damages;

3. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff Ernesto LL. Rodriguez III the amount of P200,000.00 as actual damages, the amount of
P500,000.00 as moral damages and the amount of P5,000.00 as nominal damages;

4. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff SACHA del Rosario the amount of P20,000.00 as actual damages, the amount of P50,000.00
as moral damages and the amount of P5,000.00 as nominal damages;

5. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff Zenaida Z. Rodriguez the amount of P100,000.00 as actual damages, the amount of
P100,000.00 as moral damages and the amount of P5,000.00 as nominal damages; and

6. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. (pp. 63-64, Record on Appeal)

In an order dated July 9, 1982, the trial court upon motion of plaintiffs granted execution pending appeal it indeed appearing as alleged in
the motion that the continued operation of the cement batching plant of the defendant poses a "great menace to the neighborhood, both
in point of health and property."

On July 23, 1982, defendant filed a petition for relief which was however denied by the lower court. On July 29, 1982, defendant filed a
petition for injunction with the Intermediate Appellate Court which found the petition unmeritorious. 2 The appellate court promulgated on
October 5, 1983, a decision denying due course to defendant's petition.

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Appellate Court, defendant went on appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court
(G.R. No. 66097) which, after the submission of plaintiffs' comment and defendant's reply thereto, denied its petition for lack of merit.

The petition for injunction having been denied by both the IAC and this Court, defendant pursued the remedy of appeal in respondent IAC,
assigning the following errors.

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED APPELLANT IN DEFAULT DESPITE THE FACT THAT ITS FAILURE TO FILE ITS ANSWER ON TIME
WAS DUE SOLELY TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF ITS COUNSEL AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE MOTION TO DISMISS THAT IT HAD FILED COULD HAVE
VERY WELL STOOD AS THE ANSWER OF THE APPELLANT.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ASSUMED JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE AND WHEN IT RENDERED JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT AGAINST
THE APPELLANT ON GROUNDS AND/OR BASIS NOT ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT FILED AGAINST THE APPELLANT.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT ALLOW RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT IN THE FACE OF THE REASONS PRESENTED TO IT AS BASIS
FOR SUCH RELIEF.

IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN DESPITE THE APPEAL HAVING BEEN DULY PERFECTED, IT DETAINED THE CASE WITH IT AND THEREAFTER,
ISSUED AN ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL WITHOUT APPROPRIATE PRIOR NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT. (pp. 1-2, Appellant's Brief)

On March 21, 1986, respondent court promulgated its decision, the decretal portion of which is as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside and another one entered, remanding the case to the court of
origin for further proceedings and thereafter, to render judgment accordingly.

No pronouncement as to costs.

Notice of respondent Court's decision was received by plaintiffs-appellees thru counsel on April 3, 1986. Plaintiffs filed on April 15, 1986 a
motion for extension of 30 days from April 18, 1986 or up to May 18, 1986 to file a motion for reconsideration. However, on May 10, 1986, they
filed a 24-page motion for reconsideration.

Meanwhile, on April 23, 1986, defendant's opposition to the motion for extension and counter-motion to enter final judgment were received
by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs countered with a reply filed April 29, 1986. (Annex "C-2") Plaintiffs' counsel was surprised to receive on April 24, 1986,
respondent Court's resolution dated April 18, 1986, denying the motion for extension. Plaintiffs requested respondent Court to treat their
aforesaid reply filed on April 29, 1986 as a motion for reconsideration of the said resolution of April 18, 1986, received by them on April 21,
1986, the request being contained in their opposition dated May 22, 1986, to defendant-appellant's motion to strike out the said opposition
attached thereto as Annex C-3 " Neither the motion for reconsideration (converted from the reply filed on April 29, 1986) nor the motion for
reconsideration of the decision itself was acted upon by respondent court.

Hence this petition to review, petitioners alleging that "Respondent court's challenged resolution purporting to deny appellees' motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration is a nullity because the decision in Habaluyas v. Japson case, 3 solely relied on by the
said resolution has been made by the Supreme Court to operate prospectively and thereby rendered inapplicable to parties situated as
petitioners are, in order precisely to spare them from unfair and unjust deprivation of their right to appeal."

In Our resolution, promulgated May 30, 1986 in the Habaluyas case itself (G.R. No. 70895), We set aside the original judgment therein, thus:

However, the law and the Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit the filing of a motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration of a final order or judgment.

In the case of Gibbs vs. Court of First Instance (80 Phil. 160), the Court dismissed the petition for certiorari and ruled that the failure of
defendant's attorney to file the petition to set aside the judgment within the reglementary period was due to excusable neglect, and,
consequently, the record on appeal was allowed. The Court did not rule that the motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration could not be granted.

In the case of Roque vs. Gunigundo (Administrative Case No. 1684, March 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 178), a division of the Court cited the Gibbs
decision to support a statement that a motion to extend the reglementary period for filing the motion for reconsideration is not authorized or
is not in order.

The Intermediate Appellate Court 4 is sharply divided on this issue. Appeals have been dismissed on the basis of the original decision in this
case.

After considering the able arguments of counsels for petitioners and respondents, the Court resolved that the interest of justice would be
better served if the ruling in the original decision were applied prospectively from the time herein stated The reason is that it would be unfair
to deprive parties of their fight to appeal simply because they availed themselves of a procedure which was not expressly prohibited or
allowed by the law or the Rules. ... (pp. 3-4; Resolution dated May 30, 1986 in G.R. No. 70895; emphasis supplied)

This Court further elucidated:

1). Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time
to file a motion petition for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts,
and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort,
which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. (p. 4, emphasis supplied)

The above new rules are made effective no earlier than June 30, 1986. In the instant case, respondent Court's decision was received by
plaintiffs on April 3, 1986. Plaintiffs or petitioners herein filed on April 15, 1986 a motion for extension of 30 days from April 18, 1986 or up to May
18, 1986 to file a motion for reconsideration. On May 10, 1986, plaintiffs filed their motion for reconsideration. Plaintiffs' motion for extension of
time was not intended for delay but upon showing of good cause, to wit: "for lack of material time due to heavy pressure of work on the part
of petitioners' counsel presently taking charge thereof, what is more the counsel handling this case was doing so for the first time in
substitution of Atty. Emmanuel Pelaez, who was recently appointed Philippine Ambassador to the U.S"

It is clear therefore that petitioners' motion was based on good cause and was filed opportunely making the act of respondent Court
unwarranted in denying petitioners' motion for extension of time to file its motion for reconsideration.

Another important issue raised by the petitioners is that the "subject decision which purports to set aside the order of default rendered by the
trial court is a nullity because respondent court arbitrarily ignored in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction 1) the
conclusive effect of the trial court's final and unappealed order denying defendant's motion to set aside the default order," and 2) the res
judicata effect of the appellate court's final judgment in the injunction case aforementioned upholding the trial court's order granting
execution of its Judgment pending appeal and, necessarily, the default order as well 3) the law of the case effect of the appellate court's
express ruling in the said injunction case sustaining the default order.

Petitioners' contentions merit our consideration.

It has been Our consistent ruling that a default order, being interlocutory, is not appealable but an order denying a motion or petition to set
aside an order of default is not merely interlocutory but final and therefore immediately appealable. 5
Since the trial court's order of November 13, 1981, denying defendant's motion to set aside the order of default was appealable but was not
appealed by defendant, the necessary conclusion is that the default order became final. Clearly therefore, respondent Court committed a
grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the finality of the default order.

The validity and finality of the default order was upheld by the judgment of the Appellate Court in the injunction case (which passed upon
the merits of the issuance of an order of execution pending appeal) by virtue of the principle of res judicata and the doctrine re the law of
the case.

There is no question that there were good reasons for the trial court to issue the order of execution pending appeal. The order categorically
stated that there was a need for the closure and stoppage of the operation of defendant's (Daytona Construction) cement batching plant
because it posed "a great menace to the neighborhood both in point of health and property." The trial court thus stated:

From the uncontroverted evidence presented by the plaintiffs, there is hardly any question that the cement dust coming from the batching
plant of the defendant corporation is injurious to the health of the plaintiffs and other residents in the area. The noise, the vibration, the
smoke and the odor generated by the day and night operation of the plant must indeed be causing them serious discomfort and untold
miseries. Its operation therefore violates certain rights of the plaintiffs and causes them damage. It is thus a nuisance and its abatement
justified. (Decision, p. 5; p. 90, Rollo)

after taking into consideration evidence presented by plaintiffs (petitioners herein) as follows:

The evidence shows that the defendant is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with business
address of 252 Don Mariano Marcos Avenue (actually South Zuzuarregui Avenue), Quezon City. It was issued by the Quezon City
government a business permit (Exhibit B) for the manufacture of road and building concrete materials such as concrete aggregates, with
cement batching plant. Among the conditions set forth in the permit are that the said batching plant shall (1) institute measures to prevent
dust emission during the manual charging of cement from bags to the receiving hopper of the bucket elevator of the batching plant; (2)
remove all sediment deposit in the settling of tank for process water and proper maintenance should be observed at all times. While the
original permit issued to the defendant stated that its operation at the place shall "not (be) beyond Dec. 31, 1979" (Exhibit B-2), it was
somehow allowed to operate way beyond said period.

Plaintiff Ernesto LL. Rodriguez Ill testified that he has three parcels of residential lots adjacent to the Daytona compound. He informed the
Court that his property, with an area of 8,892 square meters has been over-run by effluence from the cement batching plant of the
defendant. The sediment settled on the lots and all forms of vegetation have died as a result, and the land tremendously diminished in
value. His three lots are located in a prime residential zone and each square meter in the area is easily valued at P500.00. While he would like
to sell at least a part of his property, he finds no buyer because of its condition. It would cost him no less than P250,000.00 to be able to repair
the damage done to his property, and since its present condition has been existing during the five years, he claimed that the interest on his
loss would be about P5,000.00. He has agreed to his counsel's fee of P200,000.00. Zenaida Rodriguez testified that she owns a lot with an area
of 1,500 square meters. Two thirds of this area has been damaged by the cement dust, emanating from the defendant's cement batching
plant. The continous flow of cement dust into her property affected her deep well, their source of drinking water, and most of their fruit-
bearing and ornamental trees dried up. She also said that she has had sleepless nights and became nervous as a result of the batching
plant operation. Even her previous pedigreed poodles have been afflicted by all sorts of illnesses, many of them dying in the process. She
claimed to have sustained damages amounting to P370,000.00.

SACHA del Rosario testified that her house has to close its windows most of the time because of the dust pollution and her precious plants
have been destroyed by the cement powder coming from the constant traffic of trucks and other vehicles carrying the product of the
batching plant passing through her area. She claims damages amounting to more than P100,000.00.

A chemical engineer, Alexander Cruz, said that the effluence deposited on the properties of Ernesto LL. Rodriguez III and Zenaida Rodriguez
has a very high PH 11.8, and the soil is highly alkaline and cannot support plant life; that pollution coming from the batching plant can cause
stomach disorder and skin problems; that the place of Ernesto LL. Rodriguez III is bare of grass and the trees are dying, (Exhibits J, J-1 and J-2
and that there is also a high degree of calcium on the property in question.

Witness Guido L. Quiban a civil engineer, testified that on the basis of his examination of the property of Rodriguez I I I affected by the
pollution, it would cost at least P250,000.00 for the excavation filling, concreting of canal and rental of equipment to repair it or restore it to its
status quo ante.

Lawyer Ernesto R. Rodriguez, Jr., the 70-year old father of both Ernesto Ill and Zenaida Z. Rodriguez, submitted a medical certificate that he
had recently been taken ill with acute bronchial asthma, hypertension and atherosclerotic heart disease. (Exhibits L, L-1 to L-4). His physician,
a specialist graduate from the University of London and connected with various hospitals in Manila, advised him against exposure to
environmental allegens, specifically cement dust and pollution. He also submitted as exhibits various newspaper clippings (Exhibit M and
excerpts from a book (Exhibits N and N-1 showing that pollution can irritate the eye, sear lungs and destroy vegetation, raise blood pressure,
increase cholesterol levels, interfere with sleep, cause ulcer, trigger heart attacks and the like; that it is the common denominator of
respiratory diseases, especially asthma chronic bronchitis, bronchial asthma and emphysema and that polluted air can develop
abnormalities in lung function.

Dr. Raul I. del Rosario, a neighboring physician, testified that he had treated several patients who traced their sickness to the pollution
caused by defendant Daytona batching plant. He said that cement dust produces broncho-pulmonary obstructive diseases, broncho
fibriotic lesions which may produce cardio pulmonary complications, and the people living in the neighborhood of the batching plant are
the most susceptible to these diseases. He reported many cases of bronchial asthma in both children and adult who live in the vicinity of the
cement batching plant and these cases have been intermittently admitted and discharged from the Quirino Labor Hospital where he
presently works as a resident physician. He had intended to open a medical clinic at his residence but he could not do so because the
washings from the cement mixers are dumped on the access road in front of his house and when these washings are dried up they pollute
the neighborhood, rendering his intended medical clinic unfit and impractical for the treatment of patients, particularly those suffering from
respiratory ailments.

Another lawyer, Eliseo Alampay, Jr., who likewise resides a few meters away from the site of the Daytona batching plant, testified that the
said plant is certainly injurious to the health; that the cement dust are agents of lung ailments, impair the growth of plants and even kill the
birds in their cages; that it is a demonstrable nuisance because its uncontrolled engine noise and night long pounding prevent the
neighborhood from being able to sleep soundly and peacefully. He told the court that there was a time when he felt like organizing the
whole neighborhood into a demolition team to forcibly dismantle the entire Daytona plant because "the authorities concerned apparently
have chosen to close their eyes and leave us to our miserable plight." He said that the homes in the community all look dirty and dusty
because of the pollution that the batching plant of the defendant causes. (Decision in Injunction Case, AC-G.R. No. 14602-SP, pp. 10-14)
Anent the default order, the appellate court in the injunction case said:

From the foregoing, it appears that petitioner was recreant in failing to file an answer after respondent judge denied its motion to dismiss the
complaint. The motion to dismiss was denied in the order of the lower court under date of April 3, 1981, a copy of which was received by
petitioner on April 23, 1981. A motion for reconsideration of the order of denial filed by petitioner on May 7, 1981 was denied by said court on
July 7, 1981. Instead of filing an answer promptly, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a motion for extension of time to file a petition for
review, but it never filed one, prompting the Supreme Court to issue a resolution dated October 5, 1981 informing the parties that no petition
for review was filed within the period that expired on August 15, 1981. Inspite of the Supreme Court's resolution, petitioner still failed to file any
answer or pleading to arrest the running of the prescriptive period. It was only on July 23, 1982, when petitioner filed its Petition for Relief
which was nine (9) months after the Supreme Court's resolution was issued. Petitioner's assertion in its Petition for Relief that the failure to file
the answer was caused by "the unforseen sickness of its corporate secretary who has custody of the records necessary for the preparation of
its defense" cannot be taken without much doubt and hesitation. Petitioner did not even point out who was the supposed corporate
secretary or explain why the records were in the possession of the corporate secretary instead of the counsel handling the case. (Decision in
Injunction case, p. 16; emphasis supplied)

With reference to defendant's allegation that it thought that the period within which to answer (after its motion to dismiss had been denied)
had been suspended by its having filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court, same is without merit. The circumstances of the case
point to a deliberate desire to delay: the corporation, governed as it is by knowledgeable business executives, should have taken steps to
prevent its being declared in default. The corporation waited six (6) months before verifying the status of the case: in the meantime it had
been declared in default, a judgment by default had been rendered against it, execution was already pending before it woke up to file the
case at hand.

We agree with Justice Luis A. Javellana in his concurring opinion in the injunction case before the appellate court, thus:

Petitioner's conduct here appears to me to be tainted with fraud and intended simply to delay the disposition of the case. When its motion
to dismiss the complaint was denied, and its motion for reconsideration of that denial was, Unwise denied, it manifested its intention to
elevate these orders to the Supreme Court on a petition for review. Yet, it did nothing to this end. The purpose of the ploy is obvious. Once it
had announced its intention to go to the Supreme Court, it effectively suspended the proceedings in the trial court, or, at least, that was the
effect. This enabled it to continue with its operations and it would have done so indefinitely if it had not been declared in-default and private
respondents allowed to present their evidence. It is quite apparent that petitioner really had no intention of elevating the case to the
Supreme Court otherwise, it would not have allowed the extended period given to it by the Supreme Court to lapse without filing the
petition. Or, if it was in good faith, there it should have informed the trial court that it was no longer pursuing its remedy in the Supreme Court
after it had decided that it is no longer availing of such remedy. Instead, it concealed this fact from the trial court and the adverse party,
and allowed matters to take their course. It was not until it received the adverse decision that it frantically sought to set things right I do not
think that petitioner deserves any consideration for trifling with the administration of justice. (pp. 3-4; emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision and resolution are hereby SET ASIDE, and a new judgment is hereby rendered REINSTATING the decision of
the trial court with the modification that all awards for nominal damages are hereby eliminated. Costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.