NEW YORK TIMES CO. VS SULLIVAN
The Defendant
FACTS:
 The Plaintiff was one of three Commissioners of
Montgomery, Alabama, who claimed that he was
defamed in a full-page ad taken out in the New York
Times.
 The advertisement was entitled, “Heed Their Rising
Voices” and it charged in part that an unprecedented
wave of terror had been directed against those who
participated in the civil rights movement in the South.
Some of the particulars of the advertisement were
false.
 Although the advertisement did not mention the
Plaintiff by name, he claimed that it referred to him
indirectly because he had oversight responsibility of
the police.
 The Defendant claimed that it authorized publication
of the advertisement because it did not have any
reason to believe that its contents were false. There
was no independent effort to check its accuracy.
 The Plaintiff demanded that the Defendant retract the
advertisement. The Defendant was puzzled as to why
the Plaintiff thought the advertisement reflected
adversely on him.
 The jury found the ad libe
lous per se and actionable without proof of malice. The
jury awarded the Plaintiff $500,000 in damages. The
Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.
appealed.
ISSUE:
Is the Defendant liable for defamation for printing an
advertisement, which criticized a public official’s official
conduct?
HELD:
No. Reversed and remanded.
* Safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press are
required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution in a libel action brought by a public
official against critics of his official conduct.
* Under Alabama law, a publication is libelous per se if the
words tend to injure a person in his reputation or to bring
him into public contempt. The jury must find that the words
were published of and concerning the plaintiff. Once libel per
se has been established, the defendant has no defense as to
stated facts unless he can persuade the jury that they were
true in all their particulars.
* Erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate and it must
be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the
breathing space that the need to survive.
* The constitutional guarantees require a federal rule that
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves that the statement was made with actual malice —
that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.
* The Supreme Court of the United States holds that the
Constitution delimits a State’s power to award damages for
libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their
official conduct. In this case, the rule requiring proof of actual
malice is applicable.
* The Defendant’s failure to retract the advertisement upon
the Plaintiff’s demand is not adequate evidence of malice for
constitutional purposes. Likewise, it is not adequate evidence
of malice that the Defendant failed to check the
advertisements accuracy against the news stories in the
Defendant’s own files. Also, the evidence was constitutionally
defective in another respect: it was incapable of supporting
the jury’s finding that the allegedly libelous statements were
made of and concerning the Plaintiff.
ROSENBLOOM VS. METROMEDIA
FACTS:
 Petitioner was a distributor of nudist magazines in
Philadelphia. In response to the complaints of the
citizens, the Special Investigations Squad of the
Philadelphia Police Department initiated a series of
enforcement actions under the obscenity laws of the
city.
 The police purchased various magazines from 20 news
stands throughout the city, which were subsequently
determined as obscene.
 While the police were making arrests, petitioner
arrived to deliver some of his nudist magazines and
was arrested.
 Three days later, police obtained a search warrant for
petitioner’s home and rented barn he uses as
warehouse. The inventory of magazines and books
found in the locations were seized and he surrendered.
 Petitioner was released on bail, but he was arrested for
the 2nd time.
 Following the 2nd arrest, Captain Ferguson telephoned
respondent’s radio station (WIP) and other local radio
stations, and a local newspaper informing them of the
raid on petitioner’s home and of his arrest.
 WIP broadcasted the event on October 4, 1963. It was
broadcasted several times but from October 5 to 21,
WIP did not broadcast further reports relating to the
petitioner. But they did not mention the petitioner’s
name but used the terms “SMIT LITERATURE RACKET”
and “GIRLIE-BOOK PEDDLERS”
 Petitioner brought an action in the Federal District
Court alleging that the magazines he distributed were
not obscene and for the defamatory broadcasts. The
jury acquitted petitioner in the State Court and he filed
a case for damages. He contends that the broadcasts
of October 4 describing his arrest, constituted libel
per se and was proved false by petitioner’s
subsequent acquittal. District court awarded the
damages, Court of Appeals reversed the decision.
Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether WIP’s October 4 broadcasts regarding the
arrest of the petitioner constituted libel.
HELD:
No. The libel law holds actionable any unprivileged
“malicious” publication of matter tending to harm a person’s
reputation and expose him to public hatred, contempt, or
ridicule. Pennsylvania’s libel laws recognize truth as a
complete defense to a libel action. The burden of proof lies
with the petitioner to prove that (a) one or more of the
broadcasts were defamatory; (b) that a reasonable listener
would conclude that it refers to the petitioner; (c) that WIP
forfeited privilege to report official proceedings fairly and
accurately that it intends to injure the plaintiff personally; and
(d) that the reporting was false. Petitioner was not able to
comply with the requirements of proof sufficiently.
The police activities which were aimed at
implementing the obscenity laws were for the interest of the
public. The Court opined that if a matter is subject of public
or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely
because a private individual is involved. Pennsylvania’s libel
law recognizes that society’s interest in protecting individual
reputation often yields to other important social goals.
BARTNICKI VS. VOPPER
FACTS:
 Some unknown person tapped and recorded a cell
phone conversation between Bartnicki who was chief
negotiator for a teachers’ union, and Kane who was
president of the same union.
 The conversation included a threat of violent action
such as a proposed strike and Kane, even mentioned
that “If they’re not gonna move for three percent we’re
gonna have to go to their homes.”The negotiations
eventually wound up with a settlement in favor of the
teachers.
 After the settlement, Vopper, a radio commentator,
and who had been critical of the union in the past,
played the recording of the intercepted conversation
on his show along with his report on the settlement.
He was not party to the interception, and did not know
who was responsible for it, and had obtained the
recording by legal means. Some stations broastcast the
tape and local newspapers published its contents. They
found that Jack Yocum, the head of the local taxpayer’s
organization that opposed the union’s demands
through negotations. Yocum testified that he found the
tape in his mailbox shortly after the interception and
recognized the voices of Bartnicki and Kane.
 The two union leaders filed for damages under federal
wiretapping laws, which under S. 2511(1)(a) prohibits
intercepting cell phone calls, and under S. 2511(1)(c)
prohibits disclosure of material obtained by illegal
interception. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review
of the case.
ISSUE:
 Do the wiretapping laws which proscribe disclosure of
material obtained by unlawfully tapping
communications violate the First Amendment, if used
to conceal information which has been obtained by
legal means from the intercepting party, and when
such information is related to public concern?
HELD:
 Yes. The provisions of federal wiretapping laws are in
violation of the First Amendment if used to suppress
the disclosure of information obtained legally from a
party which illegally intercepted a conversation, and if
the information is such as concerns the public. Since
the Court has no doubt of Vopper’s statement that he
was not involved in nor had knowledge of the illegal
interception of the conversation, that he came into
possession of the intercepted communication lawfully,
and that the disclosed information was of public
concern.
 In such a case, it would be a violation of the acted illegally in obtaining the tapped conversation.
constitution if a state were to make a citizen liable for The decision is affirmed.
the publication of true information. The issue to be
determined here is whether a person who has
obtained access to some material in a legal manner
from one who has procured it through illegal means
should be punished for publishing the material. The
wiretapping legislation has as its first intent the
removing of incentive for any interception of private
communication. This is not served if an innocent
disclosure of public information obtained legally is
punished under that law.
 The person who performed the illegal act is the one
who merits punishment, and only in such a case will
the punishment have the desired deterrent
action. The second intent the government intends to
serve through this law is to prevent harm from ensuing
to the persons whose private communications were
thus illegally intercepted. This is a much stronger
motive, as it is an important essential of government
to ensure privacy of comversation.
 In this suit, however, the maintenance of privacy is of
less concern than the disclosure of matters which
concern the public. When a person involves himself in
public affairs, he invites some loss of privacy as a
matter of course. This material of public concern
cannot be removed from the protection afforded by
the First Amendment because some unknown person