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Chapter 6
Australia’s Trade Policy
Australia has a long history of protection in the manufacturing sector where tariffs and quotas have
been used to shield domestic firms from direct import competition. Much of this protection was
put in place after 1901 when Australian governments used a policy of protection from imports to
develop the manufacturing sector through the creation of infant industries and domestic employment.
A centralised wage fixing system was also adopted to set minimum or award wages for workers in
this sector. Levels of protection were increased during the Great Depression in the 1930s to protect
domestic employment levels, with the British Preferential Tariff reaching over 30%, and the General
Tariff Rate for non Commonwealth countries rising to over 60%. These high levels of protection from
import competition for manufacturing remained in force until the early 1970s, with the effect of raising
the domestic cost structure and the price of domestic and imported manufactured goods in Australia.
Figure 6.1: Decline in the Average Rates of Effective Assistance 1989-2001 (%)
The new Hawke federal Labor government elected in 1983 agreed with the IAC that the scaling back of
protection would enable Australia to achieve the following potential gains from free trade:
• Increased specialisation and economies of scale in production would result in a lower cost structure
for manufacturing and improve the overall efficiency of Australian industry.
• A greater mix of output (from both domestic and overseas sources) would increase the quality and
quantity of goods available to Australian consumers and raise general living standards.
• Increased competition between firms in the tradable goods sector (exports and import substitutes)
of the economy, and with international enterprises, would lead to lower prices and more exports.
• Incentives for firms to innovate would rise through the use of the latest cost reducing technology
(including information and communications technology or ICT) to increase competitiveness.
The Hawke government (1983-1991) implemented a policy of dismantling industry protection
on a large scale in the 1988 Industry Statement. This change in policy recognised the increasing
internationalisation of the Australian economy, and the need for efficient export firms to maintain their
competitiveness in overseas markets. The government argued that the reduction in protection would
have both microeconomic benefits for the manufacturing industry as well as macroeconomic benefits
for Australia. The 1988 Industry Statement phased in cuts to protection over four years, with the
protection of manufacturing falling from an average of 15% in 1989 to 10% by 1993-94 and then to
5% in 2000. This reduction in manufacturing protection is shown in Figure 6.1.
QLD -- 59 -- 59
SA 97 333 -- 430
WA -- 115 -- 115
TAS 30 8 -- 38
The textiles, clothing and footwear (TCF), passenger motor vehicles (PMV) and steel industries were
exempted from these cuts in protection (see Figure 6.1). They were put on separate industry plans,
designed by Senator John Button, to introduce a gradual ‘phasedown’ of tariff and quota protection,
giving employees and management in manufacturing firms time to restructure and minimise transitional
costs such as structural unemployment and the retraining of workers. These industries had three years to
facilitate plans for structural change in order to receive continued support from the government. This
allowed time for resources to be reallocated and a process of voluntary redundancies to be implemented
as summarised in Table 6.2. Around 6,373 retrenchments were planned by 1991, reflecting a loss of
jobs in major Australian industrial regions where the TCF, PMV and steel industries were located.
The 1991 Industry Statement was introduced by the Hawke Labor government to accelerate the pace
of tariff reform in Australia and announced the following new measures:
• The reduction of the majority of tariffs to 5% by 1996;
• The abolition of import quotas for PMV and a reduction in tariffs for PMV to 15% by 2000;
• The abolition of import quotas for TCF in 1993, and a reduction in tariffs to a maximum of 25%
by the year 2000; and
• The exemption from sales tax of a wider range of business inputs used by manufacturers, farmers
and miners. The intention of this policy was to eliminate any taxes on export industries.
The Howard government, elected in 1996, was committed to Labor’s previous tariff reforms. It cut
tariffs for PMV products to 15% in 2000, and these tariffs were frozen until January 1st 2005, when
they were cut to 10%. Automotive tariffs of 10% were reduced to 5% in January 2010, and will
stay at this level until 2015. The Automotive Competitiveness and Investment Scheme (ACIS) was
introduced in 2001 to provide transitional assistance to the automotive industry during the move to
a lower tariff environment. Tariffs for TCF were reduced on January 1st 2005, falling from 25% to
17.5% on imported clothing; from 15% to 10% on imported cotton and footwear; and from 10% to
7.5% on imported linen, sleeping bags and footwear parts. Australian tariffs were an average of 4.7%
for manufacturing and 4.7% for agriculture in 2009-10 (see Table 6.1 on page 149).
The benefits from reduced protection were estimated by the Productivity Commission (PC) as a gain
of $4b in GDP for Australia through additional export volumes and a higher rate of economic growth.
Figure 6.2 illustrates the significant reduction in tariffs for all manufacturing industries in the 1990s
in terms of both nominal and effective rates of assistance compared to the levels that prevailed in the
1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Large disparities between certain industries were also removed such as those
between the highly protected TCF and PMV industries, compared to manufacturing as a whole.
Two measures of industry assistance include the nominal and effective rates of assistance:
1. The nominal rate of assistance is the percentage difference between the price the domestic producer
receives with protection and the price the producer would receive in the absence of protection.
2. The effective rate of assistance is the amount of protection expressed as a percentage of the domestic
value added to production. This is a more accurate measure of the protection of domestic industry
against imports which is used by the Productivity Commission (PC) and is shown in Figure 6.2.
The reasons for the change in government industry assistance policy in the 1980s and 1990s were to:
• Increase the competitiveness of Australian industry, especially in the tradable goods sector;
• Increase the rate of economic growth through structural reform to industry. By reducing the cost
structure of industry this would improve technical, allocative and dynamic efficiency; and
• Encourage higher levels of productivity and technology industries (i.e. ‘sunrise industries’) to
increase their export shares, especially in the fast growing Asian market and other global markets.
Figure 6.2: Average Rates of Effective Assistance for Manufacturing Industries
1968-69 to 1996-97 (%)
Source: Productivity Commission (2012), Trade and Assistance Review 2010-11, Melbourne
Tariffs have direct effects on the returns received by Australian producers. Tariffs on imported goods
increase the price at which these goods are sold in the Australian market and allow scope for domestic
producers of similar products to increase their prices. Tariffs also increase the price of goods that are
used as inputs and penalise local industries. The Productivity Commission’s estimate of tariff assistance
on outputs was $8.6b in 2010-11 (see Table 6.3) This compares with an estimate of $9b in 2009-10
and $9.5b in 2008-09. The fall in assistance reflects reductions in tariffs on motor vehicles and parts,
and TCF products in January 2005 and 2010. The estimated cost penalties to user industries of tariffs
was -$7.9b in 2010-11. After deducting the tariff input penalty from the output assistance, net tariff
assistance was estimated to be around $761.2m in 2010-11, a decline of 58.3% since 2006-07.
Source: Productivity Commission (2006), Trade and Assistance Review 2005-06, Melbourne.
Table 6.4: Coverage of Multilateral Trade Rounds by GATT and the WTO
Changes to trade rules governed by the WTO occur principally through ‘rounds’ of multilateral
negotiations involving all members of the WTO. The current Doha round is the ninth round of talks
held since GATT was formed in 1947 (refer to Table 6.4). The negotiation and bargaining process
involves members making ‘concessions’ (i.e. a commitment to reducing a trade barrier in their domestic
market) in exchange for concessions made by other members. Decisions are made on a consensus basis
with proposals for changes only adopted after all members agree. The average global tariff rate of 40%
in the late 1940s had been reduced to around 5% in the mid 1990s as a result of GATT rounds. The
Uruguay round in 1994 also led to the first reduction in agricultural protection and new agreements on
trade in services, investment and intellectual property.
At a regional level Australia was a founding member of the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC)
forum in 1989 which is a multilateral regional trade forum (rather than a trade bloc or free trade
area). APEC’s 21 members include the advanced countries of the USA, Japan, Australia, New Zealand,
Canada, Brunei and Chile; the NIEs of Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong SAR; the
developing nations of China, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam, Mexico, Papua New
Guinea and Peru; and the transition economy of Russia. APEC is a discussion forum on trade policy
issues and has developed mechanisms for closer trade and investment links in the Asia Pacific region.
APEC is a powerful forum representing 2.7b people, 54% of world GDP and 44% of world trade.
The APEC Bogor Declaration was an agreement signed by APEC leaders in 1994 in Indonesia to
dismantle trade barriers by 2020. At the APEC meeting in 2009 in Singapore, leaders responded to
the Global Financial Crisis by rejecting any moves towards increased protectionism, and strengthening
trade and investment links within the APEC region (i.e. regional economic integration). Support
was also given to finalising the WTO’s Doha round of trade talks, and working towards a Free Trade
Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) with an expanded membership of countries. At the APEC meeting
in Honolulu in November 2011 leaders agreed to strengthen regional economic integration and trade.
The main advantage of APEC’s approach to economic integration and trade liberalisation is that it is
based on ‘open regionalism’ where reductions in trade barriers take place on a non discriminatory basis
by liberalising trade between members, but not discriminating against non APEC members. In this way
APEC initiatives are consistent with the WTO’s guiding principles for free trade. Average tariff levels
across APEC members were estimated by the Productivity Commission to have fallen to 3% in 2004.
If the Bogor Goals are met by APEC countries by 2020 it is estimated that Australia’s trade flows (i.e.
exports and imports) will increase by 6% and world trade flows by 3%.
REVIEW QUESTIONS
AUSTRALIA’S POLICIES TOWARDS
PROTECTION AND FREE TRADE
1. Why did the Australian government use a policy of industry protection for much of the twentieth
century? Refer to Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 and discuss the changes in the levels of protection in
manufacturing from the 1980s to the 2000s.
2. Why did the Australian government implement policies to reduce protection in 1988?
3. What measures were taken in the 1988 and 1991 Industry Statements to dismantle the protection
of Australian manufacturing? Refer to Table 6.1 and Figures 6.1 and 6.2 in your answer.
4. What are the ‘plan’ industries? Why were they given more time to adjust to lower levels of
protection? What adjustment costs did plan industries face? Refer to Table 6.2 in your answer.
Discuss recent trends in reducing protection from the text, Figure 6.3 and Table 6.3.
5. Distinguish between Australia’s unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral policies to promote
free trade in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s.
6. Explain the advantages and disadvantages of multilateral trade agreements (like the WTO and
APEC) and bilateral trade agreements (like ANZCERTA and AUSFTA) to Australia.
The costs to Australia of reducing its barriers to trade have been confined to the short run, with
uncompetitive industries contracting and unviable firms going out of business. Lower employment
levels have occurred in the TCF, PMV and steel industries which have experienced restructuring and
rising levels of structural unemployment. Structural adjustment has also led firms to introducing the
latest technology and they have tended to substitute more capital for less labour to achieve higher
productivity, and this has resulted in redundancies and the retrenchment of many workers in plan
industries. According to the Productivity Commission (2012), between 1996-97 and 2010-11, $22b
in budgetary assistance was allocated for structural adjustment in industry. In addition, direct assistance
has been given to displaced workers through the social security system and training programmes.
Other costs of reducing protection have included the effects on regional economies dependent upon
manufacturing industries for employment opportunities and the provision of support services. Cities
such as Geelong, Newcastle, Whyalla, Port Kembla and Wollongong have high levels of structural
unemployment because of structural change caused by lower tariff regimes. The Australian government
is responsible for labour market adjustment and provides funds for retraining and relocation schemes
for the structurally unemployed in the federal budget. This adds to federal government expenditure, but
is an important means of retraining displaced labour, providing displaced workers with income support,
and helping them find and secure new employment opportunities. The Productivity Commission
estimated that $140m had been spent on regional adjustment funds between 1996-97 and 2010-11.
• Making firms more internationally competitive, thereby increasing their access to world markets
and responsiveness to changes in world demand and technology;
• Improving the allocation of the economy’s resources, thereby reducing the price and cost structure
in product and factor markets and maximising the returns from capital investment;
• Increasing the flexibility of the economy, particularly to shifts in world demand and the terms of trade,
by developing a more diverse export base, with less dependence on agricultural exports;
• Supporting the microeconomic reform agenda which seeks to raise multifactor productivity; and
• Reducing the resources wasted by the ‘rent seeking’ activities of some domestic industries in political
lobbying for continued industry protection.
• The GATT agreement on trade related investment measures (TRIMS) related to direct investment
guidelines for industrial and emerging economies, and the relationship between multinational
corporations (MNCs) and host governments.
• The GATT agreement on trade in manufactured goods led to tariffs being cut by 15%, and a
further undertaking was made to review tariff levels at the Millennium Trade Talks in 2000.
In macroeconomic terms, the projected benefits to Australia of the Uruguay Round measures suggested
increased output and faster growth in export volumes than import volumes for most sectors of the
economy. Capital investment was also projected to rise in all sectors.
At a global level, Australia’s commitment to internationalising its economy through tariff reform enabled
it to play an important and credible role in pushing for free trade at the Uruguay Round of GATT. The
main outcomes of the Uruguay Round for Australia were threefold:
1. The scaling down of agricultural subsidies in the EU and USA.
2. Governments that subsidised agriculture were forced to adhere to WTO rules on agriculture.
3. Increased market access for trade in services was a boost for Australia’s service exports.
The Uruguay Round also led to the replacement of GATT by the WTO, as a permanent forum for trade
negotiations. The WTO was given greater powers to monitor and control world trade:
• The WTO has powers extending to goods, services and intellectual property rights;
• The WTO has greater power to limit the use of anti-dumping actions;
• The WTO can use sanctions to resolve trade disputes; and
• The WTO can restrict government support for industry through control over subsidies.
• In agriculture, the elimination of agricultural export subsidies is on the WTO agenda for the first
time ever. The negotiations will hopefully deliver major cuts in domestic subsidies and also open
up agricultural markets where tariffs are much higher than for manufactured products.
• In services, the negotiations will pursue more open conditions for trade in services such as
professional services, transport, finance and communications.
• Australia is against the use of geographic indication protection currently given to wine and
spirits, and which may be extended to food. This would prevent Australian exporters from using
terms such as ‘champagne’ or ‘kalamata’ olives in export markets.
Australia’s unilateral reductions in protection have imposed short term costs on the economy
but in the long term, Australia is well positioned to take advantage of world economic growth
sourced from cuts in global tariff and non tariff barriers through the WTO process of more
countries reciprocating by liberalising their trade regimes.
Agriculture
• Market access: all WTO members (except least developed countries) are to reduce agricultural
tariffs and quotas based on a tiered formula
• Domestic support: Each WTO member is to reduce its level of support by 20% in the first year
after negotiations are concluded
• Export subsidies: WTO members are to phase out all export subsidies by a date to be agreed
• Use of a formula to reduce tariffs on manufactured goods with the aim of standardising tariffs to
a similar level across the board
Services
• All WTO members are requested to submit ‘offers’ to reduce their barriers to trade in services
• WTO members will negotiate on trade facilitation proposals (e.g. improvements in customs,
transit and border procedures) as part of the Doha Round. However the other three ‘Singapore
issues’ (investment rules, competition policy and transparency in government procurement) are off
the Doha negotiating agenda.
Source: Productivity Commission (2004), Trade and Assistance Review 2003-04, Melbourne.
The next WTO Ministerial Conference was held in Hong Kong in December 2005, with agreement
reached on an ‘end date’ for agricultural support subsidies, the structure for reductions in trade barriers
for agricultural and industrial goods, and an ‘end date’ for reducing regulations over trade in services.
Key outcomes of the WTO’s Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in 2005 were as follows:
• Members agreed to remove all agricultural export subsidies by 2013.
• Three bands were created for the reduction of domestic support for agriculture (i.e. subsidies),
with larger reductions required by those countries in the higher bands. The European Union is in
the top band, Japan and the United States are in the middle band, and all other countries are in
the bottom band.
• Members agreed to adopt a tariff formula for a reduction in the highest industrial tariffs by
larger amounts, with the intention of eliminating tariff peaks and an escalation in tariffs.
• Members agreed to finalise an agreement in reducing regulations on trade in services by
October 2006.
At the conclusion of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in 2005, the WTO’s Director,
Pascal Lemy, estimated that the Doha Round was 60% complete. However further negotiations in
Geneva in July 2006 between trade representatives and negotiators of the main countries such as the
USA, the EU, Japan, Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa reached an impasse, and the talks
again became deadlocked over ‘loopholes’ aimed at reforming world trade in agriculture.
Since it commenced in 2001, the Doha Round has focused on the main issue of opening the agricultural
markets of rich countries such as the USA and those in the EU, to agricultural exports from developing
countries. In this sense the Doha Round linked the reform of agricultural trade to an increase in
economic growth and development in developing countries by increasing their access to agricultural
markets in developed countries. If this occurred, more developing countries would benefit from the
gains from free trade. The World Bank estimated that if the US$300b worth of agricultural assistance
in rich countries could be cut or even eliminated, this would increase global trade by US$96b.
However the main obstacles to finalising the Doha Round talks in July 2006 were threefold:
1. The EU was unwilling to cut agricultural subsidies by more than an average 50%, whilst Australia
and other countries wanted a cut of at least 60%;
2. The USA was unwilling to cut its farm subsidies from US$20b to US$15b per year; and
3. Developing countries such as Brazil and India wanted to exclude many industrial and consumer
products (e.g. cars and electronic goods) from tariff cuts and not open their markets to overseas
competition from other developing as well as developed countries.
The unwillingness of the EU and USA to cut agricultural subsidies and improve market access to
developing countries represents the greatest impediment to global free trade and economic development.
Because of the slow progress in finalising the Doha Round, Australia has followed the global trend
towards negotiating and signing preferential trade agreements (PTAs) with some of its major trading
partners. The number of PTAs grew dramatically from nine in the 1960s to 278 in 2010 as shown in
Figure 6.4. Many of these agreements have been made between developing and emerging countries.
Since 2003 Australia has signed bilateral agreements with Singapore, Thailand, the USA, Chile and
ASEAN. Negotiations have been held on possible bilateral agreements with China, Malaysia, Japan,
Korea, the UAE, India and Indonesia. If Australia concludes PTAs with all of these countries, it is
estimated that 43% of Australia’s two way trade will be covered by preferential arrangements. The
Australian government argues that PTAs which are comprehensive in scope and coverage can complement
and provide momentum to Australia’s wider multilateral trade objectives in the WTO.
Source: Productivity Commission (2010), Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements, Draft Report, Melbourne.
However an eminent panel of trade policy experts in the WTO believes that PTAs can involve a number
of costs, including the diversion of trade from the most efficient countries and an undermining of
support for more ambitious multilateral trade reform in the WTO. Despite the deadlock in negotiations
in the Doha Round, the WTO remains fundamental to a global rules based trading system.
Trade negotiations in the Doha Round recommenced formally in early 2007 with the Director General
of the WTO, Pascal Lemy, calling for intensive discussion and negotiations by the WTO Trade
Negotiations Committee in September 2007 to conclude the ninth Doha Round of trade talks.
The July 2008, April 2011 and December 2011 Meetings in Geneva
Some progress was made towards concluding the Doha Round in 2007 and 2008 with ongoing
negotiations between the G6 (Australia, Brazil, the European Union, India, Japan and the United
States). Progress needed to be made on the ‘triangle’ of trade issues:
• The US would have to agree to deeper cuts in its domestic farm support;
• The European Union would have to agree to increased agricultural market access through greater
tariff cuts in agricultural products; and
• Developing countries such as China, Brazil and India would have to agree to lower tariffs on non
agricultural goods.
In July 2008 another WTO Ministerial Council meeting was held in Geneva to work towards the
conclusion of the Doha Round. The goal was to agree on the ‘modalities’ (i.e. the formulas and
methods) to be used to cut tariffs and agricultural subsidies. Agreement on modalities would determine
the scale of reductions in tariffs on thousands of industrial and agricultural products and future levels of
farm subsidies in WTO member countries. However the talks collapsed after nine days of negotiations
eventhough 18 of the 20 topics discussed were agreed upon. Commentators argued that the increasing
power of China and India had swayed the talks with their refusal to reduce their farm subsidies because
of global food shortages and the threat of increased imports from other countries.
The WTO Trade Negotiations Committee met in Geneva in April 2011. The WTO Director General,
Pascal Lemy warned that unless the Doha Round was completed in 2011 there would be a lost
opportunity to boost world trade, increased protectionism and an erosion of faith in the multilateral
trading system under the WTO.
The eighth Ministerial Conference of the Doha Round was held in Geneva in December 2011 with
leaders of the G20 and APEC calling for a ‘fresh approach’ to negotiations. This included the possibility
of adopting the Doha drafts as they stand eventhough they are short of the ‘end point’ envisaged when
the Round commenced. It was argued that at a time of low growth in Europe and the USA the trade
benefits offered by the Doha drafts would still be valuable to WTO members.
REVIEW QUESTIONS
THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF REDUCING PROTECTION
AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
1. Discuss the impact of Australia’s unilateral reduction in protection on competition, productivity
and efficiency for previously protected firms and industries.
2. Discuss the estimated macroeconomic benefits to Australia of the reform of industry assistance.
3. Explain the costs of reforms to industry assistance to firms and workers in industries and regions
affected by tariff cuts such as TCF, PMV and steel.
4. How does tariff reform affect consumers and the government? What are the long run economic
gains from the reform of industry assistance?
5. Why does Australia participate in the WTO? What are the effects of EU and US agricultural
subsidies on Australian exporters?
6. What were the main positive outcomes of the Uruguay Round for Australia?
7. How the does the WTO differ from the GATT mechanism for liberalising world trade?
9. Discuss the reasons for the deadlock in negotiations at the WTO’s Doha Round of trade talks.
10. Define the following terms and abbreviations and add them to a glossary
Paper products 6% 2% 7% 2%
Refer to the table above of nominal and effective rates of assistance for Australian
manufacturing for 1991 and the forecasts for 2000 and answer the following questions. Marks
2. Discuss TWO reasons for the Australian government reducing protection in 1988. (1)
3. What is the difference between the nominal and effective rates of protection? (2)
5. Explain TWO costs and TWO benefits of reducing protection in the Australian economy. (4)
“In April 2011 the Australian government released a Trade Policy Statement outlining its
commitment to free trade as a pathway to improved employment prospects and economic
prosperity in Australia. The government’s trade strategy announced in the Trade Policy Statement
adopts five main principles:
• The pursuit of ongoing unilateral trade related economic reform without waiting for other
countries to reform their trade policies;
• Non discrimination among countries in trade negotiations;
• Foreign policy considerations should not override trade policy;
• Transparency in free trade negotiations; and
• The seamless execution of trade policy and wider economic reform.
To pursue these principles the government also announced a set of disciplines that would govern
the negotiation and content of international trade agreements:
Discuss the main elements of the Australian government’s trade policy and evaluate the costs
and benefits of Australia pursuing bilateral free trade agreements at the expense of multilateral
trade agreements through the WTO.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
AUSTRALIA’S TRADE POLICY
1. Australia has a long history of protection in the manufacturing sector where tariffs and quotas
have been used to shield domestic firms from import competition.
2. Since the early 1970s both nominal and effective rates of assistance given to manufacturing have
been cut by the Australian government. Cuts in protection were undertaken in the 1988 Industry
Statement, followed by the 1991 Industry Statement, which accelerated the pace of tariff reform.
3. The main reasons for the change in government policy towards reducing protection were to
increase the efficiency and international competitiveness of Australian industry, and to increase
economic growth through a process of structural reform in industry.
4. The short term costs of the reduction in protection for Australian manufacturing were an increase
in structural unemployment in plan industries (such as textiles, clothing and footwear, passenger
motor vehicles and steel) and the resources needed to finance retraining, relocation and in some
cases redundancy schemes for displaced workers in these industries.
• A
unilateral decision was taken in the 1980s and 1990s to dismantle protection and open up
the Australian economy to import competition, especially in manufactured goods.
• O
n a bilateral basis, Australia has negotiated a number of free trade agreements with countries
such as New Zealand (ANZCERTA), Thailand, Singapore, the USA, Chile and ASEAN.
• O
n a multilateral basis, Australia is a vocal proponent of free trade in the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) rounds of trade talks (such as the Uruguay and Doha Rounds), and forums
such as the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) and ASEAN.
6. The major benefits of the reduction in protection in Australia include a more competitive and
efficient manufacturing sector which now exports to the world market and contributes over 20% to
Australia’s merchandise exports. Other positive outcomes include employment gains in efficient
industries, and at the macroeconomic level, a higher rate of economic growth has been achieved.
The major short term costs of the reduction in protection in Australia have been a rise in structural
unemployment and structural change in affected industries. Many regional economies have
also been affected through the contraction of previously protected industries. The Australian
government has also had to finance the cost of retraining and the relocation of displaced workers.
7. The extent of international protection has an adverse impact on Australian exporters. This is
especially the case for agricultural exporters who compete with subsidised wheat, dairy, beef
and sugar in European, American and some Asian markets such as Japan and South Korea.
Australia has played a very active role in the Cairns Group of countries and the WTO forum
to achieve reductions in agricultural subsidies which distort world agricultural prices, deny
market access to efficient exporters like Australia, and reduce export income for Australian
farmers. The current Doha Round of WTO talks has the major objectives of reducing protection
of agricultural and manufactured goods as well as services. The Doha Round remained unfinished
in 2012 against the background of rising levels of protection due to the Global Financial Crisis.