WEEK 6 CASE DIGESTS
property without due process of law contrary to the Bill of
VELILLA vs. POSADAS (CUSTODIO)
DOCTRINE: To effect the abandonment of one's domicile, there must be
a deliberate and provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with actual
residence in the place chosen, with a declared or provable intent that it
should be one's fixed and permanent place of abode, one's home.
FACTS:
 This case arose from the death of one Arthur Graydon Moody,
who died in Calacutta, India on February 18, 1931.
 He executed in the Philippines a will where he bequeathed all
his property to his only sister, Ida M. Palmer (Palmer), who is a
citizen and resident of New York, USA.
 On July 14, 1931, Palmer was declared to be the sole and only
heiress of Moody.
 Moody’s estate consisted of bonds and shares of stock
corporations organized under the laws of the Philippines, bank
deposits, and other personal properties shown in the
inventory.
 BIR prepared an inheritance tax return and income tax return
for the estate of Moody.
 The estate of Moody paid under protest.
 Both parties introduced evidence which appears that Moody,
an American citizen came to the Philippines and engaged in
business here up to the time of his death in Calcutta, India.
 That he had no business elsewhere, and all of said property at
the time of his death was located and had its situs within the
Philippines.
 Plaintiff now contends that that there is no valid law or
regulation of the Government of the Philippine Islands under
or by virtue of which any inheritance tax may be levied,
assessed or collected upon transfer, by death and succession,
of intangible personal properties of a person not domiciled in
the Philippine Islands, and the levy and collection by defendant
of inheritance tax computed upon the value of said stocks,
bonds, credits and other intangible properties as aforesaid
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constituted and constitutes the taking and deprivation of
Rights and organic law of the Philippine Islands…
 Plaintiff alleged that Moody, at the time of his death, was a non-
resident of the Philippine Islands under the following
circumstances:
 Moody was never married and was in the Philippine Islands
from 1902 or 1903 forward during which time he accumulated
a fortune from his business here.
 He lived in the Elks' Club in Manila for many years and was
living there up to the date he left Manila the latter part of
February, 1928.
 Moody was afflicted with leprosy in an advanced stage and had
been informed by Dr. Wade that he would be reported to the
Philippine authorities for confinement in the Culion Leper
Colony as required by the law.
 He promised Dr. Wade that he would voluntarily go to Culion.
But distressed at the thought of being segregated, he left the
Philippines under cover of night, on a freighter, without ticket,
passport or tax clearance certificate.
 In March and April of 1929, he lived with a friend in Paris,
France where he was receiving treatment for leprosy at the
Pasteur Institute.
 On November 26, 1930, the latter date when he wrote a letter
to Harry Wendt of Manila, offering to sell him his interest in the
Camera Supply Company, a Philippine corporation, in which
Moody owned 599 out of 603 shares.
 He stated in the letter: “Certainly I'll never return there to live
or enter business again…”
 Defendant answered that Moody, was and prior to the date of
his death, was a resident in the Manila, Philippines where he
was engaged actively in business.
ISSUE: Whether or not Moody was legally domiciled in the Philippines
on the day of his death? YES, Moody was legally domiciled in the
Philippine Islands on the day of his death.

HELD:
 As Moody died of leprosy less than two months after the letters
were written, there can be no doubt that he would have been
immediately segregated in the Culion Leper Colony had he
returned to the Philippine Islands.
 Therefore, he was a fugitive from confinement in the Culion
Leper Colony in accordance with the law of the Philippine
Islands, not from justice.
 There is no statement of Moody, oral or written, in the record
that he had adopted a new domicile while he was absent from
Manila.
 Though he was physically present for some months in Calcutta
prior to the date of his death there, the appellant does not
claim that Moody had domicile there although it was precisely
from Calcutta that he wrote and cabled that he wished to sell
his business in Manila and that he had no intention to live
there again.
 Thus, the claim that he established a legal domicile in Paris in
February 1929 is much less plausible.
 The record contains no writing whatever of Moody from Paris.
 There is no evidence as to where in Paris he had any fixed
abode that he intended to be his permanent home; no evidence
that he acquired any property in Paris or engaged in any
settled business on his own account there.
 There is no evidence of any affirmative factors that prove the
establishment of a legal domicile there; the negative evidence
that he told Cooley that he did not intend to return to Manila
does not prove that he had established a domicile in Paris.
 His short stay of three months in Paris is entirely consistent
with the view that he was a transient in Paris for the purpose
of receiving treatments at the Pasteur Institute.
 The evidence indicates clearly that Moody's continued absence
from his legal domicile in the Philippines was due to evade
confinement in the Culion Leper Colony; for he doubtless knew
that on his return he would be immediately confined, because
his affliction became graver while he was absent than it was on
the day of his precipitous departure.
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 And also, he could not conceal himself in the Philippines where
he was well known, as he might do in foreign parts.
 Our [then] Civil Code (art. 40) defines the domicile of natural
persons as "the place of their usual residence".
 The record leaves no doubt that the "usual residence" of
Moody, who was described as a "fugitive" and "outcast", was in
Manila where he had lived and toiled for more than a quarter
of a century, rather than in any foreign country he visited
during his wanderings up to the date of his death in Calcutta.
 To effect the abandonment of one's domicile, there must be a
deliberate and provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with
actual residence in the place chosen, with a declared or
provable intent that it should be one's fixed and permanent
place of abode, one's home.
 There is a complete dearth of evidence in the record that
Moody ever established a new domicile in a foreign country.
SANTOVINCENZO, CONSUL OF THE KINGDOM OF ITALY
AT NEW YORK, v. EGAN, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATOR, ET AL.
(JAVIER)
DOCTRINE: The treaty-making power is broad enough to cover all
subjects that properly pertain to our foreign relations, and agreement
with respect to the rights and privileges of citizens of the United
States in foreign countries, and of the nationals of such countries
within the United States, and the disposition of the property of aliens
dying within the territory of the respective parties, is within the
scope of that power, and any conflicting law of the State must yield
OVERVIEW: The surrogate's court had decreed that the estate of an
Italian national who died intestate without heirs or next of kin be
paid into the treasury of New York City. The Consul General
contended that he was entitled to the assets of the estate for
distribution to the Kingdom of Italy. The Court reversed the decree
and remanded the cause. The Court observed that the treaty-making
power was broad enough to cover all subjects that properly pertained
to the foreign relations of the United States, that the rights and
privileges of citizens of the United States in foreign countries and of
nationals of such countries in the United States and the disposition of
the property of aliens dying within the territory of the respective
parties were within the scope of that power, and that any conflicting
law of the State had to yield. The Court concluded that by virtue of
the most-favored-nation clause of Article XVII of the Consular
Convention of 1878 between the United States and Italy, 20 Stat.
725, 732, the Consul General was entitled to the benefit of Article VI
of the Treaty between the United States and Persia of 1856, 11 Stat.
709, 710 and that the assets should be delivered to him.
OUTCOME: The Court reversed the decree of the surrogate's court
in favor of the Public Administrator on appeal by the Consul General
of the settlement of an estate and remanded the cause for further
proceedings not inconsistent with the Court's opinion.
FACTS: Antonio Comincio, a native of Italy, died intestate in New
York City sometime prior to March 10, 1925, when letters of
administration were issued to the respondent as Public Administrator
by the Surrogates' Court of New York County. Upon the judicial
settlement of the administrator's account, the appellant, the Consul
General of Italy at New York, presented the claim that the decedent
at the time of his death was a subject of the King of Italy and had left
no heirs or next of kin, and that, under Article XVII of the Consular
Convention of 1878 between the United States and Italy, the
petitioner was entitled to receive the net assets of the estate for
distribution to the Kingdom of Italy. The Attorney General of New
York contested the claim. The Surrogates' Court, finding that the
domicile of the decedent was in New York City, decreed that the
balance of the estate, amounting to $ 914.64, after payment of debts
and the sums allowed as commissions and as expenses of
administration, be paid into the treasury of New York City for the
use and benefit of the unknown kin of the decedent. The decree was
affirmed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the
State, First Department, and both the Appellate Division and the
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Court of Appeals of the State denied leave to appeal to the latter
court. The case may [*35] be regarded as properly here on certiorari.
The decedent was never naturalized, and at the time of his death was
an Italian subject. He had lived in New York for many years, and the
finding that the decedent was domiciled there is not open to question.
Nor were any heirs or next of kin discovered.
"Article XVII. HN1Go to the description of this Headnote.The
respective Consuls General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls and Consular
Agents, as likewise the Consular Chancellors, Secretaries, Clerks or
Attaches, shall enjoy in both countries, all the rights, prerogatives,
immunities and privileges which are or may hereafter be granted to
the officers of the same grade, of the most favoured nation."
Pursuant to this agreement, the Italian Consul General sought the
application of Article VI of the Treaty between the United States and
Persia of 1856, as follows (11 Stat. 709, 710):
"Article VI. HN2Go to the description of this Headnote.In case of a
citizen or subject of either of the contracting parties dying within the
territories of the other, his effects shall be delivered up integrally to
[*36] the family or partners in business of the deceased; and in case
he has no relations or partners, his effects in either country shall be
delivered up to the consul or agent of the nation of which the
deceased was a subject or citizen, so that he may dispose of them in
accordance with the laws of his country."
This Treaty with Persia was terminated on May 10, 1928, but, as this
was subsequent to the death of the Italian national whose estate is in
question, the termination does not affect the present case.
ISSUE: Whether the net assets shall go to Italy or to the State of
New York. HN4Go to the description of this Headnote.
HELD: Estate should go to Italy.
"Article III. The citizens and subjects of the two high contracting
parties, travellers, merchants, manufacturers, and others, who may
reside in the territory of either country, shall be respected and
efficiently protected by the authorities of the country and their
agents, and treated in all respects as the subjects and citizens of the
most favored nation are treated."
HN6Go to the description of this Headnote.It would be wholly
inadmissible to conclude that it was the intention that citizens of the
United States, making their residence in Persia under this Treaty,
would be denied the benefit of Article III in case they acquired a
domicile in Persia. The provision contemplated residence, nothing is
said to indicate that domicile is excluded, and the clear import of the
provision is that, so long as they retained their status as citizens of
the United States, they would be entitled to the guaranty of Article
III. The same would be true of Persians permitted to reside here
under the Treaty.
the Italian Consul General sought the application of Article VI of the
Treaty between the United States and Persia of 1856, as follows (11
Stat. 709, 710):
"Article VI. HN2Go to the description of this Headnote.In case of a
citizen or subject of either of the contracting parties dying within the
territories of the other, his effects shall be delivered up integrally to
[*36] the family or partners in business of the deceased; and in case
he has no relations or partners, his effects in either country shall be
delivered up to the consul or agent of the nation of which the
deceased was a subject or citizen, so that he may dispose of them in
accordance with the laws of his country."
It may be assumed that Article XVII of the Consular Convention
with Italy contemplates reciprocity with respect to the rights and
privileges sought, and there is no suggestion that Italy has not
recognized the right of consuls of the United States to take the
effects of the citizens of the United States dying in Italy in
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circumstances similar to those in which the present claim of the
Italian Consul General is pressed. As, in this view, there appears to
be no ground for denying the right of the Italian Consul General to
demand the application of the last clause of Article VI of the Treaty
with Persia,
Our conclusion is that, by virtue of the most-favored-nation clause of
Article XVII of the Consular Convention between the United States
and Italy of 1878, the Italian Consul General was entitled in the
instant case, being that of the death of an Italian national in this
country prior to the termination of the Treaty between the United
[*41] States and Persia of 1856, to the benefit of Article VI of that
Treaty, and that the net assets of the decedent should be delivered to
him accordingly.
WILKINS vs. ELLETT (FERRER)
Doctrine:
The personal estate of a deceased was to be regarded, for
the purposes of succession and distribution, as having no other
locality than that of his domicile.
Facts:
Quarles died in Alabama, where he was domiciled. Letters of
administration were taken there by one Goodloe (home
administrator). Wilkins, a resident of Memphis, Tennessee owed the
estate $3,455. Being called upon by the home administrator, Wilkins
paid the debt in full and took a receipt. The home administrator duly
accounted before the Alabama probate court the sum received.
Afterwards, Ellett (foreign administrator)(a citizen of the
State of Virginia) professed to be the next of kin of Quarles, also
took out letters of administration in Tennessee, and brought this suit
against Wilkins, to recover the same debt. There were no creditors or
persons entitled as distributees of the intestate in Tennessee.
 LOWER COURT: Payment by the debtor to the home
administrator was his own wrong, gave judgement to Ellett.

Issue/s:

WON the voluntary payment made by the debtor (Wilkins)

to the home administrator (Goodloe) discharged the former from his
debt.

Held:

YES. The Court reversed lower court’s judgement.

The Court held that the personal estate of a deceased was to

be regarded, for the purposes of succession and distribution, as
having no other locality than that of his domicile. The HOME
ADMINISTRATOR, therefore, with letters taken out at the place of
the domicile, was invested with the title to all the personal property
of the deceased for the purpose of collecting the effects of the estate,
paying the debts, and making distribution of the residue. The law
was in favor of the validity of the debtor’s payment to the home
administrator.

Additional Note:

The personal estate of the deceased is to be regarded, for the

purposes of succession and distribution, wherever situated, as having
no other locality than that of his domicile; and if he dies intestate, the
succession is governed by the law of the place where he was
domiciled at the time of his death, and not by the conflicting laws of
the various places where the property happened to be situated.

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