DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS

A.C. No. 7325 January 21, 2015

DR. DOMICIANO F. VILLAHERMOSA, SR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ISIDRO L. CARACOL, Respondent.
RESOLUTION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Dr. Domiciano F. Villahermosa, Sr.,

against Atty. Isidro L. Caracol for deceit, gross misconduct and violation of oath under
Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Villahermosa is respondent in two land cases3 involving cancellation of emancipation
patents and transfer certificates of title, cancellation of special power of attorney and
deeds of absolute sale and recovery of ownership and possession of parcels of land
derived from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 433 which covered 23.3018 hectares
of land in Valencia, Bukidnon. Counsel on record for plaintiff was Atty. Fidel Aquino.
OCT No. 433 was a homestead patent granted to Micael Babela who had two sons,
Fernando and Efren. As legal heirs of Micael, Fernando received 53,298 square meters
while Efren received 33,296 square meters. Subsequently, Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCTs) were issued in their respective names.
When the agrarian reform law4 was enacted on October 21, 1972, emancipation
patents and titles were issued to Hermogena and Danilo Nipotnipot, beneficiaries of the
program,who in turn sold the parcels of land to complainant’s spouse, Raymunda
Villahermosa. A deed of absolute sale was executed in favor of Raymunda.
On March 2, 1994, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
issued a decision ordering the cancellation of the emancipation patents and TCTs
derived from OCT No. 433 stating that it was not covered by the agrarian reform law.
This decision was appealed to and affirmed by the DARAB Central Board and the Court
of Appeals.
On September 25, 2002, Atty. Caracol, as "Add’l Counsel for the Plaintiffs-Movant," filed
a motion for execution with the DARAB, Malaybalay, Bukidnon praying for the full
implementation of the March 2, 1994 decision.5
On December 20, 2005, Atty. Caracol filed a Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ
of Execution and Demolition6 which he signed as "Counsel for the Plaintiff Efren
Babela"7. Villahermosa filed this complaint8 alleging that Atty. Caracol had no authority
to file the motions since he obtained no authority from the plaintiffs and the counsel of
record. Villahermosa posited that Efren could not have authorized Atty. Caracol to file
the second motion because Efren had already been dead9 for more than a year. He
claimed that Atty. Caracol’s real client was a certain Ernesto I. Aguirre, who had
allegedly bought the same parcel of land. Villahermosa presented affidavits of Efren’s
widow10 and daughter11 both stating that Efren never executed a waiver of rights and
that the parcel of land was sold to Villahermosa through a deed of sale. Both also stated
that they werefamiliar with Efren’s signature. They state that the signature inthe waiver
was different from his usual signature. Villahermosa averred that Atty. Caracol
committed deceit and gross misconduct.
In addition, Villahermosa claimed that Atty. Caracol introduced falsified and
manufactured evidence intothe proceedings. Atty. Caracol, in introducing a document
denominated asWaiver of Rights where Efren waived all his rights in favor of Ernesto
Aguirre, was able to secure the execution of the judgment in one of the cases12 in favor
of Ernesto Aguirre. Villahermosa also filed a case13 for falsification of public document
and use of falsified document against Ernesto Aguirre and Atty. Caracol.14
Atty. Caracol insists that Efren and Ernesto authorized him to appear as "additional
counsel". He said that he had consulted Atty. Aquino who advised him to go ahead with
the filing. Moreover, he stated that he was not aware that there was a waiver of rights
executed in Ernesto Aguirre’s favor.
In its Report and Recommendation,15 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission
on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) found that Atty. Caracol committed deceitful acts and
misconduct. It found that respondent did not present credible evidence to controvert the
allegation that he was not authorized by plaintiff or counsel of record. Respondent
admitted that at the time of the filing of the second motion, Efren was dead. It noted that
Atty. Caracol did not explain how he obtained the authority nor did he present any proof
of the authority. However, there was insufficient evidence to hold him liable for
falsification.
The IBP CBD stated that Atty. Caracol clearly misled and misrepresented to the
DARAB, Region X that he was counsel of Efren to protect the interest of Ernesto
Aguirre, his real client, violating his oath as a lawyer. It thus recommended that Atty.
Caracol be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and recommendation but modified the
penalty to one year suspension from the practice of law.16 Atty. Caracol moved for
reconsideration17 but was denied.18
Atty. Caracol filed a notice of appeal19 which this Court returned to him since no legal
fees are required in administrative cases.20
We adopt the findings of the IBP.
The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a presumption of a lawyer’s
appearance on behalf of his client, hence:
SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. – An attorney is presumed to be properly
authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of
attorney isrequired to authorize him to appear in court for his client, butthe presiding
judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown,
require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the
authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the
name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice
requires. An attorney willfully appearing in court for a person without being employed,
unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contemptas an officer of the court
who has misbehaved in his official transactions. (Emphases supplied)
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pamintuan Dev’t. Co.,21 this Court said that while a
lawyer is not required to present proof of his representation, when a court requires that
he show suchauthorization, it is imperative that he show his authority to act. Thus:
A lawyer is not even required to present a written authorization from the client. In fact,
the absence of a formal notice of entry of appearance will not invalidate the acts
performed by the counsel in his client’s name. However, [a] court, on its own initiative or
on motion of the other party may require a lawyer to adduce authorization from the
client.22
Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act as counsel for a person
without being retained nor may he appear in court without being employed unless by
leave of court.23 If an attorney appears on a client’s behalf without a retainer or the
requisite authority neither the litigant whom he purports to represent nor the adverse
party may be bound or affected by his appearance unless the purported client ratifies or
is estopped to deny his assumed authority.24 If a lawyer corruptly or willfully appears as
an attorney for a party toa case without authority, he may be disciplined or punished for
contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transaction.25
We must also take into consideration that even if a lawyer is retained by a client, an
attorney-client relationship terminates upon death of either client or the lawyer.26
Here, Atty. Caracol was presumed to have authority when he appeared in the
proceedings before the DARAB. The records are unclear at what point his authority to
appear for Efren was questioned. Neither is there any indication that Villahermosa in
fact questioned his authority during the course of the proceedings.
However, Atty. Caracol knew that Efren had already passed away at the time he filed
the Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition. As an
honest, prudent and conscientious lawyer, he should have informed the Court of his
client’s passing and presented authority that he was retained by the client’s successors-
in-interest and thus the parties may have been substituted.27
We also note the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz in People v. Mendoza28
where he stated:
I am bothered by the improvident plea of guilty made by accused Juan Magalop,
presumably upon the adviceof his counsel, Atty. Isidro L. Caracol of the CLAO (now the
PAO). It would seem that this lawyer was less than conscientious when he advised his
indigent client to admit a crime the man did no[t] commit. As the ponenciaobserves,
"outside of his improvident plea of guilt, there is absolutely no evidence against him –
presented or forthcoming. From the evidence of the prosecution, there is no way by
which Magalop could have been implicated."
It seems to me that if any one is guilty in this case, it is the PAO lawyer who, through an
incredible lack of zeal in the discharge of his duties, was apparently willing, without any
moral compunctions at all, and without proof, to consign an innocent man to prison.
The PAO is supposed to defend the accused, not to condemn them without
cause.1âwphi1 The defense counsel in this case did not seem to appreciate this
responsibility when he prodded Magalop to plead guilty and waived the right to submit
evidence in his behalf.29
While this observation does not serve to exacerbate Atty. Caracol’s liability under the
present circumstances, we would like to highlight the important role of an attorney in our
judicial system. Because of the particular nature of an attorney’s function it is essential
that they should act with fairness, honesty and candor towards the courts and his
clients.30 Under Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall
he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
This flows out from the lawyer's oath which each lawyer solemnly swears to uphold the
law and court processes in the pursuit of justice. Thus, a lawyer must be more
circumspect in his demeanor and attitude towards the public in general as agents of the
judicial system.
Here, Atty. Caracol, as observed by the IBP CBD, has been less than candid about his
representation. We also observe that he has used underhanded means to attain his
purpose. Atty. Caracol's blatant disregard of his duties as a lawyer cannot be
countenanced. In view of his actions of contravening his lawyer's oath and in violation of
Canons 8 and 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility we deem it
proper to suspend him from the practice of law for a period of one year.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Isidro L. Caracol GUILTY. Accordingly, we
SUSPEND respondent Atty. Isidro L. Caracol from the practice of law for ONE YEAR
effective upon finality of this Resolution, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to respondent's personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information
and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10135 January 15, 2014
EDGARDO AREOLA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARIA VILMA MENDOZA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This refers to the administrative complaint1 filed by Edgardo D. Areola (Areola) a.k.a.
Muhammad Khadafy against Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), from the
Public Attorney s Office (PAO) for violation of her attorney s oath of office, deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court, and for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the letter-complaint dated November 13, 2006 addressed to the Honorable
Commissioners, Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), Areola stated that he was filing the complaint in behalf of his co-detainees Allan
Seronda, Aaron Arca, Joselito Mirador, Spouses Danilo Perez and Elizabeth Perez. He
alleged that on October 23, 2006, during Prisoners Week, Atty. Mendoza, visited the
Antipolo City Jail and called all detainees with pending cases before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 73, Antipolo City where she was assigned, to attend her
speech/lecture.2 Areola claimed that Atty. Mendoza stated the following during her
speech:
"O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang- areglo ay maging
praktikal sana kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na
hindi masasayang ang pera ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng kamag-anak ninyo ang
pera at ako na ang bahalang maglagay kay Judge Martin at Fiscal banqui; at kayong
mga detenidong mga babae na no bail ang kaso sa drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si
Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon."3
Atty. Mendoza allegedly said that as she is handling more than 100 cases, all detainees
should prepare and furnish her with their Sinumpaang Salaysay so that she may know
the facts of their cases and their defenses and also to give her the necessary payment
for their transcript of stenographic notes.4
Areola furthermore stated that when he helped his co-inmates in drafting their pleadings
and filing motions before the RTC Branch 73, Antipolo City, Atty. Mendoza undermined
his capability, to wit:
(1) Atty. Mendoza purportedly scolded detainee Seronda when she learned that the
latter was assisted by Areola in filing a Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Republic Act
No. 8942 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) in the latter’s criminal case for rape, which was
pending before the RTC, Branch 73, Antipolo City. She got angrier when Seronda
retorted that he allowed Areola to file the motion for him since there was nobody to help
him.
(2) Areola assisted Spouses Danilo and Elizabeth Perez in filing their Joint Motion for
Consolidation of Trial of Consolidated Offenses and Joint Motion to Plead Guilty to a
Lesser Offense. The spouses were likewise scolded for relying on the Complainant and
alleged that the respondent asked for ₱2,000.00 to represent them.
(3) Areola helped another co-detainee, Mirador in filing an "Ex-parte Motion to Plead
Guilty to a Lesser Offense". When Atty. Mendoza learned of it, she allegedly scolded
Mirador and discredited Areola.5
In her unverified Answer6 dated January 5, 2007, Atty. Mendoza asseverated that the
filing of the administrative complaint against her is a harassment tactic by Areola as the
latter had also filed several administrative cases against judges in the courts of Antipolo
City including the jail warden of Taytay, Rizal where Areola was previously detained.
These actuations show that Areola has a penchant for filing various charges against
anybody who does not accede to his demand.7 Atty. Mendoza contended that Areola is
not a lawyer but represented himself to his co-detainees as one.8 She alleged that the
motions/pleadings prepared and/or filed by Areola were not proper.
After both parties failed to appear in the Mandatory Conference set by the IBP on
August 15, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner considered the non-appearance as a
waiver on their part. Nonetheless, in the interest of justice, both parties were required to
submit their respective position papers.9
On December 29, 2009, the Investigating Commissioner issued his Report and
Recommendation.10 The Investigating Commissioner stated that the Complainant is
knowledgeable in the field of law. While he may be of service to his fellow detainees, he
must, however, be subservient to the skills and knowledge of a full fledged lawyer. He
however found no convincing evidence to prove that Atty. Mendoza received money
from Areola’s co-detainees as alleged. The charges against Atty. Mendoza were also
uncorroborated, viz:
There is no convincing evidence that will prove that the respondent received money
from the inmates since the charges are uncorroborated. In fact, the complainant is not
the proper party to file the instant case since he was not directly affected or injured by
the act/s being complained of. No single affidavits of the affected persons were attached
to prove the said charges. Hence, it is simply hearsay in nature.11
Nonetheless, Atty. Mendoza admitted in her Answer that she advised her clients and
their relatives to approach the judge and the fiscal "to beg and cry" so that their motions
would be granted and their cases against them would be dismissed. To the
Investigating Commissioner, this is highly unethical and improper as the act of Atty.
Mendoza degrades the image of and lessens the confidence of the public in the
judiciary.12 The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Mendoza be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) months.13
In a Notice of Resolution14 dated November 19, 2011, the Board of Governors resolved
to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.
Atty. Mendoza sought to reconsider the Resolution15 dated November 19, 2011 but the
IBP Board of Governors denied her motion in its Resolution16 dated May 10, 2013. The
Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors was transmitted to the Court for final action
pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 12, Paragraph b17 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The Court’s Ruling
After a judicious examination of the records, the Court finds that the instant Complaint
against Atty. Mendoza profoundly lacks evidence to support the allegations contained
therein. All Areola has are empty assertions against Atty. Mendoza that she demanded
money from his co-detainees.
The Court agrees with the IBP that Areola is not the proper party to file the Complaint
against Atty. Mendoza. He is not even a client of Atty. Mendoza. He claims that he filed
the Complaint on behalf of his co-detainees Seronda, Arca, Mirador and Spouses
Perez, but it is apparent that no document was submitted which would show that they
authorized Areola to file a Complaint. They did not sign the Complaint he prepared. No
affidavit was even executed by the said co-detainees to substantiate the matters Areola
raised. Consequently, the Court rejects Areola’s statements, especially as regards Atty.
Mendoza’s alleged demands of money.
The Court agrees with the observations of the Investigating Commissioner that Areola
initiated this complaint when he felt insulted because Atty. Mendoza refused to
acknowledge the pleadings and motions he prepared for his co-detainees who are PAO
clients of Atty. Mendoza.18 It appears that Areola is quite knowledgeable with Philippine
laws. However, no matter how good he thinks he is, he is still not a lawyer. He is not
authorized to give legal advice and file pleadings by himself before the courts. His
familiarity with Philippine laws should be put to good use by cooperating with the PAO
instead of filing baseless complaints against lawyers and other government authorities.
It seems to the Court that Areola thinks of himself as more intelligent and better than
Atty. Mendoza, based on his criticisms against her. In his Reply19, he made fun of her
grammatical errors and tagged her as using carabao english20. He also called the PAO
as "Pa-Amin Office"21 which seriously undermines the reputation of the PAO. While
Areola may have been frustrated with the way the PAO is managing the significant
number of cases it deals with, all the more should he exert efforts to utilize his
knowledge to work with the PAO instead of maligning it.
Interestingly, Atty. Mendoza admitted that she advised her clients to approach the judge
and plead for compassion so that their motions would be granted. This admission
corresponds to one of Areola’s charges against Atty. Mendoza—that she told her clients
" Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso
noon." Atty. Mendoza made it appear that the judge is easily moved if a party resorts to
dramatic antics such as begging and crying in order for their cases to be dismissed.
As such, the Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Mendoza made
irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that "a lawyer shall not
counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system." Rule 15.07 states that "a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance
with the laws and the principles of fairness."
Atty. Mendoza’s improper advice only lessens the confidence of the public in our legal
system. Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external
forces or factors22 according to the merits of a case. Atty. Mendoza’s careless remark
is uncalled for.
It must be remembered that a lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the administration
of justice.1âwphi1 To that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate. His conduct
ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means,
not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of
his devotion to his client’s cause, is condemnable and unethical.23
In spite of the foregoing, the Court deems the penalty of suspension for two (2) months
as excessive and not commensurate to Atty. Mendoza’s infraction. Disbarment and
suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be
imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is established by clear, convincing
and satisfactory proof.24 The Court notes that when Atty. Mendoza made the remark
"Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso
noon", she was not compelled by bad faith or malice. While her remark was
inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment is not disparaging and reproachful so as
to cause dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary.
In several administrative cases, the Court has refrained from imposing the actual
penalties in the presence of mitigating factors. Factors such as the respondent’s length
of service, the respondent’s acknowledgement of his or her infractions and feeling of
remorse, family circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations,
respondent’s advanced age, among other things, have had varying significance in the
Court’s determination of the imposable penalty.25 The Court takes note of Atty.
Mendoza’s lack of ill-motive in the present case and her being a PAO lawyer as her
main source of livelihood.26 Furthermore, the complaint filed by Areola is clearly
baseless and the only reason why this was ever given consideration was due to Atty.
Mendoza’s own admission. For these reasons, the Court deems it just to modify and
reduce the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza
GUILTY of giving improper advice to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is accordingly meted out the penalty of
REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act
will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5581 January 14, 2014
ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated January 8, 2002 filed by complainant
Rose Bunagan-Bansig (Bansig) against respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera
(respondent) for Gross Immoral Conduct.
In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R.
Bunagan (Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a certified
xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila.2
Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie R. Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.
However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted
another marriage on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba),
as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City
Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila.3
Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid and
in full legal existence when he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the
first marriage had never been annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.
Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his
marriage is still subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a
member of the Bar, which renders him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.
In a Resolution4 dated February 18, 2002, the Court resolved to require respondent to
file a comment on the instant complaint.
Respondent failed to submit his comment on the complaint, despite receipt of the copy
of the Court's Resolution, as evidenced by Registry Return Receipt No. 30639. Thus,
the Court, in a Resolution5 dated March 17, 2003, resolved to require respondent to
show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing
to file his comment on the complaint against him.6
On December 10, 2002, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex Parte Motion7 praying that
respondent's failure to file his comment on the complaint be deemed as a waiver to file
the same, and that the case be submitted for disposition.
On May 4, 2003, in a Motion, respondent claimed that while it appeared that an
administrative case was filed against him, he did not know the nature or cause thereof
since other than Bansig's Omnibus Motion, he received no other pleading or any
processes of this Court. Respondent, however, countered that Bansig's Omnibus
Motion was merely a ploy to frighten him and his wife from pursuing the criminal
complaints for falsification of public documents they filed against Bansig and her
husband. He also explained that he was able to obtain a copy of the Court's Show
Cause Order only when he visited his brother who is occupying their former residence
at 59-B Aguho St., Project 3, Quezon City. Respondent further averred that he also
received a copy of Bansig's Omnibus Motion when the same was sent to his law office
address.
Respondent pointed out that having been the family's erstwhile counsel and her
younger sister's husband, Bansig knew his law office address, but she failed to send a
copy of the complaint to him. Respondent suspected that Bansig was trying to mislead
him in order to prevent him from defending himself. He added that Bansig has an
unpaid obligation amounting to ₱2,000,000.00 to his wife which triggered a sibling
rivalry. He further claimed that he and his wife received death threats from unknown
persons; thus, he transferred to at least two (2) new residences, i.e., in Sampaloc,
Manila and Angeles City. He then prayed that he be furnished a copy of the complaint
and be given time to file his answer to the complaint.
In a Resolution8 dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to (a) require Bansig to furnish
respondent with a copy of the administrative complaint and to submit proof of such
service; and (b) require respondent to file a comment on the complaint against him.
In compliance, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of Mailing to show proof that a copy of the
administrative complaint was furnished to respondent at his given address which is No.
238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City, as evidenced by Registry
Receipt No. 2167.9
On March 17, 2004, considering that respondent failed anew to file his comment despite
receipt of the complaint, the Court resolved to require respondent to show cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure.10
On June 3, 2004, respondent, in his Explanation,11 reiterated that he has yet to receive
a copy of the complaint. He claimed that Bansig probably had not complied with the
Court's Order, otherwise, he would have received the same already. He requested
anew that Bansig be directed to furnish him a copy of the complaint.
Again, on August 25, 2004, the Court granted respondent's prayer that he be furnished
a copy of the complaint, and required Bansig to furnish a copy of the complaint to
respondent.12
On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her Manifestation,13 lamented the dilatory tactics
allegedly undertaken by respondent in what was supposedly a simple matter of receipt
of complaint. Bansig asserted that the Court should sanction respondent for his
deliberate and willful act to frustrate the actions of the Court. She attached a copy of the
complaint and submitted an Affidavit of Mailing stating that again a copy of the
complaint was mailed at respondent's residential address in Angeles City as shown by
Registry Receipt No. 3582.
On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a Show Cause Order to respondent as to why
he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with
the Resolution dated July 7, 2003 despite service of copy of the complaint by registered
mail.14
On August 1, 2005, the Court noted the returned and unserved copy of the Show Cause
Order dated May 16, 2005 sent to respondent at 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino
Subd. under Registry Receipt No. 55621, with notation "RTS-Moved." It likewise
required Bansig to submit the correct and present address of respondent.15
On September 12, 2005, Bansig manifested that respondent had consistently indicated
in his correspondence with the Court No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision,
Angeles City as his residential address. However, all notices served upon him on said
address were returned with a note "moved" by the mail server. Bansig averred that in
Civil Case No. 59353, pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1,
Tuguegarao City, respondent entered his appearance as counsel with mailing address
to be at "Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City."16
On February 13, 2006, the Court resolved to resend a copy of the Show Cause Order
dated May 16, 2005 to respondent at his new address at Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922
Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City.17
On June 30, 2008, due to respondent's failure to comply with the Show Cause Order
dated May 16, 2005, for failure to file his comment on this administrative complaint as
required in the Resolution dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (a) IMPOSE upon
Atty. Celera a FINE of ₱1,000.00 payable to the court, or a penalty of imprisonment of
five (5) days if said fine is not paid, and (b) REQUIRE Atty. Celera to COMPLY with the
Resolution dated July 7, 2003 by filing the comment required thereon.18
In a Resolution19 dated January 27, 2010, it appearing that respondent failed to comply
with the Court's Resolutions dated June 30, 2008 and July 7, 2003, the Court resolved
to: (1) DISPENSE with the filing by respondent of his comment on the complaint; (2)
ORDER the arrest of Atty. Celera; and (3) DIRECT the Director of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) to (a) ARREST and DETAIN Atty. Celera for non-compliance with
the Resolution dated June 30, 2008; and (b) SUBMIT a report of compliance with the
Resolution. The Court likewise resolved to REFER the complaint to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.20
However, the Return of Warrant21 dated March 24, 2010, submitted by Atty. Frayn M.
Banawa, Investigation Agent II, Anti-Graft Division of the NBI, showed that respondent
cannot be located because neither Halili Complex nor No. 922 Aurora Blvd., at Cubao,
Quezon City cannot be located. During surveillance, it appeared that the given address,
i.e., No. 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City was a vacant lot with debris of a
demolished building. Considering that the given address cannot be found or located and
there were no leads to determine respondent's whereabouts, the warrant of arrest
cannot be enforced.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in compliance with the Court's
Resolution, reported that as per their records, the address of respondent is at No. 41
Hoover St., Valley View Royale Subd., Taytay, Rizal.
Respondent likewise failed to appear before the mandatory conference and hearings
set by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD),
despite several notices. Thus, in an Order dated August 4, 2010, Commissioner
Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, of the IBP-CBD, declared respondent to be in default and
the case was submitted for report and recommendation. The Order of Default was
received by respondent as evidenced by a registry return receipt. However, respondent
failed to take any action on the matter.
On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended
that respondent Atty. Celera be suspended for a period of two (2) years from the
practice of law.
RULING
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is
rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers.22 The issue to be
determined is whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the
dispensation of justice. Hence, an administrative proceeding for disbarment continues
despite the desistance of a complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to answer the charges against him
despite numerous notices.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial
evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the
respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering
the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this
Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the administrative penalty.23
In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a
second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as
evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 3,
2001 by the City Civil Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent
Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R.
Bunagan at the Church of Saint Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage,
however, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued
on October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila, states that
respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma.
Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the Mary the Queen Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San
Juan, Metro Manila.
Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that
respondent entered into a second marriage while the latter’s first marriage was still
subsisting. We note that the second marriage apparently took place barely a year from
his first marriage to Bunagan which is indicative that indeed the first marriage was still
subsisting at the time respondent contracted the second marriage with Alba.
The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in
custody thereof, are admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as provided for
under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the
original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in
custody thereof.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being
admissible in evidence, also clearly indicate that respondent contracted the second
marriage while the first marriage is subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of the
marriage certificates would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of
two marriages entered into by respondent. The certified xerox copies should be
accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. For purposes of this
disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the name of respondent are
competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders
him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar.24
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding
respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is
subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.25
This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without addressing rather respondent’s
defiant stance against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its
Resolution requiring him to file his comment on the complaint. This case has dragged
on since 2002. In the span of more than 10 years, the Court has issued numerous
directives for respondent's compliance, but respondent seemed to have preselected
only those he will take notice of and the rest he will just ignore. The Court has issued
several resolutions directing respondent to comment on the complaint against him, yet,
to this day, he has not submitted any answer thereto. He claimed to have not received a
copy of the complaint, thus, his failure to comment on the complaint against him.
Ironically, however, whenever it is a show cause order, none of them have escaped
respondent's attention. Even assuming that indeed the copies of the complaint had not
reached him, he cannot, however, feign ignorance that there is a complaint against him
that is pending before this Court which he could have easily obtained a copy had he
wanted to.
The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with respondent's nonchalant attitude
towards this case; accommodating respondent's endless requests, manifestations and
prayers to be given a copy of the complaint. The Court, as well as Bansig, as evidenced
by numerous affidavits of service, have relentlessly tried to reach respondent for more
than a decade; sending copies of the Court's Resolutions and complaint to different
locations - both office and residential addresses of respondent. However, despite
earnest efforts of the Court to reach respondent, the latter, however conveniently offers
a mere excuse of failure to receive the complaint. When said excuse seemed no longer
feasible, respondent just disappeared. In a manner of speaking, respondent’s acts were
deliberate, maneuvering the liberality of the Court in order to delay the disposition of the
case and to evade the consequences of his actions. Ultimately, what is apparent is
respondent’s deplorable disregard of the judicial process which this Court cannot
countenance.
Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this
Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a
sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Respondent’s cavalier attitude in
repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the
judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. We
have repeatedly held that a Court’s Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere
request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively."
Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s orders "not only betrays a
recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful
orders which is only too deserving of reproof."26
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court grounds therefor. - A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do
so. The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but also
the lawful orders of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to continue as an officer of
the court.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A.
CELERA, guilty of grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders
rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus
ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken of the Roll of
Attorneys, effective immediately.1âwphi1
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall
forthwith record it in the personal file of respondent. All the Courts of the Philippines and
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6368 June 13, 2012
FIDELA BENGCO AND TERESITA BENGCO, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. PABLO S. BERNARDO, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainants Fidela G. Bengco (Fidela) and
Teresita N. Bengco (Teresita) against respondent Atty. Pablo Bernardo (Atty. Bernardo)
for deceit, malpractice, conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and violation of his
duties and oath as a lawyer.
The acts of the respondent which gave rise to the instant complaint are as follows:
That sometime on or about the period from April 15, 1997 to July 22, 1997, Atty. Pablo
Bernardo with the help and in connivance and collusion with a certain Andres Magat
[wilfully] and illegally committed fraudulent act with intent to defraud herein
complainants Fidela G. Bengco and Teresita N. Bengco by using false pretenses,
deceitful words to the effect that he would expedite the titling of the land belonging to
the Miranda family of Tagaytay City who are the acquaintance of complainants herein
and they convinced herein complainant[s] that if they will finance and deliver to him the
amount of [₱]495,000.00 as advance money he would expedite the titling of the subject
land and further by means of other similar deceit like misrepresenting himself as lawyer
of William Gatchalian, the prospective buyer of the subject land, who is the owner of
Plastic City at Canomay Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila and he is the one handling
William Gatchalian’s business transaction and that he has contracts at NAMREA,
DENR, CENRO and REGISTER OF DEEDS which representation he well knew were
false, fraudulent and were only made to induce the complainant[s] to give and deliver
the said amount ([₱]495,000.00) and once in possession of said amount, far from
complying with his obligation to expedite and cause the titling of the subject land,
[wilfully], unlawfully and illegally misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said
amount to his personal use and benefit and despite demand upon him to return the said
amount, he failed and refused to do so, which acts constitute deceit, malpractice,
conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and Violation of Duties and Oath as a
lawyer.2
In support of their complaint, the complainants attached thereto Resolutions dated
December 7, 19983 and June 22, 19994 of the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Sto. Tomas and Minalin, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga and the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, Pampanga, respectively, finding probable
cause for the filing of the criminal information5 against both Atty. Bernardo and Andres
Magat (Magat) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga,
Branch 48, charging them with the crime of Estafa punishable under Article 315, par.
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
The respondent was required to file his Comment.6 On September 24, 2004, the
respondent filed an undated Comment,7 wherein he denied the allegations against him
and averred the following:
2. He had not deceived both complainants between the period from April 15, 1997 to
July 22, 1997 for purposes of getting from them the amount of [₱]495,000.00. It was
Andy Magat whom they contacted and who in turn sought the legal services of the
respondent. It was Andy Magat who received the said money from them.
3. There was no connivance made and entered into by Andy Magat and respondent.
The arrangement for titling of the land was made by Teresita N. Bengco and Andy
Magat with no participation of respondent.
4. The acceptance of the respondent to render his legal service is legal and allowed in
law practice.8
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.
On February 16, 2005, the IBP ordered the respondent to submit a verified comment
pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 6 of the Rules of Court as it appeared that the
respondent’s undated comment filed with the Court was not verified.9
On March 15, 2005, respondent through counsel requested for an additional fifteen (15)
days from March 17, 2005, or until April 1, 2005, within which to comply due to his
medical confinement.10
Thereafter, on April 4, 2005, the respondent filed a second motion11 for extension
praying for another 20 days, or until April 22, 2005, alleging that he was still recovering
from his illness.
On August 3, 2005, the case was set for mandatory conference.12 The respondent
failed to appear; thus, the IBP considered the respondent in default for his failure to
appear and for not filing an answer despite extensions granted. The case was then
submitted for report and recommendation.13
Based on the records of the case, Investigating Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-
Maala made the following findings:
[O]n or before the period from 15 April 1997 to 22 July 1997, respondent with the help
and in connivance and collusion with a certain Andres Magat ("Magat"), by using false
pretenses and deceitful words, [wilfully] and illegally committed fraudulent acts to the
effect that respondent would expedite the titling of the land belonging to the Miranda
family of Tagaytay City, who were the acquaintance of complainants.
Respondent and Magat convinced complainants that if they finance and deliver to them
the amount of [₱]495,000.00 as advance money, they would expedite the titling of the
subject land. Respondent represented himself to be the lawyer of William Gatchalian,
the owner of Plastic City located at Canomay Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, who
was allegedly the buyer of the subject land once it has been titled. Respondent and
Magat also represented that they have contacts at NAMREA, DENR, CENRO and the
Register of Deeds which representation they knew to be false, fraudulent and were only
made to induce complainants to give and deliver to them the amount of [₱]495,000.00.
Once in possession of the said amount, far from complying with their obligation to
expedite and cause the titling of the subject land, respondent and Magat [wilfully],
unlawfully and illegally misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount to
their personal use and benefit and despite demand upon them to return the said
amount, they failed and refused to do so.
In view of the deceit committed by respondent and Magat, complainants filed a
complaint for Estafa against the former before the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court, of
Sto. Tomas and Minalin, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. In the preliminary investigation
conducted by the said court, it finds sufficient grounds to hold respondent and Magat for
trial for the crime of Estafa defined under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. The case was transmitted to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Pampanga for appropriate action as per Order dated 7 December 1998.
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Pampanga conducted a re-investigation of the case. During the re-investigation thereof,
Magat was willing to reimburse to complainants the amount of [₱]200,000.00 because
according to him the amount of [₱]295,000.00 should be reimbursed by respondent
considering that the said amount was turned over to respondent for expenses incurred
in the documentation prior to the titling of the subject land. Both respondent and Magat
requested for several extensions for time to pay back their obligations to the
complainants. However, despite extensions of time granted to them, respondent and
Magat failed to fulfil their promise to pay back their obligation. Hence, it was resolved
that the offer of compromise was construed to be an implied admission of guilt. The
Asst. Provincial Prosecutor believes that there was no reason to disturb the findings of
the investigating judge and an Information for Estafa was filed against respondent and
Magat on 8 July 1999 before the Regional Trial Court, San Fernando, Pampanga.
The failure of the lawyer to answer the complaint for disbarment despite due notice on
several occasions and appear on the scheduled hearings set, shows his flouting
resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrates his despiciency for his oath of
office as a lawyer which deserves disciplinary sanction x x x.
From the facts and evidence presented, it could not be denied that respondent
committed a crime that import deceit and violation of his attorney’s oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility under both of which he was bound to ‘obey the laws of the
land.’ The commission of unlawful acts, specially crimes involving moral turpitude, acts
of dishonesty in violation of the attorney’s oath, grossly immoral conduct and deceit are
grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers (Rule 138, Section 27, RRC).
The misconduct complained of took place in 1997 and complainants filed the case only
on 16 April 2004. As provided for by the Rules of Procedure of the Commission of Bar
Discipline, as amended, dated 24 March 2004, "A complaint for disbarment, suspension
or discipline of attorneys prescribes in two (2) years from the date of the professional
misconduct" (Section 1, Rule VIII).14
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that:
x x x [R]espondent ATTY. PABLO A. BERNARDO be SUSPENDED for a period of
TWO YEARS from receipt hereof from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and as
a member of the Bar. 15
On February 1, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2007-
065, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED
with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is hereby ordered, the restitution of
the amount of [₱]200,000.00 within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice with Warning
that if he does not return the amount with in sixty days from receipt of this Order then he
will be meted the penalty of Suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.16
On May 16, 2007, the respondent promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 of the
aforesaid Resolution of the IBP. The respondent averred that: (1) the IBP resolution is
not in accord with the rules considering that the complaint was filed more than two (2)
years from the alleged misconduct and therefore, must have been dismissed outright;
(2) he did not commit any misrepresentation in convincing Fidela to give him money to
finance the titling of the land; (3) he was hired as a lawyer through Magat who
transacted with Teresita as evidenced by a Memorandum of Agreement18 signed by
the latter; (4) he was denied due process when the Investigating Commissioner
considered him as in default after having ignored the representative he sent during the
hearing on August 3, 2005; and (5) he long restituted the amount of ₱225,000.00 not as
an offer of compromise but based on his moral obligation as a lawyer due to Teresita’s
declaration that he had to stop acting as her legal counsel sometime in the third quarter
of 1997. The respondent pointed out the admission made by Fidela in her direct
testimony before the RTC that she received the amount, as evidenced by photocopies
of receipts.
In an Order19 dated May 17, 2007 issued by the IBP, the complainant was required to
comment within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
In her Comment,20 Fidela explained that it took them quite some time in filing the
administrative case because they took into consideration the possibility of an amicable
settlement instead of a judicial proceeding since it would stain the respondent’s
reputation as a lawyer; that the respondent went into hiding which prompted them to
seek the assistance of CIDG agents from Camp Olivas in order to trace the
respondent’s whereabouts; that the respondent was duly accorded the opportunity to be
heard; and finally, that no restitution of the ₱200,000.00 plus corresponding interest has
yet been made by the respondent.
On June 21, 2008, Fidela filed a Manifestation21 stating that the RTC rendered a
decision in the criminal case for Estafa finding the accused, Atty. Bernardo and Magat
"guilty of conspiracy in the commission of Estafa under Article 315 par. 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code and both are sentenced to suffer six (6) years and one (1) day of
Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal
as maximum."22
In a Letter23 dated March 23, 2009, addressed to the IBP, Fidela sought the resolution
of the present action as she was already 86 years of age. Later, an Ex-parte Motion to
Resolve the Case24 dated September 1, 2010 was filed by the complainants. In another
Letter dated October 26, 2011, Fidela, being 88 years old, sought for Atty. Bernardo’s
restitution of the amount of ₱200,000.00 so she can use the money to buy her medicine
and other needs.
The Court adopts and agrees with the findings and conclusions of the IBP.
It is first worth mentioning that the respondent’s defense of prescription is untenable.
The Court has held that administrative cases against lawyers do not prescribe. The
lapse of considerable time from the commission of the offending act to the institution of
the administrative complaint will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer.
Otherwise, members of the bar would only be emboldened to disregard the very oath
they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant
would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated
from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for.25
Further, consistent with his failure to file his answer after he himself pleaded for several
extensions of time to file the same, the respondent failed to appear during the
mandatory conference, as ordered by the IBP. As a lawyer, the respondent is
considered as an officer of the court who is called upon to obey and respect court
processes. Such acts of the respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on
the court’s authority which can not be countenanced.
It can not be overstressed that lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice.
As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal
proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so
doing, the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. Lawyers may
be disciplined – whether in their professional or in their private capacity – for any
conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor.26
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to
solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding
his qualifications or legal services.
There is no question that the respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself
admitted in his answer that his legal services were hired by the complainants through
Magat regarding the purported titling of land supposedly purchased. While he begs for
the Court’s indulgence, his contrition is shallow considering the fact that he used his
position as a lawyer in order to deceive the complainants into believing that he can
expedite the titling of the subject properties. He never denied that he did not benefit
from the money given by the complainants in the amount of ₱495,000.00.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service,
not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a
money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.
The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public
service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of
lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves.27
It is likewise settled that a disbarment proceeding is separate and distinct from a
criminal action filed against a lawyer despite having involved the same set of facts.
Jurisprudence has it "that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result
in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, the respondent’s acquittal
does not necessarily exculpate him administratively."28
In Yu v. Palaña,29 the Court held that:
Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that administrative cases against
lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed
independently of criminal cases. A criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial
question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative
proceedings. Besides, it is not sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a
criminal case before a complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this
Court will be rendered helpless to apply the rules on admission to, and continuing
membership in, the legal profession during the whole period that the criminal case is
pending final disposition, when the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly
disparate. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare and
for preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice
law. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the
court.30 (Citations omitted)
As the records reveal, the RTC eventually convicted the respondent for the crime of
Estafa for which he was meted the penalty of sentenced to suffer six (6) years and one
(1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of Reclusion
Temporal as maximum. Such criminal conviction clearly undermines the respondent’s
moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. Rule 138, Section 27 provides that:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.
– A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.
In view of the foregoing, this Court has no option but to accord him the punishment
commensurate to all his acts and to accord the complainants, especially the 88-year old
Fidela, with the justice they utmost deserve.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is found
guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon notice hereof.
Further, the Court ORDERS Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo (1) to RETURN the amount of
₱200,000.00 to Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco within TEN (10) DAYS from receipt
of this Decision and (2) to SUBMIT his proof of compliance thereof to the Court, through
the Office of the Bar Confidant within TEN (10) DAYS therefrom; with a STERN
WARNING that failure to do so shall merit him the additional penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for one (1) year.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 9116 March 12, 2014
NESTOR B. FIGUERAS and BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR., Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review filed by Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez assailing the
February 19, 2009 Resolution1 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) suspending him from the practice of law for a period of six months for
breach of Rule 12.03,2 Canon 12,3 Canon 17,4 Rule 18.03,5 and Canon 186 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He likewise assails the June 26, 2011 Resolution7
of the IBP Board of Governors denying his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. is the entity in charge of the
affairs of the homeowners of Congressional Village in Quezon City. On January 7,
1993, the Spouses Federico and Victoria Santander filed a civil suit for damages
against the Association and Ely Mabanag8 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 104 for building a concrete wall which abutted their property and
denied them of their right of way. The spouses Santander likewise alleged that said
concrete wall was built in violation of Quezon City Ordinance No. 8633, S-71 which
prohibits the closing, obstructing, preventing or otherwise refusing to the public or
vehicular traffic the use of or free access to any subdivision or community street.9 The
Law Firm of Gonzalez Sinense Jimenez and Associates was the legal counsel for the
Association, with respondent as the counsel of record and handling lawyer. After trial
and hearing, the RTC rendered a decision10 on October 4, 1996 in favor of the
Spouses Santander. The Association, represented by said law firm, appealed to the
Court of Appeals (CA). On February 5, 1999, the CA issued a Resolution11 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 55577 dismissing the appeal on the ground that the original period to file the
appellant’s brief had expired 95 days even before the first motion for extension of time
to file said brief was filed. The CA also stated that the grounds adduced for the said
motion as well as the six subsequent motions for extension of time to file brief were not
meritorious. The CA resolution became final.
Eight years later or on April 11, 2007, complainants Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido
Victoria, Jr., as members of the Association, filed a Complaint12 for Disbarment against
respondent before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) for violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03, Canon 12; Canon 17; and Rule
18.03, Canon 18 thereof for his negligence in handling the appeal and willful violation of
his duties as an officer of the court.
In his Verified Answer with Counter Complaint,13 respondent denied administrative
liability. He claimed that although his law firm represented the homeowner’s association
in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577, the case was actually handled by an associate lawyer in his
law office. As the partner in charge of the case, he exercised general supervision over
the handling counsel and signed the pleadings prepared by said handling lawyer. Upon
discovery of the omissions of the handling lawyer, appropriate sanctions were imposed
on the handling lawyer and he thereafter personally took responsibility and spent
personal funds to negotiate a settlement with Federico Santander at no cost to the
Association. No damage whatsoever was caused to the Association.
Respondent likewise alleged that after he defeated complainant Figueras in the election
for President of the homeowner’s association in 1996, Figueras and his compadre,
complainant Victoria, stopped paying their association dues and other assessments.
Complainants and other delinquent members of the association were sanctioned by the
Board of Directors and were sued by the association before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB). In retaliation, complainants filed the present disbarment
case against him and several other cases against him and other officers of the
association before the HLURB to question, among others, the legitimacy of the
Association, the election of its officers, and the sanctions imposed by the Association.
Thus, he concluded that the disbarment case was filed to harass him. Respondent
added that complainants have no personality to file the disbarment complaint as they
were not his clients; hence, there was likewise no jurisdiction over the complaint on the
part of the IBP-CBD.
As counterclaim, respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the disbarment case for
lack of merit, the imposition of sanctions on complainants, and the payment of damages
for the filing of the baseless complaint for disbarment.
On October 3, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD found respondent
liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03 of
Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 thereof, and recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three to six months,
with warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.14
On February 19, 2009, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVIII-
2009-1415 adopting the recommendation with modifications as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,
with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution [as] Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s breach of Rule 12.03, Canon
12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03 and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months. The Warning imposed against respondent is hereby deleted.
Respondent sought reconsideration of the resolution but his motion was denied in IBP
Resolution No. XIX-2011-480 dated June 26, 2011.16 The IBP Board of Governors
noted that respondent’s motion was a mere reiteration of matters already discussed and
there were no substantial grounds to disturb the February 19, 2009 Resolution.
Respondent now comes to this Court essentially raising the issue whether the IBP
correctly found him administratively liable for violation of Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon
17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds that the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law is proper.
The Court finds no merit in respondent’s contention that complainants have no
personality to file a disbarment case against him as they were not his clients and that
the present suit was merely instituted to harass him.
The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real
party-in-interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. In fact, the
person who called the attention of the court to a lawyer’s misconduct "is in no sense a
party, and generally has no interest in the outcome."17
In Heck v. Judge Santos,18 the Court held that "[a]ny interested person or the court
motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings." The right to institute disbarment
proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining
suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of
public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the
charges.
The Court agrees with the IBP that respondent had been remiss in the performance of
his duties as counsel for Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. Records
show that respondent filed the first motion for extension of time to file appellant’s brief
95 days after the expiration of the reglementary period to file said brief, thus causing the
dismissal of the appeal of the homeowner’s association. To justify his inexcusable
negligence, respondent alleges that he was merely the supervising lawyer and that the
fault lies with the handling lawyer. His contention, however, is belied by the records for
we note that respondent had filed with the CA an Urgent Motion for Extension, which he
himself signed on behalf of the law firm, stating that a previous motion had been filed
but "due to the health condition of the undersigned counsel…he was not able to finish
said Appellants’ Brief within the fifteen (15) day period earlier requested by him."19
Thus, it is clear that respondent was personally in charge of the case.
A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting
the latter’s interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the appellant’s brief on behalf
of his client, respondent had fallen far short of his duties as counsel as set forth in Rule
12.04,20 Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which exhorts every
member of the Bar not to unduly delay a case and to exert every effort and consider it
his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Rule 18.03, Canon
18 of the same Code also states that:
Canon 18—A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03.—A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
In In Re: Atty. Santiago F. Marcos21 the Court considered a lawyer’s failure to file brief
for his client as amounting to inexcusable negligence. The Court held:
An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with
utmost diligence.1âwphi1 (Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A failure to
file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. (People
vs. Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the
duty owed by him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in
the speedy administration of justice. (Canons 21 and 22, Canons of Professional Ethics;
People vs. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People vs. Estocada, 43 SCRA 515).
It has been stressed that the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred
or merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion.22
The penalties for a lawyer’s failure to file a brief or other pleading range from
reprimand,23 warning with fine,24 suspension25 and, in grave cases, disbarment.26 In
the present case, we find too harsh the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months. Under
the circumstances, we deem the penalty of suspension for one month from the practice
of law to be more commensurate with the extent of respondent’s violation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is found
administratively liable for violation of Rule 12.04, Canon 12 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is suspended from the practice of law for
one (1) month effective from finality of this Resolution, with warning that a repetition of
the same or similar violation shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished, upon its finality, to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all the courts in the Philippines, and spread on the personal record of
respondent lawyer in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7360 July 24,2012
ATTY. POLICARIO I. CATALAN, JR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSELITO M. SILVOSA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint filed by Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. (Atty. Catalan) against Atty.
Joselito M. Silvosa (Atty. Silvosa). Atty. Catalan has three causes of action against Atty.
Silvosa; (1) Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same case for
which he previously appeared as prosecutor; (2) Atty. Silvosa bribed his then colleague
Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio (Pros.Toribio) for P30,000; and (3) the Sandiganbayan
convicted Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case No. 27776 for direct bribery. Integrated Bar of
the Philippines’ (IBP) Commissioner for Bar Discipline Dennis A.B. Funa (Comm. Funa)
held Atty. Silvosa liable only for the first cause of action and recommended the penalty
of reprimand. The Board of Governors of the IBP twice modified Comm. Funa’s
recommendation: first, to a suspension of six months, then to a suspension of two
years.
Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa
appeared as public prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 10256-00, "People of the
Philippines v. SPO2 Elmor Esperon y Murillo, et al." (Esperon case), for the complex
crime of double frustrated murder, in which case Atty. Catalan was one of the private
complainants. Atty. Catalan took issue with Atty. Silvosa’s manner of prosecuting the
case, and requested the Provincial Prosecutor to relieve Atty. Silvosa.
In his first cause of action, Atty. Catalan accused Atty. Silvosa of appearing as private
counsel in a case where he previously appeared as public prosecutor, hence violating
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.1 Atty. Catalan also alleged that,
apart from the fact that Atty. Silvosa and the accused are relatives and have the same
middle name, Atty. Silvosa displayed manifest bias in the accused’s favor. Atty. Silvosa
caused numerous delays in the trial of the Esperon case by arguing against the position
of the private prosecutor. In 2000, Provincial Prosecutor Guillermo Ching granted Atty.
Catalan’s request to relieve Atty. Silvosa from handling the Esperon case. The RTC
rendered judgment convicting the accused on 16 November 2005. On 23 November
2005, Atty. Silvosa, as private lawyer and as counsel for the accused, filed a motion to
reinstate bail pending finality of judgment of the Esperon case.
In his second cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the affidavit of Pros. Toribio. In a
case for frustrated murder where Atty. Catalan’s brother was a respondent, Pros.
Toribio reviewed the findings of the investigating judge and downgraded the offense
from frustrated murder to less serious physical injuries. During the hearing before
Comm. Funa, Pros. Toribio testified that, while still a public prosecutor at the time, Atty.
Silvosa offered her P30,000 to reconsider her findings and uphold the charge of
frustrated murder.
Finally, in the third cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the Sandiganbayan’s
decision in Criminal Case No. 27776, convicting Atty. Silvosa of direct bribery on 18
May 2006. Nilo Lanticse (Lanticse) filed a complaint against Atty. Silvosa before the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Despite the execution of an affidavit of
desistance by the complainant in a homicide case in favor of Lanticse’s father-in-law,
Arsenio Cadinas (Cadinas), Cadinas still remained in detention for more than two years.
Atty. Silvosa demanded P15,000 from Lanticse for the dismissal of the case and for the
release of Cadinas. The NBI set up an entrapment operation for Atty. Silvosa. GMA 7’s
television program Imbestigador videotaped and aired the actual entrapment operation.
The footage was offered and admitted as evidence, and viewed by the Sandiganbayan.
Despite Atty. Silvosa’s defense of instigation, the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty.
Silvosa. The dispositive portion of Criminal Case No. 27776 reads:
WHEREFORE, this court finds JOSELITO M. SILVOSA GUILTY, beyond reasonable
doubt, of the crime of direct bribery and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of:
(A) Imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, one year, one
month and eleven days of prision correccional, as minimum, up to three years, six
months and twenty days of prision correccional, as maximum;
(B) Fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Php 10,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency; and
(C) All other accessory penalties provided for under the law.
SO ORDERED.2
In his defense, on the first cause of action, Atty. Silvosa states that he resigned as
prosecutor from the Esperon case on 18 October 2002. The trial court released its
decision in the Esperon case on 16 November 2005 and cancelled the accused’s bail.
Atty. Silvosa claims that his appearance was only for the purpose of the reinstatement
of bail. Atty. Silvosa also denies any relationship between himself and the accused.
On the second cause of action, Atty. Silvosa dismisses Pros. Toribio’s allegations as
"self-serving" and "purposely dug by [Atty. Catalan] and his puppeteer to pursue
persecution."
On the third cause of action, while Atty. Silvosa admits his conviction by the
Sandiganbayan and is under probation, he asserts that "conviction under the 2nd
paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, do [sic] not involve moral turpitude
since the act involved ‘do [sic] not amount to a crime.’" He further claims that "it is not
the lawyer in respondent that was convicted, but his capacity as a public officer, the
charge against respondent for which he was convicted falling under the category of
crimes against public officers x x x."
In a Report and Recommendation dated 15 September 2008, Comm. Funa found that:
As for the first charge, the wordings and prohibition in Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility [are] quite clear. [Atty. Silvosa] did intervene in Criminal
Case No. 10246-00. [Atty. Silvosa’s] attempt to minimize his role in said case would be
unavailing. The fact is that he is presumed to have acquainted himself with the facts of
said case and has made himself familiar with the parties of the case. Such would
constitute sufficient intervention in the case. The fact that, subsequently, [Atty. Silvosa]
entered his appearance in said case only to file a Motion to
Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal would still constitute a violation of Rule 6.03 as such act
is sufficient to establish a lawyer-client relation.
As for the second charge, there is certain difficulty to dissect a claim of bribery that
occurred more than seven (7) years ago. In this instance, the conflicting allegations are
merely based on the word of one person against the word of another. With [Atty.
Silvosa’s] vehement denial, the accusation of witness [Pros.] Toribio stands alone
unsubstantiated. Moreover, we take note that the alleged incident occurred more than
seven (7) years ago or in 1999, [l]ong before this disbarment case was filed on
November 2006. Such a long period of time would undoubtedly cast doubt on the
veracity of the allegation. Even the existence of the bribe money could not be
ascertained and verified with certainty anymore.
As to the third charge, [Atty. Silvosa] correctly points out that herein complainant has no
personal knowledge about the charge of extortion for which [Atty. Silvosa] was
convicted by the Sandiganbayan. [Atty. Catalan] was not a party in said case nor was
he ever involved in said case. The findings of the Sandiganbayan are not binding upon
this Commission. The findings in a criminal proceeding are not binding in a disbarment
proceeding. No evidence has been presented relating to the alleged extortion case.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that [Atty. Silvosa] is GUILTY only of the
First Charge in violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
should be given the penalty of REPRIMAND.
Respectfully submitted.3
In a Resolution dated 9 October 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of Comm. Funa and
suspended Atty. Silvosa from the practice of law for six months. In another Resolution
dated 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of Governors increased the penalty of Atty.
Silvosa’s suspension from the practice of law to two years. The Office of the Bar
Confidant received the notice of the Resolution and the records of the case on 1 March
2012.
We sustain the findings of the IBP only in the first cause of action and modify its
recommendations in the second and third causes of action.
Atty. Catalan relies on Rule 6.03 which states that "A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter
in which he had intervened while in said service." Atty. Silvosa, on the hand, relies on
Rule 2.01 which provides that "A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons the
cause of the defenseless or the oppressed" and on Canon 14 which provides that "A
lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy."
We agree with Comm. Funa’s finding that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he
entered his appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa
conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that "A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of facts."
Atty. Silvosa’s attempts to minimize his involvement in the same case on two occasions
can only be described as desperate. He claims his participation as public prosecutor
was only to appear in the arraignment and in the pre-trial conference. He likewise
claims his subsequent participation as collaborating counsel was limited only to the
reinstatement of the original bail. Atty. Silvosa will do well to take heed of our ruling in
Hilado v. David:4
An attorney is employed — that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a
lawyer or counselor — when he is listening to his client’s preliminary statement of his
case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his
client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s cause
in open court.
xxxx
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney
and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is
designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as
well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. It
is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. As has been said in another
case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether
the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind,
it behooves attorneys, like Caesar’s wife, not only to keep inviolate the client’s
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only
thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice.
Indeed, the prohibition against representation of conflicting interests applies although
the attorney’s intentions were honest and he acted in good faith.5
Atty. Silvosa denies Pros. Toribio’s accusation of bribery and casts doubt on its veracity
by emphasizing the delay in presenting a complaint before the IBP. Comm. Funa, by
stating that there is difficulty in ascertaining the veracity of the facts with certainty, in
effect agreed with Atty. Silvosa. Contrary to Comm. Funa’s ruling, however, the records
show that Atty. Silvosa made an attempt to bribe Pros. Toribio and failed. Pros. Toribio
executed her affidavit on 14 June 1999, a day after the failed bribery attempt, and had it
notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then President of the IBP-Bukidnon Chapter. There
was no reason for Pros. Toribio to make false testimonies against Atty. Silvosa. Atty.
Silvosa, on the other hand, merely denied the accusation and dismissed it as
persecution. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough
that he denies the charges against him. He must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality
and integrity which at all times is expected of him.6 Atty. Silvosa failed in this respect.
Unfortunately for Atty. Silvosa, mere delay in the filing of an administrative complaint
against a member of the bar does not automatically exonerate a respondent.
Administrative offenses do not prescribe. No matter how much time has elapsed from
the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of the
complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of
the Court.7
We disagree with Comm. Funa’s ruling that the findings in a criminal proceeding are not
binding in a disbarment proceeding.
First, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any interested person. There can be
no doubt of the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts and
doings of public officers which a citizen feels are incompatible with the duties of the
office and from which conduct the public might or does suffer undesirable
consequences.8 Section 1, Rule 139-B reads:
Section 1. How Instituted. – Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of
attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall
state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits
of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such
documents as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court
or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and
prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those in government
service.
xxxx
It is of no moment that Atty. Catalan is not the complainant in Criminal Case No. 27776,
and that Lanticse, the complainant therein, was not presented as a witness in the
present case. There is no doubt that the Sandiganbayan’s judgment in Criminal Case
No. 27776 is a matter of public record and is already final. Atty. Catalan supported his
allegation by submitting documentary evidence of the Sandiganbayan’s decision in
Criminal Case No. 27776. Atty. Silvosa himself admitted, against his interest, that he is
under probation.
Second, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment.
Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.9 Section 27, Rule 138 provides:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor.
– A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
In a disbarment case, this Court will no longer review a final judgment of conviction.10
Third, the crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. In Magno v.
COMELEC,11
we ruled:
By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of
direct bribery:
1. the offender is a public officer;
2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or
through another;
3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer
with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act
which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing
something which it is his official duty to do; and
4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with
the performance of his official duties.
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees
to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from
performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on
the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and
society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and
position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly
contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals. In all
respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. (Italicization in the original)
Atty. Silvosa’s representation of conflicting interests and his failed attempt at bribing
Pros. Toribio merit at least the penalty of suspension.1âwphi1 Atty. Silvosa’s final
conviction of the crime of direct bribery clearly falls under one of the grounds for
disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138. Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty.
Silvosa’s conviction of the crime. We are constrained to impose a penalty more severe
than suspension because we find that Atty. Silvosa is predisposed to flout the exacting
standards of morality and decency required of a member of the Bar. His excuse that his
conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer, but as a public officer, is unacceptable
and betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity in his character. The practice of law is a
privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise this privilege.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby DISBARRED and his
name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s personal
record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to the Office of the Court Administration for circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5355 December 13, 2011
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. DANIEL B. LIANGCO, Respondent.
DECISION
Per Curiam:
The Case
This is an administrative Complaint for Disbarment filed by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) against respondent Atty. Daniel B. Liangco.
In a per curiam En Banc Resolution in Gozun v. Hon. Liangco, 1 dated 30 August 2000,
this Court ordered the dismissal from service of respondent as judge of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga and as acting judge of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Mexico-San Luis, Pampanga. His dismissal was with
forfeiture of all his retirement benefits and accumulated leave credits; and with prejudice
to his reinstatement or reemployment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the
government, including government-owned or -controlled corporations. The Court further
directed the OCA to initiate disbarment proceedings against him for misconduct as a
member of the bar. Hence, this present case for resolution by the Court.
The Facts
We quote the facts as stated in A. M. No. MTJ-97-1136,2 as follows:
Complainant Hermogenes T. Gozun (hereinafter referred to as "Gozun") was in open
and adverse possession of subject land for a period of more than thirty years. His
family’s house was erected on the land. The house was made of old vintage lumber,
cement, hollow blocks, G. I. sheet roofing and other strong materials. Gozun inherited
the house and lot from his parents.
The municipality of San Luis, Pampanga claimed to own the same lot.
On January 12, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga issued
Resolution No. 26-96, stating:
"RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED that the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis,
Pampanga do hereby consider (sic) the lot under Tax Dec. No. 114 owned by the
Municipal Government of San Luis, Pampanga, specifically the lot where Mr.
Hermogenes Gozun and family were squatting (sic) as the new site of the Rural Health
Center will rise (sic).
On May 17, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan issued Resolution No. 34-96 to amend the
correct Resolution No. 26-96.
On May 24, 1996, Romulo M. Batu, Vice Mayor, on behalf of the Sangguniang Bayan,
filed with the MTC, San Luis, Pampanga, a petition for declaratory relief. We quote the
petition:
"PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF
"THE HONORABLE
JUDGE DANIEL LIANGCO
"In behalf of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga, We would like to petition
your good office to render legal opinion on the following matters, to wit:
"1. The validity of the attached Resolution.
"2. The powers of the Municipal Mayor to enforce said Resolution.
"3. To issue an order to the PNP to assist the Municipal Mayor in implementing said
Resolution.
"These request are (sic) in connection with our plan to construct a new site for the Rural
Health Center of San Luis, Pampanga. However, the designated place thereof is
presently being squatted (sic) by a certain Mr. Hermogenes Gozun and inspite of the
official notice of Atty. Benlfre S. Galang, our Provincial Legal Officer, and personal
request of our Municipal Mayor Jovito C. Bondoc to Mr. Gozun to vacate his (sic)
premises, he continues to defy such notices and request to the detriment of the
proposed project.
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this petition will merit your favorable
consideration and appropriate action for the sake of public interest."
On the very same day, May 24, 1996, respondent judge issued a resolution, reasoning:
First, the municipality of San Luis, Pampanga through its Sangguniang Bayan may
enact resolutions and ordinances to regulate the use of property within its jurisdiction.
Second, Resolution No. 34-96 is not contrary to law, morals and public policy. Third, the
municipal mayor through an executive order may order the Philippine National Police or
any government law enforcement agency to enforce or implement the resolution, using
reasonable force if necessary and justified. Fourth, squatting in government property is
considered a "nuisance per se". Respondent judge ruled:
"With the issuance by the Municipal Mayor of an executive order, the municipality of
San Luis may order the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed in San Luis,
Pampanga to effect the eviction of Hermogenes Gozun and all other persons who may
be claiming any right under him from Lot No. 114 covered by tax Declaration No. 6030
(underscoring ours)."
Again, on the same day, March 24, 1996, the municipal mayor, Jovito C. Bondoc,
pursuant to the aforequoted resolution, issued Executive Order No. 1, series of 1996,
ordering the PNP to implement Resolution No. 34-96.
Note that complainant Gozun was not served with summons or given notice of the
petition for declaratory relief.
On June 2, 1996, complainant Gozun learned about the resolution.
On June 3, 1996, complainant Gozun’s wife together with other public school teachers
went to the office of the respondent judge. When asked about the resolution,
respondent judge answered, "Ing Apung Guinu yu y Mayor Bondoc at kaya ko
makisabi" ("Your God is Mayor Bondoc and you should talk to him").
On August 8, 1996, agents of the municipal government demolished complainant
Gozun’s house, using respondent judge’s resolution and the mayor’s executive order as
basis.
On December 18, 1996, complainant Gozun filed this administrative complaint with the
Office of the Court Administrator. He averred that respondent judge’s issuance of the
resolution amounts to "gross misconduct, gross inefficiency and incompetence."
Complainant Gozun further accused the municipal mayor of having bribed respondent
judge. Mayor Bondoc told complainant Gozun that "the respondent judge is in his
pocket…because he (Mayor Bondoc) has given him (respondent judge) a lot of things
("dacal naku a regalo kaya").
On January 20, 1997, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted the petition to this
Court for its consideration, recommending that the complaint be given due course.
On March 21, 1997, the Court resolved to require respondent judge to comment
thereon, within ten (10) days from notice.
On May 15, 1997, respondent judge submitted his comment, denying the charges and
urging that the case be dismissed.
On June 23, 1997, we referred the case back to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
On April 13, 2000, after investigation, Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo submitted
a memorandum, recommending the dismissal from office of respondent judge. 3
A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136
Dismissal of Respondent from the Bench
The OCA Resolution was forwarded to this Court for evaluation and action and
docketed as A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136. On 30 August, 2000, the Court En Banc
promulgated a per curiam Resolution adopting the report and recommendation of the
Court Administrator. It ruled that respondent had blatantly ignored the basic rules of fair
play, in addition to acting without jurisdiction in entertaining a Petition for Declaratory
Relief despite his being a judge of a first-level court.4 The Court also pointed out that his
ruling on the said Petition resulted in the demolition of the house of complainant Gozun,
thus rendering his family homeless.5 It described respondent’s acts as biased and
"maleficent" and ruled that those acts merited the punishment of dismissal from the
service,6 viz:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court hereby orders the DISMISSAL of respondent Judge
Daniel B. Liangco, Municipal Trial Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Fernando,
Pampanga, and Acting Judge Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Mexico-San Luis,
Pampanga, from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accumulated
leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reinstatement or reemployment in any branch,
instrumentality or agency of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
The Court directs the Court Administrator to initiate disbarment proceedings against
respondent Judge for misconduct as a member of the bar within thirty (30) days from
finality of his decision.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.7
A.C. No. 5355
Disbarment
On 10 November 2000, the OCA filed a Complaint for Disbarment against respondent.8
In its Complaint dated 06 November 2000, docketed as Administrative Case No. (A.C.)
5355, the OCA charged him with gross misconduct for acting with manifest bias and
partiality towards a party, as well as for inexcusable ignorance of well-established rules
of procedure that challenged his competence to remain a member of the legal
profession. Thus, it prayed that he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys.9
On 28 November 2000, the Court En Banc promulgated a Resolution requiring
respondent to file his Comment on the Complaint for Disbarment against him.10 On 01
June 2001, he filed his Comment on/Answer to Complaint for Disbarment, 11 appealing
for understanding and asking that the Court allow him to continue practicing as a
lawyer. He reasoned that when he acted on the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by
the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of San Luis, Pampanga, he was merely
rendering a legal opinion "honestly and in good faith"; 12 and that his actions were not
attended by malice, bad faith or any other ulterior motive.13 He further pleads for
compassion from this Court and for permission to remain a member of the bar, because
the practice of law is his only means of livelihood to support his family.14
On 07 August 2001, the Court En Banc noted the submission of respondent and
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of the records of the case. 15
IBP’s Report and Recommendation
The IBP held a series of hearings on the disbarment case with respondent’s
participation. On 03 October 2003, the investigating commissioner issued her Report
and Recommendation16 finding justification for the disbarment of respondent and
recommending that his name be struck off the Roll of Attorneys. The investigating
commissioner found that, based on the facts of the case, there was clear, convincing
and satisfactory evidence to warrant the disbarment of respondent. 17 She observed that
he had exhibited lapses, as well as ignorance of well-established rules and procedures.
She also observed that the present Complaint was not the first of its kind to be filed
against him. She further noted that before his dismissal from the judiciary, respondent
was suspended for six (6) months when he assigned to his court, without a raffle, fifty-
four (54) cases for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1602 – a violation of Supreme
Court Circular No. 7 dated 23 September 1974. Also, pending with the Supreme Court
were three (3) administrative cases filed against him for dishonesty, gross ignorance of
the law, and direct bribery. In the bribery case, he was caught by the National Bureau of
Investigation in an entrapment operation.18
On 30 January 2009, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration 19 of the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP. He alleged that the evidence presented in the proceedings
for his dismissal as judge was the same as that which was used in the disbarment case
against him. Thus, because he did not have the chance to cross-examine the
witnesses, he claimed to have been deprived of due process. 20 In addition, respondent
emphasized the submission by Gozun of an Affidavit of Desistance from the Complaint
the latter had originally filed against him and contended that the case should have been
dismissed.21 Lastly, respondent averred that he had endeavored to improve himself as a
devout Catholic by joining religious organizations. He also impressed upon the IBP his
effort to improve on his knowledge of the law by attending Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE).22
On 12 May 2009, respondent filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 23
wherein he implored the IBP to take a second look at his case. He emphasized the
submission by Gozun of an Affidavit of Desistance and the fact that the former had
already suffered the supreme penalty of dismissal as MTC judge.24 Respondent also
reiterated the grounds already stated in his first Motion for Reconsideration.
On 09 October 2008, the IBP board of governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
525,25 which adopted the Report and Recommendation of the investigating
commissioner, who found that respondent had acted with manifest bias and partiality in
favor of a party-litigant and shown inexcusable ignorance of the Rules of Procedure.
The Resolution likewise adopted the recommendation to disbar respondent.
On 30 June 2011, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted the case records
of A. C. No. 5355 to this Court, which noted it on 16 August 2011.26
The Court’s Ruling
The Court affirms in toto the findings and recommendations of the IBP.
The evidence on record overwhelmingly supports the finding that respondent is guilty of
gross misconduct and inexcusable ignorance of well-established rules of procedures.
Gross Misconduct
In Sps. Donato v. Atty. Asuncion, Jr.27 citing Yap v. Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr.,28
this Court explained the concept of gross misconduct as any inexcusable, shameful or
flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration of
justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of
the cause. The motive behind this conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or
intentional purpose.
In the case at bar, respondent acted upon the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga, without the mandatory notice to Gozun
who would be affected by the action. The records show that respondent, upon receipt of
the Petition, had it docketed in his court, designated Gozun as respondent in the case
title, and quickly disposed of the matter by issuing a Resolution – all on the same day
that the Petition was filed without notice and hearing. Respondent admitted that, to his
mind, he was merely rendering a legal opinion at the local government’s behest, which
he gladly and expeditiously obliged. Without denying this fact in his Comment, he
admitted that he had erred in acting upon the Petition, but emphasized that his actions
were not attended by malice or bad faith.29
We find his statements hard to believe.
The undue haste with which respondent acted on the Petition negates good faith on his
part. Moreover, the testimonial evidence on record indicates that he maintained close
relations with the municipal vice-mayor of San Luis, Pampanga, a party-litigant who had
an obvious interest in the outcome of the case. The testimony of Romulo A. Batu,
former vice-mayor of San Luis, Pampanga, showed that respondent denigrated his
impartiality as a judge is as follows:
COMM. SANSANO:
You don’t remember therefore that at any time at all you were with the mayor in going to
see the respondent?
WITNESS: (Mr. Batu)
I do not know any instance that the mayor visited the respondent, Your Honor. I do not
know any instance that I was with him.
COMM. SANSANO:
But other than the occasion of the filing of this request there were times when you went
to see the respondent also in his office?
WITNESS:
There was no other visit, Your Honor.
COMM. SANSANO:
So May 24, 1996 was the first time you went to see him in his office?
WITNESS:
Before that, Your Honor, nagpupunta na kami doon kung minsan may nagpapatulong
na mga may kaso.
COMM. SANSANO:
Yon ang tanong ko kanina sa iyo kung bago May 24 pumupunta ka na sa opisina
niyang datihan?
WITNESS:
Yes, Your Honor. 30
The testimony of respondent’s own witness clearly showed his wanton disregard of
Canon 1, Sections 4 and 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, which requires the observance of judicial independence and its protection
from undue influence, whether from private or from public interests. 31
In Edaño v. Judge Asdala,32 we explained the rationale behind this imposition:
As the visible representation of the law and justice, judges, such as the respondent, are
expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance the respect and
confidence of the people in the judicial system. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their
independence, integrity and impartiality; but they must also avoid any appearance of
impropriety or partiality, which may erode the people’s faith in the judiciary. Integrity and
impartiality, as well as the appearance thereof, are deemed essential not just in the
proper discharge of judicial office, but also to the personal demeanor of judges. This
standard applies not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by which the
decision is made. Section 1, Canon 2, specifically mandates judges to "ensure that not
only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of
reasonable observers." Clearly, it is of vital importance not only that independence,
integrity and impartiality have been observed by judges and reflected in their decisions,
but that these must also appear to have been so observed in the eyes of the people, so
as to avoid any erosion of faith in the justice system. Thus, judges must be circumspect
in their actions in order to avoid doubt and suspicion in the dispensation of justice. To
further emphasize its importance, Section 2, Canon 2 states:
Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the
integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be
done.
As early as June 6, 2003, OCA Circular No. 70-2003 has directed judges as follows:
In view of the increasing number of reports reaching the Office of the Court
Administrator that judges have been meeting with party litigants inside their chambers,
judges are hereby cautioned to avoid in-chambers sessions without the other party and
his counsel present, and to observe prudence at all times in their conduct to the end
that they only act impartially and with propriety but are also perceived to be impartial
and proper.
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to
"the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made." As such,
judges must ensure that their "conduct, both in and out of the court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the
impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary." In the same vein, the Code of Judicial
Conduct behooves all judges to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all their activities, as such is essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge
in order to maintain the trust and respect of the people in the judiciary.
Also relevant is Canon 3, particularly Section 2 of the new code, which exhorts judges
not only to be impartial in deciding the cases before them, but also to project the image
of impartiality.33 Unfortunately, as shown by the facts of the case, these rules were not
properly observed by respondent as a judge of a first-level court.
Inexcusable Ignorance of the Law
We are appalled by respondent’s ignorance of the basic rules of procedure. His wanton
use of court processes in this case without regard for the repercussions on the rights
and property of others clearly shows his unfitness to remain a member of the bar.
A cursory look at the Resolution dated 24 May 1996 issued by respondent would
prompt an ordinary person to conclude that an action in the form of a Petition for
Declaratory Relief was indeed filed, because it bears the name and the branch of the
court of law that issued it. It had a docket number and the names of the parties involved.
The Resolution even states the justiciable question to be resolved and accordingly
makes a judicial determination thereof. In reality, though, there was no notice sent to
Gozun, the named respondent in the Petition; nor was a hearing held to thresh out the
issues involved. As far as respondent was concerned, he simply issued a "legal
opinion," but one with all the hallmarks of a valid issuance by a court of law, despite the
absence of mandatory processes such as notice – especially to Gozun – and hearing.
Even this excuse is unacceptable. Judges do not, and are not allowed, to issue legal
opinions. Their opinions are always in the context of judicial decisions, or concurring
and dissenting opinions in the case of collegiate courts, and always in the context of
contested proceedings.
What is most unfortunate is that the Sanguniang Bayan, relying on the Resolution
respondent issued, caused the demolition of the house of Gozun and his family, who
were thus ejected from the property they had been occupying for decades. In effect,
Gozun was deprived of his property without due process. To us, this is precisely the
injustice that members of the bench and the bar are sworn to guard against.
Regrettably, respondent as judge was even instrumental in its commission. When his
liability for his act was invoked, he casually justifies them as honest mistakes not
attended by malice or bad faith. His justification is unacceptable to us.
As a member of the bar and former judge, respondent is expected to be well-versed in
the Rules of Procedure. This expectation is imposed upon members of the legal
profession, because membership in the bar is in the category of a mandate for public
service of the highest order. Lawyers are oath-bound servants of society whose conduct
is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is
the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which they have sworn to be
fearless crusaders.34
As judge of a first-level court, respondent is expected to know that he has no jurisdiction
to entertain a petition for declaratory relief. Moreover, he is presumed to know that in his
capacity as judge, he cannot render a legal opinion in the absence of a justiciable
question. Displaying an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he in effect erodes the
public’s confidence in the competence of our courts. Moreover, he demonstrates his
ignorance of the power and responsibility that attach to the processes and issuances of
a judge, and that he as a member of the bar should know.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer must uphold
the Constitution and promote respect for the legal processes.35 Contrary to this edict,
respondent malevolently violated the basic constitutional right of Gozun not to be
deprived of a right or property without due process of law.
Under Canon 10, Rule 10.03, respondent as lawyer is mandated to observe the Rules
of Procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.36 In this case,
however, the opposite happened. Respondent recklessly used the powers of the court
to inflict injustice.
Should the misconduct of respondent as judge also warrant his disbarment from the
legal profession? We answer in the affirmative.
In Collantes v. Renomeron,37 we ruled therein that the misconduct of the respondent
therein as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer:
As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:
"A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress
upon him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an ‘officer of the court’ on whose
shoulders rest the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy
and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid
discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion be that truth and
justice triumph. This discipline is what has given the law profession its nobility, its
prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are
expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor,
intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility - all of which,
throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as 'moral character.'
xxx xxx xxx
"A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession." (Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.)
This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable"
may practice the profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer
must pursue "only the highest standards in the practice of his calling" (Court
Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).
Recently, in Samson v. Judge Caballero,38 we ruled that because membership in the
bar is an integral qualification for membership in the bench, the moral fitness of a judge
also reflects the latter’s moral fitness as a lawyer. A judge who disobeys the basic rules
of judicial conduct also violates the lawyer’s oath.
We note that on 25 August 2011, respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
assailing Resolution No. XVIII-2008-525 dated 09 October 2008 promulgated by the IBP
board of governors, which adopted and approved the findings of the investigating
commissioner recommending his disbarment. Respondent alleged therein that he had
served as assistant provincial prosecutor in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Pampanga for thirteen (13) years prior to his dismissal as MTC judge of San Luis,
Pampanga and as acting MCTC judge of Mexico-San Luis, Pampanga. He also
complains that he was deprived of due process by the IBP board of governors when it
approved and adopted the findings of the investigating commissioner recommending his
disbarment; and he prays for a second look at his case, considering the withdrawal of
the Complaint originally filed by Gozun.
In the light of our ruling in this case, we can no longer consider the undocketed Petition
for Review on Certiorari filed by respondent. In the first place, such kind of petition is not
available to assail the resolution of the IBP in an administrative case. His remedies from
an adverse resolution is to seek a reconsideration of the same, and when denied, to
raise the same defenses against administrative liability before this Court. He has availed
of both remedies in this case.
Disbarment proceedings are sui generis. As such, they render the underlying motives of
complainant unimportant and of little relevance. The purpose of disbarment proceedings
is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the court
and as participant in the dispensation of justice – an issue which the complainant’s
personal motives have little relevance. For this reason, upon information of an alleged
wrongdoing, the Court may initiate the disbarment proceedings motu proprio. 39lavvphil
Recently in Garrido v. Atty. Garrido,40 we reiterated the unique characteristic of
disbarment proceedings and their purpose in this wise:
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure – such as the verification of
pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing
of affidavits of desistance by the complainant – do not apply in the determination of a
lawyer’s qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the
past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of
law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest
because it involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are also
qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack
of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal
cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court. In
this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in
the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own; effectively, his or her participation is
that of a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.lawphi1
Thus, despite Gozun’s desistance in A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136, from whence this case
originated, respondent is not exonerated.
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to DISBAR Atty. Daniel B. Liangco for the following
offenses:
1. GROSS MISCONDUCT in violation of Canon 1, Sections 4 and 5 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
2. INEXCUSABLE IGNORANCE OF THE LAW in violation of Canons 1 and 10, Rule
10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Daniel B.
Liangco in the Office of the Bar Confidant and another copy furnished the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines.
The Bar Confidant is hereby directed to strike out the name of Daniel B. Liangco from
the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
DISCIPLINE OF FILIPINO LAWYERS PRACTICING ABROAD

A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, respondent.
x-------------------------x
Bar Matter No. 1227 July 25, 2006
RE: OATH-TAKING OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, INCOMING PRESIDENT OF
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
x-------------------------x
A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC July 25, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE REMOVAL OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA FROM THE
IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS AS EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND
GOVERNOR.
IN THE MATTER OF THE LETTER-COMPLAINT OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA
DATED MAY 18, 2005 TO FORTHWITH DENY/DISAPPROVE THE IBP
RESOLUTION UNJUSTLY, ILLEGALLY, ARBITRARILY, AND ABRUPTLY
REMOVING HIM FROM THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE IBP FOR
ABSOLUTE LACK OF BASIS AND FOR FLAGRANT DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.
DECISION
Per Curiam:
Before Us are three consolidated cases revolving around Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Governor and Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de Vera.
The first pertains to a disbarment case questioning Atty. de Vera's moral fitness to
remain as a member of the Philippine Bar, the second refers to Atty. de Vera's letter-
request to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President, and the third case
concerns the validity of his removal as Governor and EVP of the IBP by the IBP Board.
The resolution of these cases will determine the national presidency of the IBP for the
term 2005-2007.
A.C. No. 6697
The Office of the Bar Confidant, which this Court tasked to make an investigation, report
and recommendation on subject case,1 summarized the antecedents thereof as follows:
In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the
suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the
following grounds:
1) respondent's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered
against him by the State Bar of California; and
2) respondent's alleged violation of the so-called "rotation rule" enunciated in
Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (in the Matter: 1989 IBP
Elections).
Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds due
his client, was found to have performed an act constituting moral turpitude by the
Hearing Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing Department – San Francisco, State Bar of
California in Administrative Case No. 86-0-18429. Complainant alleged that the
respondent was then forced to resign or surrender his license to practice law in the said
state in order to evade the recommended three (3) year suspension. Complainant
asserted that the respondent lacks the moral competence necessary to lead the
country's most noble profession.
Complainant, likewise, contended that the respondent violated the so-called "rotation
rule" provided for in Administrative Matter No. 491 when he transferred to IBP Agusan
del Sur Chapter. He claimed that the respondent failed to meet the requirements
outlined in the IBP By-Laws pertaining to transfer of Chapter Membership. He surmised
that the respondent's transfer was intended only for the purpose of becoming the next
IBP National President. Complainant prayed that the respondent be enjoined from
assuming office as IBP National President.
Meanwhile, in his Comment dated 2 May 2005, respondent stated that the issues raised
in above-mentioned Complaint were the very issues raised in an earlier administrative
case filed by the same complainant against him. In fact, according to him, the said
issues were already extensively discussed and categorically ruled upon by this Court in
its Decision dated 11 December 2005 in Administrative Case No. 6052 (In Re: Petition
to Disqualify Atty. Leonard De Vera). Respondent prayed that the instant administrative
complaint be dismissed following the principle of res judicata.
On 15 June 2005, both parties appeared before the Office of the Bar Confidant for
presentation of evidence in support of their respective allegations.
Subsequently, in a Memorandum dated 20 June 2005, complainant maintained that
there is substantial evidence showing respondent's moral baseness, vileness and
depravity, which could be used as a basis for his disbarment. Complainant stressed that
the respondent never denied that he used his client's money. Complainant argued that
the respondent failed to present evidence that the Supreme Court of California accepted
the latter's resignation and even if such was accepted, complainant posited that this
should not absolve the respondent from liability.
Moreover, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the
case at bar. He asserted that the first administrative case filed against the respondent
was one for his disqualification. x x x.
Bar Matter No. 1227
A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC
As earlier adverted to, Bar Matter No. 1227 refers to Atty. de Vera's letter-request to this
Court to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President. A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, on
the other hand, is a letter-report dated 19 May 2005 of IBP National President Jose
Anselmo I. Cadiz (IBP President Cadiz) furnishing this Court with the IBP's Resolution,
dated 13 May 2005, removing Atty. De Vera as member of the IBP Board and as IBP
EVP, for committing acts inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP in general. 2
The controversy in Bar Matter No. 1227 and A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC arose from the
regular meeting of the IBP Board of Governors held on 14 January 2005. In said
meeting, by 2/3 vote (6 voting in favor and 2 against), the IBP Board approved the
withdrawal of the Petition filed before this Court docketed as "Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, et al. – Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, SC-R165108." The Petition was intended to
question the legality and/or constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9227, authorizing the
increase in the salaries of judges and justices, and to increase filing fees.3
The two IBP Governors who opposed the said Resolution approving the withdrawal of
the above-described Petition were herein respondent Governor and EVP de Vera and
Governor Carlos L. Valdez.4
On 19 January 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed this Court of the decision taken by
the IBP Board to withdraw the afore-mentioned Petition. Attached to his letter was a
copy of the IBP Board's 14 January 2005 Resolution.5
On 15 April 2005, Bar Matter No. 1227, pertaining to Atty. de Vera's request for
oathtaking as National President, was filed. The same was subsequently consolidated
with A.C. No. 6697, the disbarment case filed against Atty. de Vera. 6
On 22 April 2005, a plenary session was held at the 10th National IBP Convention at
the CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center, Baguio City. It was at this forum where
Atty. de Vera allegedly made some untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in
connection with the IBP Board's Resolution to withdraw the Petition questioning the
legality of Republic Act No. 9227.7
On 10 May 2005, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining
Atty. de Vera from assuming office as IBP National President.8
On 12 May 2005, IBP Gov. Romulo A. Rivera wrote IBP National President Cadiz a
letter wherein he prayed for the removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board
for having committed acts which were inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP. 9
On 13 May 2005, in the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board held at the Waterfront Hotel,
Cebu City, the IBP Board, by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as member of
the IBP Board of Governors and as IBP Executive Vice President.10 Quoted hereunder
is the dispositive portion of said Resolution:
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that Governor
Leonard S. de Vera is REMOVED as a member of the IBP Board of Governors and
Executive Vice President for committing acts inimical to the IBP Board of Governors and
the IBP, to wit:
1. For making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in public about the
Supreme Court and members of the IBP Board of Governors, during the Plenary
Session of the IBP 10th National Convention of Lawyers, held at CAP-Camp John Hay
Convention Center on 22 April 2005, making it appear that the decision of the IBP
Board of Governors to withdraw the PETITION docketed as "Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. The Senate of the Philippines, et al.,
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer for the Issuance of A Temporary
Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, S.C.-R. 165108", was due to
influence and pressure from the Supreme Court of the Philippines;
2. For making said untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies that brought the
IBP Board of Governors and the IBP as a whole in public contempt and disrepute;
3. For violating Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers which
mandates that "A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others", by making untruthful
statements, innuendos and blatant lies during the Plenary Session of the IBP 10th
National Convention of Lawyers in Baguio City;
4. For instigating and provoking some IBP chapters to embarrass and humiliate the IBP
Board of Governors in order to coerce and compel the latter to pursue the aforesaid
PETITION;
5. For falsely accusing the IBP National President, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, during the
Plenary Session of the 10th National Convention in Baguio City of withholding from him
a copy of Supreme Court Resolution, dated 25 January 2005, granting the withdrawal of
the PETITION, thereby creating the wrong impression that the IBP National President
deliberately prevented him from taking the appropriate remedies with respect thereto,
thus compromising the reputation and integrity of the IBP National President and the
IBP as a whole.11
On 18 May 2005, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing the then
Hon. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter captioned as "Urgent Plea to Correct a
Glaring Injustice of the IBP Board of Governors; Vehement Protest to the Board
Resolution Abruptly Removing Atty. Leonard de Vera from the Board of Governors in
Patent Violation of Due Process; Petition to Deny/Disapprove the Completely Unjustified
and Highly Arbitrary Resolution Precipitately Ousting Atty. de Vera from the Board of
Governors in Less Than Twenty Four (24) Hours from Notice and Judgment Without
Formal Investigation."12
In the said letter, Atty. de Vera strongly and categorically denied having committed acts
inimical to the IBP and its Board. He alleged that on the basis of an unverified letter-
complaint filed by IBP Governor Rivera, the IBP Board voted to expel him posthaste,
without just cause and in complete disregard of even the minimum standards of due
process. Pertinent portions of his letter read:
It is evident that the Board of Governors has committed a grave and serious injustice
against me especially when, as the incumbent Executive Vice President of the IBP, I am
scheduled to assume my position as National President of the IBP on July 1, 2005. x x x
I was denied the very basic rights of due process recognized by the Supreme Court
even in administrative cases:
1. The denial of the right to answer the charges formally or in writing. The complaint
against me was in writing.
2. The denial of the right to answer the charges within a reasonable period of time
after receipt of the complaint.
3. The denial of the right to a fair hearing.
4. The denial of the right to confront the accuser and the witnesses against me. I
challenged Gov. Rivera to testify under oath so I could question him. He refused. I
offered to testify under oath so I could be questioned. My request was denied.
5. The denial of my right to present witnesses on my behalf.
6. The denial of my right to an impartial judge. Governor Rivera was my accuser,
prosecutor, and judge all at the same time.
7. Gov. Rivera's prejudgment of my case becomes even more evident because when
his motion to expel me was lost in a 5-3 votes (due to his inhibition to vote), Gov. Rivera
asked for another round of voting so he can vote to support his own complaint and
motion to expel me.13 (Emphasis and underscoring in original.)
On 27 May 2005, the IBP Board responded to the 18 May 2005 letter of Atty. de Vera. 14
In their Reply, the IBP Board explained to this Court that their decision to remove Atty.
de Vera was based on valid grounds and was intended to protect itself from a
recalcitrant member. Among the grounds cited and elucidated by the IBP Board were
the following:
(i) Atty. de Vera engaged himself in a negative media campaign and solicited
resolutions from IBP Chapters to condemn the IBP Board of Governors for its decision
to withdraw the Petition, all with the end in view of compelling or coercing the IBP Board
of Governors to reconsider the decision to withdraw the Petition.
(ii) Atty. de Vera embarrassed, humiliated and maligned the IBP Board of Governors
and the IBP National President in public or during the Plenary Session at the 10th
National Convention of Lawyers.
(iii) Rather than pacify the already agitated 'solicited' speakers (at the plenary session),
Atty. de Vera "fanned the fire", so to speak, and went to the extent of making untruthful
statements, innuendos and blatant lies about the Supreme Court and some members of
the IBP Board of Governors. He deliberately and intentionally did so to provoke the
members of the IBP Board of Governors to engage him in an acrimonious public debate
and expose the IBP Board of Governors to public ridicule.
(iv) Atty. de Vera uttered untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies, e.g., that
some of the members of the IBP Board of Governors voted in favor of the withdrawal of
the petition (without mentioning names) because "nakakahiya kasi sa Supreme Court,
nakakaawa kasi ang Supreme Court, kasi may mga kaibigan tayo sa Court." He made it
appear that the IBP Board of Governors approved the resolution, withdrawing the
petition, due to "influence" or "pressure" from the Supreme Court.15
The IBP Board explained that Atty. de Vera's actuation during the Plenary Session was
"the last straw that broke the camel's back." He committed acts inimical to the interest of
the IBP Board and the IBP; hence, the IBP Board decided to remove him.
On 3 June 2005, Atty. de Vera furnished the Court with copies of resolutions and a
position paper coming from various IBP Chapters all condemning his expulsion from the
IBP Board and as IBP EVP.16
On 15 June 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed Chief Justice Davide that in a special
meeting of the IBP Board held at the EDSA Shangri-la Plaza on 13 June 2005, the IBP
Board took note of the vacancy in the position of the IBP EVP brought about by Atty. de
Vera's removal. In his stead, IBP Governor Pura Angelica Y. Santiago was formally
elected and declared as IBP EVP.17
On 17 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested against the election of Atty. Santiago.18 On 20
June 2005, Atty. Santiago voluntarily relinquished the EVP position through a letter
addressed to the IBP Board.19 Thus, on 25 June 2005, during its last regular meeting,
the IBP Board elected a new EVP in the person of IBP Governor Jose Vicente B.
Salazar to replace Atty. Santiago.
On 28 June 2005, IBP National President Cadiz, through a letter addressed to Chief
Justice Davide, reported to this Court Atty. Salazar's election.20 IBP National President
Cadiz also requested, among other things, that Atty. Salazar's election be approved and
that he be allowed to assume as National President in the event that Atty. de Vera is
disbarred or suspended from the practice of law or should his removal from the 2003-
2005 Board of Governors and as EVP is approved by this Court. 21 Also on 28 June
2005, Atty. de Vera protested the election of Atty. Salazar.22
In his Extended Comment23 dated 25 July 2005, Atty. de Vera maintained that there
was absolutely no factual or legal basis to sustain the motion to remove him from the
IBP Board because he violated no law. He argued that if the basis for his removal as
EVP was based on the same grounds as his removal from the IBP Board, then his
removal as EVP was likewise executed without due notice and without the least
compliance with the minimum standards of due process of law.
Atty. de Vera strongly averred that, contrary to the utterly false and malicious charges
filed against him, the speakers at the Plenary Session of the Baguio Convention,
although undeniably impassioned and articulate, were respectful in their language and
exhortations, not once undermining the stature of the IBP in general and the IBP Board
of Governors in particular. He posited that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution
of the Board during the Convention's Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or
expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of Governors; and the decision to
remove him only shows that the right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not
recognized by the incumbent IBP Board.
Anent the charges that he accused the National President of withholding a copy of this
Court's Resolution granting the withdrawal of the Petition questioning the legality of
Republic Act No. 9227, Atty. de Vera avowed that he made no such remarks. As
regards the election of a new IBP EVP, Atty. de Vera contended that the said election
was illegal as it was contrary to the provisions of the IBP By-Laws concerning national
officers, to wit:
Section. 49. Term of office. - The President and the Executive Vice President shall
hold office for a term of two years from July 1 following their election until 30 June of
their second year in office and until their successors shall have been duly chosen and
qualified.
In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his functions and duties shall be
performed by the Executive Vice President, and in the event of death, resignation, or
removal of the President, the Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President
for the unexpired portion of the term. In the event of death, resignation, removal or
disability of both the President and the Executive Vice President, the Board of
Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold office for the unexpired portion of the
term or during the period of disability.
Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, all other officers and employees appointed
by the President with the consent of the Board shall hold office at the pleasure of the
Board or for such term as the Board may fix.24
To bolster his position, Atty. de Vera stressed that when both the President and the
EVP die, resign, are removed, or are disabled, the IBP By-Laws only provides for the
election of an Acting President and that no mention for an election for EVP was made.
Thus, when such election for EVP occurs, such is contrary to the express provision of
the IBP By-Laws.
Atty. de Vera also argued that even if he were validly removed as IBP EVP, his
replacement should come from Eastern Mindanao and not from any other region, due to
the Rotation Rule embodied in par. 2, Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws.
In response to Atty. de Vera's averments, the 2003-2005 IBP Board, through its
counsel, submitted a Reply dated 27 January 2006 and clarified as follows:
(i) The IBP Board of Governors is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect
itself from an intractable member by virtue of Article VI, Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws;
(ii) Atty. de Vera was removed as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP not
because of his disagreement with the IBP Board's position but because of the various
acts that he committed which the IBP Board determined to be inimical to the IBP Board
and the IBP as a whole;
(iii) Atty. de Vera cannot exculpate himself from liability by invoking his constitutional
right to Free Speech because, as a member of the Bar, it is his sworn duty to observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and to insist on similar
conduct by others;
(iv) The IBP Board, in effecting the removal of Atty. de Vera, observed the fundamental
principles of due process. As the records would bear, Atty. de Vera was duly notified of
the Regular Meeting of the IBP Board held on 13 May 2004; was furnished a copy of
Governor Rivera's Letter-Complaint the day before the said meeting; was furnished a
copy of the said Meeting's Agenda; and was allowed to personally defend himself and
his accuser, Gov. Rivera;
(v) Atty. de Vera was validly removed because the required number of votes under
Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws to remove Atty. de Vera as a member of the IBP Board
and as IBP EVP was duly complied with;
(vi) Atty. de Vera's replacement as IBP EVP need not come from Eastern Mindanao
Region because: (a) the rotation rule under Article VII, Section 47, par. 2 of the IBP By-
Laws had already been complied with when Atty. de Vera, who hails from Eastern
Mindanao, was elected IBP EVP; and (b) the rotation rule need not be enforced if the
same will not be practicable, possible, feasible, doable or viable; and, finally, that –
(vii) Atty. Salazar was validly elected as IBP EVP and, thus, should now be allowed to
take his oath as IBP National President.25
The Court's Ruling
AC No. 6697
In his Memorandum26 dated 20 June 2005, complainant tendered the following issues
for the consideration of the Court:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic)
COMMITED MALPRACTICE WHICH AMOUNTED TO MORAL T[U]RPITUDE IN THE
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA AND IN THE PHILIPPINES, IN THE COURSE OF HIS
PRACTICE OF LAW.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE OATH OF OFFICE AS LAWYER IS ATTACHED TO THE
PERSON OF ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) WHEREVER HE MAY GO AND
NOT NECESSARILY BOUND BY THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE MORAL
T[U]RPITUDE, AS BASIS FOR DISBARMENT OF RESPONDENT IN AN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THIS CASE, DUE TO ADMIN.
CASE NO. [6052]27
The disposition of the first three related issues hinges on the resolution of the fourth
issue. Consequently, we will start with the last issue.
A.C. No. 6052 is not a bar to the filing of the present administrative case.
In disposing of the question of res judicata, the Bar Confidant opined:
To reiterate, the instant case for suspension and/or disbarment against respondent
Leonard De Vera is grounded on the following:
1) respondent's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered
against him by the State Bar in California; and
2) respondent's alleged violation of the so-called "rotation rule" enunciated in
Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (In the Matter: 1989 IBP
Elections).
It appears that the complainant already raised the said issues in an earlier
administrative case against the respondent. Verily, these issues were already argued
upon by the parties in their respective pleadings, and discussed and ruled upon by this
Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2003 in Administrative Matter No. 6052 (In Re:
Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera).
As such, with respect to the first issue, this Court held that:
"As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients when he was
practicing law in California, which in turn compelled him to surrender his California
license to practice law, he maintains that it cannot serve as basis for determining his
moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for the position he is aspiring for. He explains that
there is as yet no final judgment finding him guilty of the administrative charge, as the
records relied upon by the petitioners are mere preliminary findings of a hearing referee
which are recommendatory findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline which
are subject to the review of and the final decision of the Supreme Court. He also
stresses that the complainant in the California administrative case has retracted the
accusation that he misappropriated the complainant's money, but unfortunately the
retraction was not considered by the investigating officer. xxx"
"On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he
was still practicing law in California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered
by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. He surrendered his
license to protest the discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator and he
found it impractical to pursue the case to the end. We find these explanations
satisfactory in the absence of contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who
alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same. In this case, the petitioners have not
shown how the administrative complaint affects respondent De Vera's moral fitness to
run for governor.
On the other hand, as regards the second issue:
"Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is
not really from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in Parañaque and he was
originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter
membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post,
which is the national presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP membership,
respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule.
The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II, a lawyer
included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the particular
IBP Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:
xxx
It is clearly stated in the aforequoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic that
a lawyer will become a member of the chapter where his place of residence or work is
located. He has the discretion to choose the particular chapter where he wishes to gain
membership. Only when he does not register his preference that he will become a
member of the Chapter of the place where he resides or maintains office. The only
proscription in registering one's preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more
than one chapter at the same time.
The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this Section,
transfer of IBP membership is allowed as long as the lawyer complies with the
conditions set forth therein, thus:
xxx
The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made
not less than three months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to which the
lawyer wishes to transfer.
In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership to
Agusan del Sur on 1 August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime
M. Vibar wrote a letter addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP
PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero, Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter,
informing them of respondent de Vera's transfer and advising them to make the
necessary notation in their respective records. This letter is a substantial compliance
with the certification mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that de Vera's
transfer was made effective sometime between 1 August 2001 and 3 September 2001.
On 27 February 2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers were simultaneously
held all over the Philippines, as mandated by Section 29.a of the IBP By-Laws which
provides that elections of Chapter Officers and Directors shall be held on the last
Saturday of February of every other year. Between 3 September 2001 and 27 February
2003, seventeen months had elapsed. This makes respondent de Vera's transfer valid
as it was done more than three months ahead of the chapter elections held on 27
February 2003.
In the case of Romulo G. Dinsay vs. Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco (Administrative Case No.
2995, 27 November 1996), this Court declared that:
"The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not
to the exercise of the [Court's] administrative powers."
In the said case, respondent Clerk of Court Cioco was dismissed from service for grave
misconduct highly prejudicial to the service for surreptitiously substituting the bid price in
a Certificate of Sale from P3,263,182.67 to only P730,000.00. Thereafter a complaint for
disbarment was filed against the respondent on the basis of the same incident.
Respondent, interposing res judicata, argued that he may no longer be charged on the
basis of the same incident. This Court held that while the respondent is in effect being
indicted twice for the same misconduct, this does not amount to double jeopardy as
both proceedings are admittedly administrative in nature. This Court qualified that, in the
first case, the respondent was proceeded against as an erring court personnel under
the Court's supervisory power over courts while, in the second case, he was disciplined
as a lawyer under the Court's plenary authority over membersof the legal profession.
In subsequent decisions of this Court, however, it appears that res judicata still applies
in administrative cases. Thus, in the case of Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera vs. Judge
William Layague (Administrastive Matter No. RTJ-93-986), this Court ruled that:
"While double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases, it would be contrary to
equity and substantial justice to penalize respondent judge a second time for an act
which he had already answered for.";
Likewise, in the recent case of Executive Judge Henry B. Basilia vs. Judge Amado L.
Becamon, Lolita Delos Reyes and Eddie Delos Reyes (Administrative Matter No. MTJ-
02-1404, 14 December 2004), this Court held that:
"Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the present
administrative case becomes dismissible.
xxx
Under the said doctrine, a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent
jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively settled if it arises in
any subsequent litigation between the same parties and for the same cause. It provides
that
[a] final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes an absolute
bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. Res
judicata is based on the ground that the party to be affected, or some other with whom
he is in privity, has litigated the same matter in the former action in a court of competent
jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it again.
This principle frees the parties from undergoing all over again the rigors of unnecessary
suits and repetitious trials. At the same time, it prevents the clogging of court dockets.
Equally important, res judicata stabilizes rights and promotes the rule of law."
In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised by the complainant
had already been resolved by this Court in an earlier administrative case. The
complainant's contention that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at
bar as the first administrative case was one for disqualification while the instant
administrative complaint is one for suspension and/or disbarment should be given least
credence. It is worthy to note that while the instant administrative complaint is
denominated as one for suspension and/or disbarment, it prayed neither the suspension
nor the disbarment of the respondent but instead merely sought to enjoin the
respondent from assuming office as IBP National President.28
Contrary to the findings of the Bar Confidant, Adm. Case No. 6052 entitled, "In Re:
Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera, on Legal and Moral Grounds, From Being
Elected IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the May 31 IBP Election" and
promulgated on 11 December 2003 does not constitute a bar to the filing of Adm. Case
No. 6697. Although the parties in the present administrative case and in Adm. Case No.
6052 are identical, their capacities in these cases and the issues presented therein are
not the same, thereby barring the application of res judicata.
In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential conditions
must concur, namely: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2)
the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment or order on
the merits, and (4) there must be between the first and second action identity of parties,
identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action. 29 In the absence of any one
of these elements, Atty. de Vera cannot argue res judicata in his favor.
It is noteworthy that the two administrative cases involve different subject matters and
causes of action. In Adm. Case No. 6052, the subject matter was the qualification of
Atty. de Vera to run as a candidate for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern
Mindanao. In the present administrative complaint, the subject matter is his privilege to
practice law. In the first administrative case, complainants' cause of action was Atty. de
Vera's alleged violation or circumvention of the IBP By-laws. In the present
administrative case, the primary cause of action is Atty. de Vera's alleged violation of
lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first case, the
complainants sought to prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP Governor
for Eastern Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by complainant in his
Memorandum, what is being principally sought is Atty. de Vera's suspension or
disbarment.
The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was
resolved on the basis of the parties' rights and obligations under the IBP By-laws. We
held therein that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified from running as Regional
Governor as there is nothing in the present IBP By-laws that sanctions the
disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. Consequently, we stressed that the
petition had no firm ground to stand on. Likewise, we held that the complainants therein
were not the proper parties to bring the suit as the IBP By-laws prescribes that only
nominees - which the complainants were not - can file with the IBP President a written
protest against the candidate. The Court's statement, therefore, that Atty. de Vera
cannot be disqualified on the ground that he was not morally fit was mere obiter dictum.
Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not allow for pre-election disqualification proceedings;
hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the basis of the administrative findings of
a hearing officer of the State Bar of California suspending him from the practice of law
for three years. We held in that case that –
There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit
before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of
moral fitness of a candidate lies in the individual judgment of the members of the House
of Delegates. Indeed, based on each member's standard of morality, he is free to
nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter possesses the basic requirements
under the law. For another, basically the disqualification of a candidate involving lack of
moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral
turpitude.30
What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by the Supreme Court in a
proper case declaring otherwise, every lawyer aspiring to hold the position of IBP
Regional Director is presumed morally fit. Any person who begs to disagree will not be
able to find a receptive audience in the IBP through a petition for disqualification but
must first file the necessary disbarment or suspension proceeding against the lawyer
concerned.
And this is precisely what complainant has chosen to do in the instant case. As his
petition is sufficient in form and substance, we have given it due course pursuant to
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. And, considering that this case is not barred by the prior
judgment in Adm. Case No. 6052, the only issue left for consideration is whether or not
Atty. de Vera can be suspended or disbarred under the facts of the case and the
evidence submitted by complainant.
The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of California, standing
alone, is not proof of malpractice.
In the case of the Suspension From The Practice of Law In The Territory of Guam of
Atty. Leon G. Maquera,31 we were confronted with the question of whether or not a
member of the Philippine Bar, who is concomitantly an attorney in a foreign jurisdiction
and who was suspended from the practice of law in said foreign jurisdiction, can be
sanctioned as member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the
foreign jurisdiction.
We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of Atty. de Vera who
was admitted to the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of California,
U.S.A.) and against whom charges were filed in connection with his practice in said
jurisdiction. However, unlike the case of Atty. Maquera, no final judgment for
suspension or disbarment was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation
of suspension of three years as he surrendered his license to practice law before his
case could be taken up by the Supreme Court of California.
In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer
in a foreign jurisdiction does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in
the Philippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension are not grounds for disbarment
and suspension in this jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer
may transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis
of the foreign court's action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in
this jurisdiction. We likewise held that the judgment of the foreign court merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer.
The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of Court which
provides:
Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final
order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final
order is as follows:
xxxx
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest
by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
In Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc.,32 we explained that "[a]
foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it
comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of
proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum."
In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the
recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not constitute
prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by
substantial evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by the hearing officer
was based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise
unethical under Philippine law.
There is substantial evidence of malpractice on the part of Atty. de Vera
independent of the recommendation of suspension by the hearing officer of the
State Bar of California
Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. –
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court
or other disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as
an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action
includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be
prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension.33
Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the court and the public from
the misconduct of officers of the court and to protect the administration of justice by
requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable
and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.34 The statutory
enunciation of the grounds for disbarment on suspension is not to be taken as a
limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent
power of the court over its officers cannot be restricted.35
Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a
lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term "Malpractice." 36
That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a
profession, not a business.37
Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules on ethical code of
his profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession.38
Now, the undisputed facts:
1. An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of
California, docketed then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an insurance
case Atty. de Vera handled involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an automobile
accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera was authorized by the elder Willis (father of Julius who
was given authority by the son to control the case because the latter was then studying
in San Diego California) for the release of the funds in settlement of the case. Atty. de
Vera received a check in settlement of the case which he then deposited to his personal
account;39
2. The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera
be suspended from the practice of law for three years;40 and
3. Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was accepted by the
Supreme Court of California.41
Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he
misappropriated his client's funds as the latter's father (the elder Willis) gave him
authority to use the same and that, unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider
this explanation notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis testified under oath that he
"expected de Vera might use the money for a few days."
By insisting that he was authorized by his client's father and attorney-in-fact to use the
funds, Atty. de Vera has impliedly admitted the use of the Willis funds for his own
personal use.
In fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainant's allegation in the latter's memorandum
that he (de Vera) received US$12,000.00 intended for his client and that he deposited
said amount in his personal account and not in a separate trust account and that, finally,
he spent the amount for personal purposes.42
At this point, it bears stressing that in cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial
bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence or
that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion.43 It means such evidence which affords a substantial basis from
which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.44
Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his client's funds is highly unethical.
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic about this, thus:
CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES
OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME TO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his
own and those of others kept by him.
In Espiritu v. Ulep45 we held that –
The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such, it
requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on the part of the
attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of the client.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all
money and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Accordingly, he
shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Even
more specific is the Canon of Professional Ethics:
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he
abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.
Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the
possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should
not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him.
Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property held by
him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the
same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by,
his client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it
impairs the public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.
Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of
professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.
Those who are guilty of such infraction may be disbarred or suspended indefinitely from
the practice of law. (Emphases supplied.)
In herein case, as it is admitted by Atty. de Vera himself that he used his client's money
for personal use, he has unwittingly sealed his own fate since this admission constitutes
more than substantial evidence of malpractice. Consequently, Atty. de Vera now has
the burden of rebutting the evidence which he himself supplied.
In his defense, Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly authorized by the elder Willis to
use the funds intended for the latter's son. Atty. de Vera also points out that he had
restituted the full amount of US$12,000.00 even before the filing of the administrative
case against him in the State Bar of California.46
Aside from these self-serving statements, however, we cannot find anywhere in the
records of this case proof that indeed Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to use the
funds of his client. In Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera47 we declared that –
When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies
the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against
him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity
which at all times is expected of him.
Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that the elder
Willis had indeed testified that he "expected de Vera might use the money for a few
days." As Atty. de Vera had vigorously objected to the admissibility of the document
containing this statement, he is now estopped from relying thereon. Besides, that the
elder Willis "expected de Vera might use the money for a few days" was not so much an
acknowledgment of consent to the use by Atty. de Vera of his client's funds as it was an
acceptance of the probability that Atty. de Vera might, indeed, use his client's funds,
which by itself did not speak well of the character of Atty. de Vera or the way such
character was perceived.
In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to his client's money without
the latter's acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It is clear
that Atty. de Vera, by depositing the check in his own account and using the same for
his own benefit is guilty of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and unethical behavior.
He caused dishonor, not only to himself but to the noble profession to which he belongs.
For, it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants to the profession is inexorably
diminished whenever a member of the profession betrays their trust and confidence. 48
Respondent violated his oath to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his client.
Nevertheless, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the
practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. 49 Where any
lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.
In Mortera v. Pagatpatan,50 we imposed upon Atty. Pagatpatan two years suspension
from his practice of law for depositing the funds meant for his client to his personal
account without the latter's knowledge. In Reyes v. Maglaya;51 Castillo v. Taguines;52
Espiritu v. Atty. Cabredo IV,53 the respondents were meted one year suspension each
for failing to remit to their clients monies in the amounts of P1,500.00; P500.00, and
P51,161.00, respectively, received by them for their clients without the latter's
permission. In Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya,54 we indefinitely suspended respondent for
failure to remit to his client the amount of the measly sum of P4,344.00 representing the
amount received pursuant to a writ of execution. Considering the amount involved here
– US$12,000.00, we believe that the penalty of suspension for two (2) years is
appropriate.
Transferring IBP membership to a chapter where the lawyer is not a resident of is
not a ground for his suspension or disbarment
Complainant insists that Atty. de Vera's transfer of membership from the Pasay,
Parañaque, Las Piñas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP
Chapter is a circumvention of the rotation rule as it was made for the sole purpose of
becoming IBP National President. Complainant stresses that Atty. de Vera is not a
resident of Agusan del Sur nor does he hold office therein.
In Adm. Case No. 6052, we held that Atty. de Vera's act of transferring to another IBP
Chapter is not a ground for his disqualification for the post of IBP Governor as the same
is allowed under Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws with the qualification only that the
transfer be made not less than three months immediately preceding any chapter
election.
As it was perfectly within Atty. de Vera's right to transfer his membership, it cannot be
said that he is guilty of unethical conduct or behavior. And while one may incessantly
argue that a legal act may not necessarily be ethical, in herein case, we do not see
anything wrong in transferring to an IBP chapter that -- based on the rotation rule – will
produce the next IBP EVP who will automatically succeed to the National Presidency for
the next term. Our Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the Lawyer's Oath do
not prohibit nor punish lawyers from aspiring to be IBP National President and from
doing perfectly legal acts in accomplishing such goal.
Bar Matter No. 1227
Administrative Matter No. 05-5-15-SC
To resolve Bar Matter No. 1227 and Administrative Matter No. 05-5- 15-SC, the
following issues must be addressed:
I. Whether the IBP Board of Governors acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing
Atty. de Vera as Governor and EVP of the IBP on 13 May 2005.
i. Whether the IBP Board of Governors complied with administrative due process in
removing Atty. de Vera.
ii. Whether the IBP removed Atty. De Vera for just and valid cause.
II. Whether Governor Salazar was validly elected as EVP of the IBP on 25 June 2005,
and can consequently assume the Presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.
The IBP Board observed due process in its removal of Atty. de Vera as IBP
Governor
We start the discussion with the veritable fact that the IBP Board is vested with the
power to remove any of its members pursuant to Section 44, Article VI of the IBP By-
Laws, which states:
Sec. 44. Removal of members. – If the Board of Governors should determine after
proper inquiry that any of its members, elective or otherwise, has for any reason
become unable to perform his duties, the Board, by resolution of the Majority of the
remaining members, may declare his position vacant, subject to the approval of the
Supreme Court.
Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause,
including three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable
excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the
Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the delegates from
the region shall by majority vote, elect a successor from among the members of the
Chapter to which the resigned governor is a member to serve as governor for the
unexpired portion of the term. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the aforementioned section, a member of the IBP Board may be removed for
cause by resolution adopted by two-thirds (2/3) of the remaining members of the Board,
subject to the approval of this Court.
In the main, Atty. de Vera questions his removal from the Board of Governors on
procedural and substantive grounds. He argues that he was denied "very basic rights of
due process recognized by the Honorable Court even in administrative cases" like the
right to answer formally or in writing and within reasonable time, the right to present
witnesses in his behalf, the right to a fair hearing. Atty. de Vera protests the fact that he
was not able to cross-examine the complainant, IBP Gov. Romulo H. Rivera (Atty.
Rivera) and that Atty. Rivera voted as well for his expulsion which made him accuser,
prosecutor and judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera emphasized the fact that Atty.
Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting on his own motion. However, when his
inhibition resulted in the defeat of his motion as the necessary 2/3 votes could not be
mustered, Atty. Rivera asked for another round of voting so he could vote to support his
own motion.
The IBP Board counters that since its members were present during the plenary
session, and personally witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera's actuations, an evidentiary
or formal hearing was no longer necessary. Since they all witnessed and heard Atty. de
Vera, it was enough that he was given an opportunity to refute and answer all the
charges imputed against him. They emphasized that Atty. de Vera was given a copy of
the complaint and that he was present at the Board Meeting on 13 May 2005 wherein
the letter-complaint against him was part of the agenda. Therein, he was given the
opportunity to be heard and that, in fact, Atty. de Vera did argue his case.
We are in agreement with the IBP Board.
First, it needs stressing that the constitutional provision on due process safeguards life,
liberty and property.55 It cannot be said that the position of EVP of the IBP is property
within the constitutional sense especially since there is no right to security of tenure
over said position as, in fact, all that is required to remove any member of the board of
governors for cause is a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members of the
board.
Secondly, even if the right of due process could be rightfully invoked, still, in
administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to
explain one's side.56 At the outset, it is here emphasized that the term "due process of
law" as used in the Constitution has no fixed meaning for all purposes due "to the very
nature of the doctrine which, asserting a fundamental principle of justice rather than a
specific rule of law, is not susceptible of more than one general statement." 57 The
phrase is so elusive of exact apprehension,58 because it depends on circumstances and
varies with the subject matter and the necessities of the situation. 59
Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with "judicial process" for a
trial in court is not always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of
right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest
upon different principles. The due process clause guarantees no particular form of
procedure and its requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of
administrative character, the right to a notice or hearing are not essential to due process
of law. The constitutional requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a
regularly established administrative agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings
be had before the making of a determination if thereafter, there is available trial and
tribunal before which all objections and defenses to the making of such determination
may be raised and considered. One adequate hearing is all that due process requires.
What is required for "hearing" may differ as the functions of the administrative bodies
differ.60
The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process. 61 Nor is an
actual hearing always essential62 especially under the factual milieu of this case where
the members of the IBP Board -- upon whose shoulders the determination of the cause
for removal of an IBP governor is placed subject to the approval of the Supreme Court –
all witnessed Atty. de Vera's actuations in the IBP National Convention in question.
It is undisputed that Atty. de Vera received a copy of the complaint against him and that
he was present when the matter was taken up. From the transcript of the stenographic
notes of the 13 May 2005 meeting wherein Atty. de Vera was removed, it is patent that
Atty. de Vera was given fair opportunity to defend himself against the accusations made
by Atty. Rivera.
Atty. de Vera, however, additionally questions the fact that Atty. Rivera, who authored
the complaint against him, also voted for his expulsion making him accuser, prosecutor
and judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera likewise laments the fact that Atty. Rivera
initially inhibited himself from voting but when this resulted in the defeat of his motion for
lack of the necessary 2/3 vote, he agreed to another round of voting and that, this time,
he voted in favor of his motion.
For the record, of the nine governors comprising the IBP Board, six voted for Atty. de
Vera's expulsion (including Atty. Rivera) while 3 voted against it (including Atty. de
Vera).
Section 44 (second paragraph) of the IBP By-Laws provides:
Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including
three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by
resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the
approval of the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of an IBP Governor is done via a resolution
adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members. The phrase "remaining members" refers to
the members exclusive of the complainant member and the respondent member. The
reason therefore is that such members are interested parties and are thus presumed to
be unable to resolve said motion impartially. This being the case, the votes of Attys.
Rivera and de Vera should be stricken-off which means that only the votes of the seven
remaining members are to be counted. Of the seven remaining members, five voted for
expulsion while two voted against it which still adds up to the 2/3 vote requirement for
expulsion.
The IBP Board removed Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor for just and valid cause
All the concerned parties to this case agree that what constitutes cause for the removal
of an IBP Governor has not been defined by Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws albeit it
includes three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse.
Thus, the IBP Board argues that it is vested with sufficient power and authority to
protect itself from an intractable member whose removal was caused not by his
disagreement with the IBP Board but due to various acts committed by him which the
IBP Board considered as inimical to the IBP Board in particular and the IBP in general.
Atty. de Vera, on the other hand, insists that speaking in disagreement with the
Resolution of the Board during the Convention's Plenary Session is not a valid cause to
remove or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of Governors and the decision
to remove him only shows that the right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is
not recognized by the IBP Board.
After weighing the arguments of the parties and in keeping with the fundamental
objective of the IBP to discharge its public responsibility more effectively, we hereby find
that Atty. de Vera's removal from the IBP Board was not capricious or arbitrary.
Indubitably, conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees of intensity, if not animosity,
are inherent in the internal life of an organization, but especially of the IBP since lawyers
are said to disagree before they agree.
However, the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other organization, is diluted if the
conflicts are brought outside its governing body for then there would be the impression
that the IBP, which speaks through the Board of Governors, does not and cannot speak
for its members in an authoritative fashion. It would accordingly diminish the IBP's
prestige and repute with the lawyers as well as with the general public.
As a means of self-preservation, internecine conflicts must thus be adjusted within the
governing board itself so as to free it from the stresses that invariably arise when
internal cleavages are made public.
The doctrine of majority rule is almost universally used as a mechanism for adjusting
and resolving conflicts and disagreements within the group after the members have
been given an opportunity to be heard. While it does not efface conflicts, nonetheless,
once a decision on a contentious matter is reached by a majority vote, the dissenting
minority is bound thereby so that the board can speak with one voice, for those elected
to the governing board are deemed to implicitly contract that the will of the majority shall
govern in matters within the authority of the board.63
The IBP Board, therefore, was well within its right in removing Atty. de Vera as the
latter's actuations during the 10th National IBP Convention were detrimental to the role
of the IBP Board as the governing body of the IBP. When the IBP Board is not seen by
the bar and the public as a cohesive unit, it cannot effectively perform its duty of helping
the Supreme Court enforce the code of legal ethics and the standards of legal practice
as well as improve the administration of justice.
In view of the importance of retaining group cohesiveness and unity, the expulsion of a
member of the board who insists on bringing to the public his disagreement with a
policy/resolution approved by the majority after due discussion, cannot be faulted. The
effectiveness of the board as a governing body will be negated if its pronouncements
are resisted in public by a board member.
Indeed, when a member of a governing body cannot accept the voice of the majority, he
should resign therefrom so that he could criticize in public the majority opinion/decision
to his heart's content; otherwise, he subjects himself to disciplinary action by the body.
The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto
meant his removal as EVP as well
The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his
removal as EVP as well. Section 47, Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP provides:
SEC. 47. National Officers. – The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a
President and Executive Vice President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from
among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. x x x
Thus, to be EVP of the IBP, one must necessarily be a member of IBP Board of
Governors. Atty. de Vera's removal from the Board of Governors, automatically
disqualified him from acting as IBP EVP. To insist otherwise would be contrary to
Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
The Court will not interfere with the Resolution of the IBP Board to remove Atty.
de Vera since it was rendered without grave abuse of discretion
While it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an extensive power of
supervision over the IBP,64 it is axiomatic that such power should be exercised
prudently. The power of supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP should not
preclude the IBP from exercising its reasonable discretion especially in the
administration of its internal affairs governed by the provisions of its By-Laws. The IBP
By-Laws were precisely drafted and promulgated so as to define the powers and
functions of the IBP and its officers, establish its organizational structure, and govern
relations and transactions among its officers and members. With these By-Laws in
place, the Supreme Court could be assured that the IBP shall be able to carry on its
day-to-day affairs, without the Court's interference.
It should be noted that the general charge of the affairs and activities of the IBP has
been vested in the Board of Governors. The members of the Board are elective and
representative of each of the nine regions of the IBP as delineated in its By-Laws.65 The
Board acts as a collegiate body and decides in accordance with the will of the majority.
The foregoing rules serve to negate the possibility of the IBP Board acting on the basis
of personal interest or malice of its individual members. Hence, the actions and
resolutions of the IBP Board deserve to be accorded the disputable presumption 66 of
validity, which shall continue, until and unless it is overcome by substantial evidence
and actually declared invalid by the Supreme Court. In the absence of any allegation
and substantial proof that the IBP Board has acted without or in excess of its authority
or with grave abuse of discretion, we shall not be persuaded to overturn and set aside
the Board's action or resolution.
There is no question that the IBP Board has the authority to remove its members as
provided in Article VI, Section 4467 of the IBP By-Laws. Issue arises only as to whether
the IBP Board abused its authority and discretion in resolving to remove Atty. de Vera
from his post as an IBP Governor and EVP. As has been previously established herein,
Atty. de Vera's removal from the IBP Board was in accordance with due process and
the IBP Board acted well within the authority and discretion granted to it by its By-Laws.
There being no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the IBP Board, we find no
reason to interfere in the Board's resolution to remove Atty. de Vera.
The election of Atty. Salazar by the IBP Board as IBP EVP in replacement of Atty.
De Vera was conducted in accordance with the authority granted to the Board by
the IBP By-Laws
In the same manner, we find no reason to disturb the action taken by the 2003-2005
IBP Board of Governors in holding a special election to fill-in the vacant post resulting
from the removal of Atty. de Vera as EVP of the IBP since the same is a purely internal
matter, done without grave abuse of discretion, and implemented without violating the
Rules and By-Laws of the IBP.
With the removal of Atty. de Vera from the Board, by virtue of the IBP Board Resolution
dated 13 May 2005, he was also removed from his post as EVP; thus, there was a
resultant vacancy in the position of IBP EVP.
Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-Laws expressly grants to the Board the authority
to fill vacancies, however arising, in the IBP positions, subject to the provisions of
Section 8 of the Integration Rule,68 and Section 11 (Vacancies),69 Section 44 (Removal
of members),70 Section 47 (National officers),71 Section 48 (other officers),72 and
Section 49 (Terms of Office)73 of the By-Laws. The IBP Board has specific and sufficient
guidelines in its Rules and By-Laws on how to fill-in the vacancies after the removal of
Atty. de Vera. We have faith and confidence in the intellectual, emotional and ethical
competencies of the remaining members of the 2005-2007 Board in dealing with the
situation within the bounds of the IBP Rules and By-Laws.
The election by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors of a new EVP, who will assume
the Presidency for the term 2005-2007, was well within the authority and prerogative
granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws, particularly Article VII, Section 47, which
provides that "[t]he EVP shall automatically become President for the next succeeding
term." The phrase "for the next succeeding term" necessarily implies that the EVP that
should succeed Atty. Cadiz as IBP President for the next succeeding term (i.e., 2005-
2007) should come from the members of the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors.
Hence, in A.M. No. 05-7-19-SC, we restrained now IBP EVP Feliciano Bautista from
assuming the position of Acting President because we have yet to resolve the question
as to who shall succeed Atty. Cadiz from the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors.
Accordingly, the elections of Governor Santiago on 13 June 2005 as IBP EVP, and
thereafter, Governor Salazar on 25 June 2005, as the new IBP EVP, upon the
relinquishment of Gov. Santiago of the position, were valid.
Neither can this Court give credence to the argument of Atty. De Vera that, assuming
his removal as IBP Governor and EVP was valid, his replacement as IBP EVP should
come from Eastern Mindanao Region pursuant to the rotation rule set forth in Article VII,
Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws.
According to Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws, the EVP shall be chosen by the
Board of Governors from among the nine Regional Governors, as much as practicable,
on a rotation basis. This is based on our pronouncements in Bar Matter 491, wherein
we ruled:
"ORDER
xxxx
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected
by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [9] IBP regions) from
among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be
restored. The right of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the
presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this
Court's resolution dated July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby
restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall
automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of governors shall
then elect an Executive Vice-President from among themselves. The position of
Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One
who has served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a
succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions
shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.
xxxx
(Emphasis Supplied)"
In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP which is actually rotated
among the nine Regional Governors. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is
merely a result of the automatic succession rule of the IBP EVP to the Presidency.
Thus, the rotation rule pertains in particular to the position of IBP EVP, while the
automatic succession rule pertains to the Presidency. The rotation with respect to the
Presidency is but a consequence of the automatic succession rule provided in Section
47 of the IBP By-Laws.
In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon the election of
Atty. De Vera as IBP EVP, each of the nine IBP regions had already produced an EVP
and, thus, the rotation was completed. It is only unfortunate that the supervening event
of Atty. de Vera's removal as IBP Governor and EVP rendered it impossible for him to
assume the IBP Presidency. The fact remains, however, that the rotation rule had been
completed despite the non-assumption by Atty. de Vera to the IBP Presidency.
Moreover, the application of the rotation rule is not a license to disregard the spirit and
purpose of the automatic succession rule, but should be applied in harmony with the
latter. The automatic succession rule affords the IBP leadership transition seamless and
enables the new IBP National President to attend to pressing and urgent matters
without having to expend valuable time for the usual adjustment and leadership
consolidation period. The time that an IBP EVP spends assisting a sitting IBP President
on matters national in scope is in fact a valuable and indispensable preparation for the
eventual succession. It should also be pointed out that this wisdom is further
underscored by the fact that an IBP EVP is elected from among the members of the IBP
Board of Governors, who are serving in a national capacity, and not from the members
at large. It is intrinsic in the IBP By-Laws that one who is to assume the highest position
in the IBP must have been exposed to the demands and responsibilities of national
leadership.
It would therefore be consistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession
rule for Governor Salazar to assume the post of IBP President. By electing the
replacement EVP from among the members of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors, the
IBP benefits from the experience of the IBP EVP of 2003-2005 – in this case, Governor
Salazar – who would have served in a national capacity prior to his assumption of the
highest position.
It will also be inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule if
the EVP for the term 2003-2005 will be elected exclusively by the members of the
House of Delegates of the Eastern Mindanao region. This Court notes that the removal
of Atty. De Vera in 13 May 2005 was about a month before the expiration of the term of
office of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors. Hence, the replacement Governor would
not have been able to serve in a national capacity for two years prior to assuming the
IBP Presidency.
In any case, Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase "as much as practicable" to
clearly indicate that the rotation rule is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar exceptions
in compelling and exceptional circumstances.
It is in view of the foregoing that the argument advanced by Atty. De Vera that the IBP
national presidency should be assumed by a nominee from Eastern Mindanao region
from where he comes, can not hold water. It would go against the intent of the IBP By-
Laws for such a nominee would be bereft of the wealth of experience and the
perspective that only one who is honed in service while serving in a national post in the
IBP would have.
We therefore rule that the IBP Board of Governors acted in accordance with the IBP By-
Laws, in electing Atty. Salazar as IBP EVP and in ensuring a succession in the
leadership of the IBP. Had the Board of Governors not done so, there would have been
no one qualified to assume the Presidency of the IBP on 1 July 2005, pursuant to
Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:
1) SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the practice of law for TWO
(2) YEARS, effective from the finality of this Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be
attached to the personal record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts;
2) DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in A.M.
No. 05-5-15-SC, praying for the disapproval of the Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, of
the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines removing him from his
posts as Governor and Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the said Resolution having been rendered without grave abuse of
discretion;
3) AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar as
Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the remainder of
the term 2003-2005, such having been conducted in accordance with its By-Laws and
absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion; and
4) DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his oath of office and
assume the Presidency of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the term 2005-2007
in accordance with the automatic succession rule in Article VII, Section 47 of the IBP
By-Laws, upon receipt of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 2112 July 24, 2012
IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE
PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, Petitioner,
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the Office
of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in
the Philippines.
The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) on March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when he became a
citizen of the United States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that on September
15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of
allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Washington,
D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if granted, to resume the
practice of law. Attached to the petition were several documents in support of his
petition, albeit mere photocopies thereof, to wit:
1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General Domingo P.
Nolasco;
2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of same date;
3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of same date;
4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of membership dues with the IBP;
5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).
In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was confronted with a
similar petition filed by Benjamin M. Dacanay (Dacanay) who requested leave to
resume his practice of law after availing the benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was
admitted to the Philippine Bar in March 1960. In December 1998, he migrated to
Canada to seek medical attention for his ailments and eventually became a Canadian
citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, Dacanay re-acquired his Philippine citizenship
pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 after taking his oath of allegiance before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. He returned to the Philippines and intended to
resume his practice of law.
The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar
and is, in fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means
termination of the petitioner’s membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage in
the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country
are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic.1 Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another
country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to
be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume
the practice of law is not automatic.2 R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends
to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice.3
It can not be overstressed that:
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.1âwphi1 It is so delicately
affected with public interest that it is both the power and duty of the State (through this
Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of
morality, faithful observance of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory
continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in
good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a
lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which
the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional
privilege.4
Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law,
the OBC required the herein petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of
the following documents in relation to his petition:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;
5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;
6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership dues;
7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and
8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.
In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau
of Immigration, in lieu of the IC;
5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to his
good moral character as well as his updated payment of annual membership dues;
6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;
7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and
8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator,
UC-MCLE Program, University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance with
the MCLE.
The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the
MCLE. After all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the
petitioner has met all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for membership
in the bar, the OBC recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice
of law.
Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and sees
no bar to the petitioner's resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED,
subject to the condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by
the Court and subject to the payment of appropriate fees.
Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the necessary
guidelines for the re-acquisition of the privilege to resume the practice of law for the
guidance of the Bench and Bar.
SO ORDERED.
REINSTATEMENT AFTER DISBARMENT

B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF
SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other
individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul
Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the
infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as
part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered
into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded
guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was
accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen
(14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging
from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation
with the lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18
June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of
probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the
probation officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to
Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal
conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar
Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993.1 He passed the
Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the
attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge
Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11
April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months
from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June
1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his
Petition for Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to
everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of
good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and
certified.2 The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is
stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as
having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the
applicant's right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he
must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements
necessary to make up such a character. It is something more than an absence of bad
character. It is the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have
acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he must have conducted
himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such
character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least resistance,
but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to
do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper.
Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his
advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are
committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals
with is client's property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of
the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx4
In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359,
210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate
from the straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in
the practice of profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for
admission to the bar to possess a high moral standard therefore becomes clearly
apparent, and the board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a
minute examination to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for admission
to practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that
the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of a
candidate who presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be
successfully met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been
admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has established himself therein, a far
more difficult situation is presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for
disbarment and for the recalling and annulment of his license.
In Re Keenan:6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right
to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued
only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral
character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it.
Elaborate machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards fair to all and to
separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to enter the
profession, and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain in it.
Re Rouss:7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and
professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is
not to punish him for past offense: an examination into character, like the examination
into learning, is merely a test of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only
protect the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of
the cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to courts could such agents give?
They are required to be of good moral character, so that the agents and officers of the
court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due administration of the law,
and it is of the highest possible consequence that both those who have not such
qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall
not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of
greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice
are concerned, than the possession of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10
Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice of the
law unless he covered an upright moral character. The possession of this by the
attorney is more important, if anything, to the public and to the proper administration of
justice than legal learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if the
applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances are
that his character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace instead of an
ornament to his great calling — a curse instead of a benefit to his community — a Quirk,
a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin.9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those
seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly
broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to
practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California
Bar the court cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears that
he has been guilty of acts which would be cause for his disbarment or suspension,
could not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment
proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence which tends to show the
applicant's character as respects honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may no
doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts
declared to be causes for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek
admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct
expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a
general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with
inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the
progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal
system as we know it.12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of
the required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely
accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to
the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws
on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had
failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who
had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all
of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a
useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings
inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was
totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was
then possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court
is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has
purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress
that good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated
not only at the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also,
and more importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the
attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration,
evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good
moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may
consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community
who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a
significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by
Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the
senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the
community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to
show that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to
the ancient and learned profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written
manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof,
brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any,
of Raul Camaligan.
B.M. No. 1222 April 24, 2009
RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN, Petitioner,
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This treats the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated November 10,
2008 filed by petitioner Danilo de Guzman. He prays that this Honorable Court "in the
exercise of equity and compassion, grant petitioner’s plea for judicial clemency, and
thereupon, order his reinstatement as a member in good standing of the Philippine
Bar."1
To recall, on February 4, 2004, the Court promulgated a Resolution, in B.M. No. 1222,
the dispositive portion of which reads in part:
WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the recommendations of the Investigating
Committee, hereby resolves to —
(1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law effective upon his
receipt of this RESOLUTION;
xxxx
The subject of the Resolution is the leakage of questions in Mercantile Law during the
2003 Bar Examinations. Petitioner at that time was employed as an assistant lawyer in
the law firm of Balgos & Perez, one of whose partners, Marcial Balgos, was the
examiner for Mercantile Law during the said bar examinations. The Court had adopted
the findings of the Investigating Committee, which identified petitioner as the person
who had downloaded the test questions from the computer of Balgos and faxed them to
other persons.
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) has favorably recommended the reinstatement of
petitioner in the Philippine Bar. In a Report dated January 6, 2009, the OBC rendered its
assessment of the petition, the relevant portions of which we quote hereunder:
Petitioner narrated that he had labored to become a lawyer to fulfill his father’s
childhood dream to become one. This task was not particularly easy for him and his
family but he willed to endure the same in order to pay tribute to his parents.
Petitioner added that even at a very young age, he already imposed upon himself the
duty of rendering service to his fellowmen. At 19 years, he started his exposure to public
service when he was elected Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of Barangay
Tuktukan, Taguig City. During this time, he initiated several projects benefiting the youth
in their barangay.
Thereafter, petitioner focused on his studies, taking up Bachelor of Arts in Political
Science and eventually pursuing Bachelor of Laws. In his second year in law school, he
was elected as the President of the Student Council of the Institute of Law of the Far
Eastern University (FEU). Here, he spearheaded various activities including the conduct
of seminars for law students as well as the holding of bar operations for bar examinees.
Despite his many extra-curricular activities as a youth and student leader, petitioner still
managed to excel in his studies. Thus, he was conferred an Academic Excellence
Award upon his graduation in Bachelor of Laws.
Upon admission to the bar in April 1999, petitioner immediately entered government
service as a Legal Officer assigned at the Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig.
Simultaneously, he also rendered free legal services to less fortunate residents of
Taguig City who were then in need of legal assistance.
In March 2000, petitioner was hired as one of the Associate Lawyers at the Balgos and
Perez Law Offices. It was during his stay with this firm when his craft as a lawyer was
polished and developed. Despite having entered private practice, he continued to
render free legal services to his fellow Taguigeños.
Then in February 2004, by a sudden twist of fate, petitioner’s flourishing career was cut
short as he was stripped of his license to practice law for his alleged involvement in the
leakage in the 2003 Bar Examinations.
Devastated, petitioner then practically locked himself inside his house to avoid the
rather unavoidable consequences of his disbarment.
On March 2004, however, petitioner was given a new lease in life when he was taken
as a consultant by the City Government of Taguig. Later, he was designated as a
member of the Secretariat of the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). For the next
five (5) years, petitioner concentrated mainly on rendering public service.
Petitioner humbly acknowledged the damaging impact of his act which unfortunately,
compromised the integrity of the bar examinations. As could be borne from the records
of the investigation, he cooperated fully in the investigation conducted and took
personal responsibility for his actions. Also, he has offered his sincerest apologies to
Atty. Balgos, to the Court as well as to all the 2003 bar examinees for the unforeseen
and unintended effects of his actions.
Petitioner averred that he has since learned from his mistakes and has taken the said
humbling experience to make him a better person.
Meanwhile, as part of his Petition, petitioner submitted the following testimonials and
endorsements of various individuals and entities all attesting to his good moral
character:
1) Resolution No. 101, Series of 2007, "Resolution Expressing Full Support to Danilo G.
De Guzman in his Application for Judicial Clemency, Endorsing his Competence and
Fitness to be Reinstated as a Member of the Philippine Bar and for Other Purposes"
dated 4 June 2007 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, City of Taguig;
2) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang
Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Southeast People’s Village
Homeowners Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA) kay Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang
Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang
Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 1
June 2007 of the Southeast People’s Village Homeowners Association, Inc.
(SEPHVOA), Ibayo-Tipas, City of Taguig;
3) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang
Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahang Residente ng Mauling
Creek, Inc. (SAREMAC) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong
Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang
Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 1
June 2007 of the Samahang Residente ng Mauling Creek, Inc. (SAREMAC), Lower
Bicutan, City of Taguig;
4) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang
Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahan ng mga Maralita (PULONG
KENDI) Neighborhood Association, Inc. (SAMANA) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa
Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa
Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado"
dated 1 June 2007 of the Samahan ng mga Maralita (PULONG KENDI) Neighborhood
Association, Inc. (SAMANA), Sta. Ana, City of Taguig;
5) "An Open Letter Attesting Personally to the Competence and Fitness of Danilo G. De
Guzman as to Warrant the Grant of Judicial Clemency and his Reinstatement as
Member of the Philippine Bar" dated 8 June 2007 of Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino,
Laogan, Trespeses and Llantino Law Offices;
6) "Testimonial to the Moral and Spiritual Competence of Danilo G. De Guzman to be
Truly Deserving of Judicial Clemency and Compassion" dated 5 July 2007 of Rev. Fr.
Paul G. Balagtas, Parish Priest, Archdiocesan Shrine of St. Anne;
7) "Testimonial Letter" dated 18 February 2008 of Atty. Loreto C. Ata, President, Far
Eastern University Law Alumni Association (FEULAA), Far Eastern University (FEU);
8) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang
Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran,
Inc. (SABISKA) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng
Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang
Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 8 July 2008 of the
Samahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA);
9) Board Resolution No. 02, Series of 2008, "A Resolution Recognizing the
Contributions of Danilo G. De Guzman to the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB)
– Taguig City, Attesting to his Utmost Dedication and Commitment to the Call of Civic
and Social Duty and for Other Purposes" dated 11 July 2008 of the People’s Law
Enforcement Board (PLEB);
10) "A Personal Appeal for the Grant of Judicial Forgiveness and Compassion in Favor
of Danilo G. De Guzman" dated 14 July 2008 of Atty. Edwin R. Sandoval, Professor,
College of Law, San Sebastian College – Recoletos;
11) "An Open Letter Personally Attesting to the Moral competence and Fitness of Danilo
G. De Guzman" dated 5 September 2008 of Mr. Nixon F. Faderog, Deputy Grand
[Kn]ight, Knights of Columbus and President, General Parent-Teacher Association,
Taguig National High School, Lower Bicutan, Taguig City;
12) "Testimonial Letter" dated 5 September 2008 of Atty. Primitivo C. Cruz, President,
Taguig Lawyers League, Inc., Tuktukan, Taguig City;
13) "Testimonial Letter" dated 21 October 2008 of Judge Hilario L. Laqui, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trail Court (RTC), Branch 218, Quezon City; and
14) "Testimonial Letter" dated 28 October 2008 of Justice Oscar M. Herrera, former
Justice, Court of Appeals and former Dean, Institute of Law, Far Eastern University
(FEU).
Citing the case of In Re: Carlos S. Basa, petitioner pleaded that he be afforded the
same kindness and compassion in order that, like Atty. Basa, his promising future may
not be perpetually foreclosed. In the said case, the Court had the occasion to say:
Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of California
and the Philippine Islands. Recently, he was charged in the Court of First Instance of
the City of Manila with the crime of abduction with consent, was found guilty in a
decision rendered by the Honorable M.V. De Rosario, Judge of First Instance, and was
sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two years, eleven months and eleven days
of prision correccional. On appeal, this decision was affirmed in a judgment handed
down by the second division of the Supreme Court.
xxxx
When come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be taken by
the court, we do so regretfully and reluctantly. On the one hand, the violation of the
criminal law by the respondent attorney cannot be lightly passed over. On the other
hand, we are willing to strain the limits of our compassion to the uttermost in order that
so promising a career may not be utterly ruined.
Petitioner promised to commit himself to be more circumspect in his actions and
solemnly pledged to exert all efforts to atone for his misdeeds.
There may be a reasonable ground to consider the herein Petition.
In the case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino to Take the Lawyer’s Oath (Bar Matter 712),
which may be applied in the instant case, the Court said:
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros
Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal
profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer’s oath, the Court recognizes that Mr.
Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications
show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public
service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts, to atone for the death
of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial
notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
xxxx
Meanwhile, in the case of Rodolfo M. Bernardo vs. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia (Administrative
Case No. 2984), the Court [in] deciding whether or not to reinstate Atty. Mejia to the
practice of law stated:
The Court will take into consideration the applicant’s character and standing prior to the
disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred, his
conduct subsequent to the disbarment and the time that has elapsed in between the
disbarment and the application for reinstatement.
Petitioner was barely thirty (30) years old and had only been in the practice of law for
five (5) years when he was disbarred from the practice of law. It is of no doubt that
petitioner had a promising future ahead of him where it not for the decision of the Court
stripping off his license.
Petitioner is also of good moral repute, not only before but likewise, after his
disbarment, as attested to overwhelmingly by his constituents, colleagues as well as
people of known probity in the community and society.
Way before the petitioner was even admitted to the bar, he had already manifested his
intense desire to render public service as evidenced by his active involvement and
participation in several social and civic projects and activities. Likewise, even during and
after his disbarment, which could be perceived by some as a debilitating circumstance,
petitioner still managed to continue extending his assistance to others in whatever
means possible. This only proves petitioner’s strength of character and positive moral
fiber.
However, still, it is of no question that petitioner’s act in copying the examination
questions from Atty. Balgos’ computer without the latter’s knowledge and consent, and
which questions later turned out to be the bar examinations questions in Mercantile Law
in the 2003 Bar Examinations, is not at all commendable. While we do believe that
petitioner sincerely did not intend to cause the damage that his action ensued, still, he
must be sanctioned for unduly compromising the integrity of the bar examinations as
well as of this Court.
We are convinced, however, that petitioner has since reformed and has sincerely
reflected on his transgressions. Thus, in view of the circumstances and likewise for
humanitarian considerations, the penalty of disbarment may now be commuted to
suspension. Considering the fact, however, that petitioner had already been disbarred
for more than five (5) years, the same may be considered as proper service of said
commuted penalty and thus, may now be allowed to resume practice of law.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that the
instant Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated 10 November 2008 of
petitioner DANILO G. DE GUZMAN be GRANTED. Petitioner’s disbarment is now
commuted to suspension, which suspension is considered as served in view of the
petitioner’s five (5) year disbarment. Hence, petitioner may now be allowed to resume
practice of law.
The recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant is well-taken in
part.1avvphi1.zw+ We deem petitioner worthy of clemency to the extent of commuting
his penalty to seven (7) years suspension from the practice of law, inclusive of the five
(5) years he has already served his disbarment.
Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders.2
While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows
how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose. 3
In cases where we have deigned to lift or commute the supreme penalty of disbarment
imposed on the lawyer, we have taken into account the remorse of the disbarred
lawyer4 and the conduct of his public life during his years outside of the bar. 5 For
example, in Valencia v. Antiniw, we held:
However, the record shows that the long period of respondent's disbarment gave him
the chance to purge himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse and repentance,
and to demonstrate his willingness and capacity to live up once again to the exacting
standards of conduct demanded of every member of the bar and officer of the court.
During respondent's disbarment for more than fifteen (15) years to date for his
professional infraction, he has been persistent in reiterating his apologies and pleas for
reinstatement to the practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts to show that he has
regained his worthiness to practice law, by his civic and humanitarian activities and
unblemished record as an elected public servant, as attested to by numerous civic and
professional organizations, government institutions, public officials and members of the
judiciary.6
And in Bernardo v. Atty. Mejia,7 we noted:
Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejia’s disbarment, it also cannot
close its eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. While the age of the
petitioner and the length of time during which he has endured the ignominy of
disbarment are not the sole measure in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court
takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other
transgression has been attributed to him, and he has shown remorse. Obviously, he has
learned his lesson from this experience, and his punishment has lasted long enough. x
xx
Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated the remorse expected of him considering the
gravity of his transgressions. Even more to his favor, petitioner has redirected focus
since his disbarment towards public service, particularly with the People’s Law
Enforcement Board. The attestations submitted by his peers in the community and other
esteemed members of the legal profession, such as retired Court of Appeals Associate
Justice Oscar Herrera, Judge Hilario Laqui, Professor Edwin Sandoval and Atty.
Lorenzo Ata, and the ecclesiastical community such as Rev. Fr. Paul Balagtas testify to
his positive impact on society at large since the unfortunate events of 2003.
Petitioner’s subsequent track record in public service affords the Court some hope that
if he were to reacquire membership in the Philippine bar, his achievements as a lawyer
would redound to the general good and more than mitigate the stain on his record.
Compassion to the petitioner is warranted. Nonetheless, we wish to impart to him the
following stern warning:
"Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws.
He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override
the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bands of society, argues
recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate
and dangerous elements of the body politic."8
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Judicial Clemency and
Compassion is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The disbarment of DANILO G. DE
GUZMAN from the practice of law is hereby COMMUTED to SEVEN (7) YEARS
SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW, reckoned from February 4, 2004.
SO ORDERED.
Adm. Case No. 6148 January 22, 2013
FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO, Respondent.
RE: PETITION (FOR EXTRAORDINARY MERCY) OF EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For resolution is the Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) filed by respondent Edmundo L.
Macarubbo (respondent) who seeks to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.
Records show that in the Decision1 dated February 27, 2004, the Court disbarred
respondent from the practice of law for having contracted a bigamous marriage with
complainant Florence Teves and a third marriage with one Josephine Constantino while
his first marriage to Helen Esparza was still subsisting, which acts constituted gross
immoral conduct in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. The dispositive portion of the subject Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found guilty of gross immorality
and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. He is likewise ORDERED to show
satisfactory evidence to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline and to this Court that he
is supporting or has made provisions for the regular support of his two children by
complainant.
Let respondent’s name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.2
Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Appeal for Compassion and
Mercy3 which the Court denied with finality in the Resolution4 dated June 1, 2004. Eight
years after or on June 4, 2012, respondent filed the instant Petition (For Extraordinary
Mercy)5 seeking
judicial clemency and reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys. The Court initially treated
the present suit as a second motion for reconsideration and accordingly, denied it for
lack of merit in the Resolution dated September 4, 2012.6 On December 18, 2012, the
same petition was endorsed to this Court by the Office of the Vice President7 for re-
evaluation, prompting the Court to look into the substantive merits of the case.
In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency,8 the Court laid down the following guidelines in
resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not
be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the
community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an
administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong
presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period
of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive
years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem
himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal
acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or
administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency. 9
(Citations omitted)
Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the applicant must, like any other
candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral
character.10
Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the Court finds the instant petition
meritorious.
Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his indiscretion in
the legal profession and in his personal life. He has asked forgiveness from his children
by complainant Teves and maintained a cordial relationship with them as shown by the
herein attached pictures.11 Records also show that after his disbarment, respondent
returned to his hometown in Enrile, Cagayan and devoted his time tending an orchard
and taking care of his ailing mother until her death in 2008. 12 In 2009, he was appointed
as Private Secretary to the Mayor of Enrile, Cagayan and thereafter, assumed the
position of Local Assessment Operations Officer II/ Office-In-Charge in the Assessor’s
Office, which office he continues to serve to date.13 Moreover, he is a part-time
instructor at the University of Cagayan Valley and F.L. Vargas College during the
School Year 2011-2012.14 Respondent likewise took an active part in socio-civic
activities by helping his neighbors and friends who are in dire need.
The following documents attest to respondent’s reformed ways: (1) Affidavit of Candida
P. Mabborang;15 (2) Affidavit of Reymar P. Ramirez;16 (3) Affidavit of Roberto D.
Tallud;17 (4) Certification from the Municipal Local Government Office; 18 (5) Certification
by the Office of the Municipal Agriculturist/Health Officer, Social Welfare Development
Officer;19 (6) Certification from the Election Officer of Enrile, Cagayan;20 (7) Affidavit of
Police Senior Inspector Jacinto T. Tuddao;21 (8) Certifications from nine (9) Barangay
Chairpersons;22 (9) Certification from the Office of the Provincial Assessor; 23 (10)
Certification from the Office of the Manager, Magsaka ca Multi-Purpose Cooperative;24
and (11) Certification of the Office of the Federation of Senior Citizens, Enrile Chapter. 25
The Office of the Municipal Treasurer also certified that respondent has no monetary
accountabilities in relation to his office26 while the Office of the Human Resource
Management Officer attested that he has no pending administrative case.27 He is not
known to be involved in any irregularity and/or accused of a crime. Even the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) attested that he has no record on file as of May 31,
2011.28
Furthermore, respondent’s plea for reinstatement is duly supported by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, Cagayan Chapter29 and by his former and present colleagues. 30
His parish priest, Rev. Fr. Camilo Castillejos, Jr., certified that he is faithful to and puts
to actual practice the doctrines of the Catholic Church.31 He is also observed to be a
regular churchgoer.32 Records further reveal that respondent has already settled his
previous marital squabbles,33 as in fact, no opposition to the instant suit was tendered
by complainant Teves. He sends regular support34 to his children in compliance with the
Court’s directive in the Decision dated February 27, 2004.
The Court notes the eight (8) long years that had elapsed from the time respondent was
disbarred and recognizes his achievement as the first lawyer product of Lemu National
High School,35 and his fourteen (14) years of dedicated government service from 1986
to July 2000 as Legal Officer of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports;
Supervising Civil Service Attorney of the Civil Service Commission; Ombudsman Graft
Investigation Officer; and State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice. 36 From the
attestations and certifications presented, the Court finds that respondent has sufficiently
atoned for his transgressions. At 5837 years of age, he still has productive years ahead
of him that could significantly contribute to the upliftment of the law profession and the
betterment of society. While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and even
remove its errant officers, concomitant to it is its duty to show compassion to those who
have reformed their ways,38 as in this case.
Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered .reinstated to the practice of law.1âwphi1 He
is, however, reminded that such privilege is burdened with conditions whereby
adherence. to the rigid standards of intellect, moral uprightness, and strict compliance
with the rules and the law are continuing requirements.39
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. Respondent
Edmundo L. Macarubbo is hereby ordered REINSTATED in the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC September 19, 2007
RE: LETTER OF JUDGE AUGUSTUS C. DIAZ, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF
QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 37, APPEALING FOR JUDICIAL CLEMENCY.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In a letter dated July 18, 2007, Judge Augustus C. Diaz, presiding judge of Branch 37 of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, informed the Court that he is an applicant
for judgeship in one of the vacant Regional Trial Court branches in Metro Manila. In
connection therewith, he was interviewed by the Judicial and Bar Council on July 10,
2007. He was told to seek judicial clemency due to the fact that he was once fined
₱20,000 "for not hearing a motion for demolition." He claims that this lapse happened
only once as a result of "oversight." He requests judicial clemency and, in particular,
that he be allowed to "again be nominated to one of the vacant branches of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila or in any of the cities where [his] application [is being]
considered."
In a subsequent letter,1 Judge Diaz stated that he has been the presiding judge of
Branch 37 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City since March 1, 1995. He
expressed deep remorse for the lapse for which he was held administratively liable in
Alvarez v. Diaz.2 He confessed that "[t]he stain of the penalty has taught [him] a bitter
lesson" and promised to avoid the commission of the same or similar acts. He submitted
himself to the judicious discretion of this Court for whatever action the Court may take
on his plea for judicial clemency.
In Alvarez, Judge Diaz was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law when he granted
the following motions: (1) a motion for execution which was fatally defective for lack of
notice to the defendant and (2) a motion for demolition without notice and hearing. His
action on the motion for demolition also made him liable for grave abuse of authority. 3
He was fined ₱20,000.4
Section 5, Rule 4 of the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council provides:
SEC. 5. Disqualification. – The following are disqualified from being nominated for
appointment to any judicial post or as Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman:
1. Those with pending criminal or regular administrative cases;
2. Those with pending criminal cases in foreign courts or tribunals; and
3. Those who have been convicted in any criminal case; or in an administrative
case, where the penalty imposed is at least a fine of more than ₱10,000, unless he
has been granted judicial clemency. 5 (emphasis supplied)
Under the said provision, Judge Diaz is disqualified from being nominated for
appointment to any judicial post, until and unless his request for judicial clemency is
granted.
Concerned with safeguarding the integrity of the judiciary, this Court has come down
hard6 and wielded the rod of discipline against members of the judiciary who have fallen
short of the exacting standards of judicial conduct. 7 This is because a judge is the
visible representation of the law and of justice.8 He must comport himself in a manner
that his conduct must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to the
performance of his official duties but also as to his behavior outside his sala and as a
private individual.9 His character must be able to withstand the most searching public
scrutiny because the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to
the preservation of the people’s faith in the judicial system.101âwphi1
Clemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with
the preservation of public confidence in the courts. The Court will grant it only if there is
a showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a showing of potential and promise
are indispensable.11
In the exercise of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts
and all personnel thereof,12 the Court lays down the following guidelines in resolving
requests for judicial clemency:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation.13 These shall include but should not
be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the
community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an
administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong
presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty14 to ensure a
period of reformation.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive
years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem
himself.15
4. There must be a showing of promise16 (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal
acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or
administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service. 17
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.
In this case, Judge Diaz expressed sincere repentance for his past malfeasance. He
humbly accepted the verdict of this Court in Alvarez. Three years have elapsed since
the promulgation of Alvarez. It is sufficient to ensure that he has learned his lesson and
that he has reformed. His 12 years of service in the judiciary may be taken as proof of
his dedication to the institution. Thus, the Court may now open the door of further
opportunities in the judiciary for him.
Accordingly, the letter dated July 18, 2007 of Judge Augustus C. Diaz is hereby
NOTED. His request for judicial clemency is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.