Saudi Prolif DA

1NC
The US is combining hedging and reassurance in the Gulf now –
increased presence and military cooperation are reassuring
allies
Lynn E. Davis 14, Senior Political Science, RAND Corporation, Ph.D. and M.A. in
political science, Columbia University, “The Days after a Deal with Iran: U.S. Policies of
Hedging and Engaging,” 2014,
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE125/RAND_PE1
25.pdf

A U.S. Approach Is Emerging That Emphasizes Hedging and Reassurance

From Obama administration statements and a growing consensus among U.S. regional experts, a set of U.S. policies and
assumptions seems to be emerging as to what policies the United States should pursue in the aftermath of a nuclear
agreement with Iran.3

• The nuclear agreement will offer Iran incentives in the form of graduated sanctions
relief for forgoing its pursuit of capabilities associated with nuclear weapons and for maintaining
limits on its nuclear infrastructure. Any further incentives , as well as all but
minimal engagement, need to wait in order to test Iran’s compliance with the
agreement and its behavior elsewhere in the region. The rationale for this narrow focus lies
in the uncertainties as to the Iranian domestic situation and what future Iranian behavior will be in the region. In this
view, a nuclear agreement with Iran will not change the fact that the Iranian regime, especially Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei and the conservative establishment, view the United States as the chief source of global “oppression.”
President Hassan Rouhani and other pragmatic Iranians may aspire to more normal ties with the United States but the
Islamic Republic remains a revolutionary state guided not only by its interests of regime survival and maintaining
territorial sovereignty, but also expanding its regional influence.4

• The consequences of potential Iranian violations of the nuclear agreement will be made explicit, including the threat of
and clear plan for a rapid reimposition of sanctions and of a potential military response against the Iranian nuclear
infrastructure.

• U.S.
engagement (both diplomatic and military) with its partners in the region will
intensify and include additional military cooperation with Israel and
the GCC countries, military sales, the integration of GCC air and missile
defenses, and expanded maritime and air exercises. U.S. presence in the Gulf will
remain robust and retain capabilities for rapid strikes on the Iranian nuclear infrastructure. These steps
will be primarily to respond to concerns of partners over Iran and provide
reassurance , but also to reinforce the threat to Iran as to the consequences
of violating the agreement.5
This emerging U.S. approach is heavily informed by practical limitations. First, there is recognition among U.S.
policymakers that things are very uncertain as to what an agreement will mean for Iranian compliance, its intentions with
respect to the nuclear program, and the relationship of an agreement to its other regional policies. So, any real
change in U.S. policies toward Iran, partners, and military posture, or any opening or relaxation of pressure,
needs to wait until Iran demonstrates its willingness to implement the
agreement—and perhaps even until changes occur in Iran’s regional behavior. Second, U.S. domestic politics will
constrain policymakers in the sense that even if decisionmakers see an opportunity for an emerging détente with Iran,
cooperation or normalization of relations with Tehran may not be possible in the current U.S. political climate. Third, the
anxieties of U.S. regional partners reinforce the need for the United States
to move very slowly in any engagement with Iran lest these partners
interpret actions as the United States abandoning their interests . Finally, these
policies are consistent with a view that to influence Iran, one needs to show a
willingness to make the costs outweigh any gains , in terms of its future
implementation of the nuclear agreement and regional behavior.6

Withdrawal causes fast and immediate Saudi prolif---presence is

the key determinant of the US security guarantee
Christopher Clary 12, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Watson Institute for International
and Public Affairs at Brown University, PhD, Political Science, MIT, M.A. in National
Security Affairs, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, “The Pak-Saudi Nuke, and How to Stop
It,” The American Interest, Volume 7, Number 6, 6/10/12, http://www.the-american-
interest.com/2012/06/10/the-pak-saudi-nuke-and-how-to-stop-it/
The debate about military options on Iran has focused on the extent to which Tehran can be deterred, but it’s just as
important to consider the knock-on proliferation consequences of an Iranian bomb. The path for Saudi
nuclearization is readily apparent and could occur rapidly —within months or
years, not decades. Analyses that perceive Iranian nuclearization as manageable typically discount the
possibility of quick Saudi acquisition of nuclear weapons. In this vein, at least 11
other Middle Eastern states have developed varying levels of interest in nuclear technology over the past decade or so.37
Few, however, could move as quickly as Saudi Arabia.

Stopping a proliferation chain reaction need not require preventive military strikes. Robust U.S. security
guarantees to Saudi Arabia might dampen Saudi demand for a nuclear
deterrent. But making these guarantees credible could prove challenging.
Extended deterrence is inherently difficult. A state is attempting to guarantee that it will endanger its most vital interests
(risk nuclear attacks on its homeland) in order to protect more peripheral interests (prevent conventional or nuclear
attacks on a third-party state). In
the Cold War, the United States relied on overseas basing
to demonstrate its commitment. By placing U.S. forces in harm’s way, it not
only increased military options in the region, but also made the U.S. commitment more
credible. As Thomas Schelling famously argued, “What can 7,000 American troops do [in Berlin], or 12,000 Allied
troops? Bluntly, they can die.”38 In the Saudi case, however, the experience of the 1990s and 2000s suggests that a
substantial U.S. military presence may generate a great deal of popular resentment and thus prove unsustainable. Indeed,
the United States may have more options basing U.S. troops on the Saudi
Arabian periphery . To some extent, it already does in Bahrain (home of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth
Fleet) and Qatar (location of Al Udeid airbase). The United States clearly hopes the newly inaugurated U.S.-GCC
Strategic Cooperation Forum will provide another way to demonstrate “the rock-solid commitment of the United States to
the people and nations of the Gulf.”39
It remains possible that the Obama Administration’s emphasis on ever-stronger economic sanctions, perhaps combined
with covert action against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and scientists, might prevent Iranian nuclearization. If it doesn’t,
however, then analysts and policymakers must incorporate the risk of rapid Saudi nuclearization into their calculus
regarding Iran. Moreover, given Pakistan’s intrinsic importance as a large, Muslim, nuclear-armed state, U.S.
policymakers should be wary of backing Islamabad into a corner in which its elites see risky behavior as necessary. As
frustrating and provocative as Pakistan is to the United States, isolating it could easily backfire. Moreover, the desirability
of curtailing U.S. support for Pakistan is not solely a function of that nation’s support for the U.S. presence in Afghanistan
or counter-terror efforts in Pakistan, but may instead be a function of proliferation fears for the indefinite future. For that
reason, too, the United States should exercise great caution in substantially
reducing its regional presence , lest it set loose a set of interlocking
responses from regional actors that would be extremely dangerous for all
concerned.
Saudi capability is inevitable---motivation is key
Jeffrey Lewis 15, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Sorry, Fareed: Saudi Arabia Can
Build a Bomb Any Damn Time It Wants To ,” 6/12/15,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/12/sorry-fareed-saudi-arabia-can-build-a-bomb-any-
damn-time-it-wants-to/
[Table omitted]
it is deeply misguided to
While I don’t think it is terribly likely that Saudi Arabia will choose to build nuclear weapons, I think

conclude that Saudi Arabia (or pretty much any state) cannot do so. Simply put, Zakaria is wrong — and it’s not all
that hard to demonstrate why.¶ Zakaria isn’t explicit about what he believes to be the technical requirements for building a nuclear weapon, but he clearly thinks it

the
is hard. Which was probably true in 1945 when the United States demonstrated two different routes to atomic weapons. Since then, however,

technologies associated with producing plutonium and highly enriched

uranium have been developed, put to civilian use, and spread around the
globe . The fact that most states don’t build nuclear weapons has a lot more
to do with restraint than not being able to figure it out.¶ Zakaria’s argument that Saudi Arabia can’t
build nuclear weapons is pretty shallow and relies largely on two assertions: a flip comment about Saudi Arabia lacking even a domestic automotive industry, and a
superficially data-driven claim about Saudi Arabia’s “abysmal” math and science ranking.¶ First, automobile production is a terrible indicator of whether a state
can build a nuclear weapon. The technologies are really not at all similar — or at least they don’t have to be. India, Pakistan, and North Korea all succeeded in
building nuclear weapons despite not having much of an auto industry at home. And the Soviets were really good at building nuclear weapons, even though their
cars famously sucked. ¶ And, anyway, Saudi Arabia is investing in a domestic auto industry. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry is hoping the Meeya will be on

the market by 2017. So, there’s that.¶ More importantly, Saudi Arabia is investing in a civil nuclear
industry. “Where would Saudi Arabia train the scientists to work on its secret program?” Zakaria wonders. Oh, I don’t know, how about the King
Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy? Somehow Zakaria never mentions that Saudi Arabia is building a

dedicated city for training nuclear scientists . I can’t predict whether this investment will pay off, but
then again neither can Zakaria — if he even knows it exists. ¶ Zakaria is also skeptical because, he writes, Saudi Arabia “ranks 73rd in the quality of its math and
science education, according to the World Economic Forum — abysmally low for a rich country. Iran, despite 36 years of sanctions and a much lower per capita
GDP, fares far better at 44.” ¶ Abysmally low for a rich country? Perhaps. But for a nuclear weapons state? Not nearly. Let’s do what he should have done and make
a little table using his own data. Here is a list of selected countries — in bold if they currently possess nuclear weapons — by “Quality of Math and Science

Saudi Arabia would hardly be the

Education.” (Again, this is his data. Don’t blame me!)¶ Using Zakaria’s own measure,

least nerdy country to acquire a nuclear weapon. Now, obviously I’d prefer to have historical data. But I
strongly suspect that China’s and India’s rankings weren’t nearly so high in 1964 and 1974 when

they conducted their first nuclear tests. The point is this: You don’t need to be a rich
country , or have a great education system, to build a bomb .¶ This should be no surprise. Did I mention that we just celebrated the
70th anniversary of the first nuclear explosion, Trinity? Seventy years. What other 70-year-old technology do we believe remains impossible for non-European
countries to acquire, even after several have done so? You know what else was invented in the 1940s? Microwave ovens, solid-body electric guitars, and the Slinky.¶
I don’t mean “acquire” in terms of buying a nuclear weapon off the shelf — I agree with Zakaria that is a nutty idea. And I don’t mean purchasing a turn-key
infrastructure to produce plutonium, as Syria did from North Korea, or highly enriched uranium as Libya did from Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan. No, I mean building a

The fancy machine tools, materials, and components that were good
bomb from scratch.

enough to build the nuclear weapons of the 1970s are widely available
now . My favorite example is that one of the machine tools linked to the A.Q. Khan network was a used Denn machine tool. If you go to the Denn website,
they tell you what their machine tools can be used for: everything from armaments to kitchenware. And, be still Fareed Zakaria’s fluttering heart, auto parts. (Flow
forming machines make sweet rims.) Talk about dual use!¶ The United States was deeply skeptical that Pakistan could build centrifuges in the 1970s because of the
country’s limited industrial base. What U.S. analysts didn’t grasp was that Pakistan’s industrial base — and that of every other proliferator — was the entire world.
There is no reason to think this problem went away with A.Q. Khan. Take a spin around Alibaba, the big Chinese online B2B procurement site sometime.¶

a proliferator doesn’t have to try to acquire the most modern

Moreover,

centrifuges. When U.N. inspectors were stumbling across the remnants of the Iraqi nuclear program in the early 1990s, they made a surprising
discovery: Calutrons. These were an obsolete uranium enrichment technology (electromagnetic isotope separation) from the 1940s that fell out of favor after World

we’re
War II. Inefficient, sure, but good enough to make the highly enriched uranium for the Little Boy bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.¶ Frankly,

lucky that nuclear weapons have not spread as quickly as the technology to
make them. Some of the success in slowing the spread of nuclear weapons is down to sanctions, export controls, and the occasional air strike. Most of
the success, however, goes to the regime that discourages states that could build nuclear weapons from doing so in the first place. ¶ If you ask a policy wonk
whether the nonproliferation regime has been successful or not, the chances are better than even that you’ll hear about President John F. Kennedy’s famous
warning that “I see the possibility in the 1970s of the President of the United States having to face a world in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have these
weapons.” (It’s kind of a standard talking point we all learn early on.)¶ That didn’t happen — and credit usually goes to the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). To see why, look at the countries that were in Kennedy’s list of 15, 20, or 25 nuclear-armed states. Kennedy’s estimate came from a 1963 briefing paper
provided by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara that is now declassified. Here is McNamara’s chart: ¶ Look at those names. They aren’t rogue states, but rather
a list of the world’s relatively industrialized countries, along with a few developing regional powers like China and the UAR (The United Arab Republic was a brief
political union of Egypt and Syria). The working assumption behind Kennedy’s estimate was that any state that could build nuclear weapons probably would.
That’s because, before the NPT, nuclear weapons were seen by many people as just another weapon, part of any modern military’s future arsenal. In fact, virtually
all the non-Warsaw Pact countries on this list seriously considered a nuclear weapons program. Australia, Sweden, and Switzerland all had active nuclear weapons
programs.¶ The NPT helped changed that. (In the case of Australia, Jim Walsh has written a particularly compelling account of the role played by the NPT in
constraining Canberra’s nuclear aspirations.) Treaties are absolutely necessary. It is simply not possible to sustain a nearly universal regime through technology
denial and military action. The regime depends on the vast majority of states choosing compliance, allowing the international community to focus its enforcement
efforts on a small number of hard cases like North Korea and Iran.¶ ¶ The nonproliferation regime can only function with the support of those states that can build

The Saudis are clearly alarmed by the

nuclear weapons, but choose not to — states like Saudi Arabia.

possibility of an Iranian nuclear weapon. While I suspect that a lot of the talk about acquiring nuclear weapons is
intended to make the United States focus on Saudi security concerns, it doesn’t help to dismiss Riyadh’s anxieties by mocking their educational system and ability

to go nuclear.¶ Rather, we need to focus on making sure the nonproliferation regime works for Saudi Arabia and other states. That means closer
consultations on regional defense issues, expanded security arrangements , and crucially an attempt to head off an
Saudis will not have a bomb in 10 years,
Iranian bomb with a negotiated settlement. Fareed Zakaria may well win his bet that the

but it’s not because they can’t have one . If he wins — and I hope he does — it’s because the United States

and other powers have successfully addressed Iran’s nuclear program and
the regional security issues that would push Riyadh toward a bomb. And who knows,
maybe in 10 years we’ll all be driving Meeyas.

Saudi prolif causes nuclear war---it’s fast and destabilizing

Eric S. Edelman 11, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, former U.S.
Ambassador to Turkey, former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Finland, and former
Principal Deputy Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, “The
Dangers of a Nuclear Iran: The Limits of Containment,” Foreign Affairs,
January/February 2011, NU Libraries

There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support:
Saudi Arabia . And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the
region . Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous
pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to
preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is
already pursuing a nuclear power capability , which could be the first step
along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might
be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan .
During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation
throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen CSS-2 intermediate-range
ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the
deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the CSS-2s, which are not accurate enough
to deliver conventional warheads effectively.

There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or
security guarantees. This "Islamabad option" could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell
operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could
provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support
they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not
only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more
heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical
reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more
fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own.
Alternatively, Pakistan
might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi
Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons , delivery systems, and troops on
Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could
be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating
the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be
preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the
kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain
financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against
its chief rival, India.

The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most
worrisome being how India would respond . Would it target Pakistan's
weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons?
How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in
either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India's reaction, any decision by
the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be
highly destabilizing . It would increase the incentives of other nations in
the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability
to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state
that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only
circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT.