G.R. No.
164457 April 11, 2012 duplicate copies of the receipts petitioner submitted to the office; that
ANNA LERIMA PATULA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In the trial of everycriminal case, a judge must rigidlytest the State’s
evidence of guilt in order to ensure that such evidenceadheres to the basic
rules of admissibility before pronouncing an accused guilty of the crime
charged upon such evidence. Nothing less is demanded of the judge;
otherwise, the guarantee of due process of law is nullified.The accused
need notadduceanythingto rebut evidence that is discredited for failing the
test.Acquittal should then follow.
Antecedents
Petitioner was charged withestafaunder an informationfiled in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in DumagueteCitythat averred:
That on or about and during the period from March 16 to 20, 1997 and for
sometime prior thereto, in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a
saleswoman of Footlucker’s Chain of Stores, Inc., Dumaguete City, having
collected and received the total sum of ₱131,286.97 from several customers
of said company under the express obligation to account for the proceeds
of the sales and deliver the collection to the said company, but far from
complying with her obligation and after a reasonable period of time despite
repeated demands therefore, and with intent to defraud the said company,
did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to deliver the
said collection to the said company but instead, did, then and there willfully
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the
proceeds of the sale to her own use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of the said company in the aforesaid amount of ₱131,286.97.
Contrary to Art. 315, par 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.1
Petitioner pled not guiltyto the offense charged in the information. At pre-
trial, no stipulation of factswas had, and petitioner did not avail herself of
plea bargaining. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The Prosecution’s first witness was Lamberto Go, who testified that he was
the branch manager of Footlucker’s Chain of Stores, Inc. (Footlucker’s) in
Dumaguete City since October 8, 1994; that petitioner was an employee of
Footlucker’s, starting as a saleslady in 1996 until she became a sales
representative; that as a sales representative she was authorized to take
orders from wholesale customers coming from different towns (like Bacong,
Zamboanguita, Valencia, Lumbangan and Mabinay in Negros Oriental, and
Siquijor), and to collect payments from them; that she could issue and sign
official receipts of Footlucker’s for the payments, which she would then
remit; that she would then submit the receipts for the payments for tallying
and reconciliation; that at first her volume of sales was quite high, but later
on dropped, leading him to confront her; that she responded that business
was slow; that he summoned the accounting clerk to verify; that the
accounting clerk discovered erasures on some collection receipts; that he
decided to subject her to an audit by company auditor Karen Guivencan;
that he learned from a customer of petitioner’s that the customer’s
outstanding balance had already been fully paid although that balance
appeared unpaid in Footlucker’s records; and that one night later on,
petitioner and her parents went to his house to deny having
misappropriated any money of Footlucker’s and to plead for him not to
push through with a case against her, promising to settle her account on a
monthly basis; and that she did not settle after that, but stopped reporting
to work.2
On March 7, 2002, Go’s cross examination, re-direct examination and re-
crossexamination were completed.
The only other witness for the Prosecution was Karen Guivencan,
whomFootlucker’s employed as its store auditor since November 16, 1995
until her resignation on March 31, 2001. She declared that Go had
requested her to audit petitioner after some customers had told him that
they had already paid their accounts but the office ledger had still reflected
outstandingbalances for them; that she first conducted her audit by going
to the customers in places from Mabinay to Zamboanguitain Negros
Oriental, and then in Siquijor; thatshe discovered in the course of her audit
that the amounts appearing on the original copies of receipts in the
possession of around 50 customers varied from the amounts written on the
upon completing her audit, she submittedto Go a written report
denominated as "List of Customers Covered by Saleswoman LERIMA
PATULA w/ Differences in Records as per Audit Duly Verified March 16-20,
1997" marked as Exhibit A; and that based on the report, petitioner had
misappropriated the total amount of₱131,286.92.3
During Guivencan’s stint as a witness, the Prosecution marked the ledgers
of petitioner’s various customers allegedly with discrepancies as Exhibits B
to YYand their derivatives, inclusive. Each of the ledgers had a first column
that contained the dates of the entries, a second that identified the invoices
by the number, a third that statedthe debit, a fourth that noted the credit
(or the amounts paid), and a fifth that summed the balances (debit minus
credit).Only 49 of theledgerswere formally offered and admitted by the RTC
because the 50thledger could no longer be found.
In the course of Guivencan’sdirect-examination,petitioner’s counsel
interposed a continuing objection on the ground that the figuresentered in
Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay because the
persons who had made the entries were not themselves presented in
court.4 With that, petitioner’s counsel did not anymore cross-examine
Guivencan, apparently regarding her testimony to be irrelevant because she
thereby tended to prove falsification, an offense not alleged in the
information.
TheProsecution thenformally offered its documentary exhibits, including
Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives (like the originals and duplicates of the
receipts supposedly executed and issued by petitioner), inclusive, the
confirmation sheets used by Guivencan in auditing the accounts served by
petitioner, and Guivencan’s so-called Summary (Final Report) of
Discrepancies.5
After the Prosecution rested its case, the Defense decided not to file a
demurrer to evidence although it had manifested the intention to do so,
and instead rested itscase.The Prosecution and Defense submitted their
respective memoranda, and submitted the case for decision. 6
On January 28, 2004, the RTC, stating that inasmuch as petitioner had opted
"not to present evidence for her defense" the Prosecution’s evidence
remained "unrefuted and uncontroverted,"7 rendered its decision finding
petitioner guilty of estafa, to wit:
Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing facts and circumstances, the Court
finds ANNA LERIMA PATULA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa under Art. 315 par (1b) of the Revised Penal Code and accordingly,
she is hereby sentenced to suffer an INDETERMINATE PENALTY of
imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 18 years
and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum with all the accessory
penalties provided by law and to indemnify private complainant the
amount of ₱131,286.92 with interest at 12% per annum until fully paid and
to pay the costs.
Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
cash bail put up by the accused shall be effective only until the
promulgation of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, butthe RTC denied the motion
on May 7, 2004.9
Issues
Insisting that the RTC’s judgment "grossly violated [her] Constitutional and
statutory right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against her because, while the charge against her is estafa under Art. 315,
par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, the evidence presented against her and
upon which her conviction was based, was falsification, an offense not
alleged or included in the Information under which she was arraigned and
pleaded not guilty," and that said judgment likewise "blatantly ignored and
manifestly disregarded the rules on admission of evidence in that the
documentary evidence admitted by the trial court were all private
documents, the due execution and authenticity of which were not proved in
accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence,"
petitioner has directly appealed to the Court via petition for review on
certiorari, positing the following issues, to wit:
 1. WHETHER THE ACCUSED OR ANY ACCUSED FOR THAT
MATTER , CHARGED OF ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE CAN BE CONVICTED UPON OR BY
EVIDENCE OF FALSIFICATION WHICH IS EVEN (SIC) NOT ALLEGED
IN THE INFORMATION.
2. WHETHER THE ACCUSED’S CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE
ACCUSATION AGAINST HER WAS VIOLATED WHEN SHE WAS
CONVICTED UPON OR BY EVIDENCE OF FALSIFICATION
CONSIDERING THAT THE CHARGE AGAINST HER
IS ESTAFA THROUGH MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER ART. 315, PAR.
1 (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN
EVIDENCE, EXHIBITS "B" TO "YY"-"YY-2", ALL PRIVATE
DOCUMENTS, THE DUE EXECUTION AND AUTHENTICITY OF
WHICH WERE NOT PROVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SEC. 20, RULE
132 OF THE SAID REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE ASIDE FROM THE
FACT THAT SAID EXHIBITS TEND TO PROVE FALSIFICATION BY THE
ACCUSED, A CRIME NEITHER CHARGED NOR ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION.
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
THE TESTIMONY OF KAREN GUIVENCAN DESPITE THE OBJECTION
THAT SAID TESTIMONY WHICH TRIED TO PROVE THAT THE
ACCUSED FALSIFIED EXHIBITS "B" TO "YY"-"YY-2"INCLUSIVE
VIOLATED THE ACCUSED’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE
INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION
AGAINST HER, FOR BEING IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL SINCE
THE CHARGE AGAINST THE ACCUSED IS ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315,
PAR. 1 (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
5. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION "REMAINS
UNREFUTED AND UNCONTROVERTED" DESPITE ACCUSED’S
OBJECTION THAT SAID EVIDENCE IS IMMATERIAL AND
IRRELEVANT TO THE CRIME CHARGED.
6. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENSE’S NOT CROSS-EXAMINING
KAREN GUIVENCAN FOR THE REASON THAT HER TESTIMONY IS
IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT AS IT TENDED TO PROVE AN
OFFENSE NOT CHARGED IN INFORMATION RESULTED IN THE
ADMISSION OF SAID TESTIMONY AS BEING "UNREFUTED AND
UNCONTROVERTED", AND WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENSE’S
OBJECTION WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED WAIVED IF THE
DEFENSE CROSS-EXAMINED SAID WITNESS.
7. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
EXHIBIT "A", WHICH IS THE LIST OF CUSTOMERS COVERED BY
SALESWOMAN LERIMA PATULA WITH DIFFERENCE IN RECORD IS
NOT HEARSAY AND SELF-SERVING.10
The foregoing issues are now restatedas follows:
1. Whether or not the failure of the information for estafa to
allege the falsification of the duplicate receipts issued by
petitioner to her customersviolated petitioner’s right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
2. Whether or not the RTC gravely erred in admitting evidence of
the falsification of the duplicate receiptsdespite the information
not alleging the falsification;
3. Whether or not the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and
their derivatives, inclusive) were admissible as evidence of
petitioner’s guilt for estafaas charged despite their not being
duly authenticated;and
4. Whether or not Guivencan’stestimony onthe ledgers and
receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive) to
prove petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion
wasinadmissible for being hearsay.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
II
Testimonial and documentary evidence,being hearsay,
did not prove petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt
Nonetheless, in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden
to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In
discharging this burden, the Prosecution’s duty is to prove each and every
element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of
guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein. 14 The
Prosecution must further prove the participation of the accused in the
commission of the offense.15 In doing all these, the Prosecution must rely on
the strength of its own evidence, and not anchor its success upon the
weakness of the evidence of the accused. The burden of proof placed on
the Prosecution arises from the presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused that no less than the Constitution has guaranteed.16Conversely, as
to his innocence, the accused has no burden of proof, 17 that he must then
be acquitted and set free should the Prosecution not overcome the
presumption of innocence in his favor.In other words, the weakness of the
defense put up by the accused is inconsequential in the proceedings for as
long as the Prosecution has not discharged its burden of proof in
establishing the commission of the crime charged and in identifying the
accused as the malefactor responsible for it.
Did the Prosecution adduce evidence that proved beyond reasonable doubt
the guilt of petitioner for the estafa charged in the information?
To establish the elements of estafa earlier mentioned, the Prosecution
presented the testimonies of Go and Guivencan, and various
documentsconsisting of: (a) the receipts allegedly issued by petitioner to
each of her customers upon their payment, (b) the ledgers listing the
accounts pertaining to each customer with the corresponding notations of
the receipt numbers for each of the payments, and (c) the confirmation
sheets accomplished by Guivencan herself. 18 The ledgers and receipts were
marked and formally offered as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives,
inclusive.
On his part, Go essentially described for the trial court the various duties of
petitioner as Footlucker’s sales representative. On her part, Guivencan
conceded having no personal knowledge of the amounts actually received
by petitioner from the customersor remitted by petitioner to
Footlucker’s.This means that persons other than Guivencan prepared
Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive,and that Guivencan based
her testimony on the entries found in the receipts supposedly issued by
petitioner and in the ledgers held by Footlucker’s corresponding to each
customer, as well as on the unsworn statements of some of the customers.
Accordingly, her being the only witness who testified on the entries
effectively deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to validate and
test the veracity and reliability of the entries as evidence of petitioner’s
misappropriation or conversion through cross-examination by petitioner.
The denial of that opportunity rendered theentire proof of
misappropriation or conversion hearsay, and thus unreliable and
untrustworthy for purposes of determining the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
To elucidate why the Prosecution’s hearsay evidence was unreliable and
untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative value, reference is made
toSection 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness
can testify only to those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge;
that is, which are derived from her own perception, except as otherwise
provided in the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a witness is a
substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes
the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft ofpersonal knowledge of the
disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her testimony
derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently
testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source
of her information.
In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard
another person say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom the
witness derived the information on the facts in dispute is not in court and
under oath to be examined and cross-examined. The weight of such
testimony thendepends not upon theveracity of the witness but upon the
veracity of the other person giving the information to the witness without
oath. The information cannot be tested because the declarant is not
standing in court as a witness andcannot, therefore, be cross-examined.
It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to
enter into any particular, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to
reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any
ambiguities; and that she entrenches herself in the simple assertion that
she was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent
author.19 Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the
ground that there was no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. 20 The
testimony may have been given under oath and before a court of justice,
but if it is offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-
examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same.21
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is
offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the
assertor becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can
be received as evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject to
the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is
offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without
reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not
apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that
he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is
admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely
to show that the accused uttered those words. 22 This kind of utterance
ishearsay in character but is not legal hearsay. 23 The distinction is, therefore,
between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay
rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement,
to which the hearsay rule applies.24
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only
rule that explains why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from
consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the
opposing party to cross-examine the originaldeclarant claiming to have a
direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence. 25If hearsay is allowed,
the right stands to be denied because the declarant is not in court. 26 It is
then to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse party’s
witness,
being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies, is essential to the administration of justice.
To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as evidence to
establish the truth in a dispute while also safeguardinga party’s right to
cross-examine her adversary’s witness,the Rules of Court offers two
solutions. The firstsolution is to require that allthe witnesses in a judicial
trial or hearing be examined only in courtunder oath or affirmation. Section
1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court formalizes this solution,viz:
Section 1. Examination to be done in open court. - The examination of
witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and
under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or
the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the
witness shall be given orally. (1a)
The secondsolution is to require that all witnesses besubject to the cross-
examination by the adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Courtensuresthis solutionthusly:
Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. – Upon the
termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined
by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or
connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his
accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse,
and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue. (8a)
Although the second solution traces its existence to a Constitutional
precept relevant to criminal cases, i.e., Section 14, (2), Article III, of the
1987 Constitution,which guarantees that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall xxx enjoy the right xxx to meet the witnesses face to face
xxx," the rule requiring the cross-examination by the adverse party equally
applies to non-criminal proceedings.
We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon
serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay
evidence due to its not being given under oath or solemn affirmation and
due to its not being subjected to cross-examination by the opposing counsel
to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-
court declarant or actor upon whose reliability the worth of the out-of-
court statement depends.27
Based on the foregoing considerations, Guivencan’s testimony as well as
Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, must be entirely rejected as
proof of petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion.
III
Lack of their proper authentication rendered
Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives
inadmissible as judicial evidence
Petitioner also contends that the RTC grossly erred in admitting as evidence
Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, despite their being private
documents that were not duly authenticated as required by Section 20,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Courtdistinguishes between a public
document and a private document for the purpose of their presentation in
evidence, viz:
Section 19. Classes of documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in
evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last
wills and testaments, and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents
required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private.
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the
documents may be presented as evidence in court. A public document, by
virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been
acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent
public official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public
record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and
requires no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in
court.In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed, or
instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a
notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition or
agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character
of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private
document requires authentication in the manner allowed by law or the
Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court. The requirement
of authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances,
specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of
Section 21,28 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; (b) when the genuineness and
authenticity of an actionable document have not been specifically denied
under oath by the adverse party;29 (c) when thegenuineness and
authenticity of the document
have been admitted;30 or (d) when the document is not being offered as
genuine.31
There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives were private
documents because private individuals executed or generated them for
private or business purposes or uses. Considering that none of the exhibits
came under any of the four exceptions, they could not be presented and
admitted as evidence against petitioner without the Prosecution dutifully
seeing to their authentication in the manner provided in Section20 of Rule
132 of the Rules of Court,viz:
Section 20. Proof of private documents. – Before any private
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution
and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is
claimed to be.
The Prosecutionattempted to have Go authenticate the signature of
petitioner in various receipts, to wit:
ATTY. ABIERA:
Q. Now, these receipts which you mentioned which do not tally with the
original receipts, do you have copies of these receipts?
A. Yes, I have a copy of these receipts, but it’s not now in my possession.
Q. But when asked to present those receipts before this Honorable Court,
can you assure this
(Next Page)
ATTY ABIERA (continuing):
Honorable Court that you will be able to present those receipts?
A. Yes.
Q. You are also familiar with the signature of the accused in this case, Anna
Lerima Patula?
A. Yes.
Q. Why are you familiar with the signature of the accused in this case?
A. I used to see her signatures in the payroll and in the receipts also.
Q. Okay, I have here a machine copy of a receipt which we would present
this,or offer the same as soon as the original receipts can be presented, but
for purposes only of your testimony, I’m going to point to you a certain
signature over this receipt number FLDT96 20441, a receipt from Cirila
Askin, kindly go over the signature and tell the Honorable Court whether
you are familiar with the signature?
A. Yes, that is her signature.
INTERPRETER:
Witness is pointing to a signature above the printed word "collector".
(Next Page)
ATTY. ABIERA:
Q. Is this the only receipt wherein the name, the signature rather, of the
accused in this case appears?
A. That is not the only one, there are many receipts.
ATTY. ABIERA:
In order to save time, Your Honor, we will just be presenting the original
receipts Your Honor, because it’s quite voluminous, so we will just forego
with the testimony of the witness but we will just present the same using
the testimony of another witness, for purposes of identifying the signature
of the accused. We will request that this signature which has been
identified to by the witness in this case be marked, Your Honor, with the
reservation to present the original copy and present the same to offer as
our exhibits but for the meantime, this is only for the purposes of
recording, Your Honor, which we request the same, the receipt which has
just been identified awhile ago be marked as our Exhibit "A" You Honor.
COURT:
Mark the receipt as Exhibit "A".
ATTY. ABIERA:
And the signature be bracketed and be marked as Exhibit "A-1".
(Next Page)
COURT:
Bracket the signature &mark it as Exh. "A-1". What is the number of that
receipt?
ATTY. ABIERA:
Receipt No. 20441 dated August 4, 1996 the statement that: received from
Cirila Askin.32
xxx
As the excerpts indicate, Go’s attempt at authentication of the signature of
petitioner on the receipt with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 (a document
that was marked as Exhibit A, while the purported signature of petitioner
thereon was marked as Exhibit A-1) immediately fizzled out after the
Prosecution admitted that the document was a meremachinecopy, not the
original. Thereafter, as if to soften its failed attempt, the Prosecution
expressly promised to produce at a later date the originalsof the receipt
with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and other receipts. But that promise
was not even true, because almost in the same breath the Prosecution
offered to authenticate the signature of petitioner on the receiptsthrougha
different witness (though then still unnamed). As matters turned out in the
end, the effort to have Go authenticate both themachinecopy of the
receiptwith serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and the signature of petitioner
on that receipt was wasteful because the machine copy was
inexplicablyforgotten and was no longer evenincluded in the Prosecution’s
Offer of Documentary Evidence.
It is true that the original of the receipt bearing serial number FLDT96 No.
20441was subsequentlypresented as Exhibit Bthrough Guivencan.
However,the Prosecution did not establishthat the signature appearing on
Exhibit B was the same signature that Go had earliersought to identify to be
the signature of petitioner (Exhibit A-1) on the machine copy (Exhibit A).
This is borne out by the fact that the Prosecution abandoned Exhibit A as
the marking nomenclature for the machine copyof the receipt bearing serial
number FLDT96 No. 20441 for all intents and purposes of this case, and
used the same nomenclature to referinstead toan entirely
differentdocument entitled "List of Customers covered by ANA LERIMA
PATULA w/difference in Records as per Audit duly verified March 16-20,
1997."
In her case, Guivencan’s identification of petitioner’s signature on two
receipts based alone on the fact that the signatures contained the legible
family name of Patula was ineffectual, and exposed yet another deep flaw
infecting the documentary evidence against petitioner. Apparently,
Guivencan could not honestly identify petitioner’s signature on the receipts
either because she lacked familiarity with such signature, or because she
had not seen petitioner affix her signature on the receipts, as the following
excerpts from her testimony bear out:
ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
Q. There are two (2) receipts attached here in the confirmation sheet, will
you go over these Miss witness?
A. This was the last payment which is fully paid by the customer. The other
receipt is the one showing her payment prior to the last payment.
COURT:
Q. Where did you get those two (2) receipts?
A. From the customer.
Q. And who issued those receipts?
A. The saleswoman, Miss Patula.
ATTY. ZERNA:
We pray, Your Honor, that this receipt identified be marked as Exhibit "B-3",
receipt number 20441.
(Next Page)
COURT:
Mark it.
ATTY. ZERNA:
The signature of the collector be marked as –
Q. By the way, there is a signature above the name of the collector, are your
familiar with that signature?(shown to witness)
A. Yes.
Q. Whose signature is that?
A. Miss Patula.
Q. How do you know?
A. It can be recognized because of the word Patula. Make a follow-up question and what was the result when you copied that
amount in the ledger and you had it confirmed by the customers, what was
the result when you had it confirmed by the customers?
Q. Are you familiar with her signature?

WITNESS:
A. Yes.

A. She has no more balance but in our office she has still a balance of
ATTY. ZERNA:
₱10,971.75.

We pray that the signature be bracketed and marked as Exhibit "B-3-a"

ATTY. ZERNA to witness:

COURT:
Q. Do you have a-what’s the basis of saying that the balance of this
customer is still ₱10,971.75
Mark it.
(Next Page)
ATTY. ZERNA:
ATTY. ZERNA (continuing):
The other receipt number 20045 be marked as Exhibit "B-4" and the
signature as Exhibit "B-4-a".
[i]n your office?

COURT:
COURT:

Mark it. 33
That was already answered pañero, the office has a ledger.

xxx
Q. Now, did you bring the ledger with you?

ATTY. ZERNA:
A. No, Ma’am.35

Q. Ms. Witness, here is a receipt colored white, number 26603 issued to

(Continuation of the Direct Examination of
one Divina Cadilig. Will you please identify this receipt if this is the receipt
Karen Guivencan on August 13, 2002)
of your office?

ATTY. ZERNA to witness:

A.Yes.

Q. Okay, You said there are discrepancies between the original and the
Q.There is a signature over the portion for the collector. Whose signature is
duplicate, will you please enlighten the Honorable Court on that
this?
discrepancy which you said?

A.Ms. Patula.
A. Like in this case of Cirila Askin, she has already fully paid. Her ledger
shows a zero balance she has fully paid while in the original
Q.How do you know that this is her signature?
(Next page)
A.Because we can read the Patula.34
WITNESS (continuing):
We also have similar impressions of lack of proper authentication as to the
ledgers the Prosecution presented to prove the discrepancies between the
[r]eceipt she has a balance of Ten Thousand Seven hundred Ninety-one
amountspetitioner hadallegedly received from the customers and the
Pesos and Seventy-five Centavos (10,791.75).
amounts she had actually remitted to Footlucker’s. Guivencanexclusively
relied on the entries of the unauthenticated ledgersto support her audit
report on petitioner’s supposed misappropriation or conversion, revealing COURT:
her lack of independent knowledge of the veracity of the entries, as the
following excerpts of her testimony show:
Q. What about the duplicate receipt, how much is indicated there?

ATTY. ZERNA to witness:

Q. What is your basis of saying that your office records showed that this
Cecilia Askin has an account of ₱10,791.75?
ATTY. DIEZ:
The question answers itself, You Honor, what is the basis, office record.
A. The customer has no duplicate copy because it was already forwarded to
the Manila Office.
Q. What then is your basis in the entries in the ledger showing that it has
already a zero balance?
A. This is the copy of the customer while in the office, in the original receipt
she has still a balance.

COURT: xxx

Let the witness answer. ATTY. ZERNA:

WITNESS: The confirmation sheet ---

A. I made the basis on our ledger in the office. I just copied that and COURT:
showed it to the customers for confirmation.
The confirmation sheet was the one you referred to as the receipt in your
ATTY. ZERNA to witness: earlier testimony? Is that what you referred to as the receipts, the original
receipts?
Q. What about the receipts?
A. This is what I copied from the ledger.
COURT:
Q. So where was that(sic) original receipt which you said showed that that I think, I remember in the last setting also, she testified where those entries
particular customer still has a balance of Ten Thousand something? were taken. So, you answer the query of counsel.

A. The receipt is no longer here. xxx

Q. You mean the entry of that receipt was already entered in the ledger? ATTY. DIEZ:

A. Yes.36 Your Honor please, to avoid delay, may I interpose a continuing objection to
the questions profounded(sic) on those ledgers on the ground that, as I
have said, it is hearsay.
In the face of the palpable flaws infecting the Prosecution’s evidence, it
should come as no surprise that petitioner’s counsel interposed timely
objections. Yet, the RTC mysteriously overruled the objections and COURT:
allowedthe Prosecutionto present the unauthenticated ledgers, as follows:
Okey(sic). Let the continuing objection be noted.
(Continuation of the Direct Examination of
Witness Karen Guivencan on September 11, 2002)
Q – (To Witness) The clerk who allegedly was the one who prepared the
entries on those ledgers, is she still connected with Footluckers?
ATTY. ZERNA:
A – She is no longer connected now, Your Honor,
CONTINUATION OF DIRECT-EXAMINATION
COURT:
Q – Ms. Witness, last time around you were showing us several ledgers.
Where is it now?
Alright proceed.

A – It is here.
(Next Page)

Q – Here is a ledger of one Divina Cadilig. This Divina Cadilig, how much is
ATTY. ZERNA:
her account in your office?

Your Honor, these are entries in the normal course of business. So, exempt
ATTY. DIEZ:
from the hearsay rule.

Your Honor please before the witness will proceed to answer the question,
let me interpose our objection on the ground that this ledger has not been
duly identified to by the person who made the same. This witness will be
testifying on hearsay matters because the supposed ledger was not
identified to by the person who made the same.
COURT:
Those ledgers were already presented in the last hearing. I think they were
already duly identified by this witness. As a matter of fact, it was she who
brought them to court
(Next Page)
COURT (cont.):
because these were the ledgers on file in their office.
ATTY. DIEZ
That is correct, Your Honor, but the person who made the entries is not this
witness, Your Honor. How do we know that the entries there is (sic) correct
on the receipts submitted to their office.
COURT:
COURT:
Okey(sic), proceed.37
The mystery shrouding the RTC’s soft treatment of the Prosecution’s flawed
presentation was avoidable simply by the RTC adhering to the instructions
of the rules earlier quoted, as well as withSection 22 of Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court,which contains instructions on how to prove the genuineness
of a handwriting in a judicial proceeding, as follows:
Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. – The handwriting of a
person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting
of such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing
purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and
has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence
respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by
the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by
the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to
the satisfaction of the judge. (Emphases supplied)
If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had not themselves seen the
execution or signing of the documents,the Prosecution surely did not
authenticate Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives conformably with the
aforequoted rules. Hence, Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive,
were inescapably bereft of probative value as evidence. That was the
onlyfair and just result, as the Court held in Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v.
Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation:38

Precisely, she brought along the receipts also to support that. Let the
witness answer. On the first issue, petitioner Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., contends that
Jeanne King’s testimony was hearsay because she had no personal
knowledge of the execution of the documents supporting respondent’s
WITNESS: cause of action, such as the sales contract, invoice, packing list, bill of
lading, SGS Report, and the Marine Cargo Policy. Petitioner avers that even
A – It’s the office clerk in-charge. though King was personally assigned to handle and monitor the
importation of Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation, herein respondent,
this cannot be equated with personal knowledge of the facts which gave
COURT: rise to respondent’s cause of action. Further, petitioner asserts, even
though she personally prepared the summary of weight of steel billets
The one who prepared the ledger is the office clerk. received by respondent, she did not have personal knowledge of the weight
of steel billets actually shipped and delivered.
ATTY. ZERNA:
At the outset, we must stress that respondent’s cause of action is founded
on breach of insurance contract covering cargo consisting of imported steel
She is an auditor, Your Honor. She has been qualified and she is the auditor
billets. To hold petitioner liable, respondent has to prove, first, its
of Footluckers.
importation of 10,053.400 metric tons of steel billets valued at
₱67,156,300.00, and second, the actual steel billets delivered to and
COURT: received by the importer, namely the respondent. Witness Jeanne King,
who was assigned to handle respondent’s importations, including their
insurance coverage, has personal knowledge of the volume of steel billets
being imported, and therefore competent to testify thereon. Her testimony (e) The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of
is not hearsay, as this doctrine is defined in Section 36, Rule 130 of the business or duty.41
Rules of Court.However, she is not qualified to testify on the shortage in the
delivery of the imported steel billets. She did not have personal knowledge
The Court has to acquit petitioner for failure of the State to establish her
of the actual steel billets received. Even though she prepared the summary
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court reiterates that in the trial of
of the received steel billets, she based the summary only on the receipts
every criminal case, a judge must rigidly test the State’s evidence of guilt in
prepared by other persons. Her testimony on steel billets received was
order to ensure that such evidence adhered to the basic rules of
hearsay. It has no probative value even if not objected to at the trial.
admissibility before pronouncing an accused guilty of the crime charged
upon such evidence. The failure of the judge to do so herein nullified the
On the second issue, petitioner avers that King failed to properly guarantee of due of process of law in favor of the accused, who had no
authenticate respondent’s documentary evidence. Under Section 20, Rule obligation to prove her innocence. Heracquittal should follow.
132, Rules of Court, before a private document is admitted in evidence, it
must be authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person
IV
before whom its execution was acknowledged, any person who was present
and saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the
signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the instruments had No reliable evidence on damage
previously confessed execution thereof. In this case, respondent admits
that King was none of the aforementioned persons. She merely made the Conformably with finding the evidence of guilt unreliable, the Court
summary of the weight of steel billets based on the unauthenticated bill of declares that the disposition by the RTC ordering petitioner to indemnify
lading and the SGS report. Thus, the summary of steel billets actually Footlucker’s in the amount of ₱131,286.92 with interest of 12% per annum
received had no proven real basis, and King’s testimony on this point could until fully paid was not yet shown to be factually founded. Yet, she cannot
not be taken at face value. now be absolved of civil liability on that basis. Heracquittal has to
bedeclared as without prejudice to the filing of a civil action against her for
xxx Under the rules on evidence, documents are either public or private. the recovery of any amount that she may still owe to Footlucker’s.1âwphi1
Private documents are those that do not fall under any of the enumerations
in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.Section 20of the same law, in WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE ANDREVERSESthe decision convicting
turn, provides that before any private document is received in evidence, its ANNA LERIMA PATULAof estafa as charged, and ACQUITS her for failure of
due execution and authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the Prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, without
the document executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness of prejudice to a civil action brought against her for the recoveryof any
the signature or handwriting of the maker. Here, respondent’s documentary amount still owing in favor of Footlucker’s Chain of Stores, Inc.
exhibits are private documents. They are not among those enumerated in
Section 19, thus, their due execution and authenticity need to be proved
before they can be admitted in evidence.With the exception concerning the
summary of the weight of the steel billets imported, respondent presented
no supporting evidence concerning their authenticity. Consequently, they
cannot be utilized to prove less of the insured cargo and/or the short
delivery of the imported steel billets. In sum, we find no sufficient
competent evidence to prove petitioner’s liability.

That the Prosecution’s evidence was left uncontested because petitioner

decided not to subject Guivencan to cross-examination, and did not tender
her contrary evidencewas inconsequential. Although the trial court had
overruled the seasonable objections to Guivencan’s testimony
bypetitioner’s counsel due to the hearsay character, it could not be denied
thathearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, had no probative
value.39 Verily, the flaws of the Prosecution’s evidence were fundamental
and substantive, not merely technical and procedural, and were defects
that the adverse party’s waiver of her cross-examination or failure to
rebutcould not set right or cure. Nor did the trial court’s overruling of
petitioner’s objections imbue the flawed evidence with any virtue and
value.

Curiously, the RTC excepted the entries in the ledgers from the application
of the hearsay rule by also terselystating that the ledgers "were prepared in
the regular course of business."40 Seemingly, the RTC applied Section 43,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 43. Entries in the course of business. – Entries made at, or near the
time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or
unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated,
may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in
his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary
or regular course of business or duty.

This was another grave error of the RTC.The terse yet sweeping mannerof
justifying the application of Section 43 was unacceptable due to the need to
show the concurrence of the several requisites before entries in the course
of business could be excepted from the hearsay rule. The requisites are as
follows:

(a) The person who made the entry must be dead or unable to
testify;

(b) The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions
to which they refer;

(c) The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the
entries;

(d) The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the

performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral, or
religious;

G.R. No. 198022 April 7, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SONNY GATARIN y CABALLERO @ "JAY-R" and EDUARDO
QUISAYAS, Accused,
EDUARDO QUISAYAS, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 dated February
23, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 03593 affirming the Regional Trial Court
(RTC)2 Decision3 dated June 20, 2008 in Criminal Case No. 13838 convicting
appellant Eduardo Quisayas of Robbery with Homicide committed against
the victim Januario Castillo y Masangcay (Januario).
The facts of the case follow:
Appellant and accused Sonny Gatarin y Caballero were charged in an
Information4 with Robbery with Homicide committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of November, 2004, at about 8:00 o’clock (sic)
in the evening, at Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of Mabini, Province of
Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, armed with a bladed weapon, conspiring and
confederating together, acting in common accord and mutually helping
each other, with intent to gain, without the knowledge and consent of the
owner thereof and with violence against or intimidation of person, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob, and carry away
cash money amounting to Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00), Philippine
Currency, belonging to Januario Castillo y Masangcay alias "Ka Maning," to
the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforementioned amount and
that on the occasion and by reason of said robbery, the said accused with
intent to kill and taking advantage of their superior strength, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the
said weapon Januario Castillo y Masangcay alias "Ka Maning," thereby
inflicting upon the latter the stab wounds to [the] anterior chest and right
shoulder and right axilla, which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.5
Appellant was arrested, while his co-accused remained at-large. When
arraigned, he pleaded "Not Guilty." Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented the testimonies of the following witnesses: (1)
Maria Castillo, the victim’s wife; (2) Howel Umali (Umali), who allegedly
saw how the accused mauled the victim; (3) SPO3 Gregorio G. Mendoza
(SPO3 Mendoza) of the Mabini Police Station, who saw the victim lying on
the floor and the accused running away from the crime scene, and testified
on the dying declaration of Januario; (4) Dr. Catalino Ike A. Rasa Jr. (Dr.
Rasa), who attended to the victim when he was brought to the hospital;
and (5) PO1 Rogelio Dizon Coronel (PO1 Coronel), who saw the accused
running fast near the crime scene and who, likewise, testified on Januario’s
ante mortem statement.
From the testimonies of the above-named witnesses, the prosecution
established the following facts:
On November 3, 2004, at 8 o’clock in the evening, Umali was riding a bicycle
on his way home when he saw Januario being mauled by two persons
opposite Dom’s Studio in Poblacion, Mabini, Batangas. Upon seeing the
incident, he stayed in front of the church until such time that the accused
ran away and were chased by policemen who alighted from the police
patrol vehicle.6
On the same night, SPO3 Mendoza and PO1 Coronel were on board their
patrol vehicle performing their routine patrol duty when they met two
men, later identified as the accused, who were running at a fast speed.
When asked why they were running, the accused did not answer prompting
the policemen to chase them. The policemen, however, were unsuccessful
in catching them and when it became evident that they could no longer find
them, they continued patrolling the area. There they saw Januario lying on
the street in front of Dom’s studio. As he was severely injured, the
policemen immediately boarded Januario to the patrol vehicle and brought
him to the Zigzag Hospital. While inside the vehicle, SPO3 Mendoza asked
Januario who hurt him. He answered that it was "Jay-R and his uncle" who
stabbed him. The uncle turned out to be the appellant herein, while Jay-R is
his co-accused who remains at-large.7
At the Zigzag Hospital, Januario was attended to by Dr. Rasa who found him
in critical condition. Three fatal wounds caused by a bladed weapon were
found in Januario’s body which eventually caused his death.8
Maria Castillo, for her part, testified on how she learned of what happened
to her husband, the victim herein, the amount allegedly stolen from her
husband, as well as on the expenses and loss incurred by reason of
Januario’s death. She, further, quantified the sorrow and anxiety the family
suffered by reason of such death.9
In his defense, appellant denied the accusation against him. He claimed
that he is from the Province of Samar but has been residing in Cupang,
Muntinlupa City since 1987. He denied knowing, much more residing in,
Mabini, Batangas, as he only heard about the province from his employer
who happens to be a resident therein. He claimed that he did not know
Januario and that he was, in fact, working in Muntinlupa City on the date
and time the crime was allegedly committed.10
The prosecution’s rebuttal witness Mr. Bienvenido Caponpon, however,
belied appellant’s claim and insisted that appellant was renting a house in
Mabini, Batangas and that he was seen there until the day the crime was
committed.11
On June 20, 2008, the RTC rendered a Decision against the appellant, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the People having proven the guilt of accused Eduardo
Quisayas beyond reasonable doubt, he is hereby declared "GUILTY" of the
offense as charged. Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to a prison term of
Reclusion Perpetua.
Further, he is hereby ordered to pay herein offended party of the following:
(a) civil indemnity in the amount of Php50,000.00
(b) actual damages in the amount of Php20,000.00, plus Php35,310.00
(funeral and hospital expenses), and
(c) moral damages in the amount of Php100,000.00
SO ORDERED.12
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Maria Castillo not only as
to the fact of taking money from Januario but also the amount taken. 13 The
fact of death was, likewise, found by the court to have been adequately
proven by the testimony of Dr. Rasa. 14 Though there was no evidence
whether the unlawful taking preceded the killing of Januario, the court held
that there was direct and intimate connection between the two acts.15
As to the identity of the perpetrators, the court considered the victim’s
response to SPO3 Mendoza’s question as to who committed the crime
against him as part of the res gestae, which is an exception to the hearsay
rule.16 As to appellant’s defense of alibi, the court gave more weight to the
prosecution’s rebuttal evidence that indeed the former was an actual
resident of Mabini, Batangas.17
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. Contrary, however, to the
RTC’s conclusion, the appellate court considered Januario’s statement to
SPO3 Mendoza, that the accused were the ones who stabbed him and took
his wallet, not only as part of res gestae but also as a dying declaration. 18
Hence, the appeal before the Court.
We find appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt not of robbery with
homicide but of murder.
The trial court’s factual findings, including its assessment of the credibility ATTY. EBORA:
of the witnesses, the probative weight of their testimonies, and the
conclusions drawn from the factual findings are accorded great respect and
We will object. That will be misleading.
even conclusive effect. We, nevertheless, fully scrutinize the records, since
the penalty of reclusion perpetua that the CA imposed on appellant
demands no less than this kind of careful and deliberate consideration.19 COURT:

To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must If she is aware.
prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging
to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or ATTY. EBORA:
intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the
robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense, was
committed.20 We submit.

First, in order to sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery with COURT:
homicide, it is necessary that the robbery itself be proven as conclusively as
any other essential element of the crime. 21 In order for the crime of robbery You ask her if she is aware who the perpetrators are.
with homicide to exist, it must be established that a robbery has actually
taken place and that, as a consequence or on the occasion of robbery, a
homicide be committed.22 ATTY. MASANGYA:

For there to be robbery, there must be taking of personal property Q Madam Witness, were you informed who are the perpetrators of the
belonging to another, with intent to gain, by means of violence against or crime on your husband?
intimidation of any person or by using force upon on things. 23 Both the RTC
and the CA concluded that robbery was committed based on the WITNESS:
testimonies of Maria Castillo, SPO3 Mendoza, and PO1 Coronel. A closer
look at the testimonies of these witnesses, however, failed to convince us
A Not yet, sir. It was not told to me by the policemen because the
that indeed robbery took place.
policemen were in a hurry.

Maria Castillo’s testimony was offered by the prosecution to prove that her
ATTY. MASANGYA:
husband, the victim herein, was a victim of robbery with homicide and that
he is a businessman, and that she suffered damages by reason of such
death. The pertinent portion of her direct testimony is quoted below for a Q After the policemen went to your house, was there [any] person who
closer scrutiny: informed you who were the perpetrators of the crime?

ATTY. MASANGYA: A Yes, sir. My niece.

Q The victim in this case Januario Castillo, how are you related to him? Q And who is that niece of yours, Madam Witness?

WITNESS: A Josephine Borbon, sir.

A My husband, sir. Q Did Miss Borbon tell you about the identity of the perpetrators of the
crime, Madam Witness?
Q On November 3, 2004, do you remember of any unusual incident that has
occurred? A Yes, sir.

A Yes, sir. Q And who are the persons did Miss Borbon mention?

Q And what is that event? A My former helper Sonny Gatarin and his uncle Eduardo Quisayas, sir.

A At around 8:30 o’clock in the evening of November 3, 2004 while I was at Q You were told that your husband was robbed, how much was taken from
home, policemen arrived and informed me that my husband was wounded, your husband, Madam Witness?
sir.
A ₱20,000.00.
Q Did these police officers inform you the location (sic) of where your
husband was located? Q And can you tell, Madam Witness, why is your husband carrying that
amount of money at the time of his death?
A According to the policemen, my husband was at Zigzag Hospital, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you go to Zigzag Hospital, Madam Witness?
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
A Those were the earnings for that day for he delivered merchandise and
Q What happened, Madam Witness, when you arrived at the hospital? groceries, sir.

A I was informed by the nurse there that my husband was already dead. ATTY. MASANGYA:

ATTY. MASANGYA: Q Do you know, Madam Witness, if your husband is engaged in any
business?
Q Were you informed of the cause of the death of your husband?
A Yes, sir.
WITNESS:
Q And what is your proof in saying your husband is engaged in business?
A According to them my husband was wounded, many wounds and he was
robbed, sir. A Our business was we delivered bottled goods and groceries, sir.

Q Madam Witness, were you able to know who are the persons responsible Q The business wherein your husband is engaged has an existing license
for the death of your husband? with the appropriate local government?
A Yes, sir. PO1 Coronel’s Answers to the questions propounded by the Presiding
Judge:
Q If a copy will be shown to you, will you be able to identify the same?
THE COURT:
A Yes, sir.
Alright, the Court will ask.
Q I am showing to you [a] certified copy of [the] Mayor’s permit previously
marked as Exhibit "H"? Q When did you talk with the victim?

A This is it, sir. A When we were inside the patrol car, your Honor.

Q If you know, Madam Witness, how much is your husband earning in his Q What exactly did you ask from the victim?
sari-sari or grocery business?
A I asked him who stabbed him, your Honor.
WITNESS:
Q Did you tell the victim his condition?
A Yes, sir.
A No, your Honor.
ATTY. MASANGYA:
Q You just asked the victim who stabbed him?
Q How much is he earning at the time?
A Yes, your Honor.
A He earns ₱40,000.00.
Q What was the answer of the victim?
Q In a month or year?
A That he was stabbed by Jay-ar and his uncle, your Honor.
A ₱40,000.00 a month, sir.
Q And no other question did you ask him?
Q How do you feel or confront the situation that your husband is already
dead?
A None, your Honor.

A We felt deep sorrow together with my three (3) children, sir. (Witness is
x x x x28
crying)

Direct Testimony of SPO3 Mendoza:

x x x x24

xxxx
From the above testimony, it can be inferred that Maria Castillo obviously
was not at the scene of the crime on that fateful night as she was only
informed that the incident took place and that Januario was brought to the Q And when you saw Januario Castillo lying on the street, what did you do?
Zigzag Hospital. It, likewise, appears that she had no personal knowledge
that Januario was robbed. While she claimed that ₱20,000.00 was illegally A We lifted him and boarded him in our vehicle then we brought him to the
taken from him, no evidence was presented to show that Januario indeed hospital.
had that amount at that time and that the same was in his possession. As
Maria Castillo claimed that the said amount was allegedly received from
their clients in their grocery business, said fact could have been proven by Q While you were travelling, were you able to talk to the victim Januario
receipts or testimonies of said clients. The prosecution’s failure to present Castillo?
such evidence creates doubt as to the existence of the money.
A Yes, sir.
The trial and appellate courts likewise relied on the testimony of SPO3
Mendoza and PO1 Coronel on the statement of Januario after the Q What was your conversation all about?
commission of the crime. While both policemen testified as to the dying
declaration of Januario pertaining to the cause and circumstances
surrounding his death, only PO1 Coronel testified during his direct A I asked Ka Maning Castillo as to who stabbed him and he answered Jay-R
examination that when asked who stabbed him, Januario replied that it was and his uncle.
"Jay-Ar and his uncle who stabbed him and took his wallet." 25 In response
to the Presiding Judge’s clarificatory question, however, PO1 Coronel x x x x29
admitted that when he asked Januario who stabbed him, he replied that it
was Jay-Ar and his uncle. After which, no further question was asked. 26 On
It is, therefore, clear from the foregoing that the evidence presented to
the other hand, nowhere in SPO3 Mendoza’s testimony did he talk about
prove the robbery aspect of the special complex crime of robbery with
the alleged taking of wallet. The pertinent portions of their testimonies
homicide, does not show that robbery actually took place. The prosecution
read:
did not convincingly establish the corpus delicti of the crime of robbery.

Direct Examination of PO1 Coronel:

Corpus delicti has been defined as the body or substance of the crime and,
in its primary sense, refers to the fact that a crime has actually been
xxxx committed. As applied to a particular offense, it means the actual
commission by someone of the particular crime charged. 30 In this case, the
Q: What did you do next after boarding him inside your vehicle? element of taking, as well as the existence of the money alleged to have
been lost and stolen by appellant, was not adequately established. 31 We
find no sufficient evidence to show either the amount of money stolen, or if
A We brought him at the Zigzag Hospital and we asked him who stabbed any amount was in fact stolen from Januario. Even if we consider Januario’s
him. dying declaration, the same pertains only to the stabbing incident and not
to the alleged robbery.
Q What was his reply Mr. Witness?
Moreover, assuming that robbery was indeed committed, the prosecution
A He told us that Jay-ar and his uncle stabbed him and took his wallet. must establish with certitude that the killing was a mere incident to the
robbery, the latter being the perpetrator’s main purpose and objective. It is
not enough to suppose that the purpose of the author of the homicide was
x x x x27 to rob; a mere presumption of such fact is not sufficient. 32 Stated in a
different manner, a conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the
main purpose, and objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely Januario when he was brought to the hospital, also testified as to the
incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of nature and extent of the injury sustained by Januario. He clearly stated that
human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the Januario sustained three fatal injuries which caused his death. The
robbery.33 What is crucial for a conviction for the crime of robbery with pertinent portion of Dr. Rasa’s testimony reads:
homicide is for the prosecution to firmly establish the offender’s intent to
take personal property before the killing, regardless of the time when the
ATTY. MASANGYA:
homicide is actually carried out.34 In this case, there was no showing of the
appellant’s intention, determined by their acts prior to, contemporaneous
with, and subsequent to the commission of the crime, to commit Q How many injuries were sustained by the victim, Mr. Witness?
robbery.35 No shred of evidence is on record that could support the
conclusion that appellant’s primary motive was to rob Januario and that he A Three.
was able to accomplish it.36 Mere speculation and probabilities cannot
substitute for proof required in establishing the guilt of an accused beyond
reasonable doubt.37 Where the evidence does not conclusively prove the Q In what parts of the body was the victim injured?
robbery, the killing of Januario would be classified either as a simple
homicide or murder, depending upon the absence or presence of any A The victim sustained three injuries: one on the left side of the parasternal
qualifying circumstance, and not the crime of robbery with homicide. 38 To border the heart (sic) and it penetrated, and then the second one was on
establish the fact that appellant and his co-accused killed the victim by the right side of the chest near the shoulder and the third one was under
stabbing him with a bladed weapon, the prosecution presented Umali as an the armpit also to the chest.
eyewitness to the mauling incident. It was this same witness who identified
the perpetrators. The trial and appellate courts also relied on the statement
of Januario as to the circumstances of his death, testified to by PO1 Coronel ATTY. MASANGYA:
and SPO3 Mendoza as dying declaration and as part of res gestae.
Q Which of those injuries caused the death of the victim?
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its
hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following A All of them are fatal, because the one over the heart penetrated the heart
requisites concur, namely: (a) the declaration concerns the cause and the and the aorta. The one in the anterior chest near the right shoulder hit the
surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) it is made when blood vessels of the armpit and the wound under the armpit apparently hit
death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness the lungs.
of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify
had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in
x x x x43
which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant's death.39

This same physician issued the Medical Certificate explaining the location of
In the case at bar, it appears that not all the requisites of a dying
the stab wounds as well as the cause of death of Januario, to wit:
declaration are present. From the records, no questions relative to the
second requisite was propounded to Januario. It does not appear that the
declarant was under the consciousness of his impending death when he Location of Stab Wounds:
made the statements. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration
admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered 1. Stab wound penetrating 2nd inter-costal space left para-sternal border,
by the declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid 6" deep penetrating the heart chambers and aorta
succession of death in point of fact that renders a dying declaration
admissible. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of
survival and looked on death as certainly impending. 40 Thus, the utterances 2. Stab wound over the right anterior deltoid muscle, penetrating
made by Januario could not be considered as a dying declaration.
3" into the right axilla space; injuring the axilla blood vessels.
However, even if Januario’s utterances could not be appreciated as a dying
declaration, his statements may still be appreciated as part of the res 3. Stab wound over the right axilla, penetrating to the right chest cavity.
gestae. Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that
grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so
spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the CAUSES OF DEATH
idea of deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as
a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or Immediate Cause: Hypovolemic Shock
exclamation, is so interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event
that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and
Antecedent Cause: Multiple stab wounds to the anterior chest, right
also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to
manufacture testimony.41
axilla, and right axilla penetrating the chest cavity.
The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae
concur herein. When Januario gave the identity of the assailants to SPO3 x x x x44
Mendoza, he was referring to a startling occurrence which is the stabbing
by appellant and his co-accused. At that time, Januario and the witness From the testimony of the eyewitness and corroborated by the medical
were in the vehicle that would bring him to the hospital, and thus, had no certificate of Dr. Rasa, it can be inferred that indeed the qualifying
time to contrive his identification of the assailant. His utterance about circumstance of abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the
appellant and his co-accused having stabbed him, in answer to the question crime. To be sure, with two assailants younger than the victim, armed with
of SPO3 Mendoza, was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the a bladed weapon and inflicting multiple mortal wounds on the victim, there
startling occurrence. Definitely, the statement is relevant because it is definitely abuse of superior strength deliberately taken advantage of by
identified the accused as the authors of the crime. Verily, the killing of appellant and his co-accused in order to consummate the offense.
Januario, perpetrated by appellant, is adequately proven by the
prosecution.
Now on the penalty. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
From the evidence presented, we find that as alleged in the information,
abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the crime, and thus, ART. 248. Murder. – Any person who, not falling within the provisions of
qualifies the offense to murder. Abuse of superior strength is considered article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished
whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following
the aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength notoriously advantageous attendant circumstances:
for the aggressor which the latter selected or took advantage of in the
commission of the crime.42 1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of
armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or
It is clear from the records of the case that Januario was then fifty-four (54) persons to insure or afford impunity.
years old. Appellant, on the other hand, was then forty (40) years old.
Appellant committed the crime with his co-accused, his nephew. Clearly, x x x x45
assailants are younger than the victim. These two accused were seen by
Umali as the persons who mauled Januario. Moreover, assailants were
armed with a bladed weapon, while Januario was unarmed. This same There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, appellant
bladed weapon was used in repeatedly stabbing Januario, who no longer shall be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
showed any act of defense. Dr. Rasa, the medical doctor who attended to
Finally, the award of damages. In murder, the grant of civil indemnity which
has been fixed by jurisprudence at ₱50,000.00 requires no proof other than
the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of the accused’s
responsibility therefor. Moral damages, on the other hand, which in this
case is also ₱50,000.00 are awarded in view of the violent death of the
victim.46 Moreover, exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00
should likewise be given, considering that the offense was attended by an
aggravating circumstance whether ordinary, or qualifying as in this case. As
duly proven by Maria Castillo, actual damages representing the hospital and
funeral expenses, as evidenced by receipts in the amount of ₱35,300.00, be
awarded. Finally, in addition and in conformity with current policy, we also
impose on all the monetary awards for damages an interest at the legal rate
of six percent (6%) from date of finality of this decision until full payment. 47

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we MODIFY the Court of Appeals

Decision dated February 23, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 03593, affirming
the Regional Trial Court Decision dated June 20, 2008 in Criminal Case No.
13838, convicting appellant Eduardo Quisayas of Robbery with Homicide.
We find appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER
and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

We, likewise, ORDER appellant TO PAY the heirs of the victim Januario
Castillo y Masangcay the following: (1) ₱35,300.00 actual damages; (2)
₱50,000.00 civil indemnity; (3) ₱50,000.00 moral damages; (4) ₱30,000.00
exemplary damages; plus (5) six percent (6%) interest on all damages
awarded from the date of the finality of this decision until full payment.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 214453 June 17, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BERNABE P. PALANAS alias "ABE", Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal filed by accused-appellant Bernabe P.
1
Palanas alias "Abe" (Palanas) assailing the Decision dated January 16, 2014 of
2
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04925, which affirmed the
Decision dated October 20, 2010, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
3
157 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 133352-H finding Palanas guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
An Information was filed before the RTC charging Palanas of the murder ofSP02
4
Ramon Borrey Orio (SP02 Borre), viz.:
On or about March 26, 2006, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused [Palanas], acting in conspiracy with one male
person who is at-large, whose true identity and where about[s] are still unknown
acted as co-principal in the killing of one SPO2 Ramon Borre y Orio, committed
as follows: said male person, armed with a gun, with intent to kill and with the
qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shot one SPO2
Ramon Borre yOrio on his head and different parts of his body which directly
caused his death, and thereafter, took the firearm of the said victim, boarded a
motorcycle driven by the accused who thereafter, drove the motorcycle away
from the scene of the crime.
Contrary to Law. 5
The prosecution presents the following version of the facts:
At around 6:40 in the morning of March 26, 2006, SPO2 Borre took his five (5)-
month-old grandson outside his residence at Block 14, Kenneth Street corner
Eusebio Avenue, Pasig City. PO3 Leopoldo Zapanta (PO3 Zapanta), who slept at
SPO2 Borre’s residence, was watching television when four (4) successive
gunshots rang out. PO3 Zapanta looked through the open door of SPO2 Borre’s
house and saw two (2) men armed with .38 caliber revolvers standing a meter
away from SPO2 Borre. He saw Palanas deliver the fourth shot to SPO2 Borre,
but he could not identify the other shooter. Thereafter, the two (2) assailants
fled on a motorcycle. PO3 Zapanta, together with SPO2 Borre’s stepson Ramil
6
Ranola (Ramil), brought SPO2 Borre to the Pasig City General Hospital. On the
way to the hospital, SPO2 Borre told Ramil and PO3 Zapanta that it was "Abe,"
"Aspog," or "Abe Palanas" – referring to his neighbor, Palanas – who shot him.
This statement was repeated to his wife, Resurreccion Borre (Resurreccion), who
followed him at the hospital. At around 11 o’clock in the morning of even date,
SPO2 Borre died due to gunshot wounds on his head and trunk. 7
For his part, Palanas interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that
on March 25, 2006 he was in Parañaque City attending to the needs of his sick
father. The next day, he went to a baptism in Tondo, Manila and stayed there
from morning until 9 o’clock in the evening, after which he returned to his father
in Parañaque City. He maintained that he was not aware of the death of SPO2
Borre until he was informed by a neighbor that Resurreccion was accusing him of
killing her husband. He also denied any knowledge why Resurreccion would
blame him for SPO2 Borre’s death. 8
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision dated October 20, 2010, the RTC convicted Palanas of the crime of
9
Murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and
ordered him to pay the heirs of SPO2 Borre the amounts of: (a) ₱50,000.00 as
civil indemnity; (b) ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages; (c) ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages; and (d) ₱2,464,865.07 as actual damages.
10 11
The RTC found that the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt
that Palanas and his companion were the ones who killed SPO2 Borre through
the positive identification of the eyewitnesses to the incident. Moreover, SPO2
Borre’s statements that Palanas shot him constituted an ante mortem statement
and formed part of the res gestae, and, thus, admissible as evidence against
Palanas. It further opined that treachery attended SPO2 Borre’s killing as he had
no inkling that the attack would take place, and that he was in no position to
mount any feasible defense. The RTC, however, did not appreciate evident
12
premeditation because of the absence of the following elements: (a) the time
when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly
indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse
of time between determination and execution to allow himself time to reflect
upon the consequences of his act. 13
On the other hand, the RTC gave no credence to Palanas’s defense of alibi. It
observed that it was not physically impossible for Palanas to be at the locus
criminis as his own witness even stated that the distance between Pasig City and
Parañaque City could be traversed in less than one (1) hour. 14
Dissatisfied, Palanas appealed his conviction to the CA. 15
The CA Ruling
In a Decision dated January 16, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling with
16
modification increasing the amounts awarded to the heirs of SPO2 Borre to
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The CA found all the elements of the crime of Murder to be present, giving
probative weight to the dying declaration of SPO2 Borre that it was Palanas who
shot him. It also found the presence of treachery as SPO2 Borre was in no
position to defend himself when he was successively shot. 17
Aggrieved, Palanas filed the instant appeal. 18
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not Palanas’s conviction for the
crime of Murder should be upheld.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Murder is defined and penalized under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by
Republic Act No. (RA) 7659, as follows: 19
Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article
246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed
men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to
insure or afford impunity.
xxxx
Treachery is a well-established concept in criminal law. "There is treachery when
the offender commits any of the crimes against a person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make." There are two (2) conditions therefore that must
20
be met for treachery to be appreciated: (a) the employment of means of
execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and (b) the means of execution was deliberately or consciously
adopted. 21
The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without warning in a swift,
deliberate, and unexpected manner, granting the victim no chance to resist or
escape. The attack must be sudden and unexpected rendering the victim unable
1avvphi1
and unprepared to put up a defense. With the foregoing in mind, the Court
22
agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that Palanas killed SPO2 Borre,
and that the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the same. The
records show that SPO2 Borre was outside carrying his grandson when two (2)
assailants shot him. During the attack, SPO2 Borre had no opportunity to raise
any meaningful defense against his assailants; and consequently, he suffered
multiple gunshot wounds on his head and trunk, causing his death. 23
The CA is also correct in admitting SPO2 Borre’s statements on his way to the
hospital as evidence, both as a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae.
For a dying declaration to constitute an exception to the hearsay evidence
24
rule, four (4) conditions must concur: (a) the declaration must concern the
25
cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the
time the declaration was made, the declarant is conscious of his impending
death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is
offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant
is the victim. On the other hand, a statement to be deemed to form part of the
26
res gestae, and thus, constitute another exception to the rule on hearsay
27
evidence, requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (a) the principal
act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made
before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must
concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances. 28
In the case at bar, SPO2 Borre’s statements constitute a dying declaration, given
that they pertained to the cause and circumstances of his death and taking into
consideration the number and severity of his wounds, it may be reasonably
presumed that he uttered the same under a fixed belief that his own death was
already imminent. This declaration is considered evidence of the highest order
29

and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death
would make a careless and false accusation. Verily, because the declaration was
30

made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every
motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful
considerations to speak the truth, the law deems this as a situation so solemn
and awful as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath
administered in court. 31

In the same vein, SPO2 Borre’s statements may likewise be deemed to form part
of the res gestae. "Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations
that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so
spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of
deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the
res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so
intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also
whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony." In this case, SPO2 Borre’s statements refer to a startling occurrence,
32

i.e., him being shot by Palanas and his companion. While on his way to the
hospital, SPO2 Borre had no time to contrive the identification of his assailants.
Hence, his utterance was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the
startling occurrence. Definitely, such statement is relevant because it identified
Palanas as one of the authors of the crime. Therefore, the killing of SPO2 Borre,
perpetrated by Palanas, is adequately proven by the prosecution. 33

On the other hand, the Court does not find credence in Palanas’s defense of alibi.
It is axiomatic that alibi is an inherently weak defense, and may only be
34

considered if the following circumstances are shown: (a) he was somewhere else
when the crime occurred; and (b) it would be physically impossible for him to be
at the locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime. In this case, the RTC
35

correctly observed that aside from the admission that travel from Parañaque
Cityto Pasig City only takes about one (1) hour, the incident occurred on a
Sunday when traffic is not usually heavy. Moreover, Palanas had access to a
motorcycle that allowed him to travel faster on the date and time of the
incident. Under the circumstances, there is the possibility that Palanas could
36

have been present at the locus criminis at the time of the shooting. Accordingly,
his defense of alibi must fall.

Anent the proper penalty to be imposed upon Palanas, Section 3 of RA

9346 provides that "[p]ersons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion
37

perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason

of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known
as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended." Pursuant thereto, Palanas
should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility for parole. 38

Finally, to conform with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court increases the

amounts of damages awarded to the heirs of SPO2 Borre, as follows: (a)
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱75,000.00 as moral damages; and (c)
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with interest at the rate of six percent
39

(6%) per annum from the date of finality of judgment until the same are fully
paid.40

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated January 16, 2014 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04925 finding accused-appellant Bernabe
P. Palanas alias "Abe", GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
as defined and punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION, in that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, and ordered to pay the heirs of
SPO2 ₱2,464,865.07 as actual damages, all with legal interest at the rate of six

percent (6%) per annum from the finality of judgment until full payment.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 113685 June 19, 1997
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THEODORE BERNAL, JOHN DOE and PETER DOE, accused-appellants.
ROMERO, J.:
Accused-appellant Theodore Bernal, together with two other persons whose
identities and whereabouts are still unknown, were charged with the crime of
kidnapping in Criminal Case No. 26658-92 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City, Branch 10, under an information dated July 13, 1992, which reads as
1
follows:
That on or about August 5, 1991, in the City of Davao, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
mentioned accused, armed with hand guns, conspiring,
confederating and cooperating together and helping one another,
and by means of force, violence, intimidation and threat, wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously grabbed and kidnapped one Bienvenido
Openda, Jr., while the latter was drinking liquor with his friends as
Bolton Isla, this City and was brought, handcuffed and carried away
using the PU then fled together with Bienvenido Openda, Jr., thereby
depriving the said Bienvenido Openda, Jr. of his liberty against his
will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
A plea of not guilty having been entered by Bernal during his arraignment, trial
ensued. The prosecution presented four witnesses. On the other hand,
2
Theodore Bernal testified for his defense.
The materials facts and events as found by the court a quo are:
It appears that on August 5, 1991, around 11:30 in the morning, while Roberto
Racasa and Openda, Jr. were engaged in a drinking spree, they invited Bernal,
who was passing by, to join them.
After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave both men, apparently because he
was going to fetch his child. Thereafter, two men arrived, approached Openda,
Jr., and asked the latter if he was "Payat." When he said yes, one of them
3
suddenly pulled out a handgun while the other handcuffed him and told him
"not to run because they were policemen" and because he had an "atraso" or a
score to settle with them. They then hastily took him away. Racasa immediately
went to the house of Openda, Jr. and informed the latter's mother of the
abduction.
The theory of the prosecution, as culled from the testimony of a certain Salito
Enriquez, tends to establish that Openda, Jr. had an illicit affair with Bernal's wife
Naty and this was the motive behind the former's kidnapping. Until now,
Openda, Jr. is still missing.
On the other hand, the defense asserts that Openda Jr. was a drug-pusher
arrested by the police on August 5, 1991, and hence, was never kidnapped. 4
On December 10, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment finding Bernal
5
"guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for the abduction
and disappearance of Bienvenido Openda Jr. under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code and hereby sentences him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify his
mother Teresita Openda in the amount of P50,000.00 for her mental anguish and
moral suffering."6
Bernal assails the lower court for giving weight and credence to the prosecution
witnesses' allegedly illusory testimonies and for convicting him when his guilt
was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
We find no compelling reason to overturn the decision of the lower court.
The Court notes that up to this day, neither the victim nor his body has been
found. This, however, does not preclude the Court from ruling on the merits of
the case. In Kidnapping, what is important is to determine and prove the fact of
seizure, and the subsequent disappearance of the victim will not exonerate an
accused from prosecution therefor. Otherwise, kidnappers can easily avoid
punishment by the simple expedient of disposing of their victim's bodies.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides thus:
Art. 267. — Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. —
Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any
other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five
days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill him shall have
been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or a
public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or
any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-
mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
For the charge of kidnapping to prosper, the deprivation of the victim's liberty,
which is the essential element of the offense, must be duly proved. In the case at
bar, Bernal indisputably acted in conspiracy with the two other unknown
individuals "as shown by their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought
and community of purpose." Proof of conspiracy is perhaps most frequently
7
made by evidence of a chain of circumstances only. The circumstances present in
8
this case sufficiently indicate the participation of Bernal in the disappearance of
Openda, Jr.
The prosecution has profferred sufficient evidence to show that, indeed, Bernal,
together with his two companions, abducted Openda, Jr. on August 5, 1991. A
certain Adonis Sagarino, a childhood friend and neighbor of the victim, testified
that he saw Bernal at the billiard hall at about 11:00 a.m. with his two
companions and overheard him dispatching one of them to "Tarsing's Store" to
check if a certain person was still there. This person later turned out to be
Openda, Jr. He added that after the latter's presence was confirmed, the three
men left the billiard hall. Minutes later, Openda, Jr., already handcuffed, passed
by the billiard hall with Bernal's companions.
Equally important is the testimony of Roberto Racasa, a resident of Bucana,
Davao City who knew both Bernal and the victim, the former being his neighbor
and compadre. He narrated that he and the victim were drinking at "Tarsing's
Store" on that fateful day when Bernal passed by and had a drink with them.
After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave, after which, two men came to the
store and asked for "Payat." When Openda, Jr. confirmed that he was indeed
"Payat," hew was handcuffed and taken away by the unidentified men.
Likewise, a certain Salito Enriquez, a tailor and a friend of Openda, Jr., testified
that sometime in January 1991, Openda, Jr. confided to him that he and Bernal's
wife Naty were having an affair. One time, Naty even gave Openda, Jr. money
which they used to pay for a motel room. He advised Naty "not to do it again
because she (was) a married woman. Undoubtedly, his wife's infidelity was
9
ample reason for Bernal to contemplate revenge.
Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of
the perpetrator. Coupled with enough circumstantial evidence of facts from
which it may be reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive
may be sufficient to support a conviction. Openda, Jr.'s revelation to Enriquez
10
regarding his illicit relationship with Bernal's wife is admissible in evidence,
pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:
Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. — The declaration made by a
person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the
declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it
was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration
unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against
himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons.
With the deletion of the phrase "pecuniary or moral interest" from the present
provision, it is safe to assume that "declaration against interest" has been
expanded to include all kinds of interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or
even penal. 11
A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites,
to wit: "(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a
fact against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said
declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid
interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such
declaration to be true." 12
Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to
testify. His confession to Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own
interest, since his affair with Naty Bernal was a crime, is admissible in
evidence because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his
13
own detriment. 14
In his brief, Bernal highlights supposed inconsistencies in Sagarino's testimony.
He alleges that the latter could not have seen the actual handcuffing because
"Tarsing's Store" could not be seen from the billiard hall. Sagarino's testimony
shows that after Bernal and two others left the billiard hall, the latter came back
with Openda, Jr., already handcuffed.
Q The three of them together?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what about you, where did you stay?
A I just stayed in the billiard hall.
Q While you stay (sic) in the billiard hall, after
a while, what did you see next?
A The two came back.
Q Who were these two whom you said who
(sic) came back?
A The companions of Bernal.
Q And what did these two men do?
A They apprehended Jun-jun Openda. 15
From this proceeding, Bernal wrongly inferred that Sagarino actually saw
Openda, Jr. arrested. The lower court correctly rejected this argument by holding
that:
But Sagarino has not said that he saw the actual handcuffing of
Openda, Jr. at the Tarsing or Tarcing store. On the contrary, he says
that he had not known who the person was that Bernal referred to
when he requested one of this two companions to go see if that
person was still there at the store, and that he came to know that he
was Openda, Jr. only after he saw Openda, Jr. pass by the billiard hall
already handcuffed, with the two unidentified companions of Bernal
with him, on their way out to the main road. 16
If one had a direct view of "Tarsing's Store" from the billiard hall, Bernal would
not have requested his companion to check if Openda, Jr. were still there
drinking with Racasa. Another discrepancy pointed out by Bernal arose from the
testimonies of Racasa and Sagarino. Racasa, on cross-examination, stated:
Q After Theodore Bernal left you have seen
him also returned (sic) with his child, is that
correct?
A Yes, sir, because I was still in the store. 17
On the other hand, Sagarino averred that:
Q When Theodore Bernal left the place, how
long (sic) were you able to see him again?
A Quite a time, sir, because when they left, his
two companions came back and proceeded to
Tarcing Store and arrested Jun-jun Openda.
When these two men brought out Jun-jun
Openda, fifteen minutes later, Bernal came.
Q Do you know where this Bernal from? (sic)
A He was coming from outside.
Q He has with him his son?
A He was with nobody, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A Yes, sir.
Q He was alone?
A Yes, sir. 18
The testimonies of Racasa and Sagarino are not absolutely inconsistent with
each other as to be irreconcilable. Considering the proximity of the store from
the billiard hall, there is a possibility that when Racasa saw Bernal with his son at
the store, the latter could have already brought home his son before proceeding
alone to the billiard hall where he was seem by Segarino. 19
Bernal would like the Court to dismiss Sagarino's testimony by imputing revenge
as his motive for testifying. He alleges that on July 29, 1991, or six days before
the alleged kidnapping, five policemen arrived at Kasilak, Bucana on board a
patrol car asking for Openda, Jr., Sagarino, Joseph Mendoza, Dansoy Madelo and
Dagoy Balagan. He replied that they were residents of the place and staying at
the billiard hall and mahjong house. The policemen departed and went to the
places he mentioned.
Q Minutes later do you know what
happened?
A They came back.
Q What did you do after they came back?
A I asked these police officers if they found
these (sic) persons they were looking (for) ?
Q What was their answer?
A They answered in the negative.
Q Since the answer is in the negative, what
did you do ?
A I asked the police officers why they were
looking for these persons.(?)
Q What was the answer of the policemen?
A The police officer said that those people
were wanted by them because accordingly
(sic) they were marijuana pushers. 20
Bernal's position is that no abduction or kidnapping ever took place but that an
arrest was made by pursuing policemen. This contention is quite improbable, if
not highly preposterous.
The trial court correctly appreciated the testimony of Sagarino, it being free from
any ill-motive against Bernal. If the latter's allegations were true, then Sagarino
should have been arrested by the police at the time he gave his testimony in
court. No such arrest was, however, made.
The court a quo committed no error in finding the testimonies of Enriquez,
Racasa and Sagarino sufficient to convict Bernal. The court said that Sagarino's
forthright answers to the questions of the prosecutor and defense counsel
clearly establish the participation of Bernal in the abduction or kidnapping or
Openda, Jr. Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness, but must be credible in itself. This Court once again finds
21
occasion to reiterate the established rule that the findings of fact of a trial court
carry great weight and are entitled to respect on appeal, absent any strong and
cogent reason to the contrary, since it is in a better position to decided the
question of credibility of witnesses.22
We note that after a lapse of a considerable length of time, the victim has yet to
resurface. Considering the circumstances, it is safe to assume that Openda, Jr. is
already dead.
Finally, the Solicitor General, pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
recommended to this Court the penalty of seventeen (17) years of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum. The maximum
penalty must be determined in accordance with rules and provision of the
Revised Penal Code. With respect to the minimum penalty, however, "it is left
entirely within the discretion of the court to fix it anywhere within the range of
the penalty next lower without reference to the periods into which it may be
subdivided." Consistent with this ruling, this Court imposes reclusion temporal,
23
in its maximum period, as the minimum penalty, to reclusion perpetua, as
maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the
appealed decision dated November 18, 1993, is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against accused-appellant Theodore Bernal.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 121027 July 31, 1997
CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORA DOMINGO, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
The present appeal by certiorari seeks the reversal of the judgment
rendered by respondent Court of Appeals on June 30, 1995 1 which affirmed
the Order of December 3, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 98, granting herein private respondent's Demurrer to Plaintiff's
Evidence filed in Civil Case No. Q-88-1054 pending therein.
The present appellate review involves an action for reconveyance filed by
herein petitioners against herein private respondent before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, docketed as the aforesaid Civil Case
No. Q-88-1054, over a parcel of land with a house and apartment thereon
located at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and which was originally
owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. It
appears that petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece and
nephew, respectively, of the deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero who is the
sister of petitioner's father, Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and
was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners.
Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek
to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her
surviving spouse, Martin, executed on September 15, 1986 an Affidavit of
Extrajudicial Settlement2 adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir,
the land in dispute which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
66886, as a consequence of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 358074
was issued in the name of Martin Guerrero. On January 2, 1988, Martin
Guerrero sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and
thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 was issued in the latter's
name.
Martin Guerrero died on October 25, 1988. Subsequently, herein petitioners
filed an action for reconveyance on November 2, 1988, claiming that they
are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of
representation.
At the pre-trial conference, the following issues were presented by both
parties for resolution:
(1) whether or not the plaintiffs (herein petitioners)
are the nephew and niece of the late Teodora
Dezoller;
(2) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to inherit
by right of representation from the estate of the late
Teodora Dezoller;
(3) whether or not defendant (herein private
respondent) must reconvey the reserved participation
of the plaintiffs to the estate of the late Teodora
Dezoller under Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court
which was duly annotated on the title of the
defendant;
(4) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to
damages, moral and exemplary, plus attorney's fees
for the willful and malicious refusal of defendant to
reconvey the participation of plaintiffs in the estate of
Teodora Dezoller, despite demands and knowing fully
well that plaintiffs are the niece and nephew of said
deceased; and
(5) whether or not the subject property now in
litigation can be considered as conjugal property of
the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero.3
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the
lone witness, with the following documentary evidence offered to prove
petitioners' filiation to their father and their aunt, to wit: a family picture;
baptismal certificates of Teodora and Hermogenes Dezoller; certificates of
destroyed records of birth of Teodora Dezoller and Hermogenes Dezoller;
death certificates of Hermogenes Dezoller and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero;
certification of destroyed records of live birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller;
joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar attesting to the parents,
date and place of birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavit of
Juliana Cariaga and Manuela Cariaga attesting to the fact of marriage
between Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller; and the marriage
certificate of Martin and Teodora Guerrero. 4 Petitioners thereafter rested
their case and submitted a written offer of these exhibits to which a
Comment5 was filed by herein private respondent.
Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence on
the ground that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the
deceased Teodora Guerrero in accordance with Article 172 of the Family
Code. It is further averred that the testimony of petitioner Corazon Dezoller
Tison regarding her relationship with her alleged father and aunt is self-
serving, uncorroborated and incompetent, and that it falls short of the
quantum of proof required under Article 172 of the Family Code to establish
filiation. Also, the certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental is merely proof of the alleged
destruction of the records referred to therein, and the joint affidavit
executed by Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar certifying to the date, place of
birth and parentage of herein petitioners is inadmissible for being hearsay
since the affiants were never presented for cross-examination.6
On December 3, 1992, the trial court issued an order granting the demurrer
to evidence and dismissing the complaint for reconveyance.7
In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the
documentary evidence presented by herein petitioners, such as the
baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all
inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation. Hence, this
appeal.
We find for petitioners.
The bone of contention in private respondent's demurrer to evidence is
whether or not herein petitioners failed to meet the quantum of proof
required by Article 172 of the Family Code to establish legitimacy and
filiation. There are two points for consideration before us: first is the issue
on petitioner's legitimacy, and second is the question regarding their
filiation with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
I. It is not debatable that the documentary evidence adduced by
petitioners, taken separately and independently of each other, are not per
se sufficient proof of legitimacy nor even of pedigree. It is important to
note, however, that the rulings of both lower courts in the case are basically
premised on the erroneous assumption that, in the first place, the issue of
legitimacy may be validly controverted in an action for reconveyance, and,
in the second place, that herein petitioners have the onus probandi to
prove their legitimacy and, corollarily, their filiation. We disagree on both
counts.
It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have
regrettably overlooked the universally recognized presumption on
legitimacy. There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and
founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. 8And well settled
is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
The rationale for these rules has been explained in this wise:
The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code . . .
actually fixes a civil status for the child born in
wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked
collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be
impugned only in a direct action brought for that
purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period
limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by
way of defense or as a collateral issue in another
action for a different purpose. The necessity of an
independent action directly impugning the legitimacy
is more clearly expressed in the Mexican Code (Article
335) which provides: "The contest of the legitimacy of
a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by
proper complaint before the competent court; any
contest made in any other way is void." This principle
applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171
of the code confirm this view, because they refer to
"the action to impugn the legitimacy." This action can
be brought only by the husband or his heirs and
within the periods fixed in the present articles.
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article
170, the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can
no longer be brought. The status conferred by the
presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no
longer be questioned. The obvious intention of the
 law is to prevent the status of a child born in wedlock
from being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It
also aims to force early action to settle any doubt as
to the paternity of such child, so that the evidence
material to the matter, which must necessarily be
facts occurring during the period of the conception of
the child, may still be easily available.
xxx xxx xxx
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child
born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted
with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of
his wife produces; and he should decide whether to
conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the
moral and economic interest involved. It is only in
exceptional cases that his heir are allowed to contest
such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none — even
his heirs — can impugn legitimacy; that would
amount to an insult to his memory.9
The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the legitimate children of
Hermogenes Dezoller cannot be properly controverted in the present action
for reconveyance. This is aside, of course, from the further consideration
that private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of
herein petitioners. The presumption consequently continues to operate in
favor of petitioners unless and until it is rebutted.
Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be resolved in this case, the
burden of proof rests not on herein petitioners who have the benefit of the
presumption in their favor, but on private respondent who is disputing the
same. This fact alone should have been sufficient cause for the trial court to
exercise appropriate caution before acting, as it did, on the demurrer to
evidence. It would have delimited the issues for resolution, as well as the
time and effort necessitated thereby.
Ordinarily, when a fact is presumed, it implies that the party in whose favor
the presumption exists does not have to introduce evidence to establish
that fact, and in any litigation where that fact is put in issue, the party
denying it must bear the burden of proof to overthrow the
presumption. 10 The presumption of legitimacy is so strong that it is clear
that its effect is to shift the burden of persuasion to the party claiming
illegitimacy. 11 And in order to destroy the presumption, the party against
whom it operates must adduce substantial and credible evidence to the
contrary.12
Where there is an entire lack of competent evidence to the contrary, 13 and
unless or until it is rebutted, it has been held that a presumption may stand
in lieu of evidence and support a finding or decision. 14 Perforce, a
presumption must be followed if it is uncontroverted. This is based on the
theory that a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed, and
unless the fact thus established prima facie by the legal presumption of its
truth is disproved, it must stand as proved. 15
Indubitably, when private respondent opted not to present countervailing
evidence to overcome the presumption, by merely filing a demurrer to
evidence instead, she in effect impliedly admitted the truth of such fact.
Indeed, she overlooked or disregarded the evidential rule that
presumptions like judicial notice and admissions, relieve the proponent
from presenting evidence on the facts he alleged and such facts are thereby
considered as duly proved.
II. The weight and sufficiency of the evidence regarding petitioner's
relationship with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, whose estate is the subject of
the present controversy, requires a more intensive and extensive
examination.
Petitioners' evidence, as earlier explained, consists mainly of the testimony
of Corazon Dezoller Tison, the baptismal, death and marriage certificates,
the various certifications from the civil registrar, a family picture, and
several joint affidavits executed by third persons all of which she identified
and explained in the course and as part of her testimony.
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship
between the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison
to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in
1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece. 16 Such a
statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible,
as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead
or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose
pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by
evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was
made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the
suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any
controversy has arisen thereon.
There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements.
What remains for analysis is the third element, that is, whether or not the
other documents offered in evidence sufficiently corroborated the
declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime regarding the
pedigree of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is necessary to
present evidence other than such declaration.
American jurisdiction has it that a distinction must be made as to when the
relationship of the declarant may be proved by the very declaration itself,
or by other declarations of said declarant, and when it must be supported
by evidence aliunde. The rule is stated thus:
One situation to be noted is that where one seeks to
set up a claim through, but not from, the declarant
and to establish the admissibility of a declaration
regarding claimant's pedigree, he may not do by
declarant's own statements as to declarant's
relationship to the particular family. The reason is
that declarant's declaration of his own relationship is
of a self-serving nature. Accordingly there must be
precedent proof from other sources that declarant is
what he claimed to be, namely, a member of the
particular family; otherwise the requirement to
admissibility that declarant's relationship to the
common family must appear is not met. But when the
party claiming seeks to establish relationship in order
to claim directly from the declarant or the declarant's
estate, the situation and the policy of the law
applicable are quite different. In such case the
declaration of the decedent, whose estate is in
controversy, that he was related to the one who
claims his estate, is admissible without other proof of
the fact of relationship. While the nature of the
declaration is then disserving, that is not the real
ground for its admission. Such declarations do not
derive their evidential value from that consideration,
although it is a useful, if not an artificial, aid in
determining the class to which the declarations
belong. The distinction we have note is sufficiently
apparent; in the one case the declarations are self-
serving, in the other they are competent from reasons
of necessity. 17 (Emphasis ours.)
The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery
against a relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the
declarant himself or the declarant's estate, the relationship of the declarant
to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself. There
must be some independent proof of this fact. 18 As an exception, the
requirement that there be other proof than the declarations of the
declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach
the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right
through his declarations to the property of some other member of the
family. 19
We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one
instance where the general requirement on evidence aliunde may be
relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of the
declarant herself. Conformably, the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is admissible and constitutes
sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there
was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being such
declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving
such evidence to avoid a failure of justice. 20 More importantly, there is in
the present case an absolute failure by all and sundry to refute that
declaration made by the decedent.
From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the
sole basis of the decedent's declaration and without need for further proof
thereof, that petitioners are the niece and nephew of Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero. As held in one case, 21 where the subject of the declaration is the
declarant's own relationship to another person, it seems absurb to require,
as a foundation for the admission of the declaration, proof of the very fact
which the declaration is offered to establish. The preliminary proof would
render the main evidence unnecessary.
Applying the general rule in the present case would nonetheless produce
the same result. For while the documentary evidence submitted by
petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on their admissibility, we are
however of the considered opinion that the same may be admitted by
reason of private respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection
thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence. 22 It is elementary
that an objection shall
be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in
evidence, 23 otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, 24 since the
right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. 25
As explained in Abrenica vs. Gonda, et al., 26 it has been repeatedly laid
down as a rule of evidence that a protest or objection against the admission
of any evidence must be made at the proper time, otherwise it will be
deemed to have been waived. The proper time is when from the question
addressed to the witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the
presentation of the proof, the inadmissibility of the evidence is, or may be
inferred.
Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform with
the statute is a waiver if the provisions of the law. That objection to a
question put to a witness must be made at the time the question is asked.
An objection to the admission of evidence on the ground of incompetency,
taken after the testimony has been given, is too late. 27Thus, for instance,
failure to object to parol evidence given on the stand, where the party is in
a position to object, is a waiver of any objections thereto. 28
alienate his total undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in the entire property
to herein private respondent. Resultantly, petitioners and private
respondent are deemed co-owners of the property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 374012 in the proportion of an undivided one-fourth
(1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof, respectively.
All told, on the basis of the foregoing considerations, the demurrer to
plaintiff's evidence should have been, as it is hereby, denied. Nonetheless,
private respondent may no longer be allowed to present evidence by
reason of the mandate under Section 1 of revised Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court which provides that "if the motion is granted but on appeal the order
of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence." 33
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and herein petitioners and private
respondent are declared co-owners of the subject property with an
undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share therein,
respectively.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that counsel for private respondent SO ORDERED.
unreservedly cross-examined petitioners,as the lone witness, on the
documentary evidence that were offered. At no time was the issue of the
supposed inadmissibility thereof, or the possible basis for objection
thereto, ever raised. Instead, private respondent's counsel elicited answers
from the witness on the circumstances and regularity of her obtention of
said documents: The observations later made by private respondent in her
comment to petitioners' offer of exhibits, although the grounds therefor
were already apparent at the time these documents were being adduced in
evidence during the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison but which
objections were not timely raised therein, may no longer serve to rectify
the legal consequences which resulted therefrom. Hence, even assuming ex
gratia argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay,
but on account of herein private respondent's failure to object thereto, the
same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts
therein asserted. 29

Accordingly, the Certificate of Marriage (Exhibit S) wherein it is indicated

that the parents of Teodora Dezoller are Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo,
as well as the Certificates of Baptism of Teodora Dezoller 30 (Exhibit H) and
Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit J) which both reflect the names of their
parents as Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, to show that Hermogenes
Dezoller is the brother of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; and the Death
Certificate of Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit K) the entries wherein were
made by petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison as his daughter, together with
the Joint Affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar (Exhibits N and P), to
prove that herein petitioners are the children of Hermogenes Dezoller —
these can be deemed to have sufficiently established the relationship
between the declarant and herein petitioners. This is in consonance with
the rule that a prima facie showing is sufficient and that only slight proof of
the relationship is required. 31 Finally, it may not be amiss to consider as in
the nature of circumstantial evidence the fact that both the declarant and
the claimants, who are the subject of the declaration, bear the surname
Dezoller. 32

III. The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the manner by
which the estate of the decedent shall be divided in this case, to wit:

Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or

sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from
the latter by representation, if they survive with their
uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall
inherit in equal portions.

Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants

and ascendants, and illegitimate children and their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the
surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate,
without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters,
nephews and nieces, should there be any, under
Article 1001.

Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their

children survive with the widow or widower, the
latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance
and the brothers and sisters or theirs children to the
other half.

Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half of the subject

property was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Martin G.R. No. 124853 February 24, 1998
Guerrero, as his share in the conjugal partnership. Applying the
aforequoted statutory provisions, the remaining half shall be equally
divided between the widower and herein petitioners who are entitled to FRANCISCO L. JISON, petitioner,
jointly inherit in their own right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could only validly vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA JISON, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the 27
April 1995 decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
328601 which reversed the decision of Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Iloilo City in Civil Case No. 16373.2 The latter dismissed the
complaint of private respondent Monina Jison (hereafter MONINA) for
recognition as an illegitimate child of petitioner Francisco Jison (hereafter
FRANCISCO).
In issue is whether or not public respondent Court of Appeals committed
reversible error, which, in this instance, necessitates an inquiry into the
facts. While as a general rule, factual issues are not within the province of
this Court, nevertheless, in light of the conflicting findings of facts of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals, this case falls under an exception to
this rule?3
In her complaint4 filed with the RTC on 13 March 1985, MONINA alleged
that FRANCISCO had been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940.
At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO impregnated
Esperanza F. Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO's
daughter, Lourdes). As a result, MONINA was born on 6 August 1946, in
Dingle, Iloilo, and since childhood, had enjoyed the continuous, implied
recognition as an illegitimate child of FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his
family. MONINA further alleged that FRANCISCO gave her support and
spent for her education, such that she obtained a Master's degree, became
a certified public accountant (CPA) and eventually, a Central Bank examiner.
In view of FRANCISCO's refusal to expressly recognize her, MONINA prayed
for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that FRANCISCO
support and treat her as such.
In his answer,5 FRANCISCO alleged that he could not have had sexual
relations with Esperanza Amolar during the period specified in the
complaint as she had ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944, and did
not know of her whereabouts since then; further, he never recognized
MONINA, expressly or impliedly, as his illegitimate child. As affirmative and
special defenses, FRANCISCO contended that MONINA had no right or cause
of action against him and that her action was barred by estoppel, laches
and/or prescription. He thus prayed for dismissal of the complaint and an
award of damages due to the malicious filing of the complaint.
After MONINA filed her reply, 6 pre-trial was conducted where the parties
stipulated on the following issues:
1. Did Francisco Jison have any sexual relation[s] with Esperanza
Am[o]lar about the end of 1945 or the start of 1946?
2. Is Monina Jison the recognized illegitimate daughter of
Francisco Jison by the latter's own acts and those of his family?
3. Is Monina Jison barred from instituting or prosecuting the
present action by estoppel, laches and/or prescription?
4. Damages.7
At trial on the merits, MONINA presented a total of eleven (11) witnesses,
namely: herself, Ruben Castellanes, Sr., Adela Casabuena, Arsenio Duatin,
Zafiro Ledesma, Danthea Lopez, Romeo Bilbao, Rudy Tiangson, Alfredo
Baylosis, Dominador Zavariz and Lope Amolar.
Ruben Castellanes, Sr., a 63-year old resident of Iloilo City, testified that he
had worked for FRANCISCO for a total of six (6) years at Nelly Garden,
FRANCISCO's Iloilo residence. Towards the end of the Japanese occupation,
FRANCISCO's wife suffered a miscarriage or abortion, thereby depriving
FRANCISCO of consortium; thereafter, FRANCISCO's wife managed a
nightclub on the ground floor of Nelly Garden which operated daily from
6:00 p.m. till 3:00 a.m. of the following day, thereby allowing FRANCISCO
free access to MONINA's mother, Esperanza Amolar, who was nicknamed
Pansay.
Adela Casabuena, a 61-year old farmer, testified that she served as the yaya
("nanny") of Lourdes from July 1946 up to February 1947. Although Pansay
had left Nelly Garden two (2) weeks before Adela started working for the
Jisons, Pansay returned sometime in September 1946, or about one month
after she gave birth to MONINA, to ask FRANCISCO for support. As a result,
Pansay and Lilia Jison, FRANCISCO's wife, quarreled in the living room, and
in the course thereof, Pansay claimed that FRANCISCO was the father of her
baby. To which, Lilia replied: "I did not tell you to make that baby so it is
your fault." During the quarrel which lasted from 10:30 till 11:00 a.m.,
FRANCISCO was supposedly inside the house listening.
Arsenio Duatin, a 77-year old retired laborer, testified that from 1947 until
1977, he worked as FRANCISCO's houseboy at the latter's house on 12th
Street, Capitol Subdivision, Bacolod City. Arsenio met MONINA in 1967,
when Felipe Lagarto, the bookkeeper at Nelly Garden, informed Arsenio
that MONINA, FRANCISCO's daughter, would arrive at Bacolod City with a
letter of introduction from Lagarto.
Initially, Arsenio identified seven (7) black-and-white photographs (Exhs. X-
5 to X-11) of MONINA,8 and as he paid for the telephone bills, he likewise
identified six (6) telephone cards (Exhs. G to L). Arsenio then declared that
when MONINA arrived in Bacolod City, she introduced herself to him as
FRANCISCO's daughter. She stayed at FRANCISCO's house, but when the
latter and his wife would come over, Arsenio would "conceal the presence
of MONINA because Mrs. Jison did not like to see her face." Once, Arsenio
hid MONINA in the house of FRANCISCO's sister, Mrs. Luisa Jison Alano, in
Silay City; another time, at the residence of FRANCISCO's cousin, Mrs.
Concha Lopez Cuaycong. Finally, Arsenio declared that the last time he saw
MONINA was when she left for Manila, after having finished her schooling
at La Salle College in Bacolod City.
On re-direct and upon questions by the court, Arsenio disclosed that it was
FRANCISCO who instructed that MONINA be hidden whenever FRANCISCO
and his wife were around; that although FRANCISCO and MONINA saw each
other at the Bacolod house only once, they called each other "through long
distance;" and that MONINA addressed FRANCISCO as "Daddy" during their
lone meeting at the Bacolod house and were "affectionate" to each other.
Arsenio likewise declared that MONINA stayed at FRANCISCO's Bacolod
house twice: first for a month, then for about a week the second time. On
both occasions, however, FRANCISCO and his wife were abroad. Finally,
Arsenio recalled that FRANCISCO likewise bade Arsenio to treat MONINA
like his (FRANCISCO's) other daughters.
The testimony of Zafiro Ledesma, a 74-year old banker and former mayor of
Iloilo City, initially touched on how he and his wife were related to
FRANCISCO, FRANCISCO's wife and MONINA. Zafiro first identified Exhibit R,
a diagram of the family trees of the Jison and Lopez families, which showed
that former Vice-President Fernando Lopez was the first cousin of
FRANCISCO's wife, then told the court that the family of Vice-President
Lopez treated MONINA "very well because she is considered a relative . . .
by reputation, by actual perception." Zafiro likewise identified Exhibits X-13
to X-18, photographs taken at the 14 April 1985 birthday celebration of Mrs.
Fernando Lopez, which showed MONINA with the former Vice-President
and other members of the Lopez family.
Zafiro further testified that while MONINA lived with Mrs. Cuaycong, the
latter paid for some of MONINA's school needs and even asked MONINA to
work in a hospital owned by Mrs. Cuaycong; and that another first cousin of
FRANCISCO's wife, a certain Remedios Lopez Franco, likewise helped
MONINA with her studies and problems, and even attended MONINA's
graduation in 1978 when she obtained a masteral degree in Business
Administration, as evidenced by another photograph (Exh. X-12). Moreover,
upon Remedios' recommendation, MONINA was employed as a secretary at
Merchant Financing Company, which was managed by a certain Danthea
Lopez, the wife of another first cousin of FRANCISCO's wife, and among
whose directors were Zafiro himself, his wife and Danthea's husband. In
closing, Zafiro identified MONINA's Social Security Record (Exh. W), which
was signed by Danthea as employer and where MONINA designated
Remedios as the beneficiary.
Danthea Lopez, a 58-year old housekeeper, declared that FRANCISCO was
the first cousin of her husband, Eusebio D. Lopez; and that she came to
know MONINA in the latter part of 1965 when Remedios Franco
recommended MONINA for employment at Merchant Financing Co., which
Danthea managed at that time. Remedios introduced MONINA to Danthea
"as being reputedly the daughter of Mr. Frank Jison;" and on several
occasions thereafter, Remedios made Danthea and the latter's husband
understand that MONINA was "reputedly the daughter of [FRANCISCO]"
While MONINA worked at Merchant Financing, Danthea knew that
MONINA lived with Remedios; however, in the latter part of 1966, as
Remedios left for Manila and MONINA was still studying at San Agustin
University, Danthea and her husband invited MONINA to live with them.
During MONINA's 6-month stay with them, she was not charged for board
and lodging and was treated as a relative, not a mere employee, all owing
to what Remedios had said regarding MONINA's filiation. As Danthea
understood, MONINA resigned from Merchant Financing as she was called
by Mrs. Cuaycong, a first cousin of Danthea's husband who lived in Bacolod
City.
Romeo Bilbao, a 43-year old seaman, testified that he had worked for
FRANCISCO from 1969 up to 1980 at Nelly Garden in various capacities: as a
procurement officer, hacienda overseer and, later, as hacienda
administrator. Sometime in May, 1971, Romeo saw and heard MONINA ask
"her Daddy" (meaning FRANCISCO) for the money he promised to give her,
but FRANCISCO answered that he did not have the money to give, then told
MONINA to go see Mr. Jose Cruz in Bacolod City. Then in the middle of
September that year, FRANCISCO told Romeo to pick up Mr. Cruz at the
Iloilo pier and bring him to the office of Atty. Benjamin Tirol. At said office,
Atty. Tirol, Mr. Cruz and MONINA entered a room while Romeo waited
outside. When they came out, Atty. Tirol had papers for MONINA to sign,
but she refused. Atty. Tirol said that a check would be released to MONINA
if she signed the papers, so MONINA acceded, although Atty. Tirol intended
not to give MONINA a copy of the document she signed. Thereafter, Mr.
Cruz gave MONINA a check (Exh. Q), then MONINA grabbed a copy of the
document she signed and ran outside. Romeo then brought Mr. Cruz to
Nelly Garden. As to his motive for testifying, Romeo stated that he wanted
to help MONINA be recognized as FRANCISCO'S daughter.
Rudy Tingson, a 45-year old antique dealer, testified that in 1963-1964, he
was employed by FRANCISCO's wife at the Baguio Military Institute in
Baguio City; then in 1965, Rudy worked at FRANCISCO's office at Nelly
Garden recording hacienda expenses, typing vouchers and office papers,
and, at times, acting as paymaster for the haciendas. From the nature of his
work, Rudy knew the persons receiving money from FRANCISCO's office,
and clearly remembered that in 1965, as part of his job, Rudy gave MONINA
her allowance from FRANCISCO four (4) times, upon instructions of a
certain Mr. Lagarto to give MONINA P15.00 a month. Rudy likewise recalled
that he first met MONINA in 1965, and that she would go to Nelly Garden
whenever FRANCISCO's wife was not around. On some of these occasions,
MONINA would speak with and address FRANCISCO as "Daddy," without
objection from FRANCISCO. In fact, in 1965, Rudy saw FRANCISCO give
MONINA money thrice. Rudy further declared that in April 1965,
FRANCISCO's office paid P250.00 to Funeraria Bernal for the funeral
expenses of MONINA's mother. Finally, as to Rudy's motives for testifying,
he told the court that he simply wanted to held bring out the truth "and
nothing but the truth," and that MONINA's filiation was common
knowledge among the people in the office at Nelly Garden.
On re-direct, Rudy declared that the moneys given by FRANCISCO's office to
MONINA were not reflected in the books of the office, but were kept in a
separate book, as Mr. Lagarto explained that FRANCISCO's wife and children
"should not know [of] this." Rudy further revealed that as to the garden
"meetings" between FRANCISCO and MONINA, Rudy saw MONINA kiss
FRANCISCO on the cheek both upon arriving and before leaving, and
FRANCISCO's reaction upon seeing her was to smile and say in the Visayan
dialect: "Kamusta ka iha?" ("How are you, daughter?"); and that MONINA
was free to go inside the house as the household staff knew of her filiation,
and that, sometimes, MONINA would join them for lunch.
Alfredo Baylosis, a 62-year old retired accountant, testified that he worked
for FRANCISCO at Central Santos-Lopez in Iloilo from 1951 up to 1961, then
at Nelly Garden from 1961 until 1972. Alfredo first served FRANCISCO as a
bookkeeper, then when Mr. Lagarto died in 1967 or 1969, Alfredo replaced
Mr. Lagarto as office manager.
Alfredo knew MONINA since 1961 as she used to go to Nelly Garden to
claim her P15.00 monthly allowance given upon FRANCISCO's standing
order. Alfredo further declared that MONINA's filiation was pretty well-
known in the office, that he had seen MONINA and FRANCISCO go from the
main building to the office, with FRANCISCO's arm on MONINA's shoulder;
and that the office paid for the burial expenses of Pansay, but this was not
recorded in the books in order to hide it from FRANCISCO's wife. Alfredo
also disclosed that the disbursements for MONINA's allowance started in
1961 and were recorded in a separate cash book. In 1967, the allowances
ceased when MONINA stopped schooling and was employed in Bacolod
City with Miller, Cruz & Co., which served as FRANCISCO's accountant-
auditor. Once, when Alfredo went to the offices of Miller, Cruz & Co. to see
the manager, Mr. Atienza, and arrange for the preparation of FRANCISCO's
income tax return, Alfredo chanced upon MONINA. When Alfredo asked
her how she came to work there, she answered that "her Daddy,"
FRANCISCO, recommended her, a fact confirmed by Mr. Atienza Alfredo
then claimed that Mr. Jose Cruz, a partner at Miller, Cruz & Co., was the
most trusted man of FRANCISCO.
Dominador Savariz, a 55-year old caretaker, testified that he worked as
FRANCISCO's houseboy at Nelly Garden from November 1953 up to 1965.
One morning in April 1954, MONINA and her mother Pansay went to Nelly
Garden and spoke with FRANCISCO for about an hour, during which time,
Dominador was vacuuming the carpet about six (6) to seven (7) meters
away. Due to the noise of the vacuum cleaner, FRANCISCO and MONINA
spoke in loud voices, thus Dominador overheard their conversation. As
FRANCISCO asked Pansay why they came, Pansay answered that they came
to ask for the "sustenance" of his child MONINA. FRANCISCO then touched
MONINA's head and asked: "How are you Hija?," to which MONINA
answered: "Good morning, Daddy." After FRANCISCO told Pansay and
MONINA to wait, he pulled something from his wallet and said to Pansay. "I
am giving this for a child."
In May 1954, Dominador saw MONINA at Mr. Lagarto's office where
Dominador was to get "the day's expenses," while MONINA was claiming
her allowance from Mr. Diasnes. The next month, Dominador saw MONINA
at Nelly Garden and heard in the office that MONINA was there to get her
allowance "from her Daddy." In December 1960, Dominador saw MONINA
at Nelly Garden, in the room of Don Vicente (father of FRANCISCO's wife),
where she asked for a Christmas gift "and she was calling Don Vicente, Lolo
(grandfather)." At that time, FRANCISCO and his wife were not around.
Then sometime in 1961, when Dominador went to Mr. Legarto's office to
get the marketing expenses, Dominador saw MONINA once more claiming
her allowance.
Dominador further testified that in February 1966, after he had stopped
working for FRANCISCO, Dominador was at Mrs. Franco's residence as she
recommended him for employment with her sister, Mrs. Concha Cuaycong.
There, he saw MONINA, who was then about 15 years old, together with
Mrs. Franco's daughter and son. Mrs. Franco pointed at MONINA and asked
Dominador if he knew who MONINA was. Dominador answered that
MONINA was FRANCISCO's daughter with Pansay, and then Mrs. Franco
remarked that MONINA was staying with her (Mrs. Franco) and that she
was sending MONINA to school at the University of San Agustin.
Lope Amolar, a 50-year old resident of Dingle, Iloilo, and the younger
brother of Esperanza Amolar (Pansay), testified that he worked for
FRANCISCO as a houseboy from March to November 1945 at Nelly Garden.
Thereafter, FRANCISCO sent Lope to work at Elena Apartments in Manila.
By November 1945, Pansay was also working at Elena Apartments, where
she revealed to Lope that FRANCISCO impregnated her. Lope then
confronted FRANCISCO, who told Lope "don't get hurt and don't cause any
trouble, because I am willing to support your Inday Pansay and my child."
Three (3) days after this confrontation, Lope asked for and received
permission from FRANCISCO to resign because he (Lope) was hurt.
On 21 October 1986, MONINA herself took the witness stand. At that time,
she was 40 years old and a Central Bank Examiner. She affirmed that as
evidenced by certifications from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs.
E and F) and baptismal certificates (Exhs. C and D), she was born on 6
August 1946 in Barangay Tabugon, Dingle, Iloilo, to Esperanza Amolar (who
passed away on 20 April 1965) and FRANCISCO. 9 MONINA first studied at
Sagrado where she stayed as a boarder. While at Sagrado from 1952 until
1955 (up to Grade 4), her father, FRANCISCO, paid for her tuition fees and
other school expenses. She either received the money from FRANCISCO or
from Mr. Lagarto, or saw FRANCISCO give money to her mother, or Mr.
Lagarto would pay Sagrado directly. After Sagrado, MONINA studied in
different schools,10but FRANCISCO continuously answered for her schooling.
For her college education, MONINA enrolled at the University of Iloilo, but
she later dropped due to an accident which required a week's
hospitalization. Although FRANCISCO paid for part of the hospitalization
expenses, her mother shouldered most of them. In 1963, she enrolled at
the University of San Agustin, where she stayed with Mrs. Franco who paid
for MONINA's tuition fees. However, expenses for books, school supplies,
uniforms and the like were shouldered by FRANCISCO. At the start of each
semester, MONINA would show FRANCISCO that she was enrolled, then he
would ask her to canvass prices, then give her the money she needed. After
finishing two (2) semesters at University of San Agustin, as evidenced by
her transcript of records (Exh. Z showing the FRANCISCO was listed as
Parent/Guardian [Exh. Z-1], she transferred to "De Paul College," just in
front of Mrs. Franco's house, and studied there for a year. Thereafter,
MONINA enrolled at Western Institute of Technology (WIT), where she
obtained a bachelor's degree in Commerce in April 1967. During her senior
year, she stayed with Eusebio and Danthea Lopez at Hotel Kahirup, owned
by said couple. She passed the CPA board exams in 1974, and took up an
M.B.A. at De La Salle University as evidenced by her transcript (Exh. AA),
wherein FRANCISCO was likewise listed as "Guardian" (Exhs. AA-1 and AA-
2).
MONINA enumerated the different members of the household staff at Nelly
Garden, to wit: Luz, the household cook; the houseboys Silvestre and
Doming; the housemaid Natang; the yaya of the adopted triplets, Deling;
the yaya of Lolo Vicente, Adelina; and others. MONINA likewise
enumerated the members of the office staff (Messrs. Baylosis, Lagarto,
Tingson, Diasnes, Jalandoni, Supertisioso, Doroy, and other), and identified
them from a photograph marked as Exhibit X-2. She then corroborated the
prior testimony regarding her employment at Merchant Financing Co., and
her having lived at Hotel Kahirup and at Mrs. Cuaycong's residence in
Bacolod City, while working at the hospital owned by Mrs. Cuaycong.
MONINA further testified that in March 1968, she went to Manila and met
FRANCISCO at Elena Apartments at the corner of Romero and Salas Streets,
Ermita. She told FRANCISCO that she was going for a vacation in Baguio City
with Mrs. Franco's mother, with whom she stayed up to June 1968. Upon
her return from Baguio City, MONINA told FRANCISCO that she wanted to
work, so the latter arranged for her employment at Miller & Cruz in Bacolod
City. MONINA went to Bacolod City, was interviewed by Mr. Jose Cruz, a
partner at Miller & Cruz, who told her she would start working first week of
September, sans examination. She resigned from Miller & Cruz in 1971 and
lived with Mrs. Cuaycong at her Forbes Park residence in Makati. MONINA
went to see FRANCISCO, told him that she resigned and asked him for
money to go to Spain, but FRANCISCO refused as she could not speak
Spanish and would not be able find a job. The two quarreled and
FRANCISCO ordered a helper to send MONINA out of the house. In the
process, MONINA broke many glasses at the pantry and cut her hand, after
which, FRANCISCO hugged her, gave her medicine, calmed her down, asked
her to return to Bacolod City and promised that he would giver her the
money.
MONINA returned to Bacolod City by plane, using a Filipinas Orient Airways
plane ticket (Exh. M) which FRANCISCO gave. She called Mr. Cruz, then Atty.
Tirol, as instructed by Mr. Cruz. These calls were evidenced by PLDT long
distance toll card (Exhs. G to L), with annotations at the back reading;
"charged and paid under the name of Frank L. Jison" and were signed by
Arsenio Duatin (Exhs. G-1 to L-1). PLDT issued a certification as to the
veracity of the contents of the toll cards (Exh. BB). Likewise introduced in
evidence was a letter of introduction prepared by Mr. Cruz addressed to
Atty. Tirol, on MONINA's behalf (Exh. N).
MONINA also declared that Atty. Tirol then told her that she would have to
go to Iloilo and sign a certain affidavit, before Mr. Cruz would turn over the
money promised by FRANCISCO. She went to Atty. Tirol's office in Iloilo, but
after going over the draft of the affidavit, refused to sign it as it stated that
she was not FRANCISCO's daughter. She explained that all she had agreed
with FRANCISCO was that he would pay for her fare to go abroad, and that
since she was a little girl, she knew about her illegitimacy. She started
crying, begged Atty. Tirol to change the affidavit, to which Atty. Tirol
responded that he was also a father and did not want this to happen to his
children as they could not be blamed for being brought into the world. She
then wrote a letter (Exh. O) to FRANCISCO and sent it to the latter's Forbes
Park residence (Bauhinia Place) by JRS courier service (Exhs. O-5 to O-7).
MONINA subsequently met FRANCISCO in Bacolod City where they
discussed the affidavit which she refused to sign. FRANCISCO told her that
the affidavit was for his wife, that in case she heard about MONINA going
abroad, the affidavit would "keep her peace."
MONINA then narrated that the first time she went to Atty. Tirol's office,
she was accompanied by one Atty. Fernando Divinagracia, who advised her
that the affidavit (Exh. P)11 would "boomerang" against FRANCISCO "as it is
contrary to law." MONINA returned to Bacolod City, then met with Atty.
Tirol once more to reiterate her plea, but Atty. Tirol did not relent. Thus, on
the morning of 20 or 21 September 1971, she signed the affidavit as she
was jobless and needed the money to support herself and finish her
studies. In exchange for signing the document, MONINA received a Bank of
Asia check for P15,000.00 (Exh. Q), which was less than the P25,000.00
which FRANCISCO allegedly promised to give. As Atty. Tirol seemed hesitant
to give her a copy of the affidavit after notarizing it, MONINA merely
grabbed a copy and immediately left.
MONINA then prepared to travel abroad, for which purpose, she procured
letters of introduction (Exhs. S and T) from a cousin, Mike Alano (son of
FRANCISCO's elder sister Luisa); and an uncle, Emilio Jison (FRANCISCO's
elder brother), addressed to another cousin, Beth Jison (Emilio's daughter),
for Beth to assist MONINA. Exhibit S contained a statement (Exh. S-1)
expressly recognizing that MONINA was FRANCISCO's daughter. Ultimately
though, MONINA decided not to go abroad, opting instead to spend the
proceeds of the P15,000.00 check for her CPA review, board exam and
graduate studies. After finishing her graduate studies, she again planned to
travel abroad, for which reason, she obtained a letter of introduction from
former Vice President Fernando Lopez addressed to then United States
Consul Vernon McAnnich (Exh. V).
As to other acts tending to show her filiation, MONINA related that on one
occasion, as FRANCISCO's wife was going to arrive at the latter's Bacolod
City residence, FRANCISCO called Arsenio Duatin and instructed Arsenio to
hide MONINA. Thus, MONINA stayed with Mrs. Luisa Jison for the duration
of the stay of FRANCISCO's wife. MONINA also claimed that she knew Vice
President Fernando Lopez and his wife, Mariquit, even before starting to go
to school. Thus, MONINA asked for a recommendation letter (Exh. U) from
Mrs. Mariquit Lopez for possible employment with Mrs. Rosario Lopez
Cooper, another second cousin of FRANCISCO. In Exhibit U, Mrs. Lopez
expressly recognized MONINA as FRANCISCO's daughter. As additional
proof of her close relationship with the family of Vice President Lopez,
MONINA identified photographs taken at a birthday celebration on 14 April
1985.
MONINA finally claimed that she knew the three (3) children of FRANCISCO
by wife, namely, Lourdes, Francisco, Jr., (Junior) and Elena, but MONINA
had met only Lourdes and Junior. MONINA's testimony dealt lengthily on
her dealings with Junior and the two (2) occasions when she met with
Lourdes. The last time MONINA saw FRANCISCO was in March 1979, when
she sought his blessings to get married.
In his defense, FRANCISCO offered his deposition taken before then Judge
Romeo Callejo of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48. As
additional witnesses, FRANCISCO presented Nonito Jalandoni, Teodoro
Zulla, Iñigo Supertisioso, Lourdes Ledesma, Jose Cruz and Dolores Argenal.
FRANCISCO declared that Pansay's employment ceased as of October, 1
1944, and that while employed by him, Pansay would sleep with the other
female helpers on the first floor of his residence, while he, his wife and
daughter slept in a room on the second floor. At that time, his household
staff was composed of three (3) female workers and two (2) male workers.
After Pansay left in October 1944, she never communicated with him again,
neither did he know of her whereabouts. FRANCISCO staunchly denied
having had sexual relations with Pansay and disavowed any knowledge
about MONINA's birth. In the same vein, he denied having paid for
MONINA's tuition fees, in person or otherwise, and asserted that he never
knew that Mr. Lagarto paid for these fees. Moreover, FRANCISCO could not
believe that Lagarto would pay for these fees despite absence of
instructions or approval from FRANCISCO. He likewise categorically denied
that he told anyone, be it Danthea Lopez, Zafiro Ledesma, Concha Cuaycong
or Remedios Franco, that MONINA was his daughter.
FRANCISCO also disclosed that upon his return from the United States in
1971, he fired Alfredo Baylosis upon discovering that Alfredo had taken
advantage of his position during the former's absence. FRANCISCO likewise
fired Rudy Tingson and Romeo Bilbao, but did not give the reasons therefor.
Finally, FRANCISCO denied knowledge of MONINA's long distance calls from
his Bacolod residence; nevertheless, when he subsequently discovered this,
he fired certain people in his office for their failure to report this anomaly.
As regards the caretaker of his Bacolod residence, FRANCISCO explained
that since MONINA lived at Mrs. Cuaycong's residence, the caretaker
thought that he could allow people who lived at the Cuaycong residence to
use the facilities at his (FRANCISCO's) house.
Nonito Jalandoni, bookkeeper and paymaster at Nelly's Garden from 1963
up to 1974, then from 1980 up to 1986, the assistant overseer of Hacienda
Lopez, testified that he did not know MONINA; that he learned of her only
in June 1988, when he was informed by FRANCISCO that MONINA had sued
him; and that he never saw MONINA at Nelly's Garden, neither did he know
of any instructions for anyone at Nelly's Garden to give money to MONINA.
Teodoro Zulla, FRANCISCO's bookkeeper and paymaster from 1951 up to
1986, testified that FRANCISCO dismissed Alfredo Baylosis due to certain
unspecified discrepancies; and that he never saw MONINA receive funds
from either Mr. Lagarto or Mr. Baylosis. Upon questions from the trial court,
however, Teodoro admitted that he prepared vouchers for only one of
FRANCISCO's haciendas, and not vouchers pertaining to the latter's
personal expenses.
Iñigo Supertisioso testified that he worked for FRANCISCO at Nelly's Garden
from 1964 up to 1984 as a field inspector, paymaster, cashier and,
eventually, officer-in-charge (OIC). He confirmed Alfredo Baylosis' dismissal
due to these unspecified irregularities, then denied that FRANCISCO ever
ordered that MONINA be given her allowance. Likewise, Iñigo never heard
FRANCISCO mention that MONINA was his (FRANCISCO's) daughter.
Lourdes Ledesma, FRANCISCO's daughter, testified that she saw (but did not
know) MONINA at the Our Lady of Mercy Hospital, on the occasion of the
birth of Lourdes' first son, Mark. Over lunch one day, Lourdes' aunt casually
introduced Lourdes and MONINA to each other, but they were referred to
only by their first names. Then sometime in 1983 or 1984, MONINA
allegedly went to Lourdes' house in Sta. Clara Subdivision requesting for a
letter of introduction or referral as MONINA was then job-hunting.
However, Lourdes did not comply with the request.
Jose Cruz, a partner at Miller, Cruz & Co., testified that MONINA worked at
Miller & Cruz from 1968 up to 1971, however, he did not personally
interview her before she was accepted for employment. Moreover,
MONINA underwent the usual screening procedure before being hired. Jose
recalled that one of the accountants, a certain Mr. Atienza, reported that
MONINA claimed to be FRANCISCO's daughter. Jose then told Mr. Atienza to
speak with MONINA and see if he (Mr. Atienza) could stop her from
spreading this rumor. Mr. Atienza reported that he spoke with MONINA,
who told him that she planned to leave for the United States and needed
P20,000.00 for that purpose, and in exchange, she would sign a document
disclaiming filiation with FRANCISCO. Thus, Jose instructed Mr. Atienza to
request that MONINA meet with Jose, and at that meeting, MONINA
confirmed Mr. Atienza's report. Jose then informed Atty. Tirol, FRANCISCO's
personal lawyer, about the matter.
Atty. Tirol told Jose to send MONINA and her lawyer to his (Atty. Tirol's)
office in Iloilo. Jose then wrote out a letter of introduction for MONINA
addressed to Atty. Tirol Jose relayed Atty. Tirol's message to MONINA
through Mr. Atienza, then later, Atty. Tirol told Jose to go to Iloilo with a
clerk for P15,000.00 Jose complied, and at Atty. Tirol's office, Jose saw
MONINA, Atty. Tirol and his secretary reading some documents. MONINA
then expressed her willingness to sign the document, sans revisions. Jose
alleged that he drew the P15,000.00 from his personal funds, subject to
reimbursement from and due to an understanding with FRANCISCO.
Dolores Argenal, a househelper at Nelly Garden from May 1944 up to May
1946, testified that she knew that Pansay was Lourdes' nanny; that Lourdes
slept in her parents' room; that she had not seen FRANCISCO give special
treatment to Pansay; that there was no "unusual relationship" between
FRANCISCO and Pansay, and if there was any, Dolores would have easily
detected it since she slept in the same room as Pansay. Dolores further
declared that whenever FRANCISCO's wife was out of town, Pansay would
bring Lourdes downstairs at nighttime, and that Pansay would not sleep in
the room where FRANCISCO slept. Finally, Dolores declared that Pansay
stopped working for FRANCISCO and his wife in October, 1944.
The reception of evidence having been concluded, the parties filed their
respective memoranda.
It need be recalled that Judge Catalino Castañeda, Jr. presided over trial up
to 21 October 1986, thereby hearing only the testimonies of MONINA's
witnesses and about half of MONINA's testimony on direct examination.
Judge Norberto E. Devera, Jr. heard the rest of MONINA's testimony and
those of FRANCISCO's witnesses.
In its decision of 12 November 199012 the trial court, through Judge Devera,
dismissed the complaint with costs against MONINA. In the opening
paragraph thereof, it observed:
This is a complaint for recognition of an illegitimate child
instituted by plaintiff Monina Jison against defendant Francisco
Jison. This complaint was filed on March 13, 1985 at the time
when plaintiff, reckoned from her death of birth, was already
thirty-nine years old. Noteworthy also is the fact that it was
instituted twenty years after the death of plaintiff's mother,
Esperanza Amolar. For the years between plaintiff's birth and
Esperanza's death, no action of any kind was instituted against
defendant either by plaintiff, her mother Esperanza or the
latter's parents. Neither had plaintiff brought such an action
against defendant immediately upon her mother's death on April
20, 1965, considering that she was then already nineteen years
old or, within a reasonable time thereafter. Twenty years more
had to supervene before this complaint was eventually
instituted.
The trial court then proceeded to discuss the four issues stipulated at pre-
trial, without, however, summarizing the testimonies of the witnesses nor
referring to the testimonies of the witnesses other than those mentioned in
the discussion of the issues.
The trial court resolved the first issue in the negative, holding that it was
improbable for witness Lope Amolar to have noticed that Pansay was
pregnant upon seeing her at the Elena Apartments in November 1945, since
Pansay was then only in her first month of pregnancy; that there was no
positive assertion that "copulation did indeed take place between Francisco
and Esperanza;" and that MONINA's attempt to show opportunity on the
part of FRANCISCO failed to consider "that there was also the opportunity
for copulation between Esperanza and one of the several domestic helpers
admittedly also residing at Nelly's Garden at that time." The RTC also ruled
that the probative value of the birth and baptismal certificates of MONINA
paled in light of jurisprudence, especially when the misspellings therein
were considered.
The trial court likewise resolved the second issue in the negative, finding
that MONINA's evidence thereon "may either be one of three categories,
namely: hearsay evidence, incredulous evidence, or self-serving evidence."
To the first category belonged the testimonies of Adela Casabuena and
Alfredo Baylosis, whose knowledge of MONINA's filiation was based, as to
the former, on "utterances of defendant's wife Lilia and Esperanza allegedly
during the heat of their quarrel," while as to the latter, Alfredo's conclusion
was based "from the rumors going [around] that plaintiff is defendant's
daughter, front his personal observation of plaintiff's facial appearance
which he compared with that of defendant's and from the way the two
(plaintiff and defendant) acted and treated each other on one occasion that
he had then opportunity to closely observe them together." To the second
category belonged that of Dominador Savariz, as:
At each precise time that Esperanza allegedly visited Nelly's
Garden and allegedly on those occasions when defendant's wife,
Lilia was in Manila, this witness was there and allegedly heard
pieces of conversation between defendant and Esperanza related
to the paternity of the latter's child. . .
The RTC then placed MONINA's testimony regarding the acts of recognition
accorded her by FRANCISCO's relatives under the third category, since the
latter were never presented as witnesses, for which reason the trial court
excluded the letters from FRANCISCO's relatives (Exhs. S to V).
As to the third issue, the trial court held that MONINA was not barred by
prescription for it was of "the perception . . . that the benefits of Article 268
accorded to legitimate children may be availed of or extended to
illegitimate children in the same manner as the Family Code has so
provided;" or by laches, "which is [a] creation of equity applied only to
bring equitable results, and . . . addressed to the sound discretion of the
court [and] the circumstances [here] would show that whether plaintiff
filed this case immediately upon the death of her mother Esperanza in 1965
or twenty years thereafter in 1985, . . . there seems to be no inequitable
result to defendant as related to the situation of plaintiff."
The RTC ruled, however, that MONINA was barred by estoppel by deed
because of the affidavit (Exh. P/Exh. 2) which she signed "when she was
already twenty-five years, a professional and . . . under the able guidance of
counsel."
Finally, the RTC denied FRANCISCO's claim for damages, finding that
MONINA did not file the complaint with malice, she having been "propelled
by an honest belief, founded on probable cause."
MONINA seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No.
32860) and sought reversal of the trial court's decision on the grounds that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT WAS ERRONEOUSLY PREDISPOSED TO
ADJUDGE THIS CASE AGAINST APPELLANT DUE TO ITS
MISPERCEPTION THAT APPELLANT'S DELAY IN FILING HER
COMPLAINT WAS FATAL TO HER CASE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REJECTION OF THE TESTIMONIES
OF APPELLANT'S WITNESSES AS TAILOR-MADE, INADEQUATE
AND INCREDIBLE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REJECTION OF THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE CERTIFIED COPIES OF PUBLIC
DOCUMENTS PRESENTED BY APPELLANT AS PART OF HER
EVIDENCE.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REQUIREMENT THAT A WITNESS
TO THE ACTUAL ACT O COPULATION BETWEEN THE APPELLEE
AND APPELLANT'S MOTHER SHOULD HAVE POSITIVELY TESTIFIED
TO SAID EFFECT.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
THE DULY IDENTIFIED NOTES AND LETTER OF THE RELATIVES OF
THE APPELLEE AS HEARSAY.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT APPELLANT'S
AFFIDAVIT (EXH. P) SERVED AS A BAR AGAINST HER CLAIM FOR
RECOGNITION INSTEAD OF REINFORCING SAID CLAIM.13
Expectedly, FRANCISCO refuted these alleged errors in his Appellee's Brief. 14
In its decision of 27 April 1995,15 the Court of Appeals initially declared that
as no vested or acquired rights were affected, the instant case was
governed by Article 175, in relation to Articles 172 and 173, of the Family
Code.16 While the Court of Appeals rejected the certifications issued by the
Local Civil Registrar of Dingle, Iloilo (Exhs. E and F) as FRANCISCO did not
sign them, said court focused its discussion on the other means by which
illegitimate filiation could be proved, i.e., the open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child or, by any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, such as "the baptismal
certificate of the child, a judicial admission, a family bible wherein the
name of the child is entered, common reputation respecting pedigree,
admission by silence, testimonies of witnesses . . ." 17 To the Court of
Appeals, the "bottom line issue" was whether or not MONINA established
her filiation as FRANCISCO's illegitimate daughter by preponderance of
evidence, as to which issue said court found:
 [N]ot just preponderant but overwhelming evidence on record to
prove that [MONINA] is the illegitimate daughter of
[FRANCISCO] and that she had continuously enjoyed such status
by direct acts of [FRANCISCO] and/or his relatives.
In so ruling, the Court of Appeals observed that the testimonies of Lope
Amolar, Adela Casabuena and Dominador Savariz were already sufficient to
establish MONINA's filiation:
As adverted to earlier, the trial court discredited Lope Amolar's
testimony by saying that Lope could not have detected
Esperanza's pregnant state in November, 1945 since at that point
in time [sic] she was still in the initial stage of pregnancy.
Apparently, the trial court paid more emphasis on the date
mentioned by Lope Amolar than on the tenor and import his
testimony. As . . . Lope . . . was asked about an incident that
transpired more than 41 years back, [u]nder the circumstances,
it is unreasonable to expect that Lope could still be dead right on
the specific month in 1945 that [he] met and confronted his
sister. At any rate, what is important is not the month that they
met but the essence of his testimony that his sister pointed to
their employer [FRANCISCO] as the one responsible for her
pregnancy, and that upon being confronted, [FRANCISCO]
assured him of support for Esperanza and their child. It would
appear then that in an attempt to find fault with Lope's
testimony, the trial court has fallen oblivious to the fact that
even [FRANCISCO], in his deposition, did not deny that he was
confronted by Lope about what he had done to Esperanza during
which he unequivocally acknowledged paternity by assuring
Lope of support for both Esperanza and their child.
The Court of Appeals further noted that Casabuena and Savariz "testified
on something that they personally observed or witnessed," which matters
FRANCISCO "did not deny or refute." Finally, said court aptly held:
Taking into account all the foregoing uncontroverted testimonies
. . . let alone such circumstantial evidence as [MONINA's] Birth
Certificates . . . and Baptismal Certificates which invariably bear
the name of [FRANCISCO] as her father, We cannot go along with
the trial court's theory that [MONINA's] illegitimate filiation has
not been satisfactorily established.
xxx xxx xxx
Significantly, [MONINA's] testimony finds ample corroboration
from [FRANCISCO's] former employees, Arsenio Duatin, Rudy
Tingson and Alfredo Baylosis. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Carefully evaluating appellant's evidence on her enjoyment of
the status of an illegitimate daughter of [FRANCISCO] vis-a-
vis [FRANCISCO's] controversion thereof, We find more weight in
the former. The positive testimonies of [MONINA] and [her]
witnesses . . . all bearing on [FRANCISCO's] acts and/or conduct
indubitably showing that he had continuously acknowledged
[MONINA] as his illegitimate daughter have not been
succeessfully [sic] refuted. In fact, [FRANCISCO] himself, in his
deposition, only casually dismissed [MONINA's] exhaustive and
detailed testimony as untrue, and with respect to those given by
[MONINA's] witnesses, he merely explained that he had fired
[them] from their employment. Needless to state, [FRANCISCO's]
vague denial is grossly inadequate to overcome the probative
weight of [MONINA's] testimonial evidence.
Even the affidavit (Exh 2) which [FRANCISCO] had foisted on the
trial court . . . does not hold sway in the face of [MONINA's]
logical explanation that she at first did agree to sign the affidavit
which contained untruthful statements. In fact, she promptly
complained to [FRANCISCO] who, however explained to her that
the affidavit was only for the consumption of his spouse . . .
Further, the testimony of Jose Cruz concerning the events that
led to the execution of the affidavit . . . could not have been true,
for as pointed out by [MONINA] she signed the affidavit . . .
almost five months after she had resigned from the Miller, Cruz
& Co. . . .
At any rate, if [MONINA] were not his illegitimate daughter, it
would have been uncalled for, if not absurd, for [FRANCISCO] or
his lawyer to have secured [MONINA's] sworn statement . . . On
the contrary, in asking [MONINA] to sign the said affidavit at the
cost of P15,000. [FRANCISCO] clearly betrayed his intention to
conceal or suppress his paternity of [MONINA] . . .
In fine, We hold that [MONINA's] filiation as [FRANCISCO's]
illegitimate daughter has been conclusively, established by the
uncontroverted testimonies of Lope Amolar, Adela Casabuena
and Dominador Savariz to the effect that appellee himself had
admitted his paternity of the appellee, and also by the
testimonies of appellant; Arsenio Duatin, Romeo Bilbao, Rudy
Tingson and Alfredo Baylosis unerringly demonstrating that by
his own conduct or overt acts like sending appellant to school,
paying for her tuition fees, school uniforms, books, board and
lodging at the Colegio del Sagrado Corazon de Jesus, defraying
appellant's hospitalization expenses, providing her with [a]
monthly allowance, paying for the funeral expenses of
appellant's mother, acknowledging appellant's paternal
greetings and calling appellant his "Hija" or child, instructing his
office personnel to give appellant's monthly allowance,
recommending appellant for employment at the Miller, Cruz &
Co., allowing appellant to use his house in Bacolod and paying
for her long distance telephone calls, having appellant spend her
vacation in his apartment in Manila and also at his Forbes
residence, allowing appellant to use his surname in her
scholastic and other records (Exhs. Z, AA, AA-1, to AA-5, W & W-
5), appellee had continuously recognized appellant as his
illegitimate daughter. Added to these are the acts of
[FRANCISCO's] relatives acknowledging or treating [MONINA] as
[FRANCISCO's] daughter (Exh. U) or as their relative (Exhs. T &
V). On this point, witness Zafiro Ledesma, former Mayor of Iloilo
City, whose spouse belongs to the Lopez clan just like
[FRANCISCO], testified that [MONINA) has been considered by
the Lopezes as a relative. He identified pictures of the appellee in
the company of the Lopezes (Exhs X-16 & X-17). Another witness,
Danthea H. Lopez, whose husband Eusebio Lopez is appellee's
first cousin, testified that appellant was introduced to her by
appellee's cousin, Remedios Lopez Franco, as the daughter of
appellee Francisco Jison, for which reason, she took her in as [a]
secretary in the Merchant's Financing Corporation of which she
was the manager, and further allowed her to stay with her family
free of board and lodging. Still on this aspect, Dominador Savariz
declared that sometime in February, 1966 appellee's relative,
Ms. Remedios Lopez Franco pointed to appellant as the daughter
of appellee Francisco Jison.
Finally, the Certifications of the Local Civil Registrar of Dingle
(Exhs E and F) as well as [MONINA's] Baptismal Certificates (Exhs
C & D) which the trial court admitted in evidence as part of
[MONINA's] testimony, may serve as circumstantial evidence to
further reinforce [MONINA's] claim that she is [FRANCISCO's]
illegitimate daughter by Esperanza Amolar.
True it is that a trial judge's assessment of the credibility of
witnesses is accorded great respect on appeal. But the rule
admits of certain exceptions. One such exception is where the
judge who rendered the judgment was not the one who heard
the witnesses testify. [citations omitted] The other is where the
trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated
some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which, if
properly considered, might affect the result of the case.
[citations omitted] In the present case, both exceptions obtain.
All of [MONINA's] witnesses . . . whose testimonies were not
given credence did not testify before the judge who rendered the
disputed judgment . . .
The Court of Appeals then decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the trial
court is SET ASIDE and another one is hereby entered for
appellant Monina Jison, declaring her as the illegitimate
daughter of appellee Francisco Jison, and entitled to all rights
and privileges granted by law.
Costs against appellee.
SO ORDERED.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals
in its resolution of 29 March 1996, 18 FRANCISCO filed the instant petition.
He urges us to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, alleging that
said court committed errors of law:
I.
. . . IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND
DECLARING PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
OF PETITIONER, CONSIDERING [THE] IMPOSSIBILITY OF SEXUAL
CONTACT BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND THE PRIVATE
 RESPONDENTS MOTHER AT THE TIME CONCEPTION WAS
SUPPOSED TO HAVE OCCURRED.
II.
. . . IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING CONSIDERING
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE OF
PATERNITY AND FILIATION IS NOT CLEAR AND CONVINCING.
III.
. . . IN GIVING CREDENCE TO DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS EVIDENCE OF
FILIATION CONSIDERING THAT THE SAME ARE HEARSAY, SELF-
SERVING AND CANNOT BIND THE PETITIONER UNDER THE BASIC
RULES OF EVIDENCE.
IV.
. . . IN INTERPRETING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS SWORN
STATEMENT (EXH. "P" /EXH. "2") IN A MANNER NOT IN
CONSONANCE WITH THE RULINGS OF THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT.
V.
. . . IN NOT CONSIDERING THE LONG AND UNEXPLAINED DELAY
IN THE FILING OF THE PRESENT PATERNITY SUIT AS EQUIVALENT
TO LACHES.
As regards the first error, FRANCISCO insists that taking into account the
second paragraph of MONINA's complaint wherein she claimed that he and
Pansay had sexual relations "by about the end of 1945 or the start of 1946,"
it was physically impossable for him and Pansay to have had sexual contact
which resulted in MONINA's birth, considering that:
The normal period of human pregnancy is nine (9) months. If as
claimed by private respondent in her complaint that her mother
was impregnated by FRANCISCO "at the end of 1945 or the start
of 1946", she would have been born sometime in late September
or early October and not August 6, 1946 . . . The instant case
finds factual and legal parallels in Constantino
vs. Mendez,19 thus: . . .
FRANCISCO further claims that his testimony that Pansay was no longer
employed by him at the time in question was unrebutted, moreover, other
men had access to Pansay during the time of or even after her employment
by him.
As to the second error, FRANCISCO submits that MONINA's testimonial
evidence is "shaky, contradictory and unreliable," and proceeds to attack
the credibility of her witnesses by claiming, in the main, that: (a) Lope
Amolar could not have detected Pansay pregnancy in November 1945 when
they met since she would have been only one (1) month pregnant then; (b)
Dominador Savariz did not in fact witness the meeting between
FRANCISCO, Pansay and MONINA; (c) Zafiro Ledesma had an ulterior motive
in testifying for MONINA as he owned a bank in Iloilo which was then under
Central Bank supervision and MONINA was the Bank Examiner assigned to
Iloilo; and (d) Danthea Lopez was not related to him by blood and whatever
favorable treatment MONINA received from Danthea was due to the
former's employment at Merchants' Financing Company and additional
services rendered at Kahirup Hotel; besides Danthea admitted that she had
no personal knowledge as to the issue of paternity and filiation of the
contending parties, hence Sections 39 and 40 20 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court did not come into play. FRANCISCO likewise re-echoes the view of the
trial court as regards the testimonies of Adela Casabuena and Alfredo
Baylosis.
FRANCISCO further asserts that MONINA's testimony that he answered for
her schooling was self-serving and uncorroborated by any receipt or other
documentary evidence; and assuming he did, such should be interpreted as
a manifestation of kindness shown towards the family of a former
household helper.
Anent the treatment given by his relatives to MONINA as his daughter,
FRANCISCO points to the fact that Pansay was the former laundrywoman of
Mrs. Franco; MONINA resided with the families of Eusebio Lopez and
Concha Cuaycong because she was in their employ at Kahirup Hotel and
Our Lady of Mercy Hospital, respectively; MONINA failed to present Mrs.
Franco, Eusebio Lopez and Mrs. Cuaycong; and MONINA's employment at
the accounting firm of Miller, Cruz & Co. was attributable to her educational
attainment, there being absolutely no evidence to prove that FRANCISCO
ever facilitated her employment thereat. Hence, in light of Baluyot
v. Baluyot,21 the quantum of evidence to prove paternity by clear and
convincing evidence, not merely a preponderance thereof, was not met.
With respect to the third assigned error, FRANCISCO argues that the Court
of Appeals' reliance on the certifications of the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. E
and F) and Baptismal Certificates (Exhs. C and D) as circumstantial evidence
is misplaced. First, their genuineness could not be ascertained as the
persons who issued them did not testify. Second, in light of Reyes v. Court
of Appeals,22 the contents of the baptismal certificates were hearsay, as the
data was based only on what was told to the priest who solemnized the
baptism, who likewise was not presented as a witness. Additionally, the
name of the father appearing therein was "Franque Jison," which was not
FRANCISCO's name. Third, in both Exhibits E and F, the names of the child's
parents were listed as "Frank Heson" and "Esperanza Amador" (not
Amolar). FRANCISCO further points out that in Exhibit F, the status of the
child is listen as "legitimate," while the father's occupation as "laborer."
Most importantly, there was no showing that FRANCISCO signed Exhibits E
and F or that he was the one who reported the child's birth to the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar. As to MONINA's educational records, FRANCISCO
invokes Bañas v. Bañas23 which recognized that school records are prepared
by school authorities, not by putative parents, thus incompetent to prove
paternity. And, as to the photographs presented by MONINA, FRANCISCO
cites Colorado v. Court of Appeals,24 and further asserts that MONINA did
not present any of the persons with whom she is seen in the pictures to
testify thereon; besides these persons were, at best, mere second cousins
of FRANCISCO. He likewise assails the various notes and letters written by
his relatives (Exhs. S to V) as they were not identified by the authors.
Finally, he stresses that MONINA did not testify as to the telephone cards
(Exhs. G to L) nor did these reveal the circumstances surrounding the calls
she made from his residence.
Anent the fourth assigned error, FRANCISCO contends that the Court of
Appeals' interpretation of MONINA's affidavit of 21 September 1971 ran
counter to Dequito v. Llamas,25 and overlooked that at the time of
execution, MONINA was more than 25 years old and assisted by counsel.
As to the last assigned error, FRANCISCO bewails the Court of Appeals'
failure to consider the long and unexplained delay in the filing of the case.
In her comment, MONINA forcefully refuted FRANCISCO's arguments,
leading FRANCISCO to file his reply thereto.
On 20 November 1996, we gave due course to this petition and required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda, which they subsequently
did.
A painstaking review of the evidence and arguments fails to support
petitioner.
Before addressing the merits of the controversy, we first dispose of
preliminary matters relating to the applicable law and the guiding principles
in paternity suits. As to the former, plainly, the Family Code of the
Philippines (Executive Order No. 209) governs the present controversy. As
correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, Uyguangco 26 served as a judicial
confirmation of Article 256 of the Family Code 27 regarding its retroactive
effect unless there be impairment of vested rights, which does not hold true
here, it appearing that neither the putative parent nor the child has passed
away and the former having actually resisted the latter's claim below.
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as
MONINA's, may be established in the same way and on the same evidence
as that of legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides the various forms
of evidence by which legitimate filiation is established, thus:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any
of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence,
the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child; or
 (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.
This Article reproduces, with amendments, Articles 265, 266 and 267 of the
Civil Code.
For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under the
second paragraph. which MONINA relies upon given that she has none of
the evidence mentioned in the first paragraph, a "high standard of
proof"28 is required. Specifically, to prove open and continuous possession
of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the
manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to
consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental
affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts
must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of
paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in
all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously. 29
By "continuous" is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not
require any particular length of time.30
The foregoing standard of proof required to establish one's filiation is
founded on the principle that an order for recognition and support may
create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant in the family or
lives of the parties, so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is
established by clear and convincing evidence.31
The foregoing discussion, however, must be situated within the general
rules on evidence, in light of the burden of proof in civil cases, i.e.,
preponderance of evidence, and the shifting of the burden of evidence in
such cases. Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the
burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof
never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff
makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of
evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima facie case,
otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil
cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance
of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant's. The concept of
"preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight,
or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it
means probability of truth.32
With these in mind, we now proceed to resolve the merits of the instant
controversy.
FRANCISCO's arguments in support of his first assigned error deserve scant
consideration. While it has been observed that unlawful intercourse will
not be presumed merely from proof of an opportunity for such
indulgence,33 this does not favor FRANCISCO. Akin to the crime of rape
where, in most instances, the only witnesses to the felony are the
participants in the sexual act themselves, in deciding paternity suits, the
issue of whether sexual intercourse actually occurred inevitably redounds
to the victim's or mother's word, as against the accused's or putative
father's protestations. In the instant case, MONINA's mother could no
longer testify as to the fact of intercourse, as she had, unfortunately, passed
away long before the institution of the complaint for recognition. But this
did not mean that MONINA could no longer prove her filiation. The fact of
her birth and her parentage may be established by evidence other than the
testimony of her mother. The paramount question then is whether
MONINA's evidence is coherent, logical and natural. 34
The complaint stated that FRANCISCO had carnal knowledge of Pansay "by
about the end of 1945." We agree with MONINA that this was broad
enough to cover the fourth quarter of said year, hence her birth on 6 August
1946 could still be attributed to sexual relations between FRANCISCO and
MONINA's mother. In any event, since it was established that her mother
was still in the employ of FRANCISCO at the time MONINA was conceived as
determined by the date of her birth, sexual contact between FRANCISCO
and MONINA's mother was not at all impossible, especially in light of the
overwhelming evidence, as hereafter shown, that FRANCISCO fathered
MONINA, has recognized her as his daughter and that MONINA has been
enjoying the open and continuous possession of the status as FRANCISCO's
illegitimate daughter.
We readily conclude that the testimonial evidence offered by MONINA,
woven by her narration of circumstances and events that occurred through
the years, concerning her relationship with FRANCISCO, coupled with the
testimonies of her witnesses, overwhelmingly established the following
facts:
1) FRANCISCO is MONINA's father and she was conceived at the
time when her mother was in the employ of the former;
2) FRANCISCO recognized MONINA as his child through his overt
acts and conduct which the Court of Appeals took pains to
enumerate, thus:
[L]ike sending appellant to school, paying
for her tuition fees, school uniforms,
books, board and lodging at the Colegio del
Sagrado de Jesus, defraying appellant's
hospitalization expenses, providing her
with [a] monthly allowance, paying for the
funeral expenses of appellant's mother,
acknowledging appellant's paternal
greetings and calling appellant his "Hija" or
child, instructing his office personnel to
give appellant's monthly allowance,
recommending appellant to use his house
in Bacolod and paying for her long distance
telephone calls, having appellant spend
her long distance telephone calls, having
appellant spend her vacation in his
apartment in Manila and also at his Forbes
residence, allowing appellant to use his
surname in her scholastic and other
records (Exhs Z, AA, AA-1 to AA-5, W & W-
5) . . .
3) Such recognition has been consistently shown and manifested
throughout the years publicly, 35spontaneously, continuously and
in an uninterrupted manner.36
Accordingly, in light of the totality of the evidence on record, the second
assigned error must fail.
There is some merit, however, in the third assigned error against the
probative value of some of MONINA's documentary evidence.
MONINA's reliance on the certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar
concerning her birth (Exhs. E and F) is clearly misplaced. It is settled that a
certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence as to the issue of paternity, when there is no showing
that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificates,
and the Local Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to record the paternity of
an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person. 37 Simply put, if
the alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, e.g., supplying
the information himself, the inscription of his name by the mother or
doctor or registrar is null and void; the mere certificate by the registrar
without the signature of the father is not proof of voluntary
acknowledgment on the latter's part.38 In like manner, FRANCISCO's lack of
participation in the preparation of the baptismal certificates (Exhs. C and D)
and school records (Exhs. Z and AA) renders these documents incompetent
to prove paternity, the former being competent merely to prove the
administration of the sacrament of baptism on the date so
specified.39 However, despite the inadmissibility of the school records per
se to prove the paternity, they may be admitted as part of MONINA's
testimony to corroborate her claim that FRANCISCO spent for her
education.
We likewise disagree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the
certificates issued by the Local Civil Registrar and the baptismal certificates
may be taken as circumstantial evidence to prove MONINA's filiation. Since
they are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of such filiation, they
cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
As to Exhibits "S," "T," "U" and "V," the various notes and letters written by
FRANCISCO's relatives, namely Mike Alano, Emilio Jison, Mariquit Lopez and
Fernando Lopez, respectively, allegedly attesting to MONINA's filiation,
while their due execution and authenticity are not in issue, 40 as MONINA
witnessed the authors signing the documents, nevertheless, under Rule
130, Section 39, the contents of these documents may not be admitted,
there being no showing that the declarants-authors were dead or unable to
testify, neither was the relationship between the declarants and MONINA
shown by evidence other than the documents in question. 41 As to the
admissibility of these documents under Rule 130, Section 40, however, this
requires further elaboration.
Rule 130, Section 40, provides:
Sec. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The
reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the
controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its
members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying
thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity
or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or
 charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like may be
received as evidence of pedigree. (emphasis supplied)
It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the
portion containing the first underscored clause which pertains to
testimonial evidence, under which the documents in question may not be
admitted as the authors thereof did not take the witness stand; and the
section containing the second underscored phrase. What must then be
ascertained is whether Exhibits S to V, as private documents, fall within the
scope of the clause "and the like" as qualified by the preceding phrase
"[e]ntries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on
rights [and] family portraits,"
We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion
of this provision, in light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects
which are commonly known as "family possessions," or those articles which
represent, in effect, a family's joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree
of a person.42These have been described as objects "openly exhibited and
well known to the family," 43 or those "which, if preserved in a family, may
be regarded as giving a family tradition." 44 Other examples of these objects
which are regarded as reflective of a family's reputation or tradition
regarding pedigree are inscriptions on tombstones, 45 monuments or coffin
plates.46
Plainly then, Exhibits S to V, as private documents not constituting "family
possessions" as discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis of Rule
130, Section 40. Neither may these exhibits be admitted on the basis of
Rule 130, Section 41 regarding common reputation, 47 it having been
observed that:
[T]he weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory
that it is the general repute, the common reputation in the
family, and not the common reputation in community, that is a
material element of evidence going to establish pedigree. . . .
[Thus] matters of pedigree may be proved by reputation in the
family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity,
except where the pedigree in question is marriage which may be
proved by common reputation in the community.48
Their inadmissibility notwithstanding, Exhibits "S" to "V," inclusive, may, in
like manner as MONINA's school records, properly be admitted as part of
her testimony to strengthen her claim that, indeed, relatives of FRANCISCO
recognized her as his daughter.
We now direct our attention to MONINA's 21 September 1971 affidavit
(Exh. P/Exh. 2), subject of the fourth assigned error, where she attests that
FRANCISCO is not her father. MONINA contends that she signed it under
duress, i.e., she was jobless, had no savings and needed the money to
support herself and finish her studies. Moreover, she signed Exhibit P upon
the advice of Atty. Divinagracia that filiation could not be waived and that
FRANCISCO's ploy would "boomerang" upon him. On the other hand,
FRANCISCO asserts that full credence should be afforded Exhibit P as
MONINA was already 25 years old at the time of its execution and was
advised by counsel; further, being a notarized document, its genuineness
and due execution could not be questioned. He relies on the testimony of
Jose Cruz, a partner at the accounting firm of Miller & Cruz, who declared
that he intervened in the matter as MONINA was spreading rumors about
her filiation within the firm, which might have had deleterious effects upon
the relationship between the firm and FRANCISCO.
On this issue, we find for MONINA and agree with the following
observations of the Court of Appeals:
Even the affidavit (Exh 2) which [FRANCISCO] had foisted on the
trial court . . . does not hold sway in the face of [MONINA's]
logical explanation that she at first did agree to sign the affidavit
which contained untruthful statements. In fact, she promptly
complained to [FRANCISCO] who, however explained to her that
the affidavit was only for the consumption of his spouse . . .
At any rate, if [MONINA] were not his illegitimate daughter, it
would have been uncalled for, if not absurd, for [FRANCISCO] of
his lawyer to have secured [MONINA's] sworn statement . . . On
the contrary, in asking [MONINA] to sign the said affidavit at the
cost of P15,000. [FRANCISCO] clearly betrayed his intention to
conceal or suppress his paternity of [MONINA] . . .
Indeed, if MONINA were truly not FRANCISCO's illegitimate daughter, it
would have been unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in
order that MONINA denounce her filiation. For as clearly established before
the trial court and properly appreciated by the Court of Appeals, MONINA
had resigned from Miller & Cruz five (5) months prior to the execution of
the sworn statement in question, hence negating FRANCISCO's theory of
the need to quash rumors circulating within Miller & Cruz regarding the
identity of MONINA's father. Hence, coupled with the assessment of the
credibility of the testimonial evidence of the parties discussed above, it is
evident that the standard to contradict a notarial document, i.e. clear and
convincing evidence and more than merely preponderant, 49 has been met
by MONINA
Plainly then, the burden of evidence fully shifted to FRANCISCO.
Two (2) glaring points in FRANCISCO's defense beg to be addressed: First,
that his testimony was comprised of mere denials, rife with bare,
unsubstantiated responses such as "That is not true," "I do not believe
that," or "None that I know." In declining then to lend credence to
FRANCISCO's testimony, we resort to a guiding principle in adjudging the
credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his statements, laid down as
early as 1921:
The experience of courts and the general observation of
humanity teach us that the natural limitations of our inventive
faculties are such that if a witness undertakes to fabricate and
deliver in court a false narrative containing numerous details, he
is almost certain to fall into fatal inconsistencies, to make
statements which can be readily refuted, or to expose in his
demeanor the falsity of his message.
For this reason it will be found that perjurers usually confine
themselves to the incidents immediately related to the principal
fact about which they testify, and when asked about collateral
facts by which their truthfulness could be tested, their answers
not infrequently take the stereotyped form of such expressions
as "I don't know" or "I don't remember." . . .50
Second, the reasons for the dismissals of Tingson, Baylosis and Savariz were
unspecified or likewise unsubstantiated, hence FRANCISCO's attempt to
prove ill-motive on their part to falsely testify in MONINA's favor may not
succeed. As may be gleaned, the only detail which FRANCISCO could furnish
as to the circumstances surrounding the dismissals of his former employees
was that Baylosis allegedly "took advantage of his position" while
FRANCISCO was in the United States. But aside from this bare claim,
FRANCISCO's account is barren, hence unable to provide the basis for a
finding of bias against FRANCISCO on the part of his former employees.
As to FRANCISCO's other witnesses, nothing substantial could be obtained
either. Nonito Jalandoni avowed that he only came to know of MONINA in
June 1988;51 that during his employment at Nelly Garden from 1963 up to
1974, he did not recall ever having seen MONINA there, neither did he
know of any instructions from FRANCISCO nor Mr. Lagarto (FRANCISCO's
office manager before passing away) regarding the disbursement of
MONINA's allowance.52 Teodoro Zulla corroborated Jalandoni's testimony
regarding not having seen MONINA at Nelly Garden and MONINA's
allowance; declared that Alfredo Baylosis was dismissed due to
discrepancies discovered after an audit, without any further elaboration,
however; but admitted that he never prepared the vouchers pertaining to
FRANCISCO's personal expenses, merely those intended for one of
FRANCISCO's haciendas.53 Then, Iñigo Superticioso confirmed that according
to the report of a certain Mr. Atienza, Baylosis "was dismissed by Mr. Jison
for irregularities," while Superticioso was informed by FRANCISCO that
Tingson was dismissed for loss of confidence. Superticioso likewise denied
that MONINA received money from FRANCISCO's office, neither was there a
standing order from FRANCISCO to release funds to her.54
It is at once obvious that the testimonies of these witnesses for FRANCISCO
are likewise insufficient to overcome MONINA's evidence. The former
merely consist of denials as regards the latter's having gone to Nelly Garden
or having received her allowance from FRANCISCO's office, which, being in
the form of negative testimony, necessarily stand infirm as against positive
testimony;55 bare assertions as regards the dismissal of Baylosis; ignorance
of FRANCISCO's personal expenses incapable of evincing that FRANCISCO
did not provide MONINA with an allowance; or hearsay evidence as regards
the cause for the dismissals of Baylosis and Tingson. But what then serves
as the coup de grace is that despite Superticioso's claim that he did not
know MONINA,56 when confronted with Exhibit H, a telephone toll ticket
indicating that on 18 May 1971, MONINA called a certain "Eñing" at
FRANCISCO's office, Superticioso admitted that his nickname was "Iñing"
and that there was no other person named "Iñing" in FRANCISCO's office.57
All told, MONINA's evidence hurdled "the high standard of proof" required
for the success of an action to establish one's illegitimate filiation when
relying upon the provisions regarding "open and continuous possession'' or
"any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws;"
moreover, MONINA proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance
of evidence.
The last assigned error concerning laches likewise fails to convince. The
essential elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant,
or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which the
complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights,
the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's
conduct as having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack
of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complaint
would assert the right in which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice
to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complaint, or the suit
is not held barred.58 The last element is the origin of the doctrine that sale
demands apply only where by reason of the lapse of time it would be
inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights. 59

As FRANCISCO set up, laches as an affirmative defense, it was incumbent

upon him to prove the existence of its elements. However, he only
succeeded in showing MONINA's delay in asserting her claim, but miserably
failed to prove the last element. In any event, it must be stressed that
laches is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace
of society, the discouragement of state claims, and is principally a question
of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or
asserted. There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches; each case
is to be determined according to its particular circumstances. The question
of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and since it is an
equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations.
It cannot be worked to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud and
injustice.60 Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if
illegitimate, MONINA filed her action well within the period granted her by
a positive provision of law. A denial then of her action on ground of laches
would clearly be inequitable and unjust.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED

and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals of 27 April 1995 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 32860 is AFFIRMED.