GovCon Syllabus Part V

GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS | SYLLABUS PART V
V. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT CORRUPT AND PRACTICE ACT)

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly
promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded,
induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in
connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other part, wherein the public officer in his official capacity
has to intervene under the law.
(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, from any
person for whom the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit or
license, in consideration for the help given or to be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act.
(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise which has pending official business with him
during the pendency thereof or within one year after its termination.
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.
(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending
before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or
advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested
party.
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or
not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
(h) Director or indirectly having financing or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having a material interest in any transaction or act requiring the approval
of a board, panel or group of which he is a member, and which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or
does not participate in the action of the board, committee, panel or group.
Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those public officers responsible for the approval of manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or
irregular transaction or acts by the board, panel or group to which they belong.
(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to
such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled.
(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on account of his official position to
unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of its authorized release date.
The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or benefit referred to in subparagraphs (b) and (c); or offering or giving to the public
officer the employment mentioned in subparagraph (d); or urging the divulging or untimely release of the confidential information referred to
in subparagraph (k) of this section shall, together with the offending public officer, be punished under Section nine of this Act and shall be
permanently or temporarily disqualified in the discretion of the Court, from transacting business in any form with the Government.
Section 9. Penalties for violations. (a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3,
4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years, perpetual disqualification from public
office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his
salary and other lawful income.
Any complaining party at whose complaint the criminal prosecution was initiated shall, in case of conviction of the accused, be entitled to recover in the
criminal action with priority over the forfeiture in favor of the Government, the amount of money or the thing he may have given to the accused, or the
value of such thing.
(b) Any public officer violation any of the provisions of Section 7 of this Act shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more
than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the Court.
The violation of said section proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public officer, even if
no criminal prosecution is instituted against him.
Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or
under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final
judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
RELEVANT JURISPRUDENCE
1. COMELEC vs. Padilla, G.R. No. 151992, 18 September 2002
2. Ambil, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 175457, 06 June 2011
3. Lihaylihay and Vinluan vs. People, G.R. No. 191219, 31 July 2013
4. People vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 153952-71, 23 August 2010
Page 1 of 33
5. Garcia, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 197567, 19 November 2014

6. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Caberoy, G.R. No. 188066, 22 October 2014
7. People vs. Go, G.R. No. 168539, 25 March 2014 (from Part I)
COMELEC VS. PADILLA, G.R. NO. 151992, 18 SEPTEMBER 2002
EN BANC
[G. R. No. 151992. September 18, 2002]
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMELEC CHAIRMAN ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, COMELEC COMMISSIONERS RESURRECCION Z.
BORRA and FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., petitioners, vs. JUDGE MA. LUISA QUIJANO-PADILLA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 215 and PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORP., respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The contracting prerogative of public officers is circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. They must exercise utmost caution and observe the
law in order to protect the public from unjust and inequitable government contracts.
The case at bar provides us with another occasion to stress that with respect to government contracts, statutes take precedence over the public officers
freedom to contract. Here, the primordial question to be resolved is -- may a successful bidder compel a government agency to formalize a contract with it
notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the amount appropriated by Congress for the project?
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, alleging that respondent Judge Ma. Luisa Quijano-
Padilla of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 215, Quezon City, committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the (a) Resolution[1] dated December 19, 2001
granting private respondents application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction in Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405[2]; and (b) Resolution[3] dated
February 7, 2002 denying petitioners Omnibus Motion to dismiss the petition and their motion for reconsideration of the same Resolution and granting private
respondent's application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
The facts are undisputed.
In 1996, the Philippine Congress passed Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the "Voter's Registration Act of 1996," providing for the modernization
and computerization of the voters' registration list and the appropriate of funds therefor "in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of
voters."[4]
Pursuant thereto, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) promulgated Resolution No. 00-0315[5] approving in principle the Voter's Registration and
Identification System Project (VRIS) Project for brevity). The VRIS Project envisions a computerized database system for the May 2004 Elections. The idea is to
have a national registration of voters whereby each registrant's fingerprints will be digitally entered into the system and upon completion of registration,
compared and matched with other entries to eliminate double entries. A tamper-proof and counterfeit-resistant voter's identification card will then be issues to
each registrant as a visual record of the registration.
On September 9, 1999, the COMELEC issued invitations to pre-qualify and bid for the supply and installations of information technology equipment and
ancillary services for its VRIS Project.[6] Private respondent Photokina Marketing Corporation (PHOTOKINA) pre-qualified and was allowed to participate as one
of the bidders. After the public bidding was conducted, PHOTOKINA's bid in the amount of P6.588 Billion Pesos garnered the highest total weighted score and
was declared the winning bidder. Thus, on September 28, 2000, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3252 [7] approving the Notice of Award to PHOTOKINA,
which, in turn, immediately accepted the same. The parties then proceeded to formalize the contract, with Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain and Atty. Rodrigo D.
Sta. Ana, acting as negotiators for the COMELEC and PHOTOKINA, respectively.
However, under Republic Act No. 8760[8] the budget appropriated by Congress for the COMELECs modernization project was only One (1) Billion Pesos
and that the actual available funds under the Certificate of Availability of Funds (CAF) issued by the Chief Accountant of the COMELEC was only P1.2 Billion
Pesos.
In December 2000, then COMELEC Chairman Harriet O. Demetriou issued a memorandum to the COMELEC en bancexpressing her objections to the
contract. Commissioner Sadain, for his part, submitted a draft of the contract [9] providing a price that would not exceed the certified available appropriation but
covering only Phase I of the VRIS Project, i.e., issuance of registration cards for 1,000,000 voters in certain areas only. [10] Under the draft, the subsequent
completion of the whole project shall be agreed upon in accordance with the Bid Documents and the annual funds available for it. [11]
On February 2, 2001, the term of former Chairman Demetriou and those of Commissioners Julio F. Desamito and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores
expired. Appointed as their successors were Alfredo L. Benipayo as Chairman and Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. as Commissioners.
Meanwhile, PHOTOKINA, as the winning bidder, wrote several letters to the COMELEC requesting the formal execution of the contract, but to no
avail.[12]
Then Chairman Benipayo, through various press releases and public statements, announced that the VRIS Project has been scrapped, dropped, junked, or
set aside. He further announced his plan to re-engineer the entire modernization program of the COMELEC, emphasizing his intention to replace the VRIS
Project with his own version, the Triple E Vision.[13]
On October 2, 2001, Senator Edgardo J. Angara directed the creation of a technical working group to assist the COMELEC in evaluating all programs for
the modernization of the COMELEC which will also consider the PHOTOKINA contract as an alternative program and various competing programs for the
purpose.
Unsatisfied with the adverse turn of events, PHOTOKINA filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 215, Quezon City a petition for mandamus,
prohibition and damages (with prayer for temporary restraining order, preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction) against the
COMELEC and all its Commissioners,[14] docketed as Special Civil Action No. Q- 01- 45405. PHOTOKINA alleged three causes of
action: first, the deliberate refusal of the COMELEC and its Commissioners to formalize the contract rendered nugatory the perfected contract between
them; second, in announcing that the VRIS Project has been junked and that he has plans to re-engineer the COMELECs entire modernization
program, Chairman Benipayo committed grave abuse of discretion; and third, the COMELECs failure to perform its duty under the contract has caused
PHOTOKINA to incur damages since it has spent substantial time and resources in the preparation of the bid and the draft contract.
In support of its application for writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction, PHOTOKINA adopted the evidence it adduced during the
hearing of its application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
On December 19, 2001, respondent Judge Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla issued the first assailed Resolution granting PHOTOKINAs application for a writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction, thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to: (1) grant the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction;
and (2) deny the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
Accordingly, let a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction issue enjoining respondents, their agents, successors and assigns from replacing the VRIS Project
upon petitioners posting of a bond in the amount of P20,000,000.00, which bond shall answer for whatever damages which may be sustained by reason of the
issuance of the said writ, if it turns out that the plaintiffs are not entitled thereto.
Page 2 of 33
SO ORDERED"[15]
Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration. PHOTOKINA reiterated its plea for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. [16] For their
part, the COMELEC and its Commissioners, through the Solicitor General, prayed that the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction be set aside and that the
petition for mandamus, prohibition and damages be dismissed.[17]
On February 8, 2002, respondent judge issued the second assailed Resolution denying the COMELECs Omnibus Motion and, this time, granting
PHOTOKINAs application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves to: (1) deny Respondents Omnibus Motion for the dismissal of this case and for the
reconsideration of this Courts Resolution granting the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction; (2) grant Petitioners Motion dated January 2, 2002
insofar as it prays for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction; (3) Grant the prayer for the reduction of the preliminary prohibitory injunction
bond from P20,000,000.00 to P10,000,000.00; (4) Clarify its Resolution dated December 19, 2001 to the extent that the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction
will also enjoin Respondents, their agents, successors and assigns from disregarding the contract for the VRIS Project between Petitioner and Respondent
COMELEC; (5) deny Petitioners motion to declare Respondents in default.
"Accordingly, let a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issue directing all respondent Commissioners to immediately resume negotiations to formalize the
execution of the contract with Petitioner for the VRIS Project upon petitioners posting of a bond, separate from the above bond for the writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction, in the amount of P20,000,000.00, which bond shall answer for whatever damages that may be sustained by reason of the issuance of the
said writ, if it turns out that Petitioner is not entitled thereto.
"SO ORDERED."[18]
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in behalf of then COMELEC Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo
and Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr..
Petitioners contend that: (1) a petition for mandamus and prohibition does not lie to enforce contractual obligations, hence, PHOTOKINAs proper recourse
before the Regional Trial Court should have been an action for specific performance; (2) respondent judge, by issuing the injunctive writs, already assumed that
the VRIS Project was lawfully awarded by the COMELEC to PHOTOKINA, and that there is a valid perfected contract between them, thus, manifesting her
prejudgment; and (3) injunctive writs should not be issued when an action for damages can adequately compensate for the injuries. Petitioners pray that the two
assailed Resolutions be nullified and Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405 be dismissed outright.[19]
On February 21, 2002, the majority of the COMELEC Commissioners -- Luzviminda G. Tancangco, Rufino S.B. Javier, Ralph C. Lantion and Mehol K.
Sadain filed with this Court a Manifestation[20] that the Chairman and the two Commissioners who filed the instant Petition acted without authority from the
COMELEC en banc to take such action.
PHOTOKINA filed a Comment with Motion to Dismiss,[21] the present petition, on two procedural grounds. First, thepetition violates the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. And second, the OSG has no authority and/or standing to file the petition considering that the petitioners have not been authorized by the
COMELEC en banc to take such action. Without the concurrence of at least a majority of the members of the COMELEC, neither petitioners nor the OSG could
file the petition in behalf of the COMELEC.
In refutation of petitioners arguments, PHOTOKINA contends that mandamus is an appropriate remedy since what is involved in Special Civil Action No.
Q-01-45405 is the performance of a ministerial duty. Citing Isada vs. Bocar,[22]PHOTOKINA maintains that mandamus may be availed of by private parties to
compel public officers to act on a contract entered into pursuant to law. In its Supplemental Comment,[23] PHOTOKINA invites the Courts attention
to Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Jancom Environmental Corporation [24]whereby the winning bidder was afforded every right to seek
enforcement of its perfected contract with the government.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Initially, we must resolve the procedural roadblocks.
PHOTOKINA alleges that the OSG has no standing to file the present petition since its legal position is contrary to that espoused by the majority of the
COMELEC Commissioners. This is a leap to a non-sequitur conclusion. The OSG is an independent office. Its hands are not shackled to the cause of its client
agency. In the discharge of its task, the primordial concern of the OSG is to see to it that the best interest of the government is upheld.[25] This is regardless of the
fact that what it perceived as the best interest of the government runs counter to its client agencys position.[26] Endowed with a broad perspective that spans the
legal interest of virtually the entire government officialdom, the OSG may transcend the parochial concerns of a particular client agency and instead, promote and
protect the public weal.[27] Our ruling in Orbos vs. Civil Service Commission,[28] is relevant, thus:
"x x x It is incumbent upon him (Solicitor General) to present to the court what he considers would legally uphold the best interest of the government
although it may run counter to a clients position. x x x.
"In the present case, it appears that after the Solicitor General studied the issues he found merit in the cause of the petitioner based on the applicable law and
jurisprudence. Thus, it is his duty to represent the petitioner as he did by filing this petition. He cannot be disqualified from appearing for the petitioner
even if in so doing his representation runs against the interests of the CSC.
"This is not the first time that the Office of the Solicitor General has taken a position adverse to his clients like the CSC, the National Labor Relations
Commission, among others, and even the People of the Philippines. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, while petitioners stand is contrary to that of the majority of the Commissioners, still, the OSG may represent the COMELEC as long as in its
assessment, such would be for the best interest of the government. For, indeed, in the final analysis, the client of the OSG is not the agency but no less than the
Republic of the Philippines in whom the plenum of sovereignty resides. [29]
Moreover, it must be emphasized that petitioners are also public officials entitled to be represented by the OSG. Under Executive Order No. 292[30] and
Presidential Decree No. 478,[31] the OSG is the lawyer of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials or agents. Surely, this mandate
includes the three petitioners[32] who have been impleaded as public respondents in Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405.
Anent the alleged breach of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, suffice it to say that it is not an iron-clad dictum. On several instances where this Court was
confronted with cases of national interest and of serious implications, it never hesitated to set aside the rule and proceed with the judicial determination of the
case.[33] The case at bar is of similar import. It is in the interest of the State that questions relating to government contracts be settled without delay. This is more
so when the contract, as in this case, involves the disbursement of public funds and the modernization of our countrys election process, a project that has long
been overdue.
We now resolve the following substantive issues:
1) Is a petition for mandamus the appropriate remedy to enforce contractual obligations? and 2) May a successful bidder compel a government agency to
formalize a contract with it notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the amount appropriated by Congress for the project?
I
No rule of law is better settled than that mandamus does not lie to enforce the performance of contractual obligations. [34] As early as 1924, Justice Street,
in Quiogue vs. Romualdez,[35] already set forth the justification of this rule, thus:
Upon the facts above stated we are of the opinion that the writ of mandamus is not the appropriate, or even an admissible remedy. It is manifest that whatever
rights the petitioner may have, upon the facts stated, are derived from her contract with the city; and no rule of law is better settled than that mandamus never
lies to enforce the performance of private contracts. x x x The petitioners remedy, if any she has, is by an original action in the Court of First Instance to
compel the city to pay the agreed price or to pay damages for the breach of contract.
Page 3 of 33
"x x x. As said in Lowe vs. Phelps (14 Bush, 642):

It must, therefore, appear upon every application for a mandamus that it is the legal duty of the respondent to do that which it is sought to compel him to do, and
that he has upon proper application refused to perform that duty.' (Citing numerous authorities).
"It was not intended to aid a plaintiff in the enforcement of a mere contract right, or to take the place of the other remedies provided by law for the
adjudication of disputed claims. Looking at the case from the standpoint of appellant, it involves nothing more than an ordinary breach of contract. If, as
contended, the appellant had a valid contract with the school board, it also had an adequate remedy at law to recover damages for its breach; and to permit the
writ of mandamus to be used for the purpose of enforcing a mere contract right would be a wide departure from the settled practice in respect to the
character of cases in which relief by mandamus may be obtained.
"In Parrott vs. City of Bridgeport (44 Conn., 180), the writ was refused where the petitioner sought to compel a city to construct a public street in a certain
manner agreeably to the terms of a special agreement between the petitioner and the city. In the course of the opinion the court said:
"* * * The duty, therefore, if any, which rests upon the city in this regard, is one which it owes to the petitioner as an individual, not to the public, and the special
contract is the foundation upon which it rests. But the writ of mandamus has never been considered as an appropriate remedy for the enforcement of
contract rights of a private and personal nature and obligations which rest wholly upon contract and which involve no questions of public trusts or
official duty. Indeed, strictly speaking, it never lies where the party aggrieved has adequate remedy at law, and its aid is only to be invoked to prevent an
absolute failure of justice in cases where ordinary legal processes furnish no relief. (Emphasis supplied)
The passage of time has not eroded the wisdom of the foregoing rule. Its invocation by this Court
in Province ofPangasinan vs. Reparation Commission,[36] Aprueba vs. Ganzon,[37] City of Manila vs. Posadas,[38] Jacinto vs. Director of Lands,[39] National
[40] [41]
Marketing Corporation vs. Cloribel, Astudillo vs. The Board of Directors of Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation, and Sharp International
Marketing vs. Court of Appeals,[42] virtually reinforces the rule. The present case is our latest addition to the above catena of jurisprudence. We carefully read the
pleadings filed in Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405 and we are convinced that what PHOTOKINA sought to enforce therein are its rights under the accepted
bid proposal. Its petition alleged that notwithstanding the COMELECs issuance of a Notice of Award and its (PHOTOKINAs) subsequent acceptance thereof, the
COMELEC still refused to formalize the contract. As a relief, PHOTOKINA prayed that after trial, petitioners be directed to review and finalize the formal
contract and to implement the VRIS Project.[43] Petitioners, on their part, specifically denied the existence of a perfected contract and asserted that even if there
was one, the same is null and void for lack of proper appropriation. Petitioners labeled the contract as illegal and against public policy.
Akin to our rulings cited above, we hold that mandamus is not the proper recourse to enforce the COMELEC's alleged contractual obligations with
PHOTOKINA. It has other adequate remedy in law. Moreover, worth stressing is the judicial caution that mandamus applies as a remedy only where petitioner's
right is founded clearly in law and not when it isdoubtful.[44] In varying language, the principle echoed and reechoed is that legal rights may be enforced by
mandamus only if those rights are well-defined, clear and certain.[45] Here, the alleged contract, relied upon by PHOTOKINA as source of its rights which it seeks
to be protected, is being disputed, not only on the ground that it was not perfected but also because it is illegal and against public policy.
Of course, there are cases in which the writ of mandamus has been used to compel public officers to perform certain acts, but it will be generally observed
that in such cases, the contracts have been completely performed by the petitioner, and nothing remained to be done except for the government to make
compensation. These exceptional cases are cited in Isada vs. Bocar[46] where the act of the respondent public officer has the effect of setting aside contracts
already in the process of consummation. In contrast with Isada, the alleged contract here has not yet been fully performed by PHOTOKINA; and though it avers
readiness to perform, petitioners raised serious questions as to its validity. Their posture is tenable.
II
To spare PHOTOKINA the drudgery of a fruitless pursuit, we deem it appropriate to lay down the principles governing government contracts and to apply
them to the instant case. Meanwhile, as PHOTOKINA will later on deduce from the discussion, the contract subject of this controversy is one that can be slain in
sight for being patently void and unenforceable.
Enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution is the mandate that "no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law."[47] Thus, in the execution of government contracts, the precise import of this constitutional restriction is to require the various agencies to limit their
expenditures within the appropriations made by law for each fiscal year.
Complementary to the foregoing constitutional injunction are pertinent provisions of law and administrative issuances that are designed to effectuate the
above mandate in a detailed manner.[48] Sections 46 and 47, Chapter 8, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as "Administrative
Code of 1987," provide:
"SEC. 46. Appropriation Before Entering into Contract. - (1) No contract involving the expenditure of public funds shall be entered into unless there is an
appropriation therefor, the unexpended balance of which, free of other obligations, is sufficient to cover the proposed expenditure; and x x x
"SEC. 47. Certificate Showing Appropriation to Meet Contract. - Except in the case of a contract for personal service, for supplies for current consumption or to be
carried in stock not exceeding the estimated consumption for three (3) months, or banking transactions of government-owned or controlled banks, no contract
involving the expenditure of public funds by any government agency shall be entered into or authorized unless the proper accounting official of the
agency concerned shall have certified to the officer entering into the obligation that funds have been duly appropriated for the purpose and that the
amount necessary to cover the proposed contract for the current calendar year is available for expenditure on account thereof, subject to verification by
the auditor concerned. The certificate signed by the proper accounting official and the auditor who verified it, shall be attached to and become an integral part of
the proposed contract, and the sum so certified shall not thereafter be available for expenditure for any other purpose until the obligation of the government agency
concerned under the contract is fully extinguished.
It is quite evident from the tenor of the language of the law that the existence of appropriations and the availability of funds are indispensable pre-requisites
to or conditions sine qua non for the execution of government contracts. The obvious intent is to impose such conditions as a priori requisites to the validity of the
proposed contract.[49] Using this as ourpremise, we cannot accede to PHOTOKINA's contention that there is already a perfected contract. While we held
in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Jancom Environmental Corporation [50] that "the effect of an unqualified acceptance of the offer or proposal of
the bidder is to perfect a contract, upon notice of the award to the bidder," however, such statement would be inconsequential in a government where the acceptance
referred to is yet to meet certain conditions. To hold otherwise is to allow a public officer to execute a binding contract that would obligate the government in an
amount in excess of the appropriations for the purpose for which the contract was attempted to be made. [51] This is a dangerous precedent.
In the case at bar, there seems to be an oversight of the legal requirements as early as the bidding stage. The first step of a Bids and Awards Committee
(BAC) is to determine whether the bids comply with the requirements. The BAC shall rate a bid "passed" only if it complies with all the requirements and the
submitted price does not exceed the approved budget for the contract."[52]
Extant on the record is the fact that the VRIS Project was awarded to PHOTOKINA on account of its bid in the amount of P6.588 Billion Pesos. However,
under Republic Act No. 8760,[53] the only fund appropriated for the project was P1 Billion Pesos and under the Certification of Available Funds[54] (CAF) only P1.2
Billion Pesos was available. Clearly, the amount appropriated is insufficient to cover the cost of the entire VRIS Project. There is no way that the COMELEC could
enter into a contract with PHOTOKINA whose accepted bid was way beyond the amount appropriated by law for the project. This being the case, the BAC should
have rejected the bid for being excessive[55] or should have withdrawn the Notice of Award on the ground that in the eyes of the law, the same is null and void. [56]
The objections of then Chairman Demetriou to the implementation of the VRIS Project, ardently carried on by her successor Chairman Benipayo, are
therefore in order.
Page 4 of 33
Even the draft contract submitted by Commissioner Sadain, that provides for a contract price in the amount of P1.2 Billion Pesos is unacceptable. Indeed,
we share the observation of former Chairman Demetriou that it circumvents the statutory requirements on government contracts. While the contract price under the
draft contract[57] is only P1.2 Billion and, thus, within the certified available funds, the same covers only Phase I of the VRIS Project, i.e., the issuance of
identification cards for only 1,000,000 voters in specified areas. [58] In effect, the implementation of the VRIS Project will be"segmented" or "chopped" into several
phases. Not only is such arrangement disallowed by our budgetary laws and practices, it is also disadvantageous to the COMELEC because of the uncertainty that
will loom over its modernizationproject for an indefinite period of time. Should Congress fail to appropriate the amount necessary for the completion of the entire
project, what good will the accomplished Phase I serve? As expected, the project failed "to sell" with the Department of Budget and Management. Thus, Secretary
Benjamin Diokno, per his letter of December 1, 2000, declined the COMELEC's request for the issuance of the Notice of Cash Availability (NCA) and a multi-year
obligational authority to assume payment of the total VRIS Project for lack of legal basis.[59] Corollarily, under Section 33 of R.A. No. 8760, no agency shall enter
into a multi-year contract without a multi-year obligational authority, thus:
"SECTION 33. Contracting Multi-Year Projects. - In the implementation of multi-year projects, no agency shall enter into a multi-year contract without a multi-
year Obligational Authority issued by the Department of Budget and Management for the purpose.Notwithstanding the issuance of the multi-year Obligational
Authority, the obligation to be incurred in any given calendar year, shall in no case exceed the amount programmed for implementation during said calendar year."
Petitioners are justified in refusing to formalize the contract with PHOTOKINA. Prudence dictated them not to enter into a contract not backed up by
sufficient appropriation and available funds. Definitely, to act otherwise would be a futile exercise for the contract would inevitably suffer the vice of nullity. In
Osmea vs. Commission on Audit,[60] this Court held:
"The Auditing Code of the Philippines (P.D. 1445) further provides that no contract involving the expenditure of public funds shall be entered into unless there is
an appropriation therefor and the proper accounting official of the agency concerned shall have certified to the officer entering into the obligation that funds have
been duly appropriated for the purpose and the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract for the current fiscal year is available for expenditure on account
thereof. Any contract entered into contrary to the foregoing requirements shall be VOID.
"Clearly then, the contract entered into by the former Mayor Duterte was void from the very beginning since the agreed cost for the project (P8,368,920.00) was
way beyond the appropriated amount (P5,419,180.00) as certified by the City Treasurer. Hence, the contract was properly declared void and unenforceable in
COA's 2nd Indorsement, dated September 4, 1986. The COA declared and we agree, that:
'The prohibition contained in Sec. 85 of PD 1445 (Government Auditing Code) is explicit and mandatory. Fund availability is, as it has always been, an
indispensable prerequisite to the execution of any government contract involving the expenditure of public funds by all government agencies at all levels. Such
contracts are not to be considered as final or binding unless such a certification as to funds availability is issued (Letter of Instruction No. 767, s. 1978). Antecedent
of advance appropriation is thus essential to government liability on contracts (Zobel vs. City of Manila, 47 Phil. 169). This contract being violative of the legal
requirements aforequoted, the same contravenes Sec. 85 of PD 1445 and is null and void by virtue of Sec.87.'"
Verily, the contract, as expressly declared by law, is inexistent and void ab initio.[61] his is to say that the proposed contract is without force and effect from
the very beginning or from its incipiency, as if it had never been entered into, and hence, cannot be validated either by lapse of time or ratification.[62]
Of course, we are not saying that the party who contracts with the government has no other recourse in law. The law itself affords him the remedy. Section
48 of E.O. No. 292 explicitly provides that any contract entered into contrary to the above-mentioned requirements shall be void, and the officers entering into the
contract shall be liable to the Government or other contracting party for any consequent damage to the same as if the transaction had been wholly between
private parties." So when the contracting officer transcends his lawful and legitimate powers by acting in excess of or beyond the limits of his contracting
authority, the Government is not bound under the contract. It would be as if the contract in such case were a private one, whereupon, he binds only himself, and
thus, assumes personal liability thereunder.[63] Otherwise stated, the proposed contract is unenforceable as to the Government.
While this is not the proceeding to determine where the culpability lies, however, the constitutional mandate cited above constrains us to remind all public
officers that public office is a public trust and all public officers must at all times be accountable to the people. The authority of public officers to enter into
government contracts is circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. In the exercise of their contracting prerogative, they should be the first judges of the
legality, propriety and wisdom of the contract they entered into. They must exercise a high degree of caution so that the Government may not be the victim of ill-
advised or improvident action.[64]
In fine, we rule that PHOTOKINA, though the winning bidder, cannot compel the COMELEC to formalize the contract. Since PHOTOKINAs bid is
beyond the amount appropriated by Congress for the VRIS Project, the proposed contract is not binding upon the COMELEC and is considered void; and that in
issuing the questioned preliminary writs of mandatory and prohibitory injunction and in not dismissing Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405, respondent judge
acted with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners cannot be compelled by a writ of mandamus to discharge a duty that involves the exercise of judgment and
discretion, especially where disbursement of public funds is concerned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated December 19, 2001 and February 7, 2002 issued by respondent Judge Padilla are SET
ASIDE. Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405 is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-
Morales, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
REFERENTIAL SYLLABUS:
Remedial Law; Actions; In the discharge of its task, the primordial concern of the OSG is to see to it that the best interest of the government is upheld; This is
regardless of the fact that what it perceived as the “best interest of the government” runs counter to its client agency’s position.—PHOTOKINA alleges that the
OSG has no standing to file the present petition since its legal position is contrary to that espoused by the majority of the COMELEC Commissioners. This is a leap
to a non-sequitur conclusion. The OSG is an independent office. Its hands are not shackled to the cause of its client agency. In the discharge of its task, the
primordial concern of the OSG is to see to it that the best interest of the government is upheld. This is regardless of the fact that what it perceived as the “best
interest of the government” runs counter to its client agency’s position. Endowed with a broad perspective that spans the legal interest of virtually the entire
government officialdom, the OSG may transcend the parochial concerns of a particular client agency and instead, promote and protect the public weal.
Same; Same; In the final analysis, the client of the OSG is not the agency but no less than the Republic of the Philippines in whom the plenum of sovereignty
resides.—Hence, while petitioners’ stand is contrary to that of the majority of the Commissioners, still, the OSG may represent the COMELEC as long as in its
assessment, such would be for the best interest of the government. For, indeed, in the final analysis, the client of the OSG is not the agency but no less than the
Republic of the Philippines in whom the plenum of sovereignty resides.
Same; Same; The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad dictum.—Anent the alleged breach of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, suffice it to say that it
is not an iron-clad dictum. On several instances where this Court was confronted with cases of national interest and of serious implications, it never hesitated to set
aside the rule and proceed with the judicial determination of the case. The case at bar is of similar import. It is in the interest of the State that questions relating to
Page 5 of 33
government contracts be settled without delay. This is more so when the contract, as in this case, involves the disbursement of public funds and the modernization
of our country’s election process, a project that has long been overdue.
Same; Mandamus; Mandamus does not lie to enforce the performance of contractual obligations.—No rule of law is better settled than that mandamus does not lie
to enforce the performance of contractual obligations.
Same; Same; Mandamus applies as a remedy only where petitioner’s right is founded clearly in law and not when it is doubtful; Legal rights may be enforced by
mandamus only if those rights are well-defined, clear and certain.—Moreover, worth stressing is the judicial caution that mandamus applies as a remedy only
where petitioner’s right is founded clearly in law and not when it is doubtful. In varying language, the principle echoed and reechoed is that legal rights may be
enforced by mandamus only if those rights are well-defined, clear and certain. Here, the alleged contract, relied upon by PHOTOKINA as source of its rights which
it seeks to be protected, is being disputed, not only on the ground that it was not perfected but also because it is illegal and against public policy.
Same; Same; PHOTOKINA, though the winning bidder, cannot compel the COMELEC to formalize the contract; The proposed contract is not binding upon the
COMELEC and is considered void; In issuing the questioned preliminary writs of mandatory and prohibitory injunction and in not dismissing Special Civil Action
No. Q-01-45405, respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion.—In fine, we rule that PHOTOKINA, though the winning bidder, cannot compel the
COMELEC to formalize the contract. Since PHOTOKINA’s bid is beyond the amount appropriated by Congress for the VRIS Project, the proposed contract is not
binding upon the COMELEC and is considered void; and that in issuing the questioned preliminary writs of mandatory and prohibitory injunction and in not
dismissing Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405, respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners cannot be compelled by a writ of mandamus to
discharge a duty that involves the exercise of judgment and discretion, especially where disbursement of public funds is concerned.
AMBIL, JR. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 175457, 06 JUNE 2011
FIRST DIVISION
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., G.R. No. 175457

Petitioner,
- versus -
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR., G.R. No. 175482

Petitioner, Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,*
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent.
July 6, 2011
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. [1] and petitioner Alexandrino R. Apelado Sr.[2] assailing
the Decision[3] promulgated on September 16, 2005 and Resolution[4] dated November 8, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25892.
The present controversy arose from a letter[5] of Atty. David B. Loste, President of the Eastern Samar Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), to the
Office of the Ombudsman, praying for an investigation into the alleged transfer of then Mayor Francisco Adalim, an accused in Criminal Case No. 10963 for
murder, from the provincial jail of Eastern Samar to the residence of petitioner, then Governor Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. In a Report[6] dated January 4, 1999, the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) recommended the filing of criminal charges against petitioner Ambil, Jr. for violation of Section 3(e)[7] of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended. On September 22, 1999, the new President of the IBP, Eastern Samar
Chapter, informed the Ombudsman that the IBP is no longer interested in pursuing the case against petitioners. Thus, he recommended the dismissal of the
complaint against petitioners.[8]
Nonetheless, in an Information[9] dated January 31, 2000, petitioners Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019, together with SPO3 Felipe A. Balano. Upon reinvestigation, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Memorandum[10] dated August 4, 2000,
recommending the dismissal of the complaint as regards Balano and the amendment of the Information to include the charge of Delivering Prisoners from Jail
under Article 156[11] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, (RPC) against the remaining accused. The Amended Information[12] reads:
That on or about the 6th day of September 1998, and for sometime prior [or] subsequent thereto, [in] the Municipality of
Borongan, Province of Eastern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [the] above-named accused, Ruperto
Page 6 of 33
A. Ambil, Jr.[,] being then the Provincial Governor of Eastern Samar, and Alexandrino R. Apelado, being then the Provincial Warden of
Eastern Samar, both having been public officers, duly elected, appointed and qualified as such, committing the offense in relation to office,
conniving and confederating together and mutually helping x x x each other, with deliberate intent, manifest partiality and evident bad faith,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally order and cause the release from the Provincial Jail of detention prisoner Mayor
Francisco Adalim, accused in Criminal Case No. 10963, for Murder, by virtue of a warrant of Arrest issued by Honorable Arnulfo P. Bugtas,
Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 2, Borongan, Eastern Samar, and thereafter placed said detention prisoner (Mayor Francisco Adalim) under
accused RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR.s custody, by allowing said Mayor Adalim to stay at accused Ambils residence for a period of Eighty-
Five (85) days, more or less which act was done without any court order, thus accused in the performance of official functions had given
unwarranted benefits and advantage to detainee Mayor Francisco Adalim to the prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
BAIL BOND RECOMMENDED: P30,000.00 each.[13]
On arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty and posted bail.
At the pre-trial, petitioners admitted the allegations in the Information. They reason, however, that Adalims transfer was justified considering the imminent threats
upon his person and the dangers posed by his detention at the provincial jail.According to petitioners, Adalims sister, Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-White, had sent
numerous prisoners to the same jail where Mayor Adalim was to be held.
Consequently, the prosecution no longer offered testimonial evidence and rested its case after the admission of its documentary exhibits. Petitioners filed a Motion
for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence with Reservation to Present Evidence in Case of Denial[14] but the same was denied.
At the trial, petitioners presented three witnesses: petitioner Ambil, Jr., Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-White and Mayor Francisco C. Adalim.
Petitioner Ambil, Jr. testified that he was the Governor of Eastern Samar from 1998 to 2001. According to him, it was upon the advice of Adalims lawyers that he
directed the transfer of Adalims detention to his home. He cites poor security in the provincial jail as the primary reason for taking personal custody of Adalim
considering that the latter would be in the company of inmates who were put away by his sister and guards identified with his political opponents.[15]
For her part, Atty. White stated that she is the District Public Attorney of Eastern Samar and the sister of Mayor Adalim. She recounted how Mayor Adalim was
arrested while they were attending a wedding in Sulat, Eastern Samar, on September 6, 1998. According to Atty. White, she sought the alternative custody of Gov.
Ambil, Jr. after Provincial Warden and herein petitioner Apelado, Sr. failed to guarantee the mayors safety. [16]
Meanwhile, Francisco Adalim introduced himself as the Mayor of Taft, Eastern Samar. He confirmed his arrest on September 6, 1998 in connection with a murder
case filed against him in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar. Adalim confirmed Atty. Whites account that he spotted inmates who served
as bodyguards for, or who are associated with, his political rivals at the provincial jail. He also noticed a prisoner, Roman Akyatan, gesture to him with a raised
clenched fist. Sensing danger, he called on his sister for help. Adalim admitted staying at Ambil, Jr.s residence for almost three months before he posted bail after
the charge against him was downgraded to homicide.[17]
Petitioner Apelado, Sr. testified that he was the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar. He recalls that on September 6, 1998, SPO3 Felipe Balano fetched him at
home to assist in the arrest of Mayor Adalim. Allegedly, Atty. White was contesting the legality of Mayor Adalims arrest and arguing with the jail guards against
booking him for detention. At the provincial jail, petitioner was confronted by Atty. White who informed him that he was under the governor, in the latters capacity
as a provincial jailer. Petitioner claims that it is for this reason that he submitted to the governors order to relinquish custody of Adalim. [18]
Further, petitioner Apelado, Sr. described the physical condition of the jail to be dilapidated and undermanned.According to him, only two guards were incharge of
looking after 50 inmates. There were two cells in the jail, each housing 25 inmates, while an isolation cell of 10 square meters was unserviceable at the time. Also,
there were several nipa huts within the perimeter for use during conjugal visits.[19]
On September 16, 2005, the Sandiganbayan, First Division, promulgated the assailed Decision [20] finding petitioners guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019. The court ruled that in moving Adalim to a private residence, petitioners have conspired to accord him unwarranted benefits in the form of more comfortable
quarters with access to television and other privileges that other detainees do not enjoy. It stressed that under the Rules, no person under detention by legal process
shall be released or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to bail. [21]
The Sandiganbayan brushed aside petitioners defense that Adalims transfer was made to ensure his safety. It observed that petitioner Ambil, Jr. did not personally
verify any actual threat on Adalims life but relied simply on the advice of Adalims lawyers. The Sandiganbayan also pointed out the availability of an isolation cell
and nipa huts within the 10-meter-high perimeter fence of the jail which could have been used to separate Adalim from other prisoners. Finally, it cited petitioner
Ambil, Jr.s failure to turn over Adalim despite advice from Assistant Secretary Jesus Ingeniero of the Department of Interior and Local Government.
Consequently, the Sandiganbayan sentenced petitioner Ambil, Jr. to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
to twelve (12) years and four (4) months. In favor of petitioner Apelado, Sr., the court appreciated the incomplete justifying circumstance of obedience to a superior
order and sentenced him to imprisonment for six (6) years and one (1) month to nine (9) years and eight (8) months.
Hence, the present petitions.
Petitioner Ambil, Jr. advances the following issues for our consideration:
I
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3(e) REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS AMENDED, APPLIES TO PETITIONERS CASE BEFORE THE
SANDIGANBAYAN.
II
WHETHER OR NOT A PUBLIC OFFICER SUCH AS PETITIONER IS A PRIVATE PARTY FOR PURPOSES OF SECTION 3(e),
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS AMENDED.
III
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER ACTED WITH DELIBERATE INTENT, MANIFEST PARTIALITY, EVIDENT BAD FAITH OR
GROSS INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF SAID SECTION 3(e).
IV
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER AS PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR AND JAILER UNDER SECTIONS 1730 AND 1733, ARTICLE III,
CHAPTER 45 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917 AND SECTION 61, CHAPTER V, REPUBLIC ACT 6975 HAS THE
AUTHORITY TO TAKE CUSTODY OF A DETENTION PRISONER.
V
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF FULFILLMENT OF A DUTY OR
THE LAWFUL EXERCISE OF A RIGHT OR OFFICE.
VI
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACQUITTED BECAUSE THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE DID NOT
[22]
ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
For his part, petitioner Apelado, Sr. imputes the following errors on the Sandiganbayan:
I
THERE WAS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND/OR MISAPPLICATION OF THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
CONVICTING ACCUSED APELADO, EITHER AS PRINCIPAL OR IN CONSPIRACY WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED AMBIL.
Page 7 of 33
II
IN THE ABSENCE OF COMPETENT PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF CONSPIRACY BETWEEN ACCUSED AMBIL
AND HEREIN PETITIONER, THE LATTER SHOULD BE ACCORDED FULL CREDIT FOR THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE
UNDER PARAGRAPH 6, ARTICLE 11 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
III
THE COURT A QUOS BASIS IN CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED AMBIL AND HEREIN PETITIONER OF HAVING GIVEN
MAYOR ADALIM UNWARRANTED BENEFITS AND ADVANTAGE TO THE PREJUDICE x x x OF THE GOVERNMENT IS, AT
THE MOST, SPECULATIVE.[23]
The issues raised by petitioner Ambil, Jr. can be summed up into three: (1) Whether he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019;
(2) Whether a provincial governor has authority to take personal custody of a detention prisoner; and (3) Whether he is entitled to the justifying circumstance of
fulfillment of duty under Article 11(5)[24] of the RPC.
Meanwhile, petitioner Apelado, Sr.s assignment of errors can be condensed into two: (1) Whether he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e),
R.A. No. 3019; and (2) Whether he is entitled to the justifying circumstance of obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose under Article
11(6)[25] of the RPC.
Fundamentally, petitioner Ambil, Jr. argues that Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 does not apply to his case because the provision contemplates only transactions of a
pecuniary nature. Since the law punishes a public officer who extends unwarranted benefits to a private person, petitioner avers that he cannot be held liable for
extending a favor to Mayor Adalim, a public officer. Further, he claims good faith in taking custody of the mayor pursuant to his duty as a Provincial Jailer under
the Administrative Code of 1917. Considering this, petitioner believes himself entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of
duty.
Petitioner Apelado, Sr., on the other hand, denies allegations of conspiracy between him and petitioner Ambil, Jr.Petitioner Apelado, Sr. defends that he was merely
following the orders of a superior when he transferred the detention of Adalim. As well, he invokes immunity from criminal liability.
For the State, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) points out the absence of jurisprudence that restricts the application of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 to
transactions of a pecuniary nature. The OSP explains that it is enough to show that in performing their functions, petitioners have accorded undue preference to
Adalim for liability to attach under the provision. Further, the OSP maintains that Adalim is deemed a private party for purposes of applying Section 3(e), R.A. No.
3019 because the unwarranted benefit redounded, not to his person as a mayor, but to his person as a detention prisoner accused of murder. It suggests further that
petitioners were motivated by bad faith as evidenced by their refusal to turn over Adalim despite instruction from Asst. Sec. Ingeniero. The OSP also reiterates
petitioners lack of authority to take custody of a detention prisoner without a court order. Hence, it concludes that petitioners are not entitled to the benefit of any
justifying circumstance.
After a careful review of this case, the Court finds the present petitions bereft of merit.
Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Actwhich provides:
Section. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
In order to hold a person liable under this provision, the following elements must concur: (1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative,
judicial or official functions; (2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) his action caused any undue
injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. [26]
As to the first element, there is no question that petitioners are public officers discharging official functions and that jurisdiction over them lay with the
Sandiganbayan. Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over public officers charged with violation of the Anti-Graft Law is provided under Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 1606,[27] as amended by R.A. No. 8249.[28] The pertinent portions of Section 4, P.D. No. 1606, as amended, read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying
the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads[;]
xxxx
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic
Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional
trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
xxxx
Thus, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioner Ambil, Jr. is beyond question. The same is true as regards petitioner Apelado, Sr. As to him, a
Certification[29] from the Provincial Government Department Head of the HRMO shows that his position as Provincial Warden is classified as Salary Grade
22. Nonetheless, it is only when none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher shall exclusive jurisdiction be vested in the
lower courts. Here, petitioner Apelado, Sr. was charged as a co-principal with Governor Ambil, Jr., over whose position the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction. Accordingly, he was correctly tried jointly with said public officer in the proper court which had exclusive original jurisdiction over them the
Sandiganbayan.
The second element, for its part, describes the three ways by which a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed, that is, through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
In Sison v. People,[30] we defined partiality, bad faith and gross negligence as follows:
Partiality is synonymous with bias which excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they
are. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. Gross negligence has
been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to
Page 8 of 33
act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected.
It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property. x x x[31]
In this case, we find that petitioners displayed manifest partiality and evident bad faith in transferring the detention of Mayor Adalim to petitioner Ambil, Jr.s
house. There is no merit to petitioner Ambil, Jr.s contention that he is authorized to transfer the detention of prisoners by virtue of his power as the Provincial Jailer
of Eastern Samar.
Section 28 of the Local Government Code draws the extent of the power of local chief executives over the units of the Philippine National Police within their
jurisdiction:
SEC. 28. Powers of Local Chief Executives over the Units of the Philippine National Police.The extent of operational supervision
and control of local chief executives over the police force, fire protection unit, and jail management personnel assigned in their respective
jurisdictions shall be governed by the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred seventy-five (R.A. No. 6975), otherwise
known as The Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, and the rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto.
In particular, Section 61, Chapter 5 of R.A. No. 6975 [32] on the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology provides:
Sec. 61. Powers and Functions. - The Jail Bureau shall exercise supervision and control over all city and municipal jails. The provincial
jails shall be supervised and controlled by the provincial government within its jurisdiction, whose expenses shall be subsidized by the
National Government for not more than three (3) years after the effectivity of this Act.
The power of control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter.[33] An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his
discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.[34]
On the other hand, the power of supervision means overseeing or the authority of an officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties.[35] If the
subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. Essentially, the power of supervision means no more than the power of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act within the
law.[36] The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he does not lay down the rules, nor does he have discretion to modify or
replace them.[37]
Significantly, it is the provincial government and not the governor alone which has authority to exercise control and supervision over provincial jails. In any case,
neither of said powers authorizes the doing of acts beyond the parameters set by law. On the contrary, subordinates must be enjoined to act within the bounds of
law. In the event that the subordinate performs an act ultra vires, rules may be laid down on how the act should be done, but always in conformity with the law.
In a desperate attempt to stretch the scope of his powers, petitioner Ambil, Jr. cites Section 1731, Article III of the Administrative Code of 1917 on Provincial jails
in support. Section 1731 provides:
SEC. 1731. Provincial governor as keeper of jail.The governor of the province shall be charged with the keeping of the
provincial jail, and it shall be his duty to administer the same in accordance with law and the regulations prescribed for the
government of provincial prisons. The immediate custody and supervision of the jail may be committed to the care of a jailer to be
appointed by the provincial governor. The position of jailer shall be regarded as within the unclassified civil service but may be filled in the
manner in which classified positions are filled, and if so filled, the appointee shall be entitled to all the benefits and privileges of classified
employees, except that he shall hold office only during the term of office of the appointing governor and until a successor in the office of the
jailer is appointed and qualified, unless sooner separated. The provincial governor shall, under the direction of the provincial board and
at the expense of the province, supply proper food and clothing for the prisoners; though the provincial board may, in its discretion, let
the contract for the feeding of the prisoners to some other person. (Emphasis supplied.)
This provision survived the advent of the Administrative Code of 1987. But again, nowhere did said provision designate the provincial governor as the provincial
jailer, or even slightly suggest that he is empowered to take personal custody of prisoners. What is clear from the cited provision is that the provincial governors
duty as a jail keeper is confined to the administration of the jail and the procurement of food and clothing for the prisoners. After all, administrative acts pertain
only to those acts which are necessary to be done to carry out legislative policies and purposes already declared by the legislative body or such as are devolved
upon it[38] by the Constitution. Therefore, in the exercise of his administrative powers, the governor can only enforce the law but not supplant it.
Besides, the only reference to a transfer of prisoners in said article is found in Section 1737 [39] under which prisoners may be turned over to the jail of the
neighboring province in case the provincial jail be insecure or insufficient to accommodate all provincial prisoners. However, this provision has been superseded by
Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended. Section 3, Rule 114 provides:
SEC. 3. No release or transfer except on court order or bail.-No person under detention by legal process shall be released or
transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to bail.
Indubitably, the power to order the release or transfer of a person under detention by legal process is vested in the court, not in the provincial government, much
less the governor. This was amply clarified by Asst. Sec. Ingeniero in his communication [40] dated October 6, 1998 addressed to petitioner Ambil, Jr. Asst. Sec.
Ingeniero wrote:
06 October 1996
GOVERNOR RUPERTO AMBIL
Provincial Capitol
Borongan, Eastern Samar
Dear Sir:
This has reference to the letter of Atty. Edwin B. Docena, and the reports earlier received by this Department, relative to your alleged action
in taking into custody Mayor Francisco Aising Adalim of Taft, that province, who has been previously arrested by virtue by a warrant of
arrest issued in Criminal Case No. 10963.
If the report is true, it appears that your actuation is not in accord with the provision of Section 3, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which
mandates that an arrested person be delivered to the nearest police station or jail.
Moreover, invoking Section 61 of RA 6975 as legal basis in taking custody of the accused municipal mayor is misplaced.Said section merely
speaks of the power of supervision vested unto the provincial governor over provincial jails. It does not, definitely, include the power to take
in custody any person in detention.
In view of the foregoing, you are hereby enjoined to conduct yourself within the bounds of law and to immediately deliver Mayor Adalim to
the provincial jail in order to avoid legal complications.
Please be guided accordingly.

Page 9 of 33
Very truly yours,
(SGD.)
JESUS I. INGENIERO
Assistant Secretary
Still, petitioner Ambil, Jr. insisted on his supposed authority as a provincial jailer. Said petitioners usurpation of the court's authority, not to mention his
open and willful defiance to official advice in order to accommodate a former political party mate,[41] betray his unmistakable bias and the evident bad faith that
attended his actions.
Likewise amply established beyond reasonable doubt is the third element of the crime. As mentioned above, in order to hold a person liable for violation of Section
3(e), R.A. No. 3019, it is required that the act constituting the offense consist of either (1) causing undue injury to any party, including the government, or (2)
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge by the accused of his official, administrative or judicial functions.
In the case at hand, the Information specifically accused petitioners of giving unwarranted benefits and advantage to Mayor Adalim, a public officer
charged with murder, by causing his release from prison and detaining him instead at the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner Ambil, Jr. negates the
applicability of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 in this case on two points. First, Section 3(e) is not applicable to him allegedly because the last sentence thereof
provides that the provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses, permits or other
concessions and he is not such government officer or employee. Second, the purported unwarranted benefit was accorded not to a private party but to a public
officer.
However, as regards his first contention, it appears that petitioner Ambil, Jr. has obviously lost sight, if he is not altogether unaware, of our ruling in Mejorada v.
Sandiganbayan[42] where we held that a prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of whether or not the accused public
officer is charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. Following is an excerpt of what we said in Mejorada,
Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any public officers (sic) declared unlawful. Its reference to
any public officer is without distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts declared unlawful. We agree with the view adopted by the
Solicitor General that the last sentence of paragraph [Section 3] (e) is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and employees of
officers (sic) or government corporations which, under the ordinary concept of public officers may not come within the term. It is a strained
construction of the provision to read it as applying exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or
other concessions.[43] (Italics supplied.)
In the more recent case of Cruz v. Sandiganbayan,[44] we affirmed that a prosecution for violation of said provision will lie regardless of whether the
accused public officer is charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. [45]
Meanwhile, regarding petitioner Ambil, Jr.s second contention, Section 2(b) of R.A. No. 3019 defines a public officer to include elective and appointive officials
and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal from the
government. Evidently, Mayor Adalim is one. But considering that Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 punishes the giving by a public officer of unwarranted benefits to
a private party, does the fact that Mayor Adalim was the recipient of such benefits take petitioners case beyond the ambit of said law?
We believe not.
In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use private party rather than private person to describe the recipient of the unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference for a reason. The term party is a technical word having a precise meaning in legal parlance[46] as distinguished from person which, in general usage,
refers to a human being.[47] Thus, a private person simply pertains to one who is not a public officer. While a private party is more comprehensive in scope to mean
either a private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his personal interest.
In the present case, when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from the provincial jail and detained him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.s residence, they accorded such
privilege to Adalim, not in his official capacity as a mayor, but as a detainee charged with murder. Thus, for purposes of applying the provisions of Section 3(e),
R.A. No. 3019, Adalim was a private party.
Moreover, in order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another in the exercise of his
official, administrative or judicial functions.[48] The word unwarranted means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized or without justification
or adequate reason. Advantage means a more favorable or improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of
action. Preference signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another. [49]
Without a court order, petitioners transferred Adalim and detained him in a place other than the provincial jail. The latter was housed in much more comfortable
quarters, provided better nourishment, was free to move about the house and watch television. Petitioners readily extended these benefits to Adalim on the mere
representation of his lawyers that the mayors life would be put in danger inside the provincial jail.
As the Sandiganbayan ruled, however, petitioners were unable to establish the existence of any risk on Adalims safety.To be sure, the latter would not be alone in
having unfriendly company in lockup. Yet, even if we treat Akyatans gesture of raising a closed fist at Adalim as a threat of aggression, the same would still not
constitute a special and compelling reason to warrant Adalims detention outside the provincial jail. For one, there were nipa huts within the perimeter fence of the
jail which could have been used to separate Adalim from the rest of the prisoners while the isolation cell was undergoing repair. Anyhow, such repair could not
have exceeded the 85 days that Adalim stayed in petitioner Ambil, Jr.s house. More importantly, even if Adalim could have proven the presence of an imminent
peril on his person to petitioners, a court order was still indispensable for his transfer.
The foregoing, indeed, negates the application of the justifying circumstances claimed by petitioners.
Specifically, petitioner Ambil, Jr. invokes the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of right or office. Under paragraph 5, Article 11 of
the RPC, any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office does not incur any criminal liability. In order for this
justifying circumstance to apply, two requisites must be satisfied: (1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office;
and (2) the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or
office.[50] Both requisites are lacking in petitioner Ambil, Jr.s case.
As we have earlier determined, petitioner Ambil, Jr. exceeded his authority when he ordered the transfer and detention of Adalim at his house. Needless to state, the
resulting violation of the Anti-Graft Law did not proceed from the due performance of his duty or lawful exercise of his office.
In like manner, petitioner Apelado, Sr. invokes the justifying circumstance of obedience to an order issued for some lawful purpose. Under paragraph 6, Article 11
of the RPC, any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose does not incur any criminal liability. For this justifying
circumstance to apply, the following requisites must be present: (1) an order has been issued by a superior; (2) such order must be for some lawful purpose; and (3)
the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful. [51] Only the first requisite is present in this case.
While the order for Adalims transfer emanated from petitioner Ambil, Jr., who was then Governor, neither said order nor the means employed by petitioner
Apelado, Sr. to carry it out was lawful. In his capacity as the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar, petitioner Apelado, Sr. fetched Mayor Adalim at the
provincial jail and, unarmed with a court order, transported him to the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr. This makes him liable as a principal by direct participation
under Article 17(1)[52] of the RPC.
Page 10 of 33
An accepted badge of conspiracy is when the accused by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part of and another performing another so as to
complete it with a view to the attainment of the same object, and their acts although apparently independent were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating
closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. [53]
Conspiracy was sufficiently demonstrated by petitioner Apelado, Sr.s willful cooperation in executing petitioner Ambil, Jr.s order to move Adalim from jail,
despite the absence of a court order. Petitioner Apelado, Sr., a law graduate, cannot hide behind the cloak of ignorance of the law. The Rule requiring a court order
to transfer a person under detention by legal process is elementary. Truth be told, even petitioner governor who is unschooled in the intricacies of the law expressed
reservations on his power to transfer Adalim. All said, the concerted acts of petitioners Ambil, Jr. and Apelado, Sr. resulting in the violation charged, makes them
equally responsible as conspirators.
As regards the penalty imposed upon petitioners, Section 9(a) of R.A. No. 3019 punishes a public officer or a private person who violates Section 3 of R.A. No.
3019 with imprisonment for not less than six (6) years and one (1) month to not more than fifteen (15) years and perpetual disqualification from public
office. Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or Act No. 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225, if the offense is punished by a special law, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not
be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.
Thus, the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan upon petitioner Ambil, Jr. of imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years and four (4) months is in accord with law. As a co-principal without the benefit of an incomplete justifying circumstance to his credit, petitioner Apelado, Sr.
shall suffer the same penalty.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25892 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. We
find petitioners Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019. Petitioner Alexandrino R.
Apelado, Sr. is, likewise, sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four (4) months.
With costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019); Violations of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019; Elements.—Petitioners were charged with
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which provides: Section. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.—In addition
to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful: x x x x (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions. In order to hold a person liable under this provision, the following elements must concur: (1) the accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) his action
caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions.
Same; Same; Sandiganbayan; Jurisdiction; Conspiracy; It is only when none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher
that exclusive jurisdiction be vested in the lower courts and not in the Sandiganbayan.—The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioner Ambil, Jr. is beyond
question. The same is true as regards petitioner Apelado, Sr. As to him, a Certification from the Provincial Government Department Head of the HRMO shows that
his position as Provincial Warden is classified as Salary Grade 22. Nonetheless, it is only when none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
grade ‘27’ or higher shall exclusive jurisdiction be vested in the lower courts. Here, petitioner Apelado, Sr. was charged as a co-principal with Governor Ambil, Jr.,
over whose position the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Accordingly, he was correctly tried jointly with said public officer in the proper court which had exclusive
original jurisdiction over them—the Sandiganbayan.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Partiality,” “Bad Faith,” and “Gross Negligence,” Explained.—In Sison v. People, 614 SCRA 670 (2010), we defined
“partiality,” “bad faith” and “gross negligence” as follows: “Partiality” is synonymous with “bias” which “excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are
wished for rather than as they are.” “Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.” “Gross negligence has been so
defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully
and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and
thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property.” x x x
Provincial Jails; Power of Control; Power of Supervision; An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act, and if they are not followed, he may, in
his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself; Essentially, the power of supervision means no more than
the power of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act within the law—the supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the
rules are followed, but he does not lay down the rules, nor does he have discretion to modify or replace them; It is the provincial government and not the governor
alone which has authority to exercise control and supervision over provincial jails.—The power of control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. An officer in control lays
down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide
to do it himself. On the other hand, the power of supervision means “overseeing or the authority of an officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform their
duties.” If the subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. Essentially, the power of supervision means no more than the power of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act within the
law. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he does not lay down the rules, nor does he have discretion to modify or
replace them. Significantly, it is the provincial government and not the governor alone which has authority to exercise control and supervision over provincial jails.
In any case, neither of said powers authorizes the doing of acts beyond the parameters set by law. On the contrary, subordinates must be enjoined to act within the
bounds of law. In the event that the subordinate performs an act ultra vires, rules may be laid down on how the act should be done, but always in conformity with
the law.
Same; Same; Same; Administrative Code of 1917; Sec. 1731, Article III of the Administrative Code of 1917 survived the advent of the Administrative Code of
1987.—In a desperate attempt to stretch the scope of his powers, petitioner Ambil, Jr. cites Section 1731, Article III of the Administrative Code of 1917 on
Provincial jails in support. Section 1731 provides: SEC. 1731. Provincial governor as keeper of jail.—The governor of the province shall be charged with the
keeping of the provincial jail, and it shall be his duty to administer the same in accordance with law and the regulations prescribed for the government of provincial
prisons. The immediate custody and supervision of the jail may be committed to the care of a jailer to be appointed by the provincial governor. The position of
Page 11 of 33
jailer shall be regarded as within the unclassified civil service but may be filled in the manner in which classified positions are filled, and if so filled, the appointee
shall be entitled to all the benefits and privileges of classified employees, except that he shall hold office only during the term of office of the appointing governor
and until a successor in the office of the jailer is appointed and qualified, unless sooner sepa rated. The provincial governor shall, under the direction of the
provincial board and at the expense of the province, supply proper food and clothing for the prisoners; though the provincial board may, in its discretion, let the
contract for the feeding of the prisoners to some other person. (Emphasis supplied.) This provision survived the advent of the Administrative Code of 1987. But
again, nowhere did said provision designate the provincial governor as the “provincial jailer,” or even slightly suggest that he is empowered to take personal
custody of prisoners. What is clear from the cited provision is that the provincial governor’s duty as a jail keeper is confined to the administration of the jail and the
procurement of food and clothing for the prisoners. After all, administrative acts pertain only to those acts which are necessary to be done to carry out legislative
policies and purposes already declared by the legislative body or such as are devolved upon it by the Constitution. Therefore, in the exercise of his administrative
powers, the governor can only enforce the law but not supplant it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Sec. 1737 of the Administrative Code of 1917, under which prisoners may be turned over to the jail of the neighboring province in case
the provincial jail be insecure or insufficient to accommodate all provincial prisoners has been superseded by Sec. 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.—The only reference to a transfer of prisoners in said article is found in Section 1737 under which prisoners may be turned over to the jail of the
neighboring province in case the provincial jail be insecure or insufficient to accommodate all provincial prisoners. However, this provision has been superseded by
Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended. Section 3, Rule 114 provides: SEC. 3. No release or transfer except on court order or
bail.—No person under detention by legal process shall be released or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to bail. Indubitably, the
power to order the release or transfer of a person under detention by legal process is vested in the court, not in the provincial government, much less the governor.
Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019); Violations of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019; A prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of the
Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of whether or not the accused public officer is “charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.”—As regards
his first con tention, it appears that petitioner Ambil, Jr. has obviously lost sight, if he is not altogether unaware, of our ruling in Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan, 151
SCRA 399 (1987), where we held that a prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of whether or not the accused public
officer is “charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.” Following is an excerpt of what we said in Mejorada, Section 3 cited above
enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any public officers (sic) declared unlawful. Its reference to “any public officer” is without distinction or
qualification and it specifies the acts declared unlawful. We agree with the view adopted by the Solicitor General that the last sentence of paragraph [Section 3] (e)
is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and employees of officers (sic) or government corporations which, under the ordinary concept of “public
officers” may not come within the term. It is a strained construction of the provision to read it as applying exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of
granting licenses or permits or other concessions.
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Words and Phrases; In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use “private party” rather than “private person” to
describe the recipient of the unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference for a reason; The term “party” is a technical word having a precise meaning in legal
parlance as distinguished from “person” which, in general usage, refers to a human being; Compared to a “private person,” a “private party” is more comprehensive
in scope to mean either a private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his personal interest.—In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the
lawmakers opted to use “private party” rather than “private person” to describe the recipient of the unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference for a reason. The
term “party” is a technical word having a precise meaning in legal parlance as distinguished from “person” which, in general usage, refers to a human being. Thus,
a private person simply pertains to one who is not a public officer. While a private party is more comprehensive in scope to mean either a private person or a public
officer acting in a private capacity to protect his personal interest. In the present case, when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from the provincial jail and
detained him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s residence, they accorded such privilege to Adalim, not in his official capacity as a mayor, but as a detainee charged with
murder. Thus, for purposes of applying the provisions of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, Adalim was a private party.
Same; Same; Same; Same; “Unwarranted,” “Advantage,” and “Preference,” Explained.—In order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the
accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another in the exercise of his official, administrative or judicial functions. The word “unwarranted” means lacking
adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason. “Advantage” means a more favorable or improved position or
condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of action. “Preference” signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or
estimation above another.
Same; Same; Justifying Circumstances; Fulfillment of Duty or Lawful Exercise of Right or Office; Requisites.—Specifically, petitioner Ambil, Jr. invokes the
justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of right or office. Under paragraph 5, Article 11 of the RPC, any person who acts in the fulfillment
of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office does not incur any criminal liability. In order for this justifying circumstance to apply, two requisites must be
satisfied: (1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and (2) the injury caused or the offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. Both requisites are lacking in petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s case. As
we have earlier determined, petitioner Ambil, Jr. exceeded his authority when he ordered the transfer and detention of Adalim at his house. Needless to state, the
resulting violation of the Anti-Graft Law did not proceed from the due performance of his duty or lawful exercise of his office.
Same; Same; Same; Obedience to Order; Requisites.—In like manner, petitioner Apelado, Sr. invokes the justifying circumstance of obedience to an order issued
for some lawful purpose. Under paragraph 6, Article 11 of the RPC, any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose
does not incur any criminal liability. For this justifying circumstance to apply, the following requisites must be present: (1) an order has been issued by a superior;
(2) such order must be for some lawful purpose; and (3) the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful.Only the first requisite is present in this
case.
Same; Same; Conspiracy; An accepted badge of conspiracy is when the accused by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part of and another
performing another so as to complete it with a view to the attainment of the same object, and their acts although apparently independent were in fact concerted and
cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.—While the order for Adalim’s transfer emanated from
petitioner Ambil, Jr., who was then Governor, neither said order nor the means employed by petitioner Apelado, Sr. to carry it out was lawful. In his capacity as the
Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar, petitioner Apelado, Sr. fetched Mayor Adalim at the provincial jail and, unarmed with a court order, transported him to
the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr. This makes him liable as a principal by direct participation under Article 17(1) of the RPC. An accepted badge of conspiracy is
when the accused by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part of and another performing another so as to complete it with a view to the
attainment of the same object, and their acts although apparently independent were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association,
concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.
Page 12 of 33
Same; Gross Ignorance of the Law; Petitioner Apelado, Sr., a law graduate, cannot hide behind the cloak of ignorance of the law.—Conspiracy was sufficiently
demonstrated by petitioner Apelado, Sr.’s willful cooperation in executing petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s order to move Adalim from jail, despite the absence of a court
order. Petitioner Apelado, Sr., a law graduate, cannot hide behind the cloak of ignorance of the law. The Rule requiring a court order to transfer a person under
detention by legal process is elementary. Truth be told, even petitioner governor who is unschooled in the intricacies of the law expressed reservations on his power
to transfer Adalim. All said, the concerted acts of petitioners Ambil, Jr. and Apelado, Sr. resulting in the violation charged, makes them equally responsible as
conspirators.
G.R. No. 175457; July 6, 2011

RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 175482

ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
Eastern Samar Governor Ruperto Ambil and Provincial warden Alexandrino Apelado were found guilty before the Sandiganbayan for violating Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act after Governor Ambil, conspiring with Apelado, ordered the release of then
criminally-charged and detained mayor Francisco Adalim and had the latter transferred from the provincial jail to the the governor’s residence.
Issues:
1.)Whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over a suit where one of the 2 accused has a Salary Grade classified to be cognizable before the lower courts.
2.)Whether or not the transfer of the detainee, who was a mayor, by the governor was a violation in contemplation of Sec3(e) of RA 3019 in relation to sec2(b) of
the same act.
Held:
The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the suit where one of the 2 accused held a position with a classification of Salary Grade 27. Only when none of the
numerous accused occupies a position with a salary grade “27” or higher can exclusive jurisdiction befall in the lower courts. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
Ambil as provincial governor and so as with Apelado for being a co-principal in the perpetration of the offense although he had a salary grade of 22.
The power of control and supervision granted to by the Local Government Code and Administrative Code of 1917 does not include nor permit the usurpation of
power duly vested before the courts. Facts showed that transfer by Ambil of Adalim was attended by evident bias and badfaith. Section 3(e) still applies to the case
at hand even if the act was not one relative to the “granting of licenses and concessions”. The provision was meant to include officers with such duty to the list
already enumerated therein and not necessarily to provide exclusivity. Furthermore, the fact that Andalim, as the reciepient of the benefit, was a public officer, did
not preclude application. The act employs the phrase “private party”, which is more comprehensive in scope to mean either a private person or a public officer
acting in a private capacity to protect his personal interest.
Thus the verdict by the SAndiganbayan, finding the accused guilty of violating RA 3019 was proper.
LIHAYLIHAY AND VINLUAN VS. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 191219, 31 JULY 2013
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 191219 July 31, 2013
SPO1 RAMON LIHAYLIHAY1 AND C/INSP. VIRGILIO V. VINLUAN, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari2 are the Decision3 dated August 8, 2008 and Resolution4 dated February 12, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 22098 which found petitioners Virgilio V. Vinluan (Vii1luan) and Ramon Lihaylihay (Lihaylihay) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."
The Facts
Acting on the special audit report5 submitted by the Commission on Audit, the Philippine National Police (PNP) conducted an internal investigation 6 on the
purported "ghost" purchases of combat, clothing, and individual equipment (CCIE) worth ₱133,000,000.00 which were allegedly purchased from the PNP Service
Store System (SSS) and delivered to the PNP General Services Command (GSC). As a result of the internal investigation, an Information 7 was filed before the
Sandiganbayan, charging 10 PNP officers, including, among others, Vinluan and Lihaylihay, for the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the accusatory
portion of which reads:
That on January 3, 6, 8, 9 and 10, 1992, and for sometime subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused public officers namely: Gen. Cesar P. Nazareno, being then the Director General of the Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Guillermo T.
Domondon, Director for Comptrollership, PNP; Sr. Supt. Bernardo Alejandro, Administrator, PNP Service Store System; Sr. Supt. Arnulfo Obillos, Director, PNP,
General Services Command (GSC); C/Insp. Virgilio Vinluan, Chairman, Inspection and Acceptance Committee, PNP, GSC; C/Insp. Pablito Magnaye, Member,
Inspection and Acceptance Committee, PNP, GSC; Sr. Insp. Amado Guiriba, Jr., Member, Inspection and Acceptance Committee, PNP, GSC; SPO1 Ramon Lihay-
Lihay, Inspector, Office of the Directorate for Comptrollership, PNP; Chief Supt. Jose M. Aquino, Director, Finance Service, PNP; and Sr. Supt. Marcelo Castillo
III, Chief, Gen. Materials Office/Technical Inspector, PNP, while in the performance of their respective official and administrative functions as such, taking
advantage of their positions, committing the offense in relation to their office and conspiring, confederating with one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally, through evident bad faith, cause undue injury to the government in the following manner:
Accused Gen. Nazareno in his capacity as Chief, PNP and concurrently Board Chairman of the PNP Service Store System, surreptitiously channeled PNP funds to
the PNP SSS through "Funded RIVs" valued at ₱8 [M]illion and Director Domondon released ASA No. 000-200-004-92 (SN-1353) without proper authority from
Page 13 of 33
the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and caused it to appear that there were purchases and
deliveries of combat clothing and individual equipment (CCIE) to the General Service Command (GSC), PNP, by deliberately and maliciously using funds for
personal services and divided the invoices of not more than ₱500,000.00 each, pursuant to which the following invoices were made and payments were effected
therefor through the corresponding checks, to wit:
Invoice No. Check No. Amount
30368 880932 P 500,000.00
30359 880934 500,000.00
30324 880935 500,000.00
30325 8080936 500,000.00
30322 8080937 500,000.00
30356 8080938 500,000.00
30364 8080939 500,000.00
30360 8080940 500,000.00
30365 8080941 500,000.00
30323 880943 500,000.00
30358 880942 500,000.00
30362 880943 500,000.00
30366 880943 500,000.00
30357 880946 500,000.00
30361 880947 500,000.00
30363 880948 500,000.00
P 8,000,000.00
=============
thereafter, accused members of the Inspection and Acceptance Committee together with respondents Marcelo Castillo III and Ramon Lihay-Lihay certified or
caused to be certified that the CCIE items covered by the aforementioned invoices were delivered, properly inspected and accepted, and subsequently distributed to
the end-users, when in truth and in fact, as accused well knew, no such purchases of CCIE items were made and no items were delivered, inspected, accepted and
distributed to the respective end-users; that despite the fact that no deliveries were made, respondent Alejandro claimed payment therefor, and respondent Obillos
approved the disbursement vouchers therefor as well as the checks authorizing payment which was countersigned by respondent Aquino; and as a result, the
government, having been caused to pay for the inexistent purchases and deliveries, suffered undue injury in the amount of EIGHT MILLION PESOS
(₱8,000,000.00), more or less.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
Four of the above-named accused died during the pendency of the case, while Chief Supt. Jose M. Aquino was dropped from the Information for lack of probable
cause.9 As such, only Director Guillermo Domondon, Sr. (Domondon), Supt. Arnulfo Obillos (Obillos), C/Inspector Vinluan, Sr. Inspector Amado Guiriba, Jr.
(Guiriba), and SPO1 Lihaylihay remained as accused in the subject case. During their arraignment, Domondon, Obillos, Vinluan, and Lihaylihay all pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged,10 while Guiriba remained at large.11
The Sandiganbayan Ruling
On August 8, 2008, the Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed Decision, 12 exonerating Domondon but finding Obillos, Vinluan, and Lihaylihay guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.13 It found that all the essential elements of the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 were present in the case, in
particular that: (a) Obillos, Vinluan, and Lihaylihay are public officers discharging administrative functions; (b) they have acted with evident bad faith in the
discharge of their respective functions considering that: (1) seven of the sixteen Requisition and Invoice Vouchers (RIVs) bore erasures and/or superimposition to
make it appear that the transactions were entered into in 1992 instead of 1991; 14 (2) the details of the supplies purportedly received and inspected were not reflected
in the Reports of Public Property Purchased, thus, indicating that no actual inspection of the items were made;15 and (3) there was a "splitting" of the subject
transactions into ₱500,000.00 each to avoid the review of a higher authority as well as to make it fall within the signing authority of Obillos; and (c) they failed to
refute the prosecution’s claim that the subject CCIE items were never received by Supply Accountable Officer of the GSC (GSC SAO), Dante Mateo (Mateo), nor
delivered to its end-users,17 hence, leading to the conclusion that the subject transactions were indeed "ghost" purchases which resulted to an ₱8,000,000.00 loss to
the government. In view of their conviction, Obillos, Vinluan, and Lihaylihay were sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a term of six years and one month, as
minimum, to nine years and one day, as maximum, including the penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office. They were likewise ordered to jointly and
severally indemnify the government the amount of ₱8,000,000.00. 18 Aggrieved, Obillos, Vinluan, and Lihaylihay filed their separate motions for reconsideration
which were all denied in a Resolution19 dated February 12, 2010. Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not petitioners’ conviction for the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 was proper.
Page 14 of 33
The Court’s Ruling

The petition lacks merit.
At the outset, it bears pointing out that in appeals from the Sandiganbayan, as in this case, only questions of law and not questions of fact may be raised. Issues
brought to the Court on whether the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, whether the presumption of innocence was
sufficiently debunked, whether or not conspiracy was satisfactorily established, or whether or not good faith was properly appreciated, are all, invariably, questions
of fact.20 Hence, absent any of the recognized exceptions to the above-mentioned rule,21the Sandiganbayan’s findings on the foregoing matters should be deemed as
conclusive.
Petitioners were charged with the crime of violation of Section 3(e)22 of RA 3019 which has the following essential elements: (a) the accused must be a public
officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence;
and (c) his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions.23 As observed by the Sandiganbayan, all these elements are extant in this case:
As to the first element, it is undisputed that both petitioners were public officers discharging administrative functions at the time material to this case.
As to the second element, records show that Vinluan, in his capacity as Chairman of the Inspection and Acceptance Committee, signed the 16 certificates of
acceptance, inventory, and delivery of articles from the PNP SSS despite its incompleteness or lack of material dates, while Lihaylihay certified to the correctness
of the Inspection Report Forms even if no such deliveries were made. 24 Petitioners’ claim that the subject CCIE items were received by GSC SAO Mateo25 is belied
by the absence of any proof as to when the said deliveries were made. Moreover, the supposed deliveries to the Narcotics Command26 were properly rejected by the
Sandiganbayan considering that the said transactions pertained to a different set of end-users other than the PNP GSC. Hence, having affixed their signatures on the
disputed documents despite the glaring defects found therein, petitioners were properly found to have acted with evident bad faith in approving the "ghost"
purchases in the amount of ₱8,000,000.00.27 To note, their concerted actions, when taken together, demonstrate a common design 28 which altogether justifies the
finding of conspiracy.1âwphi1
Lastly, as to the third element, petitioners’ participation in facilitating the payment of non-existent CCIE items resulted to an ₱8,000,000.00 loss on the part of the
government.1âwphi1
Thus, considering the presence of all its elements, the Court sustains the conviction of petitioners for the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
In this relation, it must be clarified that the ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan 29 (Arias) cannot be applied to exculpate petitioners in view of the peculiar
circumstances in this case which should have prompted them to exercise a higher degree of circumspection, and consequently, go beyond what their subordinates
had prepared. In particular, the tampered dates on some of the RIVs, the incomplete certification by GSC SAO Mateo on the date of receipt of the CCIE items, the
missing details on the Reports of Public Property Purchased and the fact that sixteen checks all dated January 15, 1992 were payable to PNP SSS should have
aroused a reasonable sense of suspicion or curiosity on their part if only to determine that they were not approving a fraudulent transaction. In a similar case where
the documents in question bore irregularities too evident to ignore, the Court in Cruz v. Sandiganbayan 30carved out an exception to the Arias doctrine and as such,
held:
Unlike in Arias, however, there exists in the present case an exceptional circumstance which should have prodded petitioner, if he were out to protect the interest of
the municipality he swore to serve, to be curious and go beyond what his subordinates prepared or recommended. In fine, the added reason contemplated in Arias
which would have put petitioner on his guard and examine the check/s and vouchers with some degree of circumspection before signing the same was obtaining in
this case.
We refer to the unusual fact that the checks issued as payment for construction materials purchased by the municipality were not made payable to the supplier,
Kelly Lumber, but to petitioner himself even as the disbursement vouchers attached thereto were in the name of Kelly Lumber. The discrepancy between the names
indicated in the checks, on one hand, and those in the disbursement vouchers, on the other, should have alerted petitioner - if he were conscientious of his duties as
he purports to be - that something was definitely amiss. The fact that the checks for the municipality’s purchases were made payable upon his order should, without
more, have prompted petitioner to examine the same further together with the supporting documents attached to them, and not rely heavily on the recommendations
of his subordinates.31 (Emphasis supplied)
Equally compelling is the nature of petitioners’ responsibilities and their role in the purchasing of the CCIE items in this case which should have led them to
examine with greater detail the documents which they were made to approve. As held in the recent case of Bacasmas v.
Sandiganbayan,32 when there are reasons for the heads of offices to further examine the documents in question, they cannot seek refuge by invoking the Arias
doctrine:
Petitioners cannot hide behind our declaration in Arias v. Sandiganbayan charge just because they did not personally examine every single detail before they, as the
final approving authorities, affixed their signatures to certain documents. The Court explained in that case that conspiracy was not adequately proven, contrary to
the case at bar in which petitioners’ unity of purpose and unity in the execution of an unlawful objective were sufficiently established. Also, unlike in Arias, where
there were no reasons for the heads of offices to further examine each voucher in detail, petitioners herein, by virtue of the duty given to them by law as well as by
rules and regulations, had the responsibility to examine each voucher to ascertain whether it was proper to sign it in order to approve and disburse the cash
advance.33 (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, on the matter of the admissibility of the prosecution’s evidence, suffice it to state that, except as to the checks, 34 the parties had already stipulated on the
subject documents’ existence and authenticity and accordingly, waived any objections thereon. 35 In this respect, petitioners must bear the consequences of their
admission and cannot now be heard to complain against the admissibility of the evidence against them by harking on the best evidence rule. In any event, what is
sought to be established is the mere general appearance of forgery which may be readily observed through the marked alterations and superimpositions on the
subject documents, even without conducting a comparison with any original document as in the case of forged signatures where the signature on the document in
question must always be compared to the signature on the original document to ascertain if there was indeed a forgery.
WHEREFORE, the petition is OENIED. The Decision dated August 8, 2008 and Resolution dated February 12, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
22098 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Sandiganbayan; It bears pointing out that in appeals from the Sandiganbayan, only questions of law and not questions of
fact may be raised.—At the outset, it bears pointing out that in appeals from the Sandiganbayan, as in this case, only questions of law and not questions of fact may
be raised. Issues brought to the Court on whether the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, whether the presumption of
innocence was sufficiently debunked, whether or not conspiracy was satisfactorily established, or whether or not good faith was properly appreciated, are all,
invaria bly, questions of fact. Hence, absent any of the recognized exceptions to the above-mentioned rule, the Sandiganbayan’s findings on the foregoing matters
should be deemed as conclusive.
PEOPLE VS. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NOS. 153952-71, 23 AUGUST 2010
Page 15 of 33
Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 153952-71

Plaintiff,
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (4THDiv.) and HENRY Promulgated:

BARRERA,
Respondents. August 23, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision [1] dated May 6, 2002 of the Sandiganbayan granting the Demurrer
to Evidence of Mayor Henry E. Barrera (Mayor Barrera) and dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 25035-25037, 25039-25041, 25043, 25045-25047, 25049-25050, and
25053-25054, on the ground that the elements of the offense under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, as amended, were not established beyond reasonable doubt.
Mayor Barrera, together with Rufina Escala (Escala) and Santos Edquiban (Edquiban), were charged with 14 counts of violation of Sections 3(e) and 9
of Republic Act No. 3019 in separate Informations, which alleged essentially similar set of facts, save for the names of the complainants, to wit:
That on or about 30 June 1998, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Candelaria, province of Zambales, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Henry E. Barrera, Santos Edquiban and Rufina E. Escala, all public officers, then
being the Municipal Mayor, Market Collector, and District Supervisor, respectively, all of Candelaria, Province of Zambales, committing the
penal offense herein charged against them while in the performance of, in relation to, and taking advantage of their official functions and
duties as such, thru manifest partiality and/or evident bad faith, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and criminally, in conspiracy with
one another, prevent [Ermelinda Abella (Criminal Case No. 25035), Lourdes Jaquias (C.C. No. 25036), John Espinosa (C.C. No. 25037),
Jean Basa (C.C. No. 25038), Lerma Espinosa (C.C. No. 25039), Eduardo Sison (C.C No. 25040), Lina Hebron (C. C. No. 25041), Nora
Elamparo (C.C. No. 25042), Luz Aspiras (C.C . No. 25043), Oscar Lopez (C.C. No. 25044), Corazon Cansas (C.C. No. 25045), Michelle
Palma (C.C. No. 25046), Mila Saberon (C.C. No.25047), Merlina Miraflor (C.C. No. 25048), Edna Bagasina (C.C. No. 25049), Jocelyn
Educalane (C.C. No. 25050), Alvin Gatdula (C.C. No. 25051), Helen Egenias (C.C. No. 25052), Luz Eclarino (C.C. No. 25053) and
Josephine Elamparo (C.C. No. 25054)], a legitimate lessee-stallholder from exercising his/her contractual and/or proprietary rights to transfer
to, occupy and/or operate his/her assigned stall at the public market of Candelaria, Province of Zambales, under the subsisting lease contract
dated 25 June 1998, without any valid or justifiable reason whatsoever, by means of the issuance and implementation of the patently
unlawful Memorandum No. 1 dated 30 June 1998, thereby causing undue injury to (private complainants).[2]
Page 16 of 33
During the Pre-Trial Conference on February 22, 2000, the People and Mayor Barrera marked their respective documentary exhibits and entered into the
following stipulation of facts:
1. That at the time material to this case as alleged in all of the Informations, accused Henry E. Barrera was a public officer being
then the municipal mayor of Candelaria, Zambales;
2. That private complainants were awarded individual contract of lease for a market stall in the new Candelaria Public
Market by the former Mayor Fidel Elamparo before the oath taking of the accused on June 30, 1998;
3. That the awardees are the following:
1. Ermelina Abella 11. Corazon Cansas

2. Lourdes Jaquias 12. Michelle Palma
3. John Espinosa 13. Mila Saberon
4. Jean Basa 14. Merlinda Miraflor
5. Lerma Espinosa 15. Edna Bagasina
6. Eduardo Sison 16. Jocelyn Educalane
7. Lina Hebron 17. Alvin Gatdula
8. Nora Elamparo 18. Helen Egenias
9. Luz Aspiras 19. Luz Eclarino
10. Oscar Lopez 20. Josephine Elamparo
4. That on June 30, 1998 accused Henry E. Barrera after taking his oath as the new Mayor of Candelaria, Zambales went to the
public market and pleaded with the complainants herein not to occupy the new market stalls;
5. That there was a public hearing conducted on the issue of the public market on July 8, 1998 by the Sangguniang Bayan with the
new elected mayor as presiding officer;
6. That accused Henry E. Barrera was the Vice-Mayor of Candelaria, Zambales from 1986 to 1992;
7. That the accused was a stall holder or lessee of one of the stalls at the Candelaria Public Market;
8. That on March 11, 1995 during the time of Mayor Fidel Elamparo, the public market of Candelaria, Zambales was
razed to the ground;
9. That the incident displaced about 60 market vendors;
10. That Ex-Mayor Elamparo assured the market vendors who were displaced together with Congressman Antonio Diaz
that they will enjoy priority/preference over the new stalls once the public market is re-built; and
11. That the displaced market vendors were temporarily sheltered along Perla St. and Ruby St., adjacent to the burned
public market.
The parties agreed, that the only issue to be resolved is: whether or not accused Henry E. Barrera is liable for violation of Section 3(e) and 9
of Republic Act No. 3019.[3]
While the Pre-Trial Order, reflecting the foregoing stipulation of facts, was not signed by the members of the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan, the
issuance, authenticity, and contents thereof were never disputed nor put in issue by any of the parties.
When arraigned, accused Mayor Barrera, Escala, and Edquiban separately pleaded not guilty.
Page 17 of 33
On August 2, 2000, Escala and Edquiban filed an Omnibus Motion: 1) For the Issuance of an Order Dropping Dr. Rufina Escala and Mr. Santos
Edquiban from the Information; 2) To Withdraw Bond; and 3) To Lift Hold Departure Orders on the ground that the Ombudsman approved the recommendation of
the Special Prosecutor to drop said two accused from the Informations.
In an Order dated August 8, 2000, the Sandiganbayan granted the Omnibus Motion and accordingly ordered Escala and Edquiban dropped from the
Informations.
Complainants Abella, Jaquias, John Espinosa, Lerma Espinosa, Sison, Hebron, Cansas, Palma, Saberon, Bagasina, Educalane, Eclarino, and Josephine
Elamparo testified for the People. Upon motion of the People, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order dated August 14, 2001, dismissing the complaints of Basa,
Norma Elamparo, Lopez, Miraflor, Gatdula, and Egenias, on the ground that said charges cannot be prosecuted successfully without the testimony of these six
complainants. The People, however, proceeded with the prosecution of the complaints of Abella and the 13 other complainants (Abella, et al.). Subsequently, the
People formally offered its documentary exhibits, which were admitted in evidence.
Mayor Barrera filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence on October 23, 2001, which the Sandiganbayan granted in an Order dated October
29, 2001.
Mayor Barrera filed his Demurrer to Evidence on November 8, 2001, avowing that there was no bad faith in his issuance of Memorandum No. 1, which
prevented Abella, et al., from occupying the new stalls at the Candelaria Public Market. He explained that he needed to issue Memorandum No. 1 since the
previous Municipal Mayor, Fidel Elamparo, awarded the Lease Contracts over the new public market stalls less than a week before the end of the latters term and
without regard to the requirement of pertinent laws. Mayor Barrera also claimed that he did not act with manifest partiality in issuing Memorandum No. 1
considering that said issuance applies not only to Abella, et al., but also to all awardees of the questionable Lease Contracts. Mayor Barrera further pointed out that
Abella, et al., did not suffer any undue injury even when they were unable to occupy the new public market stalls as they were able to continue working and
earning as market vendors at the temporary public market site. Hence, Mayor Barrera argued that any purported damage sustained by Abella, et al., by reason of the
issuance and implementation of Memorandum No. 1 should be solely borne by them, being damnum absque injuria.
In its Comment/Opposition to Mayor Barreras Demurrer to Evidence, the People asserted that the pieces of evidence it adduced and presented were
more than sufficient to sustain the accused Mayors conviction. The People maintained that it would be in Mayor Barreras best interest to explain during trial why
on June 30, 1998, said Mayor, assisted by the police, forcibly evicted Abella, et al., from the new public market and padlocked the market stalls without the benefit
of any court order. According to the People, Mayor Barreras actuations displayed a wanton disregard of the constitutional rights to life and property, as well as to
due process of law, which resulted to business losses on the part of Abella, et al., from the time their market stalls were closed.
On May 6, 2002, the Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision granting Mayor Barreras Demurrer to Evidence and dismissing the criminal cases against
said Mayor. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Demurrer to Evidence filed by accused HENRY E. BARRERA, through counsel, is hereby GRANTED and
Criminal Cases Nos. 25035-37; 25039-41; 25043; 25045-47; 25049-50 and 25053-54 are hereby DISMISSED on the ground that the
elements of the offense under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, were not established beyond reasonable doubt.[4]
Page 18 of 33
Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan judgment, the People filed the present Petition, faulting the graft court for the
following:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN PROMULGATING THE ASSAILED DECISION
AS IT NEVER EXPRESSED CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY THE FACTS AND THE EVIDENCE ON WHICH IT IS BASED, IN
VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF SEC. 14, ARTICLE VIII OF THE CONSTITUTION.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO
PROVE AND QUANTIFY ACTUAL INJURY AND DAMAGE SUFFERED BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS.
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO
PROVE EVIDENT BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
The Petition has no merit.
At the outset, we note that this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was filed without a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision dated May 6, 2002 having been filed before the Sandiganbayan. This fact alone would have warranted the dismissal of the instant Petition given the
general rule that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before the filing of a petition for certiorari. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,[5] we held:
As a rule, the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, lies only when the
lower court has been given the opportunity to correct the error imputed to it through a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order or
resolution. The rationale of the rule rests upon the presumption that the court or administrative body which issued the assailed order or
resolution may amend the same, if given the chance to correct its mistake or error. The motion for reconsideration, therefore, is
a condition sine qua non before filing a petition for certiorari.
Here, petitioners filed the instant petitions for certiorari without interposing a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan. Section 1 of the same Rule 65 requires that petitioners must not only show that the trial court, in issuing
the questioned Resolution, acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, but that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. We have held that the
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is a motion for reconsideration of the questioned Order or
Resolution. It bears stressing that the strict application of this rule will also prevent unnecessary and premature resort to appellate
proceedings. We thus cannot countenance petitioners disregard of this procedural norm and frustrate its purpose of attaining speedy,
inexpensive, and orderly judicial proceedings.
In justifying their failure to file the required motion for reconsideration, petitioners vehemently assert that they were deprived of
due process and there is extreme urgency for relief, and that under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless.
We are not persuaded.
Petitioners may not arrogate to themselves the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not. To
dispense with the requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioners must show concrete, compelling, and valid reason for doing
so. They must demonstrate that the Sandiganbayan, in issuing the assailed Resolution, acted capriciously, whimsically and arbitrarily by
reason of passion and personal hostility. Such capricious, whimsical and arbitrary acts must be apparent on the face of the assailed
Resolution. These, they failed to do.
Page 19 of 33
The People in the instant case absolutely failed to provide any explanation as to why it did not first move for reconsideration of the challenged
Sandiganbayan judgment before seeking a writ of certiorari from this Court. We therefore cannot find any concrete, compelling, and valid reason to except the
People from the aforementioned general rule of procedure.
The Petition at bar must also be dismissed on substantive grounds.
Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that [n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. The purpose of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution is to inform the person reading the decision, and
especially the parties, of how it was reached by the court after consideration of the pertinent facts and examination of the applicable laws. The losing party is
entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing
party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. Thus, a decision is adequate if a party desiring to appeal therefrom
can assign errors against it.[6]
Our review of the Sandiganbayan Decision dated May 6, 2006 reveals that said judgment actually contained a summary of the antecedent facts and
proceedings; as well as a discussion on the relevant statutory provisions, the elements of the offense charged, and the testimonial and documentary evidence
presented by the People. The factual and legal bases of the assailed Sandiganbayan Decision, granting Mayor Barreras Demurrer to Evidence, are readily evident in
the following excerpts therefrom:
The instant Demurrer to Evidence is impressed with merit.

Section 3, paragraph (e) of R.A. 3019, provides that:
Section 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful;
xxxx
e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. x x x
To be liable for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, four essential elements (as stated in the Information filed in
the present cases) must be present:
1) That the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the public officers;
2) That said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his official duties or in relation to
his public position;
3) That he causes undue injury to any party, whether government or private individuals; and
4) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
The first two above-stated elements are clearly present in the instance cases. However, the third and fourth elements appear to be
absent, or at best remain doubtful.
The undue injury mentioned as the third essential element in the commission of the crime requires proof of actual injury and
damage. Clarifying, the Supreme Court, in Llorente v. Sandiganbayan, stated:
Page 20 of 33
x x x Unlike in actions for torts, undue injury in Sec. 3(e) cannot be presumed even after a wrong or a
violation of a right has been established. Its existence must be proven as one of the elements of a crime. In fact, the
causing of undue injury or the giving of any unwarranted advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence constitutes the very act punished under this section. Thus, it is required that
the undue injury be specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty.
In the instant cases, the evidence presented by the prosecution failed to prove actual injury and damage suffered by the private
complainants, as one of the elements of the crime herein charged, in that it failed to specify, quantify and prove to the point of moral
certainty the purported undue injury. The complainants in their testimonies, admitted that they have been working and earning, either as
market vendors or in pursuit of their profession from the time of the closure of their respective market stalls up to now. Also, their claims of
business losses, at the time material to the cases at bar, leave much to be desired vis--vis the moral certitude exacted by law to prove the
alleged undue injury. Pathetically, said evidence, are either contradictory or incredible.
Likewise, the prosecutions evidence failed to prove manifest partiality and/or evident bad faith on the part of the accused, as the
fourth of the above-stated requisites for the commission of the crime herein charged.
For an act to be considered as exhibiting manifest partiality, there must be a showing of a clear, notorious or plain inclination or
predilection to favor one side rather than the other. Partiality is synonymous with bias which excites a disposition to see and report matters as
they are wished for rather than as they are. Evident bad faith, on the other hand, is something which does not simply connote bad judgment
or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some
motive or intent or ill will; It partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design, or
some motive of self-interest or ill will for ulterior purpose. Evident bad faith connotes a manifest and deliberate intent on the part of the
accused to do wrong or cause damage.
The evidence presented by the prosecution falls short of that quantum of proof necessary to establish the fact that the accused
acted with manifest partiality or with evident bad faith. On the contrary, what is clear from the evidence adduced, was that herein accused
simply exercised his legitimate powers under the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) which provides that a municipal mayor has the
power to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the municipality and the exercise of its corporate powers and, for this
purpose, he shall have the power to issue such executive order as are necessary for the proper enforcement and execution of the laws and
ordinances. Ex-Mayor Elamparos acts of entering into lease contracts, when his term was about to expire and herein accused-movants term
was about to commence, being the mayor-elect, was not only in violation of the Local Government Code provision that no contract may be
entered into by the local chief executive in behalf of the local government unit without prior authorization by the sangguniang concerned, but
also of the other requirements of law such as, a verified application from the complainants, payment of application fees, drawing of lots and
the opening of bids, since not all the displaced vendors can be accommodated in the thirty-two stalls in the new public market. The intent of
such a maneuvering was obviously to tie the hands of the incoming administration.
The undue haste of awarding stalls in the new public market by Ex-Mayor Elamparo was flagrant, because from 26 June to 30
June, 1998, former stall holders of the old market that burned down, held a rally to denounce the allegedly unfair awarding of contracts of
lease over the new stalls, complaints ranging from awards to new comers, to instances of two stalls, being awarded to one lessee.
It was precisely in this state of affair that prompted herein accused-movant Barrera to cause the issuance of Memorandum No. 1,
Series of 1998, after he had taken his oath as mayor of Candelaria, Zambales, to wit:
You are hereby advised that effective 1:00 PM, June 30, 1998, the transferring to and occupancy of stalls
inside the Public Market shall be temporarily suspended.
For your strict implementation and compliance.
Lastly, of significance is the fact that Memorandum No. 1 applied to all stallholders at the new public market, be they supporters
or not of Mayor Barrera during the 1998 mayoralty elections just past. These admissions of the complaining witnesses in open court, thus,
refute their allegations in their affidavits that the purpose of the memorandum was to award the new stalls to Mayor Barreras supporters.
In the light of all the foregoing, We find that herein accused-movant Henry E. Barrera cannot in fairness be held liable under the
indictment. In this connection, it has been held that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of
the defense; the burden of proof is never on the accused to disprove the facts necessary to establish the crime charged. It is safely entrenched
in our jurisprudence says the Supreme Court, that unless the prosecution discharges its burden to prove the guilt of an accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the latter need not even offer evidence in his behalf. [7]
Page 21 of 33
In fact, based on the foregoing, the People was able to identify and discuss with particularity in its present Petition the grave abuse of discretion
allegedly committed by the graft court in granting Mayor Barreras Demurrer to Evidence. Thus, contrary to the Peoples contention, the aforequoted Sandiganbayan
judgment did not violate the mandate of Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution.
We further disagree with the Peoples assertion of grave abuse of discretion on the part of Sandiganbayan in ruling that several elements for the violation
of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019[8] are lacking, or at best, doubtful, in this case.
In order to be held guilty of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, the provision itself explicitly requires that the accused caused undue
injury for having acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or with gross inexcusable negligence, in the discharge of his official administrative or
judicial function. The Peoples evidence failed to support the existence of these two elements.
The issuance by Mayor Barrera of Memorandum No. 1 is rooted in Section 444, in relation to Section 22, of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, which provide:
Section 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The municipal mayor, as the chief executive of the
municipal government, shall exercise such powers and perform such duties and functions as provided by this Code and other laws.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal mayor shall:
xxxx
(2) Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the municipality and the exercise of its corporate
powers provided for under Section 22 of this Code, implement all approved policies, programs, projects, services and activities of the
municipality and, in addition to the foregoing, shall:
xxxx
(iii) Issue such executive orders as are necessary for the proper enforcement and execution of laws and ordinances.
Section 22. Corporate Powers. x x x
xxxx
(c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, no contract may be entered into by the local chief executive in behalf of the local
government unit without prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned. A legible copy of such contract shall be posted at a
conspicuous place in the provincial capitol or the city, municipality or barangay hall.
The award of Lease Contracts over the new public market stalls were marred by several irregularities, among which, was it being made by the former
Mayor with only one week before the expiration of his term and the lack of prior authorization by the sanggunian as required by Section 22(c) of Republic Act No.
7160. Also, there were 60 market vendors displaced by the fire at the old public market, but only 32 stalls were available for occupancy at the new public market. A
rally was held by the stall holders displaced by the fire from the old public market to denounce the allegedly unfair awarding of the Lease Contracts over the new
public market stalls to new comers, and even in some instances, the awarding of two stalls to only one lessee. These circumstances prompted Mayor Barrera, the
newly elected Municipal Mayor, to issue Memorandum No. 1 pursuant to his duty of enforcing and implementing laws and ordinances for the general welfare of
the municipality and its inhabitants. It bears to stress that Memorandum No. 1 applies equitably to all awardees of the Lease Contracts over the new public market
stalls, not just Abella, et al., and did not give any unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference to any particular private party. Consequently, we find that the
Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it declared that Mayor Barrera did not issue Memorandum No. 1 with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith, or with gross inexcusable negligence.
Page 22 of 33
Moreover, in Pecho v. Sandiganbayan,[9] we explained that the undue injury caused to any party, including the government, under Section 3(e) of Republic
Act No. 3019, could only mean actual injury or damage which must be established by evidence. Abella, et al., alleged undue damage/injury by reason of
Memorandum No. 1 because they had been unable to occupy the new public market stalls and were thus deprived of their daily income of varying
amounts.However, Abella, et al., in their own testimonies,[10] admitted that that they have continued working and earning either as market vendors at the temporary
public market site, or in pursuit of their profession from the time their market stalls were closed until present time. Hence, there was no sufficient evidence to
establish actual injury or damage suffered by Abella, et al., by reason of Memorandum No. 1.
In People v. Sandiganbayan,[11] we defined grave abuse of discretion as follows:
Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. x x x.
xxxx
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is filed after the prosecution had rested its case, and when the
same is granted, it calls for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond
reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused. Such dismissal of a criminal
case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict
being one of acquittal, the case ends there.
The sole office of an extraordinary writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. For as long as the court acted within its jurisdiction, an error of judgment that
it may commit in the exercise thereof is not correctible through the special civil action of certiorari. To reiterate, the Sandiganbayan, in
rendering the challenged Decision, acted with jurisdiction and did not gravely abuse its discretion.
There being no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in granting Mayor Barreras Demurrer to Evidence as to deprive the graft
court of jurisdiction, the issuance of a writ of certiorari is not warranted in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; Motion for Reconsideration; The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before the filing of a
petition for certiorari.—At the outset, we note that this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was filed without a Motion for Reconsideration of
the Decision dated May 6, 2002 having been filed before the Sandiganbayan. This fact alone would have warranted the dismissal of the instant Petition given the
general rule that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Constitutional Law; Judgments; The purpose of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution is to inform the person reading the decision, and especially the parties,
of how it was reached by the court after consideration of the pertinent facts and examination of the applicable laws; A decision is adequate if a party desiring to
appeal therefrom can assign errors against it.—Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that “[n]o decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.” The purpose of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution is to inform
the person reading the decision, and especially the parties, of how it was reached by the court after consideration of the pertinent facts and examination of the
applicable laws. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be
reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is
especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. Thus, a decision is adequate if a
party desiring to appeal therefrom can assign errors against it.
Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Elements in order to be held guilty of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.—In order to be held
guilty of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, the provision itself explicitly requires that the accused caused undue injury for having acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or with gross inexcusable negligence, in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial function. The People’s
evidence failed to support the existence of these two elements.
Page 23 of 33
Same; Same; Undue injury caused to any party, including the government, under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, could only mean actual injury or damage
which must be established by evidence.—In Pecho v. Sandiganbayan, 238 SCRA 116 (1994), we explained that the undue injury caused to any party, including the
government, under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, could only mean actual injury or damage which must be established by evidence. Abella, et al., alleged
undue damage/injury by reason of Memorandum No. 1 because they had been unable to occupy the new public market stalls and were thus deprived of their daily
income of varying amounts. However, Abella, et al., in their own testimonies, admitted that that they have continued working and earning—either as market
vendors at the temporary public market site, or in pursuit of their profession—from the time their market stalls were closed until present time. Hence, there was no
sufficient evidence to establish actual injury or damage suffered by Abella, et al., by reason of Memorandum No. 1.
GARCIA, JR. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 197567, 19 NOVEMBER 2014

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 197567 November 19, 2014
GOVERNOR ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, LEONARDO B. ROMAN, ROMEO L. MENDIOLA, PASTOR P. VICHUACO, AURORA J. TIAMBENG, and
NUMERIANO G. MEDINA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari1 are the Resolution2 dated May 30, 2006 and the Order3 dated October 9, 2009 of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman)
in OMB-L-C-05-0084-A, which dismissed the criminal complaint against herein respondents for lack of probable cause.
The Facts
The present case stemmed from a Complaint-Affidavit4 filed by herein petitioner Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. (Garcia), incumbent Provincial Governor of the Province of
Bataan (Province), before the Ombudsman, docketed as OMB-L-C-05-0084-A, against respondents former Provincial Governor Leonardo B. Roman (Roman),
former Executive Assistant Romeo L. Mendiola (Mendiola), former Provincial Treasurer Pastor P. Vichuaco (Vichuaco), former Budget Officer Aurora J.
Tiambeng (Tiambeng), and incumbent5 Provincial Accountant Numeriano G. Medina (Medina), all of the Provincial Capitol of Bataan, charging them with
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents under Article 217 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and
violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, or the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," inter alia.
Also charged were incumbent6 Provincial Engineer Amelia R. De Pano (De Pano), Assistant Provincial Engineer Angelito A. Rodriguez (Rodriguez), Engineer
Noel G. Jimenez (Jimenez), and Architect Bernardo T. Capistrano (Capistrano), as well as Noel Valdecañas7 (Valdecañas), the owner and manager of V.F.
Construction of Balanga City.
The essential allegations in the Complaint-Affidavit are as follows:
On November 3, 2003, Roman, being the Provincial Governor at that time, entered into a contract 8 with V.F. Construction, as represented by Valdecañas, for the
construction of a mini-theater at the Bataan State College - Abucay Campus, Abucay, Bataan (project) for the contract price of ₱3,660,000.00. 9
Thereafter, or on February 23, 2004, Roman signed and issued a Certificate of Acceptance, 10 stating that the project was "100% completed in accordance with plans
and specification[s]" per the Accomplishment Report11 and Certification,12 both dated February 20, 2004, prepared and signed by Capistrano, Jimenez, Rodriguez,
and De Pano. Valdecañas also affixed his signature on the said Accomplishment Report and later executed an Affidavit 13dated May 26, 2004 stating that the project
was 100% completed.
In view of the project’s purported completion, two (2) Land Bank of the Philippines checks 14 (Land Bank checks) – each in the amount of ₱1,655,318.18 (or
₱3,310,636.36 in total) – were respectively issued by Roman and Vichuaco on April 30 and June 2, 2004 in favor of V.F. Construction. The issuances were made
pursuant to two (2) separate Disbursement Vouchers15 prepared and issued by De Pano, Medina, and Vichuaco, and approved for payment by Roman. In addition,
an Allotment and Obligation Slip16 (ALOBS) was issued, prepared, and signed by De Pano, Tiambeng, and Medina to reimburse V.F. Construction for the cost of
the labor and materials utilized for the construction of the project. Tiambeng also certified in the ALOBS the "existence of [an] appropriation" for the said
project.17 Meanwhile, Mendiola prepared all the supporting documents for the approval and release of the funds therefor, and submitted the same to Roman for his
signature.18
The receipts issued by V.F. Construction dated May 5, 2004 19 and June 3, 200420 show that it received the payments for the project.
Page 24 of 33
Notwithstanding the various documents attesting to the project’s supposed completion, as well as the disbursement of funds in payment therefor, Garcia – Roman’s
successor as Provincial Governor – authorized the inspection of the project sometimein August 2004 and discovered that while its construction was indeed
commenced, it remained unfinished as reflected in a Memorandum Report 21 dated August 24, 2004.
Hence, Garcia filed the above-mentioned Complaint-Affidavit against, among others, respondents, who, in response, proffered their individual defenses. 22
For his part, Roman cited political enmity between him and Garcia as the reason for the filing of the complaint. 23 He defended the genuineness of the project,
averring that it was not a "ghost project" as, in fact, substantial work had been done thereon. 24 He ascribed the falsehood in this case to the Accomplishment Report
and Certification dated February 20, 2004, as well as Valdecañas’s Affidavit, which all stated that the project was 100% completed, claiming that he had no
participation in their preparation and execution25 and that he only signed the Disbursement Vouchers after finding no irregularities on the said documents. 26
Similarly, Mendiola denied any participation in the preparation and execution of any of the documents involved in the project.27
On the other hand, Vichuaco admitted having signed the Disbursement Vouchers and Land Bank checks, from which the project was funded, but denied having any
knowledge that the construction thereof was not yet completed. 28 He claimed to have signed the Disbursement Vouchers only after having ascertained that De Pano
and Medina, in their official capacities, had already signed the same, and ventured that he would not have done so had he known that the project was not yet
complete.29
Medina also admitted having signed the Disbursement Vouchers and ALOBS, but claimed that he did so after a thorough examination of the supporting documents,
i.e., the Accomplishment Report and Certification. He stated that he was not informed that the project was not yet completed when he signed the Disbursement
Vouchers and the ALOBS, adding that the project was already substantially completed when Garcia prevented further work on the same.30 He further insisted that
the project was covered by a corresponding appropriation. 31
Meanwhile, Tiambeng claimed that, as the Budget Officer of Bataan at the time, she verified that there was a corresponding appropriation for the project. Thus, she
signed the ALOBS, which she claimed was a ministerial duty on her part. 32 In this regard, she posited that she would not have signed the same had she known that
there was no appropriation for the project.33
As for the other officials charged, namely, De Pano, Rodriguez, Jimenez, and Capistrano, they collectively admitted having signed the Accomplishment Report and
Certification, but maintained that they did so only after the same had been reviewed by the other provincial engineers.34 Valdecañas, for his part, denied35 the
allegations against him and claimed that Medina borrowed his contractor’s accreditation in order to participate in the bidding for the project. He pointed out that it
was Medina who actually participated in the bidding process and that his signature appearing on the documents pertaining to the project was falsified. 36 He added
that he was out of the country when payments for the project were made. 37
The Ombudsman Ruling
In a Resolution38 dated May 30, 2006, the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict De Pano, Rodriguez, Jimenez, and Capistrano for the crime of Falsification
of Public Documents by making it appear through the aforesaid Certification and Accomplishment Report that the project had already been completed when the
same was only partially constructed. The Ombudsman held that their report was necessary for the issuance of a certification for the disbursement of funds
therefor.39
On the other hand, the Ombudsman cleared respondents from liability on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, reasoning that "mere signature on a voucher or
certification is not enough" to establish any conspiracy among them which would warrant their conviction.40 Relying on the doctrine enunciated in the case of Arias
v. Sandiganbayan41(Arias) which states that "[a]ll heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith ofthose who
prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations,"42 the Ombudsman held that there was "no direct and strong evidence that [Roman] participated in the
fraudulent act/transaction"43 and that his act, together with that of the other respondents, was protected by the "legal presumption of good faith and
regularity,"44 which Garcia failed to overcome.
Oddly, no pronouncement was made with regard to the criminal charges against Valdecañas. 45
Dissatisfied, Garcia moved for reconsideration,46 citing the Commission on Audit’s (CoA) Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2005-004-100
(2004)47 dated April 21, 2005 (CoA Memo), which stated that the project had no source of funds, thus rendering the contract therefor void and the payments made
therefor illegal.48Moreover, by approving and effecting the payment of the project despite its non-completion and the absence of an allotment therefor, Garcia
claimed that respondents, who acted in conspiracy with each other, should beheld liable this time for the crime of Technical Malversation under Article 22049 of the
RPC.50
In an Order51 dated October 9, 2009, the Ombudsman denied Garcia’s motion for reconsideration, hence, this certiorari petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The central issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in dismissing all the criminal charges against
respondents for lack of probable cause. In his certiorari petition, Garcia maintains that the findings in the CoA Memo are sufficient to establish probable cause and
to hold respondents for trial for the crimes of Technical Malversation, Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents, and for Violation
of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.52 As it appears, the other criminal and administrative charges contained in his complaint-affidavit53 were not anymore discussed in the
said petition.Thus, the Court is constrained to confine its analysis only to what has been alleged therein.
Page 25 of 33
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
I.
The present Constitution and RA 6770,54 otherwise known as the "Ombudsman Act of 1989," have endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with wide latitude, in
the exercise ofits investigatory and prosecutorial powers, to pass upon criminal complaints involving public officials and employees.55 Hence, as a general rule, the
Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman’s findings and respects the initiative and independence inherent in its office, which "beholden to no one, acts as the
champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service."56
The foregoing principle does not, however, apply when the Ombudsman’s ruling is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, subjecting the same to certiorari
correction. Among other instances, the Ombudsman may be deemed to have gravely abused its discretion when it unjustifiably fails to take essential facts and
evidence into consideration in the determination of probable cause.57 It may also be committed when the Ombudsman patently violates the Constitution, the law or
existing jurisprudence. Indeed, any decision, order or resolution of a tribunal tantamount to overruling a judicial pronouncement of the highest Court is
unmistakably grave abuse of discretion.58
Legally classified, such misdeeds fall squarely within the concept of grave abuse of discretion which is defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment on the part of the public officer concerned, which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the poweris
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.59
Applying these principles to thiscase, the Court finds that the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded the CoA Memo and patently
misapplied existing jurisprudence – particularly, the Ariascase – in ruling that there was no probable cause for the crime of Violation of Section 3 (e), 60 RA 3019.
Accordingly, respondents should be indicted for such. However, the same does not hold true for the other crimes of Technical Malversation and Malversation of
PublicFunds through Falsification of Public Documents for reasons that will be hereinafter discussed.
II.
Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, exists when the facts are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. To engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and to determine if the suspect is
probably guilty of the same, the elements of the crime charged should, in all reasonable likelihood, be present. This is based on the principle that every crime is
defined by its elements, without which there should be, at the most, no criminal offense. 61
The elements of the crime of Violation of Section 3 (e),62 RA 3019 are as follows: (a) the offender must be a public officer discharging administrative,judicial, or
official functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (c) his action caused any undue injury to
any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.63
Considering the findings contained in the CoA Memo, which the Ombudsman, however, disregarded, it is quite clear that all the foregoing elements are, in all
reasonable likelihood, present with respect to respondents’ participation in this case.
Respondents, who were all public officers at the time of the alleged commission of the crime – particularly, as provincial officials of Bataan discharging
administrative functions (first element) – apparently acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith – or, at the very least, gross inexcusable negligence – when
they issued the pertinent documents and certifications that led to the diversion of public funds to a project that had no proper allotment, i.e., the mini-theater project
(second element). The absence of such allotment not only renders invalid the release of funds therefor but also taints the legality of the project’s appropriation64 as
well as the Province’s contract with V.F. Construction. As the CoA Memo pertinently explains:
Four contracted infrastructure projects and a financial assistance extended to [the] barangay by your administration amounting to ₱5,404,000 and ₱100,000,
respectively, were found devoid of valid appropriations. Of the amounts, ₱4,992,750 was already paid while the remaining balance of ₱511,250 was lodged to
Accounts Payable. The non-existence of valid appropriations rendered the contracts void and the payments illegal.
The said projects were among the 19 provided with appropriations totalling ₱14,005,000 in the [P]rovince’s 2003 Closing Budgets embodied under Ordinance No.
A-6 and approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in its Resolution No. 54 on February 23, 2004.
The validity of the appropriations and the subsequent transactions were not considered in audit due tolack of legal basis, to wit:
a. No sources of funds for the ₱14.005M appropriation rendering it invalid
The ₱43,487,527.16 computed source/available balance for the ₱14,005,000 appropriation was already used as the beginning available balance in the computation
of the Estimated Revenues and Receipts considered in the earlier approved CY 2004 Annual General Fund Budget contained in Appropriation Ordinance No. 2 and
passed under S.P. Resolution No. 6 on January 12, 2004 (Please see Annex A [with the heading "Supplemental Appropriations of ₱14,005,000. CY 2003 Closing
Budget]). Sec. 321 of RA 7160 provides, among others, that:
Page 26 of 33
"No ordinance providing for a supplemental budget shall be enacted, except when supported by funds actually available as certified by the local treasurer or by new
revenue sources."
b. Non-release of allotments for the ₱14.005 M appropriation
Allotment is the authorizationissued by the Local Chief Executive (LCE) to a department/office of the LGU, which allows it to incur obligations, for specified
amounts, within the appropriation ordinance. (Sec. 08, Manual on the NGAS for LGUs, Volume I).
As verified from the Accounting and Budget offices, no allotments were released for the projects, hence the incurrence of the obligations were not authorized. In
spite of this, the amount of ₱14,005,000 was taken up among the continuing appropriations/allotments in CY 2004. Also, Allotment and Obligation Slips (ALOBS)
which serve as the LGU commitments to pay were certified for eight of the projects in the amount of ₱7,816,000. 65 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
To be clear, the nineteen (19) projects mentioned in the CoA Memo were listed under "Annex B" 66 thereof entitled "Schedule of Contracted Projects and Financial
Assistance Out ofInvalid Appropriations, CY 2004," all of which had no allotments issued. First and foremost on the list is the construction of the mini-theater
project. A similar CoA memorandum, AOM No. 2004-2667 dated September 6, 2004, which was also ignored by the Ombudsman, contains the same audit results
with regard to the lack of a valid allotment for the project. Thus, absent compliance with this basic requirement, the authorizations made by respondents in relation
to the project were therefore prima facie tainted with illegality, amounting to either manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or, at the very least, to gross inexcusable
negligence. Indeed, it is reasonable to expect that respondents – being the Province’s accountable officers at that time – had knowledge of the procedure on
allotments and appropriations. Knowledge of basic procedure is part and parcel of respondents’ shared fiscal responsibility under Section 305 (l) of RA 7160, viz.:
Section 305. Fundamental Principles.- The financial affairs, transactions, and operations of local government units shall be governed by the following fundamental
principles:
xxxx
(l) Fiscal responsibility shall beshared by all those exercising authority over the financial affairs, transactions, and operations of the local government units; x x x.
Hence, unless the CoA’s findings are substantially rebutted, the allotment’s absence should have roused respondents’ suspicions, as regards the project’s legality,
and, in consequence, prevented them from approving the disbursements therefor. This is especially true for Roman, who, as the Local Chief Executive of the
Province at that time, was primarily charged with the issuance of allotments. 68 As such, he was in the position to know if the allotment requirement had, in the first
place, been complied with, given that it was a pre-requisite before the project could have been contracted.
In addition, the Court observes the same degree of negligence on the part of respondents in seemingly attesting to the project’s 100% completion when such was
not the case. The erroneous certification rendered the disbursements made by the Province suspect as V.F. Construction had still to fulfill its contractual obligations
to the Province and yet were able to receive full payment.
Considering that the illegal diversion of public funds for the mini theafter project would undermine the execution of other projects legitimately supported by proper
allotments, it is quite obvious that undue injury on the part of the Province and its residents would be caused. Likewise, considering that V.F. Construction had
already received full payment for a project that had yet to be completed,it also appears that a private party was given unwarranted benefits by respondents inthe
discharge of their functions (third element).
Thus, with the elements of the crime of Violation of Section 3 (e), RA 3019 herein ostensibly present, the Court hereby holds that the Ombudsman committed
grave abuse of discretion whenit dismissed said charge against respondents.
That the Ombudsman had not, in any manner, mentioned the two (2) CoA AOMs, i.e., AOM Nos. 2005-004-100 (2004) (i.e., the CoA Memo) and 2004-26, in its
ruling leads the Court to believe that it deliberately failed to consider the same. As the Court sees it, these are significant pieces of evidence which should not have
been casually ignored. This stems from a becoming respect which all government agencies should accord to the CoA’s findings. Verily, being the constitutionally-
mandated audit arm of the government, the CoA is vested with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of
public funds and property.69 As held in the case of Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr.:70
[I]t is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially onewhich is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not
only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative
agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave
abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings.71
With the weight accorded to the CoA’s findings, the Ombudsman should have, at the very least, explained its reasons as to why the two (2) CoA AOMs had no
bearing in this case. However, no such explanation was herein made. As such, the Court holds that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in this
respect.
Palpable too is the Ombudsman’s grave abuse of discretion by its misplaced reliance on the Arias doctrine.1âwphi1
The factual circumstances which led to the Court’s ruling in Arias were such that there was nothing else in the documents presented before the head of office
therein that would haverequired the detailed examination of each paper or document, viz.:
Page 27 of 33
We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records, inspected documents, received procedures, and questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor
for a fairly-sized office could personally do all these things in all vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would be asking for the impossible. All heads of
offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. If a
department secretary entertains important visitors, the auditor isnot ordinarily expected to call the restaurant aboutthe amount of the bill, question each guest
whether he was present at the luncheon, inquire whether the correct amount of food was served, and otherwise personally look into the reimbursement voucher’s
accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency. There has to be some added reason why he should examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even small
government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume ofpapers that must be signed. x x x. 72 (Emphasis supplied)
Simply put, when a matter is irregular on the document’s face, so much so that a detailed examination becomes warranted, the Arias doctrine is unavailing.
Here, it cannot be denied that the absence of an allotment for the project already rendered all related documents/transactions irregular on their face. By this fact
alone, respondents ought to have known that something was amiss. To echo the CoA Memo, Section 321 of RA 7160 provides, among others, that "[n]o ordinance
providing for a supplemental budget shall be enacted, except when supported by funds actually availableas certified by the local treasurer or by new revenue
sources." Section 8, Chapter 3 of the Manual on the NGAS for LGUs, Volume I further defines an "[a]llotment [as] the authorizationissued by the Local Chief
Executive (LCE) to a department/office of the LGU, which allows it to incur obligations, for specified amounts, within the appropriation ordinance." Since the
mini-theater project was an appropriation made in a supplemental budget, then there should have been funds certified to be actually available for such appropriation
to even be made. However, as the CoA found, no such funds were certified as available. Likewise, the project had no supporting allotment, which means thatthere
was basically no authority for the provincial officials, i.e., respondents, to even incur the obligations under the V.F. Construction contract, much morefor them to
disburse the funds in connection therewith. Section 344 of RA 7160 provides:
Section 344. Certification on, and Approval of, Vouchers.- No money shall be disbursed unless the local budget officer certifies to the existence of appropriation
that has been legally made for the purpose, the local accountant has obligated said appropriation, and the local treasurer certifies to the availability of funds for the
purpose. x x x.
xxxx
With these apparent irregularities, it is quite perplexing how the Ombudsman could have applied the Arias doctrine in support of its ruling, especially with respect
to the charge of Violation of Section 3 (e), RA 3019. Thus, by patently misapplying existing jurisprudence, the Court finds that the Ombudsman also committed a
grave abuse of discretion on this score and its ruling, in these aspects, must bereversed and set aside. In fine, the Ombudsman is ordered to file in the proper court
the necessary Information against respondents for violating Section 3 (e), RA 3019.
That being said, the Court proceeds to discuss the other charges contained in Garcia’s petition. III.
As earlier stated, Garcia, in his petition, also seeks that respondents be indicted for the crimes of Technical Malversation, and Malversation of Public Funds through
Falsification of Public Documents. However, unlike the charge for the crime of Violation of Section 3 (e), RA 3019, the Court is unable to render the same
disposition.
First, while Garcia insists upon the sufficiency of his evidence to indict respondents for Technical Malversation, the Court cannot pass upon this issue, considering
that the Complaint-Affidavit filed before the Ombudsman originally charged respondents not with Technical Malversation under Article 220 73 of the RPC, but with
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents, defined and penalized under Article 217, 74 in relation to Article 17175 of the RPC, a
complex crime.76 It bears stressing that the elements of Malversation of Public Funds are distinctly different from those of Technical Malversation. In the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds, the offender misappropriates public funds for his own personal useor allows any other person to take such public funds for the
latter’s personal use. On the other hand, in Technical Malversation, the public officer applies public funds under his administration not for his or another’s personal
use, but to a public use other than that for which the fund was appropriated by law or ordinance.77 Technical Malversation does not include, or is not necessarily
included in the crime of Malversation of Public Funds.78
Since the acts supposedly committed by respondents constituting the crime of Technical Malversation were not alleged in the Complaint Affidavit and the crime for
which respondents raised their respective defenses was not Technical Malversation, the petition must perforce be denied on this score. Otherwise, the Court would
be sanctioning a violation of respondents’ constitutionally-guaranteed right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them, so as to deny
them a reasonable opportunity to suitably prepare their defense. 79
Finally, with respect to the chargeof Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents, the Court observes that there lies no evidence which
would give a prima facieindication that the funds disbursed for the project were misappropriated for any personal use. The CoA Memo shows that the Province’s
funds were used for a public purpose, i.e., the mini-theater project, albeit without any allotment issued therefor. Garcia also fails to convince the Court that the
Province’s funds were diverted to some personal purpose. Failing in which, the Court cannot pronounce that the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing such charge.
As it stands, Garcia’s petition is granted only in part as respondents should be indicted for the lone crime of Violation of Section 3 (e), RA 3019 for the reasons
above-discussed. It must, however, be clarified that the dismissal of the charge of Technical Malversation is without prejudice to its proper re-filing unless barred
by prescription, considering that such dismissal was based merely on procedural grounds and is not, in any way, tantamount to an acquittal. WHEREFORE, the
petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Resolution dated May 30, 2006 and the Order dated October 9, 2009 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-L-C-05-0084-
A, insofar as they dismissed the criminal charge against respondents Leonardo B. Roman, Romeo L. Mendiola, Pastor P. Vichuaco, Aurora J. Tiambeng, and
Numeriano G. Medina (respondents), for Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents, are AFFIRMED. However, the said Resolution
and Order, insofar as they dismissed the criminal charge against respondents for violation of Section 3 (e), Republic Act No. (RA) 3019 or the "Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act" are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Ombudsman is ORDERED to file in the proper court the necessary Information for violation of
Page 28 of 33
Section 3 (e), RA 3019 against respondents. Finally, for reasons herein discussed, the criminal charge against respondents for Technical Malversation is
DISMISSED, without prejudice to its proper re-filing.
SO ORDERED.
Ombudsman; The present Constitution and Republic Act (RA) No. 6770, otherwise known as the “Ombudsman Act of 1989,” have endowed the Office of the
Ombudsman with wide latitude, in the exercise of its investigatory and prosecutorial powers, to pass upon criminal complaints involving public officials and
employees.—The present Constitution and RA 6770, otherwise known as the “Ombudsman Act of 1989,” have endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with wide
latitude, in the exercise of its investigatory and prosecutorial powers, to pass upon criminal complaints involving public officials and employees. Hence, as a
general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman’s findings and respects the initiative and independence inherent in its office, which “beholden to no
one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service.”
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, exists when the facts are sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof.—Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a
criminal information, exists when the facts are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably
guilty thereof. To engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and to determine if the suspect is probably guilty of the same, the elements of
the crime charged should, in all reasonable likelihood, be present. This is based on the principle that every crime is defined by its elements, without which there
should be, at the most, no criminal offense.
Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Elements of Violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act (RA) No. 3019.—The elements of the crime of Violation
of Section 3(e), RA 3019 are as follows: (a) the offender must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions; (b) he must have acted
with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (c) his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or
gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
Administrative Agencies; Commission on Audit; Being the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government, the Commission on Audit (CoA) is vested with
broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property.—That the Ombudsman had not, in
any manner, mentioned the two (2) CoA AOMs, i.e., AOM Nos. 2005-004-100 (2004) (i.e., the CoA Memo) and 2004-26, in its ruling leads the Court to believe
that it deliberately failed to consider the same. As the Court sees it, these are significant pieces of evidence which should not have been casually ignored. This
stems from a becoming respect which all government agencies should accord to the CoA’s findings. Verily, being the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the
government, the CoA is vested with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property.
As held in the case of Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1 (2013): [I]t is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities,
especially one which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise
in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not
tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings.
Criminal Law; Technical Malversation; Technical Malversation does not include, or is not necessarily included in the crime of Malversation of Public Funds.—
While Garcia insists upon the sufficiency of his evidence to indict respondents for Technical Malversation, the Court cannot pass upon this issue, considering that
the Complaint-Affidavit filed before the Ombudsman originally charged respondents not with Technical Malversation under Article 220 of the RPC, but with
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents, defined and penalized under Article 217, in relation to Article 171 of the RPC, a complex
crime. It bears stressing that the elements of Malversation of Public Funds are distinctly different from those of Technical Malversation. In the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds, the offender misappropriates public funds for his own personal use or allows any other person to take such public funds for the
latter’s personal use. On the other hand, in Technical Malversation, the public officer applies public funds under his administration not for his or another’s personal
use, but to a public use other than that for which the fund was appropriated by law or ordinance. Technical Malversation does not include, or is not necessarily
included in the crime of Malversation of Public Funds.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. CABEROY, G.R. NO. 188066, 22 OCTOBER 2014

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 188066 October 22, 2014
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,

vs.
CYNTHIA E. CABEROY, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Page 29 of 33
This is a petition for review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Decision2 dated November 21, 2008 and Resolution3 dated May 14, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03498, which reversed and set aside the Consolidated Decision 4 dated June 30, 2005 of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas
(Ombudsman) and absolved respondent Cynthia E. Caberoy (Caberoy) of any administrative liability.
Caberoy is the principal of Ramon Avanceña National High School (RANHS) in Arevalo, Iloilo City. She was charged with Oppression and Violation of Section
3(e) and (f) ofRepublic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 or the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act"by Angeles O. Tuares (Tuares) for allegedly withholding her salary for
the month of June 2002. The case was docketed as OMB-V-A-03-0239-E. Saidcase was consolidated with OMB-V-A-03-0572-I, which was a complaint filed by
Tuares against Ida B. Endonila, Erlinda G. Gencaya, Clarissa G. Zamora and Victoria T. Calunsod.
Caberoy denied the charge against her, alleging, among others, that the payrolls of June 1 to15, 2002 and June16 to 30, 2002 show that Tuares received her salary
as shown by her signatures on lines no. 11 of the payrolls.5
In the Consolidated Decision dated June 30, 2005 rendered by the Ombudsman, Caberoy was found guilty of Oppression and was meted out the penalty of
dismissal from service. The dispositive portion of the consolidated decision provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent CYNTHIA E. CABEROY, Principal II, Ramon Avanceña National High School, (RANHS), Arevalo, Iloilo City,
is hereby found GUILTY of OPPRESSION and is hereby meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE WITH CANCELLATION OF CIVIL
SERVICE ELIGIBILITY, FORFEITURE OFEARNED LEAVECREDITS AND RETIREMENT BENEFITS, AND DISQUALIFICATION FROM
REEMPLOYMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE. On the other hand, respondents IDA B. ENDONILA, Schools Division Superintendent, ERLINDA G.
GENCAYA, Asst. Schools Division Superintendent, CLARISSA G. ZAMORA, Administrative Officer III, all three of the Division of Iloilo City, DepEd Region
VI, Iloilo City, and VICTORIA T. CALUNSOD, Officer-In-Charge/Secondary School Head Teacher III, Ramon Avanceña National High School, (RANHS)
Arevalo, Iloilo City, are found NOT GUILTYof the same offense and/or violating Sec. 3 (f) of R.A. 3019and thus these cases are considered DISMISSED as far as
they are concerned. Furthermore, on the administrative aspect of the counter-allegation of Perjury against herein complainant ANGELES O. TUARES, Ramon
Avanceña National High School, Arevalo, Iloilo City, the same is likewise DISMISSED, for lack of merit.
SO DECIDED.6
Caberoy filed a joint motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the Ombudsman in its Order dated September 19, 2006. 7
The Ombudsman found that Tuares was not paid any amount in June 2002 because of her failure to submit her clearance and Performance Appraisal Sheet for
Teachers (PAST), while the other teachers received their salaries for the same month. 8 The Ombudsman concluded that Tuares was "singled out by respondent
Caberoy as the only one who did not receive any amount from the school on June 2002 because, as established earlier, the former failed to submit her clearance and
PAST."9 The Ombudsman also took into consideration several infractions previously committed by Caberoy, which allegedly displayed her
"notoriousundesirability as a government officer for withholding teachers’ salaries without authority." 10 According to the Ombudsman, Caberoy could not honestly
claim that she had not been forewarned by the Ombudsman of the grave consequences of her repeated illegal act. 11 Caberoy filed a petition for certiorariwith the
CA, seeking the reversal of her dismissal from service, and in the assailed Decision dated November 21, 2008, the CA granted Caberoy’s petition. The dispositive
portion of the CA decision states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The consolidated decision dated June 30, 2005, of the respondent Ombudsman is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and another judgment is hereby rendered ABSOLVING the petitioner of any liability, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.12
The Ombudsman filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in the assailed Resolution dated May 14, 2009.
In clearing Caberoy from the charge against her, the CA found that no undue injury was caused to Tuares since she received her June 2002 salary. According to the
CA, since Caberoy was charged with Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and the element of undue injury is absent in this case, Caberoy cannot be held
liable for the offense.13 The CA also ruled that Caberoy’s "refusal" to release Tuares’ salary was justified and the element of "failure to so act x x x for the purpose
of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage in favor of an interestedparty, or
[discrimination] against another" under Section 3(f) of R.A. No. 3019, is likewise absent. 14 Finally, the CA found that the acts of Caberoy are not constitutive of
oppression.15
Lastly, the CA ruled that the Ombudsman’s findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidencesince Caberoy’s act of withholding Tuares’ salaries
was clearly justified.16 Hence, the present petition, based on the ground that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS’ REVERSAL OF THE PETITIONER OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN’S DECISION FINDING [CABEROY]
ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR OPPRESSION IS AN ERROR OF LAW CONSIDERING THAT ITS FINDINGS IS SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTAN[T]IAL EVIDENCE.17
The Ombudsman argues that it was error for the CA to exonerate Caberoy on the reasons that the withholding of Tuares’ salary was justified and that there was no
undue injury onher part as she later received her salary. The Ombudsman contends that Caberoy was found guilty of Oppression, which is an administrative offense
under the Civil Service law, and is distinct from the crime of Violation of R.A. No. 3019, from which she was absolved. According to the Ombudsman, the
quantum of proof in these two offenses (Oppression and Violation ofR.A. No. 3019) is distinct and the records of the case disclose that there is substantial evidence
to support its decision. The Ombudsman also contests the factual findings of the CA that Tuares actually received her salary, stating that in the summary of payrolls
and the checks, Tuares’ name does not appear. Moreover, no evidence was presented by Caberoy to prove that Tuares actually received her salary, other than her
Page 30 of 33
bare allegation. Finally, the Ombudsman states that Caberoy has already been penalized several times for previous misconduct, which displays her propensity to
commit the misdemeanor.18
Ruling of the Court
Initially, it must be stated thatin a petition for review filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Court is limited only to a review of errors of law committed by
the CA, and the Court is not required to review all over again the evidence presented before the Ombudsman.19 The rule, nevertheless, admits of exceptions, such as
when the findings of the CA and the Ombudsman are conflicting, 20 which is what occurred in the present case. Hence, the Court must now look into the matter of
whether the CA committed a reversible error when it reversed the findings and conclusions of the Ombudsman.
Tuares charged Caberoy in OMB-V-A-03-0239-E with both Oppression and Violation of Section 3(e)(f) of R.A. No. 3019. The Ombudsman, however, found
Caberoy guilty only of Oppression.
Oppression is an administrative offense21 penalized under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, 22 which provides:
Section 52. Classification of Offenses.—Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less grave or light, depending on their
gravity or depravity and effects on the government service.
A. The following are grave offenses with their corresponding penalties:
xxxx
14. Oppression.
1st Offense – Suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year;
2nd Offense – Dismissal.
xxxx
Oppression is also known as grave abuse of authority, which is a misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflict upon
any person any bodily harm, imprisonment or other injury. It is an act ofcruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority. 23 To be held administratively liable for
Oppression or Grave Abuse of Authority, there must be substantial evidence presented proving the complainant’s allegations. 24 Substantial evidence is that amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept asadequate to support a conclusion. 25 In this case, the CA correctly overturned the Ombudsman’s
findings and conclusions, and explained the reasonsfor exculpating Caberoy, as follows:
Evidently, from the foregoing disquisitions, respondent Ombudsman contradicted itself when it found and held thatpetitioner was guilty of "oppression" for not
paying the private respondent her June 2002 salary, because as a matter of fact she has been paidalbeit delayed. Such payment is clearly and indubitably established
from the table where it was shown that private respondent received on July 17 and 25, 2002, her June 2002 salary in the amounts of ₱4,613.80 and ₱4,612.00,
respectively.
xxxx
The above narration of facts do not show that petitioner committed acts constitutive of "oppression." Assuming petitioner’s action is erroneous or overly zealous,
this certainly does not merit the most severe penalty of dismissal from government service. Apparently, the petitioner is only protecting herself from any future,
adverse consequences if she allows the disbursement of public funds without the appropriate supporting documents. "It is a well-known fact that in the government
service an employee must submit his daily time record duly accomplished and approved before one cancollect his salary."
xxxx
Finally, on the contention that the findings and conclusions of the respondent Ombudsman is considered conclusive and deserve respect and finality is true only
when the same is based on substantial evidence. As discussed above, the action taken by petitioner in withholding the salaries of private respondent was clearly
justified. It was a measure taken by a superior against a subordinate who ignored the basic tenets of law by not submitting the required documents to support
payment of her salary and proportional vacation pay for the aforesaid period. x x x.
x x x [I]n this case before us, the records is bereft of substantial evidence to support respondent Ombudsman’s findings and conclusion that petitioner committed
oppressive acts against private respondent and violated Sections 3(e) and (f) of RA 3019. On the contrary and as earlier discussed, respondent Ombudsman found
and concluded that private respondent was paid her June salaryalbeit late. Hence, it cannot be gainsaid that the act of respondent Ombudsman in concluding that
petitioner is guilty as charged despite absence of substantial evidence to support the same is totally unfounded and is therefore, tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack or excess of discretion. x x x.26 (Citations omitted)
Page 31 of 33
The complaint filed by Tuares against Caberoy charged the latter with "manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence for having ordered the
payroll clerk of [RANHS] to cause the exclusion of [her] name in the payroll of June 2002 x x x and [in spite of] the fact that [she has already] rendered full service
during said days x x x without any justifiable reason and without due process and without any authority under the law." 27 A perusal of Tuares’ allegations shows
that her claim pertains to the alleged withholding of her salary for the month of June 2002. Records show, however, that Tuares was actually paid her salary for the
month of June 2002. Thus, the vouchers for the payroll period of June 1 to 15, 2002 28 and June 16 to 30, 200229 showed Tuares’ name on line 11 and her signature
acknowledging receipt of her salary for such period. This was, in fact, confirmed in the 2002 salary payrolls submitted by the RANHS Office of the Auditor and
summarized by the Ombudsman,30 to wit:
Period Voucher No. Date of Check Tuares’ No. in the Payroll Amount Received
June (Proportional pay & salary) 101-02-6-161 June 25, 2002 Name not Found Name not Found
June (Proportional pay) 101-02-6-164 June 28, 2002 Name not Found Name not Found
June (Proportional pay) PS-02-7-182 July 4, 2002 Name not Found Name not Found
June (Proportional pay & salary) PS-02-7-195 July 17, 2002 11 ₱4,613.80
June (Proportional pay) PS-02-7-196 July 19, 2002 Name not Found Name not Found
June PS-02-7-200 July 25, 2002 11 ₱4,612.00
July 101-02-8-231 August 19, 2002 16 ₱4,694.72
1âwphi1
The amounts received and signed for by Tuares correspond essentially to the other amounts she received as salaryfor the other periods in 2002. On this score,
entries in the payroll, being entries in the course of business, enjoy the presumption of regularity under Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,31 and absent any
evidence presented by Tuares showing the contrary, good faith must be presumed in the preparation and signing of such payrolls.32
Even assuming, as the Ombudsman asserted, that Tuares received her June 2002 salary only on July 2002, the same does not constitute Oppression or Grave Abuse
of Authority. The delay in the release of Tuares’ salary hardly qualifies as an "act of crueltyor severity or excessive use of authority," especially when she
contributed to the cause of the delay, that is, she submitted her Form 48 (Daily Time Record) for June 2002 only on July 11, 2002.33
Neither can the Court subscribe to the Ombudsman’s conclusion that Tuares was singled out by Caberoy.According to the Ombudsman:
In other words, as far as these fortunate teachers are concerned, checks dated June 25 and 28, 2002 and July 04 and 19, 2002 actually and in paper covered their
June 2002 salary; checks dated July 17 and 19, 2002 actually and in paper covered their July 2002 salary; x x x.
Whereas on the part of complainant Tuares, this is what really happened: The checks dated July 17 and 25, 2002 were technically for services rendered in June
2002 ascorrected by COA but the amounts corresponding to complainant’s salaryfor the whole month of June 2002 was actually received by her only in July 2002
and that in effect means that she did not really receive any amount from the school in June 2002; x x x.
Viewed from the discussion above, it is therefore crystal clear that complainant was singled out by respondent Caberoy as the only one who did not receive any
amount from the school on June 2002 because, as established earlier, the former failed to submit her clearance and PAST. 34
It must be stressed that like other grave offenses classified under the Civil Service laws, bad faith must attend the act complained of. Bad faith connotes a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of
fraud.35 There must be evidence, independent of the fact of such delay, which will lead to the inevitable conclusion that it was for the purpose of singling out
Tuares. The Court has consistently upheld the principle that in administrative cases, to be disciplined for grave misconduct or any grave offense, the evidence
against the respondent should be competent and must be derived from direct knowledge. 36 "Reliance on mere allegations, conjectures and suppositions will leave an
administrative complaint with no leg to stand on."37 Except for the Ombudsman’s deduction based on the dates of issuance of the vouchers and the checks as shown
in the payroll, the records of thiscase are bereft of evidence that will support its view that the delay in the release of Tuares’ salary indicated that she was singled
out. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the CA, "[t]he certifications issued by Acting Book keeper Hayde S. Momblan will show that it was not only [Tuares]
who was not included in the June 2002 payrolls; there were other teachers who were not included because they failed to submit the required year-end clearance. x x
x Evidently, [Tuares] was not singled out or discriminated against as insisted by her and respondent Ombudsman."38
All told, the Court finds that the CA did not commit a reversible error in exonerating Caberoy from the charge against her.
Page 32 of 33
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; In a petition for review filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court
(SC) is limited only to a review of errors of law committed by the Court of Appeals (CA), and the Court is not required to review all over again the evidence
presented before the Ombudsman. The rule, nevertheless, admits of exceptions, such as when the findings of the CA and the Ombudsman are conflicting.—
Initially, it must be stated that in a petition for review filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Court is limited only to a review of errors of law committed by
the CA, and the Court is not required to review all over again the evidence presented before the Ombudsman. The rule, nevertheless, admits of exceptions, such as
when the findings of the CA and the Ombudsman are conflicting, which is what occurred in the present case. Hence, the Court must now look into the matter of
whether the CA committed a reversible error when it reversed the findings and conclusions of the Ombudsman.
Administrative Law; Oppression; Abuse of Authority; Words and Phrases; Oppression is also known as grave abuse of authority, which is a misdemeanor
committed by a public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflict upon any person any bodily harm, imprisonment or other injury.—Oppression is
also known as grave abuse of authority, which is a misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflict upon any person
any bodily harm, imprisonment or other injury. It is an act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority. To be held administratively liable for Oppression or
Grave Abuse of Authority, there must be substantial evidence presented proving the complainant’s allegations. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Entries in the Course of Business; Presumption of Regularity; Entries in the payroll, being entries in the course of business, enjoy the
presumption of regularity under Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.—The amounts received and signed for by Tuares correspond essentially to the other
amounts she received as salary for the other periods in 2002. On this score, entries in the payroll, being entries in the course of business, enjoy the presumption of
regularity under Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, and absent any evidence presented by Tuares showing the contrary, good faith must be presumed in the
preparation and signing of such payrolls. Even assuming, as the Ombudsman asserted, that Tuares received her June 2002 salary only on July 2002, the same does
not constitute Oppression or Grave Abuse of Authority. The delay in the release of Tuares’ salary hardly qualifies as an “act of cruelty or severity or excessive use
of authority,” especially when she contributed to the cause of the delay, that is, she submitted her Form 48 (Daily Time Record) for June 2002 only on July 11,
2002.
Administrative Cases; Grave Misconduct; The Supreme Court (SC) has consistently upheld the principle that in administrative cases, to be disciplined for grave
misconduct or any grave offense, the evidence against the respondent should be competent and must be derived from direct knowledge.—It must be stressed that
like other grave offenses classified under the Civil Service laws, bad faith must attend the act complained of. Bad faith connotes a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. There must be
evidence, independent of the fact of such delay, which will lead to the inevitable conclusion that it was for the purpose of singling out Tuares. The Court has
consistently upheld the principle that in administrative cases, to be disciplined for grave misconduct or any grave offense, the evidence against the respondent
should be competent and must be derived from direct knowledge. “Reliance on mere allegations, conjectures and suppositions will leave an administrative
complaint with no leg to stand on.” Except for the Ombudsman’s deduction based on the dates of issuance of the vouchers and the checks as shown in the payroll,
the records of this case are bereft of evidence that will support its view that the delay in the release of Tuares’ salary indicated that she was singled out. Moreover,
as correctly pointed out by the CA, “[t]he certifications issued by Acting Bookkeeper Hayde S. Momblan will show that it was not only [Tuares] who was not
included in the June 2002 payrolls; there were other teachers who were not included because they failed to submit the required year-end clearance. x x x Evidently,
[Tuares] was not singled out or discriminated against as insisted by her and respondent Ombudsman.”
Page 33 of 33

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GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS | SYLLABUS PART V

V. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT CORRUPT AND PRACTICE ACT)

5. Garcia, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 197567, 19 November 2014

COMELEC VS. PADILLA, G.R. NO. 151992, 18 SEPTEMBER 2002

"x x x. As said in Lowe vs. Phelps (14 Bush, 642):

AMBIL, JR. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 175457, 06 JUNE 2011

RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., G.R. No. 175457

SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR., G.R. No. 175482

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Please be guided accordingly.

Very truly yours,

G.R. No. 175457; July 6, 2011

G.R. No. 175482

Republic of the Philippines

30368 880932 P 500,000.00

30359 880934 500,000.00

30324 880935 500,000.00

30325 8080936 500,000.00

30322 8080937 500,000.00

30356 8080938 500,000.00

30364 8080939 500,000.00

30360 8080940 500,000.00

30365 8080941 500,000.00

30323 880943 500,000.00

30358 880942 500,000.00

30362 880943 500,000.00

30366 880943 500,000.00

30357 880946 500,000.00

30361 880947 500,000.00

30363 880948 500,000.00

The Court’s Ruling

PEOPLE VS. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NOS. 153952-71, 23 AUGUST 2010

Republic of the Philippines

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 153952-71

THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (4THDiv.) and HENRY Promulgated:

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Practices Act, as amended, were not established beyond reasonable doubt.

following stipulation of facts:

3. That the awardees are the following:

1. Ermelina Abella 11. Corazon Cansas

9. That the incident displaced about 60 market vendors;

said Mayor. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

The Petition has no merit.

We are not persuaded.

People from the aforementioned general rule of procedure.

The Petition at bar must also be dismissed on substantive grounds.

can assign errors against it.[6]

the following excerpts therefrom:

The instant Demurrer to Evidence is impressed with merit.

For your strict implementation and compliance.

Section 22. Corporate Powers. x x x

bad faith, or with gross inexcusable negligence.

In People v. Sandiganbayan,[11] we defined grave abuse of discretion as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

GARCIA, JR. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 197567, 19 NOVEMBER 2014

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 197567 November 19, 2014

GOVERNOR ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, JR., Petitioner,

The essential allegations in the Complaint-Affidavit are as follows:

The Ombudsman Ruling

The Issue Before the Court

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.