CANON 17-18 ADDITIONAL

A.C. No. 11828, November 22, 2017

SPOUSES VICENTE AND PRECYWINDA GIMENA, Complainants, v. ATTY. JOJO S. VIJIGA, Respondent.

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

The relationship between lawyers and clients is a professional relationship as well as a fiduciary and confidential one. One
consequence of such professional relationship is the obligation of a lawyer to efficiently manage his cases and update his
clients of the status of the same.

ANTECEDENTS

This administrative case stems from the complaint brought by the Spouses Vicente and Precywinda Gimena (complainants),
against Atty. Jojo S. Vijiga (respondent) for the latter's failure to file the appellants' brief in their behalf, resulting in the
dismissal of their appeal in the Court of Appeals (CA).

In their complaint, Spouses Gimena alleged that they hired the respondent to represent them in a civil case for nullity of
foreclosure proceedings and voidance of loan documents filed against Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, involving eight
parcels of land (subject properties), docketed as Civil Case No. C-21053, assigned to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City, Branch 126.

After trial on the merits, the RTC dismissed the action in its Decision dated June 6, 2011.

Aggrieved by the adverse decision, the complainants then brought the case to the appellate court, docketed as CA G.R. CV
No. 98271.1

On June 7, 2012, the CA issued a notice requiring complainants, (appellants therein), to file the appellants' brief in
accordance with Sec. 7, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court.

Respondent failed to file the brief. As a result, the CA issued a Resolution2 dated September 21, 2012.

On October 11, 2012, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the reconsideration of the September 21, 2012
Resolution, citing illness and the damage to his law office due to monsoon rains, as reasons for his failure to file the
appellants' brief.3

The CA granted the motion in its Resolution dated January 3, 2013, and reinstated complainants' appeal. Complainants were
then given a period of fifteen (15) days within which to file the required brief.

Respondent failed to file the appellants' brief within the given period. Hence, the CA issued a Resolution4 on March 15, 2013
dismissing the appeal. Complainants alleged that the March 15, 2013 Resolution became final and executory and was
entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment of the CA on April 27, 2013.

Complainants alleged that throughout the proceedings in the CA, respondent did not apprise them of the status of their case.
They were thus surprised when a bulldozer suddenly entered their properties. Complainants thereafter inquired on the status
of their case, and it was then that they discovered that their appeal was dismissed.5

Complainants alleged that respondent violated Canon 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a
lawyer. They claimed that respondent's lapse is not excusable and is tantamount to gross ignorance, neligence and
dereliction of duty.

For his part, respondent denied that he abandoned and neglegted complainants' appeal. He averred that he was able to talk
to complainant Vicente, via telephone, after the CA dismissed the appeal in its Resolution dated September 21, 2012.
Complainant Vicente purportedly told respondent not to pursue the appeal considering that the subject properties are already
in the possession of the bank.6

FINDINGS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP)

The dispute was set for mandatory conference on August 20, 2014. Only complainants and their counsel appeared during the
conference, despite the notice being received by respondent.7 Respondent filed an Ex-Parte and Urgent Motion to Reset the
Scheduled Hearing8 to October 1, 2014. Respondent again failed to appear, and instead, filed another motion9 to reset the
hearing to November 5, 2014. Respondent reasoned that he was set to attend hearings on the scheduled date and time.

Investigating Commissioner Arsenio Adriano recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6)
months.

The IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution10 on June 6, 2015, adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner.
RESOLUTION NO. XXI-2015-408
CBD Case No. 14-4217
Sps. Vicente and Precywinda Gimena vs. Atty. Jojo S. Vijiga

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", finding the
recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws. Thus, Respondent Atty. Jojo S. Vijiga is
hereby found guilty of violation of Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for six (6) months.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration11 on January 4, 2016. In a Resolution12 dated January 27, 2017, the Board of
Governors denied respondent's motion for reconsideration.
RESOLUTION NO. XXII-2017-788
CBD Case No. 14-4217
Sps. Vicente and Precywinda Gimena vs. Atty. Jojo S. Vijiga

RESOLVED to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration there being no new reason and/or new argument adduced to reverse the
previous findings and decision of the Board of Governors.
ISSUE OF THE CASE

Did the respondent violate his ethical duties as a member of the Bar in his dealings with the complainants?

RULING OF THE COURT

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP. The Court finds that the suspension of respondent from the practice
of law is proper.

The Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) is clear. A lawyer owes his client competent and zealous legal representation.
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxxx

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to
the client's request for information.
Respondent's failure to submit the appellants' brief and update his clients, complainants herein, of the status of their appeal
falls short of the ethical requirements set forth under the CPR.

A lawyer is not required to represent anyone who consults him on legal matters.13 Neither is an acceptance of a client or
case, a guarantee of victory. However, being a service-oriented occupation, lawyers are expected to observe diligence and
exhibit professional behavior in all their dealings with their clients. Lawyers should be mindful of the trust and confidence,
not to mention the time and money, reposed in them by their clients.

When a lawyer agrees to act as a counsel, he guarantees that he will exercise that reasonable degree of care and skill
demanded by the character of the business he undertakes to do, to protect the clients' interests and take all steps or do all
acts necessary therefor.14

The necessity and repercussions of non-submission of an appellant's brief are provided for in the Rules of Court, to wit:
RULE 44
ORDINARY APPEALED CASES

xxxx

Sec. 7. Appellants brief.

It shall be the duty of the appellant to file with the court, within forty-five (45) days from receipt of the notice
of the clerk that all the evidence, oral and documentary, are attached to the record, seven (7) copies of his legibly
typewritten, mimeographed or printed brief, with proof of service of two (2) copies thereof upon the appellee.
 RULE 50
DISMISSAL OF APPEAL

Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.

An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following
grounds:
xxxx

(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the
time provided by these Rules; x x x (Emphasis supplied)
As a lawyer, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable of the procedural rules in appellate practice. He is presumed to
know that dismissal is an inevitable result from failure to file the requisite brief within the period stated in the Rules of Court.
In this case, the fact that the appeal was twice dismissed further highlights respondent's indifference to his client's cause.
Interestingly, respondent failed to offer any explanation as to why he failed to submit the appellants' brief within the 45-day
period from his receipt of the notice to file the same, resulting to the dismissal of the appeal for the first time. To the mind of
this Court, such failure is an unequivocal indication of his guilt in the administrative charge. Indeed, failure to file the
required pleadings is per se a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as cited above.15

His failure to file the appellants' brief, despite the CA's grant of leniency in reconsidering its initial dismissal of the appeal
further compounds respondent's inadequacies. In this case, respondent's neglect of his professional duties led to the loss of
complainants' properties and has left them bereft of legal remedies. They lost their case not because of merits but because of
technicalities, specifically the respondent's failure to file the required pleadings. Certainly, the situation in the case at bar, is
one such evil that the CPR intended to avoid.

Worse, respondent's failure to inform complainants of the unfortunate fate of their appeal further amplifies his lack of
competence and diligence. As an officer of the court, it was respondent's duty to inform his client of whatever important
information he may have acquired affecting his client's case. The purpose of informing the client is to minimize
misunderstanding and loss of trust and confidence in the attorney. The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on how
the lawyer is defending the client's interests.16

This Court fails to find merit to respondent's claim that complainant Vicente directed him not to pursue the appeal. If that
was true, candor and respect of the courts would have impelled respondent to file a motion to withdraw their appeal. Further,
if indeed it was true that complainants lost interest in pursuing the appeal, they would not have secured the services of
another counsel and file before the CA a motion to set aside the entry of judgment.

Apropos is this Court's ruling in Reynaldo G. Ramirez v. Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo17:

A problem arises whenever agents, entrusted to manage the interests of another, use their authority or power for their
benefit or fail to discharge their duties. In many agencies, there is information assymetry between the principal and the
entrusted agent. That is, there are facts and events that the agent must attend to that may not be known by the principal.

This information assymetry is even more pronounced in an attorney-client relationship. Lawyers are expected not only to
be familiar with the minute facts of their cases but also to see their relevance in relation to their causes of
action or their defenses. The salience of these facts is not usually patent to the client. It can only be seen through
familiarity with the relevant legal provisions that are invoked with their jurisprudential interpretations. More so with the
intricacies of the legal procedure. It is the lawyer that receives the notices and must decide the mode of appeal to protect the
interest of his or her client.

Thus, the relationship between a lawyer and her client is regarded as highly fiduciary. Between the lawyer and the client,
it is the lawyer that has the better knowledge of facts, events, and remedies. While it is true that the client chooses
which lawyer to engage, he or she usually does so on the basis of reputation. It is only upon actual engagement that the
client discovers the level of diligence, competence, and accountability of the counsel that he or she chooses. In some cases,
such as this one, the discovery comes too late. Between the lawyer and the client, therefore, it is the lawyer that should bear
the full costs of indifference or negligence.18 (Emphasis supplied)
True, for respondent's failure to protect the interest of complainants, respondent indeed violated Canon 17 and Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent is reminded that the practice of law is a special privilege bestowed only
upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally.

The penalty to be meted to an erring lawyer rests on sound judicial discretion. In cases of similar nature, this Court imposed
penalties ranging from a reprimand to suspension of three months or six months, and even disbarment in aggravated
cases.19 In Rene B. Hermano v. Atty. Igmedio S. Prado, Jr.20, this Court suspended Atty. Prado from the practice of law for
six months for his failure to file an appellant's brief that could have resulted to the dismissal of the case had it not been for
the intervention of another lawyer. In Felicisima .Mendoza Vda. De Robosa v. Mendoza and Navarro, Jr.21, respondent therein
was suspended for six months for a similar infraction. Also, in Cesar Talento, et al. v. Atty. Agustin F. Paneda22, one year of
suspension from the practice of law was imposed to therein respondent for his failure to file the appeal brief for his client and
for failure to return the money paid for legal services that were not performed. On the other hand, in Fidela Vda. De Enriques
v. Atty. Manuel G. San Jose23, therein respondent's negligence in handling his client's cause merited a suspension of six
months from the practice of law.
In this case, the fact that the complaining parties now stand to lose eight parcels of land which they claim to own due to
respondent's failure to perform his professional and ethical duties, We deemed justified the suspension of respondent from
the practice of law for six months.

In affirming the recommendation of the IBP, this Court is mindful of its earlier ruling in Ofelia R. Somosot v. Atty. Gerardo F.
Lara24:
The general public must know that the legal profession is a closely regulated profession where transgressions merit swift but
commensurate penalties; it is a profession that they can trust because we guard our ranks and our standards well. The Bar
must sit up and take notice of what happened in this case to be able to guard against any repetition of the respondent's
transgressions, particularly his failure to report the developments of an ongoing case to his clients. Unless the Bar takes a
proactive stance, we cannot really blame members of the public who are not very well disposed towards, and who may even
distrust, the legal profession after hearing experiences similar to what the complainant suffered. The administration of justice
is served well when we demonstrate that effective remedies exist to address the injustice and inequities that may result from
transgressions by those acting in the dispensation of justice process.25
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Jojo S. Vijiga is SUSPENDED FOR SIX (6) MONTHS from the
practice of law with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He
is ADMONISHED to exercise greater care and diligence in the performance of his duties.

This Decision shall take effect immediately upon receipt of Atty. Jojo S. Vijiga of a copy of this Decision. He shall inform this
Court and the Office of the Bar Confidant in writing of the date he received a copy of this Decision. Copies of this Decision
shall be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's personal record, and the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines. The Office of the Court Administrator is directed to circulate copies of this Decision to all courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.

CANON 20

VALERIANA U. DALISAY, A.C. No. 5655

Complainant,
Present:

PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
-versus- CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, and
GARCIA, JJ.

Promulgated:
ATTY. MELANIO MAURICIO, JR.,
Respondent. January 23, 2006

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
 At bar is a motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated April 22, 2005 finding Atty.
Melanio Batas Mauricio, Jr., respondent, guilty of malpractice and gross misconduct and
imposing upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months.

A brief revisit of facts is imperative, thus:

On October 13, 2001, Valeriana U. Dalisay, complainant, engaged respondents services as

counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044, entitled Lucio De Guzman, etc., complainants, v. Dalisay U.
Valeriana, respondent, pending before the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1, Binangonan, Rizal.
Notwithstanding his receipt of documents and attorneys fees in the total amount of P56,000.00
from complainant, respondent never rendered legal services for her. As a result, she terminated
the attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her money and documents, but
respondent refused.

On January 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, found that for the amount of P56,000.00
paid by the complainant x x x, no action had been taken nor any pleadings prepared by the
respondent except his alleged conferences and opinions rendered when complainant
frequented his law office. She recommended that respondent be required to refund the amount
of P56,000.00 to the complainant, and surprisingly, that the complaint be dismissed.

On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-121,
adopting and approving in toto Commissioner Navarros Report and Recommendation.

On April 22, 2005, we rendered the assailed Decision.

Incidentally, upon learning of our Decision, respondent went to the MTC, Branch I,
Binangonan, Rizal to verify the status of Civil Case No. 00-044. There, he learned of the trial
courts Decision dated December 6, 2001 holding that the tax declarations and title submitted by
complainant are not official records of the Municipal Assessor and the Registry of Deed.
Thereupon, respondent filed a Sworn Affidavit Complaint[1] against complainant charging her
with violations of Article 171 [2] and 172,[3] and/or Article 182[4] of the Revised Penal Code. He
alleged that complainant offered tampered evidence.

In this motion for reconsideration, respondent raises the following arguments:

First, complainant did not engage his services as counsel in Civil Case No.
00-044. She hired him for the purpose of filing two new petitions, a petition for
declaration of nullity of title and a petition for review of a decree.

Second, Civil Case No. 00-044 was considered submitted for decision as early
as August 6, 2001, or more than two months prior to October 13, 2001, the date he
was engaged as counsel, hence, he could not have done anything anymore about it.

Third, complainant refused to provide him with documents related to the case,
preventing him from doing his job.

And fourth, complainant offered tampered evidence in Civil Case No. 00-
004, prompting him to file falsification cases against her.

In her opposition to the motion, complainant contends that: (1) respondent violated the
principle of confidentiality between a lawyer and his client when he filed falsification charges
against her; (2) respondent should have returned her money; (3) respondent should have verified
the authenticity of her documents earlier if he really believed that they are falsified; and (4) his
refusal to return her money despite this Courts directive constitutes contempt.

We deny respondents motion for reconsideration.

It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person
who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment. But once he accepts
money from a client, an attorney-client relationship is established, giving rise to the duty of
fidelity to the clients cause.[5] From then on, he is expected to be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and
champion the latters cause with wholehearted devotion.[6]
 Respondent assumed such obligations when he received the amount of P56,000.00 from
complainant and agreed to handle Civil Case No. 00-044. Unfortunately, he had been remiss in
the performance of his duties. As we have ruled earlier, there is nothing in the records to show
that
he (respondent) entered his appearance as counsel of record for complainant in Civil Case
No. 00-044. Neither is there any evidence nor pleading submitted to show that he initiated new
petitions.

With ingenuity, respondent now claims that complainant did not engage his services for
Civil Case No. 00-044 but, instead, she engaged him for the filing of two new petitions. This is
obviously a last-ditch attempt to evade culpability. Respondent knows very well that if he can
successfully disassociate himself as complainants counsel in Civil Case No.00-044, he cannot be
held guilty of any dereliction of duties.

But respondents current assertion came too late in the day. He is already bound by his
previous statements. In his Verified Comment on the Affidavit-Complaint,[7] he categorically
stated that complainant engaged his services in Civil Case No. 00-044, originally handled by Atty.
Oliver Lozano, thus:

4.a. Complainant was referred to the Respondent by Atty. Oliver Lozano.

4.b. The referral intrigued Respondent no end, simply because Atty. Oliver Lozano is
a bright lawyer and is very much capable of handling Civil Case No. 00-044.

4.c. Respondent-out of respect from Atty. Oliver Lozano did not inquire the reason
for the referral. But he was made to understand that he was being referred because Atty.
Oliver Lozano believed that Respondent would be in a better position to prosecute and/or
defend the Complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044.

xxxxxx

5.c. Complainant went to the law office of Respondent on October 13, 2001 and demanded
that he provides her with free legal service.

xxxxxx

5.e. Respondent, however, told Complainant that the case (Civil Case No. 00-044)
would not entitle her to a free legal service and advised her to just re-engage the services of
Atty. Oliver Lozano.

5.f. Undaunted, Complainant asked Respondent to assess her case and how she and her
lawyer should go prosecuting and/or defending her position therein.
 5.g. Honestly believing that Complainant was no longer represented by counsel in
Civil Case No. 00-044 at that time, Respondent gave his professional opinion on the factual
and legal matters surrounding the said case.

5.h. Apparently impressed with the opinion of the Respondent, Complainant became
even more adamant in asking the former to represent her in Civil Case No. 00-044.

5.i. Respondent then told Complainant that she would be charged as a regular client is she
insists in retaining his services.

5.j. It was at this juncture that Complainant asked Respondent about his fees.

5.k. After re-assessing Civil Case No. 00-044, Respondent told Complainant that he
will have to charge her with an acceptance fee of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00), aside form being charged for papers/pleadings that may have to be prepared
and filed in court in connection with the aforesaid case.
xxxxxx

5.n. A few days after, Respondent got a call from Atty. Oliver Lozano. The said Atty.
Oliver Lozano interceded for and in behalf of Complainant and asked that the acceptance fee that
Respondent was charging the Complainant be reduced.

xxxxxx

5.r. Complainant then returned to the office of the Respondent on October 20, 2001. The
latter then informed the former of his conversation with Atty. Oliver Lozano and his (respondents)
decision to reduce the acceptance fee.

5.s. Complainant was very grateful at the time, even shedding a tear or two simply
because Respondent had agreed to handle her case at a greatly reduced acceptance fee.

Statements of similar tenor can also be found in respondents Memorandum[8]filed

with the IBP.

Undoubtedly, respondents present version is a flagrant departure from his previous

pleadings. This cannot be countenanced. A party should decide early what version he is going to
advance. A change of theory in the latter stage of the proceedings is objectionable, not due to the
strict application of procedural rules, but because it is contrary to the rules of fair play, justice
and due process.[9] The present administrative case was resolved by the IBP on the basis of
respondents previous admission that complainant engaged his legal services in Civil Case No.
00-044. He cannot now unbind himself from such admission and its consequences. In fact, if
anything at all has been achieved by respondents inconsistent assertions, it is his dishonesty to
this Court.
 At any rate, assuming arguendo that complainant indeed engaged respondents services in
filing the two (2) new petitions, instead of Civil Case No. 00-044, still, his liability is
unmistakable. There is nothing in the records to show that he filed any petition. The ethics of the
profession demands that, in such a case, he should immediately return the filing fees to
complainant. In Parias v. Paguinto,[10] we held that a lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected from the client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such
as for filing fee, but not used for failure to file the case must immediately be returned to the
client on demand. Per records, complainant made repeated demands, but respondent is yet to
return the money.

Neither do we find merit in respondents second argument. The fact that Civil Case No. 00-
044 was already submitted for decision does not justify his inaction. After agreeing to handle
Civil Case No. 00-044, his duty is, first and foremost, to enter his appearance. Sadly, he failed to
do this simple task. He should have returned complainants money. Surely, he cannot expect to
be paid for doing nothing.

In his third argument, respondent attempts to evade responsibility by shifting the blame to
complainant. He claims that she refused to provide him with documents vital to the case. He
further claims that he would be violating the Code of Professional Responsibility by handling a
case without adequate preparation. This is preposterous. When a lawyer accepts a case, his
acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses the requisite academic learning, skill
and ability to handle the case.[11] As a lawyer, respondent knew where to obtain copies of the
certificates of title. As a matter of fact, he admitted that his Law Office, on its own, managed to
verify the authenticity of complainants title. It bears reiterating that respondent did not take any
action on the case despite having been paid for his services. This is tantamount to abandonment
of his duties as a lawyer and taking undue advantage of his client.

Finally, in an ironic twist of fate, respondent became the accuser of complainant. In his
fourth argument, respondent accuses her of offering falsified documentary evidence in Civil Case
No. 00-004, prompting him to file falsification cases against her. He thus justifies his inability to
render legal services to complainant.

Assuming that complainant indeed offered falsified documentary evidence in Civil Case
No. 00-044, will it be sufficient to exonerate respondent? We believe not. First, Canon 19 outlines
the procedure in dealing with clients who perpetrated fraud in the course of a legal proceeding.
Consistent with its mandate that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal and only within the
bounds of the law, Rule 19.02 of the same Canon specifically provides:

Rule 19.02 A lawyer who has received information that his clients has, in the course of the
representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client
to rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate the relationship with such client in
accordance with the Rules of Court.

As a lawyer, respondent is expected to know this Rule. Instead of inaction, he should have
confronted complainant and ask her to rectify her fraudulent representation. If complainant
refuses, then he should terminate his relationship with her.

Understandably, respondent failed to follow the above-cited Rule. This is because there is
no truth to his claim that he did not render legal service to complainant because she falsified the
documentary evidence in Civil Case No.00-044. This brings us to the secondreason why we
cannot sustain his fourth argument. The pleadings show that he learned of the alleged falsification
long after complainant had terminated their attorney-client relationship. It was a result of his
active search for a justification of his negligence in Civil Case No. 00-044. As a matter of fact,
he admitted that he verified the authenticity of complainants title only after the news of his
suspension spread in the legal community. To our mind, there is absurdity in invoking
subsequent knowledge of a fact as justification for an act or omission that is fait accompli.

Obviously, in filing falsification charges against complainant, respondent was motivated

by vindictiveness.

In fine, let it be stressed that the authority of an attorney begins with his or her retainer. [12] It
gives rise to a relationship between an attorney and a client that is highly fiduciary in nature and
of a very delicate, exacting, and confidential character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and
good faith.[13] If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to
practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the
bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects
the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps
maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. [14] Indeed, law is an exacting
goddess demanding of her votaries not only intellectual but also moral discipline.
 WHEREFORE, we DENY respondents motion for reconsideration. Our Decision dated
April 22, 2005 is immediately executory. Respondent is directed to report immediately to the
Office of the Bar Confidant his compliance with our Decision.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to
all courts.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 98149 September 26, 1994

JOSE V. DEL ROSARIO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and DE DIOS MARIKINA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., respondents.

Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for petitioner.

Orlando B. Braga for private respondent.

VITUG, J.:

Petitioner suffered physical injuries, requiring two (2) major operations, when he fell from, and then was dragged
along the asphalted road by, a passenger bus operated by private respondent transportation company. The incident
occurred when the bus driver bolted forward at high speed while petitioner was still clinging on the bus door's handle
bar that caused the latter to lose his grip and balance. The refusal of private respondent to settled petitioner's claim
for damages constrained petitioner to file, on 26 June 1985, a complaint for damages against private respondent.

After the reception of evidence, the trial court, on 11 December 1989, rendered its decision, the dispositive portion
reading thusly:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing defendant De Dios Marikina Transportation

Co., Inc.'s counterclaim for lack of merit and ordering said defendant to pay plaintiff Jose V. Del
Rosario: (a) the sum of P76,944.41, as actual and compensatory damages; (b) the sum of
P15,000.00, as moral and exemplary damages; and (c) the sum of P33,641.50, as attorney's fees, a
s well as to pay the costs of suit; and, as regards the third-party complaint herein, ordering third-
party defendant First Quezon City Insurance Co., Inc. to indemnify third-party plaintiff
De Dios Marikina Transportation Co., Inc. in the sum of P12,000.00, with interest thereon at the legal
rate from date of filing of the third-party complaint on August 20, 1985, until full payment thereof.
Further, there being no satisfactory warrant, therefor, the Court hereby dismisses the rest of the
claims in the complaint and third-party complaint herein.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

On appeal to it, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the findings of fact of the trial court, as well as the grant to
petitioner of damages, but it reduced the award for attorney's fees from P33,641.50 to P5,000.00. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration questioning the reduction of attorney's fees was denied by the appellate court. Hence,
this petition raising this sole issue.

We see merit in the petition.

There is no question that a court may, whenever it deems it just and equitable, allow the recovery by the prevailing
party of attorneys fees. 1 In determining the reasonableness of such fees, this Court in a number of cases 2 has
provided various criteria which, for convenient guidance, we might collate thusly:

a) the quantity and character of the services rendered;

b) the labor, time and trouble involved;

c) the nature and importance of the litigation;

d) the amount of money or the value of the property affected by the controversy;

e) the novelty and difficulty of questions involved;

f) the responsibility imposed on counsel;

g) the skill and experience called for in the performance of the service;

h) the professional character and social standing of the lawyer;

i) the customary charges of the bar for similar services;

j) the character of employment, whether casual or for establishment client;

k) whether the fee is absolute or contingent (it being the rule that an attorney may properly charge a
higher fee when it is contingent than when it is absolute); and

1) the results secured.

In this instance, the complaint for damages was instituted by petitioner in June 1985, following the refusal of private
respondent to settle petitioner's claim, and the decision thereon was promulgated by the court a quo only in
December 1989 or about four years and six months later. Several pleadings were filed and no less than twenty
appearances were made by petitioner's counsel, not counting the various other pleadings ultimately filed with the
Court of Appeals and now before this Court. Given the nature of the case, the amount of damages involved, and the
evident effort exerted by petitioner's counsel, the trial court's award of attorney's fees for P33,641.50 would appear
to us to be just and reasonable.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED by
REINSTATING the trial court's award of attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED

G.R. No. L-46365 April 26, 1939

THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. PARDO Y ROBLES

HERMANOS, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.
Ramon Diokno and E. Benitez for appellant.
J. Exequiel Espinas for the appellees and in his own behalf.

CONCEPCION, J.: chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

After the public sale of the mortgaged properties, which were in the hands of a receiver,
and the adjudication thereof to the plaintiff Philippine National Bank, as the highest
bidder, the latter moved that the receiver be ordered to yield possession of said
properties in its favor and to present a final accounting. The defendants objected to the
delivery of the properties to the plaintiff, signifying, however, their conformity to the
closure of the receivership, provided their attorney, J. Exequiel Espinas, be first paid the
amount of P1,700, being the balance of his attorney's fees of P2,000. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry c han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

Attorney J. Exequiel Espinas also put in a motion asking that the receiver be ordered to
turn over to him the amount of P1,700, to be taken from any amount in the receiver's
possession as a result of the sale of the properties in receivership. cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s vi rtual law lib rary

By its order of August 20, 1936, the court ruled, among other things, that:

The amount of attorney's fees to which counsel for the defendants is entitled for his
professional services, not having been fixed either by judicial order or by agreement of
the parties, the petition of said attorney for the payment to him of P2,000 as such
attorney's fees is denied, without prejudice to his right to ask this court, upon notice to
the interested parties, to fix the said amount, which shall be paid by the plaintiff.

The quoted portion of the order was appealed by the plaintiff, and in its brief it is
contended that the trial court erred in holding that it was empowered to fix the amount
of the fees of counsel for the defendants and to order that the same be paid by the
plaintiff as receiver of the properties in litigation. chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry c han robles vi rt ual law li bra ry

As a general rule, the fees of attorneys should be paid by the party to whom they have
rendered their services. (Section 29, Code of Civil Procedure.) Pursuant to this rule, the
defendants are the ones bound to pay attorney's fees. The said fees cannot be paid from
the funds in the hands of the receiver because there is neither evidence nor allegation
that the services rendered by the said attorney for the defendants redounded to the
benefit of the receivership or to that of the plaintiff who asked for the appointment of a
receiver.

Ordinarily the services of an attorney employed by defendant to represent him in the

receivership proceedings are solely for his benefit and are not to be paid for out of funds
brought into court for the benefit of plaintiff and other claimants against the defendant.
(Atkinson & Co. vs. Aldrich-Clisbee Co., 248 Fed., 134; Barker vs.Southern Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n., 181 Fed., 636; Interstate Trust & Banking Co. vs. United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Co., 133 La., 781; O'Connor vs.Keiser, 85 S. C., 522; 67 S.E., 737.)

The defendants-appellees argue that the plaintiff has no reason to question the payment
of P1,700 inasmuch as the P300 of the total amount of P2,000, as fees of said attorney,
were paid by the appellant Philippine National Bank without appealing from the various
orders requiring it to pay the aforesaid P300. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry c han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry
It is true that by the orders of November 26, 1935 and December 16th of the same
year, the court ordered the payment of P300 to Attorney J. Exequiel Espinas on account
of his fees as counsel for the defendants; it is also true that the plaintiff did not appeal
either from the first order or from that of December 16, 1935 denying its motion for
reconsideration; but plaintiff's conformity to the payment by the receiver of the said sum
of P300 as fees of Attorney Espinas does not mean conformity to the obligation to pay
the balance of P1,700 as ordered by the appealed resolution. It is alleged, however, by
the appellees that their attorney, J. Exequiel Espinas, defended the attached properties
against extravagance and waste and that his services redounded to the benefit of the
parties; but the plaintiff, in turn, contends that the appointment of a receiver was
opposed by the defendants and that at no stage of the proceedings in the trial court did
the said attorney render any service to increase or protect the properties in the hands of
the receiver. No evidence upon the above allegations of the parties having been
adduced, we adhere to the general principle above stated that each party should pay the
fees of its attorney.
chan robl esvirt ualawli bra ry cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

The appealed order is reversed, with the cost of both instance to the defendants. So
ordered.

45 Phil. 556

MALCOLM, J.:
While the appeals in sixty-eight cases brought by more than two hundred plaintiffs to
recover damages from the Manila Railroad Company, defendant and appellant,
hereafter called the Binday cases, were in process of development for submission to the
court, Attorney Antonio de las Alas attempted to substitute Attorney E. G. Turner and
associate counsel as the legal representatives of the plaintiffs. On resistance of Attorney
Turner to the attempted substitution, the issue came down to a determination of
whether or not the alleged power of attorney in favor of Ambrosio Erfe-Mejia pursuant
to which Attorney De las Alas was assuming to act, is valid and controlling as claimed
by Attorney De las Alas, or fraudulent, null, and void as claimed by Attorney Turner.
To get the issue into its immediate background, a little further explanation is advisable.
Attorney E. G. Turner, along with Attorneys C. W. Rheberg and Teofilo Sison, were
looked upon as counsel for all of the plaintiffs in the Binday cases until July 17, 1923,
when Attorney Antonio de las Alas, signing himself as attorney for the plaintiffs,
entered his appearance. On the same date, Attorney De las Alas for plaintiffs-appellees
and Attorney Abreu for the defendant-appellant, stated to the court by motion that
"they had terminated, adjusted, and settled each and everyone of these cases amicably.
Wherefore, it is moved that all these cases be dismissed without costs." The court
accepting the motion for dismissal at its face value, granted the same two days later.
That very day also, Attorneys Turner, Rheberg, and Sison, gave notice of a lien upon
the judgments, which has been noted by the court.
If the cases had stopped here, they would have terminated themselves, but on July 24,
1923, it having been brought to the attention of the court that the motion for dismissal
in the Binday cases was pursuant to an appearance by Attorney De las Alas which did
not conform to the rules expressly laid down in the case of United States vs.Borromeo
([1911], 20 Phil., 189), it was ordered that the resolution of the court of July 19, 1923,
granting the motion for dismissal be set aside. Incidental thereto, Attorney Turner
asked for a restraining order against the Manila Railroad Company, its manager and
attorney, and others who may represent said defendant, from paying to Ambrosio Erfe-
Mejia the amount of P20,000 still in the possession of the company until further orders
in the premises, which motion the court granted. About the same time also, Attorney
Antonio de las Alas complied with the Rules of the Court in a motion for substitution
which relied on a power of attorney in favor of Ambrosio Erfe-Mejia of June 21, 1923,
acknowledged before the justice of the peace of San Fabian, Pangasinan, on June 22,
1923. But as was intimated in the beginning of the decision, Attorney Turner
contending that the supposed power of attorney which Ambrosio Erfe-Mejia has, is
fraudulent and obtained through deceit and misrepresentation, and Attorney De las
Alas claiming the exact contrary, the court framed the issue for the parties and gave
them full opportunity to demonstrate the correctness of their divergent theories. Both
parties have taken full advantage of this permission and have overwhelmed the court
with memoranda and argument, supported by affidavits and other documents.
To fit the issue into its proper setting, a more extended elucidation will now be begun.
In 1907 the Manila Railroad Company constructed a branch line from San Fabian,
Pangasinan, to Camp One. This branch line skirted along the north side of the Bued
River in the barrio of Binday, San Fabian, and was built over the Binday irrigation
system, which had been in operation for a long time. On September 17, 1911, on account
of an unusually heavy rainfall, the Bued River rose, overflowing the dam and began to
undermine the buttresses of the bridge of the railroad company. To prevent the water
from destroying the bridge, the company cut the dam with resulting damage to the
surrounding property owners.
To secure damages from the Manila Railroad Company for the value of the crops
destroyed, the property owners first bethought themselves to transfer all their claims to
Attorney E. G. Turner in order that their claims might be litigated in a single action. In
the lower court, however, a demurrer was interposed for the railroad company alleging
that it is not permissible for an attorney to accumulate distinct causes of action in
himself, and to sue in his own name for the benefit of the clients directly interested.
This demurrer was sustained by the trial judge and the order was affirmed on appeal to
the Supreme Court. (Turner vs. Manila Railroad Co., R. G. No. 10165.)[1]
On notification of the last cited decision of the Supreme Court, seventy one separate
actions were instituted against the Manila Railroad Company. The first of the separate
actions to be tried was that of Ambrosio Erfe vs. Manila Railroad Company wherein the
decision of the trial court was in favor of the defendant railroad company. Upon appeal,
the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court below. (Erfe vs.Manila Railroad
Co., R. G. No. 11500.)[2]
The next case to be called was that of Demetrio Maxion vs. Manila Railroad Company.
The trial judge in this case found on the issues of the controversy favorably to the
plaintiff and awarded to him the sum of P1,250 as damages. On appeal, this judgment
was affirmed. (Maxion vs. Manila Railroad Co., 44 Phil., 597.)
Of the remaining sixty-nine cases, one was dismissed because of failure of the plaintiff
to appear and the remaining sixty-eight were tried with favorable results to the
plaintiffs. The aggregate judgments against the Manila Railroad Company were
approximately P118,000 with interest and costs. These are the sixty-eight cases now
affected by the controversy between Attorney De las Alas on the one side, and Attorney
Turner, on the other. (See statement of Attorney Rheberg and memorandum of
Attorney Turner.)
To return again to the incidents relating to the development of the present issues, from
Exhibit U presented by Attorney De las Alas, it appears that on May 26, 1913, the
Binday property owners entered into an agreement with Ambrosio Erfe-Mejia which, in
effect, authorized Erfe to secure lawyers to prosecute the claims and to pay them fifty
per cent of the proceeds, Erfe to retain twenty per cent for his services. This document
prepared in the dialect and signed by a large number of individuals but not ratified
before a notary, reads as follows:
"CONTRATO
"Sicamin manfirmad lecsab to nia patuaen mi onguendan:
"Ta pasimbaloen mi sipan mi ed contrato ya fecha 13 de Junio, 1912, nipaacar ed:
"(a) Impangiter mi poder ed Sr. Ambrosio Erfe ed pananap toy Abogados ya
mangicolcol ed incaderal na tanaman ed dalin ya cadanum ed Payas na Binday nen
taon a 1911.
"(b) Patuaen mi ta nayarian ton isipan ed saray Abogados so cincuenta por ciento ed
bili nasingil a bayar na aderal a intanem.
"(c) Patuaen mi ta iter mi ed Sr. Ambrosio Erfe so veinte por ciento na bayar a
nabetangan mi. (Veinte por ciento na queran ibayar ed saray Abogados.)
"(d) Tan angapoy bayaran min bengat lan gastos ed panacar na sayan colcol.
"San Fabian, Pangasinan, Mayo 26, 1913."
According to Exhibit A-3 presented by Attorney Turner, the agreement of May 26, 1913,
was partially confirmed by the property owners in June, 1923. This document reads as
follows:
"We the undersigned do hereby state:
"That we are plaintiffs in a case against the M. R. R. Co., for damages caused to our
properties.
"That we ratify in all its parts the agreement executed on May 26, 1913, whereby Mr.
Ambrosio Erfe-Mejia was given power to conduct negotiations and engage an attorney
to be selected by him for the purpose of suing the M. R. R. Co.
"We hereby authorize Ambrosio Erfe, in conjunction with our attorney, Mr. Turner, to
accept a compromise of the case upon previous instructions from the latter, but only in
the manner to be indicated by said attorney, Mr. Turner; so that he should act only
according to instructions and indication of Mr. Turner. That we give Mr. Ambrosio Erfe
power to recover on our behalf such amount as may be awarded to us in the aforesaid
case, and distribute the same among us according to the instructions he may receive
from our attorney, Mr. E. G. Turner.
"That we authorize Mr. Ambrosio Erfe to retain twenty per cent of the net amount that
may be awarded to us, the same to be spent in the dealings and transactions to be later
specified by us in a resolution (registration of lands of property owners, donation, etc.,
etc.).
*******
"NOTE. I have spoken with them for the registration and survey of their lands, and they
gave me authority to engage your services in this case, but we have no surveyor."
Presumably, in conformity with Exhibit U, the services of Attorney Ritchey were first
secured to represent the Binday property owners. After Mr. Ritchey left the Philippines,
Attorney Turner became the legal representative of the claimants and he associated
with himself Attorneys Rheberg and Sison.
The Maxion case being decided favorably to the plaintiffs and being in nature a test
case, it was naturally for the benefit of the Manila Railroad Company to conclude a
compromise agreement with the plaintiffs. Negotiations were entered into by Attorney
Turner, on behalf of the plaintiffs, and Attorney Abreu and later by President Paez of
the railroad, on behalf of the railroad. The effort of Mr. Turner apparently was to
secure at least P100,000 for his clients and himself. At least such an offer by Mr.
Turner limited until July 16, 1923, was finally made. (Exhibit H.) President Paez on the
other hand would only agree to pay P80,000 in settlement of the Binday cases. There
the matter rested until Mr. Erfe and Attorney De las Alas produced the power of
attorney in favor of Mr. Erfe-Mejia of June 21, 1923, when a settlement was speedily
arrived at in the sum of P90,000. After the execution of the document of settlement,
the sum of P70,000 was delivered to Erfe and the sum of P20,000 was retained by the
Manila Railroad Company. (See affidavits, Exhibits, A and A, of Jose Paez and E. G.
Turner.)
The contested power of attorney omitting the signatures of about two hundred persons
at the end, which it is not feasible to try to decipher, as handed to President Paez, reads
as follows:
"SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY
"We, who have signed below or placed our finger marks in the middle of our names, all
of age, and residents of the municipality of San Fabian, Province of Pangasinan, and
plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 1884 to 1993; 1938 to 1954; 1979, 1980 and 1841 of the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Philippine Islands, against the Manila Railroad
Company, for damages caused by said company to our properties situated in the barrio
of Binday, municipality of San Fabian, Province of Pangasinan, which cases are now
pending in the Supreme Court upon an appeal taken by said defendant, except one of
them, that numbered 1931, which is already definitely terminated;
"We do hereby voluntarily, freely and spontaneously declare and state that we give and
grant Mr. Ambrosio Erfe-Mejia, of age, married, and resident of San Fabian, Province
of Pangasinan, P. I., special power;
"1. To withdraw from the hands of Attorney E. G. Turner, resident of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, our aforesaid cases in such a manner as to sever all connection with said
attorney from the date said Mr. E. G. Turner is notified of this power of attorney by Mr.
Ambrosio Erfe-Mejia;
"2. To annul any such power as we may have granted, or any such agreement as we may
have executed prior to this date with any person or persons to compromise the
aforesaid cases;
"3. To compromise on our behalf and in our place and stead directly with the defendant
Manila Railroad Company the aforesaid cases for such sum and in such a manner as he
may deem to be to our best interests;
"4. To recover on our behalf and in our place and stead from the Manila Railroad
Company all such amount as may be awarded to us and paid by said company by virtue
of such a compromise, should any be made;
"5. To engage, and pay for the professional services of an attorney or various attorneys
for the purpose of protecting our rights and interests:
"(a) In the execution or making of the compromise;
"(b) In the prosecution in the Supreme Court of our aforesaid cases in the event that no
compromise is made;
"(c) In any such action as any person may bring against us upon this special power of
attorney;
"(6) To pay Attorney E. G. Turner such fees as said Mr. Ambrosio Erfe-Mejia may deem
just and reasonable or equitable, taking into account the professional services rendered
by him up to this date in connection with said cases;
"7. To invest not more than twenty-five thousand pesos of the amount that may be
recovered from the aforesaid company, that is, the M. R. R. Co., in the purchase of an
agricultural land with Torrens title in any municipality of the Province of Pangasinan;
"8. To deduct from the total amount to be paid by the defendant company (the M. R. R.
Co.) twenty per cent thereof as compensation for his labor, work, services, expenses
and troubles in the institution, prosecution and termination of said cases;
"9. Also to deduct 10 per cent (ten per cent) of the total sum to be paid by the
aforementioned M. R. R. Company, the same to constitute a fund available for any
purpose in case of emergency or any event that may affect our interests or cases;
"10. To distribute the money among all of us, giving each such portion as may be
allowed in the judgments of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan or in the
Supreme Court (that is to say, in the Supreme Court) in the awarding of the damages
claimed, after deducting all the amounts mentioned in the preceding paragraphs.
"We also do hereby ratify and approve and accept whatever Mr. Ambrosio Erfe-Mejia
may do, perform or carry out pursuant to the terms of this special power of attorney,
and the same shall be considered by all and each of us for all legal purposes as if it were
done, performed or carried out by us collectively or individually.
"In testimony whereof, we have hereunto set our hands in San Fabian, Pangasinan, this
21st day of June, nineteen hundred twenty-three."
Having given more than enough attention to the past and present incidents connected
with these sixty-eight cases, we are now in a position to approach more directly the
issue and decide as best we may if the power of attorney in question is valid or invalid.
Attorney Turner in opposing the substitution of Attorney De las Alas complains of
various fraudulent acts on the part of Erfe, De las Alas, and others. Attorney Turner
claims that the power of attorney has been dressed up, added to, and changed in many
ways since June 22, 1923 (Exhibit C). He claims that it contains a number of signatures
of persons who are not legally qualified to sign a document of this class. He claims that
of those who did sign the document many did so not understanding its contents, and
under force and duress. (Exhibits in A-6V.) Attorney Turner says that "Erfe has not
only availed himself of undue influence, misrepresentation, falsehood and deceit, but
has also used force, intimidation and coercion in order to impose his acts and will upon
the ignorant plaintiffs." Therefore, in view of the fraud practiced by Erfe, De las Alas,
Lamberto Siguion Reyna, and Paez, Attorney Turner argues that the fraudulent
contract should be set aside and declared null and void.
Attorney De las Alas defends the power of attorney in favor of Ambrosio Erfe-Mejia as
truly and legally executed by the plaintiffs. He endeavors to show how the power was
executed, and how it was examined by the president and attorney of the Manila
Railroad Company who satisfied themselves of the genuineness of the document.
Attorney De las Alas naturally takes the position that the plaintiffs signed the power of
attorney with full knowledge of its contents, and that since then they have confirmed
their action not only once but many times. In turn, Attorney De las Alas makes counter
charges against Attorney Turner, Representative Camacho, and others. Attorney De las
Alas argues that as the power of attorney is valid, he should be recognized as the
counsel for the plaintiffs with power to enter into a settlement with the Manila Railroad
Company.
The leading actors on either side are painted in the blackest of colors by their
opponents. But as none of these alleged crimes and misdemeanors are properly before
us, without even mentioning them, we are glad to pass immediately to matters of
present interest. We only dip our fingers into the cauldron to pick out such facts as will
illuminate the instant issue.
Getting at last to the facts, we must confess that the court is nearly helpless in the face
of actuality. This situation results not because of lack of incentive on the part of
opposing counsel or because of the paucity of the affidavits, but arises from the nature
of the proof presented. The poor plaintiffs have been induced to sign affidavits of
exactly contrary effect; have been told one thing by one party and another thing by
another party, and finally, at the instance of the special investigator of the Governor-
General, have been corralled to secure their statements. Probably, the plaintiffs are
only top glad to sign any affidavit placed before them. Probably also they are not
especially interested in whether Attorney Turner or Attorney De las Alas represents
them. They align themselves with Attorney Turner because he promises them a larger
return. They align themselves with Attorney De las Alas because he promises them a
more prompt payment. What they have wanted is the money due them from the Manila
Railroad Company.
To demonstrate the value of the affidavits. As illustrations, let us look into the affidavits
presented by the plaintiffs Luis Sion (Repudiated Exhibits A and G, confirmed Exhibits
A-5, A-6, G, H): Marciano Zarate (Repudiated Exhibits D, Z, confirmed Exhibit BB);
Esteban Manoot (Repudiated Exhibit XX, confirmed Exhibit A-1); Venancio Amansec
(Repudiated Exhibit Y, confirmed Exhibit A-10); Inocencio Calicdan (Repudiated
Exhibit QQ, confirmed Exhibit A-11); Antonio Tabito (Repudiated Exhibit UUU,
confirmed Exhibit A-12); Filomena Generalao (Repudiated Exhibits GG, VVV,
confirmed Exhibit A-13); Bernardo Mayugba (Repudiated Exhibit EE, confirmed
Exhibit A-14); Carlos de Nieva (Repudiated Exhibits F, JJJ, and BBBBB, confirmed
before investigator). Other plaintiffs have been as easily duped if we had the patience to
hunt out their respective cases. To please Attorney Turner, they have repudiated their
act in signing the power of attorney. To please Erfe and Attorney De las Alas, they have
ratified their act in signing the power of attorney.
Some cold facts can be fixed upon to give assistance. The number of plaintiffs is
something over two hundred. The power of attorney now contains two hundred and six
signatures, although it is claimed that originally it had only one hundred and seventy-
two signatures. The justice of the peace and notary and the two attesting witnesses
affirm that the document was read in the dialect and signed in their presence by all of
the principals. (Exhibits A-21, 2-6.) Doubt being cast upon the authenticity of the
plaintiffs' act, ratification is disclosed in Exhibit H with something like two hundred
and fifty names; in Exhibit I with something like two hundred names, and in Exhibits 1,
G, and K in the local dialect with more than one hundred names. A comparison
discloses that most of the persons, who signed the affidavits presented by Attorney
Turner, have also ratified their action in taking part in the execution of the power of
attorney, as is disclosed by the affidavits presented by Attorney De las Alas. The power
of attorney is now available in the local dialect and known to the plaintiffs. Probably all
of them have received money on account of their claims from Erfe. (See, for instance,
Exhibits EE, JJ.) The hacienda Binday has been transferred to the plaintiffs by Rafael
Corpus. (Exhibit J.)
On suggestion of the parties, the Governor-General was led to send an attorney of the
Bureau of Justice to San Fabian, Pangasinan, to investigate the irregularities alleged to
have taken place in the transactions between the landowners of that municipality and
the Manila Railroad Company. While we entertain grave doubt as to the probative
value of this report and of our right to look into the evidence before the investigator,
inasmuch as both parties rely on the investigation and as no objection is made, we will
make at least incidental mention of certain facts appearing in the report of Assistant
Attorney Sabino Padilla, the representative of the Department of Justice and the
Governor-General. It may be said parenthetically that on account of the agreement of
the parties, the witnesses were heard before Attorney Padilla without either Attorney
Turner or Attorney De las Alas being present.
The classification of the testimony of the plaintiffs as made by Attorney Padilla
discloses the following: One hundred twenty-five plaintiffs accept the compromise with
the Manila Railroad Company and agree that the signature of the power of attorney
was their free, spontaneous, and voluntary action. Thirty-nine witnesses declare that
they signed the document voluntarily on behalf of deceased and absent plaintiffs. One
plaintiff testifies that he did not sign the power of attorney but that he had no
complaint relative to the settlement. Eighteen persons whose names appear in the
power of attorney did not testify. Four persons admitted that they signed the power of
attorney in question and had no complaint against Erfe, but that they did not
understand the terms of the document. Thirteen plaintiffs or their representatives
testified that they signed without understanding the terms of the power of attorney in
question and did not agree with the settlement or compromise concluded by Erfe. In
other words, practically all of the plaintiffs, with the exception of thirteen against
whom, however, some contrary testimony exists, agree with the compromise and admit
that they signed the power of attorney voluntarily (Exhibits 2-6).
It at once comes to mind, as an easy resolution of the problem, to select those persons
who have repented of the action taken on their behalf by Erfe and permit their appeals
to go on, while recognizing the compromise agreement as to all the other plaintiffs. The
trouble with this suggestion is that it is impossible to know exactly which plaintiffs
affirm the compromise and which plaintiffs disaffirm it. It is also evident that the
plaintiffs have not been proceeding individually against the Manila Railroad Company,
but that it was a community affair. They first made Erfe their representative. They next
assigned all of their interests to Attorney Turner. They next proceeded with their
individual cases under the guidance of Attorney Turner. They next signed the power of
attorney in favor of Erfe. They have held meetings in San Fabian and have proceeded
on the theory of joint action. The only recourse then is either to hold the power of
attorney good as to all of the plaintiffs or hold it bad as to all of them.
This brings us to look into the actual financial status of the plaintiffs in these cases. The
Maxion case was the first decided. The judgment was for P1,250 with interest and
costs. According to the affidavit of Maxion, the total judgment reached P1,518.68;
expenses, P460; balance, P1,058.68; attorney's fees, P529.34; amount received by
Maxion, P529.34. This settlement does not take into consideration the possible twenty
per cent due Erfe. In other words, Attorney De las Alas claims that through the
machinations of Attorney Turner, Maxion obtained only about thirty-four per cent of
the total adjudicated. (Exhibit DD.)
As to the plaintiffs in the remaining sixty-eight cases, Erfe has made a report which
includes the following data: Amount adjudicated by the various judgments, P118,000;
amount obtained through the compromise, P90,000; expenses, amount left with the
Railroad Company to pay Attorney Turner and his companions, P20,000; honorarium
of Attorney De las Alas P3,000; emergency expenses, P1,000; consultation of Attorneys
Enage and Sison, P1,000; compensation of the agent and expenses, P18,000; paid in
cash to the plaintiffs, P26,000; paid for the hacienda Binday for the plaintiffs, P21,000.
Total expenses, forty-eight per cent; total received by the property owners, fifty-two per
cent.
Up to this point, we have exerted ourselves to search out the facts. Before announcing
our conclusions, a few words should be added relative to the applicable law.
The power of attorney created the relation of principal and agent. It was a contract
which should be enforced unless vitiated by fraud or found to be an agreement contrary
to public policy. It attempted, among other things, to dismiss the lawyer and substitute
another, which may be done at any time by the client with or without cause (Code of
Civil Procedure, sec. 32). The power of attorney further attempted to compromise
pending cases, and in this connection, it is well to recall that, as provided by section 27
of the Code of Civil Procedure, lawyers "cannot, without special authority, compromise
their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of the client's claim but the full
amount in cash."
A contingent fee was originally provided for the attorney. Contingent fees are not
prohibited in the Philippines, and since impliedly sanctioned by law "should be under
the supervision of the court in order that clients may be protected from unjust
charges." (Canons of Professional Ethics, No. 13.) Where it is shown that the contract
for a contingent fee was obtained by any undue influence of the attorney over the client,
or by any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is so clearly excessive as to
amount to extortion, the court will in a proper case protect the aggrieved party.
(Taylor vs. Bemiss [1883], 110 U. S., 42.)
In this court, the liens of Attorney Turner are placed at thirty per cent of the judgments
in one document and at P40,000 in another document. Considering the long and
difficult litigation and the annoyance and trouble in connection with the trial of the
cases, these charges for the lawyer's services are not unreasonable. We treat the liens as
attaching to the proceeds of the settlement and propose to protect the right of the
attorney to his liens. The fund will be considered as still in the hands of the defendant
company and subject to court order. (See 2 R. C. L., 1076 et seq.;
Greenleaf vs. Minneapolis, etc. Railway Co. [1915], 30 N. D., 112.)
As to the power of attorney, parts of it invite suspicion. P26,000 in cash for the
plaintiffs out of a total of P90,000 is little enough under any view of the cases. On the
supposition that the compromise reached P100,000, as will be explained in a moment,
and on the further supposition that the terms of the power of attorney are given effect,
Attorney Turner and associate counsel would receive P30,000, Erfe about P20,000, all
expenses to be paid by the lawyers and the agent, and the litigants about P50,000. The
plaintiffs do in fact obtain nearly P50,000, if we take into account the hacienda Binday
as belonging to them, which we do with hesitancy, for if they wish to enter into this
community purchase, it of course is no affair of ours.
We conclude this distasteful and arduous task by making the findings which follow. We
find that the power of attorney of June 21, 1923, in connection with the prior
authorization in favor of Ambrosio Erfe-Mejia and subsequent ratification, is valid and
controlling. We find further that as the power of attorney is valid and controlling, there
has been a proper substitution of attorneys in this court, and that Attorney Antonio de
las Alas must be recognized as counsel for the plaintiffs. We find further that Attorney
E. G. Turner and associate counsel have liens on the judgments for professional
services the reasonable value of which we fix at P30,000. Inasmuch as there only
remains a balance of P20,000 available for the purpose of paying Attorney Turner and
associate counsel, inasmuch as this happened through no fault of Attorney Turner, and
inasmuch as to make him look to the plaintiffs for further payment would be unfair, the
compromise agreement is modified and approved as of the amount of P100,000.
Subject generally to the conditions above stated, and subject specifically to proof by the
Manila Railroad Company that Attorneys Turner, Rheberg, and Sison have been paid
P30,000 in satisfaction of their liens, the motion to dismiss the appeals in these sixty-
eight cases, is approved. So ordered.

CANON 21

ATTY. CARMEN LEONOR M. A.C. No. 5859

ALCANTARA, VICENTE P. (Formerly CBD Case No. 421)
MERCADO, SEVERINO P.
MERCADO AND SPOUSES JESUS Present:
AND ROSARIO MERCADO,
Complainants, CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
 - versus - PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.

ATTY. EDUARDO C. DE VERA, Promulgated:

Respondent.
November 23, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:

For our review is the Resolution[1]of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) finding respondent Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera liable for professional
malpractice and gross misconduct and recommending his disbarment.

The facts, as appreciated by the investigating commissioner,[2]are undisputed.

The respondent is a member of the Bar and was the former counsel of Rosario P. Mercado
in a civil case filed in 1984 with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and an administrative
case filed before the Securities and Exchange Commission, Davao City Extension Office. [3]

Pursuant to a favorable decision, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued in favor of
Rosario P. Mercado. Herein respondent, as her legal counsel, garnished the bank deposits of the
defendant, but did not turn over the proceeds to Rosario. Rosario demanded that the respondent
turn over the proceeds of the garnishment, but the latter refused claiming that he had paid part of
the money to the judge while the balance was his, as attorneys fees. Such refusal
prompted Rosario to file an administrative case for disbarment against the respondent.[4]

On March 23, 1993, the IBP Board of Governors promulgated a Resolution holding the
respondent guilty of infidelity in the custody and handling of clients funds and recommending to
the Court his one-year suspension from the practice of law.[5]

Following the release of the aforesaid IBP Resolution, the respondent filed a series of
lawsuits against the Mercado family except George Mercado. The respondent also instituted cases
against the family corporation, the corporations accountant and the judge who ruled against the
reopening of the case where respondent tried to collect the balance of his alleged fee
from Rosario. Later on, the respondent also filed cases against the chairman and members of the
IBP Board of Governors who voted to recommend his suspension from the practice of law for
one year. Complainants allege that the respondent committed barratry, forum shopping,
exploitation of family problems, and use of intemperate language when he filed several frivolous
and unwarranted lawsuits against the complainants and their family members, their lawyers, and
the family corporation.[6] They maintain that the primary purpose of the cases is to harass and to
exact revenge for the one-year suspension from the practice of law meted out by the IBP against
the respondent. Thus, they pray that the respondent be disbarred for malpractice and gross
misconduct under Section 27,[7]Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

In his defense the respondent basically offers a denial of the charges against him.

He denies he has committed barratry by instigating or stirring up George Mercado to file

lawsuits against the complainants. He insists that the lawsuits that he and George filed against the
complainants were not harassment suits but were in fact filed in good faith and were based on strong
facts.[8]

Also, the respondent denies that he has engaged in forum shopping. He argues that he was
merely exhausting the remedies allowed by law and that he was merely constrained to seek relief
elsewhere by reason of the denial of the trial court to reopen the civil case so he could justify his
attorneys fees.

Further, he denies that he had exploited the problems of his clients family. He argues that
the case that he and George Mercado filed against the complainants arose from their perception
of unlawful transgressions committed by the latter for which they must be held accountable for
the public interest.

Finally, the respondent denies using any intemperate, vulgar, or unprofessional language. On
the contrary, he asserts that it was the complainants who resorted to intemperate and vulgar language
in accusing him of extorting from Rosario shocking and unconscionable attorneys fees.[9]

After careful consideration of the records of this case and the parties submissions, we find
ourselves in agreement with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

It is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the
State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required
by law for the conferment of such privilege.[10] Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened
with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior
and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court
after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him.Without invading any constitutional privilege
or right, an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar
him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring
an attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to
be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of an attorney, and thus to
protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish the
attorney.[11]InMaligsa v. Cabanting,[12]we explained that the bar should maintain a high standard
of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients. To this end a member of the legal profession should refrain from doing any act which
might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty
and integrity of the legal profession. An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation
of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds
enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

In the present case, the respondent committed professional malpractice and gross
misconduct particularly in his acts against his former clients after the issuance of the IBP
Resolution suspending him from the practice of law for one year. In summary, the respondent
filed against his former client, her family members, the family corporation of his former client,
the Chairman and members of the Board of Governors of the IBP who issued the said Resolution,
the Regional Trial Court Judge in the case where his former client received a favorable judgment,
and the present counsel of his former client, a total of twelve (12) different cases in various fora
which included the Securities and Exchange Commission; the Provincial Prosecutors Office of
Tagum, Davao; the Davao City Prosecutors Office; the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline; the
Department of Agrarian Reform; and the Supreme Court.[13]

In addition to the twelve (12) cases filed, the respondent also re-filed cases which had
previously been dismissed. The respondent filed six criminal cases against members of the
Mercado family separately docketed as I.S. Nos. 97-135; 97-136; 97-137; 97-138; 97-139; and
97-140. With the exception of I.S. No. 97-139, all the aforementioned cases are re-filing of
previously dismissed cases.[14]

Now, there is nothing ethically remiss in a lawyer who files numerous cases in different
fora, as long as he does so in good faith, in accordance with the Rules, and without any ill-motive
or purpose other than to achieve justice and fairness. In the present case, however, we find that
the barrage of cases filed by the respondent against his former client and others close to her was
meant to overwhelm said client and to show her that the respondent does not fold easily after he
was meted a penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law.

The nature of the cases filed by the respondent, the fact of re-filing them after being
dismissed, the timing of the filing of cases, the fact that the respondent was in conspiracy with a
renegade member of the complainants family, the defendants named in the cases and the foul
language used in the pleadings and motions[15]all indicate that the respondent was acting beyond
the desire for justice and fairness. His act of filing a barrage of cases appears to be an act of
revenge and hate driven by anger and frustration against his former client who filed the
disciplinary complaint against him for infidelity in the custody of a clients funds.
 In the case of Prieto v. Corpuz,[16]the Court pronounced that it is professionally
irresponsible for a lawyer to file frivolous lawsuits. Thus, we stated in Prieto,
Atty. Marcos V. Prieto must be sanctioned for filing this unfounded complaint. Although no
person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate, however, this right must be
exercised in good faith.[17]

As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of
justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing frivolous petitions that only add to the workload
of the judiciary.

A lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an
instrument to advance its ends the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive adjudication
of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final judgments. A lawyer should not only help attain these
objectives but should likewise avoid any unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or
prevent their realization, charged as he is with the primary task of assisting in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.[18]Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
promulgated on 21 June 1988 is very explicit that lawyers must exert every effort and consider it
their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

Further, the respondent not only filed frivolous and unfounded lawsuits that violated his
duties as an officer of the court in aiding in the proper administration of justice, but he did so
against a former client to whom he owes loyalty and fidelity. Canon 21 and Rule 21.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility[19]provides:
CANON 21 - A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after the
attorney-client relation is terminated.

Rule 21.02 A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the
course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person,
unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.

The cases filed by the respondent against his former client involved matters and
information acquired by the respondent during the time when he was still Rosarios counsel.
Information as to the structure and operations of the family corporation, private documents, and
other pertinent facts and figures used as basis or in support of the cases filed by the respondent in
pursuit of his malicious motives were all acquired through the attorney-client relationship with
herein complainants. Such act is in direct violation of the Canons and will not be tolerated by the
Court.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera is hereby DISBARRED from the

practice of law effective immediately upon his receipt of this Resolution.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of
the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the
Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
 SO ORDERED.

CANON 22

G.R. No. L-32684 September 20, 1988

RAMON TUMBAGAHAN petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, TEODULO C. TANDAYAG, TIMOTEA LASMARIAS, JOSE F. DEL ROSARIO, and THE
IISMI SUPERVISORS HOUSING ASSOCIATION, INC., through TIBURCIO ESPENIDO respondents.

Demetrio P. Sira, Sr. for petitioner.

Francisco Ma. Garcia for respondent Timotea Lasmarias.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

In this present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner assails the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of his petition for mandamus to compel the trial court to
give due course to his appeal. The appellate court dismissed his appeal on the ground that it was filed beyond the reglementary period to appeal.

The issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner validly terminated the services of his counsels of record-Attys.
Melvyn Salise and Jose Amarga — such that service on them of processes and notices would no longer bind him.
The resolution of this issue will also resolve the question raised in the petition whether the receipt by Atty. Amarga of
the trial court's order of dismissal would start the running of the period within which the petitioner should file his
appeal.

The records show that the petitioner filed two cases with the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, Branch II,
namely: (1) Civil Case No. 1257, for declaration of ownership and reconveyance of Lot Nos. 3050 and 3051 of the
Iligan Cadastre; and (2) Cadastral Case No. IL-N-4, for the review of the decree of registration issued by the Land
Registration Commission in favor of Timotea Lasmarias and cancellation of her titles to the same lots. When the
cases were called for joint trial on April 10, 1968, the petitioner relieved Atty. Salise as his counsel. Atty. Salise filed
his withdrawal of appearance which was approved by the court. On April 15, 1968, the cases were again called for
trial. This time, the petitioner personally appeared and filed a written motion for postponement on the ground that he
still had no counsel and was not ready for trial. Upon motion of the other party, the motion for postponement was
denied and the court issued an order dismissing the two cases.

A copy of the order was sent to Atty. Amarga which he received on April 26, 1968. The petitioner received his copy
of the order on May 17, 1968. Thereafter, he filed his motion for reconsideration. After the motion was denied, he
filed a notice of appeal and record on appeal which the Court dismissed for being filed out of time, counting the
period to appeal from the day Atty. Amarga received a copy of the order of dismissal.

The petitioner alleges that he had neither engaged the services of Atty. Amarga nor authorized the latter to
represent him in his two cases. From an examination of the records, however, this Court finds that these allegations
are without merit.

The pleadings filed with the trial court bear the names of Atty. Salise and Atty. Amarga as counsels for the
petitioner. Copies of some of the pleadings of the opposing party were furnished to Atty. Amarga who received the
same and signed for Atty. Salise. Such being the case, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in
agreeing with the trial court in its rejection of the claim that the petitioner had not even authorized the said counsel to
represent him and to take part in the conduct of the case.

As stated by the Court of Appeals:

The only issue raised in petitioner's petition for mandamus is whether or not petitioner's appeal from
the order dismissing his complaint in Civil Case No. 1257 was perfected on time.

The resolution of the issue depends upon a determination of the date when services of notice of the
order of April 15,1968, was legally effected upon petitioner. Was service made on April 26, 1968,
when Atty. Jose Amarga actually received a copy of the order of April 15, 1968, as held by the
respondent court and maintained by private respondent Lasmarias? Or on May 17,1968, when
petitioner actually received a copy of said order, as contended by petitioner? Or on the date
Benjamin Sta. Maria received the other copy of said order?

At the outset we can eliminate for consideration the date Mr. Sta. Maria received a copy of said
order of dismissal for there is nothing in the record to show that Mr. Sta. Maria was authorized by
petitioner to receive the latter's mail.

Petitioner alleges that Atty. Jose Amarga is not his counsel, and that he has never engaged the
services of said lawyer and has not authorized said lawyer to represent him in Civil Case No. 1257

or Cadastral Case No. II-N-4, and that his counsel in said cases was Atty. Melvyn Salise only.

The record, however, negates, petitioner's allegations. Petitionees answer to the counterclaim of
private respondents del Rosario and the IISMI Supervisors Housing Association, Inc. was filed by
Attys. M. Salise and J. Amarga and signed by Atty. Jose B. Amarga (p. 14, record on appeal). This
fact sufficiently shows that Atty. Jose B. Amarga was one of the counsel for petitioner in said cases.

When Atty. Melvyn T. Salise filed his motion to withdraw as counsel for petitioner, he stated that
petitioner has terminated his legal services and that he was withdrawing as such counsel. There was
no indication in said motion that petitioner had likewise discharged Atty. Amarga as his counsel for
petitioner. Therefore, Atty. Amarga continued to be the counsel for petitioner.

There is another clear indication to show that petitioner had the assistance and services of legal
counsel even after Atty. Salise had withdrawn as his counsel. When the cases were called for
hearing on April 15, 1968, petitioner personally filed a motion captioned "Motion For Longer Time To
Prepare For Trial." This motion is quite long and raises legal points which only a lawyer can be
conversant with. We quote with approval respondent court's observation on this point.:

On the other hand, the court is of the observation and belief that the motion under
consideration could not have been prepared by Ramon Tumbagahan himself, who is
not a lawyer but prepared by lawyer who is afraid to show his face before the court
by not signing the motion himself, as counsel for Ramon Tumbagahan, and
apparently to deceive the court to believe the allegation of Ramon Tumbagahan that
he has not until the present, retained the services of counsel in order to secure the
postponement of the trial of the above cases to the prejudice of the oppositors and
defendants.' (Record on Appeal, p. 65).

Petitioner having been represented by counsel, service of a copy of the order of April 15, 1968, was
legally effected upon him on the date Atty. Amarga, his remaining counsel of record, actually
received said copy, i.e., on April 26, 1968. The Supreme Court and this Court have invariably
adhered to the rule that, where a party is represented by counsel, service of notices must be made
upon counsel and not upon the party personally. Service upon counsel is sufficient and binding upon
the party (Perez v. Ysip 81 Phil. 218; Hernandez v. Clapis 87 Phil. 437; Tanpinco vs. Lozada, L-
17335, January 31, 1962; Valdez vs. Valdez, CA-G.R. No. 28393, May 24, 1962). This rule is
mandatory and service of notice upon the party personally is not only superfluous but also legally
 ineffective; notice given to a party personally is not notice in law (Chaivani vs. Tancinco, 90 Phil.
862; Perez vs. Araneta, L-11788, May 16, 1958; Cabili v. Badelles, L-17786, September 29, 1962;
Capicon v. Abbas, CA-G.R. No. 16870-R, 52 O.G. 6960; Aseniero vs. Fernandez, CA-G.R. No.
23527-B, May 22, 1962. (Rollo, pp. 14-18)

This Court, therefore, affirms the appellate court's findings that Atty. Amarga was one of the counsels for petitioner
and that he remained as the petitioner's counsel after Atty. Salise withdrew from the case and was discharge by the
court.

There is a need to observe the legal formalities before a counsel of record may be considered relieved of his
responsibility as such counsel (Cubar vs. Mendoza, 120 SCRA 768). The withdrawal as counsel of a client, or the
dismissal by the client of his counsel, must be made in a formal petition filed in the case Baquiran vs. Court of
Appeals, 2 SCRA 873, 878). In this case, the termination of the attorney-client relationship between the petitioner
and Atty. Salise does not automatically severe the same relations between the petitioner and Atty. Amarga. Only
Atty. Salise's dismissal was made of record. None was made with regard to the other counsel.

The attorney-client relation does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal made of record; at least so far as
the opposite party is concerned, the relation otherwise continues until the end of the litigation (Visitacion vs. Manit
27 SCRA 523). Unless properly relieved, the counsel is responsible for the conduct of the case (Cortez vs. Court of
Appeals, 83 SCRA 31).

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 2144 April 10, 1989

CELEDONIO QUILBAN, ROMUALDO DALAGAN, FORTUNATO RAMIREZ AMADOR ALARCON and LUIS
AGAWAN, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SANTIAGO R. ROBINOL, respondent.

A.M. No. 2180 April 10, 1989

ATTY. SANTIAGO R. ROBINOL, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. A. R. MONTEMAYOR, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Subjected to frustrations were the dreams of thirty-two (32) squatter families to own the land of approximately 50
square meters each on which their respective homes were built. To vindicate their rights they have aired their plight
before this Court. Thwarted, too, was the benevolence shown by the original owner of the land which parted with its
property at a giveaway price thinking that it was accommodating the landless squatters.

The antecedent facts follow:

The Colegio de San Jose, a Jesuit corporation, (Colegio, for short) used to own a parcel of land at the Seminary
Road, Barrio Bathala, Quezon City. Through its administrator, Father Federico Escaler, it sold said land to the
Quezon City Government as the site for the Quezon City General Hospital but reserved an area of 2,743 square
meters as a possible development site. Squatters, however, settled in the area since 1965 or 1966.

Sometime in 1970, the Colegio, through Father Escaler gave permission to Congressman Luis R. Taruc to build on
the reserved site a house for his residence and a training center for the Christian Social Movement. Seeing the
crowded shanties of squatters, Congressman Taruc broached to Father Escaler the Idea of donating or selling the
land cheap to the squatters. Congressman Taruc then advised the squatters to form an organization and choose a
leader authorized to negotiate with Father Escaler. Following that advice, the squatters formed the "Samahang
Pagkakaisa ng Barrio Bathala" (Samahan, for brevity), with Bernabe Martin as President (Exhibit "24", Robinol), who
was entrusted with the task of negotiating on their behalf for the sale of the land to them.

But instead of working for the welfare of the Samahan, Martin went to one Maximo Rivera, a realtor, with whom he
connived to obtain the sale to the exclusion of the other Samahan members. On 28 March 1971, the land was
ultimately sold to Rivera at P 15 per square meter or a total consideration of P 41,961.65. The prevailing price of the
land in the vicinity then was P 100 to P 120 per square meter. It was evident that Father Escaler had been made to
believe that Rivera represented the squatters on the property. On the same date, 28 March 1971, Rivera obtained
TCT No. 175662 to the property in his name alone.

In 1972, thirty-two heads of families of the Samahan filed Civil Case No. Q-16433, Branch IV, Quezon City, entitled
"Celedonio Quilban, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. Maximo Rivera, et al., Defendants." with the principal prayer that said
defendants be ordered to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of said plaintiffs after reimbursement by the latter
of the corresponding amount paid by Rivera to the Colegio. The Court of First Instance of Quezon City, however,
dismissed the case.

To prosecute the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Samahan members hired as their counsel Atty. Santiago
R. Robinol for which the latter was paid P 2,000.00 as attorney's fees on 8 October 1975 (Exhibit "I"). Atty. Robinol
was also to be given by the members a part of the land, subject matter of the case, equal to the portion that would
pertain to each of them. What was initially a verbal commitment on the land sharing was confirmed in writing on 10
March 1979 (Exhibit "2").

On 14 November 1978, the Court of Appeals reversed the CFI Decision by:

(1) ordering defendant Maximo Rivera and all his co-defendants to execute a deed of
conveyance of the land in question in favor of herein plaintiffs after the payment of
the corresponding amount paid by the defendants to the Colegio de San Jose, Inc.,
and in case of refusal or failure on their part to do so, ordering the Clerk of Court to
execute the same in favor of plaintiffs and declaring TCT No. 175662 (Annex E) null
and void and ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel said certificate
and issue a new one in lieu thereof in the name of plaintiffs-appellants, upon
presentation of the deed of conveyance to be executed in favor of appellants and (2)
ordering appellees jointly and severally to pay appellants the sum of P 2,000.00 as
attomey's fees, plus costs." (p. 30, Report and Recommendation)

To raise the amount of P 41,961.65 ordered paid by the Court of Appeals, plus expenses for ejectment of the non-
plaintiffs occupying the property, conveyance, documentation, transfer of title etc., the five officers of the Samahan
collected, little by little, P 2,500.00 from each head of family. The Treasurer, Luis Agawan, issued the proper
receipts prepared by Atty. Robinol. On 18 May 1979, the sum of P 68,970.00 was turned over to Atty. Robinol by the
officers; on 31 May 1979 the amounts of P l,030.00 and P 2,500.00 respectively; and on 2 June 1979, the sum of P
2,500.00, or a total of P 75,000.00.

After almost a year, the five officers discovered that no payment had been made to Rivera. When queried, Atty.
Robinol replied that there was an intervention filed in the civil case and that a Writ of Execution had not yet been
issued by the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. However, it turned out that the motion for intervention had
already been dismissed. After confronting Atty. Robinol with that fact, the latter gave other excuses, which the
officers discovered to have no basis at all.
On 6 March 1980, 21 out of 32 plaintiffs arrived at a "first consensus" to change their counsel, Atty. Robinol (Exhibit
"3"). The officers of the Samahan thereafter approached Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor, who agreed to be their
counsel, after he was shown the document of 6 March 1980 containing the consensus of the Samahan members to
change Atty. Robinol as their lawyer. Upon Atty. Montemayor's advice, the officers sent Atty. Robinol a letter dated
17 March 1980 informing the latter of their decision to terminate his services and demanding the return of the P
75,000.00 deposited with him (Exhibit "5"). Atty. Robinol turned deaf ears to the demand. A subsequent letter of the
same tenor, dated 31 March 1980 (Exhibit "6"), was similarly disregarded by Atty. Robinol.

On 20 March 1980, Atty. Montemayor formally entered his appearance in Civil Case No. Q-16433 as counsel for the
plaintiffs (Exhibit "8"), vice Atty. Robinol, on the strength of the authority dated 18 March 1980 given him by plaintiffs
in said civil case through the five officers (Exhibit "9"). Atty. Montemayor then filed on 20 March 1980 a Motion for
Execution praying that the defendants and/or the Clerk of Court be directed to execute a deed of conveyance in
favor of the plaintiffs (Exhibit "10"). At the hearing of the Motion for Execution on 5 June 1980, Atty. Robinol
manifested that he had no objection to the appearance of and his substitution by Atty. Montemayor (Exhibits "11" &
"11-A").

Because Atty. Robinol, however, still questioned the first consensus dated 6 March 1980, another document
labelled the "second consensus" (Exhibit "E") was signed by 21 plaintiffs during a meeting held for the purpose on
24 November 1980 to the effect that they had decided to change Atty. Robinol as their counsel because he had
delayed paying for their land notwithstanding the Decision of the Court of Appeals in their favor.

Administrative Case No. 2144

On 15 April 1980 the Samahan officers filed this Administrative Complaint before this Court requesting the invention
of Atty. Robinol for refusal to return the P 75,000.00 and praying that the Court exercise its power of discipline over
members of the Bar unworthy to practice law. The details of their Complaint were embodied in their Joint Affidavit
executed on 14 April 1980 describing what had transpired between them and Atty. Robinol.

In his defense, Atty. Robinol maintains that he was hired by Complainants to appeal their case to the Court of
appeals after they had lost in the lower Court; that their agreement as to attomey's fees was on a contingent basis if
he obtains a reversal of the lower Court Decision, they wig give him a portion of the property subject matter of the
litigation equal to the portion that will pertain to each of the 32 plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-16433; that he did not
receive P 70,000.00 from Complainants on 18 May 1979 but only P 56,470.00; that he prepared and signed the
receipt dated 18 May 1979 showing that he received P 70,000.00 only to save complainants from embarrassment
and shame should their co-plaintiff ask for proof that they (Complainants) have paid their shares, which they have
not; that the correct amount in his possession is only P 62,470.00-it would really be P 75,000.00 had the five
Complainants paid their shares in the amount of P 12,500.00 at P 2,500.00 each and one Fortunate Ramirez paid
his balance of P 30.00; that he had the right to hold the money in his possession as guarantee for the payment of
his attomey's fees of get a portion of the property that win pertain to each of the plaintiffs, he wants his portion
converted to cash, and the cash equivalent of his portion is P 50,000.00 (2,743 square meters divided by 32
plaintiffs equals 85 square meters for each plaintiff, multiplied by P 500.00 up per square meter); that considering
that P 50,000.00 is even less than one-half (1/ 2) per cent of the total value of the property, which is more than a
million pesos, such amount is not unreasonable; that he is ready to give back the amount of P 12,470.00,
representing the difference between P 50,000.00 and the amount of P 62,470.00 in his possession; that
complainants cannot make this Court a collection agency and that while this Court has the exclusive disciplinary
power over members of the Bar, it is equally true that the Court cannot pass judgment on Complainants' plea that
the amount deposited by respondent be returned to them as this prayer should be ventilated in an ordinary action;
that he does not have the slightest intention to appropriate the money in his possession (P 62,470.00) for himself,
but he is holding it until his attomey's fees are satisfied there being no guarantee for its satisfaction because of
Complainants' adamant refusal to pay him; that there was no previous notice to him of his discharge; and that Atty.
Montemayor accepted the case without his Robinols formal withdrawal and conformity.

Administrative Case No. 2180

Pursuing that tack on 29 July 1980, Atty. Robinol filed a complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Anacleto R.
Montemayor for alleged gross unethical conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in that Atty. Montemayor readily accepted
the case without his Robinols formal withdrawal and conformity and knowing fully well that there was no consensus
of all the plaintiffs to discharge him as their counsel.
For his part, Atty. Montemayor denied that the attomey's fees agreed upon by plaintiffs and Atty. Robinol were
purely on a contingent basis, the truth being that the attomey's fees were payable on a cash basis of P 2,000.00
retainer fee, as evidenced by the receipt signed by Atty. Robinol (Annex "I"), plus whatever amount is adjudicated as
attomey's fees by the Court of Appeals; that the contingent fee referred to by Atty. Robinol was the result of his
insistent demand after the Court of Appeals Decision in Civil Case No. Q-16433 was already final, as shown by the
date of the agreement (Annex "2"); that twenty [20] out of thirty-two [32] members of the Samahan signed the
agreement to discharge Atty. Robinol and hire a substitute counsel as shown by Annex "3", which is a majority of
the membership and, therefore, a valid consensus; that he agreed to act as counsel if only to arrest the growing
belief of the Samahan that most members of the Philippine Bar are unprincipled; that although there was no formal
Motion for substitution, there was substantial compliance with Sec. 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as shown by
the formal entry of appearance in Civil Case No. Q-1 6433 (Annex "8"), the written consent of the clients (Annex
"9"), notice to Atty. Robinol of his discharge and substitution (Annexes "10' and "11"), non-objection by Robinol of
his appearance as counsel (Annex "l 2"), and implied consent of the Court to the substitution as shown by its Order
of 29 May 1980 (Annex "l 3"); that his professional and personal actuations as counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. Q-16433, CFI-Quezon City, do not cause dishonor either to himself or to the Philippine Bar; and that the
Complaint against him should be dismissed.

On 1 September 1980 and on 17 December 1980, the Court referred Adm. Case No. 2144 and Adm. Case No.
2180, respectively, to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. On 15
December 1988, the Solicitor General submitted his compliance and recommended:

1. That Atty. Santiago R. Robinol be suspended for three months for refusing to
deliver the funds of the plaintiffs in his possession, with the warning that a more
severe penalty will be imposed for a repetition of the same or similar act, and that he
be ordered to return to the plaintiffs, through the complainants in Adm. Case No.
2134, the sum of P 75,000.00.

2. That the case against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor, Adm. Case No. 2180, be
dismissed, since he has not committed any misconduct imputed to him by Atty.
Robinol. (pp. 59-60, Rollo)

Except for the disciplinary sanction suggested for Atty. Robinol, we concur with the recommendations.

Re: Atty. Santiago R. Robinol

Atty. Robinol has, in fact, been guilty of ethical infractions and grave misconduct that make him unworthy to continue
in the practice of the profession. After the Court of Appeals had rendered a Decision favorable to his clients and he
had received the latter's funds, suddenly, he had a change of mind and decided to convert the payment of his fees
from a portion of land equivalent to that of each of the plaintiffs to P 50,000.00, which he alleges to be the monetary
value of that area. Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no right to unilaterally appropriate his clients' money not only
because he is bound by a written agreement but also because, under the circumstances, it was highly unjust for him
to have done so. His clients were mere squatters who could barely eke out an existence They had painstakingly
raised their respective quotas of P 2,500.00 per family with which to pay for the land only to be deprived of the same
by one who, after having seen the color of money, heart lessly took advantage of them.

Atty. Robinol has no basis to claim that since he was unjustly dismissed by his clients he had the legal right to retain
the money in his possession. Firstly, there was justifiable ground for his discharge as counsel. His clients had lost
confidence in him for he had obviously engaged in dilatory tactics to the detriment of their interests, which he was
duty-bound to protect. Secondly, even if there were no valid ground, he is bereft of any legal right to retain his
clients' funds intended for a specific purpose the purchase of land. He stands obliged to return the money
immediately to their rightful owners.

The principle of quantum meruit applies if a lawyer is employed without a price agreed upon for his services in which
case he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services, as much as he has earned. In this case,
however, there was an express contract and a stipulated mode of compensation. The implied assumpsit
on quantum meruit therefore, is inapplicable.
But Atty. Robinol seeks to impress upon the Court that he had received only the sum of P 62,470.00 and not P
75,000.00 claiming that five (5) officers of the Samahan had not yet paid their shares to P 12,500.00.

We agree with the Solicitor General that complainants' evidence on this score is the more credible and that he had,
in fact, received the total sum of P 75,000.00 inclusive of the share of P 12,500.00 of the five (5) officers of the
Somalian For, in the pleadings filed by Atty. Robinol himself in the civil case below, namely, the Motion for Execution
on 5 June 1979; the Motion for Postponement on 31 August 1979; and the Motion to Set Hearing of Motion for
Execution on 10 March 1980, he made mention of seven (7) persons, who, as of that time, had not yet submitted
their corresponding shares which list, however, did not include any of the five (5) officers of the Samahan.

Inevitable, therefore, is the conclusion that Atty. Robinol has rendered himself unfit to continue in the practice of law.
He has not only violated his oath not to delay any man for money and to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his
clients. He has also brought the profession into disrepute with people who had reposed in it full faith and reliance for
the fulfillment of a life-time ambition to acquire a homelot they could call their own.

Re: Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor

In so far as Atty. Montemayor is concerned, we agree with the findings of the Solicitor General that he has not
exposed himself to any plausible charge of unethical conduct in the exercise of his profession when he agreed to
serve as counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-16433.

Of the thirty-two (32) plaintiffs in said civil case, twenty-one (21) had signed the first consensus of 6 March 1980
expressing their resolve to change their lawyer. In as much as Atty. Robinol sought to exclude seven (7) of the
plaintiffs (out of 32) for non-payment of their shares, only twenty five (25) of them should be considered in
determining the majority. Consequently, twenty-one (21) out of twenty-five (25) is sufficient to make the said
consensus binding. It is more than a simple majority.

Moreover, the following developments estop Atty. Robinol from questioning his discharge as counsel: On 17 March
1980 he was informed in writing by plaintiffs of the termination of his services (Exhibit "5"). That was followed by
another letter of 31 March 1980 of the same tenor (Exhibit "6"). In his Memorandum of 12 December 1985 and
during the proceedings before the lower Court on 5 June 1980 he had stated that he had no objection to Atty.
Montemayor's appearance in Civil Case Q-16433. When the latter did enter his appearance, therefore, on 20 March
1980 it was only after assuring himself that Atty. Robinol's services had been formally terminated. He had in no way
encroached upon the professional employment of a colleague.

There is no gainsaying that clients are free to change their counsel in a pending case at any time (Section 26, Rule
138, Rules of Court) and thereafter employ another lawyer who may then enter his appearance. In this case, the
plaintiffs in the civil suit below decided to change their lawyer, Atty. Robinol, for loss of trust and confidence. That
act was well within their prerogative.

In so far as the complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Robinol against Atty. Montemayor is concerned, therefore, we
find the same absolutely without merit.

ACCORDINGLY, 1) In Administrative Case No. 2144, Atty. Santiago R. Robinol is hereby DISBARRED for having
violated his lawyer's oath to delay no man for money, broken the fiduciary relation between lawyer and client, and
proven himself unworthy to continue in the practice of law. By reason of his unethical actuations, he is hereby
declared to have forfeited his rights to attomey's fees and is ordered to return the amount of P 75,000.00 to the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-16433 through the complainant in the aforementioned Administrative Case.

2) Administrative Case No. 2180 against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor for disbarment is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the respective personal records of Attys. Santiago R. Robinol and
Anacleto R. Montemayor.

This Resolution is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA EARL BEVERLY C. A.C. No. 6166

CENIZA,
Complainant, Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Chico-Nazario,
Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura, and
Peralta, JJ.
ATTY. VIVIAN G. RUBIA,
Respondent. Promulgated:

October 2, 2009
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In a verified complaint[1] dated July 25, 2003 filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant, Maria
Earl Beverly C. Ceniza charged Atty. Vivian G. Rubia with grave misconduct, gross ignorance
of the law and falsification of public documents.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On May 3, 2002, complainant sought the legal services of the respondent in regard to the share
of her mother-in-law in the estate of her husband Carlos Ceniza. As she had no money to pay for
attorneys fees since her mother-in-law would arrive from the United States only in June 2002,
respondent made her sign a promissory note for P32,000.00, which amount was lent by Domingo
Natavio. After her mother-in-law arrived and paid the loan, respondent furnished them a copy of
the complaint for partition and recovery of ownership/possession representing legitime but with
no docket number on it. They kept on following up the progress of the complaint. However, three
months lapsed before respondent informed them that it was already filed in court. It was then that
they received a copy of the complaint with Civil Case No. 4198 and a rubber stamped RECEIVED
thereon.However, when complainant verified the status of the case with the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, she was informed that no case with said title and docket
number was filed.[2]
Further, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law for
intending to file the complaint in Davao del Sur when the properties to be recovered were located
in Koronadal, South Cotabato and Malungon, Sarangani Province, in violation of the rule on
venue that real actions shall be filed in the place where the property is situated.Complainant also
alleged that respondent forged the signature of her husband, Carlito C. Ceniza, in the Affidavit of
Loss attached to a petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate certificate of title filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Digos City, Branch 20, in Misc. Case No. 114-2202.[3]

In her comment, respondent assailed the personality of the complainant to institute the
administrative complaint for disbarment as she was not a party to the action for partition and
recovery of ownership/possession. As such, her allegations in the administrative complaint were
all hearsay, self-serving and unsubstantiated. Further, the charge of forgery of the Affidavit of
Loss was belied by the March 3, 2003 decision of the trial court, wherein Carlito C. Ceniza
affirmed his statements in the said affidavit when he was called to testify.[4]

On February 2, 2004, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

On April 29, 2004, respondent filed a Supplemental Comment explaining the rubber stamped
RECEIVED on the complaint. According to her, when her staff Jan Kirt Lester Soledad was at
the RTC Office of the Clerk of Court, she called him through cellular phone and directed him to
stop the filing of the complaint as the same lacked certain attachments.However, one copy thereof
was already stamped RECEIVED by the receiving court personnel, who also assigned a docket
number. She kept the copies of the complaint, including the one with the stamp, to be filed later
when the attachments are complete.

Meanwhile, on November 7, 2005, respondent filed a Manifestation with Urgent Motion praying
that the administrative complaint be likewise dismissed in view of the dismissal of the criminal
case due to complainants apparent lack of interest to prosecute.

On January 19, 2007, the IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be
found guilty of falsification of public document and be meted the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for a period of three years. The report reads in part, as follows:

A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action, where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. It involved no
private interest. The complainant or person who called the attention of the court to the
attorneys misconduct is in no sense a party and has generally no interest in its outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. It affords
no redress for private grievance. (Tejan v. Cusi, 57 SCRA 154)
Prescinding from the aforequoted ruling, it is therefore irrelevant and immaterial if
herein complainant is not a party to the subject civil complaint prepared by the
respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or
lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether on the basis of the facts
borne out by the record, the charge has been proven.

On the payment of the acceptance fee in the amount of P32,000.00, respondents

contention that she acted as guarantor of Carlos Ceniza, complainants husband, when
he borrowed money from a money lender, Domingo Natavio, the amount representing
the acceptance, does not inspire belief. The promissory note dated May 3, 2002,
appended as Annex A of the complaint-affidavit eloquently shows that consistent with
the complainants allegation, she was made to borrow said amount to be paid as
respondents acceptance fee. It bears stress that the date of the promissory note is the
same date when respondents services were engaged leading to the preparation of the
subject civil complaint. Complainants allegation is further enhanced by the fact that
such promissory note was even notarized by the respondent.

On the alleged filing of the subject civil complaint, it is undisputed that the same was
not filed before the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC Davao Del Sur, as evidenced by
a Certification from the said office appended as Annex A of complainants Manifestation
dated October 14, 2005. Thus, the claim of complainant that respondent falsified or
caused it to falsify the stamp marked received dated May 10, 2002 including the case
number 4198, finds factual and legal bases.

It bears stress that a copy of the subject civil complaint was obtained by complainant
from the respondent herself who tried to impress upon the former that contrary to her
suspicion, the subject civil complaint was already filed in court. However, inquiry made
by the complainant shows otherwise.

Respondents contention that after one copy of the complaint was already stamped by
court personnel in preparation for receiving the same and entering in the courts docket,
she caused it to be withdrawn after realizing that the same lacked certain attachments,
is bereft of merit.

In the first place, respondent miserably failed to mention these lacking attachments that
allegedly caused the withdrawal of the complaint. Secondly, and assuming arguendo
that the withdrawal was due to lacking attachments, how come the same was not filed
in the next office day complete with attachments. And lastly, the Certification of the
Clerk of Court clearly states that Civil Case No. 4188 is not the case of Mercedes
Callejo vda. De Ceniza, et al. vs. Charlotte Ceniza, et al.

xxxx
 The fact that the City Prosecutors Office of Digos, upon motion for
reconsideration of the respondent, dismissed a similar complaint filed by herein
complainant will not in anyway affect the above captioned administrative complaint.

The pendency of a criminal action against the respondent, from the facts of which
the disciplinary proceeding is predicated, does not pose prejudicial question to the
resolution of the issues in the disbarment case. (Calo vs. Degano, 20 SCRA 447) His
conviction is not necessary to hold the lawyer administratively liable because the two
proceedings and their objectives are different and it is not sound public policy to await
the final resolution of a criminal case before the court act on a complaint against a
lawyer as it may emasculate the disciplinary power of the court. (In re Brillantes, 76
SCRA 1) Nor is his acquittal, by this fact alone, a bar to an administrative complaint
against him. (Piatt vs. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350).

The other allegations in the complaint about ignorance of the law are found to be
without basis.

RECOMMENDATION
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that herein respondent Atty.
Vivian C. Rubia, be found guilty of the charge of falsification of public document and
be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3)
years.
On May 31, 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a Resolution adopting the
Investigating Commissioners recommendation with modification, as follows:

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2007-237

Adm. Case No. 6166
Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza vs.
Atty. Vivian G. Rubia

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
A; and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents falsification of public
document, Atty. Vivian G. Rubia is hereby DISBARRED.

However, in its December 11, 2008 Resolution, the Board of Governors reconsidered its May 31,
2007 Resolution by reducing the recommended penalty of disbarment to five years suspension
from the practice of law, thus:

RESOLUTION NO. XVIII-2008-715

Adm. Case No. 6166
Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza vs.
Atty. Vivian G. Rubia

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED

the Recommendation of the Board of Governors First Division of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the Motion
for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED with modification, that Resolution
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2007-237 of the Board of Governors dated 31 May 2007
recommending the Disbarment of Atty. Vivian G. Rubia is reduced to Five (5) years
Suspension from the practice of law.
On April 20, 2009, the IBP forwarded the instant case to this Court as provided under Rule 139-
B, Section 12(b) of the Rules of Court.

Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent from the practice of law for gross misconduct,
ignorance of the law and for falsification of public document. In disbarment proceedings, the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers,
the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof. Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the administrative penalty.[5]

The sole issue in this case is whether or not there is preponderant evidence to warrant the
imposition of administrative sanction against the respondent.
In accusing respondent of falsification of public document, complainant alleged that respondent
misrepresented to her that the complaint was already filed in court, when in fact, upon verification
with the RTC Clerk of Court, it was not. Such misrepresentation is shown by the copy of the
complaint with a stamped RECEIVED and docket number thereon. Apart from said allegations,
complainant has not proferred any proof tending to show that respondent deliberately falsified a
public document.

A perusal of the records shows that complainants evidence consists solely of her Affidavit-
Complaint and the annexes attached therewith. She did not appear in all the mandatory
conferences set by the investigating commissioner in order to give respondent the chance to test
the veracity of her assertions. It is one thing to allege gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or
falsification of public document and another to demonstrate by evidence the specific acts
constituting the same.

Indeed, complainant has no way of knowing the surrounding circumstances behind the filing of
the complaint by respondents staff because she was not present when the same was filed with the
trial court. Complainant failed to disprove by preponderant evidence respondents claim that the
case was not filed but was in fact withdrawn after it was stamped with RECEIVED and assigned
with a docket number. We find this explanation satisfactory and plausible considering that the
stamp did not bear the signature of the receiving court personnel, which is normally done when
pleadings are received by the court.

Further, the certification of the RTC Clerk of Court that the complaint was not filed and that
CIVIL CASE NO. 4198 pertained to another case, did not diminish the truthfulness of
respondents claim, but even tended to bolster it. Necessarily, as the complaint was not filed,
docket number 4198 indicated in the copy of the complaint was assigned to another case thereafter
filed in court.

Thus, for lack of preponderant evidence, the investigating commissioners ruling that respondent
was guilty of falsification of public document, as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, has no
factual basis to stand on.

However, we find that respondent committed some acts for which she should be disciplined or
administratively sanctioned.

We find nothing illegal or reprehensible in respondents act of charging an acceptance fee

of P32,000.00, which amount appears to be reasonable under the circumstances. The impropriety
lies in the fact that she suggested that complainant borrow money from Domingo Natavio for the
payment thereof. This act impresses upon the Court that respondent would do nothing to the cause
of complainants mother-in-law unless payment of the acceptance fee is made. Her duty to render
legal services to her client with competence and diligence should not depend on the payment of
acceptance fee, which was in this case promised to be paid upon the arrival of complainants
mother-in-law in June 2002, or barely a month after respondent accepted the case.

Respondents transgression is compounded further when she severed the lawyer-client

relationship due to overwhelming workload demanded by her new employer Nakayama Group
of Companies, which constrained her to return the money received as well as the records of the
case, thereby leaving her client with no representation. Standing alone, heavy workload is not
sufficient reason for the withdrawal of her services.

Moreover, respondent failed to maintain an open line of communication with her client
regarding the status of their complaint.

Clearly, respondent violated the Lawyers Oath which imposes upon every member of the
bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18, and Canon
22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:
 CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

xxxx

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.

CANON 22 - A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR

GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE
CIRCUMSTANCES.

When a lawyer accepts to handle a case, whether for a fee or gratis et amore, he undertakes
to give his utmost attention, skill and competence to it, regardless of its significance. Thus, his
client, whether rich or poor, has the right to expect that he will discharge his duties diligently and
exert his best efforts, learning and ability to prosecute or defend his (clients) cause with
reasonable dispatch. Failure to fulfill his duties will subject him to grave administrative liability
as a member of the Bar. For the overriding need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people
in the legal profession demands that an erring lawyer should be sanctioned.[6]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Vivian G. Rubia is

found GUILTY of violation of Rule 18.03 and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
effective immediately, with a warning that similar infractions in the future will be dealt with more
severely.

Let all courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified of this Decision, and be it duly
recorded in the personal file of respondent Atty. Vivian G. Rubia.

SO ORDERED.