RAKES v ATLANTIC [G.R. No. 1719. January 23, 1907.] M. H., RAKES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of the defendant, was at
work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard near the Malecon in
Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was used in this work. The defendant has proved
that there were two immediately following one another, upon which were piled lengthwise seven
rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay upon two crosspieces or sills
secured to the cars, but without side pieces or guards to prevent them from slipping off.
According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the car or at its sides.
According to that defendant, some of them were also in front, hauling by a rope. At a certain spot
at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or upset, the
rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was afterwards amputated at about
the knee.

ISSUE:
Whether the company is liable

RULING:
Yes. The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to what extent it existed in fact
and what legal effect is to be given it. In two particulars is he charged with carelessness:
First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work; and
Second.That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along the boards,
either before or behind it.

The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work after noticing the slight
depression of the rail was not of so gross a nature as to constitute negligence, barring his
recovery under the severe American rule. While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only
were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by the foreman to do
so, both the officers of the company and three of the workmen testify that there was a general
prohibition frequently made known to all the gang against walking by the side of the car, and the
foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load. On this
contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of the defendant's contention to
the extent of the general order being made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the
plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate,
although not as its primary cause.

Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which
there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent
of it, but contributing under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to
replace it. this produced the event giving occasion for damages — that is, the sinking of the track
and the sliding of the iron rails.

1. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. — In order to enforce the liability of an employer for injuries
to his employee, it is not necessary that a criminal action be first prosecuted against the employer
or his representative primarily chargeable with the accident. No criminal proceeding having been
taken, the civil action may proceed to judgment.

2. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN. — The responsibility of an employer to his

employee of a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.

3. FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. — Sua cuique culpa nocet. The doctrine known as the "Fellow-
servant rule," exonerating the employer where the injury was incurred through the negligence of a
fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.