Journal of Cleaner Production 45 (2013) 38e49

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Journal of Cleaner Production

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jclepro

Expanding bioplastics production: sustainable business

innovation in the chemical industry
Alastair Iles*, Abigail N. Martin
Department of Environmental Science, Policy, and Management, University of California at Berkeley, 130 Mulford Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: The case of bioplastics illustrates how business models can link producers and customers through the
Received 13 September 2010 development of new technologies and products. Chemical companies have assumed that reducing costs,
Received in revised form increasing yields, and developing better feedstock supplies will guarantee the success of bioplastics in
5 March 2012
the market, yet a number of unconventional hurdles exist. Companies need to build markets for bio-
Accepted 7 May 2012
plastics and to assure customers that bioplastics are indeed sustainably made. We contend that
Available online 22 May 2012
companies are most able to develop business models that bring bioplastics to market effectively when
they develop and mobilize their “dynamic capabilities” around sustainability. DuPont, BASF, and Braskem
Keywords:
Bioplastics
have identified new market opportunities for bioplastics, designed distinctive types of business models
Biopolymers to seize these opportunities, and devised ways to create increased value by communicating performance
Chemical industry advantages and environmental impact reduction to downstream entities. Because they have not included
Business models societal actors in their efforts to define sustainability, the firms face significant risk that their sustainable
Dynamic capabilities value propositions may not endure without further innovations in creating accountability systems.
Innovation Ó 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
BASF
DuPont
Braskem

1. Introduction
Sustainable innovation in the global chemical industry can take
different forms. Companies may make their existing manufacturing
processes more efficient, reorganize their research and develop-
ment functions to focus on environmentally-friendly technologies
such as green chemistry, or impose environmental performance
standards on suppliers. Since the 1990s, many companies have
moved from pollution prevention to green chemistry as a more
fundamental way to achieve sustainability. Green chemistry d
a broad term referring to chemical production that aims to reduce
environmental and health hazards and to advance sustainability
(Clark and Deswarte, 2008) d aligns with the industry’s basic
business strategy of achieving growth through new products and
process technologies (Arora et al., 2001). Companies have focused
on green chemistry process innovations that make conventional
chemical production more efficient and less costly (Eder, 2003;
Radonjic and Tominc, 2007). Yet companies could also concentrate
on developing new processes and technologies that meet current
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: iles@berkeley.edu (A. Iles).
market demand, or even create new market demand for innovative,
environmentally-friendly products. A major challenge, then, is to
find ways to integrate sustainable innovation in this vein into the
chemical industry’s business models.
The case of bioplastics illustrates how business models can play
a central role in linking producers and customers through the
development of new technologies and products. Faced with
growing environmental concerns from consumers and govern-
ments, as well as unpredictable, high fossil fuel prices, many
established chemical companies have explored producing poly-
mers from renewable biomass feedstock such as corn and sugar-
cane. Although the use of biomass to produce chemicals is not
novel, scientific advances over the last decade in industrial
biotechnology have diminished the costs of converting organic
material into platform chemicals that can supply most other
chemical manufacturing streams, such as polymers (Carole et al.,
2004). The European Technology Platform for Sustainable Chem-
istry estimates that up to 30 percent of raw materials for the
European chemical industry could come from renewable sources by
2025 (SusChem, 2005). Yet to date, biobased chemical production is
tiny compared to conventional chemicals. Further, although bio-
based product lines could lessen the negative environmental and
social impacts associated with petroleum feedstock (O’Rourke and

0959-6526/$ e see front matter Ó 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2012.05.008
 A. Iles, A.N. Martin / Journal of Cleaner Production 45 (2013) 38e49
Connolly, 2003), they can still have significant impacts. Despite the
relatively rapid expansion of biobased chemicals in the 2000s, the
chemical sector continues to grapple with the implications of
switching to a new raw material.
To understand how industry is experimenting with this transi-
tion, we investigate bioplastics, the fastest growing biobased
product line globally. In recent years, companies have introduced
corn-based cups and packaging, corn-based fibers for use in carpets
and clothes, and bottles made from sugarcane. These products are
marketed as offering potential environmental advantages over
conventional plastics, along with some economic benefits. But like
other biobased innovations, bioplastics have struggled to achieve
market share; according to one estimate, bioplastics constitute less
than 0.5% of world plastics consumption (Shen et al., 2009).
Conventional plastics continue to dominate the market for several
reasons. Petroleum-based production benefits from large econo-
mies of scale and mature technologies. There are also difficulties in
substituting familiar incumbent plastics with new untried plastics,
as well as in scaling small-scale biotechnologies to industrial levels
(SBI Energy, 2010). It is still unclear whether bioplastics can be
profitable for industry despite the sunk costs required to expand
R&D activities and create new infrastructure. In addition, sustain-
ability issues pertaining to bioplastics remain unresolved, calling
into question the bioplastic value proposition.
This article examines the bioplastic businesses of three major
chemical companies to understand how firms are devising business
models to address the challenges of making the business case for
bioplastics and addressing sustainability. We contend that
companies are most able to develop business models that bring
bioplastics to market in a sustainable fashion when they mobilize
their “dynamic capabilities” (Teece, 2007). After discussing busi-
ness models for sustainability and the dynamic capabilities
framework, we contextualize the emergence of the bioplastic
industry within the trajectory of the traditional plastics production
system. BASF, DuPont, and Braskem are multi-national incumbents
and possess significant resources while continuing to thrive in their
conventional plastics businesses. These companies, however,
diverge in how they have mobilized their dynamic capabilities, thus
making the role of such capabilities in adapting business strategies
clearer. By evaluating how firm-level dynamic capabilities inform
business models for sustainable innovation, researchers can gain
rich insight into the nature and impacts of business models in
advancing industrial sustainability.
2. From corporate environmental performance to business
models for sustainability
Over the past 15 years, business and organizational scholars
have recognized that adhering to regulation and implementing
voluntary pollution prevention programs are not the only critical
factors in achieving better corporate environmental performance.
Porter and Van der Linde (1995) hypothesized that businesses
could achieve new competitive advantage by viewing environ-
mental issues as core to their business strategies. Instead of treating
pollution as extrinsic to production, companies could profit from
reducing their environmental impacts, or by developing products
with superior environmental outcomes. Hoffman (2000) added
that companies can lobby governments to recast regulation in more
stringent terms in order to crystallize markets for products or
services that meet the newly identified environmental needs of
customers. Moreover, instead of opposing consumer and NGO
pressures, companies can also help create these new markets by
responding positively to societal concerns (Hoffman, 2000). A
growing body of empirical research suggests that these principles
are broadly valid.
39
Yet the organizational behaviors and processes underlying how
companies move toward sustainability are left relatively unspeci-
fied. Researchers studying the interface of environmental perfor-
mance and competitive advantage in business strategies often
neglect the ways in which companies shift the focus of their R&D
capabilities, reorganize their innovation processes around new
techniques and inputs, collaborate with other industrial sectors and
stakeholders, and build markets around new definitions of
sustainability. One approach to developing more applied theory is
to focus on the genesis and adaptation of business models. Whereas
a business strategy is concerned with how a firm will compete,
a business model focuses attention on the “core logic” underlying
how various “activity systems” in the company can fit together to
deliver value to its customers and suppliers (Linder and Cantrell,
2000; Magretta, 2002).
Chemical companies are recognizing the centrality of business
models to meet challenges of taking bioplastics to market.
Companies can innovate not only in technologies but also in busi-
ness models (Chesbrough, 2010; Demil and Lecocq, 2010). Estab-
lished companies face decisions about whether and to what extent
they will change familiar products and processes that are already
profitable to integrate bioplastics into their portfolio (cf. Johnson
and Suskewicz, 2009).1 Confronted with uncertain market pros-
pects for bioplastics, they must imagine how using biomass feed-
stock can add value to their firm as well as to their customers and
suppliers. As with petrochemicals, companies seek to develop
superior performance attributes that result in beneficial product
differentiation for bioplastics. However, a more challenging deci-
sion is whether to substitute incumbent products with bioplastics,
or make bioplastics alongside conventional plastics. Companies
may choose to adapt their existing business model or to nestle an
experimental biobased business within their existing model to
minimize risk. They may also create new business entities by
acquiring smaller firms, such as biotechnology start-ups. No busi-
ness model will fit all companies given differences in strategy,
organizational history, and societal settings. However, business
models should reflect a company’s vision for how it will interpret
evolving technologies, customer demand, and regulatory
requirements.
The development of business models around bioplastics can
force chemical companies to consider more complex questions
around what sustainability means for their value chain. Faced with
consumer reluctance to buy dubiously sourced bioplastics or diffi-
culties in obtaining enough biomass from agricultural systems in
a sustainable fashion, companies need business models that
encompass more than defining competitive strategies, investment
priorities, R&D, commercialization and marketing plans. They need
models that to help them foresee and manage obstacles across the
supply chain, such as integrating unfamiliar technologies,
rebuilding relationships with suppliers and customers, and
ensuring environmentally and socially beneficial outcomes across
both the value chain and the product life cycle. In devising business
models for bioplastics as a more sustainable product than
conventional plastics, chemical companies may need to decide how
far to restructure their core logic around realizing ecological and
social value.
Building on Teece (2007), we posit that firms can generate
business models for sustainability by (1) creating a higher strategic
decision-making process, and (2) mobilizing their dynamic capa-
bilities around sustainability outcomes specifically. Dynamic
1
Business models may serve different roles and functions in the case of start-ups,
like Genomatica and BioAmber. These firms must evaluate how to compete with
incumbent technologies, not how to deal with their existing businesses.
40 A. Iles, A.N. Martin / Journal of Cleaner Production 45 (2013) 38e49
capabilities are internal processes creating, replacing or adjusting
a business model in response to changing business environments
and new customer needs (Teece, 2007). The strategic decision-
making level (the why) helps drive the capabilities level (the
how). The dynamic capabilities framework groups these company-
wide abilities into three areas: (i) sensing opportunities and
threats; (ii) seizing opportunities; and (iii) maintaining competi-
tiveness by reconfiguring a company’s assets. Mechanisms of
dynamic capabilities include practices, policies, organizational
units, tools, and incentives for generation and use of data, and
workforce modifications.
The framework posits that business strategy involves devel-
oping business models and technologies that achieve competitive
advantage by reshaping the business ecosystem, rather than by
“coping with competition” (e.g. Porter and Van der Linde, 1995).
From this perspective, successful innovation in a changing busi-
ness environment requires a focus on “meta-competence”, as
opposed to operational competence (Teece, 2007). In practice, this
can mean discovering new business opportunities by defining
markets and reshaping industrial norms, or by developing
new combinations of knowledge and technologies through
creating cross-functional research teams supported by new
product development routines (Teece, 2007; Eisenhardt and
Martin, 2000).
By moving from the dynamic capabilities framework to the
question of how business models can help to broaden the research
field of sustainable innovation, researchers can evaluate the extent
to which companies’ meta-competencies engage societal-based
definitions of ecological and social value. In this view, the devel-
opment of business models for sustainability in the bioplastics
market depends on whether chemical companies can orchestrate
ongoing improvement and accountability for sustainability
outcomes. Bioplastic business models in chemical companies e if
they exist e are often poorly calibrated with sustainability goals.
Therefore, we adapt Teece’s framework so that it incorporates
specific processes for making sustainability more valuable to
companies, and emphasizes accountability for actual sustainability
outcomes.
To increase the likelihood that a company adopts a business
model that enhances sustainability, the dynamic capabilities of
a firm should focus on fulfilling some or all of the conditions
identified by Boons and Ludeke-Freund (2013). That is, dynamic
capabilities should address how the company will generate its
profitability from making bioplastics ecologically and socially
valuable, how it will engage with societal actors to define and
monitor this value, how it will collaborate with suppliers and
customers to create value for them as well, and how the revenues
will be shared equitably across the production chain. In this study,
we focus on the dynamic capabilities of using research and devel-
opment to find novel value propositions, commercializing a bio-
plastic business model, and embedding it widely in the company
with ongoing improvement. To increase the likelihood of mean-
ingful sustainability outcomes, business models should include
accountability systems (Weber, 2003; Iles, 2007). Accountability
systems connect the ongoing development of technologies with
changing societal, policy, and market pressures for increased
sustainability, and make companies accountable to shareholders,
workers, governments, consumers, and communities for substan-
tive progress in achieving sustainability. Increased accountability
for sustainable outcomes can strengthen nascent dynamic capa-
bilities, feeding back into innovation and potentially enhancing
a firm’s competitive advantage. Thus, companies can improve their
prospects by structuring their dynamic capabilities around
achieving both competitive advantage and sustainability within
and outside of traditional company boundaries.
3. Methods
Initially, we investigated why the emerging bioplastics sector
has struggled to establish itself amidst traditional business models
in the petrochemical plastics industry. Whereas business models
for incumbent chemicals are organized by large production scales
and established client preferences, the emerging bioplastics sector
poses new technical, business, and infrastructure challenges that
companies are still learning to address. To develop bioplastics
product lines, chemical companies must attend to changing
customer needs, markets, and socio-political conditions together
with the organizational, scientific, and marketing challenges of
integrating industrial biotechnology and agricultural resources
into their supply chain in ways that can maximize existing
manufacturing systems and demonstrate ecological value.
To understand how companies responded to these challenges,
we adapted the dynamic capabilities framework to guide
a comparative case study of bioplastics adoption. Most research on
dynamic capabilities to date have focused on single company or
industry examples. We chose three companies from different geo-
political settings e BASF, DuPont, and Braskem, headquartered in
Germany, the US, and Brazil respectively e that are industry leaders
in conventional plastics manufacturing. Each of these firms have
introduced bioplastics as specific intermediate or platform chem-
icals. Bio-propanediol, PDO, (DuPont) and polyhydroxyalkanoates,
PHAs, (BASF) are now the largest intermediate biobased chemicals
being produced, while the platform chemical bio-polyethylene
(Braskem) may develop into the single largest bioplastic product
by 2015 (SBI Energy, 2010; Shen et al., 2009).
We created a standard tripartite format for gathering data
around how companies have been (1) sensing and shaping oppor-
tunities and threats; (2) seizing opportunities; and, (3) maintaining
competitiveness by reconfiguring a company’s assets. We used
a range of empirical evidence. Using electronic searches, we
surveyed the scientific, business, market, and policy literatures
regarding how each company conceived of, developed, and mar-
keted its bioplastic technology. We also reviewed the corporate
policies, reports, statements, and life-cycle assessments that each
company produced, for both its entire biobased chemical portfolio
and the specific bioplastic that we focused on. In addition, we
interviewed research and marketing managers at the three
companies, and analyzed their public conference presentations.
4. From incumbent plastics to bioplastics production
In this section, we review the conventional plastics production
system and the challenges that chemical companies face in
manufacturing bioplastics. We then sketch major trends in how
bioplastics are emerging. This includes a brief background of the
industrial context in which individual companies have struggled to
develop new business models around biobased plastic innovations.
Chemical companies have assumed that reducing costs, increasing
yields, developing better feedstock supplies, and simplifying
production will guarantee the success of bioplastics in the market,
yet a number of unusual hurdles exist.
Eighty percent of conventional plastics produced today are ther-
moplastics, which can be re-melted and, therefore, recycled. Both
thermoplastics and the smaller category of thermosetting polymers
(stronger, durable molecular structures that cannot be later remol-
ded) are made in tightly integrated manufacturing complexes.
Beginning at petrochemical refineries, cracking processes transform
crude oil and natural gas into platform chemicals like the monomers
ethylene and propylene. Polymerization occurs at nearby industrial
sites where platform chemicals are chemically bonded into polymer
chains. Once the polymers are compounded into process-ready
 A. Iles, A.N. Martin / Journal of Cleaner Production 45 (2013) 38e49
pellets, they are sold to customers that transform the pellets into
plastic products sold further downstream to other manufacturers or
retailers. Excepting historic polymers like Plexiglas, most polymers
are not marketed as brands that are known to downstream manu-
facturers and consumers (Meikle, 1997).
Business models for conventional plastics reflect a highly stable
value chain rooted in mature markets. Over eighty years, the
various production stages from polymerization to downstream
plastics manufacturing have become standardized around partic-
ular inputs, processing systems, operating practices, economic
models, product specifications, and measurements of output and
environmental impacts (Ludwig, 1999). As a result, it is difficult and
costly for companies to gain additional market share by introducing
new polymers (Stevens, 2002). Companies can invest heavily in
developing a new polymer, only to find that customers prefer
incumbent products that perform as expected in their injection
molding, extrusion and casting machinery. Thus, competitive
advantage in large polymer businesses is predominantly achieved
by reducing production costs and increasing reaction yields, and
product innovation is normally limited by the need to find “drop-
in” polymer blends that mirror the attributes of existing plastics.
However, producers can gain new market share through inno-
vation that satisfies performance expectations while offering some
additional benefit such as higher quality or better environmental
impacts. One area that has gained attention over the last three
decades is degradability. Plastics are valued for their ability to resist
degradation, making plastic waste a serious challenge. The US
Environmental Protection Agency estimates that in 2008, the US
alone generated 13 million tons of plastic in the municipal solid
waste stream (US EPA, 2009). Such waste may persist for decades to
millennia, and incineration can release toxic fumes.
In the 1980s, several companies responded to this concern by
introducing polymers made in part from plant starches, which
would theoretically degrade once in the waste stream. These plant-
based polymers were made into polyethylene blends for a number
of throw-away applications, such as agricultural mulch films, food
and beverage containers, and shopping bags. With enough sunlight,
the starch component could biodegrade. However, potentially toxic
polyethylene residues were left behind (Stevens, 2002). Companies
eager to market the plant-based blends as biodegradable failed to
consider the many environmental factors that determine how
plastics decompose in waste streams. As a result, the emerging
bioplastics industry became associated with misleading environ-
mental claims, impairing market acceptance and contributing to
societal skepticism about bioplastics. To restore credibility, indus-
trial standards organizations issued testing guides to distinguish
between degradable, biodegradable and compostable plastics
(Krzana et al., 2006). Yet most early starchepolyethylene blends did
not meet biodegradable or compostable standards. Despite these
set-backs, polymer producers continued to view biodegradability as
a business opportunity in light of government and retailer policies
that encourage biodegradable plastics (Gross and Kalra, 2002).
As scientific developments have grown around biopolymer
science, the emphasis on “bio” has shifted from biodegradable to
“renewably-sourced” (Freemantle, 2005). Table 1 outlines the three
most common routes to bioplastic manufacturing. Not included in
this table are pathways currently under development such as the
genetic engineering of plants like switchgrass to produce polymers
directly in plant cells, which may reduce the costly separation
operation associated with fermentation. Currently, routes that
involve fermentation represent the most active areas of biopolymer
production. These biopolymers are typically produced at bio-
refineries that are constructed near crop collection and processing
points to avoid the costs of transporting biomass over long
distances. Currently, most of these complexes process one
41
Table 1
Current pathways for biopolymers.
Current methods for Biopolymers Examples of
biopolymer production marketed biopolymers
Modified natural Starch, starch derivatives; Novamont’s starch
polymers from Cellulose, cellulose resin: Mater-Bi
plant material derivatives; Lignin
Polymers made Polyhydroxialcanoates, Metabolix’s PHA: Mirel
directly by such as Polyhydroxi-
micro-organisms butyrate and
or plants copolymers (PHB/PHA);
Polylactic acid (PLA)
Polymers made from Polylactic acid (PLA) NatureWorks’ PLA
monomers obtained Polypropylene- DuPont’s PPT: Sorona
by fermentation terephtalate (PPT)
Polyethylene (PE) and Braskem’s Green PE
other ethylene derivatives
feedstock type. It is expected that future biorefineries will switch
between multiple feedstock in concert with agricultural and
economic conditions (Clark and Deswarte, 2008).
Entering biobased chemical manufacturing is a complex deci-
sion for established chemical companies thriving on conventional
chemical production systems. Firms vary in their approaches: they
may adapt their existing business model to hedge their feedstock
sources by developing biobased versions of incumbent plastics, or
they may create a new model by building a distinct biobased
division to produce new plastics. In either case, companies consider
how trends in fossil fuel prices, evolving regulatory systems (such
as the European Union’s new REACH regime), and greater demand
for ecologically-friendly products affect the business case for bio-
plastics (SBI Energy, 2010).
To maintain markets, producers contend that biobased poly-
mers must meet at least the same processing and performance
specifications that exist for conventional polymers (Willems, 2009;
Bryndza, personal communication, April 2011). Following this logic,
the industry has increasingly focused on duplicating the most
commonly used families of thermoplastics to make biopolymers
more attractive as drop-ins to customers. Some biopolymers have
lower material performance compared to their conventional
counterparts in terms of melting strength, thermal instability, and
shear sensitivity (Shen et al., 2009). Polymer producers have
resolved this issue by blending biopolymers with petroleum-based
monomers or polymers, but reducing the renewable content and
making it more difficult to recycle or reuse the materials.
Creating high-performing biopolymers at a reasonable cost
continues to be a key concern. Bioplastics require sizeable resources
for R&D and factory construction. Although the fermentation plants
needed for biopolymer production are less complex and costly to
build than traditional petrochemical plants (Brice, 2011), incum-
bent plastics often benefit from sunk infrastructure costs and
government subsidies. Scaling up biological processes presents
additional challenges. Biopolymer production requires expensive
enzymes that cannot be recycled and must be kept alive. Reducing
these costs depends on designing and stabilizing new microbial
metabolic pathways that differ from the reaction optimization
procedure that chemical companies understand well (SBI Energy,
2010). Moreover, bioplastics compete in a market that is already
inundated with incumbents that have multiple functionalities and
undergo continual performance improvements, offering immense
flexibility to manufacturers (Bryndza, 2011).
Biopolymer production demands that chemical companies
incorporate new knowledge and technology from modern molec-
ular biology, microbial biotechnology and metabolic engineering
to lower the costs of biopolymer production. The chemical industry
is fairly insular and most established companies have little
42 A. Iles, A.N. Martin / Journal of Cleaner Production 45 (2013) 38e49
experience with inputs and technologies that differ from traditional
production, particularly in the agricultural sector. Companies either
invest building in-house biotechnology capabilities or partner with
agriculture or biotechnology firms, which generally lack the process
engineering abilities or resources needed for large-scale polymer
production (Bryndza, personal communication, April 2011).
The challenges of developing bioplastic business models are
well-illustrated by the case of polylactic acid (PLA), a compostable
biopolymer. In 2000, Dow Chemical Company and Cargill, a leading
corn processor, formed DoweCargill LLC, a joint venture (JV) to
produce PLA, from corn at a plant in Nebraska and market it to
manufacturers of food containers. Cargill had developed key tech-
nologies for PLA production since it began researching the
biopolymer in 1988 as a potential value-added product from its
corn processing. For Dow, the partnership was an unfamiliar foray
into using industry biotechnology and agricultural feedstocks for
chemical production (Ritter, 2002). Combining Cargill’s technology
with Dow’s expertise in polymer production and marketing, the JV
represented an opportunity for both companies to harness their
dynamic capabilities for the emerging biopolymer market.
Initially, PLA was markedly more expensive to produce than
conventional polymers. Moreover, it was not a drop-in technology
and required changes in downstream manufacturing, making
potential customers tepid. In marketing PLA, the JV failed to
demonstrate to customers why and how PLA was superior to
incumbents such as PET in both environmental and performance
terms, leading to uncertainty regarding how PLA might perform in
various applications. Frustrated by PLA’s apparently poor market
reception (personal communication, Dow executive, May 2011), Dow
sold its share to Cargill in 2005 (Tullo, 2005). In 2007, Cargill part-
nered with Teijin Corporation, a large Japanese chemical company to
form NatureWorks LLC. NatureWorks collaborated with its customers
to identify new applications and marketed a suite of PLA polymers
under the trademark Ingeo as compostable material ideal for pack-
aging and beverage applications. The company also emphasized cost
reduction by expanding its scale of production economy.
The case of PLA shows how business strategy for an early
biopolymer evolved when dynamic capabilities informed the
business model for a biobased chemical. Whereas the DoweCargill
JV failed to engage business stakeholders, NatureWorks helped
shape the bioplastics ecosystem by staying in alignment with
customer needs. By 2009, PLA had garnered 72 percent of the
intermediate biopolymer market (SBI Energy, 2010). However,
customers continue to have significant concerns about PLA’s
performance in containers exposed to heat and its underlying
sustainability as a corn-based product. In the next section, we
discuss a number of the environmental concerns around bio-
plastics. As bioplastics grow from their infancy into more main-
stream markets, companies must build business models that can
assure customers that bioplastics are indeed sustainably made.
5. Comparing dynamic capabilities for sustainability in
bioplastics business models at BASF, Braskem and DuPont
To understand whether and how conventional plastics producers
are managing the challenges discussed above, we compare the
approaches of BASF, Braskem and DuPont to developing business
Table 2
Comparison between companies.
Company Polymer Renewable feedstock Production technology
BASF PHAs Corn Made by micro-organisms
DuPont Bio-PDO Corn Fermentation
Braskem Green PE Sugarcane ethanol Purification of ethanol
models for integrating biobased resources into their polymer port-
folios. In each case, the firm built distinctive business models that
addressed various sustainability, organizational, scientific, and
marketing challenges in adapting new feedstock and technologies to
their existing chemical manufacturing activities. Table 2 summarizes
the companies and their respective bioplastic technologies, feed-
stock, degree of challenge to incumbent plastics, and markets.
In the late 1990s, DuPont set out to develop a biomass version of
1,3-propanediol from corn, using genetically engineered yeast, and
designed a completely new plastic product to compete against
established polymers with valuable new characteristics. The
product, Sorona, entered the market in the early 2000s, with
a biomass version finally arriving by 2007. Around 2003, BASF
wanted to substitute its petrochemical-based biodegradable Eco-
flex film product with a biobased chemical to secure access to an
ecologically conscious niche consumer market, and chose to test
novel polyhydroxyalkanoates (PHAs) made from starch. Not long
afterward, BASF decided to abandon this effort. Since, they have
resurrected their biomass feedstock strategy by using the now-
established PLA polymer. In 2007, Braskem decided to produce
polyethylene from sugarcane, using fermentation technologies, as
a drop-in replacement for PE made from petrochemicals, to take
advantage of new consumer product company efforts to brand their
plastic containers as biodegradable.
However, none of the companies have developed business
models that go beyond traditional formulations of value to include
sustainability. Sustainable value propositions should incorporate
the concerns of societal actors regarding the “balance of economic,
ecological and social value.” We argue that companies can develop
sustainable value propositions by focusing their dynamic capabil-
ities not only on achieving competitive advantage but also on
driving, and creating accountability for, sustainability within and
outside of traditional firm boundaries. This requires developing
value propositions that are not only in concert with a firm’s oper-
ational capabilities and the immediate business ecosystem, but also
with a larger network of societal actors. Firms may choose from
a spectrum of values. Unlike traditional value propositions, these
dimensions of value are framed through societal discourses and
behavior. Sustainable value propositions reflect how broader soci-
etal benefits are defined, for example, whether regulation and
policy demand greater environmental performance from compa-
nies or regional reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, or
whether customer behaviors are influenced by their perception of
a product’s environmental impact.
In this section, we use Teece’s tripartite framework to understand
whether and how each firm restructured and mobilized its dynamic
capabilities to bring a new product to market vis-a-vis incumbent
polymer businesses, and to devise a sustainable value proposition
for bioplastics in conjunction with societal actors. Table 3 summa-
rizes the dynamic capabilities we discovered across the firms.
5.1. Sensing and shaping opportunities and threats for new
bioplastic businesses
BASF, Braskem and DuPont all perceived opportunities in
exploring biobased feedstock alongside fossil fuel feedstock. Each
company initially targeted a market segment for conventional
Degree of challenge to incumbent plastics Market
Novel polymer requiring processing changes Niche biodegradable film
Novel polymer with new properties Major fiber plastics
Drop-in substitute for existing polymer Commodity plastics
 A. Iles, A.N. Martin / Journal of Cleaner Production 45 (2013) 38e49 43

Table 3
Comparison of dynamic capabilities.

Company Sensing opportunities and threats Seizing opportunities Maintaining competitiveness

DuPont Company-wide life science Backward integration into agricultural feedstock Corporate sustainability goals
policy and R&D
R&D partnership with Development of “renewably-sourced” brand Sorona New acquisitions, notably Genencor
biotechnology firm
Prioritization of bioplastics Collaboration with agri-food firm Internal biobased initiatives such as
within company portfolio Bio-Based Materials business unit
R&D screening process to Engagement with downstream manufacturers
re-evaluate top 10 renewable to design products
materials Creation of a new corporate eco-label

BASF Identification of market opportunities
in ecologically sensitive consumers
Research agreement with Metabolix
to test PHA in product
Formulation of a branded biobased Ecoflex by
purchasing PLA from NatureWorks
Collaboration with organizations, governments,
and industry rivals to set market-shaping standards
Marketing strategy emphasizing biodegradability
Production of software tool, Ecovio Eco-Efficiency Compass
Investment in university research to
determine potential for scaling
up bioplastics production
New acquisitions, notably Cognis

Braskem Use of global market research
Combination of existing technologies
and ethanol supply chain with some
modification for modern manufacturing
Commercialization of ethanol-based PE using Investment in R&D facilities
well-established supply infrastructure Sponsorship of a roadmap for
Development of its own bioconversion expertise renewable raw materials
through partnership with fermentation firm
Negotiation of many contracts with consumer
product manufacturers
Creation of a corporate eco-label, “I am Green”.

plastics in which they already had market share. Yet the cases
diverged in how each firm mobilized their sensing and shaping
capabilities to conceptualize the integration of agricultural feed-
stock and bioconversion. This is unsurprising given chemical firms
vary considerably in their histories and internal cultures in terms of
their willingness to move into new core production areas
(Chandler, 2005). Each company’s ability to identify their value
proposition for bioplastics is grounded in internal processes to
direct R&D and select new technologies; connect with science and
technology developments outside the firm; and identify business
opportunities throughout their value chain.
5.1.1. DuPont
Throughout its history, DuPont has repeatedly switched its
chemistries (Chandler, 2005). Most recently, the company has
grown more adept in life sciences, beginning with the decision to
open an $85 million life sciences research complex at its Delaware
Experimental Station in 1987. The company began recasting itself as
a life sciences enterprise as a new company-wide strategy
(Chandler, 2005). Yet DuPont’s bioplastic business model did not
emerge wholly from this strategic shift at the corporate level; the
development of bioplastics was also a response to a competitive
threat to its polymer division. In the early 1990s, Shell Chemical
commercialized a new way to manufacture polytrimethylene
terephthalate (PTT) polymers. PTT has nylon-like strength and
unique dye-ability and static-resistance properties, but has histor-
ically been heavily neglected since cheaper-to-make nylon-based
polymers dominated the market. Shell’s competitive advantage
was based on their ability to economically produce large quantities
of the fossil fuel-based monomer 1,3-propanediol (PDO). To protect
the market share it had acquired through its established nylon
business, DuPont sought to develop a PTT business model by
researching other economical routes for PDO production.
Drawing on its new capacities in the life sciences, DuPont
created an R&D partnership in 1995 to investigate a sugar-based
route for PDO production with Genencor, an industrial enzyme
producer with expertise in metabolic engineering. Using Gen-
encor’s bioconversion technology, DuPont achieved a five hundred-
fold improvement in PDO productivity at a cost competitive with
Shell (OECD, 2001). To decide what feedstock to source,
a brainstorming session was held at the Delaware Experimental
Station in which an engineering team proposed manufacturing PDO
from the sugars in corn given the availability and affordability of
corn in the US (Kurian, personal communication, December 2008).
DuPont initially invested in bio-PDO to find a cheaper method
for PTT production. However, its motivations for bio-PDO produc-
tion evolved as the firm realized that polymers made with bio-PDO
had environmental marketing benefits. Bio-PDO presented an
opportunity to build wholly new business models for “greener”
polymers with novel performance characteristics that could be used
to manufacture durable and non-durable applications (Kurian,
2005). By constructing a business model around bio-PDO, DuPont
could link its new life science capabilities with its corporate
sustainability goals. Thus, although DuPont lacked a coherent vision
for introducing biobased materials, the prescience of their internal
R&D teams and corporate management was critical in a number of
ways. By combining their emerging life science expertise with
a strategic partnership, DuPont was able to successfully experiment
with using a biobased monomer for PTT production. Faced with this
development, the company re-calibrated its business model to
focus on bio-PDO as the foundation for new product lines that could
be marketed as renewably-sourced.
With greater experience in designing and making bio-PDO, the
firm began institutionalizing its sensing capabilities with an R&D
screening process that regularly re-evaluates opportunities to
integrate renewable sources across the value chain from agricul-
tural seeds, farming, bioconversion, to intermediate chemicals and
biofuels (Bryndza, 2011). DuPont’s business model is based on
deriving sustainable value from not only developing new markets
but also finding ways to control the entire supply chain. DuPont’s
business model continues to evolve as an internal team of experts
in biology, chemistry, materials science, process economics, and
product marketing periodically conducts a company-wide audit to
identify the top 10 renewable raw material opportunities (Bryndza,
2011). This audit allows the company to flexibly evaluate the
incumbency and scaling-up challenges that biobased materials
face, and choose only those possibilities where the materials can
make inroads in the shorter term. As a result, the families of
chemicals that DuPont now formulates with Bio-PDO are the first of
what may be many biobased products.
44 A. Iles, A.N. Martin / Journal of Cleaner Production 45 (2013) 38e49
5.1.2. BASF
Compared to DuPont, BASF has typically taken a conservative
stance in adopting new chemistries (Chandler, 2005). BASF did not
mobilize its dynamic capabilities around unfamiliar biobased
chemicals and life science expertise. Rather the company built upon
its strengths in marketing and standardization. The firm identified
a limited opportunity for integrating biomass resources into its
polymer business as a way to strengthen the marketing of its
Ecoflex packaging film. Sensing that European regulatory changes
for package recycling could lead to new market niches, the
company released Ecoflex in 1998 as a petrochemical-based plastic,
which has the properties of conventional polyethylene (PE), the
most widely used plastics for making plastic bags and other durable
and non-durable products. Unlike PE, Ecoflex is biodegradable
according to standards in Europe, the US, and Japan, where BASF
offered Ecoflex at a premium to environmentally-conscious
customers. Thus, the Ecoflex business model relied on existing
distribution channels for PE (Daemmrich, 2009).
BASF did not view biodegradable plastics as a fast-growing
market segment capable of displacing incumbent plastics, and
was initially uninterested in product differentiation beyond
biodegradability. However, as it prepared to enter the US market in
2003, BASF became concerned that customers would not view
Ecoflex as “green enough” compared to the increasingly-known
NatureWorks PLA, which was marketed not only as biobased but
also as biodegradable. The company decided to offer environmen-
tally-conscious customers a biobased version of Ecoflex to compete
with NatureWorks’ PLA (Comstock et al., 2004). Because BASF’s
polymer research division lacked experience with using biomass
feedstock, it entered into a research agreement in 2003 with
Metabolix, a biotechnology start-up spun off from MIT. Metabolix
provided pilot-scale qualities of its starch-based biopolymer poly-
hydroxyalkanoate (PHA) for one year. Using PHAs would increase
the melting point and biodegradability of EcoFlex, thus expanding
its applications and marketing potential.
This partnership enabled BASF to experiment with using
a biopolymer to formulate EcoFlex (Stafford, 2007). However, it did
not result in a new business model that prioritized the use of
biopolymers or in an institutionalized process for sensing future
biobased opportunities. Lacking the corporate-level commitment
to exploring the life sciences and bioconversion exhibited by
DuPont, BASF used its dynamic capabilities in a predictable way: to
respond to both regulatory changes that could lead to new market
niches and to competition that was marketing bioplastics as both
biodegradable and biobased. Indeed, during this time, BASF
famously re-branded itself as “the chemical company”.
5.1.3. Braskem
Compared to DuPont and BASF, Braskem‘s bioplastics business
model grew from an awareness that substituting a biopolymer for
an existing polymer could appeal to a growing market segment
interested in depicting itself as “green”. As the third-largest
producer of thermoplastic resins in the Americas, Braskem noted
the market for Cargill’s PLA and began considering whether to enter
bioplastics. One manager, Antonio Morschbacker, had previously
worked for Salgema, making polyvinyl chloride (PVC) from sugar-
cane; he proposed to the director of Braskem’s Innovation &
Technology Center that PE be made from sugarcane based ethanol
(Grushkin, 2011). Braskem not only had access to an abundant
supply of low-cost ethanol in Brazil but also possessed bioconver-
sion technology, inherited from one of the firm’s predecessor
businesses in the 1970s. With the technology and the raw material
supply in place, Braskem’s major challenge was to refine its older
process with a new purification step to achieve the required
ethylene quality, which took only six months (Grushkin, 2011).
Furthermore, PE customers would not need to make adaptations for
PE derived from ethanol; customers would buy the same polymer
but pay more for its renewable origins.
Using market research feedback from its existing and potential
customers in Asia and Europe, Braskem confirmed the demand for
“renewably-sourced” PE. The firm also found that customers felt PE
made from renewable raw materials was more desirable than
biodegradable PE because of the existing plastics recycling infra-
structure in Europe and Japan (Engelman, 2010). PE is one of the
most established commodity chemical markets. As a polymer, it can
be used in around 20 plastics, underscoring a large business
opportunity in a potentially massive billion dollar market,
assuming demand for renewably-source products continues to
grow. As the consultant George Rodriquez, noted: “Green PE
customers plan to get even more value back from the market in the
form of higher profit margins, increased market share, loyalty and
the priceless brand equity associated with higher renewable
resource content” (De Guzman, 2010).
Unlike DuPont and BASF, Braskem’s sensing capabilities for
bioplastics were not clouded by questions of whether and how to
develop expertise in obtaining and processing crops. Moreover, the
company would be offering existing customers an identical product
(PE) with renewable content, thereby reducing risks in market
acceptance. In addition, it had the benefit of being able to study the
successes and failures of first-to-market bioplastics, like PLA.
Each firm mobilized their capabilities to sense new business
opportunities in bioplastics despite uncertain market conditions,
the challenges of innovation, and the presence of strong incumbent
products. DuPont has gone further to imagine the possibility of new
markets for biobased chemicals. However, to different degrees, the
companies’ traditional value propositions hindered the extent to
which they viewed constructing business models for biobased
plastics as way to realize ecological and social value. As discussed in
more detail below, they developed business models based on
extracting value from biobased feedstock by marketing chemicals
as renewable or biodegradable while largely ignoring upstream and
downstream environmental and social impacts.
5.2. Seizing opportunities in developing biopolymers by building
business models for sustainability
Having sensed opportunities for making bioplastics, DuPont,
BASF and Braskem had to adapt their business models to the
development and commercialization of bioplastics. This required
decisions about how to approach early and large-scale investments
as well as product-specific marketing, distribution and purchasing
networks. Each company also confronted questions of how to
source their biomass feedstock in predictable quantities and at
stable cost. However, unlike conventional plastics, the ability to
scale up bioplastics production depends on whether skeptical
downstream manufacturers (perhaps dissatisfied from previous
bioplastic experiences) can be convinced that bioplastics add value
to their own business model, which is determined in part by
whether those customers can successfully market the products to
their own consumers as “sustainable.” In commercializing bio-
plastics as renewable and/or biodegradable, each company faced
the question of what, if any, new configurations of technologies,
customer relationships, and market strategies were needed to
realize sustainability. The companies have all mobilized their
dynamic capabilities to these ends but major differences exist.
5.2.1. DuPont
To commercialize its economical route PDO using plant sugars,
DuPont created a Bio-Based Materials business unit to implement
a business strategy for backward integration into the agricultural
 A. Iles, A.N. Martin / Journal of Cleaner Production 45 (2013) 38e49
sector and to aggressively market its first bio-PDO product line:
renewably-source PTT trademarked as “Sorona” (Kurian, 2005).
Having chosen corn feedstock for bio-PDO production, DuPont
collaborated with London-based Tate and Lyle, a leading producer
of food additives, to produce pilot quantities of bio-PDO. The pilot
plant was successful and the companies formed a joint venture,
DuPont Tate & Lyle Bio Products LLC, to scale up production in
a commercial-scale plant in Loudon, Tennessee, where corn sugar
from a nearby Tate & Lyle corn wet mill could be easily transported
for bio-PDO production.
Initially, DuPont was disappointed by PTT’s market reception.
The company assumed customers would readily adopt the new
fiber because of its superior performance attributes when
compared to the incumbent polyethylene terephthalate (PET) yet
the uptake of Sorona for new products was low (Personal
communication, DuPont executives, March 2004). The company
responded with an unprecedented two-pronged approach. First,
DuPont began engaging with downstream manufacturers to design
products with Sorona’s attributes in mind, such as Mohawk
Industries, an ecologically motivated carpet manufacturer inter-
ested in using PTT for its SmartStrand carpets. PTT can also be used
for clothing fabric, but can require adaptations to customers’ pro-
cessing methods and product specifications. By investing in the
creation of internal scientific expertise, design tools, training
support and market development consulting for clothing manu-
facturers, DuPont created key knowledge resources to support the
development of a new customer segment. DuPont has also begun to
create an offshore network of customers that license Bio-PDO
technology. The company is targeting contractors that make
products for brand name companies, and is building new PTT
production facilities in China to reach these customers.
Second, to demonstrate that sustainability can provide new
value, DuPont created a new corporate eco-label, the Renewable
Materials Sourced icon, to accentuate the environmental attributes
of Bio-PDO and Sorona. As a marketing device, the icon indicates
that a product contains a minimum of 20% renewably-sourced
content by weight, allowing Sorona, which contains 37%, to qualify.
DuPont also established internal environmental performance
metrics for biodegradability, energy use and greenhouse gas
emissions. The company advertises Bio-PDO as a biodegradable
monomer based on an OECD Guideline Test for Biodegradation. To
support its eco-label, DuPont sponsored external LCA studies of
Bio-PDO from cradle to factory gate. Invoking these studies, Bio-
PDO is advertised as using 40 percent less energy compared to
petroleum-based PDO (Anex and Ogletree, 2006), and that as
a result Sorona PTT made from Bio-PDO has 50% less CO2 emissions
than petrochemical-based Nylon.
Thus, DuPont mobilized its dynamic capabilities to justify price
premiums in the context of growing consumer concerns about
environmental impacts, and to expand its upstream and down-
stream presence in the bioplastics value chain. By developing
a marketing strategy that accentuated the environmental attributes
of Bio-PDO and Sorona through labeling, DuPont created a device
that downstream customers could use to articulate ecological
values to consumers. In addition, DuPont worked to shape their
downstream supply chain. The company invested in knowledge
resources to clothing manufacturers as a potential new customer
segment and in production infrastructure that enables a larger
reach as a PTT supplier.
5.2.2. BASF
Whereas DuPont moved steadily into building a business model
for bio-PDO, BASF hesitated to seize its bioplastics opportunity.
Despite the enhanced performance benefits of PHA, BASF perceived
more market risks due to its high production costs and
45
unrecognized status than the company was prepared to tolerate
(SRI Energy, 2010). When the Metabolix agreement expired in
2004, BASF abandoned its strategy to formulate Ecoflex with bio-
based PHA. Despite its reluctance to invest in developing in-house
capabilities in bioconversion, BASF remained interested in formu-
lating biobased Ecoflex if the resulting bioplastic products were
“more sustainable than non-biodegradable materials at a perfor-
mance level that is the same or even better” (BASF, 2010).
In 2005, BASF decided that rather than compete with Nature-
Works in making biopolymers, it would formulate a biobased Eco-
flex by purchasing PLA from NatureWorks. The company initiated
a new marketing strategy for biobased EcoFlex by introducing Eco-
vio as a “new class of products made of renewable raw materials and
of Ecoflex, the familiar BASF biodegradable plastic on a petrochem-
ical basis” (BASF, 2012). Like Ecoflex, Ecovio is meant to perform
similarly to PE, and is certified as 100% biodegradable according to
three standards organizations (Germany’s EN 13432, GreenPla in
Japan, and ASTM D6400). Building on its existing strengths of
collaborating with organizations, governments and industry rivals
to set market-making standards, BASF worked with all three stan-
dards organizations throughout the process of standards develop-
ment to ensure that its products would qualify as “biodegradable”
(Daemmrich, 2009). Production of Ecovio increased Ecoflex
production from 14,000 tonnes in 2006 to 60,000 tonnes in 2010.
Although BASF has not been as aggressive as DuPont in creating
a sustainable value proposition for its customers, the company’s
approach to marketing Ecovio is unique. BASF labels Ecovio as
containing 45% renewably-sourced PLA. In 2012, BASF introduced
a software tool called Ecovio Eco-Efficiency Compass (E3C) The tool
is based on BASF’s Eco-Efficiency tool, which the company has long
used to evaluate the life-cycle environmental impacts and cost-
effectiveness of key products. To help downstream customers
make decisions to use Ecovio and to support communication of
Ecovio’s ecological value downstream in the value chain, E3C is
designed for customers to compare the eco-efficiency of Ecovio
against other products, such as Braskem’s Green PE, for particular
applications.
Thus BASF eventually developed a business model for
commercializing a biobased version of Ecoflex. Yet, despite its
external collaboration, the company mobilized few dynamic
capabilities to shape the emerging business ecosystem for bio-
plastics. Rather than invest in a business model that would expand
its capabilities in biobased chemicals, BASF chose to occupy a nar-
rower place in the bioplastics value chain.
5.2.3. Braskem
In 2007, Braskem seized the opportunity it sensed for biobased
PE by commercializing ethanol-based PE using well-established
supply infrastructure. By 2010, the plant began producing up to
200,000 tonnes at Triunfo in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, where it
already operated petrochemical crackers. As a subsidiary of the
Brazilian conglomerate, Odebrecht, Braskem purchases ethanol
from a fellow Odebrecht subsidiary, ETH Bioenergia. The company
has announced plans to expand production by opening a second
plant given the initial volume of customer orders. Building on its
success in marketing green PE, Braskem is developing another
business model for Green polypropylene (the second largest poly-
mer market), using industrial biotechnology developed through
a new partnership with the Danish fermentation firm Novozymes.
This marked a dramatic change in harnessing Braskem’s dynamic
capabilities from simply taking up pre-existing ethanol technology
to seizing an opportunity to develop its own bioconversion
expertise. Braskem also plans to become the world’s leading bio-
plastic producer, focusing on drop-in commodities rather than
niche polymers that require downstream process modifications.
46 A. Iles, A.N. Martin / Journal of Cleaner Production 45 (2013) 38e49
Because Green PE is chemically identical to petroleum-based PE,
Braskem did not need to address how a new biopolymer would
perform downstream, as did BASF and DuPont. Braskem could
secure many contracts with consumer product manufacturers
interested in renewable packaging, such as Procter & Gamble,
Toyota, Johnson & Johnson, Coca-Cola, and Tetra Pak, prior to
production starting (Engelman, 2010). These customers bought
Green PE at a 15e30% price premium despite the fact that Green PE
costs were comparable to petroleum-based PE. Still, Braskem
worked with some customers to develop special products
promoting Green PE, such as Monopoly games.
Like DuPont and BASF, Braskem launched a marketing campaign
to “prove” the environmental attributes of Green PE. The company
created the US-trademarked “I am Green” label, which is based on
the D6866 international standard and an eco-efficiency analysis by
the Espaço ECO Foundation. Using its own corporate eco-label,
Braskem contends that Green PE reduces greenhouse gases
sharply: for every ton of Green PE, 2.5 tons of CO2 are sequestered
in biomass and are not released since PE is not biodegradable
(Engelman, 2010). The label enables manufacturers to communi-
cate to consumers that products made with Green PE are renew-
able, thus allowing price premium-seeking or preferential buying
further downstream. Interestingly, some customers such as P&G do
not use this seal because their Green PE usage remains a tiny
fraction of their overall plastics consumption (De Guzman, 2010).
This is partly attributed to the lack of production capacity. The “I am
Green” label will presumably be used for other Braskem products,
such as green polypropylene.
Companies that fail to seize new opportunities are often
inhibited by their established production systems (Teece, 2007).
This appears to be the case with BASF. One important way to
overcome this conservatism is to engage the larger business
ecosystem through collaboration with other entities, such as supply
chain partners, customers, and consumers. The firms diverged in
how they integrated biomass feedstock into their manufacturing:
whereas DuPont began moving backward into agriculture, Braskem
bought readily available ethanol, and BASF ended up buying
biopolymers from another producer to manufacture its Ecovio
product. Each company took further steps to create green
marketing mechanisms but differed in how they accomplished this
through building dynamic capabilities. While DuPont collaborated
across its supply chains to increase the market availability of new
products, BASF relied on setting standards that would shape
markets and convince customers, and Braskem merely marketed its
Green PE as a straight drop-in chemical. All three firms, however,
relied extensively on LCA to legitimate their environmental claims,
despite many LCA analyses remaining opaque, publicly inaccessible
and insufficiently verified by independent experts (Iles, 2010).
5.3. Maintaining competitiveness by reconfiguring polymer
divisions and improving sustainability
The business models that BASF, DuPont, and Braskem are
developing to commercialize their bioplastic opportunities will
require continuous improvement over time because the “right
business model is rarely apparent early on in emerging industries”
(Teece, 2010). The companies must deal with the potential conse-
quences of choosing particular bioplastic markets over others, and
with emerging challenges to the “sustainability” of bioplastics. Few
companies in the chemical industry and in downstream sectors
fully understand bioconversion, biomass feedstock production, and
their environmental impacts yet. Thus, the companies have incor-
porated in their bioplastic business models strategies for regener-
ation, or the ability to continuously replenish and revise their
biobased chemical portfolio as technologies, markets, and
agricultural supply systems continue to evolve. Yet, BASF, DuPont,
and Braskem all have barely begun to address the sustainability
challenges that may undermine the durability of their bioplastic
businesses.
5.3.1. DuPont
DuPont is seeking a self-regeneration capacity by setting
corporate sustainability goals, making new acquisitions, and
focusing internally on biobased initiatives. At the corporate level,
DuPont aimed to earn 25% of its revenues from renewable materials
by 2015, using this company-wide goal to drive innovation and
investment (Bryndza, 2011). To assure that its biobased chemicals
can survive incumbency and scale obstacles, the firm uses the
following heuristics: displacing existing products with renewable
materials should lead to superior cost and performance; and
developing new products that are not drop-in must result in
significantly better performance for customers (Bryndza, personal
communication, 2011). In contrast to BASF, DuPont is thus willing to
develop a range of bioplastic markets rather than restricting itself
to a niche market, and to take reasonable risks in developing
biopolymers with novel properties to create new markets alto-
gether. DuPont also created a Bio-Based Materials Unit that unifies
scientific expertise in bioconversion through combining its
genetically-modified seed business and complementary partner-
ships with biotechnology firms such as Genencor and agri-food
companies such as Tate & Lyle. In 2011, the company boldly
bought Genencor, to control its own biotechnology intellectual
property and infrastructure.
5.3.2. BASF
Conversely, BASF is still developing self-regeneration mecha-
nisms to guide its bioplastics business growth. Ecoflex was
conceived in an experimental team in BASF’s R&D laboratories and
commercialized by a tiny management and marketing group that
lacked significant power within BASF (Daemmrich, 2009). Thus
BASF’s bioplastic exploration remained dependent on changing
managerial views of the relative merits of different biomass inputs
rather than reflecting a company-wide strategy. Nonetheless, BASF
has tentatively investigated how it could scale up biopolymer
production by investing in university research in Austria. Interest-
ingly, in 2010, BASF acquired Cognis, a Belgian company with a few
biobased specialty chemicals. Like DuPont, BASF is positioning itself
to expand its biobased product lines by acquiring in-house capacity
for R&D and bioconversion. However, the firm remains committed
to a niche polymer market, potentially limiting its future growth.
5.3.3. Braskem
Braskem initially did not perceive the need to develop internal
mechanisms. The company focused on bringing green PE quickly to
the market. When the company realized that it could seize the
commodity biopolymer market, managerial interest in self-
regeneration grew. Since 2010, Braskem has invested in R&D
facilities at the National Bioscience Laboratory located in Campinas,
in contrast to most Brazilian corporations. (R&D is largely the
domain of Brazilian government agencies like Emprapa.). The
company sponsored a roadmap to direct science and technology
policies that encourage Brazilian companies to use renewable raw
materials (Coutinho and Vitor, 2011). In addition to identifying key
drivers for increased use of renewable raw materials and fore-
casting how key competitors such as BASF, Solvay, Dow, DuPont,
and Cargill will shape the market, the roadmap concludes that
Brazilian firms have an exceptional opportunity to dominate the
new biobased materials sector, due to the presence of Brazil’s
ethanol industry and the lower greenhouse gas emissions profile of
sugarcane ethanol compared to oil. Yet Braskem’s business model
 A. Iles, A.N. Martin / Journal of Cleaner Production 45 (2013) 38e49
emphasizes only innovating drop-in chemicals from the ethanol
platform, potentially discouraging R&D for new, innovative
biopolymers, including from other feedstocks.
In general, the companies continue to treat bioplastics as
marginal products that may appeal to more ecologically aware
customers or consumers who are willing to pay price premiums.
Bioplastics are not sustainable merely because of their renewable
origins. Table 4 outlines the environmental and socio-economic
challenges, ranging from feedstock choices, contamination of
recycling systems, to pollution in bioconversion.
As customers, consumers and governments take greater critical
interest in the sustainability of bioplastics, industry will have to
improve this sustainability through innovation, remolded supply
chain relationships, and stronger governance mechanisms. Many
customers remain uncertain about the risks and benefits of bio-
plastics. A Genencor survey of American consumers revealed
a growing awareness of biobased materials as sustainable, yet also
widespread skepticism about the environmental claims being made
(Genencor, 2011). Ethanol was treated with most caution, compared
to laundry products, reflecting greater public and media scrutiny of
biofuels in the past five years. If bioplastics attract similar attention,
companies may struggle to maintain their markets.
Bioplastics face several challenges to their environmental
claims. First, a contradiction exists in using bioplastics: most
applications are now disposable or non-durable, reinforcing the
waste production economy. These applications are justified by
biodegradability or recyclability claims. BASF asserts that Ecovio
Table 4
Environmental impacts of bioplastics.
Production stage Environmental impacts
Feedstock New demand for biomass inputs can
expand uses of land, fossil fuels, chemical
inputs, and water.
Feedstock choices can reinforce existing
problems associated with corn and sugarcane.
Converting forests or grasslands to
expand agricultural production can
offset the CO2 sequestered by plants
before harvest (Searchinger et al., 2008).
Manufacturing Bioconversion is energy intensive
and processing (Gallezot, 2010).
Bioconversion may require the use of
potentially toxic petroleum-based
solvents (Ahman and Dorgan, 2007).
Bioconversion produces significant
water effluent needing treatment
(Ahman and Dorgan, 2007).
Bioconversion consumes water resources
for fermentation, cooling, and heating.
End of life fate Compostable bioplastics may contaminate
recycled plastic streams unless they are
properly separated and managed
(Song et al., 2009).
Compostable plastics require high
temperatures to decompose in a landfill
and special industrial equipment to be
composted (Song et al., 2009).
Unless a landfill is managed well and
kept dry, degrading bioplastics will
release methane gas.
Life-cycle assessments Significant reductions of energy consumption
and GHG emissions are possible
(McKone et al., 2011; Akiyama et al., 2003).
Conversely, PHAs and PHBs have higher GHG
emissions because of fossil fuel use for fertilizer
production, agricultural production, corn wet
milling, fermentation, polymer purification and
other production processes (Kurdikar et al., 2001).
47
biodegrades more rapidly than its plastic predecessors which
require industrial composting operations. Yet it remains unknown
how well Ecovio biodegrades in non-industrial composting facili-
ties. The large-scale composting facilities needed to decompose
biodegradable and compostable materials seldom exist yet
(ACS, 2007). In turn, although the Bio-PDO monomer can be com-
posted, its downstream products are blends of biomass and
petrochemical materials that are not designed for composting or
recycling. DuPont has not addressed PTT recycling and waste issues,
despite Mohawk’s acknowledgement that recycling PTT with the
more widely used PET could harm the quality of recycled polymers.
Braskem’s Green PE does not meet biodegradability standards even
with additives (Gautam et al., 2007), even though PE is among the
more easily recyclable plastics. Yet, the vast majority of PE products
are not recycled because of the complexities of collecting and
sorting uncontaminated PE (ACS, 2007). None of the companies
appear to be engaging the waste management segment of the value
chain or improving product degradation, whereas one key aim of
producing bioplastics is to reduce overall plastic impacts.
Upstream sustainability issues have similarly received scant
attention. For instance, while DuPont celebrates using corn to make
Bio-PDO, corn monocultures in the US have caused numerous
environmental problems including pesticide and fertilizer use,
damage to wildlife habitat, and rural economic decline (Gillon,
2010; Granda et al., 2007; German et al., 2011). Due to controver-
sies over ethanol, Braskem is unusually sensitive to claims that
could undermine the purported sustainability of cane feedstock.
Unlike DuPont and BASF, Braskem has created a supplier code of
practice for its feedstock to assure improved environmental and
social performance. Braskem uses this code to support its claim that
cane feedstock does not harm the Amazon or compete with food
uses, in contrast to DuPont’s dependence on corn.
More diverse biomass feedstock choices favoring multi-
functional, agriculture that can support greater functional biodi-
versity may help make bioplastics more sustainable, particularly
where government incentives favor diversification and agro-
ecological practices (Iles and Marsh, in press). Companies could
advance these developments by redirecting their R&D activities and
supply chain partnerships to encourage multi-functional agricul-
ture, rather than perpetuating traditional industry practices.
DuPont and BASF already anticipate using cellulosic feedstock from
grasses and crop residues, but have not yet made this a priority in
their R&D and business models. BASF’s former business partner,
Metabolix, aims to produce PHAs from non-food, native crops with
lower overall GHG emissions and environmental impacts. Compa-
nies could reinforce this trend by investing in biorefineries that can
take multiple feedstock, supporting the development of cellulosic
bioconversion technologies (Clark and Deswarte, 2008), and by
supporting farmers who are reluctant to engage in multi-functional
agriculture due to the risks they incur from implementing new crop
systems that require greater knowledge about managing ecological
complexity and new harvesting methods and distribution
infrastructure.
Finally, in the processing and manufacturing stages, all factory
processes should be designed to ensure sustainability. Chemical
companies have institutionalized environmental management
systems that require continuous improvement, but these have not
yet dealt with the particular resource use, pollution, and waste
issues of bioconversion. Energy and water use is particularly
intensive in biopolymer production, and companies must consider
how to recycle water inputs efficiently and integrate renewable,
low-carbon energy sources to power biorefineries (Williams et al.,
2009; McKone et al., 2011).
Nonetheless, the companies have not yet instigated robust
metrics and targets for bioplastic sustainability across the entire
48 A. Iles, A.N. Martin / Journal of Cleaner Production 45 (2013) 38e49
production life cycle. Rather than focusing almost exclusively on
greenhouse gas emissions, companies should create systems to
track, evaluate and publicize the specific activities, if any, they are
taking to address sustainability targets for bioplastics. Anecdotal
evidence from interviewing business managers in both start-up
and established firms suggests that the majority of firms do not
regard identifying and rectifying the environmental impacts of
biobased chemicals as important as moving these chemicals to
market quickly (personal communications in 2011).
Societies need to be confident that companies are addressing
sustainability issues. This requires two major steps: companies
must extend their LCA considerations past the factory gate and
implement accountability systems that enhance the ability of
companies, governments, consumers, and citizens to track the
performance of bioplastics and to provide input that can lead to
continual improvement. Accountability systems are “a system, or
set of mechanisms, designed to make sure promises are kept, duties
are performed and compliance is forthcoming” (Weber, 2003). An
accountability system can include defining sustainability priorities
and goals, making company activities and practices public and open
to critique and allowing workers and outside actors to have a say in
environmental decision-making (Iles, 2007). Having to account can
make the environmental impacts of production and products more
transparent and actionable for companies. Companies can also
develop ongoing processes for NGOs, communities, and govern-
ments along the value chain to audit their activities critically. In
turn, accountability systems and societal engagement around
defining sustainability can help companies mobilize their dynamic
capabilities more effectively to focus on environmental challenges.
6. Conclusion
Using the dynamic capability framework, we show how estab-
lished chemical companies can sense and seize market opportu-
nities for bioplastics. Merely reducing costs and increasing yields
does not assure survival in the market. Rather, developing inno-
vative business models helps create a sustainable value proposition
through using dynamic capabilities to engage society to define
ecological and social value. Through greater interaction with soci-
eties, companies need to define what is sustainably valuable about
bioplastics, collaborate with suppliers and customers to create
value for them as well, and monitor progress in sustainability. Of
the three firms, DuPont is now the most focused on inventing
sustainable business models, with BASF struggling with its tech-
nological and organizational legacies, and Braskem benefiting from
unusual symbiosis with ethanol producers.
Nonetheless, DuPont, BASF, and Braskem have acted conserva-
tively in extending the decision-making boundaries of their busi-
ness models to include the perspectives of societal actors such as
advocacy groups, government agencies, retailers, consumers,
farming communities, or universities. To date, the companies have
focused within their own operations in deciding what sustain-
ability means. They have not sought to build consultative processes
to hear back from diverse societal actors about their values and
choices regarding the environmental impacts of chemical products.
This reflects a longstanding history of industry reluctance to
acknowledge societal criticism of its production. For example,
DuPont has created a corporate “renewably-sourced” label and a set
of LCA data to warrant that Bio-PDO and PTT are sustainable. Yet
these appear to be primarily aimed at downstream manufacturers.
Consumers and NGOs have had no participation in helping shape
the criteria for evaluating biobased materials, even though they are
increasingly shaping product designs in other sectors.
Thus, the sustainable value propositions in their business
models are currently limited. Companies must now contend with
more skeptical societies and markets: their authority no longer
prevails exclusively in the face of multiple views and opposition.
While DuPont, BASF, and Braskem have introduced tools, standards,
and corporate labels for evaluating sustainability impacts, these
tools do not yet provide means to monitor improvement in bio-
plastics. Without accountability systems, governments, consumers,
and the many societal actors in the bioplastics value chain are
unable to verify whether firms are reducing adverse impacts and
increasing environmental and social benefits through their R&D,
biomass sourcing, processing, and product marketing.
Therefore, a business model for sustainability needs to
communicate to societies the ways in which bioplastics can improve
in the future. Should it be greater renewable content in products?
Better biodegradability? Better recycling systems? Better agricul-
tural practices? A combination? In particular, we argue, companies
need to develop business models to close the loop at the end of
bioplastic life cycles, and to address agricultural production impacts
that may far outweigh those of the processing and use stages.
Business models also need mechanisms for greater accountability
for achieving these changes and reporting on substantive progress
to societies. In doing so, companies will create industrial norms that
not only allow biopolymer businesses to maintain competitiveness
but ensure that they are driving sustainability within their organi-
zations and at all stages of the product life cycle.
Acknowledgements
This research was funded in part by the Energy Biosciences
Institute and the Agricultural Extension Station at the University of
California at Berkeley. We are very grateful to Frank Boons at
Erasmus University Rotterdam, multiple reviewers, and partici-
pants at the ERSCP-EMSU 2010 conference at Delft Technical
University for their valuable comments for improving the
manuscript.
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