NEWTON C. A .

D A C O S T A AND ROLANDO CHUAQUI

ON SUPPES' SET THEORETICAL PREDICATES*

INTRODUCTION

One of the basic concepts of present day mathematics is that of a

mathematical structure. This concept is today clear, and there are no
difficulties to handle it and use it in the systematization of classical
mathematics, especially after the work of Bourbaki. However, as it
can be seen in the course of the history of mathematics, the concept
was hard to clarify. As Bourbaki writes,
It is therefore tempting to assert that the modern notion of 'structure' was substantially
in existence by 1900, but in fact another thirty years of preparation were required before
it made its full-fledge appearance. Certainly, it is not difficult to recognize structures of
the same species when they are of a sufficiently simple nature; with group-structures, for
example, this point was attained in the middle of the nineteenth century. But at the same
period Hankel was still struggling, without complete success, to extract the general idea
of a field and an extension field, which he managed to express only in the semi-
metaphysical form of a 'principle of permanence' . . . , and which were definitively
formulated only by Steinitz forty years later. It has been especially difficult to escape
from the feeling that mathematical objects are 'given' together with their structures, and it
has taken many years of functional analysis to make modern mathematicians familiar
with the idea that, for example, there are several 'natural' topologies on the set of
rational numbers, and several measures on the real line. With this dissociation the
passage to the general definition of s t r u c t u r e . . , was finally achieved. (Bourbaki [1], pp.
317-18)

We may truly say that the general notion of structure, so achieved,

was the result, in a large measure, of Bourbaki's work.
Another important development in relation to this notion of struc-
ture, was to consider them semantically. This was developed in the
work of the logicians, especially the work of Tarski and his followers.
Although structures were used by logicians before the thirties, we can
safely say that the defnition of truth given by Tarski in 1931 (see [16])
was a turning point. T h e study of general (or universal) algebra and
especially of model theory greatly contributed to the precision of the
concept. However, after 1950, these studies were concentrated on
models for first-order logic (finitary or infinitary), which are not
enough to give an account of all structures used in mathematics.

Erkennmis 29 (1988) 95-112.

~) 1988 by Kluwer Academic Publishers.
96 NEWTON C. A . D A C O S T A AND ROLANDO CHUAQUI

Starting in the fifties, and inspired by Tarski's notion of a model

but without restricting it to first-order models, P. Suppes used the con-
cept of a set-theoretical predicate in the domain of the empirical
sciences. According to Suppes,
The kernel of the procedure for axiomatizing theories within set theory may be
described very briefly: to axiomatize a theory, is to define a predicate in telms of notions
of set theory. A predicate so defined is called a set theoretical predicate . . . . We shall
not give a sharp definition of 'set-theoretical p r e d i c a t e ' . . . w e shall assume that the
set-theoretical framework within which we operate consists not only of general set
t h e o r y , . . , but also of the full apparatus of classical mathematics, that is, the real
numbers, functions of real numbers, derivatives and integrals of such functions, and the
like. (Suppes [14], p. 249)

Though Suppes never tried to make precise his notion of a set-

theoretical predicate, in the sense of a predicate that really defines a
non-trivial theory, it is clear from his remarks that such predicates
may be identified with Bourbaki's species of structures.
Unfortunately, Bourbaki's treatment of mathematical structures (cf.
[1], chap. IV) is restricted to the purely syntactical level. For him, a
species of structures constitutes simply a formal theory (stronger than
formal set theory), naturally construed as a collection of symbols
subject to certain metamathematical rules. We think it is more proper
to consider structures semantically, in the sense of Tarski.
Taking into account the role played by the notion of (set-theoreti-
cal) species of structures, not only in mathematics, but also in the
philosophy of the theoretical sciences (see, for instance, Suppes [14]
and [15]; Sneed [11]; and Stegmiiller [12] and [13]), it seems
extremely convenient to have at hand a model-theoretical approach to
such notion.

1. BOURBAKI'S SPECIES OF STRUCTURES

In this section, which is not necessary for the understanding of our

version of structures of the following sections, we informally describe
Bourbaki's concept of a species of structures. We suppose that we are
working in some standard system of set theory, for example Zermelo-
Fraenckel's system (cf. [6], pp. 274-75). Perhaps it may be better to
work in a system containing proper classes, such as Kelley-Morse's
system (see [9], appendix, or [3]).
Following Bourbaki ([1], chap. IV), we call an echelon construction
 ON SUPPES' SET THEORETICAL PREDICATES 97

s c h e m e a finite s e q u e n c e (cl, C2 . . . . , Cm) of o r d e r e d pairs of natural

n u m b e r s ci = (ai, bi), for 1 < i < m, such that:
(1) If b~ = 0, then 1 < a ~ i - 1.
(2) If a~ ~: 0 and b~ ~: 0, then 1 < a i < i - 1 and 1 < b~< i - 1.
As a c o n s e q u e n c e , we h a v e that c~ ~ (0, 0), for all i, and that Cl =
(0, b~) with 0 < bi. If n is the largest s e c o n d m e m b e r bi of the pairs
c~ = (0, b~) (with first m e m b e r 0), then (cl . . . . . c,,) is called an echelon
construction s c h e m e o f order n.
If S = (Cl . . . . . c,.) is an e c h e l o n c o n s t r u c t i o n s c h e m e of o r d e r n and
X1, X2 . . . . , Xn are n sets, then an echelon construction o f s c h e m e S on
X1 . . . . , Xn is the s e q u e n c e (C1, C2 . . . . . C,.), defined as follows:
(1) If c, = (0, b), then Ci = Xb.
(2) If C~ = (a, 0), then C~ is the p o w e r set P ( X a ) of )Ca.
(3) If ci = (a, b), w h e r e a ~ 0 a n d b :/: 0, then C~ is Ca • Cb.
C,,, is called an echelon o f s c h e m e S on the base sets X1, X2, . . . , X ,
and is d e n o t e d by S ( X t , X 2 . . . . . Xn).
W e n o w define the n o t i o n of an isomorphism b e t w e e n e c h e l o n s of
s c h e m e S. L e t us s u p p o s e that we h a v e :
(a) )m echelon construction scheme S = ( c ~ , c2 . . . . , c,.) of
o r d e r n.
(b) Two finite sequences of sets (X1,...,Xn), and
(Y1 . . . . , Y~) of n terms.
(c) A s e q u e n c e of functions f~: X~ ~ Y~, 1 < i < n.
(d) The echelon constructions of s c h e m e S o n ( X 1 , . . . , X~)
and (Y1 . . . . . Y~), (C1 . . . . . Cm) and ( B b . . . , Bm), r e s p e c -
tively.
W e c a n then define step by step a s e q u e n c e (g~, g2 ..... gra), w h e r e
: C~ --~ Bi, 1 < i < m, b y the following clauses:
(1) If ci = (0, b), t h e n C~ = Xb and Bi = Yb, and we put g / = lb.
(2) If c~ = (a, 0), then we h a v e C / = P ( C a ) and B~ = P(B~), and
we p u t gl = g*, w h e r e g* is the c a n o n i c a l extension of ga to
the p o w e r sets of A~ and B~, respectively (i.e. g * ( x ) =
[g~(y)" y c x], for all x c P(Ca)).
(3) If ci = (a, b), w h e r e a ~ 0 and b =f 0, then Ci = Ca x Cb and
Bi = B , x Bb, and we put g~ = g~ x gb, w h e r e g~ x ~ is the
c a n o n i c a l extension of g~ a n d gb to Ca • Cb (i.e., g~ x
~,((x, y))= (g~(x), g~(y))).
98 NEWTON C. A. DA COSTA AND ROLANDO CHUAQUI

T h e function g,, is denoted by (fl, f2 . . . . . fn) s and is called an

isomorphism between s and s ' = gin(s), where s = C,, and s ' = Bin.
Formulas of the f o r m
s ~ S(X~,.., X,)
are called typifications.
In a typification, some of the sets X t , X 2 , . . . , Xn are said to be
principal, and the remaining ones are said to be auxiliary. T h e r e are
always principal sets, but there m a y exist no auxiliary sets. So, we
represent a typification as follows:
s c S(X1 ..... Xp, A1 . . . . , Aq),
where Xx . . . . . Xp are the principal sets and A~ . . . . . Aq are the
auxiliary sets. Normally, A I . . . . . Aq are sets such as the real numbers,
possessing relevant properties, previously investigated.
Let us consider the formula of set theory
F ( X 1 . . . . , Xp, 3 1 . . . . , Aq, s)
where there are no other free variables than those displayed. Let
f i : X i ~ Yi, 1 <__i < p, be a sequence of bijections, and l j : A i ~ A t, be
the identity m a p p i n g of At, 1 < j < q. We say that F is a transportable
f o r m u l a with respect to the typification s ~ S ( X 1 . . . . , Xp, A1 . . . . . Aq),
the Xi, 1 < i < p, being considered as principal base sets and the At,
1 < j<__q, as auxiliary base sets if we have,
F ( X I . . . . . Xp, A, . . . . . Aq, s)
(--) F ( Y , . . . . . Ye, A1 . . . . . Aq, s'),
where s' = ( f l . . . . . fp, 1 1 , . . . , lq)'(s).
According to Bourbaki, then, a species of structures is the class
defined by a predicate of the f o r m
P(s)<--> 3 X a . . . . . 3 X p ( s ~ S ( X 1 . . . . , Xp, A I , . . . , Aq)
A F ( X , . . . . . Xp, A , . . . . . ,am, s)),
where F is transportable in the a b o v e sense, s e S ( X 1 . . . . . Xp,
A1 . . . . . ,am) is the typification of the species of structures and F is its
axiom.
A n y s which satisfies P is called a structure o f species P. All usual
m a t h e m a t i c a l species of structures are particular cases of the preced-
ing definition (cf. [1], chap. IV). Some species of structures, for
example those of group and of topological space, do not have auxiliary
 ON SUPPES' SET THEORETICAL PREDICATES 99

b a s e sets; o t h e r s , s u c h as t h o s e of r e a l v e c t o r s p a c e a n d of c o m p l e x
v e c t o r s p a c e , h a v e a u x i l i a r y b a s e sets, t h e sets of r e a l n u m b e r s a n d of
complex numbers, respectively.
W e e m p h a s i z e t h a t B o u r b a k i ' s t r e a t m e n t of t h e c o n c e p t of s p e c i e s
of s t r u c t u r e s ( i n c l u d i n g t h e n o t i o n of s t r u c t u r e ) is p u r e l y s y n t a c t i c a l .
T h i s m a k e s his e x p o s i t i o n a w k w a r d a n d t o o e l a b o r a t e d (see, for
i n s t a n c e , B o u r b a k i ' s o r i g i n a l d e f i n i t i o n of s p e c i e s of s t r u c t u r e s in [1],
C h a p t e r I V , S e c t i o n 4).
U s u a l l y an e c h e l o n of s c h e m e S, S ( X 1 , . . . , Xp, A1 . . . . , Aq), of a
s p e c i e s of s t r u c t u r e s c a n b e d e c o m p o s e d as a C a r t e s i a n p r o d u c t

St(X1 . . . . . Xp, 3 1 . . . . , Aq) x S2(Xt . . . . , Xp, 31 . . . . . Aq)

x . . . • Sk(X1 . . . . , Xp, A1 . . . . . Aq)
so t h a t a t y p i f i c a t i o n s ~ S(X1 . . . . . Xp, A t . . . . , Aq) m a y b e e n v i s a g e d
as a k - t u p l e (in t h e s c h e m e Sj, l < j - < k , s o m e of t h e sets
X t , . . . , Xp, A t . . . . . Aq m a y o c c u r v a c u o u s l y ) .
O b s e r v e t h a t t h e a b o v e p r e s e n t a t i o n of B o u r b a k i ' s i d e a s c o u l d
e a s i l y b e e x t e n d e d to t h e c o n c e p t s i n t r o d u c e d in [1], C h a p t e r I V , s u c h
as i s o m o r p h i s m a n d t r a n s p o r t of s t r u c t u r e s , d e d u c t i o n of s t r u c t u r e s ,
e q u i v a l e n t s p e c i e s of s t r u c t u r e s , m o r p h i s m s , initial s t r u c t u r e s , final
s t r u c t u r e s , a n d u n i v e r s a l m a p p i n g s . M o r e o v e r , m a n y of t h e results of
m o d e l t h e o r y c a n b e d e v e l o p e d f r o m t h e p o i n t of v i e w of B o u r b a k i ,
a l t h o u g h to p r o c e e d in this w a y in m o d e l t h e o r y is c u m b e r s o m e .

2. SUPPES SET-THEORETICAL AXIOMATIZATION

OF THEORIES

S u p p e s ([15], 2 - 2 9 , 2 - 3 0 ) w r i t e s t h a t ,
In the first place, it may be well to say something more about the slogan 'To axiomatize
a theory is to define a set-theoretical predicate'. It may not be entirely clear what is
meant by the phrase 'set-theoretical predicate'. Such a predicate is simply a predicate
that can be defined within set theory in a completely formal way. For a set theory based
only on the primitive predicate of membership,.., this means that ultimately any
set-theoretical predicate can be defined solely in terms of membership. Any standard
mathematical notion will be used freely in the definiens of such a set-theoretical
definition of a predicate, for we shall assume that these standard notions have already
been fully developed and formalized. Such a development of mathematics is in fact to be
found in the many-volumed treatise written under the collective pseudonym of Bour-
baki. Whenever a previous set-theoretical formalization of an empirical theory is
assumed, this will be explicitly so indicated. . . .
100 NEWTON C. A . D A C O S T A AND ROLANDO CHUAQUI

This last remark suggests there may be some systematic difference between a
set-theoretical definition embodying concepts of pure mathematics and one involving
concepts of the empirical sciences. I do not mean to suggest anything of the sort. It is
one of the theses of this book that there is no theoretical way of drawing a sharp
distinction between a piece of pure mathematics and a piece of theoretical science. The
set-theoretical definitions of the theory of mechanics, the theory of thermodynamics,
and the theory of learning, to give three rather disparate examples, are on all fours with
the definitions of the purely mathematical theories of groups, rings, fields, etc. From the
philosophical standpoint there is no sharp distinction between pure and applied mathe-
matics, in spite of much talk to the contrary.
Clearly, to define a theory in the sense of Suppes is to construct a
set-theoretical predicate, but the converse is certainly not true. For
instance, it does not make sense to say that the predicate

P ( x ) ~ x = O,
where ~ is the empty set, defines a theory. Since Suppes does not
specify further the notion of a set-theoretical predicate adequate to
represent a scientific theory, it is necessary to discover his meaning
from the examples of theories that he and his followers have
developed.
Actually, it is not difficult to see from the examples that he presents
that Suppes' set-theoretical predicates can be identified with Bour-
baki's species of structures. Moreover, since the empirical parts (sets
of empirical elements) of a theory of an empirical science can always
be codified by means of mathematical sets, for instance, by ordinals,
the identification is complete.
T h e models of Suppes' theories are the same as Bourbaki's struc-
tures of a convenient species of structures, and conversely. So a theory
in the sense of Suppes is characterized by a set-theoretical predicate
(or formula) of the kind described in the previous section. Such a
predicate defines a proper class (supposing that its extension is not
empty, i.e., that the corresponding theory is consistent). In other
words, the theory is determined by its models (or structures). In
consequence, to give a theory in Suppes acceptation, mathematical or
empirical, is to give the class of its models. In this way, Suppes'
conception is connected with usual model theory.
We shall dub a set-theoretical predicate that defines a theory (which
can be identified with a species of structures) a Suppes predicate. The
sets satisfying a Suppes predicate P, i.e., those structures that are
models of P, we call P-structures.
 ON SUPPES' SET THEORETICAL PREDICATES 101

3. SUPPES PREDICATES

W e p r o c e e d to p r e s e n t o u r s e m a n t i c a l t r e a t m e n t of S u p p e s p r e d i c a t e s
(or B o u r b a k i ' s species of structures). W e are w o r k i n g in Z e r m e l o -
F r a e n c k e l set theory, t h o u g h - we insist on this point - it would
p e r h a p s b e b e t t e r to use a s y s t e m such as that of K e l l e y - M o r s e . W e
shall e m p l o y the c o n n e c t i v e s and the quantifiers freely, w i t h o u t any
c o m m e n t on the s y m b o l s c h o s e n for t h e m . Similarly, we shall not
m a k e explicit o t h e r traits of the l a n g u a g e of o u r t h e o r y ; in particular,
we shall not define f o r m u l a , list the a x i o m s of o u r theory, or f o r m u l a t e
the c o m m o n c o n v e n t i o n s tacitly used in the writing of formulas. O u r
set t h e o r y does not c o n t a i n Urelemente, a l t h o u g h their inclusion would
c a u s e no m a j o r i n c o n v e n i e n c e for o u r d e v e l o p m e n t s .

DEFINITION 1. (a) L e t X be a set. W e put

Vo( X ) = X
v~§ = v~(x) u P(V~(X)),
for e v e r y natural n u m b e r n. T h e set V ~ ( X ) is the universe o f sets o f
rank n over X.
(b) W e define by r e c u r s i o n the set of types o f n sorts. If 1 __< i__<n,
t h e n i is a type. If a a n d b are types, t h e n ( a , 0) and ( a , b) are types.
N o t i c e that if <a, b) is a type, t h e n a r 0.
(c) L e t X1 . . . . . X . be sets and c a type of n sorts. W e define the set
of o b j e c t s of type c o v e r X1 . . . . . X . , To(X1 . . . . . X~).
(i) If c = i with 1 < i < n, then Tc(X1 . . . . , X . ) = X i .
(ii) If c = (a, 0), then T ~ ( X , . . . . . X , ) = P ( T a ( X , . . . . , X~)).
(iii) If c = ( a , b), with b ~ 0, then T,(X1 ..... X,) =
Ta(X1 . . . . , X~) • T b ( X , . . . . . Xk).

W e say that a set x is o f type c over X 1. . . . , X , , if x ~ T c ( X 1. . . . , X n ) )

(d) L e t X , . . . . . X . , Y 1 , . . . , Y, be sets and fl . . . . . f~ be functions
such that fi : X~ --> Y~ for 1 < i < n. W e e x t e n d the s e q u e n c e f to f, for
e a c h type c:
(i) If c = ( a , 0), then fc(x) = [fa(Y) : y ~ x], for x
T~(X, ..... Xn).
(ii) If c = ( a , b), with b ~ O, then f c ( ( x , y)) = ( f a ( x ) , fb(y)), for
x c Ta(X1 . . . . . X,,) and y ~ Tb(X1 . . . . . X,,).
102 NEWTON C. A. DA COSTA AND ROLANDO CHUAQUI

It is clear that L : T o ( X 1 , . . :, X , ) ~ T o ( Y 1 , . . . , Yn). It is also clear

that each To(X1 . . . . . X , ) c Vk(X1 . . . . , Xn), for a certain k.
Definition 1 is a modification of Bourbaki's notion of an echelon
construction that is m o r e appropriate for our purposes, because it is
easier to treat in this f r a m e w o r k certain special typed languages,
which will be defined in the next section. It is easy to see how to pass
f r o m an echelon scheme to a type and vice-versa. Similar remarks
apply to our definition of systems E (Definition 2) and Bourbaki's
echelons of scheme S.

D E F I N I T I O N 2. A system or structure E is a quadruple ( X , Y, t, n),

where:
(i) n is a natural number, i.e. n ~ to. n determines the universe
of the system E , V , ( X 1 U 9 9 9 O Xk), o v e r which the vari-
ables of the language to be introduced presently range.
(ii) X is a finite sequence of sets X h . . . , X k , called the basic
sets of the system. Some of them, say the first p, 1 < p < k,
are said to be the principal sets, the others, are called
auxiliary sets. T h e r e m a y be no auxiliary sets.
(iii) Y is a finite sequence of sets, Y 1 , . . . , Ym, and t is a
sequence of types of k sorts h . . . . . tm such that Y~ is a set
of type ~ o v e r X I . . . . . X k , for each i with 1 < i < m.
T h e quadruple (k, p, t, n) is called the similarity type of the system E.
T w o systems are said to be similar, if they h a v e the same type and the
same auxiliary sets. W e shall prefer the n a m e system, because struc-
ture is also used for the m o r e abstract property shared by isomorphic
systems.
T h e n u m b e r n is introduced in the description of a system in order
to limit the range of the variables in a flexible way. For instance, when
n = 0, and the types of the Y ' s are appropriately restricted, we get the
usual systems for first order languages. With different types of the Y's,
we get systems for first order languages of different similarity types. If
we had not included this n, and use another device to limit the range
of the variables, for example, to limit this range to the least j such that
Yi ~ Vj(Xi U . . . U Xk), we could not get first order systems as a
special case.
We need to include the sequence of types t in the description of a
 ON SUPPES' SET THEORETICAL PREDICATES 103

system, because the sets Y h . . . , Ym do not determine their type over

X1 . . . . . Xk. This will be seen more clearly after the definition of
isomorphism.
T h e language LE appropriate for handling the system E =
(X, Y, t, n) is a first-order language with identity, that has member-
ship as a binary predicate, individual constants for the terms of X and
Y, and an individual constant r that stands for V , ( X I L J . . . O Xk).
T h e quantifiers of the language are all relativized to this constant r. It
is clear that the appropriateness of a sentence for a structure depends
only on the type of the structure. So, we shall also denote the language
L(k,p.t,,>.
T h e auxiliary sets have, in general, properties derived from the
conditions previously imposed on them, which are expressed by sen-
tences (closed formulas) of LE.
A sentence q~ of LE is true in E, in symbols E ~ q~, if the set-
theoretical sentence expressed by ~ with the constants interpreted in
the way we have indicated, is set-theoretically true. T h e relation E ~ q~
can be defined inside set theory, with the ususal devices. T h e expres-
sion E ~ q~ can also be read E satisfies q~, and, in general, we can
define the notion of "the assignment s for the free variables of the
formula q~ satisfies q~ in E " , in symbols E ~ tp[s], just as usual.
We now define isomorphisms of systems.

D E F I N I T I O N 3. Let E --- (X, Y, t, n) and F = ( U, Z, t, n) be systems

of the same type. Then it is clear that if X = ( X 1 . . . . . Xk) and
Y = (Y~ . . . . , Y,,,), then U and Z are also sequences of length k and
m respectively. Then,
(i) T h e sequence f = ([1 . . . . , fk) is an isomorphism of E onto F,
if E and F are similar, fi is a bijection of Xi onto U~, for
1 < i < k,/~ is the identity function for p < i < k, and if ~ is
the type c, then [c(Yj)= Zj, for 1__</__<m. T w o systems E
and F are said to be isomorphic or to have the same
structure, if there is an isomorphism between them.
(ii) A sentence q~ appropriate for E is transportable, if for any
structure F isomorphic to E, we have

E ~ ~p if and only if F ~ ~p.

104 NEWTON C. A. DA COSTA AND ROLANDO CHUAQUI

In (i), we see that we need to indicate the type of Yj in order to decide

for which c we must apply It.
It is easy to see that Bourbaki's criteria of transportability ([2], pp.
51-69) can be reformulated to fit our exposition.

D E F I N I T I O N 4. A Suppes predicate is a formula P(E) of set theory

saying: ' E is a system of type (k, p, t, n) which satisfies ~' where ~ is a
set of transportable sentences appropriate for (k, p, t, n). If P(E), that
is, if E satisfies P, then E is called a P-system.
Suppes predicates and Bourbaki's species of structures can easily be
transformed into each other.
The methods of model theory can be employed to study Suppes
predicates and their systems, and most results of Bourbaki remain
valid or can be modified to remain valid. In particular, we have:
(1) From the above considerations, it is obvious that we may
introduce languages to talk about several systems, similar
or not, simultaneously.
(2) In a certain sense, a Suppes predicate P(E) is determined
by the class of all systems E such that P(E), i.e. a theory is
determined by the class of its models, which gives a precise
meaning to Suppes' dictum: 'To axiomatize a theory is to
define a set-theoretical predicate'.
(3) All theories or species of structures considered by Suppes
and Bourbaki are special cases of Suppes predicates. Also,
physical theories in the sense of Sneed [11] can be for-
mulated in our framework.
(4) The notions of semantic consequence, satisfiability, cate-
goricity, etc. can be rigorously introduced and easily
treated set-theoretically. In particular, our theory encom-
passes common first-order model theory (it is enough to
make the restrictions noted above in the systems and the
language utilized in the investigation of these systems).
(5) Non-standard systems, such as the field of reals extended by
the adjunction of infinitesimals, can naturally be defined,
according to our approach.
(6) Since our definitions are internalizable in set theory, we
may cope with the semantics of infinitary languages and
with possible systems whose sets of axioms are infinite.
 ON SUPPES' SET THEORETICAL PREDICATES 105

4. TYPED FORMULAS

In this section, we introduce a typed language, which seems m o r e

natural than the language LE for dealing with our systems. For each
type c of k sorts, as defined in the previous section, we have in this
new language L T k , p , , , , an infinite sequence of variables of type c, xc,
Yc, zi . . . . . w h e n e v e r T c ( X 1 . . . . , X k ) C_ V,,(X11.3 9 9 9 13 X k ) , for any
k-tuple of n o n - e m p t y sets X1 . . . . . X k . W e assume that the variables
of type c range o v e r the set T c ( X 1 . . . . . X k ) . T h e language has the
constants in Lk,p,,,,, including the e-relation, plus the binary operation
symbol ( , ) that produces a t e r m of type (a, b), (-r, tr), w h e n e v e r ~- is a
t e r m of type a and o- is a t e r m of type b. T h e r e is one individual
constant for e a c h ~ of type ~. A variable or individual constant of type
c is a t e r m of type c
T h e atomic formulas of LTk,p,,,~ consist of the expressions:

~-~ or, where, if 1" is a t e r m of type a, then r is a t e r m of

type (a, 0), ~"= o-, where -r and tr are terms of the same
type.

T h e language has the usual logical connectives and quantifiers for

variables of all types. W h e n there is no danger of confusion, we omit
the subscripts indicating the similarity types f r o m the designation of
the languages, using just L or L T .
Satisfaction and truth of formulas of the typed language in our
systems E is defined in the usual way, with the variables of type c
ranging o v e r T r . . . . . X k ) . W e say that a sentence ~0 of L T is
equivalent to a sentence W of L, if for each system E of the right
similarity type, we h a v e E ~ ~0 if and only if E ~ W. W e also call a
sentence of L, xIr, typed, if W is equivalent to a sentence ~0 of L T . A
set X of sentences implies a set II, in our sense, if e v e r y system E
which is a model of • is also a model of II.
For e v e r y sentence of L T there is an equivalent sentence of L. It is
e n o u g h to replace the quantifiers ::lx~ and Vx~, by :Ix c
T~(Xi .... , Xk) and Vx e Tr .... , Xk), and noticing that
T o ( X 1 . . . . . X k ) is definable in set theory f r o m X1 . . . . , Xk, and that
o r d e r e d pairs are also definable.
It is easy to show that e v e r y sentence of L T is transportable, and,
hence, e v e r y typed sentence of L, is also transportable. T h e axioms
for all known B o u r b a k i ' s species of structures or Suppes predicates are
106 NEWTON C. A. DA COSTA AND ROLANDO CHUAQUI

typed. Thus, a natural requirement would be to have these axioms

always typed.
A natural conjecture is that a sentence of L is transportable if and
only if it is typed. A weaker conjecture is that every transportable
sentence is implied by a typed sentence, or, even weaker, that every
set of transportable sentences is implied by a set of typed sentences. If
one of this weaker conjectures were true, we could always replace,
loosely speaking, an axiom system composed of transportable sen-
tences by one composed of typed sentences.

5. A PREDICATE FOR CLASSICAL PARTICLE MECHANICS

In Suppes [14] and [15], Bourbaki's work, and Krantz et al. [10],
several mathematical and scientific theories are set-theoretically
axiomatized, that is, formulated in terms of Suppes' predicates.
Among others, we mention the theories of groups, fields, rings, real
and complex vector spaces, topological spaces, uniform structures,
classical particle mechanics, and relational systems related to the
theory of measurement.
In order to exemplify our methods, we present the simple example
of the predicate that defines a group, and the more elaborate example
of an axiomatization of classical particle mechanics, which is a theory
ot the domain of the empirical sciences. The axiomatization is based
on that presented by Suppes in the papers mentioned above and modi-
fied by him in an unpublished book that he is preparing on the subject.
We begin with the predicate that defines the notion of group. The
predicate for groups is based on systems ((G), Y, t, n) where (G) is
the sequence of one element G, the universe of the group, Y is the
one element sequence consisting of the relation o of type ((1, 1)1),
t---(((1, 1)1)), and n = 0. The axioms of the group predicate are just
the usual axioms for groups, which are clearly transportable.
We now turn to particle mechanics. Before turning to mechanics
proper, we must introduce some mathematical, more specifically
geometrical, systems that will be used in the formalization. We also
need the system for the real numbers. The set R is the set of real
numbers. We take as given the field of real numbers, which is just the
system (R, Y , t , n ) such that Y = (+, -, 0,1, <), t = (((1,1), l),
((1, 1), 1), 1, 1, (1, 1)), and n = 1. Here, as usual, + is the operation of
addition on real numbers, 9 is the operation of multiplication, 0 is the
 ON SUPPES' SET THEORETICAL PREDICATES 107

number zero, 1 is the number one, and < is the relation of less than
between real numbers, t is the sequence of types of these relations and
operations. We put n = 1, since, in order to give a complete axioma-
tization of the real numbers, we need variables that range over sets of
real numbers. We might need for some purposes to have 1 < n, for
instance, if we have to talk about real functions in general. T h e axioms
for the field of real numbers are well-known, and it is easy to see that
they are typed sentences, and, hence, transportable.
We now turn to v e c t o r spaces over the field of real numbers. A
vector space is a system of the following form (X, Z , u, n), where
X = (R, V), Z = Y ~ ( + , - , 0) (~ is concatenation of sequences), u =
F(((2, 2), 2), ((1, 2), 2), 2), and n = 1. V is a basic set and R is an
auxilliary set. + is the operation of addition of elements of V, - is the
multiplication of a real times a vector, and 0 is the zero vector. A
Euclidean vector space additionally has the operation of scalar or
inner product of type ((2, 2), 1), and the vector or exterior product of
type ((2, 2), 2). We shall write the scalar product of vectors x and y,
(x, y), and its vector product Ix, y]. T h e axioms for vector spaces and
Euclidean v e c t o r spaces are well-known and clearly first order and
transportable.
We also need the predicate for real atline spaces. Here the systems
have one additional universe of points, say A, so that the basic sets are
A and V, and the auxilliary set is R. We fix the sequence of universes
as (R, V, A). We also add a new operation of difference of points
which is a mapping from A x A to V, i.e. of type ((3, 3), 2). T h e
difference of points Q and P is denoted by Q - P or PQ. T h e only
new axioms that are needed are the statement that the difference of
points is a function from A x A onto V, and the law of addition of
points:
For any P, Q, R ~ A , P Q + O R = PR.
A n affine space in which the vector space is Euclidean is a Euclidean
space. We can then define the distance between points P, Q ~ A by
d(P, Q) = IPQI= ( P Q , po).2. This distance has the usual properties.
T h e next important system to define is that of a Galilean space-time
system, which we could just name classical space-time. We start with a
four dimensional afline space with universes (R, V, A) and all the
operations described earlier. We add a new universe V~, which is a
subset of V, an operation t from A into R, i.e., of type (3, 1), and
108 NEWTON C, A. DA COSTA AND ROLANDO CHUAQUI

relations of type ((4, 4), 1) and ((4, 4), 4), ( , ) and [ , ]. t represents
the measure of time. The following additional axioms should be
satisfied:
(1) V1 is a three dimensional subspace of the vector space V
with scalar product ( , ) and vector product [ , ].
(2) t is a function from A into R such that for each P e A, the
set [Q : I ( Q ) = t(P)] is a three dimensional Euclidean space
with vector space V1. The affine space for t ( P ) = r is
denoted by A(r).
We now are ready to characterize systems for classical particle
mechanics. We add a new universe P, the set of particles, and, for
convenience, the set N of natural numbers, used to index the external
forces. So now we have as sequence of universes (R, V, A, V1, P, N).
We also add the relations necessary to make (R, V, A, V1) a Galilean
space-time system plus the following new relations:
A function a of type (1, 3), which gives the origin at each
time,
a position function s of type ((5, 1), 3); we write sp(t) for
s(p, t),
a mass function m of type (5, 1),
a force function | of type (((5, 5), 1), 2), which represents
the internal forces
a force function g of type (((5, 1), 6), 2), which represents
the external forces.
In order to state the axioms, we need many notions of analysis, such as
derivatives and convergence of series. So the number n that deter-
mines the universe should be higher than 1, at least 5. The field of real
numbers should also be completed with the operations for differen-
tiation, integration, and addition of series. These are operations of a
higher type. For instance, differentiation takes real functions into real
functions.
The axioms that are added to those for Galilean space-time systems
are the following:

Kinematical axioms.
(1) The range of t is an interval of real numbers, say T.
 ON S U P P E S ' SET T H E O R E T I C A L PREDICATES 109

(2) P is a finite, non-empty set.

(3) a is a function from T to A, such that for each t 9
a( t) 9 A( t).
(4) s is a function form P x T into A, such that for each p 9 P
and t 9 T, we have that sp(t) 9 A(t).
(5) m is a function from P into R.
(6) [ is a function from P x P x T into V~.
(7) g is a function from P x T x N into V1.
(8) For e v e r y p 9 P and t 9 T the v e c t o r function s p ( t ) - a(t) is
twice differentiable at t.

Dynamical Axioms
(9) For p 9 P, re(p) is a positive real number.
(10) For p, q 9 P, and t 9 T, t(p, q, t) = - l ( q , p, t).
(11) For p, q 9 P, and t 9 T,
Is(p, t) - s(q, t), t(p, q, t) - [(q, p, t)] = 0.
(12) For p 9 and t 9 the series X,g(p,t,n) is absolutely
convergent.
(13) For p 9 P and t 9
m(p)D2(sp(t)- a ( t ) ) = Xqd, l(p, q, 0 + ~ , g ( P , t, n),
where D E is the second derivative with respect to t.
We shall not give a justification for these axioms, which can be
found in Suppes' works. T h e only remark we wish to make is that all
the axioms presented are clearly typed formulas, and, hence, trans-
portable.

7. FINAL REMARKS

Our present investigation of the concept of structure in mathematics

and in the empirical sciences is c o n n e c t e d with Hilbert's sixth prob-
lem, called by him The mathematical treatment of the axioms of
physics. In effect, Hilbert describes his sixth problem as follows:
The investigations of the foundations of geometry suggest the problem: To treat in the
same manner, by means of axioms, those physical sciences in which mathematics plays an
important part; in the first rank are the theory of probability and mechanics.
II0 NEWTON C. A. DA COSTA AND ROLANDO CHUAQUI

Important investigations by physicists on the foundations of mechanics are at hand; I

refer to the writings of Mach . . . . Hertz . . . . Boltzmann,... and Volkmann . . . . It is
therefore very desirable that the discussion of the foundations of mechanics be taken up
by mathematicians also. Thus, Boltzmann's work on the principles of mechanics
suggests the problem of developing mathematically the limiting processes, there merely
indicated, which lead from the atomistic view to the laws of continua. Conversely one
might try to derive the laws of motion of rigid bodies by a limiting process from a system
of axioms depending upon the idea of continuously varying of a material filling all space
continuously, these conditions being defined by parameters. For the question as to the
equivalence of different systems of axioms is always of great theoretical interest.
If geometry is to serve as a model for the treatment of physical axioms, we shall try
first by a small number of axioms to include as large a class of physical phenomena, and
then by adjoining new axioms to arrive gradually at the more special theories. At the
same time Lie's principle of subdivision can perhaps be derived from the profound
theory of infinite transformation groups. The mathematician will have also to take
account not only of those theories coming near to reality, but also, as in geometry, of all
logically possible theories. He must be always alert to obtain a complete survey of all
conclusions derivable from the system of axioms assumed.
Further, the mathematician has the duty to test exactly in each instance whether the
new axioms are compatible with the previous ones. The physicist, as his theories
develop, often is forced by results of his experiments to make new hypotheses, while he
depends, with respect to the compatibility of the new hypotheses with the old axioms,
solely upon these experiments or upon a certain physical intuition, a practice which in
the rigorously logical building up of a theory is not admissible. The desired proof of the
compatibility of all assumptions seems to me also of importance, because the effort to
obtain such a proof always forces us most effectually to an exact formulation of the
axioms. ([8])

H e n c e , t h e a x i o m a t i z a t i o n o f e m p i r i c a l t h e o r i e s , t h a t is, t h e f o r -
m u l a t i o n o f t h e s e t h e o r i e s as s p e c i e s of s t r u c t u r e s o r o f S u p p e s '
predicates, besides being relevant from the philosophical standpoint,
constitutes an important kind of mathematical problem. (Details on
t h e p r e s e n t s t a t u s o f H i l b e r t ' s s i x t h p r o b l e m m a y b e f o u n d in [17].)
T h e r e is a n o t h e r r e m a r k w h i c h d e s e r v e s to b e m a d e . T h e r e a r e
m a t h e m a t i c a l kinds of structures w h i c h d o n o t q u i t e fit t h e a b o v e
d e f i n i t i o n o f a s p e c i e s o f s t r u c t u r e o r o f S u p p e s ' p r e d i c a t e . T h i s is t h e
c a s e o f s o m e c l a s s e s of m a t h e m a t i c a l o b j e c t s s t u d i e d in d i f f e r e n t i a l
g e o m e t r y (for i n s t a n c e , t h e so c a l l e d s p e c i e s o f l o c a l s t r u c t u r e s , in [4]
a n d [5]) a n d , in g e n e r a l , in t h e t h e o r y o f c a t e g o r i e s (see [7]). I n o r d e r
t o a c o m m o d a t e t h e s e o b j e c t s in a s e t - t h e o r e t i c a l f r a m e w o r k , w e n e e d
to s t r e n g t h e n t h e u s u a l s e t t h e o r i e s . W e shall d e a l w i t h this q u e s t i o n in
a forthcoming paper.
 ON SUPPES' SET THEORETICAL PREDICATES 111

NOTES

* Research for this paper was partially supported by the DIUC, Catholic University of
Chile and by the Regional Scientific and Technological Development Program of the
Organization of American States.
The authors would like to thank Professor P. Suppes, whose seminar, in Stanford
University, was the main force behind their interest in the subject of this paper, which is
the first of a series of articles devoted to the theory of structures and the axiomatization
of scientific theories.

REFERENCES

[1] Bourbaki, N.: 1968, Theory of Sets, Herman and Addison-Wesley, Boston and
Reading, Massachusetts.
[2] Bourbaki, N.: 1957, Thdorie des Ensembles, Chapitre 4 (Structures), Herman,
Paris.
[3] Chuaqui, R.: 1981, Axiomatic Set Theory. Impredicative Theories of Classes,
North-Holland, Amsterdam.
[4] Dedecker, P.: 1958, 'Introduction aux structures locales', in Colloques du centre
Beige de recherches math~matiques, g~om~trie diff(rentieUe, Universit6 Catholique
de Louvain, pp. 103-35.
[5] Ehresmann, C.: 1957, 'Gattungen von lokalen Strukturen', Jahresbericht der Deut-
schen Math. Vereinigung, 60, 49-77.
[6] Fraenckel, A. A. and Y. Bar-HiUel: 1958, Foundations of Set Theory, North-
Holland, Amsterdam.
[7] Hatcher, W. S.: 1982, The Logical Foundations of Mathematics, Pergamon Press,
Philadelphia - London - Toronto.
[8] Hilbert, D.: 1976, 'Mathematical Problems (1900)', in F. E. Browder (ed.),
Mathematical Developments Arising from Hilbert Problems, Proceedings of Sym-
posia in Pure Mathematics XXVIII, Am. Math. Soc., pp. 1-34.
[9] Kelley, J. L.: 1955, General Topology, van Nostrand Reinhold, New York.
[10] Krantz, D. H., R. D. Luce, P. Suppes, and A. Tversky: 1971, The Foundations
of Measurement I, Academic Press, New York.
[11] Sneed, J. D.: 1971, The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics, D. Reidel,
Dordrecht.
[12] Stegmiiller, W.: 1970, 1973, Theorie und Erfahrung, vol. 1, (1970), and vol. 2,
(1973), Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg.
[13] Stegmiiller, W.: 1979, The Structuralist View of Theories. A Possible Analogue of
the Bourbaki Programme in Physical Science, Springer-Verlag, New York.
[14] Suppes, P.: 1957, Introduction to Logic, van Nostrand Reinhold, New York.
[15] Suppes, P.: 1967, Set-Theoretical Structures in Science, mimeographed, Stanford
University, California.
[16] Tarski, A.: 1935, 'Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen', Studia
Philosophica 1, 261--405. English translation in J. Corcoran (ed.), Logic, Seman-
tics, Metamathematics, 2nd ed., Hackett Publishing Co, (1983).
112 NEWTON C. A. D A C O S T A AND ROLANDO CHUAQUI

[17] Wightman, A. S.: 1976, Hilbert's Sixth Problem: Mathematical Treatment of the
Axioms of Physics', in F. E. Browder (ed.), Mathematical Developments Arising
from Hilbert Problems, Proceedings of Symposia in Pure Mathematics XXVIII,
Am. Math. Soc., pp. 147-240.

Manuscript received 1 June 1987

da Costa
Department of Philosophy
University of S~o Paulo
Silo Paulo, SP
Brazil
and
Chuaqui
Institute of Mathematics
Catholic University of Chile
Santiago
Chile