Also by David Graeber ‘Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value ‘The False Coin of Our Own Dreams Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology Lost People Magic and the Legacy of Slavery in Madagascar Possibilities Essays on Hierarchy, Rebellion, and Desire Direct Action ‘An Ethnography Debt The First 5,000 Years Revolutions in Reverse Essays on Politics, Violence, Art, and Imagination ‘The Democracy Project Atistory, A Crisis, A Movement The Utopia of Rules On Technology, Stupidity, and the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy David Graeber dt wetvicte House‘THE UTOPIA OF RULES copyright © 2015 by David Grobor Mail House peintg:Februmy 2015, pel Gm Kat Deo "The Copel, eid by y Kina bli by Fen 2012 Copigh © 199 and 23 by hy Kane and Ps Maes, “The foi hp origi ppc nomen diet ‘abe fooning pins: "Dead Zoe othe git: An so St Sept -Dend Zonef the angio: On Vien, Deanne eon Lb The 206 Mano Moral Leese” in HAL! The own gue Th Ne 22.202 “ofiying Coan the Desa seo Pt! a Te Bol, 18,2912 "op Baan sn te Pole Case Poe Meee Hoe Poblsing f maktock Mew pbeokicom/ fetbookcoevmighonks / @ehileowe 180578161219 3748 hank) Isa 978-1-61218-484 percept elon) ISBN 979-1.65219.55-5 (enc) Dos Ay lew oss7654321 cao cod ris ook ii om eit of Congres Contents Introduction. ‘The Iron Law of Liberalism and the Era of Total Bureaucratization 3 1 Dead Zones of the Imagination ‘An Essay on Structural Stupidity 45, 2 Of Flying Cars and the Declining Rate of Profit, 105 3 The Utopia of Rules, or Why We Really Love Bureaucracy After All, 149 ‘Appendix wy On Batman and the Problem of Constituent Power 207 Notes 229Introduction The Iron Law of eralism and the Era of Total Bureaucratization Nowaésys, nobody talks mach about bureaucracy. But in the ‘middle ofthe lat century, particularly in the late ssties nd ety seventies, the word wns everywhere. There were sociological tomes with grandiose titles like A General Theory of Bure ‘The Pals of Bureoucy.? or even The Buesuratzation ofthe Wold? and popular paperback creeds with ties ike Parkinson’ Law, The Peer Priiple! ot Bureneras: How to Anny Them. These were Kafksesque novel, and satirical films. Everyone seemed to fea that the foibles and abwurdities of ureaterai fe and bureaucratic procedures were one ofthe defining features fof modern existence, and as such, eminently worth discussing Butsince the seventies, there hasbeen a peculiar fling of Consider, for example, the following table, which diagrams how frequently the word “bureaucracy” appears in books writ- ten in English over the last century and a half A subject of only moderate interest uni the postwar period, it shoot into prominence stating in the fies and then, alter» pinnacle in 1973, begins slow but inexorable decline‘Why? Wel ome obvious reson i hat wee jt become accom tit Boenuray has become the we in which swe svi, Now i imagine another graph, one ha Spy ocimented the average mamiber of hours pee yea a el ‘Ameriear—or a Briton, or an inabitan of Thaand—apent fling ov forms or otherwise filing prey baresscrtic ablations. (Needles cosy, the overreling moriey of these obligations no longer inoie actual phys paper) Tit fraph would almost certainly show a line mach lie the one Inthe fe graphs slow climb ut 1973. But here the two traps wood diverge rather tan filing back, the Hie would oninve to cimb if anything, t wold do x0 more preii- tomy racking hon the ne twentieth cent idler cStaensspent evermore hous srugling with phone tes and ‘ve interices while the les fertanate pent ever more hours of their day trying to jump through the increasingly elaborate hoops rege to gai acces wo dvnding soil services. ‘This is nota graph of hous spent on paperwork, just of how ‘often the word “paperwork has been used in English-language hooks. But absent time machines that could allow us to carry ‘out a more direc investigation, this is about as cle at we're iely oo get. By the way, most similar paperwork-related terms yield most dential rau: ‘The essays asembled in this volume are all,in one way oF other, about this disparity. We no longer like to think about Dbureauctacy, yeti informs every spect of our existence, Is at ‘fava planetary civilization, we have decided to clap our hands ‘over our eats and star humming whenever the topic comes tp. Insofar as we are even willing to discuss it tb sil in the terme popular in the sixties and early seventies. The socisl movements of the sities were, on the whole, left-wing in inspiration, but they were ao rebellions agaist bureaveracy or, t0 put it more accurately, rebellions against the bureaucrat mindset, against the soul-destroying conformity of the postwar welfare sates. In the face of the gray fanctionaries of both state-capialit and state-socalie regimes, sities rebels stood for individual ‘expression and spontaneous convivial and agains (“rules and regulations, who needs them?) every form of social conti ‘With the collapse of the old elie tats, allthis hae come to seem decidedly quaint. As the language of antibureaucratic individualism hss been adopted, with increasing ferocity, by the Right, which insists on “market solutions” co every socalproblem, the mainsream Left has inressingly seduced itself to fighting 2 kindof pathetic rearguard action, aying to salage remnants of the old welfare sate: it as acquiesced with—ofien ‘even speatheaded-—attemps to make government efforts more “eficient” dhrough the partial privatization of services and the incorporation of ever-more “masket principles? “market incentives” and market-based “accountability processes” into the seractute ofthe bureaucracy ite ‘The reli a poical catastrophe. Theres really no other ‘way to putit What is presented asthe “moderate” ef solution to any socal problems—and radical lef solutions ae, almost everywhere now, ruled out fou court—has invariably come to bbe some nightmare fision ofthe wore elements oFbureauersey and the worst elements of capi consciously tried to create the least appealing posible poi cal position, ei a tesimony to the genuine lingering power ‘of left ideas that anyone would even consider voting for 2 parry that promoted this sore of thing—because surely i they do, its not beesute they actully think these are good policies, ‘bat because eheve are the only policies anyone who identifies themselves a left-ofcenter is llowed to set forth, Ts there any wonder, then, that every time there ea social cris, it isthe Right, rather than the Let, which becomes the ‘enue forthe expreion of popula anger? The Right, at least, hes a critique of bureaucracy. I's not 4 very good one. Bur a least it exis. The Left has none. As resulwhen those who identify with the Lit do have anything negative to say about bureaucracy, they ae ually forced to sdapt a watered-dovm version of the right-wing ertigue? ism, Is a8 if someone had ‘This right-wing critique can be disposed of fly quickly. 1 ths its origins i nineteenth-contury Hberaism.'The story that emerged in middle-class circles in Burope in the wake of the Feench revolution was that the civilized world was experiene= ng gradual, uneven, but inevitable trtaformation sway fom the rule of warrior elites, with thei authoritarian goveraments, their presly dogmas, and thei casteike satiation, to one of liberty, equality and enlightened commercial self-interest "The mercantile clases in the Middle Ages undermined the old feudal order like termites munching from below—termite, es, but the good kind. The pomp and splendor ofthe absolut states chat were being overthrown wer, acording tthe liberal version of history. che lst gasps of che old order, which would, end 25 sates gave way to markets, religious faith to scientiic understanding, and fxed orders and statuses of Marquis and Baroneses and the lke to free contracts between individuals, The emergence of modern bureaucracies was always some- ‘hing ofa problem for this tory because ie didn ell St. In principle al cheseseufy inetionares in cei offices, with their elaborate chains of command, should have been mete feudal hholdovers, soon to go the way ofthe armies and oficer carpe that everyone was expecting to gradually become unnecessary as well. One need only flip open a Russi novel from the late nineteenth century ll che scion of old aristocratic faites in fact almost everyone in those books—had been transformed into either miliary officers or evil servans (90 one of any notice seems to do anything ese) and the military and civil hierarchies seemed to have neatly identical ranks, les, and sensibilies. Bt chere was an obvious problem. If bureaucrats ‘were just holdowers, why was it that everywhere—not justin buckssaers ike Rusa but in booming industrial societies lke England and Germany—every yea semed to bring more and more of them? "There followed stage ovo of the argument, which was, its essence, that bureaucracy represents an inherent Baw in the democratic project? Its greatest exponent was Ludwig ‘yon Mises, an exiled Austrian aristocrat, whose 1944 book.Buseaucasy argued that by definition, stems of government “diminietation could never onganize information with anything like the efficiency of impersonal matket pricing mechanisms. However, extending the vote to the loses of the economic game would inevitably lead to cals ‘ion, famed at high-minded schemes for trying to solve socal problems through administrative means. von Mises was wil: ing to admit chat many of those who embraced such slatons ‘wete enteely well-meaning; however, thie effors could only smake mates worse. In fact, he fle they would ulimately end ‘up destroying the polical basis of democracy ive since the sddministrators of socal programs wold inevitably form power- ‘loc fir more inuentil dan the politicians elected to run the government and support ever-more radical forms Von Mises argued that 25a result, the social wel states then emerging in places lke France ot England let alone Denmark or Sweden, ‘would, within a generation or two inevitably lead to fascism, Tithe view the ie ofburescricy wae the lime example ‘of good intentions run amok, Ronald Resgan probably made the most effective popular deployment of this ine of thought ‘with his ious claim that, "the nine most errfVing words in the English language are,‘'m ffom the government and I'm here to help" The problem with all hii that it bears very litle relation ‘to what actualy happened. Fis of al historically, markers sim ply did not emerge 2s ome autonomous dams of freedom independent of, and opposed eo, tate authorities. Exacly the ‘opposite is the case. Historically, markets are genenlly ether a side effect of government operations, especially miliary opera~ tions, or were directly created by government policy. This has been true at leas since the invention of coinage, which was fst created and promulgated ata means of provisioning colder for ‘mit of Furasian history ordinary people used informal credit arrangements and physical money, gold aver, bronze, and the kind of impersonal markets they made possible remained mainly an adjunce to the mobilization of legions, sacking of cites, extraction of erbute, and diposing of loot. Modern cen tral banking ymtems were likewise fis So there’ one inital problem with the convensional history. There’ snother even more dramatic one. While the idea that the markets somehow opposed to and independent of govern rent hss ben used at lent atleattsince the nineteenth century to justify atsez fire economic policies designed to lessen the role of government, they never actually have that effect. Ea ‘lish liberalism, for insence, did not lead toa reduction of tate bureaucracy, bur the exact opposite: an endlesly ballooning anny of legal clerk, registrars, inspectors, notaries, and police officials who made the liberal dream ofa word office contract Dbeeween autonomous individual posible, Ie tarned ot that ‘mainaining afiee matket economy required a thoasand times more paperwork chan Louis XIV-style absolutist monarchy This apparent paradox—that government polices intending to reduce government interference in the economy actualy rated to finance wars nd up producing more regulations, more bureaucrats, and more police—can be observed so regularly that I think we are justified in treating i 5 a general sociological la propete to call tthe iron law of liberalism" ‘The Iron Law of Liberalism sates that any matket reform, any government initiative intended to reduce red tape and promote market forces will have the ultimate effect of increasing the coal number ofregu~ lations, the coal amount of paperwork, and the total number of burevucrats the government employs. French sociologist Emile Durkheim wat already obsery- ing ths tendency at the turn of the bwentieth century,” and eventually i became imposible to Sgnore. By the middle oftheTe Ul of ae century, even right-wing cits lke von Mises were willing to scdmit—at leat in their academic writing—that markets don't really regulate themes, and that an army of administrators wat indeed required to Keep any marker system going, (For ‘von Mises, that army only became problematic when it was deployed to alter market outcomes that caused unde suier- ing forthe poor) Sei, right-wing populss soon realized that, whatever the realities, making 2 target of bureaucrats was aknost lays effective. Hence, in their pubic pronounce~ mens, the condemnation of what US. governor George ‘Wallace, in hie 1968 campaign for President, fst labeled “poimy-headed bureaucras” living off hardworking citizens’ axes, wae unrelenting ‘Wallace is actually a crucial figure here. Nowadiys, Ameri~ cans mainly remember him asa filed reactionary, oF even 2 naling late: the lst die-hard Southern segregationist sand ing wih an axe outside + public school door. But in ecms of his Broader legacy, he could just 25 well be represented 2s a kind of politieal genias, He was, afer all, the fase politician create 2 national platform for 3 kind of vight-wing populism that wat soon to prove so infectious that by now, 2 gener. tion ter i as come to be adopted by pretty much everyone, ses the polccal spectrum. Asa result, amongst working-clss ‘Americans, goverament is now generally seen as being made up of two sorts of people: “politicians” who are blostering crooks and liars but can a last occasionally be voted out of Office, and “bureaucrats” who are condescending clits almost Jmposible to uproot, There i assumed tobe a kind of tact ali- sce besveen what came to be soen a the paasitical poor (2 ‘Ameria usualy pictured in overly racist terms) and the equally parssitialselErightooss officials whose existence depends on subsidizing the poor using other peoples money. Again, even the mainssream Lefi—or what itt supposed to pas for a Left these days—has come to ofe ile more than a watered-down 0 version of this right-wing language. Bill Clinton, fo instance, hha spent so much of his career bashing evil servants that afer ‘the Oklzhoma City bombing he actualy flt moved to remind ‘American that public servants were human beings unto them- selves,and promised never to use the word “bureaucrat” again = In contensporary American populism—nd increasingly, in the rest of the world as wel—there can be only one alterna- ‘ive to “bureaucracy” and that is “the market” Sometimes this is held to mean that government should be run more like a Dbasines, Sometimes i is held to mean we should simply get the bureaueras out of the way and let atare take its coune, ‘which means letting people attend tothe business oftheir lives ‘untrammelled by endless rales and regulations imposed on. them ffom above, anc so allowing the magic ofthe marketplace to provide is own solutions. “Democracy” thus cme co mean the market; “bureaueragy” in turn, government interference with the market 2nd this is prety much what the word conkinus to mean to this dy. Te wasa' always s.The rise of the modern corporation, in the lave ninoteenth century, was largely seen at che ime as 2 mater ‘of applying modern, bureaucratic techniques tothe private sec~ tor—and these techniques were asumed to be required when, ‘operating on a large scale, because they were more eficient than the networks of personal or informal connections chat had dominated 2 woud of small family firms. The pioneers of these new, private bureaucracies were the United States and Ger ‘many, and Max Weber, the German sociologist, observed that ‘American in his day were particulary inclined to see public and private bureaucracies a essentially the same animal: ‘The body of officials actively engaged in a “phic” office, along with the respective apparatus of material‘Tre Uap tm implements andthe fles, make up "bureau." In private enterprise, "he bureaus often elle Teis the peeuliasty of the modern entrepreneur that be conduc himelfas the "Bs oficial” oF his corpo ration, in the very same way in which the ruler of a specifically modern bureaucratic sae spoke of him- sels "the fie servant” of the sate-The idea that che Dreau stivitis ofthe state ate intrinsically different in character ftom the managemest of private economic offices isa continental European notion and by way of contrat scot foreign to the American way In other words, around the turn ofthe century, rather chan anyone complaining that government should be un more like a busines, Americans simply assumed that governments and businese—or big busines at any rate—were run the sume way. ‘True for much ofthe nineteenth century he United Seats ‘was largely an economy of smal family ims and high finance— such lice Brisa’ at the time. But Ameria’ advent asa power ‘onthe word stage athe end of the century corresponded tothe site of a ditinedy American form: corporate—bureauertio— capitalism. As Giovanni Arrighi pointed out, an analogous cor~ porate model was emerging atthe same time in Germany, and the evo countres—the United States and Germany—ended ‘up spending most ofthe first alf ofthe next cencury bating, cover which would te over fom the declining British empire and establish its own vision for a global economic and political ‘order Weal now wito won. Atrghi makes another interesting point here. Unlike che Brith Empire, which had taken its free market shetori seriously eliminating ite ov protective tacts ‘with the famous Anti-Corn Law Bill of 1846, neither the Ger- sman or American rgimes had ever been especially interested in five sade. The American in particular were much more con cerned with creating structures of international administration. "The very freeing the United States di, on ofcally taking ‘over che reins tom Great Bitsin after World War I, ws to st ‘up the world frst genuinely planetary bureaucratic institutions in the United Nations andthe Bretton Woods insseution—the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and GATT, later to become the WTO. The British Empire had never atempted anything like this. They ether conquered other nations, oF traded with them. The Amin tempted 10 administer ‘everything and everyone. Bitith peopl, ve observed are quite proud that they are not especially skilled at bureueracy; Americans, in contest, seem embarrased by the fict that on the wile, cheye really aguite good st it le docs fi the American seléimage. Were supposed to be sel-elian individuals, (This prectey why the right-wing populit demonization of bureaucrats sso effec- tive.) Yet the fact emains the United Stats is—and for a well ‘overs century has been—a profoundly bureaucratic socieeyThe seasonitsso easy to overlook is because most American bureat~ cratic habits and sensblties—ftom the clothing tothe language to the design of forms and offices —emerged from the pri- ste sector. When novelists and sociologists deteribed the “Organization Man," or “the Man in the Gray Flainel Suit” the soullesly conformist US. equivalent to the Soviet apparat- chk they were not alking about functionaries in the Depare- sent of Landmarks and Preservation of the Social Security ‘Adinistation—they were describing corporate middle man agement. True, by that time, corporate bureaucrats were not actually being called bureaucrats. Bus dhey were sil sting the standard for what administrative functionaries were supposed tobe ike, ‘The impression that the word “bureaucrat” should be weited a5 a synonym for “civil servant” can be traced back to the New Deal in the thirties, which was ako the moment when bureaucratic steuctures and techniques first becamedramatically visible in many ordinary people’ lives. But it ict, fiom the very beginning, Roosevelt New Dealers worked in close coordination with the batalions of lawyers, engineers, and corporate bureaucrats employed by firms like Ford, Coca Cola, or Proctor & Gamble, absorbing much of thei syle and seosiiles, ands the United States sifted to war footing in the fortie—o did the gargantuan bureaucracy ofthe US. nilitsry. And, of court, the United States ha never relly gone ff war footing ever since, Stil thzough these means, the word bureaucrat” came to attach itelf almost exclusively to civil servants: even if what they do all day is sitat des, fll out forms, and fle reports, neither middle managers nor military officers tue ever quite considered bureaucras. (Neither for that matter are police, or employecs of the NSA.) In the United Sats, the ines between public and privat have Jong been blurry. The American military, for examples famous for its revolving door—high-ranking officers involved in pro- ccurement regularly end up on the bourds of corporations that ‘operate on military contracts. On 2 broader level the need to preserve certain domestic indutries for matary posposes, and to develop others, has allowed the US. government to engage in practically Soviet-syle industrial planning without ever having to admit is doing so. After al, pretty much anything, fom maintaining a cersin number of stel plants, to doing the initial zesearch co set up che Internet, ean be jusiied on ‘grounds of military preparedness. Yer again, since this kind of planning operates via an al and corporate bureaucrats, its never perceived 2s something, nce between military bureaucrats bureaucratic at al Sl with the rise ofthe financial sector, things have reached qualitatively different lee!—one where itis becoming almost impossible to say what is public and what i private Ths isnot Just due to che much-noted outiourcing of one-time gowsen- ‘mene fanctions to private corporations Above allt’ dae tothe way the private corporations themselves have come o aperie Let me give an example. A few weeks ago, [spent several hours on the phone with Bank of Aimetica, trying to work out how to get access to my account information fom over seat, This involved speaking to four diferent representatives, two refers to nonexistent numbers, ere long explanations cof complicated and apparenty arbitrary rules, and two filed sntempts to change outdated addres and phone amber infor- ‘mation lodged on various compute systems. In other words, it was the very definition ofa buresuortic runaround, (Neither was I able, when i was ll ove, to actually acces my account) [Now there isnot the slightest doubt in my mind that, were 1 eo actually Toate a bank manager and demand to know how such things could happen, he or she would immediately insist that the bask was not to Blame—that it was all an effec of a arcane maze of government regulations. However, lam equally confident that, were it posible to investigate how there regula- tions came about, one would find chat they were composed Jointly by aids co legazorson some banking commitee and lobbyists and attorneys employed by the banks chemselves, in 2 process greased by generous contributions t0 the coffers of those same legislators’ reelection campaigns, And the same would be tue of anything fiom credit ratings, insurance pre= sions, mortgage applications, to, for that mater, the proces of Dying an aiine ticket applying fora scuba license, oF eying to requisition an ergonomic char for one' office in an estonsily private universing The vast majority ofthe paperwork we do eis in jot cit tore of in-between zone—ortensibly private, ‘bat in fet entirely shaped by a government tha provides the legal famework, underpins th rules with its courts and all of the elaborate mechanisms of enforcement that come with them, bbue—crucially—works closely with the private concerns tocensure chat che results will guarantee a certtin rate of private prof, In cases like this te language se employ—derived as i is fiom the right-wing ertque—is completely inadequate Ie tll ‘us nothing about whats acrally going on.” Consider the word “deregulation.” In today’s poiial dis- cours, “deregulation” is—like “rforan”—almost invariably rested at 2 good thing. Deregulation means lest bureaucratic ‘meddling, and fewer roles and regulations sting innovation and commerce. This usage puts these on the letchand side of ‘the political spectrum in an awicward position, since opposing deregulation even, pointing out that twas an orgy ofthis very " deragultion” ha ed to the banking criss of 2008—seem to imply a desire for more rules and regulations and cherefore, ‘more gray men in suis sanding in the way of fcedom and ingovation and generaly telling people what :0 do ‘Bust this debate is based on fe premises. Les go back to Danks. There’ no such thing a8 an "nregulated” bank. Nor could thete be. Banks ae institutions to which the government thas granted the power to create mone}—or, to be slightly more technical about i, the right t0 issue TOUs that the govern ‘mene will recognize a legal tender, and, therefore, aceept in payment of taxes and to discharge other debs within its own ational tetstory. Obviously no government is about to grant, snyone—leart ofall a proi-seking firm—the power to ere- seas much money 25 they like undor any circumstances. That ‘would be insane, The power to create money is ane tha, by definition, governments can only grant under carefilycircum- scribed ((ead: regulated) conditions. And indeed this is what we alvays find: government regulates everyting fom a bank's reserve requirements to its hours of operation; how much it can charge in interest, fees, and penalties; what sort of secu rity precautions ie ean or must employ; how is reconds must bbe Kept and reported; how and when it mast inform its ci- nts oftheir rights and responsibilities; and pretty much every- thing be So what are people actually referring t0 when they talk sboue "deregulation"? Tn ordinary sage, the word seems to scan “changing the regulatory structure in a vay dhat Fike” In practice this can refer vo almost anything, Inthe ease of sinlines or telecommunicatons in the seventies and eighties, t ‘cant changing the sytem of regulation fom one that encoss aged afer large firms to one that fostered careflly supervised competition Between midsize firms. Inthe ease of banking, “deregulation” has wavy meane exactly the opposite: moving. away fom a situation of managed compesiion berween mid sized firms to one where a handful of fiancil conglomerates axe allowed to completely dominate the matket. This is what makes the term so handy. Simply by labeling a new segulatory measure “deregulation,” you can ffame it in the public mind as 4 way to reduce bureaucracy and set individual initiative Bee, ven if the rule i a fivefold increte in the actual number of forms to be filled in, reports to be fle, rales and regulations for Inwyers to interpret, and oficiows people in ofices whose entte job seems to be to provide convoluted explanations for why youe no allowed to do things" ‘This proces—the gradual fasion of public and private power into single enti rfe with rules and regulations whore whi- mate purpose isco extzact wealth inthe form of profi—does rot yet have 2 name. hatin ise is significant These things can happen largely because we lick a way to tlk: about them, But one can see its effects in every aspect of our lives. Ills ox days with paperwork. Application forms get longer and more elaborate. Ordinary documents ike bills or tckews or member- ships in sports or book clubs come to be bucwesed by page of legalistic fne print.Pm going to make up a name. I'm going to call this the age of “total bureaucraszation” (1 was tempted to call this the age of “predatory bureaucratization” but it really the al- encompassing matore of the beast I want eo highlight here.) Te had its Gist sieings, one might sy, jus at the point where public discussion of bureaucracy began to fill off in the late seventies, and ie began to get seriously under way in the eight ies. Bue it eruly took off nthe nineties, ‘nan eadier book, auggested that the fandamental historical break that ushered in oue current economic regime occurred in 1971, the date chat che U.S. doll went off the gold san ard. This is what paved the way fest for the Fnancialization of capitalism, but ultimately, for much more profound long- ter changes that I suspect wll ulkimately spel dhe end of eapitalim cntirely [still think chat But here we are speaking of much more short-term effec, What did financilization mean fr the deeply buresucatized sociery that was postwar America?” T think what happened is best considered ae a kind of sift in clas allegiances on the pat of the managerial staf of major corportions, from an uneasy, de facto alliance with ther own worker, (o one with imvestors.As John Kenneth Galbraith long sg pointed ou ifyou create an organization geared to produce perfumes, dairy products, or area faselages, those who make i up will fle to their own devices, tend to concentrate their efforts on producing more and better perfumes, dairy products, or aircraft fuselage, rather than thinking primarily of what wail make the most mony for the shareholders. What more, since for mos of the twentieth century job i rmegi-firm meant lifetime promive of employment, everyone involved in the process—managers and workers alike-—cended to see themselves as sharing a certsin common interest in this regu, over and aginst meddling owners and investors. This kind of solidarity across clas lines even had a name: it was called “corporatsm.” One mustn't romantcize it. was among 2 large bureaucratic other things the philosophical bait of fascism. Indeed, one argue that fiscism simply took the iea that workers sad managers had common interest, that organizations Bke corporations or communices formed organic wholes and that financiers were an alien, parasical force, and drove them to their ukimate, murderous extreme. Even in is more benign socal democratic versions, in Europe or America, the attendant politics often came tinged with chauvinism—but they also ensured that the investor cles was always seen ao some extent outsiders, guint whom white-collar and blue-collar workers could be considered, at least to some degree, to be united in a common Bont. From the perspective of sistics radicals, who regulaely watched antiwar demonstrations attacked by nationalist team sters and construction workers, the reactionary implications of corporation appeared self-evident. The corporate sit ad the ‘well-paid, Archie Bunker elements ofthe industrial proletariat ‘were clearly om the same sie. Unsurprising then thatthe lef wing critique of bureaucracy at the time focused on the ways that social democracy had more in common with fim than irs proponents cared to admit. Unsurprsin, too, that thi ri- tique seems utterly irelevan today.” ‘What began co happen in the seventies, and paved the way for what we see today, was a kind of strategic pivot of the "upper echelons of US. corporate bureaueracy—avay from the workers, and towards sharcholders, and eventually, towards the financial sacrore asa whole. The mergers and acquisi- tions, corporate raiding, junk bonds, and aset stripping that began under Reagan and Thatcher and culminated in the rise cof private equity firms were merely ome ofthe more dramatic caly mechanisns through which this shift of allegiance worked itvelfout I fact, there wae x dovble movement: corporate man agement became more financiaized, bot a the same time, the nancial sector became corporatized, with invesiment bakes,hedge finds, and the Bike largely replcing individual investors, [Asa result the investor clas and the executive class became almost indistinguishable, (Think here of the term “Gnancial management,” which came to refer simultaneously to how the highest ranks ofthe corporate bureaucracy ran their firms, and how investors managed their portfoion.) Before long, heroic (CEOs were being lionized in the media, cheir success largely seated by the number of employees they could fre, By the nineties, lifetime employment, even for white-collar workers, had become a thing ofthe pat. When conporations wished to win loyalty, they increasingly di it by paying their employees n stock options ‘As the sume time, the new credo was that everyone should Took ache woe through the eyes ofa investor—that's why. in the eighties, newspapers began firing their bor reporters, but ordinary TV news reports came to be accompanied by crawls ax the bottom of the screen displaying the latest sock quote ‘The common cant was tht though participation in personal retirement funds and investment finds of one sort or anther, everyone would come to own a piece of capitalism. In reality, the magi circle was only really widened to include the higher aid professionals and che corporate bureaucrats themselves. Sill, chat extension wat extremely importnt. No politeal revolution can succeed without alles, and bringing slong a cer- tain portion ofthe middle clas—and, even more crucially, con- vineing che bulk of the middle clases that they had some kind sake in finance-driven capitalsm—ws critical. Ulimately, the more liberal members ofthis professonsl-manageril elite became the social base for what came to pass a8 “lef-wing” political pares, as actual working-class organizations lke trade unions were cast into the wildemes. (Hence, the US Democratic Party, or New Labour in Grest Britain, whose leaders engage in regular ritual acts of public abjuraton of the very unions that have historically formed their strongest ase ‘of suppor). These were of course people who akeady tended ‘0 work in thoroughly bureaucratized environmens, whether schools, hospital, or corporste lw firm. The actual working. clas, who bore a tradicional loathing for uch characters, either roped out of polities entirely, or were increasingly reduced to casting protest votes forthe radical Right” This was not just polisial realignment. Ie was a cultral transformation. And itset the sage fr the process whereby the bureaucratic techniques (performance reviews, focus group, time alocation surveys...) developed in financial and corporate circles came eo invade the rest of society—educaton, scien jgovernment—and eventually 0 pervade almost every aspect of everyday life. One can best tace the proces, pechaps, by fol= lowing its language. There is peculiar idiom that fist emerged in such circles, fll of bright, empey terms like vision, quality, stakeholder, leadership, excellence, innovation, strategic gous, lor best practices. (Much of i races back to "self aetlization” rmovernent like Lifespring, Mind Dynamics, nd EST, which were extremely popular in corporate boardroom in the seven tics, butt quickly became a language unto itself) Now magine it would be possible to createa map ofsome majorctyand then place one tiny bue dot on the location of every docament that uses at least eee ofthese word. Then imagine that we could wate it change overtime. We would be able to obeerve this new corporate bureaverstic culture spread ike blue stain in & pete dish, starting in she financial ditriets, on to boardrooms, then government offices and universities, hen, inal, enguling any location where any number of people emer to dxcue the location of resources of any kind al. For allt celebration of maskets and individ inititve, this alliance of government and finance often produces results that bear a striking resemblance to the worst excesses ofburesucratiztion in the formee Soviet Union or former calo- nial backwaters of the Global South, Thee isa vich anhopo- logical literarre, fr instance, on th cut of certificates, licenses, and diplomas in the former colonial word, Oen the argument is that in countries like Bangladesh, Trinidad, or Cameroon, which hover between the sifing legacy of colonial domination and their ow magical eadtions, oficial credentials are seem as 4 Kind of material fsh—magical objects conveying power in ‘heie ov righ, entirely apart from the real knowledge, expesi- cence, of tsining they're suppoted to represent. But since the cighties, the real explosion of credentaism has been in what are supposedly the mott"advanced” economies ike the United States, Great Beitsin, or Canada. As one anthropologist, Sarah Kendzior, pus it “The United Sates has become the mos rigidly ere~ dentialsed society in the work” write Janes Engel and Anthony Dangecfeld in theit 2008 book Saving “Higher Education in the Age of Money. "A BA is toquired for jobs that by no stretch of imagination need two ‘eats of fill-time gaining let alone four” The promotion of college as 2 requirement for a middle-class... has reslted in the excision of the non-college educated ffom professions of publi infu- ence. In 1971, 38 percent of journalists had a college degree. Today 92 percent do, and at many publications, 2 graduate degree in journalism is requred—despite the face that most renowned journalists have never ssudied journalism,” Journalism it one of many fields of public inf ence—indluding polities—in which credentials fane- Bion 2s defacto permission to speak, rendering those ‘who lack chem les likely to be employed and let able to afford to say in their field. Ability is discounted without credentials, but the ability to purchase creden- tals ests, more often than not, on family wealth (One could repeat the sory in ld after fel, from nares to art teachers, physica therapists to foreign policy consuleants ‘Almost every endeavor that used o be considered an are (best learned through doing) nov requires formal professional tain ing and a cerficate of completion, and this seems to be hap- pening, equally in both the private and public sectors, since, s+ ahesdy noted, in maters buraueraig, such ditncrions are becoming effectively meaningless, While these measures are touted ae all bareavcratic messures—ae a vay of eesting ‘ir, impersonal mechanisms in elds previously dominated by insider knowledge and socal connections, the effects often the ‘opposite. As anyone who has been to graduste school knows, ies precisly the children ofthe profsiosl-manageral cases, ‘hose whose family sources make them the leat in need of financial support, who best know how wo navigate the word of paperwork that enables them to get sid support For every- foe ele, the main esl of one's yeas of profesional taining is to ensure that one is saddled with such an enormous burden of student debr that a substantial chunk of any subsequent income fone will ge from pursuing that profession will henceforth be siphoned off, ech month, by the financial sector. In some cases, these new training requirements can only be described as ‘outright scams, ax when lenders and those prepared to set up the taining programs, jointly lobby the government to insist ‘hat, a, all phatmacits be henceforth sequined to pass some additional qualfVing examination, forcing thousands already practicing the profession ino night school, which these phar- smacists know many will only beable to afford withthe help of| high-iterse student loans By doing this lenders are in effect, legislating themselves a cut of most pharmacist’ subsequent“Theater night seer an extreme cat, bt ints own way its paradigmatic ofthe fision of public and privae power under the new financial regime, Increasingly, corporste profits in America are not derived ffomn commerce or industry at all, but fiom finance—which means, ultimately from other people’ debs. “These debts do not just happen by accident To a large degree, they are engineeted—and by precisely this kind of fasion of public and private power. The corporatization of education the resulting ballooning of titions as students are expected to pay for giant football stadiams and similar pet projects of| executive tristoes,o to conibute tothe burgeoning lacs of| cver-multiplying univers officials the increasing demands for degrees as cetfcaes of entry into any job that promises access ‘o anything like a middle-class standard of ving esting ris- ing levels of indebredness—all these form a single web. One result fll his debts co render the government iselfche main mechanism for the extraction of corporate profs. (Just think, here, of what happens if one tries to defalt on one’ student loans the entire legal apparatus leaps into action, threatening, to seize assets, garnish wages, and apply thousands of dollars in additional penalties) Another i to fore the debtors them. selves to bureaucrtive ever-increasing dimensions ofthis own lives, which have to be managed 25 if they were themlves a siny corporation messuring inputs and outputs and constantly struggling to balance its accounts {es alo imporcant co emphasize chat while chit ystem of cextrction comes dresed up in a language of rales and regula- tions, init actual mode of operation, it has almost nothing to do with she rule of law: Rather, the legal sytem bas itself become the means fora system of increasingly arbitrary excrac~ tions. As the profits from banks and credit card companies