Contents of Volume 5 xxxv

5. Consequences and Causes of Variation in Governance 4615

5.1 Correlates of governance 4615
5.2 The first stage 4620
5.3 Origins of bad governance in Sierra Leone 4625
6. Improving Governance 4629
6.1 Persistence of power and incentives—The See-Saw Effect 4631
6.2 Persistence of de facto power 4633
6.3 The Iron Law of Oligarchy 4637
6.4 Successful reform 4640
6.5 Governance and equity—The Scandinavian model 4641
6.6 Promoting reform 4647
7. Conclusions 4648
End Notes 4649
References 4650

CHAPTER 70 Labor Regulations, Unions, and Social Protection in Developing

Countries: Market Distortions or Efficient Institutions? 4657
Richard B. Freeman
Abstract 4657
Keywords 4658
1. The Debate Over Labor Institutions 4661
1.1 Theoretical perspectives 4664
2. Microevidence on Minimum Wages 4667
3. Wage Curve 4670
4. Employment Regulations 4672
5. Mandated Benefits 4674
6. Union Effects 4674
7. Cross-Country Evidence 4680
8. Country Cases 4682
8.1 China 4683
8.2 Argentina 4684
9. The Informal Sector 4684
10. Conclusions 4687
Appendix A 4688
Appendix B: Regression 4693
End Notes 4693
References 4695