Manuel v.

Ong

15 October 2014 G.R. No. 205249 LEONEN, J.

Petitioners Spouses Benedict and Sandra Manuel

Respondent Ramon Ong

Doctrine Personal service of summons has nothing to do with the

location where summons is served. A defendant’s address is
inconsequential. Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is clear in what it requires: personally handing the
summons to the defendant (albeit tender is sufficient should
the defendant refuse to receive and sign). What is
determinative of the validity of personal service is, therefore,
the person of the defendant, not the locus of service.

Facts

Respondent Ramon Ong filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint
for accion reivindicatoria against Spouses Manuel. He alleged that the later constructed
improvements through force, intimidation, strategy, threats, and stealth on a property
he supposedly owned. On February 3, 2010, summons were issued to the Spouses
Manuel. On April 23, 2010, Ong filed with the RTC a motion to declare the Spouses
Manuel in default. Per the sheriff’s return on summons, on February 12, 2010, Sheriff
Sales, along with Ong’s counsel and a certain Laureano, attempted to personally serve
summons on the Spouses Manuel at their address in Lower Bacong, Loacan, Itogon,
Benguet. The Spouses Manuel, however, requested that service be made at another time
considering that petitioner Sandra Manuel's mother was then critically ill. The sheriff’s
return further indicates that on March 16, 2010, another attempt at personal service was
made. After Sheriff Joselito Sales had personally explained to petitioner Sandra Manuel
the content of the summons and the complaint, the latter refused to sign and receive the
summons and the complaint. Sheriff Joselito Sales was thus prompted to merely tender
the summons and complaint to petitioner Sandra Manuel and to advise her to file their
answer within fifteen (15) days. As the Spouses Manuel failed to file their answer
within this period, Ong asked that they be declared in default.

The RTC granted Ong's motion prompting the spouses to file a motion to lift the
order of default alleging that it is the siblings of petitioner Manuel who resided in
Lower Bacong, Itogon, Benguet, while they resided in Ambiong, La Trinidad, Benguet.
Thus, summons could not have been properly served on them in the former address.
Issues

1.) Did the court acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the Spouses Manuel?

2. Are Spouses Manuel entitled to relief from the order of default?

Ruling

1.) Yes. Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: “Whenever
practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in
person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.”

In this case, the sheriff’s return on summons indicated that Sheriff Sales
endeavored to personally hand the summons and a copy of the complaint to the
Spouses Manuel on two (2) separate occasions. He relented from doing so on the first
occasion in deference to the medical condition of petitioner Sandra Manuel’s mother.
On the second occasion, he was constrained to tender the summons and copy of the
complaint as petitioner Sandra Manuel refused to accept them. The Spouses Manuel did
not deny the occurrence of the events narrated in the sheriff’s return but claimed that no
valid service of summons was made. They claimed that they did not reside in Lower
Bacong, Loacan, Itogon, Benguet, where the service of summons was made. From this,
they surmised that the "Sandra Manuel" who was specifically identified in the sheriff’s
return was someone other than petitioner Sandra Manuel.

2.) Yes. As valid service of summons was made on them, it was incumbent upon the
Spouses Manuel, pursuant to Rule 11, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, to
file their answer within fifteen (15) days from March 16, 2011. Having failed to do so,
they were rightly declared to be in default.

Rule 9, Section 3 allows a court to proceed to render judgment as the pleading

may warrant should a defendant fail to timely file his or her answer. However, a court
may decline from immediately rendering judgment and instead require the plaintiff to
present evidence. Per Rule 9, Section 3(a), a party declared to be in default shall
nevertheless be "entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings," although he or she may
no longer take part in the trial. Here, it is not disputed that Ong filed a motion to
declare the Spouses Manuel in default. The latter filed their answer after the fifteen-day
period, counted from March 16, 2010, had lapsed. The Spouses Manuel only filed their
answer along with their motion to lift order of default on September 13, 2010.
 Planters Development Bank v. Chandumal

5 September 2012 G.R. No. 195619 REYES, J.

Petitioner Planters Development Bank

Respondent Julie Chandumal

Doctrine The fundamental rule is that jurisdiction over a defendant in
a civil case is acquired either through service of summons or
through voluntary appearance in court and submission to its
authority. If a defendant has not been properly summoned,
the court acquires no jurisdiction over its person, and a
judgment rendered against it is null and void.

Facts

BF Homes, Inc. (BF Homes) and Julie Chandumal entered into a contract to sell a
parcel of land, together with improvements. Chandumal paid her monthly
amortizations but later on defaulted in her payments. As a result, an action for judicial
confirmation of notarial rescission and delivery of possession was filed by PDB, which
bought the property from BF Homes, against Chandumal. Summons were issued and
served by deputy sheriff Galing. According to his return, he attempted to personally
serve the summons upon Chandumal but it was unavailing as she was always out of
the house on said dates. Hence, the sheriff caused substituted service of summons by
serving the same through Chandumal’s mother who acknowledged receipt thereof.

For her failure to file an answer within the prescribed period, PDB filed on April
24, 2000 an ex parte motion to declare Chandumal in default. Chandumal filed an
Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of Default contending that she did not receive the
summons and/or was not notified of the same. The RTC denied Chandumal’s motion
but was reversed by the CA due to invalid and ineffective substituted service of
summons.

Issue

Did the court acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent Chandumal
through her voluntary appearance?

Ruling
 Yes. For a valid substituted service of summons, it must be shown the
impossibility of prompt personal service – the party relying on substituted service or
the sheriff must show that the defendant cannot be served promptly or there is
impossibility of prompt service as describe in the Return of Summons the facts and
circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. Here, the Return of
Summons does not specifically show or indicate in detail the actual exertion of efforts or
any positive step taken by the officer or process server in attempting to serve the
summons personally to the defendant. The return merely states the alleged
whereabouts of the defendant without indicating that such information was verified
from a person who had knowledge thereof. Indeed, the sheriff’s return shows a mere
perfunctory attempt to cause personal service of the summons on Chandumal. There
was no indication if he even asked Chandumal’s mother as to her specific whereabouts
except that she was "out of the house", where she can be reached or whether he even
tried to await her return. The "efforts" exerted by the sheriff clearly do not suffice to
justify substituted service and his failure to comply with the requisites renders such
service ineffective.

Nevertheless, although there was no valid substituted service of summons,

Chandumal voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Section 20, Rule
14 of the Rules of Court states: “The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action
shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance.” When Chandumal filed an Urgent Motion to Set
Aside Order of Default and to Admit Attached Answer, she effectively submitted her
person to the jurisdiction of the trial court as the filing of a pleading where one seeks an
affirmative relief is equivalent to service of summons and vests the trial court with
jurisdiction over the defendant’s person. Thus, it was ruled that the filing of motions to
admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default
judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration is considered
voluntary submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction.
 Palileo v. Planters Development Bank
8 October 2014 G.R. No. 193650 DEL CASTILLO, J.

Petitioners George Pidlip P. Palileo and Jose De La Cruz

Respondent Planters Development Bank

Doctrine Settled is the rule that a party is barred from assailing the
correctness of a judgment not appealed from by him. The
presumption that a party who did not interject an appeal is
satisfied with the adjudication made by the lower
court" applies to it.

Facts

Plaintiff George Philip Palileo and Jose L. Dela Cruz filed a complaint for specific
performance and/or sum of money and damages with prayer for the issuance of writs
of preliminary attachment and preliminary injunction against Engr. Torcende, Planters
Development Bank (defendant Bank), Reyes, Tria, Tividad, and Tesalonia.

In the last pre-trial hearing only Palileo and Dela Cruz and their counsel
appeared, thus, the latter moved for the presentation of evidence ex-parte, which was
granted by the Court with the reservation of verifying the return card to determine
whether the order for the pre-trial was indeed received by defendants. Plaintiffs later on
were allowed to present evidence ex-parte before the Clerk of Court. Planters
Development Bank (PDB) received a copy of the RTC Decision on July 17, 2006. On July
31, 2006, PDB filed by private courier service an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration
and for New Trial. Petitioners’ copy was likewise sent on July 31, 2006 by courier
service through LBC, but in their address of record – Tupi, South Cotabato – there was
no LBC service at the time. On August 2, 2006, PDB filed with the RTC another copy of
the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial via registered mail; another
copy thereof was simultaneously sent to petitioners by registered mail as well. The RTC
denied the Omnibus Motion but was reversed upon appeal.

Issue

Was the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial filed on time?

Ruling
 No. Section 5, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states, “Notice of
hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date
of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.”

Here, the motion was filed via an LBC courier on 28 July 2006 and was actually
received by the Court on 31 July 2006, which was followed by filing of the same motion
thru registered mail on 2 August 2006. Since PDB’s motion was filed late and the 15-day
period within which to appeal expired without PDB filing the requisite notice of appeal,
it follows that its right to appeal has been foreclosed; it may no longer question the trial
court’s Decision in any other manner. There being no appeal taken by PDB from the
adverse judgment of the trial court, its Decision has become final and can no longer be
reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court. Assuming for the sake of argument that it
timely filed its motion, it nonetheless violated the ten-day requirement on the notice of
hearing under Section 5 of Rule 15. Also, even before it could be notified of the trial
court’s resolution of its omnibus motion on September 14, 2006 – assuming it was
timely filed, it filed a notice of appeal on September 7, 2006 – which thus implies that it
abandoned its bid for reconsideration and new trial, and instead opted to have the
issues resolved by the CA through the remedy of appeal. If so, then there is no Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial that the trial court must rule upon; its
August 30, 2006 Order thus became moot and academic and irrelevant.
 Heirs of Favis Sr. v. Gonzales
15 January 2014 G.R. No. 185922 PEREZ, J.

Petitioners Heirs Of Dr. Mariano Favis Sr. Represented by their Co-Heirs

and Attorneys-In-Fact Mercedes A. Favis and Nelly Favis-
Villafuerte

Respondents Juana Gonzales, her son Mariano G. Favis, Ma. Theresa Joana
D. Favis, James Mark D. Favis, all minors represented herein
by their parents Sps. Mariano Favis and Larcelita D. Favis
Doctrine Failure to allege earnest but failed efforts at a compromise in
a complaint among members of the same family, is not a
jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the statement of a
cause of action.

Facts

Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. was married to Capitolina Aguilar with whom he had
seven children. When Capitolina died, Dr. Favis took Juana Gonzales as his common-
law wife with whom he sired one child, Mariano G. Favis married to Larcelita. When
Dr. Favis and Juana got married in 1974, Dr. Favis executed an affidavit acknowledging
Mariano as one of his legitimate children. Dr. Favis died intestate but allegedly
executed a Deed of Donation transferring and conveying properties in favor of his
grandchildren with Juana. Claiming that said donation prejudiced their legitime, Dr.
Favis’ children with Capitolina, petitioners herein, filed an action for annulment of the
Deed of Donation, inventory, liquidation and partition of property before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Juana, Spouses Mariano and Larcelita and their grandchildren as
respondents.

The RTC nullified the Deed of Donation and cancelled the corresponding tax
declarations. The Court of Appeals motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the
complaint for failure of petitioners to make an averment that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, as mandated by Article 151 of the Family Code hence a
ground for its dismissal under Section 1, par. (j), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Issue

May the court motu proprio dismiss the complaint for failure to allege therein
that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made?

Ruling

No. Rule 16 provides: “Within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made when a
condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.”

The appellate court’s reliance on this provision is misplaced since it treats of the
grounds for a motion to dismiss the complaint. It must be distinguished from the
grounds provided under Section 1, Rule 9 which specifically deals with dismissal of the
claim by the court motu proprio. Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides: “Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the
evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there
is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the
action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss
the claim.”

The error of the Court of Appeals is evident even if the consideration of the issue
is kept within the confines of the language of Section 1(j) of Rule 16 and Section 1 of
Rule 9. That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with, a
ground for a motion to dismiss emanating from the law that no suit between members
from the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint
that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made but had failed, is, as the Rule
so words, a ground for a motion to dismiss. Significantly, the Rule requires that such a
motion should be filed "within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint
or pleading asserting a claim." The time frame indicates that thereafter, the motion to
dismiss based on the absence of the condition precedent is barred. It is so inferable from
the opening sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 stating that defense and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. There are, as
just noted, only four exceptions to this Rule, namely, lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter; litis pendentia ; res judicata ; and prescription of action. Failure to allege in the
complaint that earnest efforts at a compromise has been made but had failed is not one
of the exceptions. Upon such failure, the defense is deemed waived.
 Dio v. Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc.,
11 June 2014 G.R. No. 189532 PEREZ, J.

Petitioners Virginia S. Dio and H.S. Equities, Ltd

Respondents Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc., Represented by Its

Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Timothy Desmond

Doctrine The rule is that a compulsory counterclaim cannot remain

pending for independent adjudication by the court. This is
because a compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to the
proceeding in the original suit and merely derives its
jurisdictional support therefrom.

Facts

Petitioner H.S. Equities, Ltd., (HSE) is a foreign corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the British Virgin Islands, represented by Virginia S. Dio . On
the other hand, respondent Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc. (SBME) is a domestic
corporation, duly organized and existing under the Philippine laws and is represented
by Timothy Desmond.

SBME decided to expand its business by operating a beach resort inside the
property administered by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). Dio thus
agreed to invest with SBME by purchasing 750,000 common shares After HSE initially
paid US$200,000.00 for its subscription, it refused to further lay out money for the
expansion project of the SBME due to the alleged mismanagement in the handling of
corporate funds. Consequently, SBME initiated an intra-corporate dispute before the
RTC of HSE and Dio. SBME essentially alleged that HSE unjustly refused to pay the
balance of its unpaid subscription effectively jeopardizing the company’s expansion
project. Apart from their refusal to honor their obligation under the subscription
contract, it was further alleged by SBME that Dio tried to dissuade local investors and
financial institutions from putting in capital to SBME by imputing defamatory acts
against Desmond. HSE maintained in its Answer with Compulsory that their reputation
and good name in the business community were tarnished as a result of the filing of the
instant complaint, and thus prayed that they be indemnified in the amount of
US$2,000,000.00 as moral damages. Constrained to litigate to protect their rights,
petitioners asked that they be indemnified in the amount of ₱1,000,000.00 in litigation
expenses. Petitioners likewise sought to recover their investment of US$1,500,000.00
since they were purportedly inveigled by Desmond into putting in money to SBME
under the pretext that they will be accorded with minority protection rights. HSE
prayed that SBME and its Board of Directors be jointly and severally held liable to pay
exemplary damages in the amount of US$2,000,000.00.

The trial court refused to set HSE’s counterclaims for hearing on the
ground that the case was deemed closed and terminated by the Court of Appeals
after the latter dismissed respondents’ appeal because of their failure to file their
appellants’ brief.

Issue

Can the counterclaim still be maintained for independent adjudication despite

the dismissal of the main case?

Ruling

Yes. The nature of the counterclaim notwithstanding, the dismissal of the

complaint does not ipso jure result in the dismissal of the counterclaim, and the latter
may remain for independent adjudication of the court, provided that such
counterclaim, states a sufficient cause of action and does not labor under any infirmity
that may warrant its outright dismissal. Stated differently, the jurisdiction of the court
over the counterclaim that appears to be valid on its face, including the grant of any
relief there under, is not abated by the dismissal of the main action. The court’s
authority to proceed with the disposition of the counterclaim independent of the main
action is premised on the fact that the counterclaim, on its own, raises a novel question
which may be aptly adjudicated by the court based on its own merits and evidentiary
support.

Here, HSE’s counterclaim against SBME is for damages and attorney's fees
arising from the unfounded suit. While SBME's Complaint against HSE is already
dismissed, the latter may have very well already incurred damages and litigation
expenses such as attorney's fees since it was forced to engage legal representation in the
Philippines to protect its rights and to assert lack of jurisdiction of the courts over its
person by virtue of the improper service of summons upon it. Hence, the cause of action
of HSE's counterclaim is not eliminated by the mere dismissal of SBME's complaint. The
counterclaim can thus proceed independently of the complaint of the respondents.