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HALL, Constance Margaret, 1937-


THE SOCIOLOGY OF PIERRE JOSEPH PROUDHON
(1809-1865).

The American University, Ph.D., 1970


Sociology, general

University Microfilms, A XEROXCompany, Ann Arbor, Michigan

© Copyright by

Constance Margaret Hall

1970
THE SOCIOLOGY OP PIERRE JOSEPH PROUDHON (1809-1865)

by
Constance Margaret Hall

Submitted to the

Paculty of the College of Arts and Sciences

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Sociology

Signatures of^Committee:
Chairman: 1)

Dean of the College 4,0 ' . Q fj


Bate:

1970
The American University THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY,
Washington, D. C. ^ ^

t//Asr
PREFACE

This study is both a response to and a reflection of


the current trend in American sociology towards a revitali­
zation of historical research in the examination of the
intellectual origins and growth of sociology.
The ideas I have presented here concerning an all
but forgotten contributor to the foundations of sociology
as an intellectual discipline have greatly benefited from
discussions with fellow students and faculty of The Ameri­
can University sociology department as well as from the
generous and constructive guidance of the chairman of my
advisory committee, Ur. Gillian Gollin, and committee
members, Dr. Austin Van der Slice, Dr. Artemis Emmanuel
and Dr. David N. Ruth.
I am indebted to Dr. Gollin for bringing the social
thought of Pierre Joseph Proudhon to my attention. She

has continued to be an inspiration to me throughout all

stages of the construction of this study and I am deeply


grateful to her. Dr. Van der Slice has not only expressed
interest in this study, but by bringing his own ideas and

experience as a historian of social thought to bear on the


often times complex issues presented in "translating"
Proudhon's ideas into contemporary sociological terminology,

has been of great help to me. All gave me the encouragement


I needed to complete my own synthesis of what I understand
to be Pierre Joseph Proudhon's sociology.
iii
TABLE OP CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

P R E P A C E ............................................... iii
I. INTRODUCTION ............................... 1

Objectives of the S t u d y .................. 2


Probable Value and Importance of theStudy. 7
Data Sources and Methodological Procedures
of A n a l y s i s ............................ 10
Outline of the S t u d y .................... 14
II. PIERRE JOSEPH PROUDHON: A BIOGRAPHICAL
S K E T C H .................................. 18
Socio-Cultural and Political Background to
Proudhon's Lifetime . . . . . 18

Proudhon's Lifetime .................... 23


III. PROUDHON AS S O C I O L O G I S T .................... 51
The Growth of Sociology in Nineteenth

Century Prance ........................ 53


Proudhon's General SociologicalOrientation 58
IV. PROUDHON'S CONCEPT OP SOCIETY ............... 68

Proudhon's General Views on the Concept of


S o c i e t y ................................ 70
Economic Institutions ............ ... 75
Political Institutions ................ 79
Social Institutions .................... 86
iv
CHAPTER PAGE
V. PROUDHON'S THEORY OF SOCIAL CHANGE .......... 93
Proudhon's Principle of Dialectic - A
Determinant of Social Change ............ 98
Proudhon's Concept of War - A Dimension of
Social Change .......................... 107

Proudhon's Concept of Revolution - A


Consequence of Social Change ............ 114
VI. PROUDHON'S SOCIOLOGY OP RELIGION ............. 120

Proudhon's Definition of Religion ........ 120

Proudhon's Historical Analysis of the


Origins of R e l i g i o n ......................126
Proudhon's Views on the Dysfunctions of

R e l i g i o n .................................. 132
VII. PROUDHON'S CONCEPT OP JUSTICE: TOWARDS A
THEORY OP N O R M S ............................144
Scope of the Concept of J u s t i c e ........... 145
Justice as a Basis of Secular Norms .... 156
Justice in Relation to Revolution and
E q u i l i b r i u m .............................. 161
VIII. PROUDHON ON SOCIAL STRATIFICATION: EQUALITY
AND THE FUSION OP C L A S S E S ..................166

Factors Maintaining Existing Inequalities:


Determinants of Stratification .......... 168
Forms and Functions of Inequality: Nature

of the Class S y s t e m ......................171

v
CHAPTER PAGE
Relationship Between Classes .............. 175
Stratification and Social Change: Equality

and the Fusion of C l a s s e s ............ 180


IX. PROUDHON'S RELATIONSHIP TO HIS CONTEMPORARIES:
SAINT-SIMON AND M A R X .................... 191
Proudhon and Saint-Simon .................. 195

Proudhon and M a r x ...................... 209


X. PROUDHON'S RELATION TO CONTEMPORARYSOCIOLOGY. 219

Proudhon and the Structural Functional


A p p r o a c h ...............................221
Proudhon and Modern Sociology ofReligion . 227

Proudhon and Conflict Theories of Social

C h a n g e .................................229
Proudhon and Theory of Social Stratifi­

cation .................................... 232


XI. CONCLUSION......................235
Proudhon's Ideas in the Context of His Day . 235
Proudhon and the Intellectual Roots of

S o c i o l o g y .............................239
Major Sociological Themes in the Work of

P r o u d h o n ...............................242
Proudhon's Sociology: an Evaluation. . . . 248

A P P E N D I X ........................................... 253
Proudhon's Sociological Works: a Selective
Annotated Bibliography

vi
CHAPTER PAGE
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................... 259

Primary Sources
Books, Selections and Collections. . . . 260

Newspapers.............................263
Translations of Proudhon's Works .......... 263
Secondary Sources on Proudhon and His Age . 263

Proudhon's Contemporaries and Broader


Socio-Cultural Background .............. 267
General Sources on Intellectual Discipline
of Sociology...........................269
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In spite of sociologists' general acceptance of


Auguste Comte1s dictum that "a new science must be pursued
historically," students of sociology, in their actual
research, have been tardy in applying the techniques of
sociological analysis to the historical development of
1
their discipline. European sociologists have, in general,

retained a more historical and philosophical perspective


in their study of the origins and growth of sociology,
whereas American sociology has been criticized for neglect­
ing the study of the historical development of sociology and

at times even ignoring the historical concerns of its nine-


2
teenth century European founders. Also, although early
sociologists thought that their new discipline would clarify
and make more systematic fields of inquiry which had hither­
to been the primary concern of historians, today the relation­
ship between the two disciplines could well be said to be

Howard Becker and Alvin Boskoff (eds.), Modern


Sociological Theory (New York: Dryden Press, 1957), p. 35.
2
Seymour Martin lipset, "History and Sociology:
Some Methodological Considerations," Sociology and History.
Seymour Martin lipset and Richard Hofstadter, editors
(New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1968), pp. 20-58.
reversed. Thus the historian has come to provide valuable
knowledge to contemporary sociologists who are increasingly
making use of historical materials and methodological tech­
niques in their research.1

Ob.iectives of the Study


This study aims to contribute to a deeper under­

standing of the development of the intellectual discipline


of sociology by analysing the sociological perspectives,
concepts, and substantive concerns of an all but forgotten
contributor to the foundations and emergence of the disci­
pline. The focus of interest of our study is the social
thought of Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865). The analysis
and interpretation of sociologically pertinent ideas of

central significance in the work of Proudhon constitute the


raison d'etre of this study.
There are a few works on Proudhon in English, notably
Denis William Brogan's Proudhon (1934), Henri De lubac's
The Un-Marxian Socialist (1948), J. Hampden Jackson's Marx,
Proudhon and European Socialism (1957), George Woodcock's
Proudhon, and Alan Ritter's The Political Thought of Pierre-

Joseph Proudhon (1969). In general these works are marked


by a lack of interpretation of his varied contributions to
social thought, focusing instead on descriptive accounts of

his lifetime, his role as a social reformer and specific

Bernhard J. Stern, Historical Sociology (New York:


The Citadel Press, 1959), p. 34-
non-sociological aspects of his work. None of these studies
applies a sociological perspective to the thought and
"theories" of Proudhon.
The first objective of this study is to outline the
major sociological themes of an all but forgotten pioneer
of our discipline. In the face of the general lack of
research and absence of accumulated knowledge of Proudhon's
sociology, this study will necessarily be exploratory. A
general survey of Proudhon's works suggests that particular

attention needs to be given to his ideas on the concept of


society, social change, the role of religion in society,
his central concept of justice, and his views on social

stratification.
A second objective involves the analysis of the inter­

relationships between Proudhon's ideas and the society in


which he lived. The emergence of Proudhon's social thought
will be viewed as the joint product of its author and its
age.'*' Proudhon's specifically sociological ideas will be
further clarified by relating them to information concerning

his personal life history as well as the intellectual and


socio-political climate within which he moved. Por example,
in analysing Proudhon's social thought within its broader
cultural context we must take into account that Proudhon's
age, in reaction to the eighteenth-century exaltation of

■*"The importance of viewing social thought as such a


product is discussed by Becker and Boskoff in Modern Socio­
logical Theory, pp. 37 ff.
reason, extolled Instead emotion and imagination, leading

to a great revival of religion, poetry and art. Also, it


was in this same era that the concepts in social thought of
"the group," "the community," and "the nation" became

important.1
A third objective involves seeking a broadened
understanding of the roots of sociology as an intellectual
discipline in order to evaluate the specific contribution

of the thought of Proudhon to the history of sociology.


All early sociology "rubs shoulders with history, or at least
2
with the philosophy of history." Proudhon's work is

especially relevant to a study of these origins of sociology


and suggests, moreover, that the notion which is popular
within the discipline of sociology itself of Auguste Oomte
as being "the" founding father of sociology is both naive
•5
and mistaken. Proudhon's social thought and social theories

Irving M. Zeitlin, Ideology and the Development of


Sociological Theory (Englewood, IT. J.: Prentice Hall, 1968),
pp. 35-36.
p
Heinz Maus, A Short History of Sociology (New York:
Philosophical library, 1962), p. 6.
■3
This same point of view is elaborated in more detail
by Becker and Boskoff in Modern Sociological Theory (p. 36).
Other sociologists writing on the topic of the necessity of
deepening the popular perspective on the origins of sociology
are A. G. Keller, "Sociology and the Epic," American Journal
of Sociology. VI (September, 1900), 267 ff.; H. E. Barnes,
"Sociology before Comte: a Summary of Doctrines and an
Introduction to the Literature," American Journal of Sociology.
XXIII (September, 1917)> 174 ff.; Alvin Gouldner, Enter
Plato (New York: Basic Books, 1965).
will be examined in relation to the ideas presented in the
work of other theorists in his own day, notably those of
Saint-Simon and Marx. The concepts Proudhon used, for

example those related to his ideas on society, the sociology


of religion and social stratification, will be linked
with comparable concepts which appear in the work of both
Saint-Simon and Marx.

A fourth objective is to provide an assessment of


the contribution of Proudhon's social thought to current

sociological theory. As the scope of this study is neces­


sarily limited, however, a full historical survey of the

filiation and the lack of filiation of these sociologically


pertinent ideas cannot be undertaken.

This study is based on a careful analysis of Proud­


hon's writings, which constitute the major primary sources
for our investigation. As Proudhon's works are very exten­
sive, however, it was not possible to exhaust the rich
material contained in the various collections of Proudhon's
carnets and correspondance and there will therefore only be
limited reference made to these sources in our analysis.

Secondary source materials have been used, particularly


where they served to clarify specific points by suggesting
alternative or supplementary interpretations. These include
a number of studies of Prench sociologists, notably Celestin

Bougie's La Sociologie de Proudhon (1911); Jeanne Duprat's


Proudhon. Sociologue et Moraliste (1929); Armand Ouvillier's
Proudhon (1937); Georges Gurvitch's Les Pondateurs Francais
de la Sociologie Contemporaine; Saint-Simon et P-J Proudhon
(1955), Pour le Oentenaire de la Mort de Pierre.-Joseph

Proudhon, Proudhon et Marx: une Confrontation (1964),


and Proudhon; sa Vie, son Oeuvre, avec un expose de sa

Philo sophie (1965); and Pierre Ansart's Sociologie de


Proudhon (1965). A fifth objective of this study -will he
to re-examine these interpretations of Proudhon's sociology
in the light of our own analysis. For all these works shed
further light on this almost forgotten figure of the pioneer­
ing years of sociology.
In reviewing some of the views put forward by

Gurvitch, for example, we shall examine the validity of


Gurvitch's claim that Proudhon must be regarded as one of
the two founding fathers of sociology, the other being
Saint-Simon. Similarly a study of the nature of the relation­
ship of ideas between Saint-Simon, Proudhon and Marx will
enable us to re-evaluate Gurvitch's assertion that the

thought of Marx would not have been possible without that


of Proudhon and Saint-Simon.^ Other French secondary
sources of Proudhon's ideas which interpret Proudhon's role

Georges Gurvitch, Les Fondateurs Francais de la


Sociologie Oontemporaine; Saint-Simon et P-J Proudhon
(Vol. I of 2 vols.; Paris; Centre de Documentation Univer-
sitaire, 1955), p. 82.
as a revolutionary, socialist and political scientist will
also be consulted.'*"

Although, it was originally hoped to achieve all of


these objectives, limitations of time and source materials
made the attainment of some of these objectives far more
complicated than had been anticipated. This is particularly
true of our analysis of Proudhon's social thought in rela­
tion to their socio-cultural context. The absence of a
comprehensive and definitive biography of Proudhon further
complicated our task of examining such issues.

Probable Value and Importance of the Study


By attempting a sociological analysis of past ideas
relevant to the history of sociological theory, new light
may be thrown on current conceptions of such topics as
social class, social change and the role of religion in
society. Second, as a result of these investigations, links
between European and American social thought, past and
present, may be clarified. An understanding of the roots
of the past is essential in order to get at the task of
2
explaining why we are what we seem to be.

^Examples of such interpretations are: Nicholas


Bourgeois; les Theories du Droit International chez Proudhon.
le Eederalisme et la Paix (1927): Jacques Chabrier's L'ldee
de la Revolution d'aprks Proudhon (1935); Henri Bachelin's
P-J Proudhon. Socialiste National (1941); Jacques Bourgeat's
P-J Proudhon. Pfere du Socialisme Francais (1943); Madeleine
Amoudruz's Proudhon et 1 'Europe (19453; and Edouard Dolleans'
Proudhon et la Revolution de 1848 (1948).
2
Philip Bosserman, Dialectical Sociology: an Analysis
of the Sociology of Georges~Gurvitch (Boston. Mass.:
Porter Sargent, 1968), p. ix.
Third, the comparison of Proudhon's thought with other
major thinkers should provide us with a new perspective "both
for the work of Proudhon and for the work of others writing
along similar lines. Por example, if one accepts Gurvitch's
claim that Proudhon constitutes an indispensable link
between the social thought of Saint-Simon and Marx, one is
forced to re-examine many of the conventional historical
and socio-political evaluations and perspectives of the work
of Marx. Major theoretical concerns traditionally attri­
buted primarily to Marx, such as the determinants and con­
sequences of social stratification and the role of ideologies
and religion in society, had already been examined in some
detail by Proudhon. Proudhon's thought influenced Marx's

treatment of many of the same concepts. The influence of


Saint-Simon on Proudhon needs similarly to be clarified,

avoiding the tendency to exaggerate the similarities and


neglect the differences between earlier and later formu­
lations, "an occupational disease that afflicts many his­
torians of ideas."1

By focusing on the cultural and socio-political


background of Proudhon's life, an attempt will be made to
sketch the broader intellectual context within which his
theories arose and to which they must be related. Thus this
study should provide an analysis of a particular period in

Robert K. Merton, On Theoretical Sociology; Five


Essays, Old and New (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 14•
the history of social thought by presenting specific themes
and ideas as a reflection of particular social conditions.^
Our interest will be centered on images and reflections of
events and changes in the age of Proudhon, on the social
thought of this period rather than on events and changes
themselves. We are examining ideas, and the relation between
events and ideas is never direct; it is always mediated by
conceptions of the events. The roles of moral evaluation
and of political ideology are therefore crucial contributing
factors for an adequate understanding of any social theories

There are many aspects of social life which may be studied,

but it is the intellectual situation which provides the main


setting for the emergence of particular types or trends of
social thought.

This approach is used by Bogardus in his study of


the history of social thought. See Emory S. Bogardus, The
Development of Social Thought (New York: Longmans, Green
and-lJoT7_T55T77-P^_r^^
2
For further discussion on the significance of the
conception of social events in the study of social thought
see Robert A. Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition (Few York:
Basic Books, 1966), pp. 22 ff.

^Seymour Martin Lipset and Neil J. Smelser (eds.),


Sociology, the Progress of a Decade (Englewood, N. J.:
Prentice Hall, 1961), p. 16. For an illustration of the
different aspects of social life subjected to sociological
studies see Paul F. Lazarsfeld et al. (eds.), The TJses of
Sociology (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), pp. 7 ff
/

10

Data Sources and Methodological Procedures of Analysis


In order to trace the historical development of the
ideas elaborated by Proudhon, and to locate these ideas in
their sociological context, library materials will be used.
The examination of primary source materials in Prench will
be supplemented by secondary sources on Proudhon and his

age in Prench and English, and also by additional general


sociological works relating to theory and method.
Since we shall to a large extent be dealing with
historical materials, the historians' criteria for internal
and external criticism of documents will constitute the
most appropriate tools for the assessment of the reliability
and validity of the source materials examined. Since our

conceptual frame of reference is sociological rather than


historical, however, the fundamental theoretical orientation'
of the study will be guided by sociological criteria of

relevance.
As the aim of this study will be to clarify the
origins of sociology and the relationship of the ideas of
the "founding fathers" to each other and to the intellectual

discipline of sociology, it must be kept in mind that in any

study of the history of ideas it is impossible to separate


facts from interpretations of ideas.^ We will therefore

1A detailed expose of the intricacies of the relation­


ship between facts and the interpretations of ideas can be
found in Philip P. Wiener, "Some Problems and Methods in the
History of Ideas," Journal of the History of Ideas, XXII,
no. 4, 531-48.
11
attempt to go beyond a chronologically ordered set of' criti­

cal synopses of doctrine and seek to deal with the interplay


between theory and such matters as the social origins and
statuses of its exponents, the changing social organization
of social thought, the changes that diffusion brings to
ideas, and their relationships to the environing social
1
and cultural structure.

In order to trace some of the filiations of ideas


among the early contributors to the discipline of sociology
and contemporary contributors, some of Proudhon's basic
ideas selected for detailed examination in this study will
have to be "translated" into more commonly used sociological
terms. Thus the significance for sociology of these basic
ideas of Proudhon will be clarified and. meaningful comparisons
with the thought of other sociologists will be possible.
Although Proudhon, like most other writers, is ambiguous
or even contradictory in some of his assumptions and ideas,

this is a difficulty inherent in any study of the history

of ideas and is by no means- peculiar to this particular

1
Merton, Theoretical Sociology, p. 34.
I
t>

12

study.^ Thus an examination of Proudhon’s sociologically


pertinent work, based on our observations of his continued

usage of particular terms, requires that Proudhon's own


ideas and assumptions be reformulated or "translated" into
more specifically sociological concepts. Such "translation"
need not violate the meaning elements of Proudhon's original
ideas and assumptions within their initial intellectual and

cultural context. Proudhon's insights are therefore re­


examined and up-dated by this use of m o d e m sociological

concepts as vehicles for comprehending his thought. Proud--

hon's ideas will thus be our point of departure for the


reinterpretation of his ideas in the light of the development
of sociology since the time when he wrote. It is through
this procedure of translating his ideas that we shall also
put ourselves in a position where we shall be able to evalu­
ate what Proudhon presented in his social thought that is

pertinent to sociological concerns today.

Philip P. Wiener and Aaron Noland (eds.), Ideas in


Cultural Perspective (New Brunswick: Rutgers University
Press, 1962), p. ii. Here Wiener and Noland describe Arthur
0 . love joy's selected general features of the study of the
history of ideas: l) The presence and influence of the same
presuppositions or other operative "ideas" in very diverse
provinces of thought in different periods. 2) The role of
semantic transitions and confusions, of shifts and ambiguities
in the meanings of terms in the history of thought and
taste. 3) The internal tensions or waverings in the mind
of almost every individual - sometimes discernible even in
a single page - arising from conflicting ideas or incongruous
propensities of feeling or taste. 4) Implicit or incompletely
explicit assumptions. or more or less unconscious mental
habits, operating in the thought of an individual or a
generation.
13
The meaning of the term "sociology" as employed in
this study has been that of a science that deals with social

groups, in their internal forms or modes of organization,

and in the relations between groups."^ This simple definition


has enabled us to delineate what is of specifically sociolo­
gical significance in the work of Proudhon. In so doing
we sought to organize Proudhon's ideas within a sociologi­
cally meaningful framework.

"Sociological theory" is currently defined as tested


and systematic statements about social groups which explain
2
some aspect or aspects of these groups. As little in
3
Proudhon's work could be described as being systematic, and
none of the statements appearing in his work have been
"tested," this definition served but as a guideline in our
study. Rather it was the interrelatedness between the con­
cepts and ideas used by Proudhon that formed the basis of

This definition is based on my understanding of


contemporary American sociological theorists' work. See
especially Robert E. L. Paris, "The Discipline of Sociology,"
in Handbook of Modern Sociology, edited bv Robert E. 1. Paris
(Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1964;, pp. 1-36.
2
Por further discussion on this type of definition
of sociological theory see Claire Selltiz et al., Research
Methods in Social Relations (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1959), pp. 479-99. -
3
The strongest and most recent expression of Proudhon's
work as being "irritating, provocative, suggestive, contra­
dictory, and virtually impossible to comprehend, or to
construe in a satisfactory and coherent way" is found in
Thomas I. Cook, Review of Alan Ritter, The Political Thought
of Pierre Joseph Proudhon. The Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science. Vol. 387 (January. 1970). ,
pp. 188-89.
14
our use of the term "sociological theory."'*'

Outline of the Study


As a preliminary to our analysis of Proudhon's ideas
we will "begin "by- presenting a biography of Proudhon, including
a brief summary of Proudhon's works and the cultural and

historical background of his lifetime. (Chapter II, Pierre


Joseph Proudhon: A Biographical Sketch). Prom this portrait

of Proudhon as a social and political figure within the


context of Prench society at the time he lived we shall
move to an examination of the broader nature of Proudhon's
social thought, delineating issues treated by Proudhon which
we consider to be related to concepts and theoretical
concerns which are basic in the history of sociological

thought and pertinent to issues in the discipline of socio­


logy today. (Chapter III, Proudhon as Sociologist)
Having described the variety of topics to be studied
in greater detail,;, we shall begin our examination of specific
ideas with an analysis of Proudhon's ideas on the concept
of society. (Chapter IY, Proudhon's Concept of Society).
In our delineation of the role of society in Proudhon's
thought we shall include such questions as Proudhon's
interpretation of the relationship of society to the

^The work of Hans Zetterberg emphasizes this aspect


of sociological theory. See especially Hans L. Zetterberg,
On Theory and Verification in Sociology (Hew York: The
Bedminster Press, 1965), pp. 63-100.
/
s'
7

15
individual members of society and the relationship of parti­
cular sectors of society, for example the economy and politi­
cal institutions, to the wider society. By placing some
of Proudhon's ideas within a theoretical framework, some
assessment will he made as to whether Proudhon takes a

traditional institutional approach to the study of society


in his work, or whether his approach could he more realistic­
ally compared to a social systems approach to society as
used hy some structural functionalists in contemporary
sociology.
In Chapter V we will examine Proudhon's ideas on
social change notahly his usage of the dialectical approach
as a theoretical framework for explaining the phenomenon
of social change. The effect of the lack of resolution of
Proudhon's dialectic on his views of social change and the

implications which can he made from these observations will


he presented.. His views on war and revolution will also he
examined in relation to the topic of social change.
In Chapter VI we shall continue with an examination
of Proudhon's view of the role of religion for society and
for the individual member of society. The influence of
religion on specific social, economic and political factors
in society will he examined, the more familiar views of
Proudhon on the subject of atheism and its social and indi­
vidual consequences- being touched upon here.
Prom our examination of Proudhon's sociology of
religion we shall seek to delineate the meaning elements of
16
the concept of justice as used by Proudhon in his work.
(Chapter VII, Proudhon's Concept of Justice: Towards a
Theory of Norms). The role of this concept within the
broader context of Proudhon's social thought will be
described. A comparison of his use of the concept of
justice will be made with contemporary sociology in the sense
that the concept will be assessed as a contribution towards
a theory of norms, particular attention being given to the

notions of equilibrium and social control.

In our analysis of social stratification we will


show how Proudhon was one of the first social thinkers to

voice the position of the working classes. (Chapter VIII,


Proudhon on Social Stratification: Equality and the Pusion
of Classes). As well as examining Proudhon's views on the
roles of the different classes in society and Proudhon's
own class allegiances, emphasis will be given to the cen­
trality of Proudhon's themes of equality in social relations
and social organization and of class fusion.

The continuities and discontinuities in the socio­

logical thought of Saint-Simon, Proudhon and Marx will be


the topic of analysis of Chapter IX. An examination of
the relationship of Proudhon to his contemporaries will
be made, as will an evaluation of the role of Proudhon's
thought as an indispensable link between the thought of
Saint-Simon and that of Marx.

Before our concluding assessment of the significance

of Proudhon's social thought for the discipline of sociology,


we shall view Proudhon's work in relation to contemporary

issues in sociology. (Chapter X, Proudhon's Relation to


Contemporary Sociology). By showing some of the continuities
and discontinuities in the sociological thought of Proudhon
and that of the present day, we will conclude with an evalu­
ation of the role of Proudhon's thought from the point of
view of theoretical postulates in contemporary sociology.
I'
I

CHAPTER II

PIERRE JOSEPH PROUDHON: A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Try to Bring forward the name of Proudhon in a public


meeting or in a discussion between cultured people, in
a literary study or in a press campaign; there will be
no response, Proudhon is surrounded by silence and one
and all remain indifferent to him - except for a small
group who are familiar with his works, he is ignored
by all.1

Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1809-65) is little known and


rarely remembered. For this reason details both of
Proudhon's biography and the socio-cultural and political

background of his life provide significant insights into the


specific qualities of his thought. Por Proudhon grew up in
the shadow of the French and industrial revolutions, and
his work reflects the fact that he felt both of these
2
profoundly.

Socio-Cultural and Political Background to Proudhon's Lifetime


In France, the eighteenth century saw the rise of a
social class which, until that time, had been stifled by a

"Essayez de lancer le nom de Proudhon dans une


reunion publique ou dans Tine discussion entre gens cultive,
dans tme etutle litteraire ou dans une campagne de presse:
sans provoquer aucun echo, il sombrera dans le silence,
indifferent aux uns et aux autres, et - en dehors d'un
petit cercle d'inities - ignores de tous." Alexandre Marc
(ed.) Proudhon (Paris: Egloff, 1945), p. 13.
p
Denis William Brogan, Proudhon (London: H. Hamilton,
1934), p. 9.
18
form of social organization, which dated back to the feudal
system. Thus, at the end of the eighteenth century the

"people" revolted against the old sources of power in the


country. But power, far from resting in the hands of the
people, was claimed by the intellectual elite, the bourgeoisie
or middle class, which had been slowly disengaging itself
from the masses.^
Beyond this social structural change in the organi­

zation of French society, distinct cultural changes can also


be observed. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
marked the period in which social thought became nationalized.
The use of several vernacular languages in Europe replaced
mediaeval Latin, and consequently there grew up separate
and distinctive literature in each of the different civilized
2
countries of Western Europe. Also, the Age of Reason was
a period when reason virtually replaced religion as the
guiding principle in art, thought, and the governance of men.
Among intellectuals ideas and institutions ceased to be
respected simply because they were based on tradition,

Ernest Antoine Aim! Leon Seilliere, L 1Imoerialisme


Democratique, Vol. Ill of Philosophie de 1'Imperialism!
(Paris:Plon-Nourrit, 1907), p. 141•
O
J. T. Merz, A History of European Thought in the
Nineteenth Century (Vol. I; Edinburgh: W. Blackwood,
1912-28), p. 16.
//
3

20

precedent, religious dogma, and authority.'*' True to the


romantic spirit of the early nineteenth century, however,
philosophers of history as well as more literary figures
abandoned a theory of ideal human nature in which mind was

the supreme, universally recognized capacity to which all


2
other talents were subordinate. The thought of the nine­
teenth century gave more rein to the expression of emotions
rather than of the "pure" intellect. Yet much of the
thought of the nineteenth century cannot be considered to

be particularly revolutionary, even though the nineteenth


century was a revolutionary age in itself. The seeds of

revolutionary social thought are already much in evidence


•3
in the eighteenth century and even before then.
In considering nineteenth century France as the
immediate socio-cultural and political context of Proudhon's
lifetime and work we cannot overlook the insular character
of the French nation in this period. With the exception
of the two deeades when Louis Napoleon was at the head of
the French state, Frenchmen more or less resisted the ideas
of and economic contacts with their neighbors.. Although
Frenchmen did not refuse to associate with other peoples o%

■*"Frank Edward Manuel, The Age of Reason (Ithaca:


Cornell University Press, 1951), p. 1.
p
Frank Edward Manuel, Shapes of Philosophical History
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), p. 103.

^Merz, European Thought, Yol. I, p. 77.


11
■/

• ■ 21
to adopt others' political and economic ideas if they could
he used to their advantage, this isolationist tendency was
strong. A French nationalism with a marked "love of patrie"
developed which resembled the peasant's tenacious love of
his few acres and suspicion of everything beyond the frontiers

of his village. Even though French culture and the ideas


of French thinkers had become a substantial part of the cos­
mopolitan culture of Europe, the French themselves often
seemed provincial, with narrow horizons bounded by their own
experiences and their own traditions.'*'
Within France itself, however, many subcultures co­

existed. Although traditionally intellectual and cultural


2
matters have rarely been separated from politics in France,

cultural differences persisted throughout the nineteenth


century. In spite of the centralization of its adminis­
tration France remained rich in the diversity of its racial
types, its dialects and its customs. Even though the
provinces ceased to be administrative units, they still
retained their own traditions and strongly marked
■5
characteristics.

John B. Wolf, France: 1814-1919 - The Rise of a


Liberal-Democratic Society (New York: Harper and Row, 1963),
p. xix.

Paul A. Gagnon, France Since 1789 (New York:


Harper and Row, 1964), p. 526.

^J. P. T. Bury, France 1814-1940 (London: Methuen


and Co., 1962), p. 10.
In the early nineteenth century in Prance the main

classes were still as they had heen under the Ancien Regime:
nohles, clergy, "bourgeoisie of varying degree, and finally
the great mass of peasants, workers, artisans, domestics
and others who were collectively known as "the people."
Even though the structural characteristics of this system
of social stratification had endured, the conditions of

these strata were greatly altered. The nohility had lost


their ancient privileges and had retained only their
pretensions. Their numbers had been reduced by the toll
of revolution and war, and those who had emigrated had lost

their estates. The clergy had suffered still more than the
nobility. Rot only had the Revolution deprived them of
their wealth, it had also decimated their ranks and disrupted
their organization. In 1815 there were far too few clergy
to enable each parish to have its own priest.1
It was the bourgeoisie who had been the chief gainers
from the Revolution of 1789. They had led the Third Estate
to victory and were now on the way to complete political
ascendency. Their social aspirations were no longer blocked
by the privileges of the aristocracy and the higher clergy,
and it was they who had been the largest purchasers of the
2
lands confiscated by the Revolution.

1
Ibid., pp. 11-12.

2Ibid., p. 13 .
In describing the social, economic, political and
cultural changes which took place in Prance between the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, the structural
and substantive differences which can be distinguished should
not be overemphasized. Several historians'*' and Proudhon
2
himself have voiced the opinion that what appeared to be
major changes in this period were in fact merely superficial

changes. Throughout all the transformations on political,

economic, cultural and social levels in French society the


hierarchical and authoritarian power structure remained

unchanged. Also cultural, social and intellectual develop­


ments remained undeniably closely linked to traditions of
the immediate and more distant past.

Proudhon's lifetime
Important as the general social and political climate
of nineteenth century was in its influence as the context
from which Proudhon's thought arose, the immediate parentage
of Proudhon may be considered to have been an even more

significant influence on the emergent thought of Proudhon.


It is precisely because of the personal influences under

^For example: Alfred Leroy, La Civilisation Francaise


du XIXe Sifecle (Tournai, Belgium: Casterman, 1963J, p. 7>
2
This is an important theme in Proudhon's De la
Justice dans la Revolution et dans l'Eglise.
II
'1

24
which Proudhon came as a child, youth, and adult that his

lifetime activities and writings have been described as a


fight to preserve the memories and loyalties of his youth
rather than the living out of any general principle of the
age into which he had been born.'1'
Proudhon was born on February 15, 1809 in a "half-

rural" faubourg of the old city of Besan§on, Franche-Comte,

an area which was inhabited almost completely by working


2
people. Pierre Joseph's father, Claude Proudhon, was a
cooper. Claude has been described as honest and hard-working,
and as Pierre-Joseph grew into adolescence Claude bought a
■3
public house for which he brewed his own beer. Claude

Proudhon then
provided his clients with a generous measure of drink,
for which he demanded a "just" price in return, reserv­
ing for himself only the reimbursement for his initial
expenses and his salary for the day; he would have
believed himself to be a thief if he had taken more
from the buyer.4

This idea is emphasized in Amoudruz's biographical


account of Proudhon in Proudhon et 1'Furope - les Idees de
Proudhon en Politique Etrangere. Brogan suggests the same
point in Proudhon, pp. 9-10.
p
George Woodcock, Pierre Joseph Proudhon (London:
Routledge and Paul, 1956), p. 1.

^Henri De Lubac, The Un-Marxian Socialist (New York:


Sheed and Ward, 1948), p. 3.

. .fournissait a ses clients une bonne boisson


qu'il faisait payer au juste prix, en se reservant seulement
le remboursement des matieres premieres,et le salaire de sa
joumee; il etlt cru voler s'il avait preleve davantage sur
I'acheteur." Edouard Droz, P-J Proudhon (Paris: librairies
de "Pages Libres," 1909), p. 97.
II
I

25

This detail was not to go by unnoticed by the young


Pierre Joseph Proudhon. All his life Proudhon was to remain
haunted by this ideal of the "just price," by the rigorous

prohibition of this small manufacturer who demanded only


the exact remuneration for his work. Por both Proudhon and
his father all "profit" should be excluded as it was unearned
income.'*"
The young Proudhon was also greatly influenced by

his mother, the former "Catherine Simonin, a cook, a good


and clever woman endowed with a very delicate moral sense
2
and. . . .much wrapped up in household duties." Pierre
Joseph was the eldest of five children who were all boys
■5
and who were all born between the years 1809 and 1816.
Unfortunately little is known about Proudhon's relation­
ship with his brothers, which may suggest that none of them
played a crucial role in his life.
Although Pierre Joseph's family was comparatively
poor by the standards of his day, his parents and other
family members were respected in the faubourg of Besangon.
Pierre Joseph's boyhood experience was not :atypical of
that of the working class of his day. At the age of eight

Pierre Joseph was sent to work as a cowherd in the hills

"*"Armand Cuvillier, Proudhon (Paris: Editions Sociales


Internationales, 1937), p. 23* +
2
De Lubac, Un-Marxian Socialist, p. 3.
x
^Woodcock, Proudhon, p. 3.
'I

26

surrounding M s home. Later he was to write about his


happiness in this solitary work, an occupation which was
not unusual at that time for young boys and which was "well
in the tradition of his class."1

Proudhon was a cowherd for five years, attending


school on a part-time basis only during these years but

nevertheless continuing to excel in his studies. Proudhon


advanced as far as the top class of the local school, and
at the age of eighteen he became a printer's apprentice in
the Besangon firm.of Gauthier brothers. It was in this
job that Proudhon was able to continue to pursue his aca-
2
demic studies.

The firm of Gauthier brothers specialized in editions


of the Bible, the Christian Fathers, and in general theo­

logical publications. Here Proudhon developed his first


two intellectual passions - comparative grammar and theology.
As a printer's reader and compositor Proudhon perfected his
Latin, learned Hebrew, and steeped himself in the Old Testa­
's
ment - in the original and in the Yulgate translation.
Proudhon had shown an interest in theology from an early
age. From his personal experiences and those of his family
he learnt that Church membership was a criterion of social

1John Hampden Jackson, Marx. Proudhon and European


Socialism (London: English Universities Press, 1957),
pp. 16-17.

^Ibid., p. 18.

^Ibid., pp. 18-19.


class, and that the Church as an institution discriminated
against people belonging to the lower ranks of society.
By the time he was sixteen years of age Proudhon had abandoned
the practice of his religion. His strong interest in theo­
logical and social issues of the Church remained, however,
and was to be manifested subsequently in mach of his social

thought.1
The position of printer's apprentice and proof-reader
particularly suited Proudhon's temperament. Throughout
his lifetime Proudhon was to remain convinced that the
competent artisan received a more fruitful training than
the academic. He continued to express his irritation with

the claims of an intellectual elite which purported to lead


the workers for their own good. In Proudhon's opinion the
salvation of the workers had to come from within their
class. Any leadership from outside the group merely repre­
sented another form of tyranny, no matter what its claims
2
were to superior knowledge or disinterestedness.
Towards the end of 1830 Proudhon found himself out
of work. After spending a few weeks supervising studies at
Gray, he left his native surroundings and worked as a printer
A ^5
at Neuchatel in Switzerland, at Marseilles and at Draguinan.

'*'Brogan, Proudhon, p. 13.

^Ibid., p. 14.

De Lubac, Un-Marxian Socialist, p. 4.


28
In 1833, however, Proudhon returned to his native town of
Besangon and settled down with the firm of Gauthier once

more.
During the years of his absence from Besangon
Proudhon had managed to continue his own education, read
2
the theologians and study the Bible. His increased sense

of independence made it impossible for him to enjoy or even

sustain his status as an employe at Gauthier brothers. At


the beginning of 1836 Proudhon and his two friends Lambert
3
and Maurice purchased a printing firm of their own.
In spite of their joint efforts to carry on working
on their own account this new business venture proved to be
unsuccessful almost from the beginning. In 1838 Proudhon

went to Paris, and in 1843, after many hardships, the business


was sold.4
In 1839 Proudhon had submitted an essay for a prize
competition at Besangon Academy. The essay was on the
subject of the customary observances of the sabbath, and
constitutes Proudhon's first venture into sociological

^Ibid., p. 4.
2
As well as continuing his studies through reading
during these years, Proudhon exchanged ideas with his friend
and scholar, Gustave Pallot, originally from Besangon, and
with an Orientalist, Pauthier. See Pierre Joseph Proudhon,
Oorresnondance (Vol. I of 14 vols.: Paris: A Lacroix et
Cie., 1875;, pp. 23-28.
3
-\DeLubac, Un-Marxian Socialist, p. 5.

4Ibid., loc. cit.


/'
/h

29
analysis.'1' The seeds of what was to manifest itself later
as the content and form of Proudhon's lifework have been
2
discerned in this early essay. Despite the academic
character of the subject Proudhon's essay was "vivid and
arresting." Although he did not win the prize for the
■3
competition he received a mention and a bronze medal.
Of much more lasting significance than this essay on
Sunday observance, however, and "a thousand times more
disturbing," was Proudhon's first work on property.
Qu'est-ce que la Pronriete? which was published by subscrip­
tion in 1840, with an unauthorized dedication to the members
of the Besangon Academy.^

Pierre Joseph Proudhon, De la Celebration du Dimanche


(Tome IV of Oeuvres Completes de~P. J. Proudhon. Celestin
Bougie and Henri ffibysset, editors. 12 vols.; Paris:
Riviere, 1926). Here Proudhon presents Moses as the father
of social reform. In an examination of the commandment
"Thou shalt not steal" Proudhon declares property to be the
last of the false gods and voices his views against "cumu­
lative proprietors." In his attack upon the exploiters of
the proletariat Proudhon presents his readers with the rudi­
ments of his later themes of egalitarianism, property, jus­
tice and social contract. For further details on this and
other of Proudhon's works of sociological interest, see
appendix to this study containing a selected annotated
bibliography.
2 * +
See Michel Auge-laribe's introduction to Proudhon,
Celebration du Dimanche, p. 24 and Chapter I in Celestin
Bougie, la Sociologie de Proudhon (Paris: A. Colin, 1911).
•3
De lubac, Un-Marxian Socialist, p. 6.

^■Jackson, Marx, Proudhon, p. 28.


30
Proudhon gave his own answer to the question of the
title of this work in the first paragraph of the study:
"la propriete, c'est le vol." This statement was to become
one of the most famous revolutionary phrases of the nine­
teenth century.

Qu'est-ce que la Propriete? was published at a time


when large-scale industry was just beginning to expand
rapidly in Prance, whose industrial development had lagged
a little behind that of England. The invention of the machine
and the applications of steam had brought about major struc­

tural changes in the economic, social and political systems


of these countries.'1' Thus the background of this and indeed
all of Proudhon's works was one of social, political and
ideological fermentation, the intellectual and moral state
of the working class being much influenced by the material
2
conditions they were subjected to.

After 1840 trends of social thought within the general


climate of the romanticism of the nineteenth century focused

on the solution of social problems. In Qu'est-ce que la


Propriete? and in his subsequent works, however, it can be
seen that nobody writing at this time manifested a more
vigorous antipathy against romanticism than Proudhon.
Proudhon was particularly critical of the "nebulous principles"

^Cuvillier, Proudhon, p. 9.
^Ibid., pp. 13 and 21.
offered by this new way of looking at the world, politics,
and the rapport between individuals and nations. In contrast
to the romanticism so prevalent in the French society of
his own day, Proudhon placed his confidence in science,

particularly in economic, political and social sciences, as


a method of viewing the social problems of the age and as
a power to bring about economic, political and social re­
forms - through the application of scientific knowledge
and principles to these conditions. It was this kind of
pragmatism that gives Proudhon's social thought one of its

essential distinguishing traits.1


After the publication of Qu'est-ce que la Propriete?
in 1840 Proudhon's fame spread quickly. The work also
circulated in Germany where, in 1842, Marx discovered and
2
praised Proudhon's opinions about property.
During the 1840's Proudhon lived intermittently at

Lyons, the city considered to be the center of the French


industrial revolution. Here, whilst working once more for

1Madeline Amoudruz, Proudhon et 1 'Europe - Les Idles


de Proudhon en Politique Etrangfere (Paris: Domat Mont-
chrestien, 1945), p. 16.
2
Marx had already singled out, in his own thought
about the nature of society, the great significance of
economic factors in the total social organization. See
Chapter IX for more details on the relationship of the
thought of Proudhon to that of Marx.
*2
^De Lubac, Un-Marxian Socialist, p. 71.
11

o'

32

the Gauthier firm, Proudhon gained a personal introduction


to the world of working class revolt.

he la Creation de 1'Ordre dansl'Humanite, Proudhon's


longest work so far, was published in 1843, whilst hewas
working in Lyons. This philosophical treatise deals with
topics as diverse as religion, metaphysics, history and

economics.^ The work provides evidence of the new intel­


lectual influences under which Proudhon had come during the
2
preceding years, particularly those of Comte and Fourier.

Proudhon returned to Paris in September, 1844, and


it was at this time that Proudhon and Marx met. Marx had
been anxious to meet with Proudhon for some time now, being
particularly interested in Proudhon's main theme of the
importance of economic organization for workers' equal rights
to enjoy the products of society.
Of their meeting, however, neither Marx nor Proudhon

has left any detailed record.^ At the time the Frenchman

^Here Proudhon presents "serial law" as the law of


relationships in creation, thought, and social order. This
law has no concern with cause or substance and is a principle
of order and the basis of science. Each being and each
thing is a series, serial law being the principle of unity
in diversity, of synthesis in division. Like Comte Proudhon
predicts the advent of a scientific era of social thought.
2
Le Lubac, Un-Marxian Socialist, p. 8.
■5
Jackson, Marx. Proudhon. p. 55.

4Ibid.. p. 56.
was thirty-five years old, the German twenty-five; the
former already famous, the latter still quite unknown.
Proudhon had studied the economists in greater depth than
Marx and had already established himself as the first socialist
to take the approach of economic science to what had hitherto
been cloudy utopianism. It would thus have been surprising
if, in their long discussions, Marx had as much influence
on Proudhon as Proudhon on Marx. Moreover, since Marx

intended himself to play such a social role it is unlikely


that, if he had in fact learnt anything from Proudhon in

1844, he would have been ready to admit this freely.^


In October, 1846 Proudhon's first major work was
published by Guillaumin in Paris: two substantial volumes
bearing the title Systeme des Contradictions Economiques, ou
Philosophie de la Misere. Here Proudhon set out to investi­
gate the whole economic basis of contemporary society. His
interest focused on the actual play of contradictions in
society, the chief contradiction he noted being the paradox
of poverty in the midst of potential plenty. He dissected
the conception of God as shown in theology, and argued that

the religious attitude perpetuated the contradictions within

human society, serving as a prototype for injustice.


Marx was outraged by this study of Proudhon's and
savagely attacked it, in French, in his work Misere de la

1Ibid., p. 57.
Philosophie. Here Marx criticized Proudhon for taking an
unnecessarily abstract stand in his reasoning and i n t h e justi­
fication of his ideas.1 Marx belittled Proudhon by describing
him as a "petty-bourgeois" thrown hither and thither between
capital and labor, between economics and socialism. He
sought to reduce Proudhon's status to that of a propagator
2
of a pretended science.
The main importance of Marx's Misere de la Philosophie

is that it marked the occasion of Proudhon's break with


Marx. Proudhon in turn accused Marx of departing from the

goal of discovering a science of social economics insofar


as Marx sought to create what Proudhon thought to be a
"system" with which he wished to indoctrinate the working

classes.^
February, 1848 was the date of the Revolution in
France against Louis Philippe and his minister Guizot who

wanted to maintain a property qualification for the suffrage.


It was this Revolution that led to the setting up of the

Second Republic and also to the establishment of universal


suffrage. Proudhon was at the center of the events of

1Earl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy (New York:


International Publishers, 1963).
p
Jackson, Marx. Proudhon, p. 66.

^Brogan, Proudhon, p. 42.

^See Lettre a Karl Marx, 17 mai 1846, in Proudhon,


Oorresnondance, Tome II, pp. 198-199.
c
■'De Lubac, Un-Marxian Socialist, p. 9.
February 24, 1848. Although Proudhon declared his dislike
of the process of insurrection throughout his ■work because
he thought that the "real" problem of a lack of scientific
organization of the economy could not be solved through
revolution alone, he did leave one of the best eye-witness
accounts of the Revolution of 1848.1 It has been suggested
that the passion and action of this Revolution did not dis­
tort Proudhon's interpretation of these events, and that
Proudhon was the only Frenchman, with the exception of de

Tocqueville, who understood the deep significance of what


2
was happening.
On June 4, 1848 Proudhon and several other Socialist

leaders were appointed to the Finance Committee of the new


Assembly. During the Revolution of February, 1848 Proudhon's
platform had been his own newspaper, le Representant du
Peuple. As Proudhon wrote in support of the insurgents of
the insurrection of June, 1848, however, Cavaignac suspended
le Representant du Peuple, and all other papers of a "violent

character," at the end of June, 1848.

■^For example Proudhon's letters to his Besangon


friend Maurice in Proudhon, Correspondance, passim; articles
in le Representant du Peuple and le Peuple; and Confessions
d'un Revolutionnaire - 300 pages on the subject of the
insurrections of 1848 written in six weeks in 1849.
p
Jackson, Marx. Proudhon, pp. 76-77.
3
^De lubac, Un-Marxian Socialist, pp. 10-11.
I'
/?

36
Proudhon's career as a deputy in the new Assembly
was short but not uneventful. The speech he delivered in

the National Assembly on July 31, 1848 created a stir in


that Proudhon vigorously contrasted the conditions of people
of working classes with those of the bourgeoisie or middle
class.1 The press subsequently presented Proudhon to their
readers as a dangerous enemy to society, referring to him
as the same trouble-maker who had already caused such
2
unnecessary alarm by his paradoxes on property.

On January 31, 1849 Proudhon founded a "People's


Bank," which was to make use.of the gratuitous nature of
credit as its principle. Proudhon wanted this bank to be
a center for all the various working-men's associations
which had greatly increased in numbers the previous year.

This idea of a bank was much criticized by Louis Blanc

and Pierre Leroux. We cannot judge whether it would have


been a successful venture because within two months Proudhon
had been condemned to pay a fine of 3,000 francs and to three

For an autobiographical account of Proudhon's speech-


making see Pierre Joseph Proudhon, Les Confessions d'un
Revolutionnaire pour servir a l'Histoire de la Revolution
de Fevrier (Paris: G a m i e r freres, 1850), p. 200.
2
An article was devoted to such criticism in the
August 5, 1848 edition of Illustration, a French journal.
•Z
Louis Blanc (1811-82), historian and politician,
b o m in Madrid. One of the Socialist leaders demanded as
Minister of Labor by the insurgent crowds in the February
Revolution and acclaimed by the mob which invaded the
National Assembly on May 15, 1848.
//

37
years' imprisonment for two articles which, he had written

against the Prince President, Louis Bonaparte.^


Although Proudhon's impressions and interpretations
of the Revolution of 1848 consisted largely of newspaper
2
articles, one significant work of hook length had appeared
at the end of March, 1848. This study, Solution du Probleme
Sociale. one of the few of Proudhon's works which has been
translated into English, dealt with the immediate problems
of the time at which Proudhon wrote. Proudhon criticized
the current political policy which did not reach as far as
the basic contradictions underlying the prevalent economic
distress, and pointed out the dangers inherent in deifying

universal suffrage.
The failure of the 1848 revolutions meant that there
was no longer any question of a working class movement, let
alone a socialist movement. The revolutions had on the
whole been middle class affairs, but the hopes of the social­
ists had depended on them. The old ruling classes were back
in control of every country in Europe. The bourgeoisie in
Prance now fortified their position of dominance, their

■4)e Lubac, Un-Marxian Socialist, pp. 11-12.


p
i.e., including those articles appearing in Le
Peuple, which replaced Le Representant du Peuple and which
began in November, 1848.

■'Jackson, Marx, Proudhon, p. 95.


I
)l

38

protege being Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, the nephew of


Napoleon 1.^
It was in this mid-nineteenth century period of
bourgeois consolidation in Europe that social thought
focusing on the subject of social change emerged, as opposed.
2
to social thought with the previous focus on conservation.
Proudhon, in devoting a great part of his attention to an
analysis and criticism of the revolutionary process, and

therefore to the subject of social change, was a represen­


tative of this new stream of social thought. The idea of
revolution is present in all of Proudhon's work. If Proudhon
may be called philosopher, moralist, economist or politician,
he is only one or all of these insofar as he serves his
7
central theme of revolution.
In yet another respect Proudhon can be considered

to be in the mainstream of the social thought of his times


and in the mainstream of that particular trend of social
thought which was to become known later as the sociological
tradition. Although Proudhon has been criticized, in a

deprecating way, for being a moralist and not a philosopher

^Georges Cogniot, Proudhon et la Demagogie Bonanartiste


(Paris: Editions Sociales, 1958), p. 5.

^leon Bramson, The Political Context of Sociology


(Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 19^7), p. 20.

^This viewpoint is expressed throughout the work of


Jacques Chabrier, I 1Idee de la Revolution d'apres Proudhon
(Paris: Domat-Montchrestien, P. Loviton, 1935)* See
especially discussion on p. 7.
or an economist, we do well to remember that even modern
sociology, for all its scientific pretensions, has a moral
basis, and that the social sciences invariably have roots
2
in moral aspirations. Proudhon was preoccupied with "right

The object of all social and economic arrangements for him


was not to increase the level of material well-being. His
goal was the creation of a society in which the great law
of the universe, the subordination of all ends to the rule
of justice, embodied in independent and equal men (or, more
strictly, heads of families) was, after thousands of years
3
of "error," to be given free play.
As soon as Proudhon heard of the sentence of imprison

ment for three years brought against him in March, 1849 he


fled to Belgium for asylum.^ There Proudhon assumed the
name of Dupuis and passed himself off as a magistrate. He
spent much of his scanty funds on fruitless wandering and
soon gained the impression that the Belgians were hostile

to Prench journalists. Within a few weeks he decided to


5
return to Paris clandestinely.
Arriving in Paris in April, 1849 Proudhon took no
precautions beyond an assumed name and attempted no disguise

^Por example: Brogan, Proudhon, p. 38.


2
Nisbet, Sociological Tradition, p. 18 and passim.
3
^Brogan, Proudhon, p. 38.

^De lubac, Un-Marxian Socialist, p. 12.

^Woodcock, Proudhon, p. 146.


I'
13

40

He was by no means wholly concerned with business or politics

at this time, however, as he was courting his wife-to-be,


Euphrasie Piegard.1 It was thought, moreover, that Proud­
hon's real reason for coming back to Paris was the idea of
marrying this "pretty," "modest," and "serious" young girl
2
whom he had met in 1847 whilst walking on the street.
Although there is no direct reference to his plans to marry
* 3
Euphrasie Piegard in Proudhon's writings, Proudhon has been
recorded as saying in conversation to his friend Darimon in
June of 1849 that ". . .1 want to get married. The presence
of a woman at my hearth has become necessary to me. I came

to Paris to see if I can realize this project, which I


4
have been cherishing for the last two years."

It was not until December of 1849, however, that


Proudhon married the lady of his choice, and this during a
leave from his prison cell.'’ Eor on June 10, 1849 Proudhon
had been arrested and taken to the Sainte-Pelagie prison to
g
serve his sentence. Whilst walking in broad daylight in the

1Ibid.. p. 147.
Pierre Joseph Proudhon, Lettres a Sa Femme (Paris:
Bernard Grasset, 1950), p. 11.
% o reference to Proudhon's intentions to marry can
be found in his Garnets at this time, and nothing but a
chance general remark about his marriage in his Correspondance.

Woodcock, Proudhon, p. 148.

Jackson, Marx. Proudhon, p. 97.

^Ibid.. pp. 95-96.


41
Place de Lafayette Proudhon had been recognized by an
acquaintance who had instantly informed the police.■*"
Euphrasie Piegard, a Parisian girl of twenty-six, was
2
a lace-maker by profession. She has been described as

". . .a woman of no education but with a strict moral sense,


who gave him (Proudhon) four daughters and until the end
3
remained his faithful, loving and courageous helpmate."
It is no doubt as a consequence of his own stable married
life that Proudhon saw fit to emphasize in his later works

the importance of the family as an institution in the "just"

organization of society, and the dangers to the effective


functioning of this institution when the woman of the house

assumed an occupational role outside the home.^


It was whilst Proudhon was in the Sainte-Pelagie
prison serving his three year sentence that he founded a
new newspaper, La Voix du Peuple, and wrote and published
Les Confessions d'un Revolutionnaire pour servir a l'Histoire
de la Revolution de Pevrier (1849). This book has been
described as being written by Proudhon with an "ease and
vigor" which he had never equalled before, and also as being

^Woodcock, Proudhon, p. 149.


2
Jackson, Marx, Proudhon, p. 97.
3
^Le Lubac, Un-Marxian Socialist, p. 13.

^Eor example, Proudhon discussed the institution of


marriage in Le la Justice dans la Revolution et dans l'Eglise.
Here Proudhon emphasized the element of reciprocity in
marriage, stating that moral reform for the individual begins
with the justice emerging from the reciprocity of the marital
relationship.
»/

42
a much more capably written book than anything Proudhon had.

produced previously.1 Les Confessions is a study of the


revolutionary movement in Prance from 1789 to 1849 with
anticipations of its further ..development. Absolutism and
socialism are here portrayed as being the poles of past and.
future between which society moves.

Before being released from prison in June, 1852


Proudhon wrote and published I'Idee Generale de la Revolu­
tion au XIXe Siecle. Appearing in July of 1851, this work
contained Proudhon's most hopeful and. favorable view of
society. In it Proudhon appealed to the bourgeoisie to
bring about a reconciliation between themselves and the
workers, and so to precipitate a revolution that would
liberate both classes. This revolution was not to be a
political revolution, however. It would be a non-violent
but basic change in the economic organization of society,
bringing about further changes in the political and social
spheres of society.
The month following Proudhon's release from prison,
July 1852, marked the appearance of la Revolution demontr^e
par le Coup d'Etat, a work which Proudhon had almost
finished whilst still in prison. Here Proudhon examined in

detail the circumstances that led up to the Bonapartist

seizure of power and the revolution itself. On the even of

Woodcock, Proudhon, p. 155*


If
?<r

43
publication this book was banned by the Minister of Police

as in it Proudhon elaborated a doctrine of anarchy as the


true end of nineteenth century social evolution, drawing on

the record of the first Napoleon as a warning to the third.1


Prom the end of 1852 the political climate of Prance
became steadily more oppressive and fear entered deeply into
public life. The Bonapartist regime had struck a period of

crisis and, had not the Crimean War intervened, Louis


Napoleon might well have been forced to mitigate the dicta-
2
torship. The war was seen as an opportunity for the Bona-
partes to revive their military glory and as a means to
muffle discontent at home. At this time writers who took
an independent or dissenting point of view were increasingly
ostracized. The social reaction of prejudice against
Proudhon penetrated into the most personal aspects of his
life. Pinancial anxiety and the fear of discrimination
became so acute in Proudhon's mind that in the earlier part

of 1853 he searched frantically for any kind of employment


■5
that might give security to his growing family. In 1855
even Madame Proudhon went out to work at her old trade of
lace-making in order to balance the family budget.^

Woodcock, Proudhon, p. 182.

2Ibid., p. 186.
3Ibid., p. 187.
^■Jackson, Marx. Proudhon, p. 110.
44
The three volumes of De la Justice dans la Revolution
et dans l'Eglise were published in April, 1858. Here Proud­
hon gave a secular basis to the idea of justice. Proudhon's
personal political opinions and his broader view of the
universe are also contained in this work. Proudhon drew
attention to the struggle between reason and unreason which
lay underneath what Proudhon saw to be a complacent scientism,
or an interpretation of law and order at the expense and
neglect of conflict or contradictions which he thought to
be prevalent at the time he wrote. Because the work was

received as a threat to the status quo and contained a


derogatory criticism of the Roman Catholic Church and its
authoritative position in French society, Proudhon was again

faced with a fine and prison sentence. In spite of a peti­


tion to the Senate - which was looked upon as an aggravation

of the offence and was in turn seized - the author's sentence


of three years' imprisonment and order to pay a fine of
4,000 francs for offences against religion and morals was
enforced. Proudhon drafted a written defence but all the
publishers fought shy of it. To avoid a second term of
imprisonment he crossed the frontier into Belgium once more,
and in July, 1858 settled down in Brussels as a professor

of mathematics under the name of Durfort.'1'

■*De lubac, Un-Marxian Socialist, p. 16.


The two volumes of La Guerre et la Paix, published
in 1861, brought Proudhon recognition of a type which he
had not expected. In this work Proudhon showed how war had
played an essential role in social evolution. His thesis
was that as society advanced in its evolution, war no longer
fulfilled its original purpose as the instrument of construe
tive social change, but that multiplied abuses entered into
its conduct. As his work contained many paradoxes and
sentences which, isolated from their context, appeared to

be extremely controversial in the time he wrote, Proudhon


was hailed as a reactionary, a renegade, and a war-monger

by journalists and citizens.


Proudhon had always opposed nationalist movements
for the same reason that he opposed socialist movements:
because they led to centralization and so to the stifling

of the natural workings of the principle of justice. He


expressed his views in diverse newspaper articles during
his stay in Belgium. It was a casual remark in a newspaper

article, taken out of context to imply that Proudhon was in


favor of the annexation of Belgium to Prance, that caused
a violent public reaction to the work and to Proudhon him­
self in Brussels. A crowd gathered outside Proudhon's home
in Rue du Conseil, its members waving flags and shouting up

at Proudhon's windows, "Long live Belgium! Down with the

■*"For a fuller discussion of Proudhon's theses in this


work see Woodcock, Proudhon, pp. 233-38.
!!
jf

46

Annexationists!" The police advised Proudhon and his family


to leave Brussels to escape the fury of the mob. They

hastily took the train for Paris where they had to find and
furnish a new home.'*'
Upon his return to Prance Proudhon began to work
feverishly. He published four books in a period of two
years, the most important of which was Du Principe Federatif
p
et de 1 'Unite en Italie, which appeared in 1863. This work,
the shortest of Proudhon's major works, contained a clear

summary of his political thought. It has also been described

as the best exposition of the federal principle that has


even been written. living in the age he did, Proudhon was
necessarily witness to the breakup of the old order in
Europe, an order which had rested on kinship, land, social

class, religion, local community, and monarchy.^ In his


later years, therefore, it is not surprising that Proudhon's
work reflected this interest in the subject of national and
international reorganization, his theory of federalism
encompassing perhaps the whole world, or at a minimum
Europe. Although the solutions Proudhon proposed for the
problem of order may have relevance to the disciplines of

1Jackson, Marx. Proudhon, p. 137.


2
De lubac, Un-Marxian Socialist, p. 18.
Jackson, Marx. Proudhon. p. 139.
^Nisbet, Sociological Tradition, p. 21.
^Amoudruz, Proudhon et l fEurope, p. 3.
both, intellectual history and sociology, his solutions have
been dismissed by many as being discordant with Proudhon's
own times, this being supposedly due to Proudhon's lack of
understanding of the early sixties which constituted the

final years of his life.1


Por several years Proudhon had suffered ill-health.

He had continually been the victim of heavy colds in the


head and of "increasing brain-fag" throughout his years in

Belgium. Prom September, 1863 when he fell quite severely


ill he had recurring relapses until his death on January 19,
2
1865 when he was not yet fifty-six years of age. The
precise cause of death is unknown, which is not surprising
considering the lack of medical attention for the lower

classes during Proudhon's lifetime.


The news of Proudhon's death brought a shock to the

whole democratic world of Paris. The day of his funeral,


January 23, 1865 Parisians manifested a public display of
grief which Proudhon himself would not have expected. Public
demonstrations of this grief were also spontaneous manifes­
tations of the rising spirit of revolt which was ever-

present in these years.


It has been surmised that Proudhon knew that he was
at the end of his life. During his final years in Paris he

1Ibid., p. 151.
p
De Lubac, Un-Marxian Socialist, p. 18.
■z
^Woodcock, Proudhon, p. 268.
48
is reputed to have found, through and in spite of his sick­

ness, a way to live without the comfort of good health.1


In his last days Proudhon almost managed to complete writing
his work De la Canacite Politique des Glasses Ouvriferes.
Here Proudhon signaled the entry of the workers as an inde­
pendent force in the field of politics. It has "been argued
that in this work Proudhon appealed as much to the factory
workers of Prance as to the country people and the Parisian
artisans. Their political consciousness was to dawn as a

result of action according to the principle of mutuality.


Furthermore it was hy developing mutuality that the workers
would bring justice into the economic life of society and
so organize society on an egalitarian basis. The book was

highly influential in shaping the social thought and radical


2
movements of the later nineteenth century.
In the following years some of Proudhon's friends
•3
published a series of his works posthumously. These are
generally considered to be less important and not as well
written as his earlier works. Among them are: Theorie de
la Propriete. La Pornocratie. Les Contradictions Politiques,
and Oesarisme et Christianite. There are also fourteen

volumes of Oorrespondance and eleven volumes of Les Carnets.

1Jackson, Marx, Proudhon, pp. 150-51


2
Woodcock, Proudhon, p. 273.
■3
See De Lubac, Un-Marxian Socialist, p. 18 for more
details about these works.
most of which, remain unpublished although they are scheduled
for publication in the near future.^

The influence of Proudhon's ideas has naturally been


most direct and enduring in Prance. Although it is mis­
leading to attempt to trace this influence solely in insti­
tutional terms, the difference in trade unionism in Prance,
as compared in trade unionism in other West European countries,
has been attributed to the influence of Proudhon. Although
before the Second World War French trade unionism had turned
to politics and was becoming the prey of parties and sects,
the general apolitical character of French trade unionism

can be said to be largely due to the emphasis given by


Proudhon in his work to the singular importance of scientific

economic organization as the foundation and basis of sound


2
political organization.
This brief sketch clearly cannot do justice to the
complexities of Proudhon's character and life history, but
3
even the full biographies available have little or no

information on such crucial aspects as the nature of Proud­


hon's social contacts and friendships. Although a more
detailed biography is beyond the scope of this study, a more

Alan Ritter, The Political Thought of Pierre-Joseph


Proudhon (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969},
p. vii.
2
Jackson, Marx. Proudhon, pp. 167-68.
3
For example, Woodcock, Proudhon.
careful analysis of Proudhon's correspondence could well
provide additional insights into this complex individual.
The studies of Proudhon that are available are indicative

of the gap between the theoretical and methodological pre­


suppositions of intellectual history and actual historical
analyses: the work that is carried out by scholars by no
means incorporates the theoretical and methodological
apparatus that intellectual historians say it ought to.'1'

■^Por a full discussion on the "principles" of intel


lectual history see Wiener and Noland, Ideas, pp. ii ff.
in
I

CHAPTER III

PROUDHON AS SOCIOLOGIST

Before elaborating on any specific topics of socio­


logical interest treated by Proudhon in M s -works, a brief
sketch of the growth of sociology in nineteenth century
Prance will be presented in order to give some idea of the
state of sociology at the time when Proudhon wrote and to
place his work in the context of the work of other French
sociologists. It is within this broader context that
Proudhon's own sociological orientation will be examined.
Through an examination of Proudhon's general sociological
perspective and of specific topies of sociological interest
treated by him in his works, evidence will be sought to
support the view that there exist in Proudhon's work con­
cepts and theoretical concerns which are relevant to the

history of sociological thought and to the issues of con­


temporary sociology.
Although much of what Proudhon wrote was relevant

only to the period, place and society of his own day,


certain of his concepts and theories have been taken up and
developed further at a later date. Proudhon would seem to
fall into a category of "leading theorists of the past" in
that he was above all concerned with the development of

51
Ill

?■

52

theories about relevant aspects of the social reality which


he faced, rather than with the "building of "airtight but
1
empty scholastic systems." In developing his theories.
about aspects of the social situation of his day, moreover,
Proudhon not only expounded his views on the uselessness of
systems of theology and philosophy, but he also warned
against making generalizations and abstractions from the
social situation to the detriment of focusing on what was
2
of major importance for social reform.
Topics of sociological interest present and past
will be examined both from the point of view, of their place
in Proudhon's own sociology and from the perspectives of
twentieth century American sociology. In examining Proud­
hon's view of society, reference will be made to contem­
porary structural-functionalists' concept of the social
system. Similarly in analyzing Proudhon's sociology of
religion, theory of social change, concept of justice and
theory of social stratification we will have as our refer­

ence point the conceptual foci of contemporary American

Lewis A. Coser and Bernard Rosenberg (eds.), Socio­


logical Theory: A Book of Readings (New York: Macmillan,
1964), pp. xi and xiii.
2
Proudhon's Be la Justice dans la Revolution et dans
1 'Eglise had as one of its main themes the idea that both
society and the individual suffered harmful consequences
from the unrealistic abstractions of theological and philo­
sophical systems. In Solution du Problfeme Social Proudhon
made the point that we should focus attention on the scien­
tific explanation of economic contradictions, and that we
should not deify the principle of universal suffrage.
IIf
J

53
sociological theory.

Although these topics are familiar to sociologists


today and also give some order and sociological pertinence
to Proudhon's work, it must he emphasized that the early
history of sociology was far from cumulative, the concep­
tions of each scholar seldom heing huilt upon the work of
1
those who had gone before. Inspection of the sociological
theories of the past and present, however, shows that they
2
revolve around only a few problems.. It is the extent to
which such problems are stated and answered in the work of
Proudhon that provides an important indicator to assess and
evaluate both the range of Proudhon's sociology as well as

its nature..

The Growth of Sociology in Nineteenth Century Prance


The industrial revolution, the greatest transforma­
tion in the history of humanity, broke down the foundations
of the previous social system even more completely than the

commercial revolution had destroyed the medieval order.


Out of the confusion, in an attempt to solve the newly
created social problems, there came a further development
and differentiation of the special social sciences. The
necessity of providing a synthetic and systematic science

Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure


(New York: Free Press, 19b'/), p. 5.
2
Nicholas S. Timasheff, Sociological Theory (New
York: Random House, 1967), p. 11.
t'l
u
54

of society to criticize the validity of the multitude of


schemes presented to reconstruct the disintegrating social
order brought into being sociology in its present
1
connotation.
Because of these origins of sociology the major ideas
in the social sciences invariably have roots in moral
aspiration. Each of the ideas made its appearance in
"indisguised, unambiguous terms of moral affirmation, the
2
great sociologists never ceasing to be moral philosophers."

Until that time the social philosophy of ancient, mediaeval,


and early modern writers had had to be gleaned from the

larger mass of philosophical, theological, economic,


political and legal doctrines; for there was no strict
differentiation between social philosophy on the one hand
and religious, moral, economic or political theories on
3
the other hand.
Saint-Simon (1760-1823) was one of the earliest
significant social thinkers of the nineteenth century. He
saw in the French Revolution the climax of a profound moral,
spiritual and social crisis which had begun with the
Renaissance and Reformation. He longed for an age of
spiritual and social harmony and felt the need for a new

"Slarry Elmer Barnes (ed.), An Introduction to the


History of Sociology (Chicago: The University of Chicago
^ress, 1966), pp. 47-48.
2
Nisbet, Sociological Tradition, p. 18.
3
Barnes, "Sociology before Comte," p. 174.
Ill
6

55
unified "body of knowledge as the "basis for an integrated
society. Like de Maistre lie regarded the eighteenth century
as an age of criticism, of the dissolution of old values
and creeds. He thought the nineteenth century was a neces­
sary transition to a new, positive and organic age which
would establish the happiness of man on a secure basis."*"

In the 1830's Auguste Comte (1798-1857) laid the


groundwork for an organized discipline of sociology by
2
systematizing much of the social thought of his time.
Comte was thus one of the first to stake out a territory
for sociology showing the relation of social thought to
other fields of knowledge, and separating social statics

from social dynamics.


In this period French sociology exhibited a marked
degree of isolationism. In spite of the physical proximity
of France and Germany, for example, each country had its
own distinctive national culture which included separate
and different trends of social thought. In France the main

current of social thought ran from Turgot through Condorcet,


Saint-Simon and the Saint-Simonians, culminating in the
work of Auguste Comte. In Germany, however, a completely

"*"Hans Kohn, Making of the Modern French Mind


(Princetion, N. J.: D. Van frostrand, 1955J» PP« 5F-27.
2
Bogardus, Development of Social Thought, p. 232.
Comte1s Positive Philosophy is tlhe first treatise roughly
to propose the field of sociology. The term "sociology"
was first used by Comte about 1838, by which he meant the
science of human association.
56
different line of social thought can he delineated from the
work of Herder, Lessing and Kant, through Fichte and

Schelling to Hegel. It is only towards the middle of the


nineteenth century that the influence of German thought,

through the impact of the social thought of German emigres


in Paris, made itself felt in France. Although Karl Marx
was to write more in the German than in the French tradi­
tion, he can he seen to synthesize elements from the social
2
thought of hoth France and Germany.
It was in these years in the middle of the nineteenth
century that French social thought became once more pre­
occupied with the subject of revolution. Many original
3
"solutions" to the social problems of the day were presented.

It is in the context of these varied ideologies and social


theories that most of Proudhon's contributions must be
placed. His thought both reflects and mediates these
diverse intellectual currents.
Much of sociological theory - past and present -

deals with two levels of social reality. The first level


of social reality can be conceptualized as social action
and interaction, and the second level as social structure

1
Frank Edward Manuel, Shapes of Philosophical
History (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1965),
pp. 93-94.
2
Ibid., p. 94-
3
Armand Cuvillier, Hommes et Ideologies de 1848
(Paris: Librairie M. Riviere, 1956;, p. 7.
57
1
and social system. Although, there is nothing intrinsic
in the nature of social reality that demands that social
phenomena be viewed in this dualistic way, there have been
few attempts to synthesize or even bring these two view-
2
points together.
It has been suggested that Proudhon is one of the
first social thinkers to attempt primitive syntheses of
3
these levels of social reality. Although much of his thought
is at a descriptive level and offers no sociological or

scientific explanation of the nature of the interaction of

the two levels of social reality, at the individual and


4
group levels, Proudhon has contributed insights to the
nature of the interaction between economics and politics,
and between the state and the individual within the

See Talcott Parson^ The Structure of Social Action


(New York: McGraw Hill, 1937), pp. b97-72b for a compre-
hensive view of traditional sociological interpretations of
social reality and the implication of these for contemporary
sociological theory.
2
Percy S. Cohen, Modern Social Theory (New York:
Basic Books, 1968), p. 236.
3 * *
Celestin Bougie, La Sociologie de Proudhon (Paris:
A. Colin, 1911), pp. xii-xiii.
4
Proudhon continually referred to the interpenetration
of the two levels, however. Por example: Pierre Joseph
Proudhon, Be la Justice dans la Revolution et dans l'Eglise
(Vol. I of 3 vols.: Paris: Garnier Prfcres, 1858), pp. 63-64.
58

framework of M s views on the pMlosophy of history and


1
the concept of society.
In evaluating the contributions of early social
thinkers to the intellectual discipline of sociology we
must realize that many sociological theories do not, even
2
today, meet the ideal criteria of science. Much socio­
logical theorizing has resulted in an aggregate of discrete

insights rather than in a codified body of knowledge sub-


3
ject to reproducible research. There therefore exists no
set of propositions commonly held by all sociologists,
couched in identical or easily convertible terms and allow­
ing them to present the known facts and generalizations as
4
logical derivations of a few principles. The central ideas
of sociology have been arrived at in an intuitive or artistic
5
frame of thought, and it is against a broad interpretation
of the background and area of sociological enquiry that the
present study is made.

Proudhon's General Sociological Orientation


Proudhon wanted to promote a new orientation to
social problems founded on science. He believed that only

Bougie, Sociologie de Proudhon, loc. cit.


i
Cohen, Modern Social Theory, p. 6 .
Merton, Social Theory, p. 16.
Timasheff, Sociological Theory, p. 10.
Nisbet, Sociological Tradition, p. 18.
59
such a social science could interpret the real meaning of
the contradictions he discerned in the economy. For socio­
logical analysis for Proudhon involved placing the contra­
dictions in their appropriate social contexts, relating
them to relevant collectivities and identifying their

dynamic interdependencie s .^
In one of his earliest works, De la Celebration du
Dimanche, in which it has been claimed that the fundamentals
2
of all of Proudhon's subsequent ideas are stated, Proudhon
postulated that there must exist a science of society which
is "rigorously based on the nature of man and his faculties

and on their relationships, a science which must not be


3
invented but discovered." This science was to be baaed on
Proudhon's observation that the unity of different indivi­
duals had a unique quality which was more than their simple
4
sum. To purely individual phenomena Proudhon opposed
collective force, the collective being, and collective
5
reason.

Gurvitch, Pondateurs Francais. Yol. II, p. 15.


2
Bougie, Sociologie de Proudhon, p. 10.
3
". . .rigoureusement basee sur la nature de l'homme
et de ses facultes, et sur leurs rapports, science <ju'il
ne faut pas inventer, mais decouvrir." Proudhon, Celebra­
tion du Dimanche, p. 89.
4
The idea that the collectivity cannot be reduced
to its individual components is today more frequently
associated with Durkheim and Simmel. It clearly has its
antecedents in Proudhon's work.

Bougie, Sociologie de Proudhon, p. xiii.


Proudhon arrived at a Newtonian theme of systema­
tization as his basic interpretation of the nature of this
new social science. For Proudhon the object of social
scientific study was to discover the laws of the organiza­
tion of work and social relations in general. This social
science was to serve primarily as a theory for the recon­
struction of a society which would be freed from its
1
alienations and contradictions. In this he was merely
re-echoing the ideas of his contemporaries, notably Saint-

Simon and Comte.


Themes of contradiction and dialectic were central
in Proudhon's work and will be examined more closely in
2
relation to Proudhon's theory of social change. Por
Proudhon dialectic was the "queen of thought. . .generator
3
of every idea. . .and the criterion of evidence." The
life of man and of society were represented as being essen
4
tially contradictory in his work. In Qu'est-ce que la
Propriete? Proudhon argued that the institution of private
property, as it existed in France in 1840, created dis­
equilibrium in the functioning of the economy, resulting

Ansart, Sociology de Proudhon, p. 11.


2
See Chapter Y.
3
"la reinq de la pen§ee. . .la generatrice de toute
idee. . .le criterium de l'evidence." Pierre Joseph Proudhon,
Be la Creation de l'Ordre dans l'Humanite (Paris: Garnier,
1843;, p. 193.
4
Gurvitch, Fondateurs Francais. Vol. II, p. 31.
Ill

/>

61
1
in harmful fluctuations of activity. In Systfeme des
Contradictions Economiques he stated emphatically that man's
life was made up of contradictions which in the final'
analysis remained without solution. For Proudhon order
and happiness in society were ideals which man was "con­
demned" to follow hut which were unquestionably unobtainable
because of the nature of man, of man's spirit, and of the
2
collectivity.
Thus the approach of Proudhon offers a logic of
analysis which differs from the more traditional evolution­
ary and comparative perspectives in much sociological
3
thought. For Proudhon a contradiction was a formula of
aggression, and scientific truth itself was not unitary but

dialectical. Science was therefore a means through which


opposite theses could be presented and not merely a way of
ordering modal types. Each scientific proposition was to
4
correct itself immediately by its contrary.
One of the clearest examples of the centrality of

Proudhon's dialectic in his descriptions and in his theorizing

Pierre Joseph Proudhon, Qu'est-ce que la Propriete?


(Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1966;, p. 29.
2
Pierre Joseph Proudhon, Systeme des Contradictions
Economiques (Vol. I of 2 vols.; Paris: Flammarion, 1897)»
p. 85.
3
Talcott Parsons, Societies: Evolutionary and Com­
parative Perspectives (Englewood, tf. J.: Prentice Hall,
1966;, p. 2. The central theme of this book is the tradi­
tional perspectives used in sociological theorizing.
4
Ansart, Sociologie de Proudhon, p. 3.
/'/

/■V

62
is the use he made of this principle in Systeme des Contra­
dictions Economiques. Throughout both volumes of this work
Proudhon sought to show that all aspects of the economy
were in a dialectical relationship of antagonism. It was
these very contradictions that made imperative the reorgani­
zation of property.1 It was through the recognition and
re-organization of economic contradictions that social
contradictions would eventually he modified, the institution
of property being fundamental in all such reforms and re­

organization.
Property is essentially contradictory. Property
is the right of occupation; and at the same time the
right of exclusion. Property is the reward of work;
and the negation of work. Property is the spontaneous
product of society and the dissolution of society.
Property is an institution of justice; and property is
theft.
Although Proudhon never used the term "sociology"

itself in his work, possibly not wanting to show a need to


3
borrow it from his "rival" Auguste Comte, he continued to
reiterate a basic postulate - that the grouping of indivi­
duals together engendered a reality which was more and

1
Ibid., p. 153.
2 , ,
"La,propriete est essentiellement contradictoire.
La propriete est le droit d ’occupation; et en meme temps
le droi-fc d 1exclusion. La propriete e§t,le prix du travail;
et la negation du travail. La propriete est le produit
spontane de la societe; et la dissolution de la societe.
La propriete est une institution de justice; et la propriete,
c ’est le vol." Proudhon, Contradictions Economiques. Vol.
II, p. 183.
3
Bougie, Proudhon, p. xii.
63
1
qualitatively different from their simple sum. In Les
Confessions d'un Revolutionnaire Proudhon insisted that
only society as a collective "being could follow its "in­
stinct" freely. This was so because the superior reason
in the group would disengage itself gradually from the

reflections of individual members of the group and would


consequently always lead the group in the "right" direction,
namely in the direction of the constructive working out of
2
the principle of justice.
Proudhon saw that religion was the symbol of society,
3
being the first intellectual manifestation of the people.
He devoted much attention to a sociology of religion, this

1
Ibid., pp. xii-xiii.
2
It is interesting to contrast the work of Proudhon
with that of Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) in relation to
this idea. Prom his first book, Social Statics (1850),
Spencer argued the opposite point of view from Proudhon,
namely the themes of laissez faire and individualism. Thus
whilst in Prance social thought tended toward the reifica­
tion of the concept of the collectivity, in England doctrines
of individualism were prevalent. The tendency to analyse
the history of social thought within rather than across
geographical boundaries may perhaps account for the fact
that little or no attempt has been made to explain these
striking differences in the nineteenth century development
of sociology in Prance and England.
3
Both of these ideas are central themes of Durkheim's
Elementary Porms of the Religious Life. Por a comparison
of the actual statement of these ideas see Pierre Joseph
Proudhon, La Revolution Sociale demontree par le Ooup
d'Etat du 2 Deoembre (Paris: Garnier, 1852), p. 28 and
Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Porms of the Religious Life
(New York: The Pree Press, 1967), pp. 37-63.
/'/
id

64
part of his general sociology having been considered to he

the most detailed exposition of all of the topics selected


hy him for criticism and scrutiny."*" Proudhon thought that
it was religion that divided man's conscience and destroyed
2
the constructive principle of justice. For him hoth reli­

gion and government would eventually he replaced hy the


constructive functioning of a scientifically organized
3
economy in an "harmonic" age of humanitarianism.
Juxtaposed to Proudhon's treatment of religion was
his presentation of the concept of "justice." To Proudhon

justice was the central principle of social progress. It


was through action and interaction within a scientifically
organized economy that justice would first he manifested
4
in society. In its relation to other specific topics of
sociological treated hy Proudhon in his work, the principle

Ansart, Sociologie de Proudhon, p. 162.


2
Proudhon, De la Justice. Tome II, p. 41.
3
Pierre Joseph Proudhon, Cesarisme et Christianisme
(Paris: Marpon et Flammarion, 1883;, p. 4*
4
For a discussion on our interpretation of Proudhon's
concept of justice, where we delineate meaning elements of
this concept of Proudhon's which contribute towards the
beginnings of a contrasting theory of secular norms, see
Chapter V I .
/'/

65
of justice has been likened to "the central star around
which all his thought revolves."^-

Proudhon's development of a dialectic approach to


the study of sociology, his insistence on the distinctive
collectivity-oriented character of sociology, and his focus
on the key concepts of religion and justice as vehicles for
sociological analysis, thus serve to document the broad
outline of his general sociological orientation. It is in
the context of these guiding ideas that Proudhon's specific

contributions to social theory will now be examined.


Among the diverse interpretations of Proudhon's work

authors in different intellectual disciplines have con­


centrated their analyses on different aspects of Proudhon's
work. Por example political scientists have emphasized his
views on government and law as well as his ideas on anarchy
2
and autonomy. We have been similarly selective in our

Gurvitch, Fondateurs Francais. Vol. I. p. 1. This


assessment of the central significance given to the role of
justice in Proudhon's view of society appears throughout
Gurvitch's interpretation of Proudhon's social thought.
2
Such as Alan Ritter, The Political Thought of Pierre
Joseph Proudhon (Princeton: Princeton University i*ress,
196>9),pp. 101-117, 118-120, and 200-218. Another emphasis
of political scientists is that of Proudhon's ideas on
federalism, the central theme of Amoudruz's Proudhon et
1 'Europe; les Idees de Proudhon en Politique Etrangkre.
Such subjects have been central in what lias been considered
to be the most significant contribution of Proudhon to
European social thought. They will constitute but a small
part of our analysis of his ideas which are pertinent to
the intellectual discipline of sociology, even though these
ideas are undoubtedly of some sociological significance.
It/

/Lr

66
choice of relevant concepts for detailed examination, being
guided primarily by sociological criteria of relevance.
In evaluating and describing the contribution of
Pierre Joseph Proudhon to the discipline of sociology, and

in particular to the body of sociological theory, a quali­


tative analysis of his work has been undertaken. It is
through a detailed examination of specific topics, concepts
and theoretical concerns relevant to the history of socio­
logical thought and to the issues of contemporary sociology
that the character of Proudhon's sociology can not only be

identified, but also related to the range of topics examined

by him. Proudhon's sociology can only be -understood when


the interrelationship of the specific topics, concepts

and theoretical concerns has been examined and interpreted.


For example it is not only the meaning elements of Proudhon's
concept of justice which interests us, but also the rela­

tionship of this concept to his view of society, sociology


of religion, theories of social change and of social strati­
fication, all of which constitute critical foci in Proud­
hon's work.
It is largely because of this focus on the signifi­

cance of the interrelationships of ideas within the intel­

lectual discipline of sociology that we have adopted a


conceptual approach in our analysis rather than an analysis
by schools of thought prevalent at the period when Proudhon
wrote, or an analysis structured by biographical and chrono­
logical concerns alone. Concepts are particularly effective
/'/

67
tools of analysis in that those concepts which are useful
in the search for regularities of behavior in one field may
1
also he of import in another seemingly unrelated area.
This approach has another distinctive purpose in that it
2
is suggestive of new groupings and relations. By begin­
ning with "unit-ideas" rather than with the writer as a
person or the system within which his ideas fit, doctrines
and systems are automatically broken down into their com-
3
ponent elements.
Even a cursory survey of Proudhon's writings reveals
that he dealt with many sociologically relevant topics,
although his mode of presentation of ideas is far from
systematic. There is some evidence that the absence of
synthesis in Proudhon's work was in part deliberate: he
expressly stated at one point that although he was inter­
ested primarily in "discovering" what he called "the laws

of society," he was against proceeding from there to any


attempt to "indoctrinate the people" and to create another
4
system or school of thought.

Coser and Rosenberg, Sociological Theory, p. xiv.


2
Nisbet, Sociological Tradition, p. 4.
3
Arthur 0. love joy, The Great Chain of Being
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942}, p. 3*
4
lettre a Karl Marx, 17 mai 1846, in Proudhon,
Corresnondance. Tome 2, pp. 198-199.
CHAPTER IV

PROUDHON'S CONCEPT OP SOCIETY

Prom our description of Proudhon's general approach


to the study of society we now turn to Proudhon's macro-

sociological view of society itself. As we are to show in


our selection of Proudhon's ideas on society, his specific
approach to the presentation of the idea of society is
largely institutional in form and substance, although there
are also some basic elements of a functionalist social
system approach in his work.
Proudhon used primarily an institutional and social
systems approach in studying the conditions of the society
of his own day in the greater part of his work. In general
little of his attention was devoted to an historical or
evolutionary analysis of society. His work does, however,

show some evidence of an evolutionary perspective, notably

his treatment of the role of religion in society. Like


Durkheim, Proudhon presented the idea of God as the primal
symbol of society. Religion was the first intellectual
manifestation of the people for Proudhon, and the evolution
of society was viewed by him as an evolution of the idea
of God. This evolution was to culminate in the replacement

of religious institutions in society by economic, political

68
It''

69
and social institutions organized on a scientific basis and
1
functioning according to the principle of justice.

. . .the history of societies is no more for us than


an extended determination of the idea of God, a pro­
gressive revelation of the destiny of man. . .Humani­
tarian atheism is thus the final phase of the moral and
intellectual emancipation of man, and consequently the
last phase of philosophy serving as transition to the
reconstruction or scientific verification of all the
dogmas which have been destroyed.
Proudhon devoted much attention to the study of
3
religion and religious institutions. For the purposes of
social reform in the society of his own day, however, he

proposed that attention should be devoted to the economic


institutions of society. It was only when these were
organized according to scientific principles that the
egalitarian conditions necessary for political and social

1
See Chapter VI for our discussion of the concept of
justice and the role Proudhon saw this principle as playing
within the broader social context.
2
". . .l^histoire des societ^s n'est plus pour nous
qu'une longue determination de l'idee de Dieu, une revela­
tion progressive de la destinee de l'homme. . .I'atheisme
humanitaire est done le dernier terme de 1 'affranchisse-
ment moral et intellectuel de l'homme, par consequent la
derni^re phase de la philosophie, servant de pasage h. la
reconstruction ou verification scientifique de tous les
dogmes demolis.11 Proudhon, Contradictions Eoonomiques,
Tome I, p. 22.
3
Even though Proudhon viewed religion and religious
institutions as playing a crucial role in society, we have
decided to present our detailed analysis of these views in
a subsequent chapter presenting Proudhon's sociology of
religion. It was to the economic, political and social
institutions that Proudhon devoted his attention, most
especially to the economic institutions, in his views on
optimum social organization and the role that social science
was to play in relation to his understanding of society
itself.
70

reform would be brought into being. Thus economic institu­


tions were the foundation of society itself, political and
social spheres within society being based upon these.

Proudhon's General Views on the Concent of Society


It was man's social consciousness that made him
clearly distinguishable from animals:
Man is more than the animals, with regard to
thought, intelligence, which reflects, accounts for,
judges, reasons, combines, generalizes, classifies and
discriminates: with regard to sentiment, the conscience,
which dictates to him new laws, is two-fold: enlightened
by reason, the supreme achievement of this liberty is
to harmonize all man's acts; its supreme effort is to
sacrifice passion to duty.1
Man's raison d'etre was to serve as a member of society.

But man is born for society: it is therefore


necessary to again study the relationships of men
between themselves, for the purpose of determining
their rights and to trace rules from them. . . .2
Throughout his work Proudhon saw society as essentially

a system or an idea. He attempted to delineate the internal


logic of this system and to show how all its parts were

"l'homme a de plus que les animaux, quant a la


pensee, 1 'intelligence^ qui reflechit, compte, juge,
raisonne, combine, generalise, classe et distingue; quant
au sentiment, la conscience, qui^lui dicte de nouvelles
lois, souvent contraires aux appetits de la sensibilite.
le champ de la liberte humaine est double: eclairee par
la raison, le chef-d'oeuvre de cette liberte est d'harmoniser
tous ses actes; son plus grand effort, de sacrifier la
passion au devoir." Proudhon, Celebration du Dimanohe. p. 88 .
2 , >
"Mais l'homme nait pour la societe: il faut done
enoor© etudier les rapports des hommes entre eux, afin de
dittrminer leurs droits et de leur tracer des regies. . . . "
Ibid.. p. 89.
70

reform would be brought into being. Thus economic institu­


tions were the foundation of society itself, political and
social spheres within society being based upon these.

Proudhon's General Views on the Concent of Society


It was man's social consciousness that made him
clearly distinguishable from animals:
Man is more than the animals, with regard to
thought, intelligence, which reflects, accounts for,
judges, reasons, combines, generalizes, classifies and
discriminates: with regard to sentiment, the conscience,
which dictates to him new laws, is two-fold: enlightened
by reason, the supreme achievement of this liberty is
to harmonize all man's acts; its supreme effort is to
sacrifice passion to duty.-1-
Man's raison d'etre was to serve as a member of society.

But man is born for society: it is therefore


necessary to again study the relationships of men
between themselves, for the purpose of determining
their rights and to trace rules from them. . . .2
Throughout his work Proudhon saw society as essentially

a system or an idea. He attempted to delineate the internal


logic of this system and to show how all its parts were

"l'homme a de plus que les animaux, quant a la


pensee, 1 'intelligence^ qui reflechit, compte, juge,
raisonne, combine, generalise, classe et distingue; quant
au sentiment, la conscience, qui lui dicte de nouvelles
lois, souvent contraires aux appetits de la sensibilite.
le champ de la liberte humaine est double: eclairee par
la raison, le chef-d'oeuvre de cette liberte est d'harmoniser
tous ses actes; son plus grand effort, de sacrifier la
passion au devoir." Proudhon, Celebration du Dimanohe, p. 88.
2 , ,
/'Mais l'homme nait pour la societe: il faut done
encore etudier les rapports des hommes entre eux, afin de
determiner leurs droits et de leur tracer des regies. . . . "
Ibid., p. 89.
antagonistic, ultimately integrating themselves into a
1
"contradictory" totality. The social reality in society
for Proudhon, and the conflicting elements within the wider

whole, were action, effort and competition, each of which


2
was transformed hy successive revolutions.
In Proudhon's opinion social science should concern
itself merely with the conditions of the present and not
those of the past or of the future:
Science is reasoned and systematic knowledge of
what is.
Social science is reasoned and systematic knowl­
edge, not of what society has been, nor of what it will
be, but of what it is in all its life, that is to say
in the ensemble of its successive manifestations: for
it is only there that it is possible to have reason and
system.5

Thus many of Proudhon's views of society were closely linked


to the social conditions at the time he wrote.^

1
Ansart, Sociologie de Proudhon, p. 154.
^Georges Curvitch, La Sociologie de Karl Marx (Paris:
Centre de Documentation Universitaire, 1955), pp. 2$-30.
3
"La science est la connaissance raisonnle et
syst£matique de ce qui est. La science sociale est la con­
naissance raisonnee et syst&natique, non pas de ce qu'a £t£
la societe, hi de ce qu'elle sera, mais de ce qu'elle est
dans toute sa vie, c'est-&-dire dans 1 'ensemble de ses mani­
festations successives: car c'est la seulement qu'il peut
y avoir raison et systeme." Proudhon, Contradictions
Economiaues. Vol. I, p. 11.
4
Cuvillier, Proudhon, p. 142.
72
Although the general lack of systematization in

Proudhon's work prevented him from using propositions about


the separate institutions he examined and their relation­

ship to society as a whole, he indicated an interpenetration


"between the major institutions of society and attempted to

suggest the functions imputed to each within the social


whole. As Proudhon himself did not reach a level of explana

tion at any point in his work, however, and also as he


presented contradictory interpretations of concepts related

to his view of society, our task has been largely to make


explicit much that is merely implicit in his work itself.
Proudhon defined the optimum conditions of social
cohesion and social control in society as coming into being
1
through the free working of the principle of justice. He
saw justice as a superordinating law which arose from social
interaction itself. It would be social recognition of this
principle of justice which would ultimately determine the
effectiveness of social cohesion and social control, and
therefore the effective functioning of society:
Justice is the central star which governs socie­
ties, the pole about which the political world turns,
the principle and the rule of all transactions. . . .
Justice is not at all the work of law: on the contrary,
the law is nothing but a declaration and an applica­
tion of the just, in all circumstances where men find
themselves in relationships of interest. If therefore
the idea we have of the just and the law is falsely
determined, if it is incomplete or even mistaken, it
is obvious that all our legislative applications would

Proudhon, Pronriete, p. 59.


73
"be harmful, our institutions defective, our politics
erroneous: there -would continue to "be disorder and
social hardship.
As well as suggesting the integrating principle

governing the different subsections of society and the inte­


grating functions of the different subsystems he delineated,
Proudhon concentrated his attention on the contradictions
he saw within and between the different groupings. Proudhon
saw society as a dynamic whole which strove towards equili­
brium but which never achieved this state. In Les Contra­
dictions d'une Revolutionnaire Proudhon described how
qualitative differences in social effort gave rise to the
dynamism which he considered to be inherent in the whole
of society:

Society, in virtue of man's capacity to reason


analytically, oscillates and deviates continually to
the right and to the left of the line of progress,
according to the diversity of2Passions which serve
society as motors for action.
Social crises were viewed by Proudhon as arising from the

1
, , "La justice est l'astre central qui gouverne les
societes, le pole sur lequel tourne le monde politique, le
principe et la regie de toutes les transactions. . . .La
justice n'est point 1 'oeuvre de la loi: au contraire, la
loi n'est jamais qu'une declaration etsune application du
juste, dans toutes les circqnstances ou les hommes peuvent
se trouver en rapport d'interets. Si done l'idee que nous
faisons du juste et du droit etait mal determinee, si elle
etait incomplete ou meme fausse, il est evident que toutes
nos applications legislatives seraient mauvaises, nos insti­
tutions vicieuses, notre politique erronee: portant, qu'il
y aurait desordre et mal social." Ibid.. p. 69.
2 , .
"Mais la societe, en vertu de la raison analytique
dont l'homme est doue, oscille et devie continue11ement a
droite e-£ a gauche de la ligne du progres, suivant la
diversite des passions qui lui servent de moteurs."
Proudhon, Confessions d'un Revolutionnaire. p. 16.
74
violation of economic laws. He was especially conscious
of an antagonism between work and property in the organi-
2
zation of the economy of his own day.
Proudhon's acute awareness of conflict and contra­
diction in society led him to postulate the ubiquity of the

condition we have called war.


. . .before the transaction, there is necessarily the
struggle; before the peace treaty the duel, war, and
that always, at each second of our existence.5
Proudhon saw war and peace as states which interpenetrated
and merged into each other, and not as distinct, separate
conditions. They were a thesis and antithesis coexisting

in an unresolved synthesis:
War and peace. . .call each other out, define each
other reciprocally, complete each other and sustain
each other, like the opposite but adequate and
inseparable terms of an antinomy.*

In presenting his concept of society Proudhon viewed


economic relations as an independent variable within the

Proudhon, Creation de l'Ordre, p. 392.


2
Pierre Joseph Proudhon, Discours Prononce a l'Assembl!e
Nationale (1848) in Oeuvres Completes ITome X), p. 428.
5
". . .avant la transaction, il y a necessairement
la lutte; avant^le trait! de paix, le duel, la guerre, et
cela toujours, a chaque instant de 1 1existence." Pierre
Joseph Proudhon, la Guerre et la Paix: Recherches sur le
Principe et la Constitution du Droit des Gens (Tome I of
2 vols.; Bruxelles: A. Lacroix, Van Meenen et Cie., 1861),
p. 80.
4
"la guerre et la paix. . .s'appellent l'une l'autre,
se definissent reciproquement, se complfetent et se soutien-
nent, comme les termes inverses, mais adequate et insepar­
ables d'une antinomie." Ibidl, p. 94.
total social organization. The scientific organization of
economic institutions was to serve as a measure of reform
for political and social institutions as well as for immedi­
ate benefits in the economy itself.

Economic Institutions
Bor Proudhon society was based on the economy.
Political and social institutions, in his view, were super­
imposed on the economy and largely determined by the nature
of economic institutions.^" Both as a social reformer and

as a social scientist Proudhon repeatedly made the point

that all social reform must begin at the level of the eco­
nomic institutions of society. Por him confusion and

"social ills" were the result of economic organization


contrary to the principles of the science of social economy.
It was the free working of Proudhon's principle of
justice which was to serve as the basis of all social recon­
struction. In Proudhon's view the principle of justice
could only arise from an economy which was made up of
scientifically organized institutions. Thus the function­
ing of the principle of justice on the levels of political
and social institutions was dependent upon the effective­
ness of the scientific organization of economic institutions

"'"Cuvillier, Proudhon, p. 147.


2
Pierre Joseph Proudhon, les Majorats Litteraires
(Bruxelles: Office de Publicite, 1862), p. 110.
Proudhon attributed the malfunctioning of economic
institutions in the society of his day to the institution
of private property. It was the centralization of economic

means in the hands of a few individuals and the lack of


"free-flowing" credit that created the many gross contra­
dictions in the economy of the society of his own day in
Proudhon's opinion. One of the main themes of Proudhon's

second memorandum on property, Qu'est-ce que la Propriete?


is: "The principle cause of social difficulties comes from
the accumulation and from the immobilization of capital of
1
all kinds."

It is with his attack on private property that


Proudhon's views have been most closely identified. In
Explications Presentees au Ministere Public sur le Droit de
Propriete Proudhon himself went so far as to say that the
only thing that he had concerned himself with in all of his

writings had been that the institution of property, as he


knew it in the society of his own day, was theft itself.

In order to abolish this kind of theft Proudhon proposed


that the ownership and use of property should be universalized.

1
"la principale cause du mal venait de 1 'accumulation
et de 1 'immobilisation des capitaux de toute es^fece."
Pierre Joseph Proudhon, Qu'est-ce que la Propriete? Deuxieme
Memoire in Oeuvres Completes, Tome X, p. 57.
^Pierre Joseph Proudhon, Explications Presentees au
Ministere Public sur le Droit de Propriety (1842) in Oeuvres
Completes, Tome X. p. 255•
IV
/u

77
In spite of Proudhon's emphasis on the economic

institutions of society, the object of all economic and


social arrangements for Proudhon was not merely increasing
the level of material well-being. Proudhon was a moralist
rather than an economist in that he aimed to create a society
in which all ends would be subordinated to the rule of
1
justice. The most that Proudhon promised in his proposals
for the reorganization of the economy of Prance was the
diversion to useful work of the soldiers, officials and
other unproductive members of society made necessary by the
state system of the society of his day. In addition the
equalization of property rights was to force the idle rich
2
into productive activities.
It was this question of the organization of labor

which has been considered to have been the most controver-


3
sial issue of Proudhon's day. Although Proudhon did not
express an awareness of any specifically integrating function
of the division of labor, he can be considered to have been
a precursor of Durkheim in that his statements about the
necessity of the reorganization of labor and the social

Brogan, Proudhon, p. 38.


2
Ibid., p. 39. In this respect the social thought
of Proudhon shows close parallels with that of Saint-Simon.
Saint-Simon also emphasized the need to incorporate only
"useful" members of society and to eliminate the "oisifs."
See Introduction of Pelix Markham (ed. and trans.), Social
Organization, the Science of Man and Other Writings by Henri
&e Saint-Simon (New York; Harper and Row, 1964).

Proudhon, Contradictions Economiques. Tome I, p. 44.


11

78
consequences of such, reorganization brought about through
the science of economics have both moralistic and sociologi­
cal implications. For Proudhon it was only through the
mechanism of the division of labor that equality of economic,

political and social conditions would be realized. Thus


for him the division of labor was the first phase of eco­
nomic evolution as well as of intellectual progress.’*’
Another sphere of the economy to which Proudhon
devoted much attention was that of the organization of credit.

He saw the establishment of institutions of credit as a

solution to the inequalities arising from the concentration


of capital in the hand.” of the few. By taking the institu­

tion of capital as problematic in the extreme, Proudhon


aimed to give evidence of the "parasitism" of capital and
to show how this could be replaced by the organization of
credit. It was through the establishment of nationwide
institutions of credit that the effective liberty of indi­
viduals could be founded on the "organized initiative" of
2
the masses.
Although Proudhon was interested in political and

social reforms as well as economic ones, he considered the


former to be as secondary importance and as outgrowths of
economic reforms. In spite of his emphasis on the use of

1Ibid.. pp. 106-107.


2
Proudhon, Confessions d'un Revolutionnaire. p. 154.
79
"social economics" as an instrument of reform, economics
represented for Proudhon essentially an objective science.

As a science it had the goal of systematically analysing


various problems which focused on different aspects of the
economy, such as the institutions centering on the organiza­
tion of labor, capital, credit, exchange, property, taxation,
1
and value. At the same time Proudhon always hoped that
its potential for social reconstruction would not go
unrecognized.

Political Institutions
Even though Proudhon persisted in emphasizing that

social reform could only efficiently be brought about


through reforming the economy, he was aware that such

changes had eventually to be brought about through the


vehicle of politics. For Proudhon it was politics which,

"like religion in earlier periods, has the privilege of


2
changing the relationship of things." Through the specific

economic reforms Proudhon proposed he hoped to bring about


a change in the content of political action, such that

Pierre Joseph Proudhon, La Revolution Sociale


(Paris: Garnier Freres, 1852), p. 54.
2
"comme autrefois la religion, a le privilege de
changer le rapport des choses." Pierre Joseph Proudhon,
Theorie de l'lmnot (Bruxelles: Office de Publicite, 1861),
p. 3$.
80
politics would no longer "be the result of the "hazards of
capricious history."1
Proudhon described political science as the science
of liberty. The government of man by man, in whatever form
2
it took, was for Proudhon nothing but oppression. He
suggested that the government of society should no longer
be understood as a compact ideology, as for example in the
case of the elaboration of the theory of social contract.
For Proudhon the government of society should be perceived
as Montesquieu had demonstrated in his social thought,
3
namely as the problem of the relationship between things.
In his descriptions and suggested explanations of
the nature of the succession of governments in the political
institutions of society Proudhon reintroduced his notion of
the dialectic. For him political change resulted from the
opposition of different political forms through time:
Every government establishes itself in contra­
diction to that which preceded it: this is the reason
of its evolution, its title to existence.4

1
Nicolas Bourgeois, Les Theories du Droit Inter­
national chez Proudhon, le F^d^ralisme et la Paix (Paris:
M. Riviere, 1927;, p. 70.
Proudhon, Propriete, p. 308.
3
Ibid., loc. cit.
4
"Toute gouvernement s'etablit en contradiction de
celui qui l'a precede: c'est la sa raison d'evoluer, son
titre a 1'existence." Proudhon, Confessions d'un Revolu­
tionnaire . p. 54.
81
Even though, there had heen many changes in the form of
government in Erench society, Proudhon emphasized that these
1
changes had heen merely changes in forms of tyranny.

When we place the topic of political change within


the broader context of Proudhon's concept of society, we
find that Proudhon thought that society was concluding
"the governmental cycle" of political change. By this he
meant that public reason had become finally convinced that
politics, of itself, was powerless to contribute to the
2
progress of society. For Proudhon the apparent necessity
of the state was due solely to the presence of economic

inequality and the absence of the free workings of the prin­

ciple of justice.. It was only when men had bound themselves


to the ideal of working out mutual justice through the
scientific organization of economic institutions that the
3
need for the coercive apparatus of the state would vanish.

Political institutions must therefore eventually secede


from the sphere of significant action in the public sphere,
economic institutions becoming the base for economic,
4
political and social reform and regeneration. This idea

Proudhon, Revolution Sociale. p. 30.


2
Pierre Joseph Proudhon, Philosonhie du Progres in
Oeuvres Completes, Tome XII, p. 75.
3
Brogan, Proudhon, p. 62.
4
Ohabrier, Revolution, p. 86.
82
was re-echoed in the social thought of both Saint-Simon and
Marx, even though each perceived the consequences of such
1
reforms differently.
Although Proudhon is well-known for his views on
anarchy - a stage in the evolution of society where the
"rule" of "mutual justice" was to eliminate the necessity
of the coercive apparatus of the state - his interpretation

of this term has special connotations which go beyond the


usual simplistic definitions. For Proudhon anarchy was a

particular form of government and not merely the absence


of government. Furthermore, Proudhon viewed this new
governmental form as both rational and positive, comparing

it to the ideal type of English self-government. Thus this


form of political institution, based on the scientific
organization of the economy, was a polar opposite of both
monarchical absolutism and absolutism under the state as
Proudhon had known in his lifetime. One of the best summaries
of the meaning elements of Proudhon's concept of anarchy is

to be found in Du Principe Federatif:


As a variety of liberal regime, I have singled
out anarchy or government of each by himself, in English,
self-government. . .the notion of anarchy in politics
is as rational and as positive as any other. It con­
sists in the fact that political functions, stemming
from industrial functions, social order results from
the fact of transactions and exchanges. Because of this

The thought of Fourier also followed along these


lines. All these theorists were convinced that political
institutions had had their day and that economic institu­
tions would now play a predominant role in society and social
organization.
83
each one can consider himself his own ruler, which is
the extreme opposite of monarchical absolutism. 1
Much contemporary theorizing in the discipline of

sociology rests on the basic general meaning of the term


"system" as interdependence of variables, this interdepend-
2
ence involving both independence and dependence of variables.

Proudhon can be said to have delineated and described the


nature of such variables and their interdependence in his
views on the roles of the economy and the political sphere
within the wider society. Although Proudhon gave more

detailed attention to particular forms of economic institu­


tions rather than to particular forms of political institu­
tions, he did not make a clear distinction between the
separate forms of the two types of institutions. He postu­
lated the superior significance of economic institutions
within society as a whole, political forms being dependent
on economic forms, but these forms appeared to merge into

"Comme variete du regime liberal, j 1aiAsignal^


I'anarchie ou gouvemement de chacun par soi-meme, en
anglais, self-government. . .la notion d'anarchie, en
politique, est tout aussi rationnelle et positive qu'aucune
autre. Elle consiste en ce que, les fonctions politiques
etant ramenees aux fonctions industrielies, I'ordre social
res'ulterait du seul fait des transactions et des^^changes.
Chacun alors pourrait se dire autocrate de lui-meme, ce qui
est l 1extreme inverse de I'absolutisme monarchique." Pierre
Joseph Proudhon, Du Principe Federatif et de la Neeessite
de Reconstituer le Parti de la Revolution (Paris: E. Dentu,
1663), p. 29.----------------------------
2
Wsevolod Isajiw, Causation and Functionalism in
Sociology (New York: Schocke'n Books, 1968;, p. 11.
III
<1

84
each other rather than to exist with their own particular
boundaries and boundary-'-maintaining mechanisms.^
In describing the futility of societal dependence

upon political change in General Idea of the Revolution

(1851) Proudhon cited political change as an example of


mere change in ideologies, whilst the accumulation of
capital, the centralization of tyrannical power, and the
strife of the working classes persisted:
Therefore, while the problem propounded in '89
seemed to be officially solved, at the bottom there was
change only in government metaphysics - what Napoleon
called ideology. All minds being bewitched with
politics, society turns in a circle of mistakes, driving
capital to a still more crushing agglomeration, the
state to an extension of its prerogatives that is more
and more tyrannical, the laboring class to an irreparable

The argument that Proudhon did not give a detailed


account of the particular forms of the different parts
within his concept of society and the mechanisms which make
for the interdependence between these parts does not imply
that Proudhon's thought is void of the rudiments of a
structural-functionalist view of society. The interdepend­
ence which Proudhon emphasized is considered by several
contemporary sociologists to be the essence of the concept
of social system. In Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils
(eds.), Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1951)» PP* 1 0 7 and 180, Parsons
and Shils define "system" in terms of "order," the inter­
dependence of variables for:,them being the order in the
relationship among the components which enter into a system.
Similarly for George C. Homans in The Human Group (New
York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1950), the system is
defined in terms of the determinate, reciprocal interrela­
tionship of all its parts, regardless of the particular
structure in which these interrelations are manifested.
Basic parts or elements for him are activities, interaction,
sentiments and norms, there being no attempt on his part to
take any of these structures as fixed, privileged points
of reference.
I \J
4

85
decline, physically, morally and intellectually.1
In M s examination of political institutions it was

the centralization of power which appeared to Proudhon as


one of the greatest social ills of his day. Centraliza­
tion was shown to he a negative force in all of Proudhon's
work. Proudhon described this force as reinforcing the
power of governments and reducing, relentlessly, the initia-
2
tive of citizens. • Thus social relations suffered at the
expense of the concentration of attention on political means
and the consequent centralization of power. Proudhon
repeated his view that with this centralized form of politi­
cal organization it was impossible to have a truly demo­

cratic society where individual well-being was considered

as well as social forms. It was because of the contradic­


tion of economic, political and social forms that the social
problems of Proudhon's day were considered by him to have
arisen. An example of his explicit description of the

process of centralization and its implications for democracy


appeared in General Idea of the Revolution:
When the Revolution proclaimed liberty of the
people, equality before the law, the sovereignty of the
people, the subordination of power to the country, it
set up two incompatible things, society and government;
and it is this incompatibility which has been the cause
or the pretext of this overwhelming, liberty-destroying

Pierre Joseph Proudhon, General Idea of the Revolu­


tion in the Nineteenth Century, trans. John Beverley Robinson
(London: Freedom Press, 1923), pp. 73-74.
2
Bourgeois, Theories du Droit International, p. 56.
86
concentration, called centralization, which, the parlia­
mentary democracy admires and praises, because it is
its nature to tend towards despotism. The Republic
had society to establish: it thought only of establish­
ing government. Centralization continually fortifying
itself, while society had no institution to oppose to
it, through the exaggeration of political ideas and the
total absence of social ideas, matters reached a point
where society and government could no longer live
together, the condition of existence of the latter being
to subordinate and subjugate the former.
In drawing his readers1 attention to the fact of the

interdependence of the economic, political and social insti­


tutions in society, if not to the exact nature of this inter­

dependence, Proudhon went beyond a merely descriptive


institutional view of society. He brought out the dialectical

aspects of these different institutions, both within and


between them, and not only suggested a structural-
functionalist interpretation of their interdependence, but
also a dynamic interpretation re-echoed in the work of con­
temporary sociological theorists such as Pahrendorf.

Social Institutions

It was through the science of economics and political


science that Proudhon arrived at his social science and his
views on social relations and society in general. Although
Proudhon's ideas relating to economic, political and
social institutions and the role of individuals within these
are fragmentary and at times ambiguous, he attempted to

inter-relate these subsystems of society.

^Proudhon, General Idea, pp. 72-73.


87
Proudhon's ideal society consisted of a collectivity

of small property owners and workers, individually free but

socially united by reciprocity of services, products being


exchanged according to the principle of justice. In this
society justice would be the necessary consequence of a

scientifically organized economy, the family once more

becoming a "holy" institution.’*’ It was only when property


was divided amongst society as a whole that this type of
2
society could exist and regenerate itself.
The dynamic principle of all social organization
within society, justice, arose from the scientific organi­
zation of the economy. It was the level of the scientific
organization of the economy itself, therefore, which deter­
mined the quality of the principle of justice emmanating

from it, and consequently the type of social organization


3
possible in such a society.
Contemporary sociological theorists regard the family
4
as the most important social institution of society.

Proudhon also thought the family to be of fundamental


importance as a social institution of society, especially

Edouard Droz. P. J. Proudhon (Paris: Librairie de


"Pages Libres," 1909), p. 269.
2
Proudhon, Propriete, Deuxi&me Memoire, p. 66.
3
Ibid.. p. 37.
4
For example, the work of Talcott Parsons and
Robert P. Bales.
in the context of social reform. The family was a "basic
unit through which secular norms would emerge, the recipro­
city of the action between family members being the means
through which such norms would emerge. Social reform would,
be brought about for Proudhon through individual moral
reform at the level of interaction and mutuality within the
1
family unit.

Proudhon's views on the nature of the roles of husband


and wife within the family unit were conservative. He

emphatically postulated the view that the wife1s role could


only effectively be carried out in the home and that a
first symptom of family disintegration was the wife's seek-
2
ing employment outside of the home. The family was also

the means through which family members could be educated


as to the nature of the principle of justice, each internal­
izing this principle through the interaction and mutuality
3
practised within the family unit.

1
Proudhon's ideas on the social significance of the
family are scattered throughout his writings. Some evidence
of his views of the importance of the family unit for the
wider society are found in details of his own biography and
in his letters to his wife. See Pierre Joseph Proudhon,
Lettres h Sa Femme (Paris: B. Grasset, 1950), preface by
Suzanne Henneguy and passim.
2
Madame Proudhon was the epitome of this ideal of
Proudhon, although for one short period in their marriage
she was obliged to reassume her former employment due to
their dire economic circumstances.

Proudhon discussed this most fully in De la Justice


dans l'Eglise et dans la Revolution.
89
Proudhon viewed all social institutions as being in
1
a state of perpetual change. Por him social relations were
2
essentially contradictory rather than harmonious. In the
same way that he saw the influence of economic, political
and social institutions as merging into each other, he
conceptualized the social states of war and peace as inter-
3
penetrating each other.
It was through the scientific reorganization of the

division of labor that equality of social conditions and


equal expression of aptitudes would be realized. The divi­
sion of labor thus represented for Proudhon an initial phase
in an evolution which was at the same time economic, intel-
4
lectual and cultural..
In Systfeme des Contradictions Economiques Proudhon

discussed the economic origins of another type of cultural


or social evolution, that of religion. Although our dis­
cussion on this type of social institution will be taken up
5
later, the significance of this type of social institution
within society as a whole.must be emphasized. In Proudhon's
view it was because man despaired of finding equilibrium

Proudhon, Confessions d'un Revolutionnaire, p. 16.


2
Pierre Joseph Proudhon, La Guerre et la Paix|
Recherches sur le Principe et la Constitution du Droit des
Gens (Tome I of 2 vols.; Bruxelles: A. Lacroix, Van Meenen
et Cie., 1861), p. 80.

^Ibid., p. 94.
^Proudhon, Contradictions Economiques, Tome I, pp. 106
^See Chapter VIr Proudhon's Sociology of Religion.
through his own powers that he was first led to seek God.
Thus it was specifically through economic and social inter-
1
action that man first formulated the concept of a deity.
It was to the bourgeois, the "business men," that
Proudhon appealed to take the initiative in acting out the
social reforms he suggested, in their own group and together
2
with the working classes. The instrument of this proposed

reform, "social economy," was not a constitution or a


utopian system. Economics remained exclusively a science
3
for Proudhon, a science which he saw as being a necessary
substitute for the corrupt forms of authority in the society
of his day. In Proudhon's view the social order could only

be viewed rationally and understood in a practical way


4
through economics, a synthesis of positive ideas.
In la Revolution Sociale Proudhon touched upon a
psychological explanation of social institutions. He
described "the secret of our situation" as being the
obstinacy of the people in their belief in the superiority
5
of politics as an instrument of social reform. In his view
it was through a union of order, brought about by the scien­
tific organization of the economy, and anarchy, a consequent

Proudhon, Contradictions Economiques, Tome I, p. 319.


2
Proudhon, General Idea, p. 5.
3
Proudhon, Revolution Sociale, p. 54.

4Ibid., p. 34.
5
Ibid., p. 9.
of political reform, that the "highest perfection of society"
1
was to he found.
Therefore, for Proudhon, the social organization of
any society was dependent upon the forms of its economic
institutions, intermediate political institutions being
determined by and dependent on this foundation. Two
essential characteristics of a well-organized economy,
according to Proudhon's social thought, would be the effec­
tive universalization of property and the free circulation
of credit. Political institutions resting on such economic

institutions would show a distinct decentralization of


political power, power being subsumed in smaller units within
the total unit of society. Both social and political

organization would be dependent on the degree to which the

principle of justice could be activated through the scien­

tifically organized economy. They would also be dependent


upon the extent to which authoritarian systems, such as
those of the Roman Catholic Church and a centralized form

of government, could be replaced by science itself.


Proudhon saw society as being continuously dynamic.
Contradictions and degrees of war and peace were manifested

within society at all times and in all places. This


dynamism of society and its evolutionary development were
dependent on the economy and the emergent principle of
justice, the latter being the goal of all social reform and

"^Proudhon, Propriete. p. 308.


IV

92
the source of hope for ameliorated conditions in all future
societies.
CHAPTER Y

PROUDHON'S THEORY OP SOCIAL CHANGE

One of the most interesting recent trends in the


social sciences relates to the way the subject of "social
change" has been redefined for investigation. In the early
stages of the development of the discipline of sociology
theorists presented theories of social change characterized
by a rational emphasis, such theories being in part a
response to Thomas Hobbes' statement of the problem of

control in society. Thus in the eighteenth and nineteenth


centuries social thinkers and social scientists were inter­
ested in the problem of how to mold a society characterized

by rational order and progress for all. Eor example, the


assumptions of human nature underlying the theories of such
figures as Marx and Lester Ward lay in the belief that man
was fundamentally a rational being capable of coming to
grips with the laws of social reality, and of resolutely
working for the change of broad social and political
1
structures. Their theoretical systems were designed to
demonstrate the possibility of man's controlling his physical
and social environment for human betterment. As such their

Wayne Hield, "The Study of Change in Social Science,"


British Journal of Sociology. ([March, 1964), 1 ff.
93
IJ
I

CHAPTER V

PROUDHON'S THEORY OP SOCIAL CHANGE

One of the most interesting recent trends in the


social sciences relates to the way the subject of "social
change" has been redefined for investigation. In the early
stages of the development of the discipline of sociology
theorists presented theories of social change characterized
by a rational emphasis, such theories being in part a
response to Thomas Hobbes' statement of the problem of

control in society. Thus in the eighteenth and nineteenth

centuries social thinkers and social scientists were inter­


ested in the problem of how to mold a society characterized
by rational order and progress for all. Por example, the
assumptions of human nature underlying the theories of such
figures as Marx and Lester Ward lay in the belief that man
was fundamentally a rational being capable of coming to
grips with the laws of social reality, and of resolutely
working for the change of broad social and political
1
structures. Their theoretical systems were designed to

demonstrate the possibility of man's controlling his physical


and social environment for human betterment. As such their

Wayne Hield, "The Study of Change in Social Science,"


British Journal of Sociology. (March, 1964), 1 ff.
93
theoretical positions presented alternative programs and
methods for the patterning of societal action.1
Today social scientists are predominantly occupied
with studies that emphasize man's adjustment to, rather than
control of, the existing social and political order.

Although the theoretical basis of much research on social


change is still tied to the Hobbesian problem of how to
maintain social control, the focus has in fact shifted. For

it is the malfunctioning of social control which provides


the impetus for the development of theories of social change

by such eminent sociologists as Talcott Parsons and Robert


2
K. Merton. Similarly conflict theorists such as Dahrend6rf
and Ooser have assumed that man's inability to effectively
control his environment constitutes the central basis for
3
social change.
Since a primary justification for sociology in the
minds of its founders was the development of a viable theory
of social change, the collapse of the idea of progress and
of evolutionary theory within the main body of sociology
represented a major turning point in the intellectual

Reinhard Bendix, "The Image of Man in the Social


Sciences," Commentary, (February, 1951).
2
Hield, "Study of Change," 2-3.
3
For recent examples of the work of these sociologists
see Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial
Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 19£>7) and
lewis A. Coser, Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict
(New York: The Free Press, 1968).
95
development of sociology. A search for a new, nonhistorical
approach to the study of social change was set in motion.
But the subsequent development of structural-functionalist

theory tended, in general, to de-emphasize both social

change and historical perspective.1 Thus the theory of


social change, instead of being the strongest or most
developed branches of sociological theory as it had been in
2
the nineteenth century, became one of the weakest.
Writing in the tradition of conflict theorists such

as Karl Marx and Georg Simmel, several contemporary socio­


logists have re-established the significance of social
change and historical perspective in their theories. v

Through broadening Marx's economically determined concept

of social class to include interest groups based on authority


relationships - imperatively co-ordinated associations -

Ralf Dahrendorf has done much to re-open enquiry into such


topics as class organization and the radicalness and
3
suddenness of structural change. lewis Coser, basing his
ideas on the work of Simmel, delineates some of the functions

An example of an exception to this general trend


among structural-functionalist theorists is the work of
Neil_.Smelser which examines social change within the histori
cal context of the industrial revolution in England.
2
Don Martindale, Social Dife and Cultural Change
(Princeton: D. Vanlfostrand, 1962), p. viii.
3
Eor Dahrendorf's detailed exposition of his ideas
on the relationship between conflict groups, group con­
flicts and social change see Dahrendorf, Class Conflict,
pp. 206-240.
96
of social conflict in the process of social change. By-
examining social conflict in relation to institutional
rigidity, technical progress and productivity, he presents
propositions about social change within social systems and
1
social change of social systems.
It is against such a background of change within

the whole field of sociological theory that Proudhon’s


"theory" of social change must be examined and evaluated
for its own contribution to modern sociological theory.
Proudhon, as a nineteenth century social thinker, was inter­
ested in the subject of social change as a social process

and also in its practical applications for social recon­


struction. Yet unlike other writers of his day, such as

Auguste Comte, Proudhon did not present a coherent socio­


logical theory of progress or of social change. Rather his

work presented elements which may be assembled to form what


may be described as a rudimentary theory of social change.
His work included references to such determinants of social
change as economic contradictions, his views on the pro­

cesses of war and revolution being examples of the conse­

quences arising from the contradictions he observed.


In making selections from Proudhon's work to illus­

trate sociologically significant aspects of his ideas on


the dialectic, war and revolution, we shall suggest ways

Ooser's views on' the relationship between social


conflict and social change are discussed in Ooser, Continu­
ities. pp. 17-36.
97
in which, these different phases of social change may he

related to each other, and further, into a theory of social


change. To a lesser extent Proudhon's ideas on social

stratification are also relevant to a discussion of his


ideas on social change, most notably on the subject of
revolution. His discussion of social change frequently
centered on psychological as well as sociological levels
of explanations. For example, in his analysis of the
phenomenon of war he described warlike tendencies as being
innate, war itself being an essential condition of social
existence:
War, the same as religion and justice, is, in
humanity, an internal rather than an external phenome­
non, a fact of the moral life much more than of
physical life or life of the passions. It is for this
reason that war, always judged from its appearances by
the vulgar and by philosophers, has never been under­
stood, except perhaps in heroic times.
War is divine, that is to say primordial,
essential to life, even to the production of man and
society. It has its origins in the depths of conscience,
and encompasses in its idea the universality of human
rapports.

"la guerre, de meme^que la religion et la justice,


est, dans l'humanite, Tin phenomene plutot interne qu'externe,
un fait de la vie morale bien plus que de la vie physique
et passionnelle. O'est pour cette raison que la guerre,
toujours jugee, par le vulgaire et par les philosophes, sur
les apparences, n'a jamais ete comprise, si ce n'est peut-
ftre dans les temps heroiques. la guerre est divine, c'est
aAdire primordiale, essentielle a la vie, a la production
meme de l'homme et de la societe. Elle a son foyer dans
les profondeurs de la conscience, et embrasse dans son id£e
1 'universalite des rapports humains." Proudhon, Guerre.
Tome I, pp. 29-30. This innate aggressive drive would
eventually be brought into submission by the internalized
secular values and norms of the principle of justice.
98
Proudhon's Principle of Dialectic - A Determinant of Social

Change
Proudhon's use of a dialectical approach to the
study of social phenomena delineated three phases of social
dynamism: thesis, antithesis and unresolved synthesis. The

perpetual motion of society itself was viewed by Proudhon


to be continuous and ubiquitious. It derived its existence
from the fact of reciprocity in the economy and determined

specific forms in the sphere of politics.^ The opposition


of thesis and antithesis would never be eliminated within
the context of society. The economic contradictions which

Proudhon observed in his own day, however, would be replaced


by a scientifically-based mutualism according to the prin­

ciple of justice. Thus when society was organized on a

scientifically-based economy the social problems arising


from economic contradictions would be replaced by the
constructive products of mutualism and reciprocity.
In order to analyse both the structure and changes

of the society which he observed in his lifetime, Proudhon


used a dialectical method to conceptualize contradictions

in the social reality and to analyse their consequent


resolution or regulation. Although Proudhon used the term
synthesis to describe a later stage of the working out of

^Marcel Prelot, "Pierre Joseph Proudhon," in Inter­


national Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, David 1.
SIlTsT^dTiorTToTTT^^fTrr^^oTsTT^evrTorkT Macmillan
and Free Press, 1968), pp. 604-607.
99
the dialectical principle or the contradiction present in
the social reality, his category of "synthesis" did not
describe a social reality in which social contradictions
had cancelled each other out. The thesis and the antithesis
remained unresolved, contradictions and unresolved conflict

persisting as integral elements of the analystical phase of


social reality referred to as a synthesis. Furthermore,,

it was the contradictions which persisted in the stage of


synthesis which generated a further thesis and antithesis

in the social sphere, and eventually another unresolved


synthesis.1

Proudhon's principle and method of dialectic are


therefore used to delineate what Proudhon thought to he the
distinguishing traits of social reality: society was at all
times a dynamic expression of perpetual motion; the contra­
dictions in all social phenomena persisted and could not

he resolved; and the life of man and society were essentially


2
contradictory at all times. Por Proudhon there could he

no society where all problems had been resolved. New prob­


lems arose incessantly because society was a permanent
on-going creation and history a continuous process in which
3
new problems to resolve appeared but were never resolved.

Gurvitch, Fondateurs Francais. Yol. II, p. 11.


2Ibid.. p. 31.
3
Georges Gurvitch, "Proudhon et Marx," Oahiers Inter­
national de Sociologie, 40-41 (1966), p. 9.
'/

100
Proudhon's use and understanding of the dialectical
principle and the dialectical approach differed from that
of philosophers who were his contemporaries. For Proudhon
it was only action that could give rise to ideas, economic

action being the springboard for what Proudhon considered


to be the most influential ideas in society. In the respect

that Proudhon saw ideas as reflections of the economic


relations between men, his social thought can be seen to
1
have close parallels with that of Karl Marx. In Proudhon's
view knowledge arose primarily from work and other types
of economic action and must, in its turn, serve as the
instrument of work. Such a point of view was in opposition
to philosophical and theological viewpoints which regarded.
industry as the application of ideas, as in the thought
2
of Hegel and Calvin.
To Proudhon contradictory tendencies manifested
within individual or social entities constituted signs of
strength and vitality, a notion that is notably absent in

the contemporary ideology of the American establishment.


The principle of dialectic or contradiction permeating all

of Proudhon's thought was an "ascending" dialectic in the


social order. It was through the contradictions of the

For further discussion on the social thought of


Proudhon and Marx see Chapter IX.
^Cuvillier, Proudhon, p. 149.
thesis and antithesis that contradiction persisted in an
unresolved synthesis and opened a way for the possibility
of realizing a quasi-perfect regime. Such a regime would
be the liberation of man, groups and societies in a plural­

istic organization where political democracy and industrial


democracy would limit each other and complete each other,
1
and also where law would triumph completely over power.
This ideal of Proudhon was to be realized through
the continuous working of the dialectical principle. It
was the state of anarchy or absence of government, where
free contract would replace the authoritarian hierarchical
social structure of society which Proudhon observed in his
2
own day. Mutualism, based on reciprocity of services, was
for Proudhon the ultimate phase in the working out of the
3
dialectic in society. Proudhon applied the idea of mutual
ity to the organization of workers' associations and to the
4
political domaine. On the societal and international
levels he developed the idea of federalism which he applied

both to the interior of nations and to the rapports between


5
nations themselves.

1
Gurvitch, Pondateurs Prancais, Vol. II, p. 32.
2
Cuvillier, Proudhon, p. 221.
3
Ibid.. p. 223.
4
Ibid,., pp. 226-27.
5
Ibid., p. 229.
102
Proudhon saw a dialectic not only in nature, in

society, and in all phases of social action, hut also in


the natural sciences as intellectual disciplines. For him
the essence of the natural sciences was contradiction and
antimony. In the social sciences Proudhon arrived, at an
understanding of specific concepts by juxtaposing contrast­
ing interpretations of such concepts. For example in his

discussion on the nature of value he indicated the contra­


diction between the notion of value as usage to a single
1
individual, and the notion of value in social exchange.
Thus for Proudhon all knowledge was a rapport, a relationship
between two terms: the knowing subject and the object known,
2
the self and the non-self, unity and multiplicity.
Proudhon saw the dialectical principle as the dynamic
force of history. He described evolution as the form

through which the perpetual contradiction of the dialectical


principle was manifested. The future of humanity was
identified by Proudhon with the revelation of an eternal
reason through the perpetual contradictions in society.
It would be sufficient to be aware of this eternal
reason in order to discover scientific truth and realize
justice. It was only through action, however, that ideas,

Proudhon, Contradictions Economiques. Tome I, p. 98.


2
Kui-si Chen, la Dialeotique dans l fOeuvre de Proud­
hon (Paris: Domat-Montchrestien, 193b)» p. Y2.
V
a

103
which were also the essence of man, could manifest
1
themselves.

For Proudhon the concept of order was merely a


logical construct which could not conceal the reality of
the dialectical principle. Order had no claim to the
status of an actuality in its own right in Proudhon's
opinion. In fact, for him the very concept of order itself
at "best presupposed that an even more fundamental state of
differentiation must exist. In De la Creation de l'Ordre
Proudhon showed how the basic assumption of differentiation

must necessarily underly any notion of order in theorizing

about social relations:


Order necessarily supposes division, distinction,
difference. Each thing that is undivided, indistinct,
non-differentiated, cannot be perceived as-ordered:
these notions mutually exclude each other.
Proudhon also pointed out that not only did the

concept of order presuppose an underlying differentiation,


hut also that the idea of order itself was merely a formal
term: "Order is not a real thing at all, but only formal;
it is the idea written in substance, thought expressed. . ."

Auguste Cornu, A la Lumiere du Marxisme (Paris:


Editions Sociales Internationales, 1937), p. 11.
2
"L'ordre suppose necessairement division, distingtion,
difference. Toute chose indivise, indistincte, non differ-
enciee, ne peut etre congue comme ordonnee: ces notions
s'excluent reciproquement." Proudhon, Creation de l'Ordre,
p. 33.
5
"L'ordre n'est point quglque chose de reel, mais
seulement de formel; c'est 1 'idee inscrite dans la substance,
la pensee exprimee. . ." Ibid., p. 34.
104
In the same vein, the dialectical approach as thesis, anti­
thesis and synthesis was a reflection of reality, hut not
reality itself. Thus all forms of logical ordering were
necessarily abstractions from the social reality for Proud­
hon: "The series is not at all a form of understanding,
amorphous in its nature: it is rather an impression of

reality on the understanding.


In his focus on the economy Proudhon was above all

concerned with the great contradiction of poverty in an


age of prosperity. For him this was a manifestation of the

continuously existing dialectical principle, a contradic­


tion which increased prosperity in American society has

accentuated rather than abolished. In Systeme des Contra­


dictions Economiques Proudhon examined the opposition of
fact and law in the economy of all societies:
. . .1 do not consider as science the incoherent
collection of theories to which one has given the
official name of political economics for almost a
hundred years, and which is nothing other than the code
or the eternal routine of property. These theories
only give us the rudiments or the first section of the
science of economics; and that is why, the same as

"La serie n ’est point une forme de 1 1entendement,


amor^he de sa nature: elle est d'abord une impression de
la realite sur 1'entendement." Ibid., p. 455.
property, they are all contradictory between them,
and inapplicable half of the time.
He concluded that it was contradiction that determined both
motion and equilibrium in societies, the principle of
dialectic thus being a principle of social progress and
societal equilibrium, and the focus for all investigations

in the science of economics:


Antimony is the principle of attraction and
equilibrium in nature; antimony is therefore the prin­
ciple of progress and of equilibrium in humanity, and
the object of economics.2
Proudhon thought that society was made up of funda­

mental contradictions and that it was because of these that


social change came about without any resolution of social
problems: "Everything in our society is contradictory:
that is why we can never come to an understanding, are
3
always ready to fight." It was through the contradictions
upon which the political system rested, however, and not

". . .je,ne regarde pas comme sgience 1 'ensemble^


incoherent de theories auquel on a donne depuis a peu pres
cent ans le nom officiel d'economie politique, et qui n'est
encore autre chose que le code ou la routine immemoriale
de la propriety. Ces theories ne nous offrent que les rudi­
ments ou la premifere section de la science economique; et
c'est pourquoi, de meme que la propriety, elles sont toutes
contradictoires entre elles, et la moitie du temps inapplic-
ables." Proudhon, Oontradictions Economiques, Tome I, p. 35.
2
"I'antimonie est le principe de l 1attraction et de
l'equilibre dans la nature; I'antimonie est,done le principe
du progr&s et de l'equilibre dans l'humanite, et l'objet de
la science economiqne," Ibid., Tome II, p. 400.
3
Proudhon, General Idea, p. 261.
/

106
through the political system itself that social change
occurred: "(Social) movement is caused by polarity. . .or
antimony of the ideas on which the political system rests,
and which creates in it an agitation or perpetual move-
1
ment."

Proudhon discussed in greater detail more extreme

manifestations of social change, such as war and revolu­


tion. These will be presented in a succeeding section as
a dimension and a consequence of social change respectively.
Por Proudhon social change was the normal condition
of society, there being no such thing as a static society
which is not perpetually changing. Social change as

perpetual movement was not only normal, however, but was the
essence of social existence as the antimony of the dialectic
was never resolved. The only indicator of the normality

of the rate of social change in a society, and therefore


of society itself, was the regularity of the movements

11. . .ce mouvement a pour cause la polarite. . .ou


antimonie des notions sur lesquelles repose le systfeme
politique, et qui orient en lui une agitation ou mouvement
perpetuel." Pierre Joseph Proudhon, Contradictions Pbli-
tiques. oft. Theorie du Mouvement Constitutionnel au XlJe
Siecle (Paris: Librairie Internationale, 1 8 7 0 p. 106.
underlying the social structure of society:
Is the movement regular, like the pulse of a
man in health? One can say that the society is well.:
its government exercises itself in normal condition.1

Proudhonfs Concent of War - A Dimension of Social Change


Prom an historical perspective Proudhon saw war as
"being a dominant type of social change, history itself "being
explained by war: "War being the most important event which
2
dominates history, explains it and directs it. . ." The
most fundamental cause of war, in Proudhon's view, was
poverty and the breakdown of the economic equilibrium of
society: "The first cause of war, we have said, is pauper-
3
ism, in other words, the rupture of economic equilibrium."
In describing war, however, Proudhon referred to "its idea,
4
its superior reason, its principle and its finality,"
thereby elevating the notion of war as a sociological concept
and attributing to it a rational, purposeful character. It

was through war that the reason, which was temporarily

"le mouvement est-il regulier, comm§ !^e pouls de


I'homme en sante? On peut dire que la societe se porte
bien: son gouvernement s'exerce dans les conditions
normales." Ibid., p. 106.
2
"la guerre etant le fait capital qui domine
I'histoire, 1'explique et la conduit. . ." Proudhon, Guerre,
Tome I, p. xvii.
3
"la cause premifere de la guerre, avons nous dit,
est la pauperisme, en autres termes, la rupture de l'equilibre
economique." Ibid., Tome II, p. 320.
4
"son idee, sa raison superieure, son principe et
sa finalite." Ibid., Tome I, p. xvii.
108
hidden by the actual conflict of war, would emerge and act
in its true role as a directive of history: "In war as in
politics, as in history, it is the general reason, reason
of the peoples and reason of things, which triumphs
1
definitively."
Most of Proudhon's views on war and its relevance

to social change appeared in La Guerre et la Paix, which


Proudhon himself described as "a metaphysics of war and a
2
physics of peace." Through this study of war and his focus
on war as a dimension of a broader category of social change,
Proudhon felt he had restored academic respectability to

the concept, and had shown how war was a manifestation of

the workings of the principle of justice within society:

"I have re-established war to the prestige it had in


antiquity; I have shown, contrary to the opinion of lawyers,
3
that it is essentially an element of justice."
Although Proudhon offered his readers a psychological

explanation of war based on man's innate aggressive instincts


"By it (war) are revealed and expressed, in the first days

"Dans la guerre comme dans la politique, comme dans


l'histoire, c'est la raison generale, raison des peuples
et raison des choses, qui triomphe en definitive." Proudhon,
Revolution Sociale, p. 215.
2
"une metaphysique de la guerre et une physique de
la paix." Proudhon, Guerre, Tome I, p. i.
3
"J'ai rdtabli la guerre dans son antique prestige;
j'ai fait voir, contre 1' opinion des gens de loi, qu'elle
est essentiellement justicifere." Ibid.. p. xvi.
109
1
of history, our highest faculties." - this explanation was
not considered by him to be all-sufficient. He went on to
explain the manifestation of the phenomenon of war as a
dimension of social change and social relationships. The
innate reality of war was expressed in the activity of
man's moral life, but it was the inevitability of its'
expression through action, rather than the fact of its being
innate and intrinsic to human nature, that was the point

which Proudhon emphasized as being influential in bringing

about much misunderstanding of the social phenomenon of war.

War, as religion and justice, is, in humanity,


a phenomenon which is internal rather than external,
a fact of the moral life much more than of the physical
and emotional life. It is for this reason that war,
always judged, by the vulgar and by philosophers, by
appearances, has never been understood. . .2
Por Proudhon war was not only fundamental and neces­

sary in the nature of man, but rather it was through the


social activity of war, and war as a dimension of social
change, that man had been inspired through the ages to

utilize and express his higher faculties. It was through


war as a social activity and as a dimension of social change

"Par elle se revelent et s'expriment, aux premiers


jours de l'histoire, nos facult^s les plus elev^es." Ibid.,
p. 30.
2
"la guerre.,de meme,que la religion et la justice,
est, dans l'humanite, un phenomfene plutot interne qu1externe,
un fait de la vie morale bien plus que de la vie physique
et passionnelle. C'est pour cette raison que la guerre,
toujours jugee, par le vulgaire et par les philosophes, sur
les apparences, n'a jamais ete comprise. . .11 Ibid., p. 29.
that the mores of society had been reformed and social
progress made. Furthermore, it was only because of the
social indicators of a state of war that we could understand

the nature of peace:


War is divine, that is to say primordial, essen­
tial to life, even to the production of man and society.
It has its origins in the depths of the conscience, and
encompasses in its idea the universality of human
rapports. By it are revealed and expressed, in the
first days of history, our most elevated faculties:
Religion, justice, poetry, fine arts, social economics,
politics, government, nobility, bourgeoisie, royalty,
property. By it, in subsequent epochs, the mores are
invigorated, nations regenerated, states equilibrated,
progress followed, justice establishes its empire,
liberty finds its guarantees. . . .Finally, peace itself,
without war, is not understood: it has nothing positive
and true, it is deprived of value and significance: it
is nothing. However, humanity flees from war and strives
with all its strength towards peace. Contradictions
between the fundamental]_endowments and the authentic
aspirations of society.
Proudhon laid great emphasis on the constructive role

played by war in the development of society, and pointed


out that it was this aspect of war as a dimension of social

"La Guerre est^divine, c'est a ^i^e primordiale,


essentielle a la vie, a la production meme de l'homme et de
la societe. Elle a son foyer dans les profondeurs de la
conscience, et embrasse dans son idee 1 'universalite des
rapports humains. Par elle se revelent et s'expriment, aux
premiers jours de I'histoire, nos facultes les plus elevees:
Religion, justice, poesie, beaux-arts, Iconomie sociale,
politique, gouvernement, noblesse, bourgeoisie, royaute,
propriete. Par elle, aux epoques subsequents,#les moeurs
se retrempent, les nations se regenerent, les etats
s'equilibrent, le progrks se poursuit, la justice etablit
son empire, la liberte trouve ses garanties. . . .La paix
elle-meme, enfin, sans la guerre ne se comprend pas; elle
n'a rien de positif et de vrai, elle est depourvue de valeur
et de signification: c'est un neant. Cependant 1 'humanity
fuit la guerre et tend de toutes ses forces k la paix.
Contradiction entre les donnees fondamentales et les aspira­
tions de la societe." Ibid., p. 30.
change that had been largely ignored by social thinkers:
. . .one does not know the essentially juridicial
nature of war; this is its ethical phenomenality, its
idea; it is because of this that it plays a positive
as well as legitimate role in the constitution of
humanity, in religious manifestations, in the develop­
ment of civilized thought, in virtue and even in the
extreme good fortune of nations.1
For Proudhon war was a form of social reason and,

as such, was a constant condition of our social existence:


"War, like time and space, like the beautiful, the just and
the useful, is a form of our reason, a law of our soul, a
2
condition of our existence." Also, as regards the frequency
of the occurrence of war as a dimension of social change,

Proudhon observed that war was more frequently found in


industrialized societies and could never be eliminated:

. . .war multiplies itself and becomes more serious


among peoples in proportion to their religious, philo­
sophical, political and industrial development; it only
seems possible to extinguish it by the extinction of
moral life itself.^

". . .on ne connait pas la nature, essentiellement


jurudique, de la guerre; c'est sa phenomenalite morale, son
idee; c'est par consequent le role, positif autant que
legitime, qu'elle joue dans la constitution de^1 'humanite
dans ses manifestations religieuses, dans le developpement
de la pensee civilisatrice, dans la vertu et jusque dans la
felicite des nations." Ibid., p. 31.
2
"La guerre, comme le temps et l'espace, comme le
beau, le juste et 1 'utile, est une forme de notre raison,
une loi de notre ame, une condition de notre existence."
Ibid.. p. 35.
3
". . .la guerre se multiplie et s'aggrave parmi les
peuples en proportion de leur developpement religieux,
philosophise, politique et industriel; elle ne parait
pouvoir s'eteindre que par 1'extinction de la vie morale
elle-meme." Ibid., p. 81.
In his descriptions of social change as a process
Proudhon emphasized that it was unrealistic to distinguish
war and peace as mutually exclusive stages and different
dimensions in this process. War and peace were insepar­
able aspects of social change and were merely different
expressions of the same contradiction or dialectical prin­
ciple :

War and peace, which the vulgar understand as


two states of affairs which exclude each other, are
alternative conditions of the life of peoples. They
imply each other, define themselves reciprocally,
complete each other, sustain each other, like inverse
terms, but adequate and inseparable, of an antimony.
Peace demonstrates and confirms war; war in its turn is
a reclaiming of peace. . . .
This is why we see, in history, war is reborn
unceasingly from even the same idea which had brought
about peace.1

Proudhon also treated war as a manifestation of the

collective mentality or the social mind. He did not think


that war could be understood by examining only its external
behavioristic manifestations. It was to the collective
mental phenomena of war that we must turn if we were to
understand the social phenomenon of war in our scientific

1
"la,guerre et la paix, que le vulgaire se figure
comme deux etats de choses qui s'excluent, sont les condi­
tions alternatives de la vie des peuples; Elles s'appellent
I 1une l 1autre, se definissent reciproquement* se completent
et se soutiennent, comme les termes inverses, mais ad^quats
et inseparables d'une antimonie. la paix dlmontre et con-
firme la guerre; la guerre a son tour est Tine revendication
de la paix. . . .C'est pourquoi nous voyons, dans l'histoire,
la guerre renaitre sans cesse de l 1idee meme qui avait
amene la paix." Ibid., pp. 94-95.
113
studies: "It is in the universal consciousness that we must
study it (war), not on the battle fields, in sieges and the
conflicts of armies, in the procedure of strategy, tactics
and armament. . . .
In singling out the distinct role of war in social
change and in viewing war as a major dimension of social

change, Proudhon concluded that war was an integral part of

all history and of all of our life. He brought his compre­


hensive view of the role of war to a close by documenting
its all-pervasive character:
War is our history, our life, our entire soul;
it is legislation, politics, the state, the country,
the social hierarchy, law, poetry, theology; once more,
it is everything.2

War animates society. Its thought, its influence


are everywhere present. It is that which gives motive
and form to all our powers, to religion, to justice,
to philosophy, to the liberal arts. War has made
society what it is,^

1
"C'est dans la conscience universelle que nous
devons l'etudier, non sur les champs de bataille, dans les
sieges et les chocs des armees, dans les procedes de la
strategie, de la tactique et de I'armement. . . . " Ibid.,
p. 104.
2
"la guerre, c'est notre histoire, notre vie, notre
ame tout entierej c'est la legislation, la politique, I'etat,
la patrie, la hierarchie sociale, le droit des gens, la
poesie, la theologie; encore une fois, c'est tout." Ibid.,
p. 107.
3
"La guerre anim§ la societe. Sa pensee, son influ­
ence, y sont partout presentes. C'est elle qui a donne
l'impulsion et% la forme ti toutes nos puissances, a la religion,
a la justice, a la philosophie, aux arts^liberaux et aux
arts utiles. La guerre a fait la societe ce qu'elle est."
Ibid.. pp. 305-306.
114
Proudhon's Concept of Revolution - A Consequence of Social
Change.
Revolution, although yet another manifestation of

social change in Proudhon's opinion, was generally treated


as a condition which arose from the contradictions of the
dialectical principle within the state of war in society.
It was a consequence of changes at the economic, political
and social levels of society. Revolution was an extreme
form of the condition of war which Proudhon thought to he

ubiquitous.
In his use of the concept of revolution as an aspect
and as a consequence of social change, Proudhon went beyond
the idea of progress so prevalent among the early sociolo­

gists and social thinkers of the nineteenth century. Proud­


hon recognized that revolution was not always progress.

He saw all too clearly that revolution, although always


fought in the name of justice, also risked the consequences
1
of failure and decadence. Progress was thus far from being
an inevitable concomitant of social change.

In Proudhon's view revolutions were the successive


manifestations of justice in humanity, representing points

of crisis in the unfolding of the social process:


A revolution is an act of sovereign justice, in
the order of moral facts, springing out of the necessity
of things, and in consequence carrying with it its own
justifications; and which it is a crime for the states­
man to oppose it.2

Gurvitch, Fondateurs Francais, Yol. II, p. 69.


2
Proudhon, General Idea, p. 40.
115
Like the state of war, revolutions were a permanent force

in society. Unlike the case of war, however, the force


resulting from revolutionary conditions was latent. In
making a scientific examination of this phenomenon, the
force should he treated as an existing reality at hoth

psychological and sociological levels, and seen as a corre-


1
lative of the principle of justice.
Until Proudhon used the word revolution, its meaning
had generally been restricted to that of a large-scale
rebellion. Proudhon went beyond this interpretation of the
concept in that for him revolution was not any kind of
2
crisis, but a crisis of growth.
Behind Proudhon's insistence on revolution, he had

always been a conserver of what he conceived to be the

basic institutions of mankind. He held marriage and the


family to be important institutions, the reciprocity and
mutualism of social interaction here being the arena for
the emergence of the principle of justice and the internali­
zation of secular norms attendant upon the emergence of the
3
principle of justice. Por Proudhon the line of progress
for the revolution lay through the application of secular
morality in economics and politics to the reform of indi­
vidual morals. These two reforms are interconnected

De Lubac, Un-Marxian Socialist, p. 169.


2
Ibid., loc. oit.
3
Jackson, Marx. Proudhon, p. 131.
V
116
at every stage, but the point of application of individual
1
morality was the institution of marriage.
Proudhon saw three main aspects of the revolution

as a social process:
- The preceding state of affairs, which the
revolution aims at overthrowing, and which becomes
counter-revolution through its desire to maintain its
existence.
- The various parties which take different views
of the revolution according to their rejudices and
interests, yet are compelled to embrace it and to use
it for their advantage.
- The revolution itself, which constitutes the
solution.2
In discussing the nature of revolution Proudhon

showed that the social tendency towards conservatism inherent


in all social institutions might be compared with the
tendency towards revolution which was also inherent in all
social institutions: "Just as the instinct for conservatism
is inherent in every social institution, the need for revolu-
3
tion is equally irresistible." It would only be when we
knew how to yield to the different stages of a revolution
that social change would be brought about peaceably.
Repression of a revolution would only intensify its subse­

quent manifestation:
A revolution is a force against which no power, divine
or human, can prevail: whose nature is to be strength­
ened and to grow by the very resistance which it en­
counters. A revolution may be directed, moderated,

1Ibid., p. 112.
2
Proudhon, General Idea, p. 11.
3
Ibid.. p. 14.
delayed: . . .the wisest policy is to yield to it,
foot by foot, that the perpetual evolution of Humanity
may be accomplished insensibly and silently instead of
by mighty strides. A revolution cannot be crushed,
cannot be deceived, cannot be perverted, all the more,
cannot be conquered. The more you repress it, the more
you increase its rebound and render its action
irresistible.1
It was only when our social science had advanced to
the point of being able to recognize the different symptoms
of a revolution that social change would come to pass in
society without social upheaval: "There is but one way to
2
ward off the perils of a revolution; it is to recognize it."
Proudhon concluded that the two conditions which had until

then prevented the detached observation of such social

phenomena were vested interests and the pride of government:


Always the status quo tried to prescribe for
poverty.
Two causes are against the peaceful accomplish­
ment of revolutions: established interests and the
pride of government.
By a fatality. . .these two causes always act
together; so that riches and power, together with
tradition, being on one side, poverty, disorganization
and the unknown on the other, the satisfied party being
unwilling to make any concession, the dissatisfied
being unable to submit longer, the conflict, little by
little, becomes inevitable.5

Proudhon, in this regard, was less of a sociologist than Marx

in that he did not indicate how one overcame the power of

such interest groups.

~Slbid., p . 15.
2
Ibid., p. 16.
3
Ibid., p. 17.
/V?

118
like Marx, Proudhon also saw revolution in economic
terms, and from this standpoint his concept of revolution
was closely tied to his ideas on social stratification.

It was only through revolution that Proudhon thought the


economic equality, which he considered to he essential for
Prance at the time he wrote, could he achieved. It was
through revolution that contradictions arising from class
differences could he resolved.
The nation is divided into three natural cate-
gones:
1) Opulence and unproductive consumption.
2 ) Industry and free trade, hut without
guarantees.
3) Absolute subjection and progressive misery.
The problem for the Revolution was to resolve
the first and the third classes in the second, the
extremes in the mean; and by that to manufacture that
all, without exception, had in equal proportion, capital,
work, openings, liberty and affluence.1
When examining social reality within an historical

perspective Proudhon stated that the fact and idea of

social contract depended, in its origins, on the social

"La nation se divise en trois categories naturelles:


l) Opulence et consommation improductive. 2) Industrie et
commerce libre, mais sans garantj.es. 3) Suje^ion absolue
et misere progressive. le probleme pour la Revolution etait
de resoudre la premiere et la troisieme classes dans la
seconde, les extremes dans le moyen; et par-la de faire
que tous sans exception, eussent en proportion egale, le
capital, le,travail, le debouch!, la liberte, et l'aisance."
Proudhon, Revolution Sociale. p. 37.
7

119
phenomenon of revolution: "Only Revolution conceived and
1
defined the social contract."

Although Proudhon did not give his readers a coherent


theory of social change in his writings, his ideas provide
insights into the dynamics of social change. Proudhon's
views on the centrality of a dialectic in society and the
ubiquity of the phenomena of war and revolution have rele­
vance for conflict sociological theory today. In this
respect Proudhon's thought can be viewed as being more
pertinent for the discipline of sociology today than it
would have been for sociology over a decade ago.

"la Revolution seule a congu et defini le contrat


social." Proudhon, De la Justice. Tome I, p. 178.
CHAPTER VI

PROUDHON'S SOCIOLOGY OP RELIGION

Although most of Proudhon's ideas about religion are


confined to his personal observations about European reli­
gions, in particular that of the Roman Catholic Church,
Proudhon described what he considered to be the social
consequences of religious belief and religious organization,
and in this way he may be thought of as having made an early
contribution to the sociology of religion. Proudhon's
ideas on religion are interspersed throughout his works and
are intermingled with his other central concepts and themes,

especially with his ideas on justice. Por Proudhon religion


and religious norms and justice and secular norms presented
alternative, but mutually exclusive, bases of normative
structure and social cohesion in society.'*'

Proudhon's Definition of Religion


In defining religion Proudhon put forward his view
that it is not religion that makes man but man that makes
p
religion. According to Proudhon religion was a social

This is the major theme of Proudhon's work De La


Justice Dans La Revolution Et Dans L'Eglise and is discussed
more fully in Chapter VII of this study.
2
Proudhon, Contradictions Economiquest Vol. I, p. 2.
120
1 1 >

121

product.'1' In postulating that religion was first and


foremost the symbol of society itself, and that the sum

total of religious beliefs of a society was the first


intellectual manifestation of that society Proudhon showed

himself to be a forerunner of the social thought of Durk-


heim. Historically religion was to Proudhon, a pre­
political phenomenon, and those individuals who held posi­
tions of authority within the religion were portrayed as
the original rulers of society: "Religion, symbol of society,
was always the first intellectual manifestation of the
2
people; the priesthood being its first master."

Alongside his definition of religion as a social


product Proudhon presented the idea that the prime function
and purpose of religion was to serve a legitimizing function
in society and as an essential basis for social cohesion.
Thus religion served social needs rather than individual
needs, and without religion and its institutions society
itself could not exist. Although Proudhon did not deny
that religion served needs of the individual members of

society, he saw the fulfillment of individual needs as

being subordinate to and as a consequence of the fulfillment

Proudhon, Celebration du Dimanche, p. 92.

"la religion, symbolique de la society, fut de tout


temps la premiere manifestation intellectuelle du peuple;
le sacerdoce, son premier maltre," Proudhon, Revolution
Sociale, p. 28.
1??

of social needs:
There therefore is the essence of Religion.
It exists, it is given, not as the bygone unbelievers
said, with the intention and premeditated wish to serve
the human race, although it had this result, but to
provide a reason, an authority and a base to Justice,
without which society would not be able to exist.

Although Proudhon emphasized the social origins of

religion and in his discussions of the nature and the role


of religion in society continued to postulate its social
reality as a collective phenomenon, Proudhon also drew his

readers1 attention to the effects on individual man of the


internalization of religious values. Religion was not only
a fundamental element of society, but the religious senti­
ment in man also had an essential character. As early as
1840, in Qu'Est-Ce Que La Propriete?, Proudhon asked:
". . .what is there in man that is more ancient and more
2
profound than the religious sentiment?" In this same work

he had already concluded that the idea of God in society

"la dgnc est 1'essence de la Religion. Elle existe,


elle est donnee, non pas, comme le disaient les anciens
incredules, dans l 1intention et avec la volonte premeditee
d'asservir l'espece humaine, bien qu'elle ait eu ce resultat,
mais pour fournir une raison, une autorite et une base a
la Justice, sans laquelle la societe ne peut subsister,"
Proudhon, le la Justice, Tome I, p. 81.
2
". . .q u ’y a-t-il dans I'homme de plus ancien et
de plus profond que le sentiment religieux?" Proudhon,
Propriete. p. 66.
I1-/

123

was both primitive, inevitable, and crucially important:

God is for humanity a fact as primitive, an idea


as inevitable, a principle as necessary as are, for our
understanding, the categorical ideas of cause, substance,
time and space.1

Religion was thus the social consciousness of society itself

and the social consciousness of man. Although man's dis­


covery of the principle of justice would bring about a
spontaneous social control in society and in man, in the
beginning, and at the time when Proudhon wrote, religion
provided the major basis of both social cohesion and social
control in society.
We can classify Proudhon's definition of religion
as a functional approach to the study of religion in that

Proudhon delineated the functions of social control and


social cohesion that the institution of religion served
for the wider society as well as for the individual.
Religious institutions were thus seen to be a prime factor
in the integration of society.
Although Proudhon recognized the function of and the
effectiveness of the Roman Catholic Church as a means of
social control he was more sympathetic and more optimistic
about the ultimate beneficial functions of the principle of

"Dieu est pour humanite un fait aussi primitif, une


idee aussi fatale, un principe aussi necessaire que le sont
pour notre entendement les idees categoriques de cause, de
substance, de temps et d'espece," Ibid., p. 65.
justice in society than he was about the working out of any

religious principle. Proudhon not only delineated the func­


tional consequences of religious institutions for society,
but also their dysfunctional properties. The integration
that Proudhon perceived as being brought about by religion,
at the level of personality and of social organization, was
merely a pseudo-integration. It was only when society was
finally integrated according to the workings of the principle
of justice that society would become truly integrated on an
egalitarian basis. Thus, unlike Comte, Proudhon saw reli­

gion as both functional and dysfunctional. He also saw


that the same religion, for example the Roman Catholic

religion, can be functional for one group and not for


another: the Roman Catholic religion, at the time when

Proudhon wrote, maintained the hierarchical structure of


society, thus serving the interests of the upper classes
while simultaneously negating the interests of the working

classes.
Even though Proudhon acknowledged the social control
function of religion, and, more importantly, the fact that
religion provided society with a normative basis, he was
relentless in criticising religion and its institutions as
manifested in the society of his own day. Ironically
enough, however, he did not think that society was yet
ready or capable of accepting a new normative basis from
the workings of the secular principle of justice. The
125

greater number of people in French society at the time

he wrote still needed to hold on to the idea of God as an


individual and social motivating force. However much the
principle of justice was beginning to emerge through revolu­
tions and through the scientific organization of the economy,
the principle was not yet apparent enough to have been
become part of the social institutions bringing about the
socialization of the individual and of groups in society.
Also, the principle of justice and its attendant secular
norms had not yet been incorporated into the educational

institutions of the masses.


The great mass of people in French society at the
time when Proudhon wrote were too much under the subjection
of an educated elite to be in a position to replace religious
norms by secular norms. The people were not educated to
use their own reason, and so the hierarchical, authori­
tarian values characteristic of religious norms would
necessarily continue to be internalized by the people until

the economy of society was reorganized scientifically and


the all-pervading principle of justice so liberated to
function freely throughout the wider society. It was only

when the secular norms of the principle of justice were


widely apparent, that is were manifest and not merely
latent, that society could be integrated effectively on an
egalitarian basis.
i l
1

126

Even though. Proudhon laid great emphasis on the


importance of the reorganization of the economy for the
liberation of the French people from the religious norms
of their society, Proudhon, unlike Marx, does not assert
that the religious institutions of society are determined
by the economy. Proudhon's thought can be much more readily
compared to Durkheim's in this respect, in that both Proudhon

and Durkheim considered religion and religious institutions


to be an early and inevitable symbolic expression of
society itself and not merely of one segment of society.

Proudhon's Historical Analysis of the Origins of Religion


Although much of Proudhon's work -was ahistorical -

he devoted many of his writings to observations of events


at the time he wrote - he made an exception in the case of
his examination of the role of religion in society. Here
many of his ideas and theories were presented in an his­
torical context. Proudhon did not generally present his

ideas in the form of a synthesis of primary source materials


and therefore much of his thinking was deductive rather

than inductive in its organization.


Many of Proudhon's recurring ideas on religion were
already present in his early essay, De La Celebration Du
Dimanche (1839). In this essay Proudhon presented the indi­
vidual and social potential of man as a rational being.
What differentiated man from the animals was his ability
to classify his thoughts and discover social laws for social
127

welfare. Man individually and socially thus elevated him­


self to a dignity which was beyond the level of satisfying
his senses. It was through man's exercise of reason that

he would achieve social liberty. It was through his rational


duties, the exercise of his rights, that all the individual
and social acts of society would be harmonized:
Man is more than the animals, with regard to
thought, intelligence, which reflects, accounts for,
judges, reasons, combines, generalizes, classifies and
discriminates: with regard to sentiment, the conscience,
which dictates to him new laws, is two-fold: enlightened
by reason, the supreme achievement of this liberty is
to harmonize all man's acts; its supreme effort is to
sacrifice passion to duty.l
It was because of man's rational nature that he could

first of all formulate religion as the symbol of society.


However, in the course of time the mythology and false
images associated with religion would make themselves known

to man through his reason, and this same faculty which


had created religion in the beginning would finally be
responsible for its replacement by the principle of justice
and secular norms. Man would be saved from the individual
and social alienation inevitable from religion and religious

^ "1'homme a de plus qu§ l§s animaux, quant a la


pensee, 1 'intelligence, qui reflechit, compte, juge,
raisonne, combine, generalise, classe et distingue: quant
au sentiment, la conscience, qui lui dicte de nouvelles
lois, souvent contraires aux appetits de la sensibilite.
le champ de la liberte humaine est double: eclairee par
la raison, le chef-d'oeuvre de cette liberte est d'harmoniser
tous ses actes; son plus grand effort, de sacrifier la
passion au devoir," Proudhon, Celebration Du Dimanche,
p. 88.
128

institutions "by his individual and collective reason. In


its earliest stages religion served an all-important "but
undifferentiated function in society. As a pre-political
phenomenon religion -was the vehicle of government in
society, as it was at once a means of education and public

and private social control: "In its origins, religion was

politics and science; the priesthood was therefore the


magistrature and also the teaching profession."^
In Systeme Des Contradictions Economiques Proudhon
re-emphasized the idea of the social origins of religion
that he had earlier formulated in Qu'Est-Ce Que la Pro-
* + 2 In this later work he was more specific in that
priete.
he presented the idea of God as a product of the collective
beliefs of the individual members of society, this product
being more than the sum of the individual beliefs in
society:
If I trace the idea of God in its successive
manifestations, I find that this idea is above all
social; I mean by that that it is much more an act of
faith on the part of collective thought than an indi­
vidual conception.3

"Dans l'origine, la religion etait politique et


science; le sacerdoce fut done aussi magistrature et
enseignement," Ibid., p. 92.
2
Por two examples of this trend of Proudhon's thought
see Proudhon, Propriite pp. 65-66.

•'’"Si je suis, a travers ses transformations successives,


I 1idee de Dieu, je trouve que cette idee est avant tout
sociale; j'entends par la qu'elle est bien plus un acte de
foi de la pensee collective qu'une conception individualle,"
Proudhon, Oontradictions Economiques, Vol. I, p. 2.
129

It is through, the idea of God that man was able to feel


his social self for the first time and recognise his own
social origins.'*" Man arrived at his social consciousness

through a state of individual and collective unquestioning


adoration:
And the first movement of man, consumed and
absorbed by enthousiasm (of divine inspiration) is to
worship the invisible Providence, upon which he feels
to be dependent, and which he calls God, . . .2

Although Proudhon did not delineate three distinct


stages in the history and evolution of social man and
social thought as Auguste Comte had done before him,
Proudhon stated that it was only when secular ideas replaced
religious ones that man would be socially and intellectu­
ally free to enter and act in a scientific phase of history,
the final phase of man's social evolution. Proudhon described
this sequence of events as "progressive revelation":
. . .the history of societies is no more for us
than a long determination of the idea of God, a progres­
sive revelation of the destiny of man. . . .Humanitarian
atheism is thus the final phase of the moral and
intellectual freeing of man, and consequently the last
phase of philosophy serving as transition to the

1Ibid., p . 5.
2
"Et le premier mouvement de I'homme, ravi et
pen£tr£ d 'enthousiasme (du souffle divin) est d ’adorer
l 1invisible Providence dont il se sent d^pendre et qu'il
nomme Dieu," Ibid.. p. 3.
■3
^Comte delineated the religious, metaphysical, and
scientific phases of evolution in the social and intellectual
history of man.
reconstruction or scientific verification of all the
dogmas -which have been destroyed.!

Proudhon saw religion and morality as entirely


2
different aspects of society, he made the point that in
primitive societies religion had the function of endorsing
the prevalent morality:

Religion, as dogmatics, has no value except


insofar as it serves, in primitive societies, as support
of the mores.

This need for religious sanction characterises


the primitive state of human souls - Later mature man
will walk alone with his own dignity and his own
justice.3

It was the collective religious sentiment which

Proudhon saw as "being an even more significant collective


force than the specific institutional forms of religion
itself. He saw the religious sentiment of the group as

". . ,1'histoire des societes n'est plus pour nous


qu'une longue determination de l'idee de Dieu, une revela­
tion progressive de la destinee de l'homme. . .L'atheisme
humanitaire est done le dermier terme de 1 ^affranchissement
moral et intellectuel de l'homme, par consequent la derniere
phase de la philosophie, servant de pasage a la recon­
struction ou verification scientifique de tous les dogmes
demolis," Ihid., p. 22.

2Proudhon, La Justice Poursuivie Par L'Eglise (1858)


in Oeuvres Completes, Tome XII, p. 215.
•3
"La Religion, comme dogmatique, n'a de valeur
qu'autant qu'elle sert, dans les societes primitives,
d'appui a la morale. Le hesoin de sanction religieuse
caracterise l'etat primitif des ames humaines - Plus tard
l'homme adulte marche seul dans sa dignite et sa justice
et sa justice propre," Pierre Joseph Proudhon, Jesus et
les Origines du Christianisme (Paris: G. Havard fils,
1896), p. 81.
131

being of basic importance in society at all stages of its


evolution. It was also this collective religious sentiment
that had persisted throughout the history of social man and
which had remained in the society of his day as a foundation
for social cohesion within the broader collectivity:
But there is one thing which. . .lasts-: that is
the universal faith in the divinity; this is the phenomenon
which is both primordial and constant of this faith,
which, without caring about scientific exactitude and
logic, attaches itself to all, sees God every where,
and sees in the smallest things tokens of the presence
of the monuments of its action, of its will and of its
wisdom. It is this phenomenon of human belief that it
is a question of reaching, whose importance strikes me;
which presents itself as the highest instance, the most
primordial instinct, the most indestructible instinct
of our nature. .

Proudhon pointed out that the primitive faith in the


divinity of the group was faith in the power of the group.
It was this faith in the power of the group which would be
eventually modified in the interests of reason and science:

In the final analysis belief in the divinity is


ourselves, our soul, our consciousness, our reason, at
least in its primitive formulation; with the result that
we are not able, from the most rigorously scientifically

"Mais il%ya une chose qui. . .subsiste: c'est la


foi universelle a la divinite; c'est le phenomene primordial
et constant, de cette foi, qui, sans se soucier d 1exactitude
scientifique et de logique, se prend a tout, voit Dieu
partout, et apergoit dans les moindres choses des signes^
de la presence des monuments de son action, de sa volonte
et de sa sagesse. C'est ce phenomene, de la croyance
humaine qu'il s'agit d'atteindre, <jui me frappe; qui se
pose comme 1'instinct le plus eleve, le plus primordial, le
plus indestructible de notre nature. . .", Ibid.. p. 86.
and positive point of view, to deny God, to deny the
belief in God, without disowning ourselves, without
condemning our soul, our spirit, our intelligence.

Faith in the divinity, in a word, appears not


like the error of the savage, who, in seeing his shadow
on the sand, takes it to be a reality, a cloud, a
spirit, a something which attaches itself to him, whilst
it is really nothing at all. This faith in us is.
organic, essential, a constituent part of our ideas and
our mores, situated at the source of all our affections.

Proudhon's Views on the Dysfunctions of Religion

Proudhon's main objection to the idea of God and the

institution of religion was that implicit in the assumptions


regarding God and religion was the limitation of the dignity

of individual and social man: "In theological language,


the essential sanctity of God, symbolic expression of
2
society, implies the original degradation of man. . ."

"Car enfin, la croyance a la divinite, c'est nous-


memes, c'est notre ame, c'est notre conscience, c'est notre
raison, au moins dans sa formule primitive, en sorte que
nous ne pouvons, au point de vue le plus rigoureusement
scientifique et positif, nier Dieu, nier la croyance a Dieu,
sans nous renier nou-memes, sans condamner notre ame, notre
esprit, notre intelligence. la foi a la divinite, en un
mot, apparait non comme 1'erreur du sauvage, qui, en voyant
son ombre sur le sable, la prendrait pour une realite, un
nuage, un esprit, un quelque chose qui s'attache a lui,
tandis que ce n'est bien positivement rien. Cette foi est
en nous organique, essentielle, constitutive de nose idees
et de nos moeurs, placee a la source de toutes nos affections"
Ibid., p. 87.
2 + *
"En langage theologique, la saintete essentielle
de Dieu, expression symbolique de la societe, implique la
degradation originelle de l'homme. . .", Ibid., p. 136.
1 1

133

For Proudhon, man was not merely equal to God, hut was better
than God. Proudhon thought that his principle of Justice
far surpassed any possible conception of God.
For Proudhon belief in God meant belief without
proofs, abstenance from reasoning, and an undirected "chaos
of naturalism and supernaturalism." It was man's capacity

to reason and his conscience that would finally oblige him


2
to admit that such belief in the idea of God was harmful.
man. . .is thus constituted in his reason and in his
conscience that, if he takes himself seriously, he is
forced to renounce his faith, to reject it, as bad and
harmful and to declare that for him, God is evil.^

Proudhon saw this renunciation of primordial religious

faith as being decisive in saving man's self-respect and


dignity. By the renunciation man lost the possibility of
experiencing ecstatic bliss, but it was this very utopian
state which Proudhon considered to be unreasonable, unreal­
istic, and insulting to man's own dignity.
For Proudhon the false beliefs of religion were

essentially powerful destructive social forces which had


the capacity to impede and even stop the development of the
principle of justice. These false beliefs alone had the

1Ibid., p. 359.

2Ibid.. pp. 90-93.


3 *
^"l'homme. . .est ainsi constituf dans sa raison et
dans sa conscience que, s'il prend au seroieux, il est
forcer de renoncer a la foi, de la rejeter, comme mauvaise
et nuisible et de declarer que pour lui, Dieu c'est le mal,"
Ibid., p. 93.
134

power to curtail the progress of justice:


There is really only one thing which, paralysing
the free will, stops the progress of Justice, and that
is the fear of God and idolatry of the universe.1
It was only through the elimination of the dysfunctional

forces of religion in society that individual and social


man would eventually become able to direct his own destiny
through science and the principle of justice. Although
there were losses to both man and society through the
replacement of religious norms by secular norms, it was
through moderation and the renunciation of religious faith

that man's true social nature would be revealed:


Beside this decisive proscription which saves
his dignity, man loses something, it is incontestably
true. . .man so places himself voluntarily in the
twilight. . .between the first cause which he renounces
and the final cause which he will never attain, this
whole, with the result that he is able to say, during
a life without precedent and without future, life which
flows with the rapidity of lightning: ME!
My conscience is mine, my justice is mine, and
my liberty is sovereign. I may die for eternity, but
at least I am man, during one revolution of the sun. 2

"II n'y a veritablement qu'une chose qui, paralysant


le libre arbitre, arrete l'essor de la Justice, c'est la
crainte de Dieu et 1'idolatrie de 1'univers,11 Proudhon,
De La Justice. Tome 3, p. 3.
2 t
"A cette proscription decisive qui sauve sa dignite,
l'homme perd quelque chose, c'est incontestable. . .il se
place^volontairement dans le crepuscule. . .entre la cause
premiere a laquelle il renonce, et la cause finale qu'il
n'atteindra jamais, ce tout, afin de pouvoir dire, pendant
une vie sans precedent et sans avenir, vie qui s'ecoule
avec la rapidite de 1'eclair: MOI! Ma conscience est
mienne, ma justice est mienne, et ma liberte est souveraine.
Que je meure pour l'|ternite, mais que du moins je sois
homme, pendant une revolution de soleil," Proudhon, Jesus,
p. 93.

\
I
(,

135

Thus Proudhon did not deny the existence of God, hut


was hostile to any idea of God which made human action
dependent on God's action or which put off to the next world
the remedy for the injustices of this.'*' However, the criti­
cism of the idea of God undertaken hy Proudhon did not end
for him, as it did for Comte or for Peuerbach, in setting

man in the place of God. Proudhon's "religion" was fixed


2
upon Justice and not Humanity.
Proudhon applied his ideas on the dysfunctions of
religion for society to a more intensive study of the case
of Christianity, particularly to that of the Roman Catholic
Church, and most especially to the case of the Roman Catholic
Church in French society at the time when he wrote. Writing

in 1852 on the subject of the Revolution of 1848 Proudhon

asked whether French society might not be ready to see the


futility of having a state religion. For Proudhon there
could be no coexistent liberty and religion in the same
society:
It was appropriate to ask, in 1848, if according
to the principle of religious liberty and the progress
of public reason, one should maintain any longer, at the
expense of the nation, a group of people as formidable
as the clergy; if the time had not come for French
society to begin to give up the cult, considered as moral
principle and instrument of order; if it did not belong
to that hour, in the interest of the mores themselves,
and without any dogmatisation, to move religious

'*'Brogan, Proudhon, p. 70.

2Ibid., p. 276.

i
r
authority to the head of the household, as one had just
moved political authority to the citizen; to teach the
masses that prayer is only an addition to reflection,
for the use of children and the simple-minded; the
sacraments and mysteries an allegory of social laws; the
cult an emblem of universal solidarity; to say to them,
finally, that the man who has no private virtue, loyalty
to commitments, devotion to the country, but by the
fear of God. . ., far from being a saint, is simply a
scoundrel?

The democratic theory of liberty is incompatible


with the theological doctrine of grace. . . .No revolu­
tion in the Church, no republic in the State.^

Having compared the evolution of both Roman Catholi­

cism and Protestantism Proudhon concluded that each, in its


different way, had arrived at the same disastrous result -
the destruction of human reason:
Papism, in denying the right to thought and the
autonomy of conscience; protestantism, in wishing to

"II y avait lieu,de se demander, en 1848^, si,d'apres


le principe de la liberte religieuse et le progres de la
raison publique, on devait entretenir plus longtemps, aux
frais de la nation, un corps aussi redoubtable que le clerge;
se le temps n'etait pas venu pour la societe^frangaise de
commencer la renonciation au culte, consider! comme principe
de morale et instrument d'ordre; s'il ne convenait pas a
cette heure, dans 1'interet des moeurs elles-memes, et sans
dogmatiser aucunement, de transporter l 1autorite religieuse
au pere de famille, comme on venait de transporter l 1autorite
politique au citoyen; d'apprendre aux masses que la priere
n'est qu'un supplement de la reflexion, a l'usage des enfants
et des simples; les sacrements et les mysteres, une allegorie
des lois sociales; le culte, un embleme de la solidarite
universelle; de leur^dire, enfin, que l'homme qui n'a de
vertu privee, de fidelite aux engagements, de devouement a
la patrie, que par crainte de Dieu. . ., loin d'etre un
saint, est tout simplement Tin scelerat? La theotie demo-
cratique de la liberte est incompatible avec la doctrine
theologique de la grace: . . .Point de revolution dans
l^Eglise, point de republique dans l'etat," Proudhon,
Revolution Sociale. pp. 28-29.
137

remove itself from the consequences of this autonomy


and this law, disregarded equally the nature of the
human spirit. Both of them, although to a different
degree, made themselves guilty of the same offence: in
order to assure belief, they destroyed reason; what
theology!. . .1

Proudhon saw the Roman Catholic Church as impeding

social progress in the French society of his day. The


religious institutions of his time supported the status

quo and thus stood in contradiction to the dialectical


process of social change. For Proudhon social progress and
the continuous negation of the status quo were synonymous:
The character of the Church is to maintain the
status quo. But the reason of man is indefatigable in
its investigations; and the more its points of view
multiply themselves, the more it becomes restless,
■unsubdued, on the object of religion.2

Proudhon continued by saying that nothing is more


absurd than considering Christianity as the religion of

progress:
That which Christianity proposes for itself is
not to follow humanity in its joyous adventures, but

"le papisme, en niant le droit a la pensee et


I'autonomie de la conscience; le protestantisme, en voulant
se soustraire aux consequences de cette autonomie et de ce
droit, meconnaissaient egalement la nature de 1*esprit humain.
Tous deux, bien qu’a' un degre different, se rendaient
coupables du meme delit: pour assurer la croyance ils
detruisaient la raison; quelle theologie!. . ." Ibid.. p. 47.

"le caractere de l'Eglise est de garder le statu


quo. Mais la raison de l'homme infatigable dans ses investi­
gations; et plus ses points de vue se multiplient, plus
elle devient inquiete, insoumise, sur I'objet de la religion,"
Ibid., p. 103.
to fix it, in ashes and hairshirt, at the foot of its
monument.^
Describing his personal reaction to religion, Chris­

tianity, and Roman Catholicism in particular, Proudhon said:


I believe that I have no need at all for these
mystical formulae; I resist them as being unjurious to
my dignity and to my mores. The day when I would be
forced, on the part of the law, to recognize the Roman
Catholic religion as state religion; to appear in church
and at the confessional, to send my children to baptism
and the holy table, that day my final hour would have
sounded. Defenders of the family, I would show you
what a father is! I don't fear anything for myself;
neither prison nor the galleys. . . .But I forbid a
priest to place a hand on my children, if he did, I
would kill the priest. . .

Proudhon saw the modern Christian society of his day

as a hierarchical tyranny, religious functionaries being

ruthless despots in this organization. He pointed out

"Ce que le Christianisme se propose, ce n'est pas


de suivre l'humanite dans ses joyeuses aventures, mais de
la fixer, dans la cendre et le cilice, au pied de son
monument," Ibid., p. 104.
2
"Je crois n'avoir aucun besoin de ces^formules
mystiques; je les repousse comme injurieuses a ma dignite
et a mes moeurs. Le jour ou je serais force, de par la
loi, de reconnaitre la religion catholique pour religion
de 1'etat; de faire acte de comparution a l^eglise et au
confessional, d'envoyer mes enfants au bapteme et a 1§, sainte
table, ce jour la aurait sonne ma derniere heure. Defen-
seurs de la famille, je vous montrerais ce que c'est qu'un
pere de famille! Je ne crains rien pour^ma personne: ni
la prison ne les galeres. . . .Mais je defends au pretre
de^porter la main sur mes enfants; sinon, je tuerais le
pretre. . .", Ibid.. p. 130.
•Z

^Proudhon, De La Justice. Tome I, p. 163.


I
0

139

that it was "by its discipline and not hy its morals that
Christianity had governed the world.1
In assessing the role of Christianity in history
Proudhon indicated the social origins of Christianity and
2
the social conditions of its development. As in the case
of the origin of all religion in society Proudhon saw the
development of Christianity as an inevitable social struc­

tural product of its own age and throughout history. For


Proudhon the teaching of Jesus was social in its character
and in its effects, and not merely theological or political:
"The Christ. . .This is a manifestation of the collective
soul, an evolution of social psychology, of which the first

convert was Jesus himself."^ These social teachings,


however, although significant and not completely dysfunc­
tional, would inevitably be replaced by the principle of
justice as a principle of organization in society. It was
only when justice was the governing principle of society,
and not the idea of God, that man would be freed of the
alienation that was attendant upon the religion and religious

organization of society.

1Ibid., p. 165.
^Proudhon, Cesarisme, pp. 2-3.

3Ibid., p. 119.

^■"le Christ. . .C'est une manifestation de l'ame


collective, une evolution de la psychologie sociale, dont
le premier converti a ete Jesus lui-meme," Ibid., p. 82.
140

Religion and Justice in the Thought of Proudhon


To religion and its implications of an inegalitarian

and alienated society, Proudhon opposed, antithetically,


the notion of Justice -with its assumptions of an egalitarian
and anarchistic society. Thus, for Proudhon, religion was
the idea and expression of inequality, whilst justice, in
its ideal manifestation, was the idea and manifestation of

equality.^
Proudhon described the opposition between religion
and justice clearly in De La Justice Pans La Revolution Et
Dans L'Eglise, and asked the basic question as to whether

they could ever be reconciled with each other.


This creative and conservative principle of the
church is Religion. Revolution affirms Justice I have
just said; Revolution believes in Humanity: that is
why it is unconquerable and always a d v a n c e s . ^

Revolution and the Church each representing


one element of the conscience, have they been called to
a conciliation?^

In describing the nature of Justice Proudhon con­


trasted the systems of Transcendance and Immanence. Both
God and Justice were originally conceived to be a power or

^Ansart, Sociologie de Proudhon, p. 178.

^"Ce principe createur et conservateur de l'Eglise


est la Religion. La Revolution affirme la‘Justice,
disais-je tout a l'heure; elle croj.t a l'Humanite; c'est
pour cela qu'elle est invincible, et qu'elle avance
toujours," Proudhon, De La Justice. Tome I, p. 26.

^"La Revolution et l'Eglise representant chacune un


element de la conscience, sont-elles appelees a une con­
ciliation?", Ibid., p. 30.
powers outside of man in the Transcendental system. It
was the immanence of Justice, however, that was its true
nature and its true manifestation, and it was Immanent
Justice, that which was innate to man, that would save
humanity from decadence."^ The immanence of justice was

proved, in Proudhon's view, "by the existence of the con­

science in man. Proudhon did not describe as fully the


process of the internalization of an external authority of
constraint, as did Durkheim writing later, but Proudhon did
present conscience as an internalization of secular norms:
In the theory of Immanence, on the contrary, the
knowledge of the just and the unjust is a result of
exercising a special faculty and of the judgement which
Reason makes afterwards upon its acts.2

This identification of internalized norms as being


essential to the functioning of justice is contrasted with
the concept of an external authority, such as God in
Christianity, a Transcendental system, where man was divided

in his loyalties:
. . .religion. . .resolving in a mythology of thought,
divides the conscience: as a consequence it destroys
morality, substituting for the positive notion of Justice
an added and illegitimate idea.

. . .Christianity, in which God is understood to be


something other than the conscience, although it is a

^Ibid.,pp. 76-88.

"Pans la theorie de l 1Immanence% au contraire, la


connaissance du juste et de 1'injuste resulte de I'exercice
d'une faculte speciale et du jugement que la Raison porte
ensuite sur ses actes," Ibid., p. 88.
figuration of the conscience: which, as a consequence,
constitutes in us a double conscience, the natural
conscience and the theological conscience, which pos­
sesses, in the sense of morality, only the rudiments
of truth. . .a figurative affirmation of Justice and
morality; but not true morality at all. Science of the
mores and efficiency of the moral sense can only develop
by the cessation of myth, by the return of the soul
to itself, that which is, to say it precisely, the end
of the reign of God.l

It was this division of man's conscience, the result

of religion, which Proudhon saw to be the cause of the down^

fall of both the church and religion:

Duplicity of the conscience, that is to say


annihilation of the conscience, this is the fatal »
stumbling-block of every church and every religion.

". . .la religion. . .se resolvant en^une mythologie


de la pensee, divise la conscience: par consequent elle
detruit la morale, en substituant a la notion positive de
Justice une notion sous-introduite et illegitime. . . .le
christianisme, dont le Dieu est pris pour autre que la
conscience, bien qu'il soit une figuration de la conscience:
qui, par consequent, constitue in nous une double conscience,
la conscience naturelle et la conscience theologale, ne
possede, en fait de morale, que les rudiments de la verite
. . .une affirmation figurative de la Justice et de la morale
mais de morale veritable, aucune. La science des moeurs et
l'efficacite du sens moral ne peuvent naitre que par la
cessation du mythe, par le retour de l'ame a soi, ce qui est,
a proprement parler, la fin du regne de Dieu," Ibid.. Tome
II, pp. 41-2.

^"Duplicite de la conscience, c'est-a dire aneantisse-


ment de la conscience, tel est I'ecueil fatal de" toute eglise
de toute religion," Ibid., Tome II, p. 42.
143

Proudhon repeatedly presented religion and justice

as mutually exclusive alternatives within society viewed

as a closed system:

Religion and Justice are between them like the


two extremities of a pair of scales: when one raises
itself up, the other descends. . .^

He explained this conflict between justice and religion

further by referring to his own personal experience:

. . .if I had been able. . .to make an abstraction of


my understanding, to separate completely, far from unit­
ing, my religion and my reason, my belief would never
have been shaken, instead of Justice making an anti­
christ of me, I would have remained the most humble and
the most obscure of Christians.2

"La Religion et la Justice sont entre elles comme


les deux extremites du balancier: quand I'une s'elfeve,
1*autre descend. . .", Ibid., Tome II, p. 43.
p
". . .si j'avais pu. . .faire abstraction de mon
entendement, separer completement, bien loin de les unir,
ma religion et ma raison, jamais ma croyance n'eut ete
ebranlee, au lieu que la Justice a fait de moi un antichrist,
je serais demeure le plus humble et le plus obscur des
chretiens," Ibid.. Tome II, p. 335.
CHAPTER VII

PROUDHON'S CONCEPT OP JUSTICE: TOWARDS A THEORY OP NORMS

Proudhon is not a great systematiser in his social


thought and his writings contain many contradictions and
ambiguities. There are some constant ideas relating to
justice as well as those which change, even though Proudhon

has given "almost innumerable definitions" to this concept


1
in his work. It is especially in relation to his views on
justice that Proudhon covered a "wide and shifting field"
with a "welter of analogous meanings," thus defying any
2
patient and well-defined analysis.

It was the questions of order, and of the creation


of order within society, which interested Proudhon most of
3
all in his studies and writing. His concept of justice
plays a crucial role in his ideas on this theme, and is used
in Proudhon's examination of past social organization and
social order as well as in his ideas of order in relation

to social reform. Thus although the concept of justice is

"de presque innombrahles definitions." Henri


Bachelin, Pierre Joseph Proudhon. Socialiste National
(Paris: Mercure de Prance, 194l)> p. 47.
2
De lubac, Un-Marxian Socialist, p. 163.
3
Leon A. Daudet, Plammes: Polemique et Polemistes
(Paris: B. Grasset, 1930), pp. 54 and 74.
not one currently used by American sociologists, the ques­
tions Proudhon raises and the answers he suggests when
dealing with this concept are pertinent to contemporary
discussions of the problem of order: the perennial issues
of social control and the topic of the internalization of
social constraint. Through a presentation of the scope of
the concept of justice in Proudhon's work, his conception
of justice as a basis of secular norms, and justice as it
relates to Proudhon's ideas on equilibrium and revolution,
we will show how Proudhon's thought on these themes may be
considered as being one of the earliest contributions towards
a sociological theory of norms.

Scope of the Concent of Justice


Proudhon's explanation of the nature of the concept

of justice and its role in society became more comprehen­


sive as his social thought matured. His early treatment

of justice in Qu'est-ce que la Propriete? concentrated on

justice as a form of social constraint and on justice as


the expression of economic equality.
In this discussion of the centrality of the importance
of justice for social organization, he compared the idea
of justice with that of law and put forward the view that
law can only be effective when it is based on justice. law
was thus one expression of justice, and where it was not
an expression of justice law itself became a source of
social hardship.
146
Justice is the central star which governs
societies, the pole ahout which the political world
turns, the principle and the rule of all transactions.
Nothing takes place "between men except in virtue of
law; nothing without the invocation of justice. Justice
is not at all the work of the law: on the contrary,
the law is never anything but a declaration and an
application of the just, in all circumstances where
men find themselves in relationships of interest. If
therefore the idea that we have of the just and the
law is falsely determined, if it is incomplete or even
mistaken, it is obvious that all our legislative appli­
cations would be harmful, our institutions defective,
our politics erroneous: there would continue to be
disorder and social hardship.

Although Proudhon did not discuss different classes


2
of juridicial rules as did Durkheim, Proudhon's under­
standing of law based on justice can be more closely compared
with Durkheim's category of retributive law than his cate-
3
gory of coercive law. In Qu'est-ce que la Propriete?
Proudhon delineated equality as an essential element of
justice and therefore of legal institutions. It was through

f # "la justice est l'astre contral qui gouverne les


societes, le pole sur lequel tourne le monde politique, le
principe et la regie de toutes les transactions.' Rien ne
se fait entre les hommes qu'en vertu du droit; rien sans
1'invocation de la justice. la justice n'est point 1'oeuvre
de la loi: au contraire, la loi n'est jamais qujune appli­
cation du juste, dans toutes les circonstances ou les hommes
peuvent se trouver en rapport d'interets. Si done 1'idee
que nous^faisons du juste et du droit etait mal determinee,
si elle etait incomplete ou meme fausse, il est evident que
toutes nos applications legislatives seraient mauvaises,
nos institutions vicieuses, notre politique erronee:
pourtant, qu'il y auraient desordre et mal social." Proudhon,
Propriete, p. 69.
2
Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society,
trans. George Simpson (New York: The free Press, 1966),
pp. 138-46.
3
Ibid., pp. 63-69.
the equalizing effects of the expression of justice through
law that property would "be restored to its rightful owners,
the workers, and taken out of the hands of exploiters, the
capitalists.^"
It was the gap between justice and law which concerned
Proudhon as commentator of the conditions of his day. As

early as his work Qu'est-ce que la Propriete? Proudhon


pointed out that justice could never he the product of
2
law, hut it was not until later in his writings that he
3
stated that the nature of justice was reciprocity, a
4
reciprocity which was dependent upon human dignity.

The rudiments of this idea of justice as heing


expressed hy the reciprocity of services were voiced in

Systfeme des Contradictions Economiques (1846), where Proud­


hon observed how values could he balanced according to the
individual's responsibility as producer:
In society justice is therefore nothing but
the proportionality of values; it has the responsibility
of the producer as its guarantee and s a n c t i o n . 5
Justice was now seen to be both a cause and an effect

of "the moral sense" of man, all of Proudhon's economic

1
Brogan, Proudhon, p. 31.
2 , ,
Proudhon, Propriete. loc. cit.
3
Cuvillier, Proudhon, p. 53.
4
Chabrier, Revolution, p. 22.
5 f
"Dans la societe la justice n'est done pas autre
chose que la proportionnalite des valeurs; elle a pour
guarantie et sanction la responsabilite du producteurs."
Proudhon, Contradictions Economiques, Tome I, p. 78.
148
and political solutions "being dependent upon human dignity.
Man affirmed his dignity, "the dignity of his nature,"

by repressing his dangerous and destructive egoism and by

"subordinating the interest of the individual or the

smallest number to the interest of the greatest number,


2
personal dignity to social dignity."
In De la Justice dans le Revolution et dans l'Eglise
(1858) Proudhon showed how this new form of justice was

first made possible by the French Revolution of 1789. It


was through this revolution that the Frenchman had had his
worth as a moral being restored, thus being capable of
respecting and being respected by others. As all men were

now seen as equals, justice made the reciprocity of respect


5
necessary, and also the reciprocity of services. Proudhon
also analysed the nature of the subordination of interests
4
of individuals or small groups as the basis of justice.
This type of subordination was the second, but more signifi'
cant, stage of human morality, the first being personal

dignity:

. . . .The first /personal dignity_/ being subordinated


to the second, /social dignity/ it would follow that

Chabrier, Revolution, pp. 22-25.


2 , ,
"la dignite de sa nature," ^'subordorujant l'interet
d'individu ou du,plus petit nombre a l'interet du plus
grand, la dignite personnelle a la dignite sociale."
Proudhon, De la Justice. Tome II, p. 438.
3
Chabrier, Revolution, p. 61.
4
Buprat, Proudhon, p. 75.
V

149
whilst individual dignity, limited by egoism, finds its
reason in itself and its happiness in the respect of
its prerogatives, its penalty in their violation:
justice comes to break up this order, and to put the
subject in torment by imposing on him with a character
of coercion which can go as far as exacting the sacri­
fice of his life, and allows no protest or neglect.
With the result that individual dignity does not main­
tain itself, and man has no happiness except that which
the society of which he is a part allows him.l

This work set out to examine not merely this coercive aspect
of justice, however, but also the question as to the nature
2
of man's agreement to be subordinated by the group.
Proudhon postulated that far from being merely transcendent

to man, justice was also, and above all, immanent to social


3
man, resulting from the interaction between men.
The social nature of justice was now emphasized
by Proudhon, "for it is obvious that without consent, there
4
can be no justice at all." Thus the problem of justice is

"la premiere etant subordonne^ a la seconde, il ^


s'ensuivrait que tandis que la dignite individuelle, limitee
par I'egoisme, trouve sa raison en soi et son bonheur dans
le respect de ses prerogatives, sa peine dans leur violation
la justice vient rompre cet ordre, et mettre le sujet au
supplice en s'imposant a lui avec un caract&re de coercition
qui peut aller jusqu'a exiger le sacrifice de la vie, et
ne souffre ni reclamation ni negligence. En sorte que la
dignite individuelle ne subsiste, et l'homme n'a de feiicitl
qu'autant que lui en laisse la societe dont il fait partie."
Proudhon, De la Justice, Tome I, p. 64.
2
Ibid., p. 65.
3
Cuvillier, Proudhon, p. 249.
4
"car il est evident que sans consentement, point de
justice." Ibid., p. 65.
J '

150
that of social cohesion and social control in the whole of
society:

The problem of justice is no other than the


problem of the whole society. Since man has united
himself with man for the common defence and search for*
subsistence, this terrible problem has been presented,
and the solution does not seem more advanced than the
first day.
The concept of justice, insofar as it is the subordination

of egoism to the collective interest, is not an artificial

coercive measure, but it arrises out of social relation­


ships :

. . .the idea of justice, in as much as it is subordina­


tion of egoism to the collective interest, is not at
all, as some have pretended, a prejudice of education,
a fiction of fanaticism or of authority. It is inherent
in the social condition and results from the very nature
of things.^

It is because of the ubiquity of justice that Proudhon


3
called it the "sine qua non of society." He argued that
it was because we did not yet know how to recognize and
institute the different forms of justice ourselves, however,

"le probleme de la justice n'est autre que le prob-


leme^de la societe tout entiere. Depuis que l'homme s'est
uni a l'homme pour la commune defense et la recherche des
subsistances, ce probleme terrible est pose, et la solution
ne semble pas plus avancee que la premier jour." Ibid., p. 66.
2
". . .la conception de la justice, en tant que
subordination de l'egoisme a 1 'interet,collectif, n^est,
nullement, comme quelques-uns l'ont pretendu, un prejuge
d 'education,#une fiction du fanatisme ou de 1'autorite.
Elle est^inherente a la condition sociale et resulte de la
nature meme des choses." Ibid.. loc. cit.

"la condition sine qua non de la societe." Ibid.,


p. 70.
that there was widespread violation of what he called the
1
"principle of justice."
Proudhon's principle of justice was not merely the
actual result of social interaction. It was also an ideal,

arising from the interaction and from the dignity of the

individuals interacting. It was hecause of the dual nature


of the reality of justice that justice played such a signif­

icant role in the life of individuals and of society as a


collectivity. Justice was in fact the mores of social
man:
It is necessary then that justice, which is the
generic term given to the mores of the subject as he
exists in society, is equally, in order to be something,
reality and idea; that it is a power of its soul, at
the same time as the relationship of subordination
which unites it to society: with the result that
justice, by which all is in the social whole, without
which nothing can exist, appears as the first and the
last word of human destiny, individual and collective,
the initial and final sanction of our happiness.
Proudhon went on to say that there were two ways in

which the mores which constituted justice could be per­


ceived. The first was the essence of the impact of the
group on the individual, and the second stemmed from the

~*~Ibid., loc. cit.


2
"II faut done que la justice, qui est le nom
generique donne aux moeurs du sujet consti^ue en societe,
soit egalement, pour etre quelque chose, realite et idee;
qu'elle soit une puissance de son ame, en meme tem^s que
le rapport de subordination qui I'unit a la societe: de
sorte que la justice, par qui tout est dans le tout social,
sans laquelle rien ne peut etre, apparaisse comme le premier
et le dernier mot de la destinee humaine, individuelle et
collective, la sanction initiale et finale de notre
beatitude." Ibid., p. 73.
152
mutuality of dignity between individuals in society. It
was the exteriority and superiority of the first form of

justice that had, in the past, led to this type of justice


to be identified with God. The second form of justice was
an internalization of values arising from social relationships
. . .there are two ways to understand the reality of
justice, and thus to determine it:
Either by a pressure of the collective being
on the individual, the first modifying the second in
its image and making out of it an organ:
Or by a faculty of the individual person who,
without leaving his conscience, would feel his dignity
in his neighbor with the same vivacity as he felt it in
himself, and would find himself thus, all in conserving
his individuality, identical and complete with the
collective being itself.
In the first case, justice is exterior and
superior to the individual, whether it resides in the
social collectivity, considered as a being in its own
right, of which the prime dignity is that of all its
members; of whether one puts it even higher, in a
transcendent and absolute being which animates or
inspires society, and which one calls God.
In the second case, justice is intimate to me,'
the same as dignity, equal to this same dignity multi­
plied, by the sum of relationships which make up social
life.1

". . .il y a deux manieres <Je concevoir la realite


de la justice, et par suite de la determiner: Ou bien par
une pression de l 1etre colleptif sur le moi individuel, le
premier modifiant le second a son image et s'en faisant un
organe: Ou bien par une faculte du moi individuel qui, sans
sortir de son for interieur, gentirait sa dignite en la
personne du prochain avec la meme vivacite qu'il la sent
dans sa propre personne, et^se trouverait ainsi, tout en
conservant son individualite, identique et adequat a l 1etre
collec^if meme. Dans le premier cas, la justice est
exterieure et superieure a l'individu, soit qu'elle reside
dans la collectivite sociale, consideree comme etre sui
generis, dont la dignite prime est celle de tous les membres
It was here that Proudhon identified these two
aspects of his more comprehensive understanding of the
concept of justice as transcendent and immanent justice:
. . . .The first. . .is the system of transcendence. .
. .All religions and quasi-religions have the goal of
inculcating it. . . .The other system, radically opposed
to the first, and for which the Revolution has had the
end of assuring its success, is that of immanence, or
of the innateness of justice in the conscience.1
Proudhon considered justice to he the form which

must he imposed on the contradictions of society if harmony


was to result from the social problems of his day. It was
justice which was to direct the dialectical process in
society towards constructive rather than destructive
2
social ends. Plowing from the collective reason of society,

social justice would harness social forces which would

otherwise oppress individual liberty as well as collective


3
liberty, especially the liberty of groups. It was justice

qui la composent; soit qu'on la place plus haut encore,


dans 1'ltre transcendant et absolu qui anime ou inspire la
soci^tl, et qu'on nomme Dieu. Dans le second cas, la
justice est intime au moi, homogene a sa dignite multipliee
par la somme des rapports que suppose la vie sociale."
Ibid., pp. 75-76.
1
"le premier. . .est le systeme de transcendance. .
. .Toutes les religions et quasi-religions ont pour objet
de I'inculquer. . . .L'autre systeme, radicalement oppose
au premier, et dont la Revolution a eu pour but d'assurer
le triomphe, est celui de 1'immanence, ou de 1'inneite de
la justice dans la conscience." Ibid., pp. 76 and 84.
2
De lubac, Un-Marxian Socialist, p. 159.
3
Gurvitch, Fondateurs Prancais, Yol. I, p. 3.
V

154
which, made it possible for societies to use force for the
social good.’*’
Proudhon's concept of justice, which was simultane-
2
ously objective and subjective, was Proudhon's "guiding
principle" for both society and for the individual member
3
of society. Justice was of central importance in society
for Proudhon, as it was through justice that the problem of

social order could be regulated and eventually resolved.


In General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century
Proudhon showed how although in the beginning justice and
authority were synonymous terms of social organization, in
its later stages justice became a quality of individual
and social conscience. While in the beginning justice was
a governing factor of distribution, it later became
"commutative," the norms arising out of social interaction:
The form under which men first conceived of
order in society is the patriarchal or hierarchical;
that is to say, in principle, Authority; in action,
Government, Justice, which afterwards was divided into
distributative and commutative justice, appeared at
first under the former heading only: a superior grant­
ing to inferiors what is coming to each one. The
governmental idea sprang from family customs and domestic
experience: no protest arose then: Government seemed
as natural to society as the subordination of children
to their father.4

1
Ibid., Yol. II, p. 73.
2
Ibid., Vol. I, p. 3.
3
Jackson, Marx. Proudhon, p. 111.
4
Proudhon, General Idea, p. 106.
Justice - Authority, incompatible terms, which
nevertheless the ordinary man persists in regarding as
synonymous. Justice, like order, began with force.
At first it was the law of the prince, not of the con­
science. Obeyed through fear rather than through love,
it is enforced, rather than explained: like the
government, it is the more or less intelligent use of
arbitrary power.1

In its later development, however, the form of justice


changed and was internalized:

Justice is an act of conscience, essentially


voluntary, as the conscience cannot be judged, condemned,
or acquitted but by itself: all else is war, the 2
rule of authority, and barbarism, the abuse of force.

In this respect justice becomes our finest human quality:

. . . .Justice is in us as love, as the notions of the


beautiful, of the useful, of the true, as all of our
powers and faculties.^
. . . .Justice is human, all human, nothing but
human. . . A

In sum Proudhon's diverse discussions of the concept

of justice cut across several related problems of societal

organization and human development: social constraint,


economic equality, law, reciprocity of services, individual
and social dignity, and social contract. Justice, for

Proudhon, was both external and internal to the individual,

1
Ibid., p. 255.
2
Ibid.. p. 257.
3
". . . .La justice est en nous comme I 1amour, comme
les notions du beau,#de l'utile, du vrai, comme toutes nos
puissances et facultes," Proudhon, De la Justice. Tome I,
p. 84.
4
". . . .La justice est humaine, tout humaine, rien
qu'humaine. . . .," Ibid., p. 85.
156
objective and subjective, an actuality which, was coming
into being, and an ideal to be achieved through the conscious
and unconscious direction and organization of society on a

scientific economic base.

Justice as a Basis of Secular Norms


Proudhon's concept of justice appeared in most parts
of his work, especially in relation to his ideas on religion
1
and social reform. It was especially when justice was
manifested in the organization of the economy that it would
be readily available to be internalized by individual members
2
of society. It was through social contract, itself brought
forward by economic transaction, that commutative justice
5
would manifest itself. It was through commutative justice,
or secular norms arising out of interaction and social

relationships of economic transactions, that law in the


form of feudal, governmental or military government would

be finally abolished:
The social contract is an agreement of man with
man; an agreement from which must result what we call
society. In this, the notion of commutative justice,
first brought forward by the primitive fact of exchange,
and defined by the Roman law, is substituted for that
of distributive justice, dismissed without appeal by
republican criticism. Translate these words, contract,
commutative justice, which are the language of the law,
into the language of business, and you have commerce,
that is to say, in its highest significance, the act by

Gurvitch, Fondateurs Francais, Vol. II, pp. 1 and 59.


Cuvillier, Proudhon, p. 249.
Proudhon, General Idea, p. 110.
157
which, man and man declare themselves essentially pro­
ducers, and abdicate all pretension to govern each
other.

Commutative justice, the reign of contract, the


industrial or economic system, such are the different
synonyms for the idea which by its accession must do
away with the old systems of distributive justice, the
reign of law, or in more concrete terms, feudal, govern­
mental or military rule. The future hope of humanity
lies in this substitution.
It has been argued that in contrast to Marx, who

postulated an economic utopia, Proudhon postulated a moral


2
utopia through his emphasis on justice. Proudhon aimed to
3
build a complete moral code, a whole philosophy. it was

against the idea of charity, as well as against the closely


related ideas of fraternity and community that Proudhon
4
set up his idea of justice as reciprocity. Proudhon formu­
lated a religion which was fixed not upon humanity, but upon
justice.^

It was in De la Justice dans la Revolution et dans


l'Eglise that Proudhon was most explicit and insistent about
the importance of the role of justice in society. His ideas
on justice as a basis of secular norms in society were
compared with religious norms in the social organization of

1
Ibid., p. 112.

Edouard Berth, Du "Capital" aux "Reflexions sur la


Violence" (Paris: M. RlvI?reT_T552Tr^P^_T5TI
3
De lubac, Un-Marxian Socialist, p. 229.
4Ibid., p. 197.
5Ibid., p. 276.
158
society. Proudhon thought that religious and secular norms

were mutually exclusive, and that only secular norms based


on the principle of justice would bring about social
progress in society. The inner conflict of religious and
secular norms was a reflection of the conflict of these
irreconcilable types of norms in the wider social collectivity:

Revolution and the Church, each one representing


an element of the conscience, have they reached a
reconciliation?
Or must one be subordinated to the other?

Or would it not be, finally, that one must


eclipse the other? That which follows from asking if
Religion and Justice, from the point of view of society,
are not by their nature incompatible, is that the first
must be enclosed in the limits of the conscience, more
or less in the family circle, whilst the second encom­
passes all.1
In spite of the incompatibility of religion and

justice, religion served as an early form of the exterior,


constraining form of justice, and was the basis of social
cohesion and authority from which the more developed justice
of reciprocity would arise:
(Religion) exists, it is given, not as was stated by
former non-believers with the intention and premeditated
wish to serve the human race, although it had this

f f "La Revolution et l'Eglise, represqntant chacune un


element de la conscience, sont-elles appelees a une con­
ciliation? Ou bien 1'une doit-elle etre subordonn^e h
1 'autre? Ou bien enfin ne serait-ce point que celle-ci ou
celle-lli s'eclipser? Ce qui revient a demander si#la
Religion et la Justice, au point de vue de la societe, ne
sont pas de leur nature incompatibles, la premiere devant
se renfermer dans les limites de la conscience, tout au
plus dans le cercle de la famille, tandis que la seconde
embrasse tout." Proudhon, De la Justice. Tome I, p. 30.
159
result, but to give a reason, an authority and a base
to justice, without which society cannot subsist.
Even though justice was related to religion in some

ways, the development and spread of justice in society would


come about through economic transactions and economic
reorganization: . .by work, much more than through
2
piety, Justice will advance."

The theory of human Justice, in which the


reciprocity of respect is converted into reciprocity
of service, has consequently approached equality in
all things more and more. . . .The application of
Justice to the economy is therefore the most important
of the sciences.*
Thus within the context of Proudhon's ideas on the

application of justice in society as a principle of social


organization, social justice is above all an economic
relationship of equality and reciprocity between two or
4
more participants in a social contract. To religion,
theory of an inegalitarian an alienated society, Proudhon

1 *
". . .existe, elle est donnee, non pas, comme le
disaient les anciens incredules, dans l'intention et avec
la volonte premeditee d'asservir I'espece humaine, bien
qu'elle ait^eu ce resultat, mais pour fournir une raison,
■une autorite et une base a la justice, sans laquelle la
society ne peut subsister." Ibid., p. 81.
2 , ,
". . .par le travail, bien plus que par la piete,
marche la Justice." Ibid., p. 141.
3
, "1^ theorie de la Justice humaine, dans laquelle la
reciprocite de respect se convertit en reciprocity de

Justice
plus importaiite
Ibid., p. 281.
4
Ansart, Sociologie de Proudhon, p. 179.
\J »

160
suggested the substitution of justice, theory of an egali-
1
tarian and anarchistic society. Through the French

Revolution man had taken the achievement of justice into


his own hands. Instead of relying on authority and revela­
tion man would now he guided by justice manifested through
2
social and political economics.
It has been suggested that the whole of Proudhon's
thought is explained by his passion for justice much more
than by any pity he felt when confronted with the suffering
of his fellows. It was not so much that love for humanity
stirred him, but rather that the service of what was right
3
claimed him. It was because Proudhon continuously inter­

mingled his ideas on what he thought to be right with


those on what he thought to be scientific reality, that his
work has been much-criticized and his concept of justice
4
difficult to delimit. Having suggested that economic
science was an application of justice in society, Proudhon
continued to postulate that morality would arise from
5
economic organization in society.

1
Ibid., p. 178.
2
Jackson, Marx, Proudhon. p. 111.
3
De lubac, Un-Marxian Socialist, p. 61.
4
G-urvitch, Fondateurs Prancais. Yol. II, p. 28.
5
Proudhon, Philosophie du Progres, p. 82.
V "
a
161
For Proudhon the apparent necessity of the state v/as
due only to economic inequality, because of the absence of
justice. When all men had bound themselves to mutual
justice, the need for the coercive apparatus of the state
1
■would vanish. In order to maintain the status quo of
inequality and privilege in society the government used both
charity and fraternity as principles of activity:
Charity is the strongest chain by which privilege
and the Government, bound to protect them, holds down
the lower class. With charity, sweeter to the heart of
man, more intelligible to the poor man than the abstruse
laws of political economy, one may dispense with
justice. . . .The Government,2like the Church, places
fraternity far above justice.

The government has presented itself falsely as "the natural

organ of justice, the protector of the weak, the preserver


3
of the peace," but it was justice, as expressed through
4
social contract, that would eventually replace government.

Justice in Relation to Revolution and Equilibrium


Although Proudhon did not think that revolution was

a necessary condition of the working out of the principle


of justice, he thought that until man could construct

society on the basis of a scientifically organized economy


revolutions would continue to occur and would be the only

1
Brogan, Proudhon, p. 62.
2
Proudhon, General Idea, p. 69.
3
Ibid., p. 107.
4
Ibid., pp. 113-14.
V ''

162
manifestations of justice in society. Revolutions were in
fact due to the suppression of the free working of justice
1
in society.
For Proudhon it was the French Revolution of 1789
that marked the beginning of the "reign" of justice in
2
society. The revolutions of 1830 and 1848 were bred by

the instability of all institutions which did not yet take


3
as their base the idea of justice. Justice was considered
to be forcibly manifested through revolution, and in this

way revolution could bring about social progress:


Revolution affirms Justice. . .it believes in
Humanity: it is because of that that it is unconquer­
able and always advances.
It was because Proudhon saw that revolution could

both be caused by justice and bring about justice itself,


that Proudhon thought revolution was justified, even though
he himself did not advocate justice as a means to be engin­
eered for the purpose of social change: "A revolution is
an act of sovereign justice, in the order of moral facts,
springing out of the necessity of things, and in consequence

Proudhon, Idee Generale. p. 17.


2
Brogan, Proudhon, pp. 18-19.
3
f This is a subsidiary theme of De la Justice dans la
Revolution et dans l ’Eglise.
^"Ia Revolution affirme la Justice. . .elle croit a
l'Humanite: c ’est pour cela qu'elle est invincible, et
qu-elle avance toujours.11 Proudhon, De la Justice. Tome I,
p. 26.
V''
;>0

163
1
carrying with it its own justification." There could only
he social progress through revolution if justice was subse­

quently manifested - not all revolutions sustained justice


2
in their wake.
If revolution was to he the means wherehy justice

was first manifested in society, dynamic equilibrium and

its attendant equalizing effects throughout society were


the results. Commutative justice, imposing on each conten­

der the duty to give goods to all others that were just as
valuable as those he received from them, obliged equal
3
exchange. Objective social justice was the expression of
4
such social forces which had been equilibrated.

For Proudhon all association, especially economic


association, had to be a productive force which consequently
assured equilibrium. All other association would be oppres-
5
sive and hinder the expression of justice. There could
only be true reciprocity in social relations through
6
justice. its application, especially in the sphere of

economics, justice resembled an equalizing force which

1
Proudhon, general Idea, p. 40.
2
De Lubac, Un-Marxian Socialist, p. 169.
3
Ritter, Political Thought, p. 134*
4
gurvitch, Fondateurs Francais. Vol. II, p. 28.
5
Proudhon, general Idea, p. 95.
6
Proudhon, De la Justice, Tome II, p. 119.
V"
r*

164
would prevent contradiction and poverty:
Actually, justice, applied to the economy, is nothing
hut a perpetual balance; or, in order to express my­
self more precisely, justice, insofar as it is concerned
with the distribution of assets, is nothing but the
obligation imposed on all citizens and in every state,
in their relationships of interest, to conform to the
law of equilibrium which manifests everywhere in the
economy, the violation of which, accidental or voluntary,
is the principle of poverty. . . .It is this obligation
of equilibrium that I name Justice or reciprocity in
the economy.

It was only a justice of equality that was conceiv­


able to Proudhon, an equality that would bring about a
2
dynamic equilibrium of the social forces of society. He
compared the reciprocity of the elements of equilibrium
contained in his notion of justice with an equation, which
3
signified a balancing out of the social forces of society.
The "equation" of justice was regarded by Proudhon as being
4
a -universal phenomenon of all sciences and philosophy.

"La justice, en effet, appliquee a l'economie, n'est


autre chose qu'une balance perpetuelle; ou, pour m'exprimer
d'une maniere^encore plus exacte, la justice, en ce qui
concerne la repartition des biens, n'est autre^chose que
1'obligation imposee a^tout citoyen et a tout etat, dans
leurs rapports d'interet, de se conformer a la loi d'equilibre
qui se manifeste partout dans l'economie, et dont la viola­
tion, accidentelle ou volontaire, est le ^rincipe de la
misere. . . .C'est cette obligation de l^equilibre que
j'appelle Justice ou reciprocite dans l'economie," Proudhon,
De la Justice. Tome I, p. 303.
2
Chabrier, Revolution, p. 28.
3
Cuvillier, Proudhon, pp. 53 and 253.
4
Proudhon, Corresuondance. Tome XI, p. 286.
165

It has been argued that Proudhon never put forward


his ideas on equilibrium in his work except in a confused

way. Having postulated that justice can be seen as an


equilibrium achieved, justice was shown to be the essential
1
principle of that equilibrium. There is no doubt that
Proudhon's ideas on this subject are ambiguous and overlap
each other, but an understanding of the very complexity of
the relationship between the concepts of justice, revolution
and equilibrium gives way to a deeper understanding of the
concept of justice itself.

1
De lubac, Un-Marxian Socialist, p. 159.
CHAPTER VIII

PROUDHON ON SOCIAL STRATIFICATION: EQUALITY AND


THE FUSION OF CLASSES

Proudhon's criteria for distinguishing the various


social strata arise from his general concept of society as
being based on the economic system. It is the specific
economic criterion of property ownership, as it existed at
the time Proudhon wrote, that formed the basis of class
affiliation in his discussions on social stratification.

In his focus on the significance of the economic and


religious institutions in society, Proudhon singled out
what he considered to be the determinants of the class

structure and the forms and functions of the inequalities


in the society of the time at which he wrote. In predicting

or anticipating the disappearance of the middle class, he


pointed out some of the consequences of this system of
social stratification.

Proudhon saw the social class system of his day as


being a necessary historical stage of the evolution of
French society. He thought that eventually no stratification
system would exist, except as necessitated by the division

of labor. He handed his readers a "state of equality,"


however, rather than presenting specific principles or a

166
program whereby the French society of his day might achieve
this condition.
All economic, political and social inequalities were
contradictions in Proudhon's opinion. The anomaly between
the condition of the poor and the condition of the wealthy,
or property owners, was considered by him to be the greatest
contradiction of the society of his day."*" His solution to
this contradiction lay in the reorganization of the economy,

most especially of the institution of private property,

with the direction of the science of economics and justice.

Unless this reorganization could come about gradually and

peacefully, violent revolution would ensue. It was only


through such means as hearing and acting upon the complaints
of the working class, the underprivileged, that revolution
could be avoided.
Although Proudhon did not advocate revolution as an
instrument of social reform or a vehicle of social change,
he saw that the process of revolution could serve a con­
structive function in social reorganization. It was through
revolution that means and opportunities had been equalized
in the past, and that hierarchical systems of social strati­
fication had become more closely approximated to a single

equilibrated class.

A discussion of this contradiction is the central


theme of Proudhon's Systeme des Contradictions Economiques.
168
Factors Maintaining Existing Inequalities: Determinants
of Stratification
Proudhon attributed the gross economic, political

and social contradictions of his day to the lack of scien­


tific organization of the economy and to irrational adherence
to religious values. He thought that in the absence of

scientific direction of the economy and the emergence and

free operation of justice, the existing inequalities would


be self-generating and would perpetuate themselves incessantly.
In Systeme des Contradictions Econominues Proudhon

placed his ideas about economic inequalities as determinants


of social stratification in an historical perspective. By
so doing he posed the question of the universality of
systems of stratification and the consequent universality
of specific determinants of social inequalities. He pointed
out that poverty had been experienced in all times and was

intrinsic to all primitive forms of society: "In the


primitive community, poverty is the universal condition."'*’
Through the ages poverty had continued to be a by-product
of economic, political and social organization: "Pauperism
is today, of all the accidents of the civilized world, the
2
best known."

"Pans la communaute primitive, la misere est la


condition universelle." Proudhon, Contradictions Economiques.
Tome I, p. 129.
2
"le pauperisme est aujourd'hui, de tous les accidents
du monde civilise, le mieux connu." Ibid.. p. 128.
J I . H

169
In this same work Proudhon emphasized that it was

the specific lack of social helief in the principle of


economic equality and its consequent lack of application
that was at the base of all social problems in any society:
Therefore equality, its principle, its means, its
obstacles, its theory, the reasons for its postponement,
the cause of social and providential iniquities: that
is what we mustiteach the world, in spite of the sarcasms
of incredulity.
For Proudhon, as for Marx, the bases of class affili­

ation were economic, political differences being super­


imposed on these. Both Proudhon and Marx stated that

irreconcilable interests in a capitalist economy determined


the social inequalities of their day. In discussing the

plight of the working classes Proudhon postulated that it


was over-specialization in the capitalist economy that had
created conditions of alienation in this segment of society:

The greater the division of labor and the power


of machines, the less the intelligence and skill of
hand of the worker. But the more the value of the
worker falls and the demand for labor diminishes, the
lower are wages and the greater is poverty.
To Proudhon it was competition that had promoted

class privileges in the capitalistic society of his day.


Competition, in his opinion, had therefore not democratized

"I'egalite done, son principe, ses moyens, ses


obstacles, sa theorie, les motifs de son ajournement, la
cause des iniquites sociales et providentielles: voila ce
qu'il faut apprendre au monde, en depit des sarcasmes de
1 1incredulite." Ibid., p. 26.
2
Proudhon, General Idea, p. 49.
industry, but had rather built up a mercantile aristocracy.
Competition, lacking legal forms and superior
regulating intelligence, has been perverted in turn,
like the division of labor. In it, as in the latter,
there is perversion of principle, chaos, and a tendency
toward evil. Thus that competition, which, as thought
in '89 would be a general right, is today a matter of
exceptional privilege: only they whose capital permits
them to become heads of business concerns may exercise
their competitive rights.
Competition. . .instead of democratizing industry,
aiding the workman, guaranteeing the honesty of trade,
has ended in building up a mercantile and land aristocracy,
a thousand times-imore rapacious than the old aristocracy
of the nobility.
Proudhon's critical evaluation of the role of relig­

ious institutions as being a crucial factor in maintaining

the social inequalities inherent in the authoritarian,


hierarchical structure of the society of his day can be
traced back to his own early life in the rural suburb of
Halevy where he was born. Here the Roman Catholic Church
of the community was the center of social activity, and it
was participation in its affairs that was the most important
2
criterion of class membership in that particular community.

Proudhon was acutely aware of social action considered

to be "charity," and in his writings interpreted the charity


given to underprivileged segments of society by institu­
tions of both the Church and the government as an inhibiting
condition of social progress. Thus, in Proudhon's opinion

~*~Ibid.. pp. 50-51.


2
Brogan, Proudhon, pp. 11 and 13.
171
charitable acts contributed only to the maintenance of the
status quo of the authoritarian hierarchical class structure
of the society of his day. It was through charity that the

interests of the different social classes had maintained


their separation, and with such charity no justice could

emerge:
Charity is the strongest chain by which privilege
and the Government, bound to protect them, holds down
the lower classes. With charity, sweeter to the heart
than the abstruse laws of political economy, one may
dispense with justice. . . .The Government, like the
Church, places fraternity far above justice.■L
Proudhon criticized the government for maintaining

the conditions of the division of the population into the


rich and the poor. He saw the role of the government
primarily in terms of maintaining this form of the status

quo:
. . . .What is the function of Government? To protect
and defend each one in his person, his industry, his
property. But if by the necessity of things, property,
riches, comfort, all go on one side, poverty on the
other, it is clear that Government is2made for the
defence of the rich against the poor.

Forms and Functions of Inequality: Nature of the Class

System
In contrast to contemporary American sociological
theorists who emphasize social mobility rather than social

^Proudhon, General Idea, pp. 69-70.


2
Ibid., p. 62.
172
1
structure in their work on social stratification, Proudhon

largely ignored the issue of social mobility in his social

thought and concentrated more on the social structural


aspects of social stratification.

Proudhon saw society in its earliest forms and con­


tinuing to the present as being divided into two dissimilar

elements or parts, the traditional or hierarchical and the


anarchical or refractory. It was only through science that
these diverse elements would be synthesized and the condi­
tion of equality for all be brought into being:
Thus society finds itself, from its origin,
divided into two large parts: one, traditional, essen­
tially hierarchical, and which, according to the object
which it considers, calls itself a turn at a time royalty
or democracy, philosophy or religion, in a word,
property; - the other which, arising at each crisis of
civilization, calls itself above all anarchical and
atheistic, that is to say insubordinate to all divine
and human authority: this is socialism. Well, modern
criticism has shown that in a conflict of this kind,
the truth is to be found, not in the exclusion of one
of the contradictory elements, but well and only in the
reconciliation of both of them; that is, I say, by the
right of science that all antagonism, either in nature
or in ideas, resolves itself in a more general fact, or
in a complex formula, which puts the opposing elements
in agreement in absorbing them, so to speak, one and
the other.

1
For example as in the work of Seymour Martin Lipset,
Neil J. Smelser, Joseph A. Zahl, Melvin M. Tumin and
Bernard Barber.

, 2,,Ainsi la societe se trouve, des son origine,


divisee en deux grands partis: l'un, traditionnel, essen-
tiellement hierarchique, et qui, selon I'objet qu'il
considere, s'appelle tour a tour royaute ou democratie,
philosophie ou religion, en un mot, propriete; - 1'autre qui,
ressucitant a chaque crise de la civilization,^se proclame
avant tout an^rchique et athee, c'est a dire refractaire a
toute autorite divine et humaine: c'est le socialisme. Or,
173
In De la Canacite Politique des Classes Ouvrieres
Proudhon examined further this issue of whether the division

of society into two classes of workers and property owners


was peculiar to the society of his own day, or whether it
was inevitable bwcause of the very nature of society.
Anticipating what he thought to be the disappearance of the
middle classes existing on the borders of the lower upper
classes and the upper lower classes, Proudhon suggested
combining the two major and more distinct social classes
into one equilibrated class with its own level of conscious­
ness. This operation would be achieved by applying the

rules of economic science and justice to existing social

conditions:
The division of modern society into two classes,
one of salaried workers, the other of property owners-
capitalist-contractors, being so apparent, one conse­
quence must follow. . .: that is one must ask oneself
if this distinction was the effect of chance or of
necessity; if it was in the true gifts of the revolu­
tion; if it could be legitimized in law, as it appeared
in fact; in a word if, by a better application of the
rules of justice and of economics, one could not bring
to an end this dangerous division, in bringing the two

la critique ijode^ne a demontre que dans un conflit de cette


espece, la verite se trouve, non dans 1'exclusion de l'un
des contraires, mais bien et seulemenj dans la conciliation
de tous deux; il est, dis-je, acquis a la science que tout
antagonisme, soit dans la nature, soit complexe, qui met
les opposants d'accord en les absorbant, pour ainsi dire,
l'un et 1 'autre." Proudhon, Contradictions Economiques.
Tomel, p. 42.
174
classes together into one only, to a perfect level and
equilibrium.1
A1though we will return to Proudhon's views on the

functions of the different social classes in our subsequent •


discussions of the relationship between stratification and
social change, a final point concerning the functions of
inequality needs to be made here. For Proudhon all inequali­
ties and contradictions served a function only insofar as

they were a necessary stage of evolution through which

society must progress. A hierarchy of functions existed in


the society of Proudhon's day only because that society was
not enlightened to the point that science and equality could

prevail as directing forces in social organization. Ideally,


however, society must not be considered as a mere hierarchy

of functions. For Proudhon society should be a system in


which free forces were in equilibrium, this equilibrium
being based on the enjoyment of equal rights in exchange for
the discharge of equal obligations, and the enjoyment of

equal advantages in exchange for the performance of equal

"La division de la sgciete moderne en deux classes,


l'une de travailleurs salaries, 1 'autre de propreitaires-
capitalistes-entrepreneurs, etant done flagrante, une
consequence devait s'ensuivre. . .: c'est que 1'on s'est
demande si cette distinction etait dans les vraies donn^es
de la revolution; se elle se pouvait legitimer en droit,
comme elle se constatait en fait; en un mot si, par une
me^lleure application des regies de la justice et de
l'economie, on ne pouvait pas faire cesser cette diyision
dangereuse, en ramenant les deux classes nouvelles a une
seule, parfaitement de niveau et en equilibre." Pierre
Joseph Proudhon, De la Capaoite Politique des Classes
Ouvrieres (Paris: Librairie Internationale, 1&68), p. 46.
175
1
services. Proudhon placed his trust in the federal contract
and mutualist institutions to bring about the economic and
therefore the social reorganization of the inegalitarian
hierarchical system of social stratification existing in
society at the time he wrote. Unlike the classical social

contract, however, Proudhon's federal contract was to involve


only limited renunciation of individual liberty, and it was
only through mutualist institutions freely created in accord­

ance with reason and experience that Proudhon believed

order could be created in the chaotic tangle of existing


2
economic relationships.

Relationship Between Glasses


Through an examination of material relating to
Proudhon's own lifetime we can suggest certain influences
which contributed to the ambivalence of Proudhon's feelings
towards the working classes. Proudhon was himself a member
of the working class throughout his lifetime and has been
criticized for never being able to stand back from these

class origins and make his observations of society with any

The view of the contemporary sociologist Wilbert E.


Moore re-echoes Proudhon's view: equality can only be
attained where there is no differential of prestige. See
Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore, "Some Principles of
Stratification," American Sociological Review. X (1945),
242-49.
2
Marcel Prelot, "Pierre Joseph Proudhon," Inter­
national Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, David D.
Sills, editor (Vol. 12 of 17 vols.; New York: Macmillan
and Eree Press, 1968), pp. 604-607.
degree of objectivity. Even though. Proudhon grew up in
the shadow of two great events, the French and the indus­

trial revolutions, Proudhon is considered to have voiced


his views for the memories and loyalties of his youth rather
than for any general principle' of class interest of his

day, his parentage thus continuing to exert the greatest


2
influence on him.

Even in his youth Proudhon had been irritated by the


claims of an intellectual elite to lead the workers for
their own good. From his adolescence he held the view that

the salvation of the workers must come from within their


group, and that any leadership from the outside, no matter

what its claims to superior knowledge might b e , was merely


3
another form of tyranny. Assuming this role of leadership
of the working classes himself, in the preface of his first
major work he expressed his intention ". . .to direct his

studies towards the means to ammeliorate the physical,


moral and intellectual condition of the most numerous and
4
poorest class."

1
Both Brogan and Amoudruz emphasize this point through­
out their studies of Proudhon and his thought.
2
Brogan, Proudhon, pp. 9-10.
3
Brogan, Proudhon, p. 14.
4
". . .de diriger mes etudes vers les moyens d'amel-
iorer la condition physique, morale et intellectuelle de
la classe la plus nombreuse et la plus pauvre," Proudhon,
Propriete. p. 39.
177
In General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth
Century Proudhon specifically addressed the middle class

as the "saviors" of the working class and the conditions of


poverty and social disorganization within the French society
of his day. Again repeating his theme of the fusion of the
social classes he asked the business men to he reconciled
with the working class and to "discover" through the Revolu-
1
tion their dream, the Democratic and Social Republic.
Proudhon gave his readers only infrequent references
to the aristocracy and the relationship between this and
the other social classes he names is unclear. In his later
works Proudhon showed how the working class would play the
role of ultimate leadership and management of society,
the middle class being absorbed into this class. On many

occasions, however, Proudhon showed himself to have more


2
sympathy with the middle class than with the working class.

■^Proudhon, General Idea, pp. 5-9.


2 s
Proudhon had already stated in Svsteme des Contradic­
tions Economiques that in his view the greatest obstacle
the objective of equality had to overcome lay not in the
aristocratic pride of the rich man, but in the intractable
egoism of the poor. (Vol. I, pp. 356-59). For a fuller
discussion of Proudhon's attitude to the working class and
to the middle class in different parts of his work see
De lubac's discussion in TJn-Marxian Socialist, p. 62, in
which De lubac concludes that although Proudhon acted as
spokesman of the working class throughout his works,
Proudhon never "unduly praised the virtues of the working
people." Even in Capacite Politique. De lubac points out,
Proudhon showed the working class to be "stupid" and angry.
178
Proudhon dedicated General Idea of the Revolution in the
Nineteenth Century to his admired "bourgeois" or "business
men:"

To you, business men, I dedicate these new


essays. You have always been the boldest, the most
skillful revolutionaries. Business men of Prance, the
initiative in the progress of humanity is yours. The
untutored workingman accepts you as his masters and
models. Is it possible that, after having accomplished
so many revolutions, you have yourselves become counter­
revolutionaries, against reason, against your own inter­
est, against honor?. . . .Because the people, through
inexperience, did not know how to continue the revolu­
tion which you had begun, you seemed to oppose this new
revolution. . . .The people thought to avenge themselves
by voting for the autocracy of a hero as a curb to your
insolence. . . .Glory, the most foolish of divinities
and the most murderous, took the place of liberty. . . .
You became accomplicesiof reaction; you ought to be
ashamed of yourselves.

It was against the upper classes that Proudhon


stated his case. He was particularly critical towards
those who held political power in the hierarchically struc­

tured society of his day. By pointing out the schism between


the middle classes and the working classes as it existed
when he wrote, Proudhon aimed to direct the middle class to
the viewpoint that their interests were not dissimilar from
those of the working class and that the two classes should

be united in a quest for liberty. Proudhon suggested that


the middle class business men should accept their role of

"revolutionaries" by uniting with the working classes,


and then that together they should act to "save the people"

Proudhon, General Idea, pp. 5-7.


179
through, revolution itself:

And now, corrupt political schemers of every


stripe. . .have covered you with ignomy, exceeding the
wretchedness which half a century of failures has left
to the workers. . .they look upon you as revolutionaries.
Gentlemen, accept this name as the title of your
glory and the pledge of your reconciliation with the
workingmen. Reconciliation is revolution, I assure
you. The enemy has established himself in your domain,
let his insults he your rallying cry.1
In continuing his plea for action on the part of the

business men, Proudhon pointed out that they must act now
as there could be no time for discussion in what was to him
the actuality of revolution:
. . .the Revolution is rushing upon you with a speed
of a million leagues a second. It is not a question
for discussion: it requires preparation to receive it,
and above all, to understand it.2
In discussing the effects of a class revolution in
the body of General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth
Century. Proudhon pointed out that if the specific grievances
of the lower classes were attended to, revolutionary changes

could be brought about without violence, although such an


ideal stiuation would be rarely achieved in his opinion.
Proudhon thought that in most cases conflict between the

classes was inevitable because of the existence of estab­

lished interests in society, and because of the pride of

the government:

1
Ibid., p. 8.
2
Ibid., p. 9.
180

. . .riches and power, together with tradition, being


on the one side, poverty, disorganization and the
unknown on the other, the satisfied party being unwil­
ling to make any concession, the dissatisfied being
unable to submit logger, the conflict, little by little,
becomes inevitable.
In a posthumously published work, Du Principe

Federatif. Proudhon once more saw the middle class as being


made up of the leaders of society. He put forward the view
that it was the middle class that would be able to remake
the constitution of France:

I have found the middle class or bourgeoisie


faithful to its traditions, to its tendencies, to its
maxims, although advancing at an accelerated pace towards
the proletariat. That the middle class might become
once more the master of itself and of the Power; that
it should be called to remake for itself a Constitution
regarding its ideas and politics regarding its heart, 2
and one is able to predict for sure what would happen. . .

Stratification and Social Change: Equality and the Fusion


of Classes

One of the central themes in Proudhon's work is

that of equality. This theme is expressed in his views on


justice, property, the economy, and anarchy and it reappears
constantly in his work. Although in his early work Proudhon
thought that the most significant way in which this equality

1
Ibid., pp. 16-17.
2
"J'ai trouve la classe moyenne ou bourgeoisie fidlle
a ses traditions, a ses ^tendances, a ses Bjaximes, bien que
s'avancant d'un pas accelere vers le proletariat. Que la
classe moyenne redevienne maltresse d'elle-meme et du Pouvoir;
qu'elle soit appelee a se refaire une Constitution selon
se§ idee^ et uneApolitique selon son coeur, et l 1on peut
predire a coup sur ce qui arrivera. . ." Proudhon, Principe
Federatif. p. vii.
181
could be brought about would be through the replacement of
a system of individual private property by a system of
1
social possession in an anarchical political system, in
his later work he showed that he thought equality between
men could only be possible through the free working of
justice. It was through justice, the foundation of science
and the basis of secular norms in society, that a scientific
economic organization and an effective legal organization
would bring about a social structure based on equality
between men, replacing the authoritarian hierarchy which
2
existed at the time when Proudhon wrote.
Proudhon continued to emphasize the fact that he did

not intend to present a specific system of reform to his

readers, as far as the equalization of class privileges


was concerned. To him the most desirable class system was

no class system: Proudhon equated equality with the most

desirable system of social stratification. It was through


the workings of justice that existing unfair privileges
would be abolished and equal rights established:
. . .1 am not making a system: I ask for the end of
privilege, the abolition of slavery, the equality of
rights, the reign of law. Justice, nothing but justice;

G-urvitch, Pondateurs Praneais. Vol. I, p. 9.


2
This theme is most clearly expressed in Proudhon,
De la Justice, Tome I.
182
such is the resume of my treatise-: I leave the care of
disciplining the world to others.
To Proudhon liberty was "a condition sine qua non

of existence," and he stated the view that without equality


there could not be society. Until the principle of justice
was both known to men and allowed by them to function

freely in all types of their organization, with its attendant


conditions of equality for all men, there could only by
2
tyranny and not true society for the whole collectivity.

It was through the scientific organization of commerce


that equal conditions for all men in society would be
accomplished. When occupations and the labor force itself

had been reorganized according to economic science, the


institution of private property, with all the inadequacies
that existed at the time when Proudhon wrote, would be

abolished:
Wot only does occupation lead towards equality;
it hinders the institution of private p r o p e r t y . 3
The system which bases property on labor implies,
as well as that which bases it on occupation, equality
of wealth. . A

. .je ne fais pas de systeme: ,je demande la fin


du privilege, 1'abolition d'esclavage, I'egalite des droits,
la regne de la loi. Justice, rien^que justice; tel est le
resume de mon discours; je laisse a d'autres le soin de
discipliner le monde.1' Proudhon, Propriete. p. 59.
2Ibid., p. 93.
3
HJon seulement^Inoccupation conduit a I'egalite;
elle empeche la propriete." Ibid., p. 120.
4
"le systeme qui fonde la propriete sur le travail
im^liquej aussi bien que celui qui la fonde sur I 1occupation,
I'egalite des fortunes. . ." Ibid.. p. 127.
183
1
Commerce can only exist between free men.
In Qu'est-ce que la Propriete? which summarized his

early ideas on social stratification, Proudhon stated that


only when scientific reform reached the political level
could equal conditions for all men become a reality. When
economic reforms had been accomplished, particularly those
which abolished the system of private property as it existed
at the time when Proudhon wrote, a "scientific government,"
a combination of order and anarchy, would replace the system
of government of man by man according to authority, which
had inevitably continued to generate the gross inequalities
stemming from the economic sphere. Political science would
therefore be the final instrument of organization through

which man would realize his true liberty in society.


Politics is the science of liberty: the govern­
ment of man by man, under whatever name it disguises
itself, is oppression: the highest perfection of 2
society is found in the union of order and anarchy.
In Explications Presentees au Ministhre Public sur

le Droit de Propriete Proudhon again concluded that it was


through the social possession of property, and its reorgani­
zation according to scientific principles, that economic
and social inequalities would be removed:

"*""Ie commerce n'existe qu'entre hommes libres."


Ibid., p. 168.
2
"la politique est la science de la liberte: le
gouvernement de I'homme par l'homme, sous quelque nom qu'il
se deguise, est oppression; la plus haute perfection de la
soci£t£ se trouve dans l'union de l'ordre et de I'anarchie."
Ibid., p. 308.
I have only written one thing in all my life,
gentlemen of the jury, and this thing, I am going to
say it in a little while, so that there will soon no
longer be any question. Property is theft. And do you
know what I have concluded from that? That in order q
to abolish this kind of theft, it must be universalized.
Proudhon also added that in all of his studies of

social relations, the economic, legal and political insti­


tutions of society, and in his focus on the institution of
private property, he had to conclude that society could not
be organized on a sound basis until there was equality of

wealth between all its members.

Here is therefore, gentlemen of the jury, what


is the sequence of my ideas on property. Metaphysics,
law, economics, conclude at the equality of w e a l t h . 2
Proudhon's continued emphasis on the desirability of

bringing about economic and political reforms in society


according to scientific principles points to the centrality
of a theme of fusion of the social classes rather than that
of class struggle. This idea of fusion between the classes
was significant in all of Proudhon's work and is an important
way in which his social thought can be clearly distinguished
from that of Karl Marx on this same topic of social

"Je n'ai qcrit dans toute ma vie qu'une chose,


messieurs les jures, et cette chose, je vais vous la dire
tout de suite, afin qu'il n'en soit tantot plus question,
la propriete, c'est le vol. Et savez-vous ce que j'ai
conclu de la? C'est que pour abolir cette espece de vol,
il faut l'universaliser." Proudhon, Explications, pp. 255-56.
2
"Voici done, messieurs l§s,jures, quelle est la
suite de mes idees sur la propriete. La metaphysique, le
droit, l'lconomie, concluent a I'egalite des fortunes."
Ibid.. p. 269.
1
stratification. This central theme of fusion of the social
classes is carried through into his ideas on political
reform in that in Proudhon's view of ideal political condi­
tions free contract would replace all authority structures
within the context of anarchy or absence of centralized
2
government. Also, in a letter to his friend Langlois in
1850, Proudhon stated that all of his doctrines, if followed
out through social reform, would lead to the synthesis of

social classes through reconciliation: "I have preached

the reconciliation of the classes, symbol of the synthesis


3
of doctrines."
In Systeme des Contradictions Economiques. Proudhon
wrote that it was his mission to teach the world about the
4
principle of equality. He explained that it was through
the reorganization of the institutions of education that
the pricniple of equality would be presented to the people.
The principle of equality would also be assimilated by the
people through their firsthand knowledge of specific examples
of the workings of the principle in the economy:
Perhaps the relationship of profits and salaries,
association, the organization of work, will at last be

1
Cuvillier, Proudhon, p. 213.
2
Ibid., p. 221.
3
"J'^.i preche la conciliation des classes, symbole
de lasynthese des doctrines." Lettre b. langlois, 18 mai
1850.Proudhon, Oorrespondanoe, Yol. 3> p. 263.
4
Proudhon, Oontradictions Economiques. Tome I, p. 26.
186
the foundation of a system of education. Isn’t the
life of man a continual apprenticeship? Aren't philo­
sophy and religion the education of humanity? To
organize instruction would be therefore to organize
industry and construct the theory of society: the
Academy, in-^its lucid moments, always comes back to
that point.
It was only through work that conditions could be

improved for all members of society: "Work is the war


2
declared upon this misery." It was thus through work and
the scientific organization of labor that the present contra­
diction of an impoverished class in an affluent society
would be overcome. The work itself would become a philo­
sophy for the underprivileged class, and it was through their
class philosophy of work that they would thrive and be
able to improve their condition:
Until the present, philosophy, like wealth, is
reserved for certain castes. . . .But in order to com­
plete this immense equation, we must begin with the
philosophy of work, after which each worker will be able
to undertake in his turn the philosophy of his condition.

"Peut-etre que le rapport des profits et des salaifes


1 'association, 1'organization du travail, enfin, se trouvent
au fond d'un systeme d'enseignement. La vie de l'homme n'est
elle pas un perpetuel apprentissage? La philosophic et la
religion ne sont-elles pas I 1education de l'humanite,
Organiser 1 'instruction, ce seraient done organiser l'indus-
trie, et faire la theorie de la societe: l'Academie, dans
ses moments lucides, en revient toujours la." Ibid., p. 28.
2
"Le travail est la guerre declaree a cette misere."
Ibid.. p. 129.
3
^"Jusqu'a present, la philosophie, comme la richesse,
s'est reservee pour certaines castes. . . .Mais, pour
consommer cette immense equation, il faut commencer par la
philosophie du travail, apres qui chaque travailleur pourra
entreprendre a son tour la philosophie de son etat." Ibid..
p. 138.
In Proudhon's view, the most effective way of amelior­
ating conditions of poverty, and of bringing about equality
within society, would be to organize credit: "Of all economic
forces, the most vital, in a society reconstructed for
1
industry by revolution, is credit." It was the organiza­
tion of credit which was to save the plight of the working

classes and bring about progress:


The peasant also knows it (credit): of the
whole of politics, he, like the business man, under­
stands only these two things, taxes and interest. As
for the working class, so marvellously fitted for
progress, such is the ignorance in which it has been
kept as to the true cause of its sufferings, that it is
hardly since February that it has begun to stammer
the word, credit; and to see in this principle the
most powerful of revolutionary forces. In a nation
devoted to labor, credit is to an animal, the means
of nutrition, life itself.2
It was only through an anarchical political organi­

zation that equality of social conditions for all men would


be achieved. To Proudhon a society in which there were
equal social conditions would be a society showing "natural
order," any form of social stratification thus being an

unnatural form of order.


In place of a natural order, conceived in accord­
ance with science and labor, we have a factitious order,
in the shadow of which have developed parasite interest,
abnormal morals, monstrous ambitions, prejudices at
variance with common sense, which today all claim to be
legitimate, invoking a tradition of sixty years, and,
being unwilling either to abdicate or to modify their

Proudhon, General Idea, p. 51.


2
Ibid., p. 52.
188
demands, place themselves in an antagonistic attitude
toward one another, in a reactionary attitude toward
progress.
In La Revolution Sociale, Proudhon advocated the

development of the potential of the working class through


education. Thus the level of achievement within society
would hecome more standardized throughout all segments of
the population:
It is repugnant that society is nothing hut the
systematic sacrifice of the greatest number to the
smallest number, when this large number is composed of
individuals of the same blood, endowed with identical
aptitudes, capable ultimately of becoming in their turn,
by instruction and work, as learned, as artistic, as
powerful inventors, as influential captains, as profound
men of state, as their cousins of the governing class
and the middle class.2
It was in a posthumously published work, De la

Oanacite Politique des Classes Ouvrieres, that Proudhon

made his final bid to his readers for the idea of a fusion
between classes and that of a combination of consciousnesses.
The middle class and the working class would intermingle
and combine in a single elevated consciousness, with the
working class thereon taking the initiative in social and

1
Ibid., p. 75.
2
"II repugne que la societe ne soit autre chose que
1'immolation systematique du grand nombre au plus^petit,
quand ce grand nombre se compose d'individus de meme sang,
doues d ’aptitudes identiques, capables enfin de devenir a
leur tour, par 1*instruction et le travail, aussi savants,
aussi artistes, aussi puissants inventeurs, aussi grands
capitaines, aussi profonds hommes d'Etat, que leurs cousins
de la classe gouvernante et bourgeoisie." Proudhon, Revolu­
tion Sociale. pp. 24-25.
economic reforms. Proudhon saw this fusion of the two

classes he mentioned as being a universal trend in social


stratification:
Whether the middle class knows it or not, its
role is finished; it would not be able to go far and it
is not able to be reborn. . . .The future of the working
class will not have the result of eliminating it, in the
sense that the working class would replace the middle
class in its political preponderance, and as a conse­
quence in its privileges, properties and possessions,
whilst the middle class would replace the working class
in its wage-earning. The real distinction, perfectly
established, furthermore, between the two classes, the
working and middle classes, is a simple accident from
the revolution. Both of them must absorb each other
reciprocally in a superior consciousness; and the day
when the working class, constituted as a majority, will
have seized the power and proclaimed, with regard to
the aspirations of new law and the formulae of science,
economic and social reform, will be the day of accomplished
fusion. It is upon these new gifts that populations,
which have lived for a long time only from their antagon­
ism, must from now on define themselves, mark their
independence and constitute their political life.

"Que la bourgeoisie la sache ou l 1ignore, son role


est £ini; elle ne saurait aller loin, et elle ne peut pas
rqnaitre. . . jl'avenement de la plebe n'aura pas pour
resultat de l'eliminer, en ce sens que la plebe remplacerait
la bourgeoisie dans sa preponderance politiquepar suite
dans ses privileges, proprietes et jouissances, pendant que
la bourgeoisie remplacerait la plebe dans son salariat. la
distinction actuelle, d'ailleurs parfaitement etablie, entre
les deux classes, ouvriere et bourgeoise, est un simple
accident revolutionnaire. Toutes deux,doivent s'absorber
reciproquement dans une conscience^superieure; et le jour
ou la plebe, constitute en majorite, aura saisi le pouvoir
et proclame, selon les aspirations du droit nouveau et les
formules de la science, la reforme economique et sociale,
sera le jour de la fusion definitive. C'est sur ces donnees
nouvelles que les populations, qui^ne vecurent longtemps
que de leur antagonisme, doivent desormais se definir,
marquer leur independence et constituer leur vie politique."
Proudhon, Canaoite Politique, pp. 51-52.
Although. Proudhon does not offer his readers what

could he today called a consistent sociological theory of


social stratification, he does demonstrate what he considered

to he the determinants and consequences of the social


stratification he observed in the French society of his own

day. It was only through a "natural" and engineered move­

ment towards the fusion of all social classes that equal


social conditions would he attained in an anarchically
organized society.
CHAPTER IX

PROUDHON'S RELATIONSHIP TO HIS CONTEMPORARIES:

SAINT-SIMON AND MARX

A major source of information on Proudhon's relation­


ships -with his contemporaries is the lengthy collection of
1
his correspondence. Some references and allusions to
Proudhon's contemporaries, Saint-Simon and Marx are also
found in his works written for the general public, and in
accounts by his biographers and interpreters of his thought.
It appears, however, that although Proudhon exchanged ideas

with many different individuals, in his correspondence and


during his visits to Paris, Proudhon was a "loner" in his
social habits. He elaborated the ideas of his youth rather

than modified his ideas according to the different personal


influences under which he came throughout his lifetime.

Amongst the strongest formulative influences on the


3
thought of Proudhon are those of Kant and Hegel. Although

1
The complete collection of Proudhon's correspondence,
Correspondence. consists of 14 volumes. Eor a single volume
of Proudhon's correspondence see a selection by Sainte-Beuve,
Lettres (Paris: B. Grasset, 1929). Also, for special
collections see Suzanne Henneguy's Lettres a Sa Femme (Paris:
B. Grasset, 1950), and a collection by Jacques Bompard,
Lettres au Citoyen Rolland. 5 octobre 1858 - 29 .juillet 1862
(Paris: B. Grasset, 1946).
2
Eor example, in the secondary sources of Proudhon's
work by Brogan, Jackson, De Lubac, and Woodcock.
3
Ritter, Political Thought, p. 90; De Lubac, Un-
Marxian Socialist, p. 146>.
191
/

192
Proudhon's "biographers differ as to their explanations of
how Proudhon, who did not read German, was exposed to these
influences, there is agreement on some of the similarities
and dissimilarities in the thought of Kant, Hegel and
Proudhon. Por example, although to Kant antimony or con­

tradictory theses are only a portion of the theory of knowl­


edge, for Proudhon they are a whole vision of the universe,
a vision to which he is constantly alluding in his works,
and which he summarized "by the term "antimony. Both
Hegel and Proudhon thought that there was in the mind, as

in everything real, a dynamic principle, a kind of "driving


soul," thanks to which everything lived and was in progress,
2
everything was in perpetual evolution. Although Proudhon
based his work on the Hegelian formula of thesis, anti­

thesis and synthesis, he attached completely different

implications to this formula in his own work. Whereas in


the thought of Hegel synthesis implied a cancelling out of
the thesis and antithesis and their final resolution, for
Proudhon the thesis and antithesis could never he resolved,

the conflict between the thesis and antithesis persisting


3
in Proudhon's stage of synthesis.

1
De Lubac, Un-Marxian Socialist, p. 146.
2
Ibid., p. 151.
3
Pierre Joseph Proudhon, La Pensee Vivante de P. J.
Proudhon: Textes Ohoisis et Prefaces par Lucien Maury
(Paris: Stock, Delamain et Boutelleau, 1942), p. 11.
n
>

193
In his youth, many intellectual influences exerted
themselves on Proudhon through his work as a proofreader.

He not only came to learn, through reading, much traditional


and contemporary thought of significance, hut he also came
into contact with some of the authors and editors of the
work that he proofread. For example, it was through Proud­
hon's corrections of a Latin Lives of the Saints that
Proudhon made the acquaintance and won the friendship of its
young editor, Gustave Fallot, the first great personal
1
influence in Proudhon's life.
Proudhon was influenced by specific published works
of his period, notably Adam Smith's Wealth of the Nations
2
and Charles Fourier's The Hew Industrial World. Although
Proudhon was not willing to admit his debt to Fourier, it
has been postulated that it was through the influence of
Fourier that Proudhon came to grips with his own under­

standing and appreciation of economic speculation. Fourier's


scepticism of the state, his view that the social revolu­

tion could be brought about within the existing society by


setting an example of a more efficient economy has points
of affinity with the later anarchical doctrines of Proudhon,

1
Brogan, Proudhon, p. 15.
2
Ibid.. p. 17.
194
although, the effect of the example given in Proudhon's
social thought is moral rather than economic.1
The German philosopher Karl Grtln and Proudhon met and
exchanged ideas in Paris in 1845. It was Grfln who, in his
small bed-sitting room in the rue Mazarine, discussed with
Proudhon the historical development of German philosophy
since Kant, and who exposed Proudhon to the work of
2
Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. It is also thought that at
this time Proudhon came under the influence of the French
historian, Jules Michelet. Proudhon also corresponded with
Michelet, and Michelet dedicated the first four volumes of
3
his Histoire de la Revolution to Proudhon.
Proudhon corresponded with, and opposed the views
4
of the French politician, Louis Blanc. By refusing to
advocate the process of revolution as a specific means of
social reform, Proudhon took a stand against the use of
5
force and therefore the arbitrary in social planning.

1
Ibid., p. 17.
2
Jacques Bourgeat, P. J. Proudhon. Pere du Social­
isms Francais (Paris: DenoSl, 1943J, p. 74.
3
Amoudruz, Proudhon, p. 23.
4
Louis Blanc, 1811-1882, contributed to the downfall
of the monarchy and became a member of the provisional
government of 1848, after which he exiled himself from
France until 1870.
5
Amoudruz, Proudhon, p. 42.
195
Although an appreciation of these different influ­
ences on the thought of Proudhon is essential to an under­
standing of Proudhon's work, it is upon the sociological
influence of Proudhon's contemporaries Saint-Simon and Marx
that this study will focus. In order to he able to assess
Proudhon's contribution to sociological thought we need now
to interpret his writings in the context of their relation­
ship to these two intellectual giants in the formative

years of the development of sociological theory. As there

are few direct references to Saint-Simon and Marx in the

body of Proudhon's published work, including his corres­


pondence, it may be surmized that Proudhon himself thought
that acknowledgement to personal sources was irrelevant
compared to the issues he had to present to his public,

even though the intricacies of their influences may have


1
been considerable.

Proudhon and Saint-Simon


Although Proudhon's and Saint-Simon's lifespans
overlapped, Saint-Simon living from 1760 to 1865, there
are no records of any personal contact between the two men.
The family heritage of both individuals was completely

1
Obviously any relationship of invluence is a two-
way process. Because of the different times at which Saint-
Simon, Proudhon, and Marx lived and wrote, however, it would
seem that we must pay most particular attention to the
influence of Saint-Simon on Proudhon, Proudhon on Marx, and
Marx on Proudhon, respectively.
A

196
different, Calude Henri de Rouvroy, Comte de Saint-Simon
"being a descendent of an ancient noble family and a relative

of the Due de Saint-Simon, the great biographer of Louis


XIV. In his youth Saint-Simon had already been deeply
concerned with the need for applying reason and science to
social organization, and for furthering industrial develop­
ment. His many ideas on industrialism, scientific methods,
and the application of science to socialNorganization were
1
stated in a stream of publications.
Proudhon's social thought was undoubtedly influenced
by the work of Saint-Simon. Prom the writing of Qu'est-ce -
que la Propriete? Proudhon spoke about the "collective force"
of society which realized itself in woi?k and production.
Also, for Proudhon the social reality was action, collective
2
effort, work and competition.

In spite of their similarities in views, Proudhon


overtly verbalized his disagreement with the thought
of Saint-Simon and with the interpretations given to

Saint-Simon's thought by the group of Saint-Simon's followers


known as the Saint-Simonians. In Proudhon's Manual of

Stock Exchange Speculator, written in 1853, Proudhon


displayed not only his scepticism about the railways, but

Hendrick M. Ruitenbeek (ed.), Varieties of Olassic


Social Theory (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1963), p. 23.
2
Georges Gurvitch, La Sociologie de Karl Marx (Paris:
Centre de Documentation Universitaire, 1955}, pp» 29-30.
!*
i

197
also his dislike of and disagreement with the Saint-

Simonians, whom he perceived as capitalists and Jews.1


In his General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth
Century (1851), Proudhon had accused the Saint-Simonians of
departing from the ideas of Saint-Simon in establishing a

system from his thought.


Thus the Saint-Simonian School, going beyond the
idea of its founder, produced a system. . . .And all
these systems, antagonistic among themselves, are
equally opposed to progress. let humanity perish sooner
than the principle! That is the motto of the Utopians,
as of the fanatics of all ages.2
In comparing his own ideas on the subject of govern­

ment with those of Saint-Simon, Proudhon asserted that the


premises on which Saint-Simon formulated his ideas were
3
entirely different from his own. Whereas Proudhon based

1
Brogan, Proudhon, p. 68. Proudhon's antisemitism
has aroused some notice, but there do not at present exist
any succinct interpretations of the role this had in his
social thought, particularly with regard to ethnic relations.
2
Proudhon, General Idea, p. 80.
3
Proudhon himself was rarely explicit in his writings
as to his criticism and disagreements with Saint-Simon. The
Saint-Simonians were his contemporaries more than was Saint-
Simon and it was this group, whose thought was different
from that of Saint-Simon, whom Proudhon criticized more
freely. Although Gurvitch was Proudhon not only as an
essential link between the thought of Saint-Simon and Marx,
but as a necessary link between their thought, another inter­
preter of Proudhon's thought, Amoudruz, took the same stand
as Proudhon himself in comparing the thought of Proudhon and
Saint-Simon: she described the positions that Proudhon took
as being very different from those of Saint-Simon. In the
opinion of Amoudruz, it was essentially because Proudhon
retained the perspective of his plebian origins in his social
thought that his premises and ideas were incontestably
different from those of Saint-Simon. See Amoudruz, Proudhon
et 1'Europe, p. 20 for a discussion of this point.
198
his own ideas on the fundamental concept of a form of social
contract, Saint-Simon referred to "the law of evolution of
humanity," taking his observations from historical evidence
and what Saint-Simon considered to be the progress of
humanity. In spite of this basic difference, however, both
Proudhon and Saint-Simon concluded that the government would
become obsolete and would be "negated" as society developed:

Saint-Simon's negation of government. . .is not


deduced from the idea of contract. . . .It flows out of
a different kind of insight, entirely experimental and
a posteriori, such as is suited to an observer of facts.
The end of governments. . .Saint-Simon establishes from
the law of the evolution of humanity. This negation of
government Saint-Simon deduced from observation of
history, and of the progress of humanity.1
In La Revolution Sociale. Proudhon again asserted

against the Saint-Simonians that social economics was not


a constitution or a system which would merely substitute
different forms for the same social tyrannies which already

existed at the time he wrote. For Proudhon progress could

only be achieved through a liberty which would make for the


effective functioning of the science of economics:

Social economics is not at all a constitution,


a system such as the utopias of Fourier and of the
Saint-Simonians. It is a science which has for its
object to resolve, by a method of special equation, the
diverse problems which are engendered by the notions of
labor, capital, credit, exchange, property, tax, value,
etc. Nothing can be substituted for the corporations
of arts and of professions of antiquity: it is liberty

1
Proudhon, General Idea, pp. 124-25.
199
which teaches this to us; it is the Revolution, progress,
the science of economics which attest it to us.
Both Saint-Simon and Proudhon were aware that the

goals of society and social forms came into "being through


the conflict and imperfections which marked society. For
Saint-Simon and the Saint-Simonians this conflict was worked
out through the alternation of progressively more compre-
2
hensive organic and critical periods. For Proudhon,
however, there was no clear-cut pattern of conflict and
intervening periods of consolidation and integration.
Proudhon's principle of dialectic and dialectical approach
to the study of social phenomena indicated the underlying
assumption of all his thought that conflict was an ever­

present social phenomenon and that conflict of the thesis

and antithesis remained unresolved even in its final dialec­

tical stage of the synthesis.


Saint-Simon and the Saint-Simonians and Proudhon also
differed in their conception and understanding of the goals

economie sociale n'est point une constitution,


un systeme tel que les utopies de Fourier et des Saint-
Simoniens. C'est une science qui a pour ohjet de resoudre,
par une methode d'equation speciale, les prohlfemes divers
<ju'engendrent les notions de travail, capital, credit,
echange, propridte, impot, valeur, etc. II n'y a rien k
suhstituer aux anciennes corporations d'arts et de metiers:
c'est la liberte qui nous 1'enseigne; c'est la Revolution,
le progrfes, la science economique qui nous 1'attestent."
Proudhon, Revolution Sociale. p. 54.
2
Georg G. Iggers, The Doctrine of Saint-Simon: An
Exposition; First Year, 1828-1829 (Boston: Beacon Press,
195S), p. ixx. ----- ----------
0

200
of society. For Saint-Simon and the Saint-Simonians the

goal of society was the total organization and rationaliza­


tion of all human behavior within the framework of a hier-
1
archy of the able. In Proudhon's thought, however, we can
easily discern a strong polemic against all types of
hierarchical organization. Proudhon believed that the

capacities of all men were inherently equal and that the


optimum social organization would be one based on the
principle of equality. It was through justice and science

that this principle of equality would be realized in social


organization.

In contrast to Proudhon Saint-Simon approached his


2
ideas from a historical perspective. Insofar as this history
was perceived as an eternal recommencement in a world of
3
perpetual flux and alternation, however, such a perspective
was comparable with Proudhon's perception of contradictions,

the dialectic and the unresolved synthesis of his thesis


and antithesis.
In distinguishing the views of the Saint-Simonians
and those of Proudhon it can be seen that it was the prin­
ciple of social relationships that was viewed differently
by the Saint-Simonians and by Proudhon. For the

1
Ibid., loc. cit.
2
Yves Coirault., L'Optique De Saint-Simon (Paris:
Librairie Armand Colin, 19o5), p. 30.
3
Ibid.. p. 529.
V
I

201
Saint-Simonians it was association of men with each other
that would make possible social reforms. Proudhon took this
idea further in that he specified the type of association
that men must have in society if social organization was to
be actualized on a scientific basis, thereby removing the
social problems which he witnessed at the time of his writing.
For the Saint-Simonains labor and work were the means of

bringing men together for the association necessarily a


prerequisite of social reorganization to alleviate and
1
eliminate social problems. For Proudhon it was mutualism
which would be the means of both discovering and practising
methods of social reorganization according to scientific
principles. Thus Proudhon's primary concern was with the
reorganization of the economy, particularly with the re­
organization of the institution of property, by the instal­

lation of a system of credit. It was the discovery of the


principles of mutuality and reciprocity that were Proudhon's
aim rather than an investigation of the conditions of

association.
Proudhon and Saint-Simon differed in their views
on religion, and on the role that each thought religion
would play in the future development of society. For Proudhon

religion and religious institutions in society, although


still necessary in society as it existed at the time he
wrote, were thought to be destructive and inhibiting factors,

Sebastien Charlety, Histoire Du Saint-Simonisme


(1825-1864) (Paris: Editions Gonthier, 1931J» p. 3b.
especially as in his opinion society could only develop in
the direction of progress according to the principle of
justice. For Saint-Simon religion was thought to offer a

constructive means through which society could he rebuilt,

according to scientific principles. Thus, in contrast to


Saint-Simon, Proudhon saw religion and scientific organiw

zation as incompatible, being mutually exclusive alternative


methods and forms of social organization. Saint-Simon, on

the other hand, thought that the attack on the religious


system of the Middle Ages had merely proved that a particu­
lar religious system, that of traditional Christianity, was
no longer in harmony with the positive sciences. Saint-
Simon thought, however, that it would be wrong to conclude
from evidence of the maladjustment of religious institu­
tions within society as a whole that religion itself either
was disappearing, or that it should disappear. What was
both necessary and possible, in his opinion, was that religion
should adjust itself to scientific progress.^ Although the
views of Proudhon and Saint-Simon on religion differed, both
social thinkers conceptualized religion and religious

institutions as pre-political phenomena.


Like Proudhon, Saint-Simon thought of religion as a

political necessity for the people, but not for the

Felix Markham (ed. and trans.) Social Organization,


the Science of Man and Other Writings by Henri de Saint-
Simon (flew York; Harper and Row, 1964), p. xvii.
203
enlightened philosopher. Whereas Saint-Simon and Proudhon
differed radically on the notion of equal economic condi-
1
tions, both Proudhon and Saint-Simon were in agreement
with the idea that religion and religious institutions

maintained inequalities of wealth, and Saint-Simon even


went so far as to say that inequality of wealth could not
2
exist without religion.

Proudhon's suggested reforms were seemingly more


practical than those of Saint-Simon although Saint-Simon
petitioned for immediate action in urging reform through his
3
writing as a publicist. Whereas Proudhon presented spe­
cific reforms for the reorganization of the economy according
to scientific principles, Saint-Simon was concerned pri­
marily with a philosophical and a scientific problem - the
search for unity of knowledge based on the Newtonian law of
gravitation, which Saint-Simon regarded as the purest and
4
the most successful example of scientific thinking. For

Saint-Simon there could be no return to an order of society


based on ideas which had lost their validity. A new organic

Proudhon thought society could only be effectively


organized when there was equality of wealth between members.
Saint-Simon thought that society could not exist without
inequality of wealth.
2
Markham, Social Organization, p. xviii.
3
Ibid., p. xix.
4
Ibid., p. xx.
society could not come into being until unity and coherence
1
had been restored to the realm of thought.

Whereas Proudhon distinguished the economic, politi­


cal and social aspects of the problems of the society
of his day, for Saint-Simon every aspect of the social
problems he witnessed were simultaneously religious, politi
cal, economic and philosophical. In Saint-Simon's view a
complete scientific explanation of experience would
constitute a new religion and would restore a stable condi­
tion of society in which the scientists would fulfill the

function performed by priests in the medieval civilization.


Even though Proudhon was particularly critical of this way
of seeing social problems holistically and of consequently

advocating a "system" of reform, it was perhaps to Saint-


Simon that Proudhon could attribute his own paralleling

ideas of the interpenetration and interconnectedness of


the economic, political and the social in society which he

himself so carefully distinguished. It was most especially


the notion of the link which Proudhon thought to exist

between the economy and politics which might be attributed


3
to the influence of Saint-Simon.

1
Ibid., p. xxi.
2
Ibid., p. xxiv.
3
Amoudruz, Proudhon, p. 25.
Proudhon assumed the self-appointed role of spokes­
man for the working classes. Proudhon was acutely aware
of the dominant role of the institution of private property
in the economy and in society at large. Although Proudhon

advocated a fusion of the classes he also predicted an

intermediate polarization of the classes into the capital­


ists and the workers, each of which, in his opinion, had
sharply differentiated interests. Saint-Simon contrasted

"producers" and "idlers" in his work. Saint-Simon's class


of producers included hankers, entrepreneurs and manual
workers,whose interests, in contrast to the thought of
1
Proudhon, were assumed to he identical.
Unlike Proudhon, Saint-Simon made no attack on the
rights of property. Not only did Saint-Simon fail to
support any idea of equality in his work, hut he actually
condemned the idea of equality. Saint-Simon regarded pro­
duction as the only means of promoting social well-heing,

and with his hierarchical and organic view of society Saint-


Simon conceived his "industrial system" as a planned
2
economy. Although Saint-Simon and Proudhon were alike in
that neither sought to promote revolution as heing a means
wherehy their ideas of reform could he taken over hy society,

Proudhon, unlike Saint-Simon, hased his ideas on man's

Markham, Social Organization, p. xxvi.


2
Ihid., p . xxvi.
206
1
capacity for respect as well as man's capacity to reason.
Unlike Proudhon, Saint-Simon did not ask whether man, as a
thinking and a willing being, could be reconciled with a
2
materialistic interpretation of experience.
Although the Saint-Simonian system of discipline
could be said to resemble a society in which Proudhon's
principle of justice operated freely, the Saint-Simonian

theory of liberty is not one of freedom of individual


action from governmental restraint, which is the ideal of
Proudhon. The Saint-Simonians' system of discipline has
been compared with modern totalitarianism. Whereas the
Saint-Simonians assumed the existence of an autocratic
harmony between individual conviction and the social doc­
trine, they reserved coercive means for "exceptional cases."
Freedom, for the Saint-Simonians, therefore, in contrast
to the anarchical ideal of Proudhon, was the development of
3
one's potentialities with the aid of social guidance.
Having delineated some of the differences in the
thought of Saint-Simon and that of Proudhon, it is important
that these differences not be exaggerated. For both Saint-
Simon and Proudhon aspired towards the discovery and rational
use of social laws in the organization of society. Whereas

1
For a fuller discussion of the role and effects of
the concept of respect in Proudhon's work see Ritter,
Proudhon, pp. 200-203.
2
Markham, Social Organization, p. xxiii.
3
Iggers, Saint-Simon, p. xiv.
Proudhon repeatedly insisted on the principles of justice
and equality, Saint-Simon reiterated the theme of liberty,
appealing - also similar to the appeals of Proudhon - for
a science of liberty:
. . . .Love of liberty is not sufficient for a people
in order that they might be free, above all it is
necessary to have a science of liberty.

The science of liberty has its facts and its


generalities like all the others; but this science is
not known, hardly is it suspected by a small number.1

The idea from which Saint-Simon took his departure

and which dominated his entire writings was that a social


system of reform was only the application of a system of
ideas. Unlike Proudhon Saint-Simon postulated that philo-
2
sophy, religion and sociology have practical social goals.
Whereas Proudhon was primarily concerned with economic
reorganization, Saint-Simon was more concerned with the

necessity of political change. Class was the central con­


cept in his analysis of contemporary political society and
he signaled out the creative political elements in the nation,
3
demonstrating the urgency of social action.

" . . . .1'amour de la liberte ne suffit pas a un


peuple pour §tre libre, il lui faut surtout la science de
la liberty, la science de la liberty a ses faits et ses
gen^ralites comme toutes les autres; mais cette science
n'est pas connue, a peine est-elle soupconnee d'un petit
nombre." C-H de Saint-Simon, La Physiologie Sociale:
Oeuvres Choisies (Vol. I; Paris: Presses Universitaires De
Prance, lyb5J, p. 80.

^Emile Durkheim, Socialism and Saint-Simon (London:


Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1359), pp. 90-91.
3
Prank E. Manuel, The New World of Henri Saint-Simon
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956;, p. 245.
208
Saint-Simon's thought had more disciples and enter­
tained a wider influence than was the case with Proudhon.

This has been so in part because it was generally easier to


distinguish the essential elements of Saint-Simon's thought
1
than those of Proudhon. Unlike Saint-Simon, Proudhon
avoided a philosophy of history which was too precise, and
expressed only a provisional adherence to the theories of
2
progress current in his day. Proudhon was more of a
moralist, a jurist, and an ideologist and militant of the
revolution than was Saint-Simon, and the fact that Proudhon

promised moral rather than material satisfactions has been


regarded as a source of Proudhon's strength as a social
3
thinker. The fact that Proudhon condemned the thought of
Saint-Simon and that of the Saint-Simonians merely because
these constituted to him "a system" was both mistaken and
unjust. His criticism and outright refusal to admit any
indebtedness to the thought of others could cursorily be
construed as narrowminded. By not giving any role to

religion, philosophy and other "arbitrary constructions"


4
in future society, Proudhon limited his own perspective and
perception of social reality.

1
Gurvitch, Fondateurs Brancais, Vol. II, p. 1.
2
Ibid., loc. cit.
3
Brogan, Proudhon, p. 17.
4
Gurvitch, Fondateurs Francais. Vol. II, p. 11.
209

Proudhon and Marx


Unlike Proudhon and Saint-Simon, Proudhon and Marx
met each other, exchanged letters, and criticized each
others1 ideas. Proudhon and Marx first met in Paris in
September, 1844. Because of the impact of the ideas of
each man on the other, this date has been considered as a
turning point of significance for hoth men, Marx being at
that time twenty-five years of age and Proudhon thirty-
1
five years.
Having reported the first meeting between Proudhon

and Marx as September, 1844, no biographers or interpreters


of Proudhon's thought have found further reliable evidence

of personal meetings between the two. Although it seems


that no records of such meetings were kept, it is thought
probable that the two men continued to see each other for
2
at most a year.
The final record of Proudhon's formal relationship
with Marx is found in a letter written by Proudhon to Marx
3
on May 17, 1846. From 1846 Proudhon and Marx spent the
rest of their intellectual lives in opposition to each other.

1
Be lubac, Un-Marxian Socialist, p. 129.
Chabrier, Revolution, p. 2.
3
Proudhon's disagreement with Marx expressed in this
letter will be discussed in detail later in this section.
4
Chabrier, Revolution, loc. cit.
/>
if

210
Before examining the differences and discontinuities
between the social thought of Proudhon and Marx, we shall
present what appear to he some of the similarities and
possible continuities between the ideas of both. As social
critics of their times, both writers were acutely aware of
the problems of the societies in which they lived which had
been caused by industrialization. Both Proudhon and Marx

formulated, in their social thought, the effects of machines


on the lives of the working classes. Proudhon preceded
Marx in his belief that a new kind of economic, political and
social reorganization would come about through the action
of a revolutionary proletariat, which would act without
delegation, representation or intervention.’*’ Proudhon also
preceded Marx in formulating some of the meaning elements
2
of the concept of alienation.
For both Proudhon and Marx the social reality within
society and of society was collective action, collective
effort, work, and competition which transformed itself by
3
successive revolutions. Marx had already read Proudhon's
memoranda on property when the two men met in Paris in

1844, and it was Proudhon's specifically singling out the

1
Berth, Du "Capital," pp. 53-54.
2
Gurvitch, Karl Marx, pp. 29-30.
3
Ibid., p. 29.
r
(

211
importance of economic factors in society for society as a
1
whole that had attracted Marx to Proudhon's ideas.
Proudhon, just as much as Marx, preached the inevit­
able victory of his cause, although the two men differed as
to how their ideas of perfect social organization would
2
come into being. Throughout their works both men continued
to emphasize the crucial role of economic organization,
embodying all their ideas in macro-sociological concepts

and themes. Both Proudhon and Marx made central use of the
dialectical method of philosophy for portraying the dynamics
of social conflict and social change, and each focused much
attention on the phenomenon of revolution. In considering
the economy to be the foundation upon which society was
built, both thought that if men would rationally apply the
principles of science to social conditions there would be
social progress. In comparing Proudhon's ideas of social
progress with those of Marx we can juxtapose Proudhon's
concept of justice and its contribution to progress and
Marx's concept of revolution. Por Marx the world communist
revolution was a revolution of human self-change, it being
3
the ultimate self-realizing act of humanity.

Be Lubac, Un-Marxian Socialist, pp. 129-30.


2
Brogan, Proudhon, p. 68.
3
Robert C. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx
(Cambridge: University Press, 19ol), p. 15^.
212
Both. Proudhon and Marx aimed to he practical in the

orientation of their ideas. For each of them philosophy


had to he superseded. Philosophical goals must he realized
hy social science, and the philosopher's alienation, philo­
sophical abstraction, and systematized dogmatism must he
1
rejected. In spite of their efforts to eliminate all
abstractions from their social thought, both Proudhon and
Marx end up hy postulating a utopia where reason and a .kind
of spontaneous justice would prevail. For Marx, as for
Proudhon, there would he no call for an external power
2
to apportion or to harmonise the various roles of society.

In tracing the discontinuities and dissimilarities

between the thought of Proudhon and Marx we can see that


whereas Proudhon referred to the collective forces of

society and social groups, Marx focused his attention on the


means of production as a special case of collective force
3
in society. In making a general comparison of the social
thought of Proudhon and Marx it has been suggested that
whereas Proudhon exhibited a tendency to postulate a moral
utopia, with Marx one can trace implications of an economic

Henri lefehvre, The Sociology of Marx (New York:


Random House, 1968), p. 13.
2
Eugene Kamenka, The Ethical Foundations of Marxism
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 45-46.
3
Gurvitch, Karl Marx, pp. 29-30.
3

213

utopia. Also, whereas Marx has "been described as an "opti­


mistic scientist" and an intellectual of socialism, Proudhon
"comes from the people," his reactions and thoughts being
1
indisputably plebian.

The thought of Proudhon and Marx was first reported


to diverge sharply at the time of the appearance of Proud­
hon's work Systeme des Contradictions Economiques or
Philosonhie de la Misere in 1846. Marx was infuriated by

what he considered to be Proudhon's meaningless and empty


philosophical assertions, which Proudhon had called science,
and Marx responded by publishing Misere de la Philosophic
in Prench. It is strange, in view of the subsequent tremen-r
dous influence of Marx, that Marx was so jealous of Proud­
hon's "glory" that he devoted a whole book to criticizing
2
the work of this "petit bourgeois," especially as today
only a few politicians and intellectuals are familiar with
3
the work of Proudhon, or even with his name. In Misfere

de la Philosophie Marx used highly volatile and critical


rhetoric in an attempt to show how much Proudhon shared
the "illusions of speculative philosophy" characteristic of
4
the age in which Proudhon wrote.

1
Berth, Du "Capital." pp. 151-54.
2
Por further discussion on this and on personality
clashes between Proudhon and Marx, see Brogan, Proudhon, p. 43.
3
Chabrier, Revolution, pp. 1-2.
4
De Lubac, Un-Marxian Socialist, pp. 129-30.
In Proudhon's letter to Karl Marx in May, 1846 we
can see how some of the objections made to the "system" of
Saint-Simon and the Saint-Simonians reappear in the thought
of Proudhon, this time being applied to the proposals for

social organization and their realization in the thought


of Zarl Marx. Here Proudhon took the stand, of being an
"anti-dogmatist," and said that he was unwilling, and in

fact violently opposed to any effort on Marx's part to

establish a new dogmatism:


let us look together, if you wish, for the laws
of society, the form in which these laws realize them­
selves, the progress by which we come to discover them;
but, for God's sake! after having destroyed all the
dogmatisms a priori, do not let us consider at all, in
our turn, to indoctrinate the people; dp not let us
fall into the contradiction of your compatriot Martin
Luther, who, after having overthrown Catholic theology,
soon applied himself to a reinforcement of excommuni­
cations and reprobations, to found a Protestant theology

Por Proudhon socialism was primarily a solution for

a moral problem, namely "the deliverance of the individual


from the fetters imposed on him by the industrial system."
Por Marx, on the other hand, there were no absolute moral

"Cherchons ensemble, si vous voluez, les lois de la


soci^tl, le mode dont ces lois se realisent, le progr&s
suivant lequel nous parvenons h les decouvrir; mais, pour
Lieu! aprfes avoir dlmoli tous les dogmatismes a priori, ne
songeons point h. notre tour, k endoctriner le peuple; ne
tombons pas dans la contradiction de votre comgatriote
Martin Luther, qui, aprfes avoir renverse la theologie
Catholique, se mit aussit&t a grands renforts d 'excommunica­
tions et d'anathfemes, h fonder une theologie protestante."
Lettre a Karl Marx, 17 mai 1846, in Proudhon, Correspondance
Tome 2, pp. 198-99.
215

truths which, had existed from the beginning of time which


the French Revolution had revealed."*" The fundamental force
for Marx was the organization of the methods of production.
Proudhon made repeated efforts to prevent himself

from being the system builder he believed Marx to be. He


repeated, in various forms, what he considered to be a few

fundamental truths, but "he recoiled from a new orthodoxy.11


It has been suggested that the perspective of Proud­
hon was much more limited and narrower than that of Marx,
Marx having a greater ability to synthesize and generalize
than Proudhon. In some ways Marx's reproaches of "petit
bourgeois" were justified, in that Proudhon retained many
4
of the insular ideas of his working-class origins.
The essential difference in the thought of Proudhon
and Marx has been thought to reside in their different
theories of value. Proudhon thought that value, founded

upon work, could only be realized effectively and fully


when the economy was socialized, which implied the inter­
vention of the ideal of justice. For Marx, however, value

In Proudhon's De la Justice dans la Revolution et


dans l'Eglise Proudhon had postulated his aim as the making
of the world safe for the idea of justice, which had been
brought into society by the French Revolution.
2
Brogan, Proudhon, p. 19.
3
Chabrier, Revolution, p. 2.
4
Amoudruz, Proudhon et 1'Europe, p. 20.
/>1.0

216
could be explained automatically by the mere functioning
1
of the economy.
Marx was critical of Proudhon for being what he
considered to be overly interested in the contradictions of
2
society and comparatively disinterested in their solution.

Marx stood in direct opposition to the ahistorical


position taken in most of Proudhon's work. In criticizing

Proudhon's ahistoricism Marx also criticized Proudhon's


particular usage of the dialectic which Marx found to be
weak. Marx concluded that reality for Proudhon was action
in "the pure ether of reason," and that all Proudhon

presented to the reader was a history of Proudhon's own


contradictions:
When M. Proudhon spoke of the series in the under­
standing, of the logical sequence of categories, he
declared positively that he did not want to give history
according to the order in time, that is, in M. Proudhon's
view, the historical sequence in which the categories
have manifested themselves. Thus for him everything
happened in the pure ether of reason. Everything was
to be derived from this ether by means of dialectics. .
What then does M history
O x iix o u vvu o u iiu x a u x u uxwiiq «

Proudhon thought progress could come about only

through the gradual reduction of the powers and functions


of the government, to the point where it would be eliminated.
Marx's vision of the moral and historical end of man,

1
Gurvitch, Fondateurs Erancais. Vol. II, p. 17.
2
Ibid., p. 31
3.
Marx, Poverty of Philosophy, p. 114.
k

217
however, would not be attained until power had been centrali-
ized in the hands of the government, and the government
1
consequently overthrown by revolution.
In conclusion, the sociological thought of Proudhon
when viewed within the broader intellectual context of its
relationship to the works of Saint-Simon and Marx, mani­
fests both continuities and discontinuities in the emergence
of a distinctively sociological tradition of societal
analysis. As each expression of social thought in part
reflects the writers' differences in class and the material
available for analysis, comparisons are complicated further.
Although continuities between Saint-Simon, Proudhon

and Marx can certainly be delineated, it is doubtful that


the thought of Proudhon formed a "sufficient" or even a

"necessary" link between that of Saint-Simon and Marx, as


Gurvitch suggests:
One can assert that Proudhon is an indispensable
link between Saint-Simon and Marx, that Marx would not
be possible without Proudhon, as well as Saint-Simon.
In sociological theory, Proudhon and Marx, rather than
exclude each other, correct each other mutually and
finally become complementary.

1
Kamenka, Ethical Foundations, p. 45.
2
"On peut affirmer que Proudhon est un chainin
indispensable entre Saint-Simon et Marx, que Marx ne serait
pas possible sans Proudhon, aussi bien que sans Saint-Simon.
Dans la theorie sociologique, Proudhon et Marx, au lieu de
s'exclure, se^corrigint mutuellement et finissent par
devenir complementaires." Gurvitch, Pondateurs Francais.
Yol. II, p. 17.
We have found many aspects of Saint-Simon's work that
have been left untouched by Proudhon. Similarly much of

Proudhon's thought was not subsequently clarified or


illuminated by Marx. The complex relationship between

the three thinkers serves well to illustrate that the


development of an intellectual discipline - in this case
sociology - is rarely, if ever, as straightforward and

logically consistent as subsequent historians of the disci­


pline would lead one to believe.
{
i

CHAPTER X

PROUDHON'S RELATION TO CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY

Prom our examination of some of the basic ideas of


Pierre Joseph Proudhon we have seen that he both asked
questions and suggested answers of interest to the discipline
of sociology as it existed in his own day and as it exists
today. In some areas his work provides instances of ideas
that have been lost sight of: for example, his emphasis on
the concept of justice as an organizing principle for
society and the analysis of social systems is not replicated.
in contemporary sociological theory. Perhaps this is due

to a widespread tendency among many sociologists today to


want to use only value-free concepts and adhere to a

strictly "scientific tradition" in their analyses of society.

Yet it is through Proudhon's use of concepts such as justice


that his readers become aware of his insights regarding
the nature of society. Through his ideas on justice,
religion and federalism, Proudhon portrayed man as a rational
being who was capable of being directed by respect for him-
1
self and others rather than by his sensual appetites.

For a further discussion on Proudhon's perception


of man as an independent, self-sufficient, dignified being
see Chapter VIII, Proudhon's Sociology of Religion, and
Ritter, Proudhon, pp. 200-203. All Proudhon's ideas on the
degrading effects of religion on man and on society, and on

219
Although many of the insights we find in Proudhon's

work have been superseded since the time he wrote, Proudhon


is significant in the sense that he is part of a socio­

logical tradition, and that his special contributions to


this tradition help us to see that the founding of sociology
as an intellectual discipline cannot be attributed to only
1
a few social thinkers. Moreover, any survey of the central
concepts of contemporary sociology brings home the extent
to which these are rooted in the moral aspirations and intel­
lectual gropings of nineteenth century social theorists
such as Proudhon. Nisbet has sought to demonstrate how
many of the sociological concepts we have today could not
have come into being apart from the persisting moral con­
flicts of the nineteenth century. However neutral these

may seem to scientists and theorists of today, they do not


2
ever really divest themselves of their moral origins.
In tracing some of the continuities and discontinui­
ties in the sociological thought of Proudhon to the present

the transcendence and immanence of the principle of justice


are based on this basic image of the nature of man, an
image which embraces more of the "Gemeinschaft" values than
does the view of man's being merely a rational being,
this latter view which can be attributed to Karl Marx more
readily than to Proudhon.
1 '
Many introductory texts of sociological theory,
especially in the United States, attribute the beginnings
of sociology as an intellectual discipline to a small and
often highly limited number of "founding fathers." This
is an overly naive perception.
2
Nisbet, Sociological Tradition, p. 18.
221

day, and in evaluating the role of Proudhon's thought from


the point of view of contemporary sociology, Proudhon's
propositions and concepts need now to he re-examined in the
light of subsequent developments.

Proudhon and the Structural Functional Approach


As we have seen, Proudhon viewed society as a dynamic
whole, progressing in the stages of its evolution accord­
ing to the free operation of the principle of justice. like
many contemporary structural functionalist theorists Proud­
hon used a traditional institutional approach in his
analyses of the structure and dynamics of society, disting­
uishing between the organization and workings of the economic,
political, social and religious institutions as well as

those of the family. Prom his analysis and conclusions

which make use of this approach, as for example in his

insistence on the predominance of the economic institutions


in the organization of society and its other institutions,

we can delineate tendencies towards a social structural


analysis of society. Thus Proudhon's work, as we shall
seek to demonstrate, provides us with the rudiments of a
social system frame of reference, his general ahistorical
method of approach to the study of social science also being
222
similar to the approach used "by the majority of structural
1
functionalist theorists in contemporary sociology.
Structural functionalist analysis in sociology has
been traditionally associated with an institutional approach
to the study of social phenomena. Proudhon's use of

economic, political, social and religious institutions as

units of analysis in his social science continued to be


emphasized throughout the nineteenth century. Durkheim,

writing in 1901, stated that sociology "can be defined as


2
the science of institutions." This institutional approach

has to this day continued to dominate macro-sociological


analyses of society. In recent years the growing importance
in the modern world of one type of institution, the large-
scale organization, has led to renewed interest in and
3
research on the general properties of institutions.

1
It is not meant to indicate here that a social system
approach and functional analysis are synonymous, nor that
an institutional approach is a necessary correlate of
structural functional analysis. Also exceptions to the
ahistorical approach of structural-functionalist theorists,
such as the work of Neil Smelser, cannot be ignored. See
Ralf Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia: Toward a Reorientation of
Sociological Analysis," American Journal of Sociology, 64
(Sept., 1958), 115-27 for a criticism of structural rune-
tionalism - especially his argument against these theorists'
use of an ahistorical approach in sociology.
2
Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method,
trans. S. Solovay and J. Mueller tChicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1938), p. lvi.
3
Alex Ihkeles, What is Sociology? An Introduction
to the Discipline and Profession (Englewood: Prentice Hall,
1964), p. 15.
223
Through, his focus on institutions Proudhon produced
analyses of society which were sociologically more signifi­
cant than analyses which take into account only the

rational motives of individuals:


The theory of institutional behavior, which is
essentially sociological theory, is precisely of the
highest significance in social science because by
setting problems of social dynamics in a context of
institutional and drawing the implications of the theorem
of institutional integration. . ., this theory is enabled
to exploit and extend the knowledge of modern psychology
about the non- and irrational aspects of motivation in
order to analyze social processes. It follows also that
any conceptual scheme which utilizes only the motivational
elements of rational instrumental goal-orientation can
be adequate theory only of certain relatively special­
ized processes within the-, framework of an institutionally
structured social system.
Proudhon was well aware that the dividing line

between the different institutions is not clear-cut. For


example, his focus on the institution of private property
showed that this institution had implications for the
political, social and religious sectors of society as well
as the obvious implications for the economy. It is Proud­
hon's recognition not only of the distinctive functions for
the maintenance of society of the different institutions,

but also of the nature and degree of interpenetration


between the different institutions that place Proudhon
amongst the founders of the structural functionalist tra­

dition in sociological theory. Basic to the general meaning


of the contemporary sociological concept of social system,

Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: The


Free Press, 1964), p. 43.
224
for example, is the notion of the "interdependence of
1
variables." Although contemporary sociological terms are
not to he found in the work of Proudhon, Proudhon's notions
of the interrelatedness of different institutions and the
interpenetration of the characteristics of these institu­
tions have parallels with what is meant by the interdepend­
ence of variables in contemporary sociological theories
2
and current sociological studies.
It is also because Proudhon wrote as a social

reformer as well as a social thinker that his ideas relating


to the economy and economic institutions were not considered
by him to be isolated phenomena within the context of the

wider society. For him the scientific organization of the


economy was significant only insofar as effects from this
would be diffused among other sectors of society, particu-
3
larly the political, the social, and the religious.
Proudhon's stage of dynamic synthesis in his analyses
of social reality and social change can be compared with

Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory


(Glencoe, 111.: The Pree^PressT-I^3T5T ”p ^2TST
2
For some details on Merton's views on the importance
of the notion of interdependence of variables in theory and
research see Merton, Theoretical Sociology, pp. 52, 79-80,
and 146-47.
3
All of Proudhon's discussions of the Revolutions of
1789 and 1848 relate the theme that it is because of the
lack of scientific reform in the economy that political and
social reform have not yet been accomplished through
revolution.
I
1

225
the structural functionalists' concept of equilibrium, even
though Proudhon's synthesis shows no resolution of the
dialectic between the thesis and the antithesis. Por
example, the most essential condition of successful dynamic
analysis for Parsons lies in the sociologists' continual
and systematic referral of every social "problem" to the
1
state of the social system as a whole. Similarly, in
Proudhon's thought each aspect of social reality, contra­
diction, or social problem leads, eventually, into a state
of synthesis. Just as Proudhon conceptualized the progres­
sion of thesis and antithesis towards the unresolved
2
synthesis, structural functionalists identify strains and
tensions in the social system only by referring them to a

state of equilibrium of the system.

Parsons, Essays. p. 217.


2
Bernard Barber's definition of a social system
might conceivably be applied to Proudhon's analysis of
society. Barber states that in his view social systems are
"relatively determinate boundary-maintaining systems in
which the parts are interdependent in certain ways to pre­
serve one another and the character of the system as a
whole." Barber also makes the observation that although
closure is implied in the concept of social system, it is
only the temporary and provisional kind of closure which is
characteristic of all scientific research and which there­
fore does not predetermine a necessarily static analysis in
any way, as many critics of social system "theory" have
suggested. See Bernard Barber, "Structural-Functional
Analysis: Some Problems and Misunderstandings," American
Sociological Review. 21 (1965), 129-35 for a fuller discus-
sion of these points.
Proudhon's sociological thought is, as we have seen,
frequently couched in overly global terms and many of its

theoretical implications remain ambiguous. His work abounds


with sociological assertions but contains few explanations.
Many contemporary sociological concepts, however, can be
subjected to the same criticism - the concepts used by
structural functionalists have "lost touch with the reality
1
about them." Both Proudhon's work and present-day socio­

logy show symptoms of such short-comings. Although many


concepts used in sociology since the time of Proudhon have
acquired a certain sophistication, the specifications of
some structural-functionalist theorists have limited
2
applications for empirical research.
Prom the rudiments of social system concepts in the
work of Proudhon to the social systems concepts currently
applied in sociology, a new trend of conceptualization
has been discerned. In formulating a theoretical framework

for the analysis of socio-cultural systems it is becoming

clear that we cannot make a neat division between those

dimensions that make up a system and those dimensions that


do not. Rather we shall have to recognize degrees of

C. Wright Mills, The Scoilogical Imagination (New


York: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 25-49.
2
Wsevolod W. Isajiw, Causation and Functionalism in
Sociology (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1957), p. 16^
x 227
"systemness." The concept of social system is treated as
a variable in its own right, rather than as an ideal type
2
of social organization.
Just as Proudhon singled out mutualism as one of the
most essential aspects of social reality, building his ideas

of economic, political and social reform on this notion,

the contemporary sociological concept of "systemness" has


been defined according to the amounts of reciprocity,

interdependence, and autonomy that exists between the


parts of the social entity and the whole. In response to
the much discussed problem of the abstractness of all
concepts related to and of such social systems or "system­
ness " it has been suggested that benefits from new develop­
ments in mathematics and methodology will help to bridge
the gap between structural functionalists' concepts and
3
the world's realities.

Proudhon and Modern Sociology of Religion


Proudhon's concern with the social consequences of
religion was permeated with his opinion that religion has

1
Walter Buckley, Sociology and M o d e m Systems Theory
(Englewood, N. J.: Prentice hall, iyby), pp. oi and 42.
2
Proudhon's dialectical analysis of social phenomena
is suggestive of this development in that the opposition of
thesis and antithesis indicates continual rather than modal
types of social phenomena.
3
Alvin W. Gouldner, "Reciprocity and Autonomy in
Functional Theory," Symposium on Sociological Theory,
Llewelyn Gross, editor (ibranston, 111.: Row, Peterson and
Co., 1959), pp. 241-70.
a limiting effect on man's potential and can only "be
assessed as having a negative influence in society as a
1
■whole. This viewpoint differs from later psychological
interpretations of religious experience which have shown
religion to have the potential of being a powerful and bene­
ficial inner personal experience, promoting constructive
activism in the social sphere:
It makes a tremendous emotional and practical
difference to one whether one accepts the universe in
the drab discolored way of stoic resignation to
necessity, or with the passionate happiness of Christian
saints. The difference is as great as that between
passivity and activity, as that between the defensive
and the aggressive mood. Gradual as are the steps by
which an individual may grow from one state into the
other, many as are the intermediate stages which dif­
ferent individuals represent, yet when you place the
typical extremes beside each other for comparison,
you feel that two discontinuous universes confront you,
and that in passing from gne to the other a "critical
point" has been overcome.
Prom the point of view of the sociology of religion,

several of Proudhon's ideas precede the formulations of


3
such classic sociological theorists as Emile Eurkheim. In

1
Religion was considered to be degrading to man's
dignity by Proudhon, any apparent advantages of religion
on the individual and social levels having a pseudo bene­
ficial effect.
2
William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience
(New York: Collier, 1968), p. 50.
3
Por example the fundamental ideas of Proudhon that
religion is a social creation and that religion, as such,
was the first symbol of society and the vehicle through
which man first started to forumlate social thought precede
the religious sociology and theory of knowledge of Eurkheim
in The Elementary Porms of the Religious Life. Joseph Ward
Swain, trans. (New York: The Pree Press, 1965), pp. 37-63
and 462-96.
229
M s views of religion and religious institutions as neces­
sary transient phenomena, Proudhon evaluated their role as
prescientific rather than as pre-political.'1’ Once the
principle of justice was allowed to work freely in society

and its principles were applied in the economy and through


the political and social spheres of society, there would he
no place for anything which resembled religion in Proudhon's
2
thought.

Proudhon and Conflict Theories of Social Change


Proudhon's view of the inevitability of the conflict
arising between religious values and those of justice,
science and secular values is not shared by a substantial
group of contemporary sociologists studying religion and
3
social conflict. An overall social cohesiveness rather

1
In this way Proudhon resembles the views of Comte
more closely than those of the contemporary sociologists,
Peter Worsley and Yonina Talmon. For example, see Yonina
Talmon, "Pursuit of the Millennium: the Relation between
Religious and Social Change," Archives Euroneenes de Sociol
ogie. Ill (196-2), 125-48.
2
The principle of justice, although based on secular
norms, was not to be a type of religion as that proposed
by Saint-Simon or Comte. Nor was the scientifically based
principle of justice comparable in its projected manifesta­
tions to the type of secular religion built around the
thought of Chairman Mao. (See Quotations from Chairman Mao
Tse-Tung. Peking: Foreign languages Press, 1966).
3
Proudhon asserted that society could not have both
religion and justice as organizing principles of its social
norms. For him a choice had to be made between the two,
only justice leading to social progress.
230
than perpetual contradiction and incompatibility is thought
to arise from conflicts focusing on religion in society,
religious values remaining as an endorsement of secular
values rather than as a contradiction of them:

For, basically, the trifaith pluralism that


characterizes mid-century America makes for national
unity and cohesiveness rather than for division and
disruption. All of the three groups are now American
groups, committed to essentially the same American values,
seeing things in essentially the same American way.^
A1though Proudhon's treatment of the subject of

social change offers us no systematic theory, Proudhon's


insights present us with a "grand" or macro-sociological
approach to social change typical of the nineteenth century.
Although these nineteenth century theories were inadequate
in providing guidance for sociological research, even today

there is no sociological theory that can fulfill this task:


The grand theories gave inadequate guidance for
sociological research, but no modern theory of social
change has replaced them, just as there is no fully
developed general theory of society. Actually, both
Talcott Parsons and Wilbert E. Moore have suggested
that a theory of society and one of social change are
inseparable.2
In comparing Proudhon's ideas of social change with

those of contemporary sociological theorists, Proudhon's

approach would appear to contain more of the rudiments of

1
Robert Lee and Martin Marty, Religion and Social
Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 19&4J, P* 157.

Amitai and Eva Etzioni (eds.), Social Change:


Sources. Patterns, and Consequences (New lork: Sasic Books,
19&U, P. 75.
V
3>

231
"conflict theory" than of structural functional analysis.
Proudhon's emphasis on revolution and war removes him from
the line of sociologists who see social change as a uni­
linear progression of slow, smooth changes, as do structural
functionalists.’*' Theories of social conflict were decisive
in the formation of sociology as an intellectual discipline,
a re-emergence of conflict theory in contemporary sociological
theory being a constructive development in the field of

contemporary sociological theory:


After an interval of almost fifty years, a theme
has reappeared in sociology which has determined the
origin of that discipline more than any other subject
area. Prom Marx and Comte to Simmel and Sorel, social
conflict, especially revolution, was one of the central
themes in social research.2

The emergence of conflict theory in contemporary

sociology is antithetical to the structural functionalists'


interpretation of society and social reality. After the
profound influence on sociological theory of the Parsonian
approach which answers the question "What holds societies
together?" the revival of conflict theory is a new opposing

or dialectical trend:

Ralf Dahrendorf, the most important exponent of the


modern social conflict theory, traces the origins of social
conflict theory back to Marx. As has already been stated
in this study, the views of Proudhon and Marx in the sphere
of social change are readily comparable. Sorel's thought
has also been traced back to that of Proudhon.
2
Ralf Dahrendorf, "Toward a Theory of Social Con­
flict," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, XI (1958),
No. 2, 170.
232
Thus it is possible that the revival of the study of
social conflict in the last decades appears to many not
so much a continuation of traditional research as a
new thematic discovery - an instance^of dialectical
irony in the development of science.

Proudhon and Theory of Social Stratification

Although Proudhon predicted and postulated his own

preference for a fusion of the classes rather than class


conflict, many of the traditional and contemporary references
to social class and social conflict reflect the notion of

the inevitability of conflict, predicted by Proudhon, if


society was not to be organized on a scientific economic
basis. In contemporary social conflict theory, however,
the concept of social class has been broadened rather than
2
dissolved in an overall idea of class fusion.

Although Weber's sociological concepts of social


status and "life-style" broadened the notions of class and
social stratification, there is still some disagreement
among sociologists today as to what criteria are indicators
of class affiliation. It has been postulated, moreover, in
opposition to the views postulated by both Proudhon and

1
Ibid.. p. 170.
2
Dahrendorf expands the basis of |his understanding
and usage of the term social class to include all interest
groups within "imperatively co-ordinated associations," thus
no longer restricting the sociological analysis of social
class and class conflict to the economic criteria delineated
by Proudhon and Marx in terms of the ownership of property
and capital. For a summary of Dahrendorf's theory of social
class and class conflict see Dahrendorf, Class Conflict,
pp. 237-40.
A

233
Marx, that the more industrialized the society, the more
complex and open will he the system of stratification.
When more wealth is created there are more types of posi­
tions to he held and hence more opportunities - more room
at the top. Also, the more urbanized a society, the more
1
complex and open the system of stratification.
The polarization of the social classes, predicted as
a societal tendency first hy Proudhon and more emphatically
later hy Marx, has not heen actualized in our modern era

of rapid industrial and technological change. It seems


unlikely moreover, that such a trend will come into heing

in the future, due to the increasing differentiating

processes paralleling technological development in modern

industrial societies. Thus although the rudiments of Proud­


hon's thought appear in contemporary theories of social
conflict, contemporary views on social stratification
supercede Proudhon's views. Proudhon's ideas on social
stratification are relevant to the time and conditions of
his day, hut they are no longer adequate for answering the
questions raised hy the study of social stratification in
contemporary social conditions. For like Marx, Proudhon
failed to anticipate the conditions under which it would

These proposition are amongst those formulated hy


Berelson and Steiner from the findings of sociological and
other social science research. See Bernard Berelson and
Gary A. Steiner. Human Behavior (New York: Harcourt, Brace
and World, 1967), pp. 70-76 for more detail concerning these
propositions ahout social stratification.
become possible for the bourgeoisie to strengthen its
position in society, so that far from disappearing, as they
predicted, it became the dominant class.
Developments in the field of sociological theory
since Proudhon's day have frequently involved modifications
and refinements of earlier problems, methods, scope and
1
assumptions. As we have seen Proudhon rarely went beyond
the level of assertion in the exposition of his ideas. His
thought, however, contains many of the basic elements of
both conflict theory and structural functional theory.
Although Proudhon did not offer his readers any conscious

synthesis of these two approaches, both are coexistent in


his sociological analyses.

Roscoe C. Hinkle, Jr. and Gisela J. Hinkle, The


Development of Modern Sociology: its Nature and Growth in
the United States (Hew York: Random House, 1954j, p. 17.
CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSION

Although, this study as a whole has "been guided hy


the perspectives of intellectual history, the tracing of
the complex filiations and disaffiliations of Proudhon's
sociological ideas and sociological concepts was beyond
the scope of the present study. In general we limited

our analysis to re-analysing and "translating" Proudhon's

thought into comparable terminology used in contemporary


sociology. In these comparisons we have attempted to pre­
serve the meaning elements of Proudhon's specific ideas
and explicit and implicit propositions, relating them to
each other as well as to salient issues in contemporary
sociology.

Proudhon's Ideas on the Context of His Lay


Our examination of Proudhon's social thought in
relation to the social thought of his own day has been
sketchy, but it enabled us to see both the originality and
lack of originality in Proudhon's thought. Unable to

surmount completely the prejudices, thoughts and fears of


his age, Proudhon did present new emphases and assertions

to his readers:
Thus the fact that Proudhon was more interested in

the social consequences of the new era of industrialization

235
and its accompanying division of labor than in specific
political developments of the time at which he wrote, led
him to focus on the role of the economy in societal develop­
ment. Although such an emphasis has become commonplace in
sociological theory after Marx, it should be remembered
that at the time Proudhon wrote most social theorists were
more concerned with the role of political events in societal
process.

Although Proudhon's views on action and work implied

that the division of labor itself was inevitable, it would

only be when the economy was reorganized scientifically


that the division of labor would inevitably have an inte­
grating influence in society. His main concern was that
contradictions in the economy and problematic social con­
ditions attendant upon the division of labor should be
eliminated.
In his discussions of the disadvantageous effects
of industrialization and mechanization and the pseudo
integration resulting from religious organization in society,
Proudhon was among the first social theorists to specify

the meaning elements of what Marx was later to define as


alienation. Proudhon implied, for example, that as reli­
gious institutions functioned according to false norms,
that is norms which were not inherently constructive for

the progress of society, the consequence of such pseudo

integration would be a negation of individual interest and


) 237

would result in alienation at both, the societal and the


individual level. Although like Saint-Simon, Comte and
Fourier he had concluded that traditional religion had
outlived its usefulness as a basis of integration for modern
society, his solution to the problem, namely the development

of a society based on the secular norms of justice, provided


an answer uniquely his own.
Having described alienation arising out of the
economic sphere as a result of its being organized around
vested interests, Proudhon went beyond the more limited
interpretations of alienation given by Marx, in that

Proudhon suggested tendencies towards alienation in the


political sphere which were consequences of the lack of

scientific organization in the economy. In pointing out


the continual perpetuation of tyrannies at the political

level of social organization and in showing the ignorance


and apathy of the masses in allowing this to continue,
Proudhon underlined the ingredients of powerlessness,

meaninglessness and apathy so often found in contemporary


1
definitions of alienation.

In his diagnosis of social change, Proudhon predicted,


like Marx, the polarization of social classes, for he

For a discussion of the meaning elements of the


contemporary sociological concept of alienation see Melvin
Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation,11 American Sociological
Review. XXIV (December, 1959), reprinted in Ooser and
Rosenberg, Sociological Theory, pp. 525-38.
believed that such, polarization would occur only if the
economy were not reorganized according to scientific prin­
ciples. In this respect Proudhon diverged from the theories
of a unilinear evolution or of a unilinear progress which

were in vogue at the time of his writing. For Proudhon


there was nothing inevitable about his idea of social
progress. He was convinced, for example, that if no
reorganization of the economy were to take place, the insti­

tution of private property would continue to advance the


vested interests of capitalists and so promote an increase
of economic, political, and social contradictions in
society.
lastly, in presenting an interpretation of society
which fell within the "community" tradition of nineteenth
1
century social thought, Proudhon's views of society may
be valuable in presenting an alternative to the "rational"
bureaucratic organization of modern society. The emphases
which Proudhon made in describing his ideal of social
organization contained the elements of what we can describe
2
as de-bureaucratization.

1
Nisbet considers the nineteenth century concept of
community as being "the most fundamental and far-reaching
of sociology's unit ideas." See Nisbet, Sociological
Tradition, pp. 47-106.
2
For a discussion of the contemporary sociological
concept of de-bureaucratization see S. N. Eisenstadt,
"Bureaucracy, Bureaucratization, and Bebureaucratization,"
Administrative Science Quarterly, 4 (1959), 302-20.
239
Proudhon and the Intellectual Roots of Sociology
This study indicates how complex the intellectual
roots of the discipline of sociology are. Popular dis­
cussions of the origins of sociology which continue to

focus exclusively on the contributions of Auguste Comte


are both mistaken and irrelevant. Proudhon is an important
part of these origins as our study has sought to document.
Proudhon was one of the earliest writers to put
forward the view that it was man who made religion and not
religion that made man. In delineating the role of reli­
gion in society and the consequences of religion and

religious institutions for the individual and for society

he paved the way for subsequent sociological studies of


religion and its relation to society.
Proudhon was not the first social thinker to single

out the importance of the economy for the rest of society,


and yet his unrelenting emphasis on this sector was a
unique contribution to the early development of sociology.
It was through his concern for the scientific reorgani­
zation of the economy that Proudhon became one of the first
to articulate the interests of the working class.
Proudhon's ideas on social reform are relevant to

the early period of sociological theorizing where most of


the concerns focused upon were linked in some way with the
240
1
idea of social policy. Subsequent changes in emphasis
have been due to ideological changes within the discipline
of sociology, these being explained in terms of the chang­
ing class position of the sociologist and the organization
2
of sociology, rather than to any lack of pertinence or
relevance of these concerns for the discipline of sociology,
past or present.
Proudhon's ideas on justice and the role of justice

in society, at psychological and social levels, are original

contributions in the tradition of social thought and


sociology and can be viewed as the beginnings of a theory
of norms in society. In applying his interpretation of
the dialectical principle to the study of society as a real
entity and not merely as an idea, Proudhon again had

insights to offer the early development of sociology which


were not merely the reiteration of others' ideas.
Proudhon made it quite clear to his readers and to

his correspondents that he did not want to form a school


3
of thought from his ideas. In this regard, the lack of

1
These ideas of social reform can also be seen to be
relevant to the contemporary policy orientation of the
sociological movement of the New Left. For an example of
this type of orientation see the work of C. Wright Mills.
2
John Horton, "The Dichotomization of Anomie and
Alienation," British Journal of Sociology. 15 (1964),
283-300.
3
A vivid example of this emphasis is found in
Proudhon's letter to Marx, 17 May, 1846 in Proudhon,
Oorrespondance, Vol. II, pp. 198-202.
k'
1

241

systematization of M s thought, in Proudhon's eyes, was a


positive aspect rather than a shortcoming. Proudhon had
criticized severely the "systems" of the Saint-Simonians,
Fourier, and Marx. Moreover, it should he remembered that
the body of social thought at the time when Proudhon wrote
frequently lacked internal coherence, for there was no
clear consensus on the essence or the boundaries of sociol­
ogy. Proudhon's style of presentation of sociologically
pertinent data was thus not uncharacteristic of the age in
which he lived."1" The nature of Proudhon's contribution to
the early development of the discipline of sociology can
only be understood when all these factors are considered.

Traditional sociology had been presented in terms


of a unilinear evolutionary perspective. By way of

contrast Proudhon's dialectic provided richer substantive


detail in his early sociological' investigations by indicat­

ing a dual perspective on social phenomena through the


persistence of thesis and antithesis at all stages of the
investigation.
Even though Proudhon's thought serves to make us
increasingly aware that the intellectual discipline of
sociology has many roots and many traditions, it cannot
be dismissed as being of historical interest only. His

The works of Vico and Saint-Simon provide instances


of similarly "unsystematic" character.
i1
i

242
thought continues to he relevant to the development of
sociology, precisely because he dealt with issues that have

continued to be of critical import for the discipline.

Ma.ior Sociological Themes in the Work of Proudhon


Taking the wider society as his social unit, Proudhon

broke this unit into sub-units, subsystems, or spheres which


he considered to play decisive roles in the organization
and functioning of society as a whole. In his emphasis

on the economy and the importance of its scientific organi­


zation, Proudhon suggested the dependency of political and
social institutions on the structure of economic institutions.
Although Proudhon was particularly concerned with

the phenomenon of revolution, he himself did not advocate


revolution as an instrument of social engineering. He saw
revolution as an inevitable consequence of other social
changes and maladjustments in society. His primary emphasis
in examining the conditions of change leading up to the
phenomenon of revolution was on the contradictions of the
economy, especially those centering on the institution of

private property as it existed in his own day.


Tied in with Proudhon's dialectical approach to the

study of social phenomena are his views on both religion


and justice. For Proudhon, these two elements, both at
the level of personality and at the level of society, were

mutually exclusive alternatives. Although Proudhon saw


the functions and positive consequences of religion and
?

243
religious institutions in society, especially in the case
of the Roman Catholic religion at the time he wrote, he
emphasized that ultimately religion and its institutions

could only alienate man because of its mythology and false


images which were removed from social reality. Thus for
Proudhon religion was essentially dysfunctional, the
necessary social control given by religious institutions
at the time he wrote creating a pseudo integration. In

general Proudhon voiced the view that society must choose

between religion and justice. It was not possible for


society to support the workings of both a religious principle
and a principle of justice. Furthermore, it was only the
free expression of the principle of justice that could save

society from destroying itself and the individual from


negating his dignity as a human being.
From a social structural point of view the
necessary hierarchical and authoritarian structure of the
Roman Catholic Church, was, for Proudhon, yet another form'
of tyranny and abuse of power. The egalitarian organiza­
tion of society resulting from the free operation of justice,
on the other hand, would bring about social progress: the
economic structure, scientifically organized according to

the principle of justice, would no longer be subjected to


the effects of poverty in an affluent society. Similarly,

the political structure, also scientifically organized and


operating according to the principle of justice, being based
244
on the economic structure, would no longer support the
status quo in respect of the endorsement of vested interests.
This ideal of social organization based upon the
principle of justice would be achieved through education in
the family and in educational institutions, and the inter­
nalization of the values of justice through interaction.^
In this way justice would become immanent at the individual

and social levels, and would act as a spontaneous and


2
infallible means of social control and social progress.
In "translating" the idea of justice into modern
sociological terms, it was found that the meaning elements

expressed by Proudhon brought this central idea of his

within the orbit of what is today called normative sociol­


ogy. There are many elements in Proudhon's descriptions of
the workings of the principle of justice and in his
explanations of the workings of the principle of justice
1
The much-used terms "interaction" and "social inter­
action" in contemporary sociology can be interpreted as
stemming from earlier ideas. In this instance Proudhon's
basic principle and theme of mutualism reflect the element
of reciprocity which both Proudhon and contemporary sociol­
ogists consider to be most significant in the analysis of
society.
2
In his discussions of the evolution^of the prin­
ciple of justice in De la Justice dans la Revolution et
dans l'Eglise Proudhon distinguished between an earlier
manifestation of justice, transcendental justice, as an
authority arising from social relationships outside the
individual person, and the later development of immanent
justice, the internalized external norms now acting as
conscience in the individual. This "progression" in the
nature of justice is re-echoed by Durkheim later in his
discussions of normative control changing its base from
exteriority and restraint to an internalized form of
conscience.
245
which, provide the underpinnings for a theory of norms. This
is particularly so because Proudhon related the principle

of justice to other basic ideas such as social change,

social progress, social economics, political science, social


control and education. It was through the acceptance of
the scientific principle and the secular norms arising from
the discovery and application of science in the spheres of

economics and politics that a "natural" social control and


a "natural" direction of social change and education for
1
all members of the society would come into being.
Proudhon's juxtaposition of social organization
according to the principles of justice and of religion
added another dimension of meaning to both religion and
justice. Por Proudhon these two principles were diametric­
ally opposed to each other and could not overlap in any
way. Thus Proudhon postulated a sharp differentiation
2
between religious and secular norms in society. For
Proudhon it was only when society was organized according

to secular norms that it would be freed of the negative


effects of an authoritarian hierarchical structure, the

1
Proudhon's idea of natural order is largely a
result of the "balancing" of social and individual factors
in society, without the imbalances caused by hierarchical
tyrannies.
2
In his predictions of the eventual secularization
of religion, Proudhon's thought is similar to that presented
later by Durkheim, although for Proudhon all evidence of
religious phenomena would, ideally, disappear from society.
246

tyranny that had kept societies and individuals in bondage


and in a perpetual state of purposeless revolution and war­
fare since the history of man began. It was through science
and justice, these two terms being used interchangeably at
certain points by Proudhon, that secular norms would come
into play and have an equalizing and liberating effect on
both society and the individual. Science and justice would
also operate as a system of social control in Proudhon's
ideal society, where group interest would always supersede
interest of the individual, although such precedence would

be in the ultimate interest of the individual.


On the level of personality Proudhon showed that
religion and religious belief negated the dignity and self-

respect of individual men. Because men looked to a power


outside of themselves for inspiration and guidance, the
natural consequence would be for men to belittle their own
capacity and spirituality. It would only be when secular
norms were internalized that men would be able to act
according to their true capacity and so give rise to a
real self respect and respect of others. It was this
condition of the internalization of secular norms that
would give rise to social progress in all spheres.

In the development of his ideas on the role of the


principle of justice in society, Proudhon examined the prin­
ciple of justice as it functioned in different economic,

political and social institutions. Proudhon did not state

how it was that the economy and political structure of


247
society would be reorganized according to the principle of
justice until he focused attention on the institutions of
education and the family. In so doing he became more
explicit in describing what he understood by the term
justice and how both the individual and society would come
to be directed and organized according to this principle
before all others. Furthermore, it was only when priority
would be given to the internalization and expression of the
principle of justice that we should be able to speak of
individual and social progress. This progress would
depend upon the disappearance of the forms and expression
of the institution of religion as well as upon the appear­

ance of forms associated with the expression of the principle


of justice.1
The contradictions which Proudhon observed in

economic, political and social conditions of his day

together formed the dynamic of social process in the thought


of Proudhon. It was only if this proces moved towards the

disappearance of the forms and expression or the institu­


tion of religion, as well as towards the appearance of the
forms associated with the expression of the principle of
justice, however, that we would be able to describe it as

social progress. Thus for Proudhon social progress was not

The appearance of educational institutions and privi­


leges to be shared by all is one example of these new
external forms of the principle of justice manifesting
itself in society.
248
possible until society began to allow the principle of
justice to operate freely.^
The point of dynamic equilibrium reached from the
opposition of the thesis and antithesis became a different

level of social control. This newly equilibrated level of


social control would be more liberating as far as the indi­
vidual and social action was concerned if it were the

expression of secular normative elements which were attri­


butes of the principle of justice.

Proudhon's Sociology: an Evaluation


Any assessment of Proudhon's sociology must bear in
mind that as a journalist Proudhon aimed at reaching a wider
general public and not merely, in fact most explicitly not,
an educated intellectual llite. Even though it was his
intention to be scientific, his work is filled with rhetoric
and assertions. The sociological ideas he presented,
although rich and complex in meaning, do not constitute
explanations of the phenomena observed.
A distinct contribution to the discipline of sociol­
ogy which Proudhon made was his use of the dialectical

principle in interpreting social phenomena. Proudhon was

not the first to make use of a dialectical approach to the

pursuit of knowledge. Many of Proudhon's own ideas about

This is yet another example of how Proudhon diverged,


from the theories of unilinear evolution or unilinear
progress in vogue at the time of his writing.
249
the use of and the meaning of the dialectic were influenced
hy the thought of Hegel, who had used the dialectic pri­
marily in the sphere of ideas. Proudhon, however, applied
his ideas of the dialectical principle to a social reality
which went far beyond the sphere of ideas, and in this
respect he may be considered to have introduced the dialec­
tical principle as a tool of sociological analysis into the
1
discipline of sociology. In this regard he served to lay
a groundwork for a new tradition of sociological analysis,
which today finds its clearest expression in the writings

of conflict theorists.
Proudhon also contributed to the delineation of the

boundaries of sociology as a distinctive intellectual dis­


cipline. Proudhon viewed sociology, or rather the "social
science" he constantly referred to, as a generalizing
science, that is a science which is dependent upon the

findings of special sciences such as economics and political


science. He saw, as is especially evident throughout his

work He la Creation de l'Ordre dans l'Humanite ou Principes


2
d fOrganization Politique. that every science depended upon

1
The introduction of the dialectic into the discipline
of sociology is traditionally associated with the thought
of Marx. For a recent discussion of the dialectic in sociol­
ogy, see Bosserman, Dialectical Sociology.
2
This hierarchy of the different sciences is reminis­
cent of the ideas of Comte, although in the range of dis­
ciplines considered by Proudhon he moved more within the
orbit of the social sciences and did not seek to synthesize
the whole field of human knowledge. These ideas are based
on Proudhon’s "serial law."
250
several others. Although Proudhon's work was far too
unsystematic to provide a program for the emergence of

sociology, he nevertheless served to strengthen the argu­


ments of those convinced of the historical necessity of

the emergence of such a discipline. Thus Proudhon helped


to clarify a particular orientation - a sociological one -
rather than to outline a curriculum of sociology like Comte.

The methodological shortcomings of Proudhon's sociol­


ogical writings should not blind us to the importance of his
ideas and substantive insights. It is especially in such
areas as his emphasis on the principle of justice as a
basis for the construction of norms, that his contribution
to contemporary sociology, as well as to the origins and
growth of the discipline, may be most clearly distinguished.
Also Proudhon's dialectical approach to the study of socio­
logical phenomena highlights the complexity of the role
played by the economy or by religion in society and thereby
increases our -understanding of the concerns of contemporary

American sociology.
Insofar as Proudhon saw society as being in a state

of perpetual motion and in perpetual conflict, his work has


parallels with that of conflict theorists in contemporary
1
sociology, and with those who see social change as being
continuous, forms of organization being defined in terms
of process. By the presentation of the two extremes of the
possible manifestations of a social phenomenon, or by
highlighting the two sides of a "contradiction" in the

^See especially the work of Ralf Dahrendorf on social


conflict and class conflict.
1

251
1
description of a social problem. Proudhon's system of
sociological analysis provides an alternative strategy to
the much.over-used sociological tool of ideal types.
In his approach to the concept of society both from
the point of view of institutions and from the point of view
of individual roles, Proudhon combined macro-sociological
and middle range theoretical concerns. Voicing opinions

in the interests of the worker rather than in those of the


capitalists, he showed a sensitive awareness of the social

roles of members of the middle and working classes and


formulated seminal theoretical approaches to role playing
and role conflict in the sphere of social stratification.
Proudhon made a useful contribution to the develop­

ment of sociological theory by relating his ideas to the


notion of the functional consequences of certain economic
conditions and religious organization for the wider society.
Proudhon was, in fact, unusually concerned with conse­
quences at a time when French sociology had been, and
continued to be, heavily influenced by Social Darwinism.
Durkheim, writing at the turn of the twentieth century,
still thought it necessary to go back to social origins,
even though he "translated" his ideas into functionalism.

Proudhon, on the other hand, insisted that we should not

See the work of C. Wright Mills and Herbert Marcuse


as examples of the dialectical approach to social phenomena;
see Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia" for a discussion of the
advantages of a problem-centered sociology.
252
persist in studies of the origins of social phenomena -
our focus for social investigations should he on the present
reality and present problems.
We may close by suggesting that Proudhon's work
provides a fruitful hunting ground for sociological hypo­
theses, many of which, with only minor reformulation, can
be tested today. The elements of sociological theory con­
tained in the social thought of Proudhon thus may provide
a creative source of ideas for future research. In an age
in which American sociology has been overly preoccupied
with the feasibility of executing competent research, the
work of a social theorist like Proudhon serves as a timely
reminder that the significance of the ideas being researched

must never be overlooked.


APPENDIX

PROUDHON'S SOCIOLOGICAL WORKS: A SELECTIVE


ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

The selection is listed in chronological order.


The original French title for each work is followed
"by the date of original publication and an English
translation of the title.

De La Calibration Du Dimanche (1926) On The Observance of


the Sabbath.
All of Proudhon's basic ideas are presented in
this essay in rudimentary form: the subject appears
to be little more than a pretext for Proudhon to
present his own ideas. In Moses, the institutor
of the discussed beneficial custom, Proudhon saw
not merely a religious leader, but also the father
of social reform.
From an examination of the commandment "Thou shalt
not steal" Proudhon draws his conclusion that this
means "Thou shalt not lay anything aside for thyself."
He declared that "Property is the last of the false
gods," and wrote against "cumulative proprietors."
He attacked the exploiters of the proletariat and
ended with an imaginary dialogue in which the poor
cry out in definace, "Proprietors, defend yourselves."
Proudhon's egalitarianism, his theory of property,
his ideas of a natural, immanent justice and his
condemnation of Rousseau's idea of the social contract
are all touched upon in this essay.
Q.u'Est-Ce Que La Propriete? (1840) What Is Property?
Proudhon answers the question of the title to
this memorandum with the word "Theft." This bold
expression was used for emphasis - by property
Proudhon meant "the sum of its abuses." His thesis
was to denounce the property that is distinguished
by interest, usury and rent, by the impositions of
the non-producer upon the producer.
Proudhon argues that labor alone is the basis of
value, but that this does not give the laborer a
right to property as labor does not create the
material out of which the product is made. Thus
the right to products is exclusive, whereas the right
to means is common. According to Proudhon the real

253
254
"surplus value" of which the capitalist appropriates
an unduly disproportionate share includes not only
raw materials, but also the accumulated techniques
and traditions of civilisation and the element of
cooperation in labor which makes each man's work so
much more effective than if he worked alone. Thus
it is the social and not the personal element in
work which the exploiter appropriates.
Proudhon refutes the anti-egalitarian arguments •
of the Saint-Simonians and the Pourierists, both of
whom declared that, because men are unequal in
capacity, they must receive an unequal return for
their labor. Proudhon, declares that although men
may be unequal in capacity, they must be equal in
rights. He states that property is incompatible
with justice because it represents the exclusion of
the worker from his equal rights to enjoy the fruits
of society. Proudhon makes the suggestion of commu­
nism as an alternative to the system of private
property. With communism as thesis and property as
antithesis, it is only when a synthesis is reached
that we shall have a solution to this problem.
Pe La Creation De L'Ordre Pans L'Humanite (1843) On the
Creation Among Men.
This book is full of undigested ideas and un­
related theories. Proudhon himself came to regret
its publication. It deals with religion, meta­
physics, history, economics and logic. Proudhon
intended to demonstrate "the essential laws of
creation, thought, and social order" in this work.
Like Comte he predicts the advent of a scientific
era of social thought.
For Proudhon "serial law" is the law of relation­
ships between things - it is the law arising from
the application of the scientific method to discover
how things exist. The series has no concern with
cause or substance, but is a principle of order and
the basis of science. Each being, each thing, is
in itself a series. The serial law is the principle
of unity in diversity, of synthesis in division.
The serial law is applied in human relationships
by political economy. Political economy is the key
to history, the theory of order. The key to the
economic organization of society lies in the inte­
gration of work, and the key to the integration of
work is the principle of equality.
Systeme Pes Contradictions Economiques. Ou Philosonhie Pe
La Misere (1846) System of Economic Contradictions.
Or Philosophy of Poverty.
Focus of this study is the problem presented by
the degrading effects of competition and of the
255
division of labor and the fact that these methods of
economic organization are the conditions of economic
progress and of social equality. Work begins with
a dissertation on the idea of God. Proudhon then
launches an attack on the bourgeois economists and
on the utopian socialists. He points out the oppo­
sition between political economy and tradition,
socialism and individualism.
After an analysis of competition and monopoly,
taxation and credit, property and community, he
examines the Malthusian theory of population. He
concludes that destitution will always be with us
as long as work is not organized according to scien­
tific principles. After provoking the consumption
of goods by the abundance of products, society
encourages a shortage by the low level of wages.
Solution Du Probleme Sociale (1868) Solution to the Social
Problem.
Proudhon attempts to show that the Revolution as
such offered no solution to the social problems of
his day as it was unorganized in any attempt at
economic reform. Parliamentary government based on
manhood suffrage offered no solution to the economic
problem. The masses wanted more than the vote - they
wanted food and work.
This work deals with the immediate problems of
-.Proudhon's day. Proudhon emphasizes the general point
that social reform will never come out of political
reform, and that political reform must emerge from
economic reform.
les Confessions 33'Un Revolutionnaire (1849) Confessions of
a Revolutionary.
This is a study of the revolutionary movement in
Prance, 1789-1849, with anticipations of its further
development. Proudhon includes autobiographical
chapters describing the mental effect of parliamentary
life and the background to the positions Proudhon
took up with regard to specific events.
Proudhon begins by examining the trends into
which Prench political movements are inclined to flow,
absolutism and socialism being at the extremes.
Absolutism and socialism represent the poles of past
and future between which society moves. It is from
this scheme that Proudhon makes his analysis of the
historic situation.
The revolution is a form of dynamic progress for
Proudhon in that it assists society in proceeding
towards the final dynamic equilibrium and synthesis
of anarchy.
u

256
Idee Generale De La Revolution Au Bix-Neuvieme Siecle
(1851) General Idea of the Revolution in the Nine­
teenth Century.
This is a utopian hook, published from prison.
It contains the first of Proudhon's full statements
of the ideas of anarchism and federalism, ideas which
represent Proudhon's major contribution to political
science.
Proudhon's thesis is that the revolution is a
continuous process which lost its direction when it
concentrated on reforming the political hierarchy.
Political powers always tend towards centralization
and so towards tyranny. Therefore all concentra­
tion of reform should be on the organization of
economic forces. The chief goal of the revolution
is to base society on economic forces organized
without the coercion of the government.
La Revolution Sociale Demontree Par le Coup B'Etat Du Deux
Becembre (1852) The Social Revolution Vindicated by
the Coup D'Etat of December Second.
Also published from prison. Proudhon bids Louis
Napoleon base his regime on mutual credit and on the
reduction of interest rates. He also appeals to the
lower middle classes, as opposed to the upper middle
class of capitalists, to lead the working class,
through the reconciliation of their interests, to
economic, political and social liberty.
Proudhon again suggests that the end of nineteenth
century evolution will be the state of anarchy. The
book was banned by the minister of police on the eve
of its publication.
Philosophie Du Progres (1853) Philosophy of Progress.
There can be no completion of evolution as the
movement of the universe is perpetual. Equilibrium,
the complementary condition to movement, does not
tend towards uniformity or a static position. By
the .conservation of forces equilibrium leads to the
perpetual renewal of movement. Progress does not
proceed in a regular manner and true morality arises
from the appearance of progress.
Progress is equated with federalism and the direct
government of the people. Proudhon thought that in
social relations the notion of progress should replace
all systems of reform.
Be La Justice Bans La Revolution Et Bans L'Eglise (1858) On
Justice in the Revolution and in the Church.
Book contains a fuller description of the prin­
ciple of justice. Social rights and duties are bound
up in Proudhon's concept of justice and he defines
257
the object of society as being to achieve justice,
so recognizing the reciprocal rights and duties of
its members. It is only through equality, an ema­
nation of social revolution, that justice can be
attained. Justice is the only real substitute for
authority and revelation resting on ecclesiastical
and monarchical bases.
It is from the application of justice to
economics that a new morality emerges. Bargaining
and credit are to be organized around the mutualist
principle of justice.
Balance between the interests of the individual
and those of the community is upset by the centrali­
zation of governmental authority. It is only through
the free federation of social groups that anarchism,
the ideal political organization, will be attained.
Proudhon discusses the institution of marriage,
bringing out the reciprocity of this type of relation­
ship. For Proudhon individual moral reform began
with the justice emerging from the reciprocity of
the marital relationship.
By proclaiming that all justice is in God, the
Church made justice transcendental. Through the
revolution justice became immanent or innate in man.
La Guerre Et la Paix (1861) War And Peace.
Proudhon sees war as the manifestation of the
right of force which is the foundation of society,
legislation, social rights and duties. As war was
no longer a means of achieving social ends, like the
Church it should be considered as an anachronism.
However this postulates an ideal condition and it
will be a long time from the present when this state
is actually achieved.
Proudhon asserts that poverty is the cause of
both war and revolution. As war recedes from its
original purpose as a dynamic of social change, abuses
enter into its conduct. War cannot be reformed now
and it must eventually be superseded.
Proudhon states both the advantages and the dis­
advantages of war. For example he shows that war
can be instrumental in bringing out the social virtues
of men. Eventually the corrupt elements of war
negate all its possible benefits. In modern times
war is the consequence of the capitalist regime which
produces economic chaos.
The solution to the social problem of war is to
create economic equilibrium between members of society.
Peace will not mean the end of antagonism and con­
flict, however. The forces of society will be trans­
formed into the constructive factors of economic
and social developments in society.
258
Du Principe Eederatif (1863) On the Principle of Dederation.
Politics rests fundamentally of the two contra­
dictory principles of authority and liberty. These
principles are not mutually exclusive but are inter­
dependent. Both principles must be recognized and
actualized through a contract of federation. The
new federated state must be organized for defence
rather than for attack.
Political federation demands economic federation
and corporations must federate. Proudhon states his
case against governmental centralization of political
powers. He urged that the party of the revolution
be reorganized as the party of decentralization and
of federation.
De la Capacite Politique Des Classes Ouvrieres (1865) On
the Political Capacity of the Working Classes.
Book was an appeal to the factory workers of
Prance, country people and Parisian artisans. Proud­
hon predicted the entry of the workers as an independent
force into politics. Actions associated with the
principle of mutuality would result from the dawning
of political consciousness of the working classes.
By developing mutuality the workers would bring
justice into the economic life of society and so
organize society on an egalitarian basis.
Politically mutualism was expressed as federalism.
True sovereignty of the people could only be guaran­
teed by federalism and the nature of the state would
change from being political to economic and social.
Proudhon's aim was to make all men free through
guaranteeing their economic independence. Only the
workers, by their recognition of the mutualist idea,
could initiate such a fundamental social change.
Through an alliance with the middle class they could
move towards liberation without civil war.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following selected bibliography is divided into


sections containing primary sources of Proudhon's work,
secondary sources on Proudhon and his age, works describing

the social thought of Proudhon's contemporaries and the


general socio-cultural context of this, and references on
the intellectual discipline of sociology. Works included
in the primary sources of Proudhon's social thought consist
of references to all of Proudhon's works available in this
country in original or early French editions, English
translations, selections, and collections of his works.
The secondary sources on Proudhon and his age are made up
of interpretations of Proudhon's thought, dealing only
cursorily with the social conditions from which his thought
arose. The works on Proudhon's contemporaries and socio­
cultural context include books which focus specifically on

the social, economic, political and intellectual climate


from which all these ideas arose. The sociological refer­

ences are highly selective, being chosen for their pertinence


to historical sociology, the history of sociological theory
and the substantive concerns focused upon in the work of
Proudhon in this study. The paucity of references to
articles is indicative of the scarcity of recent research
related to the social thought of Pierre Joseph Proudhon.

259
260
Primary Sources
Books. Selections and Collections

Proudhon^ Pierre Joseph.. Avertissement aux Proprietaires,


3e Memoire sur la Propri^tg. Tome X of Oeuvres Completes
de P. J. Proudhon. 12 vols. Paris: Rivi&re, 1926-27.
________ . Be la Capacity Politique des Classes Ouvriferes.
Paris: lihrairie Internationale, 1868.
________ . Carnets. 4 vols. Paris: M. Riviere, I960.
________ . De la Celebration du Dimanche. Tome IY of
Oeuvres Completes.
________ . Cesarisme et Christianisme. Paris: C. Marpon
et E. Elammarion, 1883.
________ . De Christianisme et l'Eglise; ou le Boulevard de
1 1Autoritg. Selection and preface by Manuel Devald&s.
Herblay (Seine-et-Oise): Editions de "l'ldee Libre,"
1930.

Des Confessions d'un Rgvolutionnaire. pour servir


l'Histoire de la Revolution de fgvrier. Paris: Au
bureau du journal la Yoix du Peuple, 1849.
________ . Contradictions Politiques. ou Theorie du Mouve-
ment Constitutionnel au XIXe sifecle. Paris: Librairie
Internationale, 1870.
________ . Correspondence. 14 vols. Paris: A. Lacroix et
Cie., 1875.
________ . De la Creation de 1'Ordre dans l'Humanite. ou
Principes d'Organisation Politique. Tome Y of Oeuvres
Completes.
________ . Dieu C'est le Mai. Selection and preface by
Manuel Devaldfes. Conflans-Honorine: Editions de l'ldee
Libre, 1927.
________ . Discours Prononce a l'Assemblee Rationale, 31
juillet 1848. Tome X of Oeuvres Completes.
________ . Le Droit au Travail et le Droit de Propriete.
Tome X of Oeuvres Completes.
________ . Explications Presentees au Minist^re Public sur
le Droit de Proprigtg^ Tome X of Oeuvres Completes.
261
. La Fldlration et 1 'Unite en Italie. Paris:
E. Dentu, 1862.
. Les Pemmelins. les Grandes Figures Romantiques.
Introduction "by Henri la Grange. Paris: Nouvelle
Librairie Rationale, 1912.
. La Guerre et la Paix: Reoherches sur le Principe
et la Constitution du Droit des Gens. 2 vols. Burxelles
A. Lacroix, Van Meenen et Cie., 1861.
. Id£e Generale de la Revolution au XIXe Siecle.
Paris: Riviere, 1924.
. Jesus et les Origines du Christianisme. Preface
and unpublished manuscripts classified by Clement
Rochel. Paris: G. Havard fils, 1896.
. Le la Justice dans la Revolution et dans l'Eglise;
nouveaux principes de philosophie pratique adresses S.
son Eminence Monseigneur Mathleu. cardinal-archev§que
de Besaneon. 3 vols. Paris! Garnier freres, 1858.
. La Justice Poursuivie par l'Eglise. Tome XII
of Oeuvres Completes.
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IV of Oeuvres Completes.
. Lettres a sa Pemme. Preface by Suzanne Henneguy.
Paris: B. Grasset, 1950.
. Lettres au Citoyen Rolland, 5 octobre 1858 - 29
juillet 1862. Introduction and notes by Jacques Bompard.
Paris: B. Grasset, 1946.
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Charles Augustin Sainte-Beauve. Paris: B. Grasset, 1929
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loi avant pour but de creer au profit des auteurs.
inventeurs et artistes, ion monopole perpetuel. Bruxelles
Office de Publicity, 1862.

Manuel du Speculateur a la Bourse. Paris:


Garnier fr&res, 1854.
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General Brialmont. Paris: librairie Illustree, 1898.
. Oeuvres Choisies. Selection by Jean Bancal.
Paris: Gallimard, 19£>7 •
262
Oeuvres Completes de P. J. Proudhon. Edited by
Celestin Bougl^ et Henri Moysset. 12 vols. Paris:
Rivifere, 1926-27-
. La Pensee Vivante de P. J. Proudhon. Selection
of original texts and preface by Lucien Maury. Paris:
Stock, Delamain et Boutelleau, 1942.
_. Philosophie du Progrfes. Tome XII of Oeuvres
Completes.
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M o d e m e s . Paris: A. Lacroix et Cie., 1875-
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by Robert Aron. Paris: P. Horay, 1951.
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Paris: Garnier frferes, 1865.
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Reconst'ituer le Parti de' la Revolution. Paris: E. Dentu,
1863.
. Programme Revolutionnaire. Tome X of Oeuvres
Completes.
. Proposition Relative a l'Imp&t sur le revenue.
Tome X of Oeuvres Completes.
Proudhon: Textes Choisis et Presentes par
Alexandre Marc. Paris: Egloff, 1945-
. Qu'est-ce que la Propriete? ou Recherohes sur le
Principe du droit et du gouvernement. premier mgmoire.
Introduction by Emile James. Paris: Garnier-Flammarion,
1966.
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. La Revolution Sociale. Demontree par le coup d'etat


du 2 decembre. Paris: Garnier frferes, 1852.
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1847-
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sophie de la Misfere. 2 vols. Paris: Flammarion, 1897.
.6

263
. Textes. Selection and presentation made by-
_

Bernard Voyenne. Paris: Club frangais du livre, 1952.


. Theorie de l'Impot. Bruxelles: Office de
_

Publicite, 1861.

Newspapers

Proudhon, Pierre Joseph. Le Peuple; Journal de la Republique


Democratique et Sociale. Septembre 1848 - juin 1849.
Paris: 1848-49.
________ . La Voix du Peuple. Octobre 1849 - mai 1850.
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Translations of Proudhon's Works


Cohen, Henry (ed.). Proudhon's Solution of the Social
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Proudhon, Pierre Joseph. General Idea of the Revolution in
the Nineteenth Century. Translated by John Beverley
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Haskell House Publishers, 1969.
Proudhon, Pierre Joseph. What is Property? Translated by
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