RULE 63 highly dubious, falsified, and incapable of proving the latter's claim

of ownership over the subject property; nevertheless, they created

CARMEN DANAO MALANA, et al vs. BENIGNO TAPPALA, et al a cloud upon petitioners' title to the property. Thus, petitioners
G.R. No. 181303 17 September 2009 were compelled to file before the RTC a Complaint to remove such
cloud from their title. Petitioners additionally sought in their
FACTS: Complaint an award against respondents for actual damages, in the
amount of P50,000.00, resulting from the latter's baseless claim
Carmen Danao Malana, et al filed a Complaint for Reinvidicacion,
over the subject property that did not actually belong to them, in
Quieting of Title, and Damages against Benigno Tappala, et al before
violation of Article 19 of the Civil Code on Human Relations.
the RTC Tuguegarao, Branch 3.Petitioners alleged that they were
Petitioners likewise prayed for an award against respondents for
the owners of a plot of land situated in Tugegarao City covered by
exemplary damages, in the amount of P50,000.00, since the latter
TCT No. T-127937. Petitioners inherited the subject property from
had acted in bad faith and resorted to unlawful means to establish
Anastacio Danao, who died intestate. During the lifetime of
their claim over the subject property. Finally, petitioners asked to
Anastacio, he had allowed Consuelo Pauig, who was married to
recover from respondents P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, because
Joaquin Boncad, to build on and occupy the southern portion of the
the latter's refusal to vacate the property constrained petitioners to
subject property. Anastacio and Consuelo agreed that the latter
engage the services of a lawyer. Before the respondents could file
would vacate the said land at any time that Anastacio and his heirs
their answer, the RTC issued an order dismissing the Complaint on
might need it. Petitioners claimed that respondents, Consuelo's
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The RTC ruled that RA No. 7691,
family members, continued to occupy the subject property even
amending BP 129, which vests the RTC with jurisdiction over real
after her death, already building their residences thereon using
actions, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds
permanent materials. Petitioners also learned that respondents
P20,000.00. It found that the subject property had a value of less
were claiming ownership over the subject property. Averring that
than P20,000.00; hence, petitioners' action to recover the same was
they already needed it, petitioners demanded that respondents
outside the jurisdiction of the RTC. Danao et al then filed a Motion
vacate the same. Respondents, however, refused to heed
for Reconsideration of the Order dismissing their Complaint, arguing
petitioners' demand. Petitioners referred their land dispute with
that their principal cause of action was the quieting of title which
respondents to the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Annafunan
falls squarely within the RTC’s jurisdiction. Said Motion was denied
West for conciliation. During the conciliation proceedings,
because it was held that quieting title was a real action, and that
respondents asserted that they owned the subject property and
said action fell within the jurisdiction of the MTC that exercises
presented documents ostensibly supporting their claim of
exclusive jurisdiction over real actions where the assessed value of
ownership. According to petitioners, respondents' documents were
real property does not exceed P20,000.00. Petitioners filed another
pleading, simply designated as Motion, in which they prayed that
the RTC Orders dated 4 May 2007 and 30 May 2007, dismissing their
Complaint, be set aside. They reiterated their earlier argument that
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court states that an action to quiet
title falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. They also
contended that there was no obstacle to their joining the two
causes of action, i.e., quieting of title and reivindicacion, in a single
Complaint. And even if the two causes of action could not be joined,
petitioners maintained that the misjoinder of said causes of action
was not a ground for the dismissal of their Complaint. The RTC
issued an Order dated 31 October 2007 denying petitioners' Motion.
It clarified that their Complaint was dismissed, not on the ground of
misjoinder of causes of action, but for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing petitioners' Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
RULING:
No. An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person
interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written
instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive
order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this
remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the
validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the
parties' rights or duties thereunder. Petitions for declaratory relief
are governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly
made a distinction between the first and the second paragraphs of
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.
The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 provides that: “Any person
interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may,
before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder.” Paragraph 2 of the same specifically refers to
(1) an action for the reformation of an instrument, recognized
under Arts. 1359-1369; (2) an action to quiet title, authorized by
Arts. 476-481; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership required
by Art. 1607 in a sale with the right to repurchase. These three
remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because they
also result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants,
often without the need of execution to carry the judgment into
effect. As to determine which court has jurisdiction to hear the case
(like the one at bar), it is imperative to note that BP 128, Sec. 33
gives the MTC exclusive original jurisdiction to hear civil actions
involving title to, possession of, real property, or any interest
therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein
does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), excluding
damages. As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject
property as stated in Tax Declaration No. 02-48386 is only P410.00;
therefore, petitioners' Complaint involving title to and possession of
the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
MTC, not the RTC. Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief
presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the
instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Since the
purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an
authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties
under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the action would depend on the value of the property involved. Given
enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle that the subject property herein is valued only at P410.00, then the
issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over an action to recover the
only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, or contract same. The RTC, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion
to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical in dismissing, without prejudice, petitioners' Complaint for lack of
remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state jurisdiction.
where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need
for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they BRO. MIKE VELARDE vs. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY
lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a G.R. No. 159357 28 April 2004
commission of wrongs. Where the law or contract has already been
contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the FACTS:
courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other
On 28 January 2003, the Social Justice Society filed a Petition for
words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for
Declaratory Relief before RTC Manila against Bro. Mike Velarde and
declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or
other religious co-respondents. SJS, a registered political party,
transgressed before the institution of the action. In the present case,
sought the interpretation of several constitutional provisions,
petitioners' Complaint for quieting of title was filed after petitioners
specifically on the separation of church and state; and a declaratory
already demanded and respondents refused to vacate the subject
judgment on the constitutionality on the acts of religious leaders
property. In fact, said Complaint was filed only subsequent to the
endorsing a candidate for office, or urging their members to vote
latter's express claim of ownership over the subject property before
for a specific candidate. Bro. Eddie Villanueva submitted, within the
the Lupong Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to petitioners' title.
original period [to file an Answer], a Motion to Dismiss.
Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already
Subsequently, Executive Minister Eraño Manalo and Bro. Mike
been deprived of the possession of their property, the proper
Velarde, filed their Motions to Dismiss. While His Eminence Jaime
remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion
Cardinal L. Sin, filed a Comment and Bro. Eli Soriano, filed an
reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. An accion
Answer within the extended period and similarly prayed for the
publiciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed one year
dismissal of the Petition. All sought the dismissal of the Petition on
after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful
the common grounds that it does not state a cause of action and
withholding of possession of the realty. An accion reivindicatoria is a
that there is no justiciable controversy. They were ordered to
suit that has for its object one's recovery of possession over the real
submit a pleading by way of advisement, which was closely followed
property as owner. Petitioners' Complaint contained sufficient
by another Order denying all the Motions to Dismiss. Bro. Mike
allegations for an accion reivindicatoria. Jurisdiction over such an
Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Eraño Manalo
moved to reconsider the denial. His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin,
asked for extension to file memorandum. Only Bro. Eli Soriano
complied with the first Order by submitting his Memorandum. The
court denied the motions to dismiss as well as the subsequent
motions for reconsideration. It further said that it had jurisdiction
over the case because in praying for a determination as to whether
the actions imputed to the respondents are violative of Article II,
Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, [the Petition] has raised only a
question of law. It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the
issue raised in the Petition - the separation of church and state -
even tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the
principle. Through its discourse, the court a quo opined at some
point that the "endorsement of specific candidates in an election to
any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause.
ISSUES:
Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable
controversy? Did it state a cause of action? Did respondent have
any legal standing to file the Petition for Declaratory Relief?
RULING:
Petition of Velarde is meritorious. Sec. 1, Rule 63 provides that:
“Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order
or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may,
before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties thereunder." Based on the foregoing, an action for
declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a
deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose
rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or
an ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is to interpret or to
determine the validity of the written instrument and to seek a
judicial declaration of the parties' rights or duties thereunder. The
essential requisites of the action are as follows: (1) there is a
justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons
whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has a
legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue is ripe for judicial
determination. Brother Mike Velarde contends that the SJS Petition
failed to allege, much less establish before the trial court, that there
existed a justiciable controversy or an adverse legal interest
between them; and that SJS had a legal right that was being violated
or threatened to be violated by petitioner. On the contrary, Velarde
alleges that SJS premised its action on mere speculations,
contingent events, and hypothetical issues that had not yet ripened
into an actual controversy. Thus, its Petition for Declaratory Relief
must fail. A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination,
not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. The SJS Petition
for Declaratory Relief fell short of this test. It miserably failed to
allege an existing controversy or dispute between the petitioner
and the named respondents therein. Further, the Petition did not
sufficiently state what specific legal right of the petitioner was
violated by the respondents therein; and what particular act or acts
of the latter were in breach of its rights, the law or the Constitution.
Indeed, SJS merely speculated or anticipated without factual
moorings that, as religious leaders, the petitioner and his co-
respondents below had endorsed or threatened to endorse a
candidate or candidates for elective offices; and that such actual or
threatened endorsement "will enable them to elect men to public
office who would in turn be forever beholden to their leaders,
enabling them to control the government;” and "posing a clear and
present danger of serious erosion of the people's faith in the
electoral process; and reinforcing their belief that religious leaders
determine the ultimate result of elections," which would then be
violative of the separation clause. Such premise is highly speculative
and merely theoretical, to say the least. Clearly, it does not suffice
to constitute a justiciable controversy. The Petition does not even
allege any indication or manifest intent on the part of any of the
respondents below to champion an electoral candidate, or to urge
their so-called flock to vote for, or not to vote for, a particular
candidate. It is a time-honored rule that sheer speculation does not
give rise to an actionable right.
ANTONIO TAMBUNTING, JR. vs. SPOUSES EMILIO and ESPERANZA
SUMABAT
G.R. No. 144101 16 September 2005
FACTS:
This case involves a dispute over a parcel of land situated in
Caloocan City which was previously registered in the names of
spouses Emilio Sumabat and Esperanza Baello. Spouses Sumabat
mortgaged the land to Antonio Tambunting, Jr. to secure the
payment for a loan worth P7, 727.95. The spouses’ debt soon
ballooned to P15, 000 for their failure to pay the monthly
amortizations. Because of their failure to pay the debt, Commercial
House of Finance, Inc. (CHFI), as assignee of the mortgage, initiated
foreclosure proceedings but did not push through with them. It was
restrained by the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Caloocan City,
Branch 33 (now RTC Branch 123) in a complaint for injunction filed
by respondents against petitioners. However, the case was
subsequently dismissed for failure of the parties to appear at the
hearing. Spouses Sumabat then filed an action for declaratory relief
with CFI Caloocan Branch 33, seeking a declaration as to their actual
indebtedness. Sumabat was declared in default for failure to file
within the reglamentary period. They moved for the dismissal of
the action on the ground that its subject, the mortgage deed, had
already been breached prior to the filing of the action. The motion
was denied for having been filed out of time and petitioners had
already been declared in default. The CFI rendered its decision. It
fixed respondents' liability at P15, 743.83 and authorized them to
consign the amount to the court for proper disposition. In
compliance with the decision, respondents consigned the required
amount. Years later, the Sumabats received a notice of sheriff’s sale
indicating that the mortgage had been foreclosed by CHFI and that
there will be an extrajudicial sale of the property. The Sumabats
thereafter instituted a civil case with a petition for preliminary
injunction, damages and cancellation of annotation of encumbrance
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, with
the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 120. However, the public auction
scheduled on that same day proceeded and the property was sold
to CHFI as the highest bidder. Respondents failed to redeem the
property during the redemption period. Hence, title to the property
was consolidated in favor of CHFI and a new certificate of title (TCT
No. 310191) was issued in its name. In view of these developments,
respondents amended their complaint to an action for nullification
of foreclosure, sheriff's sale and consolidation of title, reconveyance
and damages. On February 11, 2000, the RTC issued the assailed
decision. It ruled that the 1981 CFI decision (fixing respondents'
liability at P15, 743.83 and authorizing consignation) had long
attained finality. The mortgage was extinguished when respondents
paid their indebtedness by consigning the amount in court.
Moreover, the ten-year period within which petitioners should have
foreclosed the property was already barred by prescription. They
abused their right to foreclose the property and exercised it in bad
faith. As a consequence, the trial court nullified the foreclosure and
extrajudicial sale of the property, as well as the consolidation of title
in CHFI's name in 1995. It then ordered the register of deeds of
Caloocan City to cancel TCT No. 310191 and to reconvey the
property to respondents. It also held petitioners liable for moral
damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
RULING:
The trial court erred when it ruled that the 1981 CFI decision was
already final and executory. An action for declaratory relief should
be filed by a person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order, regulation or ordinance before breach or violation
thereof.[1] The purpose of the action is to secure an authoritative
statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a
statute, deed, contract, etc. for their guidance in its enforcement or
compliance and not to settle issues arising from its alleged
breach.[2] It may be entertained only before the breach or violation
of the statute, deed, contract, etc. to which it refers.[3] Where the
law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of
an action for declaratory relief, the court can no longer assume
jurisdiction over the action.[4] In other words, a court has no more
jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject, i.e., the
statute, deed, contract, etc., has already been infringed or
transgressed before the institution of the action. Under such
circumstances, inasmuch as a cause of action has already accrued in
favor of one or the other party, there is nothing more for the court
to explain or clarify short of a judgment or final order. Here, an
infraction of the mortgage terms had already taken place before the
filing of Civil Case No. C-7496. Thus, the CFI lacked jurisdiction when
it took cognizance of the case in 1979. The want of jurisdiction by a
court over the subject-matter renders its judgment void and a mere
nullity, and considering that a void judgment is in legal effect no
judgment, by which no rights are divested, from which no rights can
be obtained, which neither binds nor bars any one, and under which
all acts performed and all claims flowing out of are void, and
considering further, that the decision, for want of jurisdiction of the
court, is not a decision in contemplation of law, and, hence, can
never become executory, it follows that such a void judgment
cannot constitute a bar to another case by reason of res judicata.
Nonetheless, petition must fail. Article 1142 of the Civil Code is clear.
A mortgage action prescribes after ten years. An action to enforce a
right arising from a mortgage should be enforced within ten years
from the time the right of action accrues.[6] Otherwise, it will be
barred by prescription and the mortgage creditor will lose his rights
under the mortgage. Here, petitioners' right of action accrued in
May 1977 when respondents defaulted in their obligation to pay
their loan amortizations. It was from that time that the ten-year
period to enforce the right under the mortgage started to run. The
period was interrupted when respondents filed Civil Case No. C-
6329 sometime after May 1977 and the CFI restrained the intended
foreclosure of the property. However, the period commenced to
run again on November 9, 1977 when the case was dismissed. The
respondents' institution of Civil Case No. C-7496 in the CFI on March
16, 1979 did not interrupt the running of the ten-year prescriptive
period because, as discussed above, the court lacked jurisdiction
over the action for declaratory relief. All proceedings therein were
without legal effect. Thus, petitioners could have enforced their
right under the mortgage, including its foreclosure, only until
November 7, 1987, the tenth year from the dismissal of Civil Case
No. C-6329. Thereafter, their right to do so was already barred by
prescription. The foreclosure held on February 8, 1995 was
therefore some seven years too late.
AUGUSTO MANGAHAS vs. HON. VICTORIA ISABEL PAREDES, et al
G.R. No. 157866 14 February 2007
FACTS:
This case arose from a verified complaint for ejectment filed by
Avelino Banaag before MeTC Caloocan Branch 49 against Augusto
Mangahas and Marilou Verdejo. Banaag alleged that he is the
registered owner of the disputed property identified as Lot 4, Block
21, located in Maligaya Park Subdivision, Caloocan City, as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 196025 of the
Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. He averred that petitioners
constructed houses on the property without his knowledge and
consent and that several demands were made, but the same fell on
deaf ears as petitioners refused to vacate the premises. This
prompted private respondent to refer the matter to the Lupon
Tagapayapa for conciliation. The recourse proved futile since the
parties were not able to settle amicably. Private respondent then
filed an ejectment suit before the MeTC. Petitioners filed their
answer denying having unlawfully deprived private respondent
possession of the contested property. Petitioners claimed that they
have resided in the subject lot with the knowledge and conformity
of the true owner thereof, Pinagkamaligan Indo-Agro Development
Corporation (PIADECO), as evidenced by a Certificate of Occupancy
signed by PIADECO's president in their favor. On 10 July 1997,
petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Suspend
Proceedings on the ground that the subject property is part of the
Tala Estate and that the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 85, in Civil Case
No. Q-96-29810 issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 10
November 1997, enjoining the MeTCs of Quezon City and Caloocan
City from ordering the eviction and demolition of all occupants of
the Tala Estate. They posited that the injunction issued by the
Quezon City RTC is enforceable in Caloocan City because both cities
are situated within the National Capital Region. In an order dated 7
August 1997, the MeTC denied said manifestation and motion. It
ratiocinated that the injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC has
binding effect only within the territorial boundaries of the said court
and since Caloocan City is not within the territorial area of same,
the injunction it issued is null and void for lack of jurisdiction. The
MeTC ruled for private respondent., ruling that that TCT No. 196025
in private respondent's name was an indefeasible proof of his
ownership of the lot and his inherent right to possess the same. This
title entitled private respondent better right to possess the subject
property over petitioners' Certificate of Occupancy executed in their
favor by PIADECO. It held that it has jurisdiction over the
controversy since private respondent filed the case within one year
from the time the demand to vacate was given to petitioners.
Petitioners appealed to the RTC, which case was docketed as Civil
Case No. C-19097. In a Decision dated 16 November 2000, the trial
court affirmed in toto the MeTC decision. It ruled that the MeTC
was correct in denying petitioners' motion to suspend proceedings
anchored on the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the
Quezon City RTC reasoning that the writ of the latter court is limited
only to its territorial area, thus, the same has no binding effect on
the MeTC of Caloocan City. It sustained the MeTC's ruling that the
latter court has jurisdiction over the case as the same has been filed
within the reglementary period from the date of demand to vacate.
RULING:
It must be pointed out that petitioners' direct recourse to this Court
via petition for Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, and Prohibition with
Prayer for Provisional Remedy is an utter disregard of the hierarchy
of courts and should have been dismissed outright. This Court's
original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction is not
exclusive. It is shared by this Court with the Regional Trial Courts
and the Court of Appeals. Such concurrence of jurisdiction does not
give the petitioners unbridled freedom of choice of court forum. A
direct recourse of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. In the instant case, petitioners have not offered any
exceptional or compelling reason not to observe the hierarchy of
courts. Hence, the petition should have been filed with the Regional
Trial Court. Equally noteworthy is petitioners' resort to this Court
through petition for declaratory relief. This action is not among the
petitions within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Rule
63 of the Rules of Court which deals with actions for declaratory
relief, enumerates the subject matter thereof, i.e., deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, the construction or validity of
statute or ordinance. Inasmuch as this enumeration is exclusive,
petitioners' action to declare the RTC order denying their motion to
suspend execution, not being one of those enumerated, should
warrant the outright dismissal of this case.
CITY OF LAPU-LAPU vs. PEZA (G.R. No. 184203); PROVINCE OF
BATAAN vs. PEZA (G.R. No. 187583) 26 November 2014
FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari the City
of Lapu-Lapu and the Province of Bataan separately filed against
the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA).
In Lapu-Lapu, the City assailed the CA’s decision dismissing the City’s
appeal for being the wrong mode of appeal. The City appealed the
RTC Pasay Branch 111’s decision finding PEZA to be exempt from
paying real property taxes. In Bataan, the Province assailed the CA’s
decision and resolution granting PEZA’s petition for certiorari. CA
ruled that RTC Pasay Branch 111 gravely abused its discretion in
finding PEZA liable for real property taxes in Bataan.
Facts common to both cases:
President Marcos created the PEZA by virtue of PD 66, declaring as
government policy the establishment of export processing zones in
strategic locations throughout the Philippines. Said decree declared
that PEZA shall be a non-profit entity and exempt from taxes.
G.R. No. 184203:
The City of Lapu-Lapu, through its Office of the Treasurer,
demanded from PEZA the amount of P32, 912,350.08 in real
property taxes for the period 1992-1998 on PEZA’s properties
located in Mactan Economic Zone. The City pointed out that no
provision in the Special Economic Zone Act specifically exempted
the PEZA from payment of real property taxes, unlike Sec. 21, PD 66
that expressly provided for PEZA’s tax exemption. In 2002, PEZA
filed a petition for declaratory relief with RTC Pasay Branch 111,
praying that the trial court declare it exempt from the payment of
real property taxes. Pursuant to Rule 63, Sec. 3, ROC, the OSG filed a
comment on the PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief. It agreed that
the PEZA is exempt from payment of real property taxes, citing
Sections 24 and 51 of the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995.
Characterizing the PEZA as an agency of the national government,
the trial court ruled that the City had no authority to tax the PEZA
under Sections 133(o) and 234(a) of the Local Government Code. In
a resolution, the trial court granted the PEZA’s petition for
declaratory relief and declared it exempt from payment of real
property taxes.
G.R. No. 187583:
After the City of Lapu-Lapu had demanded payment of real property
taxes from the PEZA, the Province of Bataan followed suit. In its
letter dated May 29, 2003, the Province, through the Office of the
Provincial Treasurer, informed the PEZA that it would be sending a
real property tax billing to the PEZA. Arguing that the PEZA is a
developer of economic zones, the Province claimed that the PEZA is
liable for real property taxes under Section 24 of the Special
Economic Zone Act of 1995.
In its reply letter dated June 18, 2003, the PEZA requested the
Province to suspend the service of the real property tax billing. It
cited its petition for declaratory relief against the City of Lapu-Lapu
pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 111, Pasay City as
basis. The Province argued that serving a real property tax billing on
the PEZA "would not in any way affect [its] petition for declaratory
relief before [the Regional Trial Court] of Pasay City." Thus, in its
letter dated June 27, 2003, the Province notified the PEZA of its real
property tax liabilities for June 1, 1995 to December 31, 2002
totalling P110,549,032.55. After having been served a tax billing, the
PEZA again requested the Province to suspend collecting its alleged
real property tax liabilities until the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City resolves its petition for declaratory relief. The Province ignored
the PEZA's request. On January 20, 2004, the Province served on the
PEZA a statement of unpaid real property tax for the period from
June 1995 to December 2004. The PEZA again requested the
Province to suspend collecting its alleged real property taxes. The
Province denied the request in its letter dated January 29, 2004,
then served on the PEZA a warrant of levy covering the PEZA's real
properties located in Mariveles, Bataan. The PEZA's subsequent
requests for suspension of collection were all denied by the
Province. The Province then served on the PEZA a notice of
delinquency in the payment of real property taxes and a notice of
sale of real property for unpaid real property tax. The Province
finally sent the PEZA a notice of public auction of the latter's
properties in Mariveles, Bataan. On June 14, 2004, the PEZA filed a
petition for injunction with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, arguing that it is exempt from
payment of real property taxes. It added that the notice of sale
issued by the Province was void because it was not published in a
newspaper of general circulation as required by Section 260 of the
Local Government Code. The case was raffled to Branch 115. In its
order dated June 18, 2004, the trial court issued a temporary
restraining order against the Province. After the PEZA had filed a
P100,000.00 bond, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction, enjoining the Province from selling the PEZA's real
properties at public auction. On March 3, 2006, the PEZA and
Province both manifested that each would file a memorandum after
which the case would be deemed submitted for decision. The
parties then filed their respective memoranda. In the order dated
January 31, 2007, the trial court denied the PEZA's petition for
injunction. The trial court ruled that the PEZA is not exempt from
payment of real property taxes. According to the trial court,
Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code had withdrawn
the real property tax exemptions previously granted to all persons,
whether natural or juridical. As to the tax exemptions under Section
51 of the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, the trial court ruled
that the provision only applies to businesses operating within the
economic zones, not to the PEZA.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction to hear the petition of
declaratory relief of PEZA.
Ruling:
The Regional Trial Court of Pasay had no jurisdiction to hear, try
and decide the PEZA#s petition for declaratory relief against the
City of Lapu-Lapu.
We rule that the PEZA erred in availing itself of a petition for
declaratory relief against the City. The City had already issued
demand letters and real property tax assessment against the PEZA,
in violation of the PEZA’s alleged tax-exempt status under its
charter. The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, the subject matter
of PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief, had already been
breached. The trial court, therefore, had no jurisdiction over the
petition for declaratory relief. A special civil action for declaratory
relief is filed for a judicial determination of any question of
construction or validity arising from, and for a declaration of rights
and duties, under any of the following subject matters: a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order
or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation.
However, a declaratory judgment may issue only if there has been
no breach of the documents in question. If the contract or statute
subject matter of the action has already been breached, the
appropriate ordinary civil action must be filed. If adequate relief is
available through another form of action or proceeding, the other
action must be preferred over an action for declaratory relief. In the
present case, RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action, specifically, over the remedy sought. In sum, a petition
for declaratory relief must satisfy 6 requisites: first, the subject
matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or
ordinance; second, the terms of said documents and the validity
thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; third, there
must have been no breach of the documents in question; fourth,
there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the “ripening
seeds” of one between persons whose interests are adverse; fifth,
the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and sixth,
adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms
of action or proceeding. We rule that the PEZA erred in availing
itself of a petition for declaratory relief against the City. The City had
already issued demand letters and real property ta1 assessment
against the PEZA, in violation of the PEZA’s alleged tax-exempt
status under its charter. The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995,
the subject matter of PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief, had
already been breached! The trial court, therefore, had no
jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory relief.
The Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over the PEZA's petition
for certiorari against the Province of Bataan.
Appeal is the remedy "to obtain a reversal or modification of a
judgment on the merits." A judgment on the merits is one which
"determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the
disclosed facts, irrespective of the formal, technical or dilatory
objections." It is not even necessary that the case proceeded to
trial. So long as the "judgment is general" and "the parties had a full
legal opportunity to be heard on their respective claims and
contentions," the judgment is on the merits. On the other
hand, certiorari is a special civil action filed to annul or modify a
proceeding of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions. Certiorari, which in Latin means "to be
more fully informed," was originally a remedy in the common law.
certiorari" is used in two ways. An appeal before this court raising
pure questions of law is commenced by filing a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. An
appeal by certiorari, which continues the proceedings commenced
before the lower courts, is filed to reverse or modify judgments or
final orders. Under the Rules, an appeal by certiorari must be filed
within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order, or of the
denial of the appellant's motion for new trial or reconsideration. A
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, on the other hand, is an
independent and original action filed to set aside proceedings
conducted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Under the
Rules, a petition for certiorari may only be filed if there is no appeal
or any plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. The petition must be filed within 60 days from notice of the
judgment, order, or resolution. Because of the longer period to file
a petition for certiorari, some litigants attempt to file petitions
for certiorari as substitutes for lost appeals by certiorari. However,
Rule 65 is clear that a petition for certiorari will not prosper if
appeal is available. Appeal is the proper remedy even if the error, or
one of the errors, raised is grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the court rendering judgment. If appeal is available, a petition
for certiorari cannot be filed. In this case, the trial court's decision
dated January 31, 2007 is a judgment on the merits. Based on the
facts disclosed by the parties, the trial court declared the PEZA liable
to the Province of Bataan for real property taxes. The PEZA's proper
remedy against the trial court's decision, therefore, is appeal. Since
the PEZA filed a petition for certiorari against the trial court's
decision, it availed itself of the wrong remedy. As the Province of
Bataan contended, the trial court's decision dated January 31, 2007
"is only an error of judgment appealable to the higher level court
and may not be corrected by filing a petition for certiorari." That the
trial court judge allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion does
not make the petition for certiorari the correct remedy. The PEZA
should have raised this ground in an appeal filed within 15 days
from notice of the assailed resolution.
This court, "in the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in
the interest of substantial justice," has treated petitions
for certiorari as an appeal: "(1) if the petition for certiorari was filed
within the reglementary period within which to file a petition for
review on certiorari; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and
(3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the
rules." Considering that "the nature of an action is determined by
the allegations of the complaint or the petition and the character of
the relief sought," a petition which "actually avers errors of
judgment rather than errors than that of jurisdiction" may be
considered a petition for review. However, suspending the
application of the Rules has its disadvantages. Relaxing procedural
rules may reduce the "effective enforcement of substantive
rights," leading to "arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality
in the settlement of disputes." Therefore, for this court to suspend
the application of the Rules, the accomplishment of substantial
justice must outweigh the importance of predictability of court
procedures. The PEZA's petition for certiorari may be treated as an
appeal. First, the petition for certiorari was filed within the 15-day
reglementary period for filing an appeal. The PEZA filed its petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals on October 15,
2007, which was 12 days from October 3, 2007 when the PEZA had
notice of the trial court's order denying the motion for
reconsideration. Second, the petition for certiorari raised errors of
judgment. The PEZA argued that the trial court erred in ruling that it
is not exempt from payment of real property taxes given Section 21
of Presidential Decree No. 66 and Sections 11 and 51 of the Special
Economic Zone Act of 1995. Third, there is sufficient reason to relax
the rules given the importance of the substantive issue presented in
this case.
However, the PEZA's petition for certiorari was filed before the
wrong court. The PEZA should have filed its petition before the
Court of Tax Appeals. The Court of Tax Appeals has the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over local tax cases decided by Regional Trial
Courts. Section 7, paragraph (a) (3) of Republic Act No. 1125, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9282, provides:
Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. — The [Court of Tax Appeals] shall exercise:
a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein
provided:
3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in
local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise
of their original or appellate jurisdiction.
CJH DEVELOPMENT vs. BIR G.R. No. 172457 24 December 2008
FACTS:
Proclamation No. 420 (the Proclamation) was issued by then
President Fidel V. Ramos to create a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in
a portion of Camp John Hay in Baguio City. Section 3 of the
Proclamation granted to the newly created SEZ the same incentives
then already enjoyed by the Subic SEZ. Among these incentives are
the exemption from the payment of taxes, both local and national,
for businesses located inside the SEZ, and the operation of the SEZ
as a special customs territory providing for tax and duty free
importations of raw materials, capital and equipment. In line with
the Proclamation, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued
Revenue Regulations No. 12-97 while the Bureau of Customs (BOC)
issued Customs Administrative Order No. 2-98.The two issuances
provided the rules and regulations to be implemented
within the Camp John Hay SEZ. Subsequently, however, Section 3 of
the Proclamation was declared unconstitutional in part by the
Court en banc in John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition v. Lim, when
it held that: “the second sentence of Section 3 of Proclamation No.
420 is hereby declared NULL and VOID and is accordingly declared
of no legal force and effect. Public respondents are hereby enjoined
from implementing the aforesaid void provision. Proclamation No.
420, without the invalidated portion, remains valid and effective.”
The decision attained finality when the Court en banc denied the
motion for reconsideration through a resolution dated 29 March
2005. While the motion for reconsideration for the John Hay case
was pending with the Court, on 16 January 2004 the Office of the
City Treasurer of Baguio sent a demand letter to CJH Development,
ordering the latter to pay up its real property taxes due declared
under the names of the Bases Conversion
and Development Authority and Camp John
Hay Development Corporation totaling P101,935,634.17 inclusive of
penalties, as of January 10, 2004. The Bureau of Customs then
followed suit and demanded of CJH the payment of P71,983,753
representing the duties and taxes due on all importations made by
CJH from 1998 to 2004. CJH questioned the retroactive application
by the BOC of the decision of this Court in John Hay vs Lim. It
claimed that the assessment was null and void because it violated
the non-retroactive principle under the Tariff and Customs
Code. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a motion to
dismiss. The OSG claimed that the remedy of declaratory relief is
inapplicable because an assessment is not a proper subject of such
petition. It further alleged that there are administrative remedies
which were available to CJH.
In an Order dated 28 June 2005, the RTC dropped the City of Baguio
as a party to the case. The remaining parties were required to
submit their respective memoranda. On 14 October 2005, the RTC
rendered its assailed order. It held that the decision in John Hay vs
Lim applies retroactively because the tax exemption granted
by Proclamation No. 420 is null and void from the beginning. The
RTC also ruled that the petition for declaratory relief is not the
appropriate remedy. A judgment of the court cannot be the proper
subject of a petition for declaratory relief; the enumeration in Rule
64 is exclusive. Moreover, the RTC held that Commonwealth Act No.
55 (CA No. 55) which proscribes the use of declaratory relief in cases
where a taxpayer questions his tax liability is still in force and
effect.
ISSUE:
Is the remedy of declaratory relief proper in this case? Second, can
the decision in G.R. No. 119775 be applied retroactively?
RULING:
The requisites for a petition for declaratory relief to prosper are: (1)
there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking
declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and
(4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial
determination. CJH alleges that CA No. 55 has already been
repealed by the Rules of Court; thus, the remedy of declaratory
relief against the assessment made by the BOC is proper. It cited the
commentaries of Moran allegedly to the effect that declaratory
relief lies against assessments made by the BIR and BOC. CA No. 55
was never repealed by law. As a substantive law that has not been
repealed by another statute, CA No. 55 is still in effect and holds
sway. Precisely, it has removed from the courts' jurisdiction over
petitions for declaratory relief involving tax assessments. The Court
cannot repeal, modify or alter an act of the Legislature. Moreover,
the proper subject matter of a declaratory relief is a deed, will,
contract, or other written instrument, or the construction or validity
of statute or ordinance. CJH hinges its petition on the demand letter
or assessment sent to it by the BOC. However, it is really not the
demand letter which is the subject matter of the petition.
BRO. MIKE VELARDE vs. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY
Facts:
On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief
before the RTC-Manila against Velarde and his co-respondents
Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Eraño Manalo,
Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano. SJS,
a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several
constitutional provisions, specifically on the separation of church
and state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of
the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective
office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a
specified candidate. The petitioner filed a Motion to dismiss before
the trial court owing to the fact that alleged that the questioned SJS
Petition did not state a cause of action and that there was no
justiciable controversy. The trial court’s junked the Velarde petitions
under certain reasons:
1. It said that it had jurisdiction over the SJS petition, because in
praying for a determination as to whether the actions imputed to
the respondents were violative of Article II, Section 6 of the
Fundamental Law, the petition has raised only a question of law.
2. It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in
the Petition – the separation of church and state – even tracing, to
some extent, the historical background of the principle. Through its
discourse, the court quipped at some point that the "endorsement
of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear
violation of the separation clause."
The trial court’s essay did not contain a statement of facts and a
dispositive portion, however. Due to this aberration, Velarde and
Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration before the trial
court owing to these facts.
Issue:
Is the petition for declaratory relief meritorious?
Ruling:
No. The Court found nothing in the SJS Petition to suggest that an
explicit allegation of fact that SJS had a legal right to protect. In
special civil actions for declaratory relief, the concept of cause of
action under ordinary civil actions does not strictly apply. The
reason for this exception is that an action for declaratory relief
presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the
instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Nevertheless, a
breach or violation should be impending, imminent or at least
threatened. The justices could only infer that the interest from its
allegation was its mention of “its (SJS) thousands of members who
are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters and who are keenly
interested”. Aside from the fact that this general averment did not
constitute a legal right or interest, the court’s inferred interest too
vague and speculative in character. Rules require that the interest
must be material to the issue and affected by the questioned act
or instrument. To bolster its point, the SJS cited the Corpus Juris
Secundum and submitted that the plaintiff in a declaratory
judgment action does not seek to enforce a claim against the
defendant, but sought a judicial declaration of the rights of the
parties for the purpose of guiding their future conduct, and the
essential distinction between a ‘declaratory judgment action’ and
the usual ‘action’ is that no actual wrong need have been
committed or loss have occurred in order to sustain the
declaratory judgment action, although there must be no
uncertainty that the loss will occur or that the asserted rights will
be invaded. During the Oral Argument, Velarde and co-respondents
strongly asserted that they had not in any way engaged or intended
to participate in partisan politics. Not even the alleged proximity of
the elections to the time the Petition was filed below would have
provided the certainty that it had a legal right that would be
jeopardized or violated by any of those respondents. Even if the SJS
petition asserted a legal right, there was nevertheless no
certainty that such right would be invaded by the said respondents.
FELIPE B. OLLADA, etc. vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-11357 31 May 1962
FACTS:
Ollada, a CPA authorized to practice accounting at Central Bank filed
in the CFI a petition for declaratoy relief after his petition for a writ
of prelim injunction had been dismissed in the CFI assailing the
enforcement of the Bank with two requirements for CPAs, re: that
the applicant CPA should sign a statement under oath and that,
upon accreditation, a CPA would be governed by the rules and
regulations of the Central Bank and not by those of the Philippine
Institute of Accountants. He alleges that because of these
requirements he had suffered serious injury, and that such
enforcement has resulted in the unlawful restraint in the practice of
CPAs in the Office of the Central Bank. The CFI dismissed the
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for declaratory relief is proper.
RULING:
No. The complaint for declaratory relief will not prosper if filed after
a contract, statute or right has been breached or violated. In the
present case such is precisely the situation arising from the facts
alleged in the petition for declaratory relief. As vigorously claimed
by petitioner himself, respondent had already invaded or violated
his right and caused him injury — all these giving him a complete
cause of action enforceable in an appropriate ordinary civil action or
proceeding. An action for declaratory relief should be filed before
there has been a breach of a contract, statutes or right, and that it is
sufficient to bar such action, that there had been a breach — which
would constitute actionable violation. The rule is that an action for
Declaratory Relief is proper only if adequate relief is not available
through the means of other existing forms of action or proceeding.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HERMINIO ROQUE
G.R. No. 204603 24 September 2013
FACTS:
Herminio Roque, et al filed a petition before RTC Quezon City
Branch 92 assailing the constitutionality of the following sections of
RA 9372 (Human Security Act): (a) Section 3,for being void for
vagueness; (b) Section 7, for violating the right to privacy of
communication and due process and the privileged nature of priest-
penitent relationships; (c)Section 18, for violating due process, the
prohibition against ex post facto laws or bills of attainder, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as for contradicting
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; (d) Section 26,
for violating the right to travel; and (e) Section 27, for violating the
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Petitioners
moved to suspend the proceedings, averring that certain petitions
(SC petitions) raising the issue of RA 9372’s constitutionality have
been lodged before the Court. The said motion was granted. The
Southern Hemisphere cases which were pending at the time Roque
filed his petition were later on decided upheld the constitutionality
of the Human Security Act according to petitioners. Respondents
countered that the constitutionality of the Human Security Act was
not resolved in the cited case and that they properly filed for
declaratory relief. The RTC issued an Order which denied the subject
motion to dismiss, finding that the Court did not pass upon the
constitutionality of RA 9372 and that private respondents’ petition
for declaratory relief was properly filed. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration which was, however, denied by the RTC in an Order
dated July 31, 2012. The RTC observed that private respondents
have personal and substantial interests in the case and that it would
be illogical to await the adverse consequences of the aforesaid law’s
implementation considering that the case is of paramount impact to
the Filipino people.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the requirements for declaratory relief have been
satisfied in this case.
RULING:
No. The following are requisites for a petition of declaratory relief:
(1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or
regulation, or ordinance; (2) the terms of said documents and the
validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; (3)
there must have been no breach of the documents in question; (4)
there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening
seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; (5) the
issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and (6) adequate relief
is not available through other means or other forms of action or
proceeding. Based on a judicious review of the records, the Court
observes that while the first, second, and third requirements appear
to exist in this case, the fourth, fifth, and sixth requirements,
however, remain wanting. As to the fourth requisite, there is serious
doubt that an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds"
of one exists in this case. Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers
to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely
anticipatory. Corollary thereto, by "ripening seeds" it is meant, not
that sufficient accrued facts may be dispensed with, but that a
dispute may be tried at its inception before it has accumulated the
asperity, distemper, animosity, passion, and violence of a full blown
battle that looms ahead. The concept describes a state of facts
indicating imminent and inevitable litigation provided that the issue
is not settled and stabilized by tranquilizing declaration.
A perusal of private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief
would show that they have failed to demonstrate how they are left
to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some direct injury
as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372.
Not far removed from the factual milieu in the Southern
Hemisphere cases, private respondents only assert general interests
as citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which the government
could prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law
would remain untrammeled. As their petition would disclose,
private respondents’ fear of prosecution was solely based on
remarks of certain government officials which were addressed to
the general public. They, however, failed to show how these
remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or governmental action
geared towards the implementation of RA 9372 against them. In
other words, there was no particular, real or imminent threat to any
of them. The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372
does not avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of the
surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA
9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be abused.
Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts
may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable. Thus, in the same light that
the Court dismissed the SC petitions in the Southern Hemisphere
cases on the basis of, among others, lack of actual justiciable
controversy (or the ripening seeds of one), the RTC should have
dismissed private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief all the
same. As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief,
neither can it be inferred that the controversy at hand is ripe for
adjudication since the possibility of abuse, based on the above-
discussed allegations in private respondents’ petition, remain
highly-speculative and merely theorized.1âwphi1 It is well-settled
that a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. This private respondents failed to demonstrate in the
case at bar. Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it
irrelevant to proceed with a discussion on the availability of
adequate reliefs since no impending threat or injury to the private
respondents exists in the first place. All told, in view of the absence
of the fourth and fifth requisites for an action for declaratory relief,
as well as the irrelevance of the sixth requisite, private respondents’
petition for declaratory relief should have been dismissed. Thus, by
giving due course to the same, it cannot be gainsaid that the RTC
gravely abused its discretion.
TEODORO TANDA vs. NARCISO ALDAYA
FACTS:
Teodoro Tanda instituted in CFI Cavite and action for the annulment
of a contract of sale with pacto de retro in which said contract was
declared valid and absolved Narciso Aldaya of the complaint. After
a motion to set aside judgment and a motion for new trial filed
by Tanda were denied by the trial court, Tanda brought the case on
appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision appealed from particularly with regard to the validity of the
contract which is disputed by Tanda. After the two motions for
reconsideration filed by Tanda were denied, the decision became
final and executory and the record was returned to the court of
origin; but, on a initiated the present case for declaratory relief.
Considering that this action is purposeless because, while outwardly
its aim is to seek a declaratory relief on certain matters but in effect
its purpose is to nullify the judgment rendered in the previous case
which was affirmed by the Supreme Court (G. R. No. L-3278). Aldaya
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the case states no
cause of action. In the meantime, Aldaya moved to withdraw the
original of Title No. 114 which was presented in the case as
evidence in order that his ownership may be consolidated and a
new title issued in his name it appearing that case has been finally
terminated. The trial court, acting on the two motions, entered an
order granting the motion to dismiss and allowing the withdrawal of
the original title as already adverted to in the early part of this
decision.
RULING:
A court decision cannot be considered as a written instrument
within the meaning of Rule 66. This is so because the Rules of Court
already provide for the ways by which an ambiguous or doubtful
decision may be corrected or clarified without need of resorting to
the expedient prescribed by Rule 66. Thus, if a party is not
agreeable to a decision either on questions of law or of fact, he may
file with the trial court a motion for reconsideration or a new trial in
order that the defect may be corrected (Section 1, Rule 37). The
same remedy may be pursued by a party with regard to a decision
of the Court of Appeals or of the Supreme Court (section 1, Rule 54,
section 1, Rule 55, in connection with section 1, Rule 58). A party
may even seek relief from a judgment or order of an inferior court
on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence if
he avails of that remedy within the terms prescribed by section 1,
Rule 38. Apparently, Tanda has already availed of some of these
legal remedies but that he was denied relief because his claim was
found unmeritorious.
PDIC vs. CA
FACTS:
Jose Abad, et al had 71 certificates of time deposit denominated as
Golden Time Deposits with an aggregate face value
of P1,115,889.96. The Monetary Board (MB) of the Central Bank of
the Philippines issued Resolution 505 in 1987 prohibiting Manila
Banking Corporation to do business in the Philippines, and placing
its assets and affairs under receivership. The Resolution, however,
was not served on MBC until Tuesday the following week, or on
May 26, 1987, when the designated Receiver took over. the next
banking day following the issuance of the MB Resolution,
respondent Jose Abad was at the MBC at 9:00 a.m. for the purpose
of pre-terminating the 71 aforementioned GTDs and re-depositing
the fund represented thereby into 28 new GTDs in denominations
of P40,000.00 or less under the names of herein respondents
individually or jointly with each other. Of the 28 new GTDs, Jose
Abad pre-terminated 8 and withdrew the value thereof in the total
amount of P320,000.00. Respondents thereafter filed their claims
with the PDIC for the payment of the remaining 20 insured GTDs. On
February 11, 1988, PDIC paid respondents the value of 3 claims in
the total amount of P120,000.00. PDIC, however, withheld payment
of the 17 remaining claims after Washington Solidum, Deputy
Receiver of MBC-Iloilo, submitted a report to the PDIC that there
was massive conversion and substitution of trust and deposit
accounts on May 25, 1987 at MBC-Iloilo. Because of the report,
PDIC entertained serious reservation in recognizing respondents
GTDs as deposit liabilities of MBC-Iloilo. Thus, on August 30, 1991, it
filed a petition for declaratory relief against respondents with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, for a judicial declaration
determination of the insurability of respondents GTDs at MBC-Iloilo.
In their Answer filed on October 24, 1991 and Amended Answer
filed on January 9, 1992, respondents set up a counterclaim against
PDIC whereby they asked for payment of their insured deposits. In
its Decision of February 22, 1994, Branch 30 of the Iloilo RTC
declared the 20 GTDs of respondents to be deposit liabilities of MBC,
hence, are liabilities of PDIC as statutory insurer. In its second
assignment of error, petitioner posits that the trial court erred in
ordering it to pay the balance of the deposit insurance to
respondents, maintaining that the instant petition stemmed from a
petition for declaratory relief which does not essentially entail an
executory process, and the only relief that should have been
granted by the trial court is a declaration of the parties rights and
duties. As such, petitioner continues, no order of payment may arise
from the case as this is beyond the office of declaratory relief
proceedings.
RULING:
Without doubt, a petition for declaratory relief does not essentially
entail an executory process. There is nothing in its nature, however,
that prohibits a counterclaim from being set-up in the same action.
Now, there is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for
declaratory relief that proscribes the filing of a counterclaim based
on the same transaction, deed or contract subject of the
complaint. A special civil action is after all not essentially different
from an ordinary civil action, which is generally governed by Rules 1
to 56 of the Rules of Court, except that the former deals with a
special subject matter which makes necessary some special
regulation. But the identity between their fundamental nature is
such that the same rules governing ordinary civil suits may and do
apply to special civil actions if not inconsistent with or if they may
serve to supplement the provisions of the peculiar rules governing
special civil actions.
 ordinance be declared null and void ab initio, and that the
respondent Municipal Treasurer be ordered to refund the amounts
paid by petitioner under the ordinance. The petitioner also prayed
MATALIN COCONUT Co. vs. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF MALABANG, that during the pendency of the action, a preliminary injunction be
LANAO DEL SUR issued enjoining the respondents from enforcing the ordinance. The
application for preliminary injunction, however, was denied by the
FACTS: trial court; instead respondent Municipal Treasurer was ordered to
allow payment of the taxes imposed by the ordinance under protest.
The Municipal Council of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, invoking the
Purakan Plantation Company intervened in the action claiming that
authority of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264, otherwise known as
it was also adversely affected by the ordinance. The intervenor
the Local Autonomy Act, enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 45-46.
alleged that while its cassava flour factory was situated in Balabagan,
The ordinance made it unlawful for any person, company or group
Lanao del Sur, it had to transport the cassava starch and flour it
of persons "to ship out of the Municipality of Malabang, cassava
produced to the seashore through the Municipality of Malabang for
starch or flour without paying to the Municipal Treasurer or his
loading in coastwise vessels; that the effect of the enactment of
authorized representatives the corresponding fee fixed by (the)
Ordinance No. 45-46, is that intervenor had to refrain from
ordinance." It imposed a "police inspection fee" of P.30 per sack of
transporting its products through the Municipality of Malabang in
cassava starch or flour, which shall be paid by the shipper before
order to ship them by sea to other places. After trial, the Court a
the same is transported or shipped outside the municipality. Any
quo rendered a decision declaring the municipal ordinance in
person or company or group of individuals violating the ordinance
question null and void; ordering the respondent Municipal
"is liable to a fine of not less than P100.00, but not more than
Treasurer to refund to the petitioner the payments it made under
P1,000.00, and to pay P1.00 for every sack of flour being illegally
the said ordinance from September 27, 1966 to May 2, 1967,
shipped outside the municipality, or to suffer imprisonment of 20
amounting to P 25,500.00, as well as all payments made
days, or both, in the discretion of the court. The validity of the
subsequently thereafter; and enjoining and prohibiting the
ordinance was challenged by the Matalin Coconut, Inc. in a petition
respondents, their agents or deputies, from collecting the tax of
for declaratory relief filed with the then Court of First Instance of
P.30 per bag on the cassava flour or starch belonging to intervenor,
Lanao del Sur against the Municipal Council, the Municipal Mayor
Purakan Plantation Company, manufactured or milled in the
and the Municipal Treasurer of Malabang, Lanao del Sur. Alleging
Municipality of Balabagan, but shipped out through the Municipality
among others that the ordinance is not only ultra vires, being
of Malabang. After the promulgation of the decision, the Trial Court
violative of Republic Act No. 2264, but also unreasonable,
issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, upon motion of
oppressive and confiscatory, the petitioner prayed that the
petitioner, requiring the respondent Municipal Treasurer to deposit
with the Philippine National Bank, Iligan Branch, in the name of the
Municipality of Malabang, whatever amounts the petitioner had
already paid or shall pay pursuant to the ordinance in question up
to and until final termination of the case; the deposit was not to be
withdrawn from the said bank without any order from the court. On
motion for reconsideration by respondents, the writ was
subsequently modified on July 20, 1967, to require the deposit only
of amounts paid from the effectivity of the writ up to and until the
final termination of the suit.
The respondents-appellants maintain that it was error for the trial
court, in an action for declaratory relief, to order the refund to
petitioner-appellee of the amounts paid by the latter under the
municipal ordinance in question. It is the contention of
respondents-appellants that in an action for declaratory relief, all
the court can do is to construe the validity of the ordinance in
question and declare the rights of those affected thereby. The court
cannot declare the ordinance illegal and at the same time order the
refund to petitioner of the amounts paid under the ordinance,
without requiring petitioner to file an ordinary action to claim the
refund after the declaratory relief judgment has become final.
Respondents maintain that under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, the
court may advise the parties to file the proper pleadings and
convert the hearing into an ordinary action, which was not done in
this case.
RULING:
Respondents’ contention is unmeritorious. Under Sec. 6 of Rule 64,
the action for declaratory relief may be converted into an ordinary
action and the parties allowed to file such pleadings as may be
necessary or proper, if before the final termination of the case "a
breach or violation of an... ordinance, should take place." In the
present case, no breach or violation of the ordinance occurred. The
petitioner decided to pay "under protest" the fees imposed by the
ordinance. Such payment did not affect the case; the declaratory
relief action was still proper because the applicability of the
ordinance to future transactions still remained to be resolved,
although the matter could also be threshed out in an ordinary suit
for the recovery of taxes paid. In its petition for declaratory relief,
petitioner-appellee alleged that by reason of the enforcement of
the municipal ordinance by respondents it was forced to pay under
protest the fees imposed pursuant to the said ordinance, and
accordingly, one of the reliefs prayed for by the petitioner was that
the respondents be ordered to refund all the amounts it paid to
respondent Municipal Treasurer during the pendency of the case.
The inclusion of said allegation and prayer in the petition was not
objected to by the respondents in their answer. During the trial,
evidence of the payments made by the petitioner was introduced.
Respondents were thus fully aware of the petitioner's claim for
refund and of what would happen if the ordinance were to be
declared invalid by the court.
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT vs. MANILA’S
FINEST RETIREES’ ASSOCIATION
FACTS:
In 1975, PD 765 was enacted thereby creating the Integrated
National Police as a component of the Philippine Constabulary. Two
years later, PD 1184 was issued to institutionalize the INP and
promote career development therein. In 1990, RA 6795 (PNP Law)
was enacted, thereby creating the Philippine National Police which
was to initially consist of INP members as well as officers and men
of the PC. Eight years later, the PNP Law was amended by RA 8551
(PNP Reform Act). Among other things, the amendatory law
reengineered the retirement scheme in the police organization.
Relevantly, PNP personnel, under the new law, stood to collect
more retirement benefits than what INP members of equivalent
rank, who had retired under the INP Law, received. Hence, on June
3, 2002, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, all INP
retirees, spearheaded by the Manilas Finest Retirees Association,
Inc., or the MFRAI (hereinafter collectively referred to as the INP
Retirees), filed a petition for declaratory
relief, thereunder impleading, as respondents, the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM), the PNP, the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM), the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Docketed in the
RTC as Civil Case No. 02-103702, which was raffled to Branch 22
thereof, the petition alleged in gist that INP retirees were equally
situated as the PNP retirees but whose retirement benefits prior to
the enactment of R.A. No. 6975, as amended by R.A. No. 8551, were
unconscionably and arbitrarily excepted from the higher rates and
adjusted benefits accorded to the PNP retirees. The GSIS moved to
dismiss the petition on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and cause of
action. On the other hand, the CSC, DBM, NAPOLCOM and PNP, in
their respective answers, asserted that the petitioners could not
claim the more generous retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6975
because at no time did they become PNP members, having retired
prior to the enactment of said law. The trial court held that R.A. No.
6975, as amended, did not abolish the INP but merely provided for
the absorption of its police functions by the PNP, and accordingly
rendered judgment for the INP retirees.
RULING:
In a further bid to scuttle respondents’ entitlement to the desired
retirement benefits, the petitioners fault the trial court for ordering
the immediate adjustments of the respondents’ retirement benefits
when the basic petition filed before it was one for declaratory relief.
To the petitioners, such petition does not essentially entail
an executory process, the only relief proper under that setting being
a declaration of the parties’ rights and duties. Petitioners’ above
posture is valid to a point. However, the execution of judgments in a
petition for declaratory relief is not necessarily indefensible.
PDIC vs. CA: “There is nothing in the nature of a special civil action
for declaratory relief that proscribes the filing of a counterclaim
based on the same transaction, deed or contract subject of the
complaint. A special civil action is after all not essentially different
from an ordinary civil action, which is generally governed by Rules 1
to 56 of the Rules of Court, except that the former deals with a
special subject matter which makes necessary some special
regulation. But the identity between their fundamental nature is
such that the same rules governing ordinary civil suits may and do
apply to special civil actions if not inconsistent with or if they may
serve to supplement the provisions of the peculiar rules governing
special civil actions.”
Matalin Coconut Co. vs. Municipality of Malabang: “The action for
declaratory relief may be converted into an ordinary action and the
parties allowed to file such pleadings as may be necessary or proper,
if before the final termination of the case "a breach or violation of
an ordinance, should take place." In the present case, no breach or
violation of the ordinance occurred. The petitioner decided to pay
"under protest" the fees imposed by the ordinance. Such payment
did not affect the case; the declaratory relief action was still proper
because the applicability of the ordinance to future transactions still
remained to be resolved, although the matter could also be
threshed out in an ordinary suit for the recovery of taxes paid. In its
petition for declaratory relief, petitioner-appellee alleged that by
reason of the enforcement of the municipal ordinance by
respondents it was forced to pay under protest the fees imposed
pursuant to the said ordinance, and accordingly, one of
the reliefs prayed for by the petitioner was that the respondents be
ordered to refund all the amounts it paid to respondent Municipal
Treasurer during the pendency of the case.”
The Court sees no reason for treating this case differently
from PDIC and Matalin. This disposition becomes all the more
appropriate considering that the respondents, as petitioners in the
RTC, pleaded for the immediate adjustment of their retirement
benefits which, significantly, the herein petitioners, as respondents
in the same court, did not object to. Being aware of said prayer, the
petitioners then already knew the logical consequence if, as it
turned out, a declaratory judgment is rendered in the respondents
favor.
FRANCISCO CRISOLOGO vs. ISAAC CENTENO
FACTS:
Spouses Francisco Crisologo and Consolación Florentino filed with
CFI Ilocos Sur an ex parte petition for consolidation of ownership in
them as vendees a retro of two parcels of land situated
at Barrio Lapting, Lapog, Ilocos Sur, on the ground that the vendors,
the spouses Isaac Centeno and Asuncion Aquino, have failed to
exercise their right of repurchase within the periods stipulated in
the two contracts of sale with pacto de retro. After hearing, the trial
court granted the petition of the Crisologos. The vendors,
afterwards, filed a motion to set aside the order and the trial court
granted it on the ground that the movants had not been duly
notified of the hearing. On motion by the petitioners to set aside
the Order of July 27, 1956, on the ground that the vendors had been
notified by registered mail of the hearing, the lower court, by its
Order of February 27, 1957, granted the motion and set aside the
Order of July 27, 1956. The vendors appealed the Order of February
27, 1957, to the Court of Appeals. On June 27, 1958, the Court of
Appeals rendered judgment in the appeal setting aside the lower
court's Order of February 27, 1957, after holding that the vendors
had not been legally notified of the petition and the hearing, and
that the Order of January 28, 1955, was a patent nullity. The Court
of Appeals remanded the record to the lower court for reopening
and for further proceedings. Accordingly, after the vendors had
been duly summoned as respondents, they filed their answer
alleging that the two contracts of sale with pacto de retro were
really intended as equitable mortgages as securities for usurious
loans. After trial, the lower court rendered its decision on October
26, 1960, holding that the Centenos' allegation was substantiated
by their evidence.
RULING:
The Crisologos contend that the lower court erred in not finding
that the Order of January 28, 1955, was valid, final and executory
and that all proceedings thereafter taken, including the vendors'
appeal to the Court of Appeals and its decision rendered in said
appeal setting aside the Order of February 27, 1957, and remanding
the case reopening and further proceedings, as well as the
proceedings thereafter taken including the decision of October 26,
1960, are null and void. The contention is untenable. Article 1607 of
the Civil Code which provides that: “In case of real property, the
consolidation of ownership in the vendee by virtue of the failure of
the vendor to comply with the provisions of article 1616 shall not be
recorded in the Registry of Property without a judicial order, after
the vendor has been duly heard…” contemplates a contentious
proceeding wherein the vendor a retro must be named respondent
in the caption and title of the petition for consolidation of
ownership and has been duly heard. In the instant case, the caption
and title of the petition for consolidation of ownership named the
vendees as petitioners, but did not name the vendors as
respondents, and said vendors were not duly summoned and heard.
In view thereof, the Order of January 28, 1955, was a patent nullity
having been issued contrary to the contentious proceeding
contemplated in Article 1607 of the Civil Code, and the lower court
not having acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the vendors.
OSCAR RAMOS vs. CA, ADELAIDA RAMOS and LAZARO E. MENESES
FACTS:
Adelaida Ramos borrowed from her brother Oscar the amounts of
P5,000 and P9,000 in connection with her business trtansaction
with Flor Ramiro, Fred Naboa and Atty. Ruperto Sarandi involving
the recovery of a parcel of land in Tenejeros, Malabon. The said
amount was used to finance the trip to Hawaii of Ramiro, Naboa
and Atty. Sarandi. As security for said loan, private respondent
Adelaida Ramos executed in favor of petitioners two (2) deeds of
conditional sale dated May 27, 1959 and August 30, 1959, of her
rights, shares, interests and participation respectively over Lot No.
4033 covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 5125 registered in
the name of their parents, Valente Ramos and Margarita Denoga,
now deceased; and Lot No. 4221 covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 10788 then registered in the names of Socorro Ramos,
Josefina Ramos and Adelaida Ramos, said properties being of the
Cadastral Survey of Paniqui, Tarlac. Upon the failure of said private
respondent as vendor a retro to exercise her right of repurchase
within the redemption period, aforenamed petitioner filed a
petition for consolidation and approval of the conditional sale of Lot
No. 4033 in Special Proceedings No. 5174, entitled "Intestate Estate
of the late Margarita Denoga," and a petition for approval of the
pacto de retro sale of Lot No. 4221 in the former Court of First
Instance of Tarlac acting as a cadastral court. In 1960, the probate
court declared that the deed of conditional sale executed by
Adelaida in favor of Oscar and his wife conveying to the latter by
way of pacto de retro sale whatever rights and interests the former
may have in Lot No. 4033 of the Cadastral Survey of Paniqui
approved. Private respondents had been and remained in
possession of these properties until sometime in 1964 when
petitioner took possession thereof. On February 28, 1968, private
respondent filed Civil Case No. 4168 with the then Court of First
Instance of Tarlac for declaration of nullity of orders, reformation of
instrument, recovery of possession with preliminary injunction and
damages. The complaint therein alleged that the deeds of
conditional sale, dated May 27, 1959 and August 30, 1959, are mere
mortgages and were vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud and
undue influence and that the orders dated January 22, 1960 and
April 18, 1960, respectively issued by the probate and cadastral
courts, were null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners, in
their answer to the complaint, specifically deny the allegations of
fraud and misrepresentation and interposed as defense the fact
that the questioned conditional sales of May 27, 1959 and August
30, 1959 were voluntarily executed by private respondent Adelaida
Ramos and truly expressed the intention of the parties; that the
action, if any, has long prescribed; that the questioned orders of
January 22, 1960 and April 18, 1960, approving the consolidation of
ownership of the lands in question in favor of petitioner were within
the jurisdiction of the lower court, in its capacity as a probate court
insofar as Lot No. 4033 is concerned, and acting as a cadastral court
with respect to Lot No. 4221; and that said lands subject of the
conditional sales were in custodia legis in connection with the
settlement of the properties of the late Margarita Denoga, the
predecessor in interest of both petitioners and private respondents.
On January 7, 1970, the court below issued a pre-trial order to the
effect that petitioners admit the genuineness and due execution of
the promissory notes marked as Exhibits "F" and "F-1 " and that the
principal triable issue is whether or not the documents purporting
to be deeds of conditional sale, marked as Exhibits "B", "B-1" and
"G" were in fact intended to be equitable mortgages. In its order
dated February 17, 1971, the trial court also declared: "Both parties
agreed and manifested in open court the principal obligation in the
transaction reflected in Exhibits 'B' and 'B-l' and 'G' is one of loan.
RULING:
Petition is devoid of merit. The same jurisdictional flaw obtains in
the order of consolidation issued by the cadastral court. The court
of first instance or the regional trial court, acting as cadastral court,
acts with limited competence. It has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of an action for consolidation of ownership, much less to
issue an order to that effect, such action must have been filed in the
former court of first instance, now in the regional trial court, in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction. That remedy, and the procedure
therefor, is now governed by Rule 64 of the Rules of Court as a
special civil action cognizable by the regional trial court in the
exercise of original general jurisdiction.
Antecedent thereto, Article 1607 of the Civil Code provided for
consolidation as follows:
In case of real property, the consolidation of ownership in the
vendee by virtue of the failure of the vendor to comply with the
provisions of article 1616 shall not be recorded in the Registry of
Property without a judicial order, after the vendor has been duly
heard.
Hence in Crisologo, et al. vs. Centeno, et al., we ruled that said
Article 1607 contemplates a contentious proceeding wherein the
vendor a retro must be named respondent in the caption and title
of the petition for consolidation of ownership and duly summoned
and heard. An order granting the vendee's petition for consolidation
of ownership, without the vendor a retro being named as
respondent, summoned and heard, is a patent nullity for want of
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the latter. The
questioned order of consolidation issued by the cadastral court,
being void for lack of jurisdiction, is in contemplation of law non-
existent and may be wholly disregarded. Such judgment may be
assailed any time, either directly or collaterally, by means of a
separate action or by resisting such judgment in any action or
proceeding whenever it is invoked. It is not necessary to take any
step to vacate or avoid a void judgment; it may simply be ignored.
REPUBLIC vs. BATUGIAS
FACTS:
Chinese born Azucena Saavedra Batugias filed a petition for
Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur. Azucena
alleged in her Petition that she believes in the principles underlying
the Philippine Constitution; that she has conducted herself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during the period of her stay in
the Philippines, as well as in her relations with the constituted
Government and with the community in which she is living; that she
has mingled socially with the Filipinos and has evinced a sincere
desire to learn and embrace their customs, traditions, and ideals;
that she has all the qualifications required under Section 2 and none
of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of Commonwealth
Act No. 473 (CA 473);6 that she is not opposed to organized
government nor is affiliated with any association or group of
persons that uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized
governments; that she is not defending or teaching the necessity or
propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the
success and predominance of men’s ideas; that she is neither a
polygamist nor believes in polygamy; that the nation of which she is
a subject is not at war with the Philippines; that she intends in good
faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce
absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign
prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to China;
and that she will reside continuously in the Philippines from the
time of the filing of her Petition up to the time of her naturalization.
After all the jurisdictional requirements mandated by Section 97 of
CA 473 had been complied with, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed its Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Azucena failed
to allege that she is engaged in a lawful occupation or in some
known lucrative trade. Finding the grounds relied upon by the OSG
to be evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied said Motion. Thereafter,
the hearing for the reception of Azucena’s evidence was then set on
May 18, 2004. Neither the OSG nor the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor appeared on the day of the hearing. Azucena’s counsel
moved that the evidence be presented ex-parte, which the RTC
granted. Accordingly, the RTC designated its Clerk of Court as
Commissioner to receive Azucena’s evidence. During the November
5, 2004 ex-parte hearing, no representative from the OSG appeared
despite due notice.
Batugias never left the Philippines from the moment of birth,
completed her education in Zamboanga, worked as a teacher,
married a Filipino and begot 5 children from the marriage, all of
them having been educated in the Philippines. Soon, Azucena and
her husband, as conjugal partners, engaged in the retail business of
and later on in milling/ distributing rice, corn, and copra. As proof of
their income, Azucena submitted their joint annual tax returns and
balance sheets from 2000-200222 and from 20042005. The business
name and the business permits issued to the spouses’ store,
‘Azucena’s General Merchandising,’ are registered in Santiago’s
name, and he is also the National Food Authority licensee for their
rice and corn business.25 During their marital union, the Batuigas
spouses bought parcels of land in Barrio Lombog, Margosatubig.
The RTC found that Azucena has amply supported the allegations in
her Petition. Among these are her lack of a derogatory record, her
support for an organized government, that she is in perfect health,
that she has mingled with Filipinos since birth and can speak their
language, that she has never had any transgressions and has been a
law abiding citizen, that she has complied with her obligations to
the government involving her business operations, and that the
business and real properties she and Santiago own provide
sufficient income for her and her family. In its Omnibus Motion, the
OSG argued that the ex-parte presentation of evidence before the
Branch Clerk of Court violates Section 10 of CA 473, as the law
mandates public hearing in naturalization cases. Rejecting this
argument in its March 21, 2005 Order, the RTC held that the public
has been fully apprised of the naturalization proceedings and was
free to intervene. The OSG and its delegate, the Provincial
Prosecutor, are the only officers authorized by law to appear on
behalf of the State, which represents the public. Thus, when the
OSG was furnished with a copy of the notice of hearing for the
reception of evidence ex-parte, there was already a sufficient
compliance with the requirement of a public hearing. In dismissing
the OSG’s appeal, the CA found that Azucena’s financial condition
permits her and her family to live with reasonable comfort in
accordance with the prevailing standard of living and consistent
with the demands of human dignity.
RULING:
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship
through either judicial naturalization under CA 473 or administrative
naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the “Administrative
Naturalization Law of 2000”). A third option, called derivative
naturalization, which is available to alien women married to Filipino
husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that:
“[a]ny woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen
of the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized
shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.”
Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine
citizens may be deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens and it is
neither necessary for them to prove that they possess other
qualifications for naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do
they have to submit themselves to judicial naturalization.
We are not unmindful of precedents to the effect that there is no
proceeding authorized by the law or by the Rules of Court, for the
judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. “Such judicial
declaration of citizenship cannot even be decreed pursuant to an
alternative prayer therefor in a naturalization proceeding. This case
however is not a Petition for judicial declaration of Philippine
citizenship but rather a Petition for judicial naturalization under CA
473. In the first, the petitioner believes he is a Filipino citizen and
asks a court to declare or confirm his status as a Philippine citizen.
In the second, the petitioner acknowledges he is an alien, and seeks
judicial approval to acquire the privilege of becoming a Philippine
citizen based on requirements required under CA 473. Azucena has
clearly proven, under strict judicial scrutiny, that she is qualified for
the grant of that privilege, and this Court will not stand in the way
of making her a part of a truly Filipino family.
ELEUTERIA TAN vs. REPUBLIC
FACTS:
A petition was presented to CFI Misamis Occdiental alleging that
Eleuteria Feliseta Tan is the common-law wife of Tan King Pock a
Chinaman, and that nine minor children were born to them out of
wedlock; that she and her children are registered as aliens; that she
had asked the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel her
registration and that of her children as aliens, but that the
Commissioner refused to grant her petition. Therefore, she prayed
that the cancellation of the alien certificate of registration of herself
and her children be ordered. The court issued an order suggesting
that Eleuteria amend her petition into one for declaratory relief.
Eleuteria edited her petition converting it into one for declaratory
judgment, alleging that petitioner is a Filipino citizen being the
illegitimate child of a Chinaman by the name of Sy Siwa and Benita
Feliseta, a Filipina, without benefit of marriage; that the children
mentioned in the petition are children of herself and Tan King Pock
and their registration as aliens has been a mistake; that she had
asked the Commissioner of Immigration for the cancellation of their
alien certificate of registration but the Commissioner had denied
her petition, so she prayed that her alien certificate of registration
be cancelled. The Solicitor General presented an answer asking for
the denial of the petition because the petition is not based upon
any of the grounds required by the rules as a ground for declaratory
judgment; that there is no need for the present action for the
cancellation of their alien certificate of registration; and that the
petition is evidently one which seeks a judicial pronouncement as to
petitioner's claim for citizenship, which matter should be threshed
out in a proper action. The provincial fiscal also prayed that the
petition be denied, alleging that the petition is not in order; that the
children are not represented by a guardian, and that the end sought
in the petition should be threshed out in a proper action. After
hearing the petition and the arguments, the court rendered
judgment declaring said Eleuteria Feliseta Tan a Filipino citizen; that
her registration as an alien has been a clear mistake on her part and
on the part of the City Treasurer of Ozamis City and therefore, the
Commissioner of Immigration is hereby ordered to cancel the Alien
Certificate of Registration the herein petitioner as well as those of
her children born out her relationship as husband and wife without
benefit of marriage with Tan King Pock.
RULING:
The judgment or order appealed from must be set aside.
Declaratory relief in this jurisdiction is a special civil action which
may lie only when "any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected
by statute or ordinance," demands construction thereof for a
declaration of his rights thereunder. None of the above
circumstances exists in the case under consideration. And this Court
has already held that there is no proceeding established by law or
the rules by which any person claiming to be a citizen may get a
declaration in a court of justice to that effect or in regard to his
citizenship. "Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding
for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts
of justice exist for the settlement of justiciable controversies, which
imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or
omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or
sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of
the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the
court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to, their
status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power.
If the petition be considered as one for declaratory judgment, the
facts do not warrant the filing of the said special civil action. If the
petition seeks to compel the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel
her and her children's alien certificate of registration, this petition
would not lie because such a remedy of cancellation of alien
certificate of registration can only be had by virtue of a judgment of
a competent court, in an action where the citizenship of parties is a
material matter in issue, declaring the Filipino citizenship of the
petitioner and her children, and such declaration cannot be
obtained directly because there is no proceeding at present
provided by law or the rules for such purpose.