Garcia vs.

Board of Investments (BOI)

191 SCRA 288
November 1990

FACTS:

The Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), a Taiwanese private corporation, applied for registration with the Board of
Investments (BOI) in February 1988 as a new domestic producer of petrochemicals in the Philippines. It originally specified the
province of Bataan as the site for the proposed investment but later submitted an amended application to change the site to
Batangas. Unhappy with the change of the site, Congressman Enrique Garcia of the Second District of Bataan requested a copy
of BPC’s original and amended application documents.

The BOI denied the request on the basis that the investors in BPC had declined to give their consent to the release of the
documents requested, and that Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code protected the confidentiality of those documents
absent consent to disclose.

The BOI subsequently approved the amended application without holding a second hearing or publishing notice of the
amended application. Garcia filed a petition before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the application of the investors without
considering the national interest

COURT RULING:

The Supreme Court found the BOI to have committed grave abuse of discretion in this case, and ordered the original application
of the BPC to have its plant site in Bataan and the product naphta as feedstock maintained.

The ponente, Justice Gutierrez, Jr., first stated the Court’s judicial power to settle actual controversies as provided for by
Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987 Constitution before he wrote the reasons as to how the Court arrived to its conclusion. He
mentioned that nothing is shown to justify the BOI’s action in letting the investors decide on an issue which, if handled by our
own government, could have been very beneficial to the State, as he remembered the word of a great Filipino leader, to wit: “..
he would not mind having a government run like hell by Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation”.

Justice Griño Aquino, in her dissenting opinion, argued that the petition was not well-taken because the 1987 Investment Code
does not prohibit the registration of a certain project, as well as any decision of the BOI regarding the amended application. She
stated that the fact that petitioner disagrees with BOI does not make the BOI wrong in its decision, and that petitioner should
have appealed to the President of the country and not to the Court, as provided for by Section 36 of the 1987 Investment Code.

Justice Melencio-Herrera, in another dissenting opinion, stated that the Constitution does not vest in the Court the power to
enter the realm of policy considerations, such as in this case.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 119903. August 15, 2000]

HON. RICARDO T. GLORIA, in his capacity as SECRETARY, AND DIRECTOR NILO L. ROSAS in his
capacity as REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND
SPORTS, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND DR. BIENVENIDO A.
ICASIANO, respondents.

FACTS:

On June 29, 1989, private respondent Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools Division
Superintendent, Division of City Schools, Quezon City, by the then President Corazon C. Aquino.

On October 10, 1994, petitioner Secretary Gloria recommended to then President Fidel Ramos that the
petitioner be reassigned as Superintendent of the MIST [Marikina Institute of Science and Technology],
to fill up the vacuum created by the retirement of its Superintendent, Mr. Bannaoag F. Lauro, on June
17, 1994. President Ramos approved the recommendation.

Dr. Icasiano requested Secretary Gloria to reconsider the reassignment, but the latter denied the
request.

On October 19, 1994, Dr. Icasiano prayed to the Court of Appeals for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) which was initially denied by the Court of Appeals but subsequently set aside its
decision and restrained the petitioners from implementing the reassignment.

Petitioners are now before the Court seeking relief from the decision of the appellate court. They
contend that the doctrine enunciated in Bentain vs. Court of Appeals -- that "a reassignment that is
[10]

indefinite and results in a reduction in rank, status and salary, is in effect, a constructive removal from
the service" -- does not apply in the present case for the reassignment in question was merely
temporary, lasting only until the appointment of a new Vocational School Superintendent of MIST.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the reassignment of the private respondent is only temporary, hence, the doctrine
enunciated in Bentain vs. Court of Appeals is not applicable to the case at bar.

HELD:

No. The Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that the reassignment of petitioner to MIST
"appears to be indefinite". The same can be inferred from the Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for
[11]

President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the reassignment of private respondent will "best fit his
qualifications and experience" being "an expert in vocational and technical education." It can thus be
gleaned that subject reassignment is more than temporary as the private respondent has been
described as fit for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in the field. Besides, there is nothing in the said
Memorandum to show that the reassignment of private respondent is temporary or would only last
until a permanent replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact evinces an
intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private respondent with no definite period or duration.
Such feature of the reassignment in question is definitely violative of the security of tenure of the
private respondent.

Robles v. HRET

FACTS

Petitioner Virgilio Robles and private respondent Romeo Santos were candidates for the
position of Congressman of the 1st district of Caloocan City in the last May 11, 1987
congressional elections. Petitioner Robles was proclaimed the winner on December 23, 1987.
Rep. Virgilio Robles elected to 1st Dist. of Caloocan. Romeo Santos then filed an elec. contest
w/ HRET (electoral fraud & irregularities) & called for re-counting / re-appreciation of votes.
Santos, filed Motion to Withdraw Contest but later filed Urgent Motion to Recall/Disregard his
Previous Motion. 1st Motion not acted upon by HRET, 2nd Motion granted. Robles claimed that
the 1st motion divested HRET of jurisdiction.

ISSUE

Whether HRET acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion thus giving
the Supreme Jurisdiction over the subject matter

RULING

The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested
precincts, without any action on the part of respondent tribunal, does not by itself divest the
tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case. It is an established doctrine that jurisdiction, once
acquired, is not lost at the instance of the parties but continues until the case is
terminated. Certainly, the Tribunal retains the authority to grant or deny the Motion, and the
withdrawal becomes effective only when the Motion is granted. To hold otherwise would permit
a party to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction already acquired. Petition is dismissed.
Bondoc vs. Pineda G.R. No. 97710, September 26, 1991

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Facts:

In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were
candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was
proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET),
which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of
the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter,
a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP
voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the
contest.

On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter
informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido
Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said
political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter
informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives
decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.

Issue:

Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein,
may change that party’s representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely
reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein

Held:

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an
independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of
partisan consideration.

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with
complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political party to
which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the
expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having
cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and
appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives
committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of
expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it
violates Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of
congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy
security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated
except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member’s congressional term of office, his death,
permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation
with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the
House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with an