G.R. No.

115595 November 14, 1994

ANTONIO DEMETRIOU, HARRIET DEMETRIOU, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE RHODIE A. NIDEA, and HILDA RALLA-ALMINE,

respondents.

FACTS:

1. PET: action to annul judgment of RTC before CA, which ordered the Register
of Deeds to issue a new owner's duplicate certificate of title to PRIVATE
RESPONDENT – DENIED on ground of fraud alleged therein was not extrinsic fraud
but, if at all, only intrinsic fraud which did not justify setting aside the final decision
of the trial court.THEN filed PET FOR REV before SC.

2. PET allege that the property in question is in the name of Pablo Ralla, private
respondent's deceased father, wherein they are co-owners.

3. that petitioners acquired two-thirds of the property by DOS was ratified and
confirmed by virtue of an order date 11 May 1989 of the Regional Trial Court of
Fifth Judicial Region, Branch 8 Legaspi City

4. that at the time of the sale of the Property to the petitioners, there was a
ten-year lease contract over the property which was scheduled to expire on 15 July
1991, for this reason, the petitioners decided to await the termination of the lease
before registering the sale and obtaining a new title in their name;

5. that soon after the expiration of the lease contract, the father of the
petitioners went to the Register of Deeds to have the deed of sale registered and
to obtain new title in the name of the petitioners and learned from the Register of
Deeds that by an order of Judge Rhodie A. Nidea of the RTC of Tabaco, Albay,
Branch 16, the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-65878 in the possession of the
petitioner had been declared of no further force and effect and that a new second
owner's duplicate copy of said title has been issued to the private respondent;
that subsequent investigation by the petitioners disclosed that on Sept. 20, 1990
private respondent filed a petition with the RTC of Tabaco, Albay, Branch 16 and
docketed as CAD Case No. T-1024 wherein she falsely and fraudulently alleged that
"the owner's duplicate copy of the said Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-65878
was lost and/or destroyed while in the possession and custody of herein
petitioner.

6. Respondent Judge Rhodie A. Nidea, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Tabaco, Albay, Branch 16, issued an order dated Dec. 7, 1990 ordering the
Register of Deeds to issue a second owner's duplicate copy of transfer certificate
of title No. T-65878 with all the annotations and encumbrances thereon, which
shall be of like faith and credit as the one lost and declaring the lost or destroyed
owner's duplicate copy of the TCT No. T-65878 of no further force and effect, and
that pursuant to the order, the Register of Deeds issued a new second owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. T-65878 to the private respondent; that despite repeated
demands by petitioners and despite protracted attempts at settlement, private
respondent refused to deliver or turn over to the petitioners the second owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. 65878 issued pursuant to the aforesaid order of Judge
Rhodie A. Nidea; that the aforesaid order of Judge Rhodie A. Nidea has become
final and executory

7. SO: CA said FRAUD is only INTRINSIC not EXTRINSIC

a. An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud will lie only if
the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character.

b. EXTRINSIC FRAUD REFERS to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in

the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the
defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case, by
fraud or deception practiced on him by his

c. INTRINSIC FRAUD takes the form of "acts of a party in a litigation during

the trial such as the use of forged or false document or perjured testimony, which
did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just
determination of the case".
d. In the present petition, the allegation of fraud involves admission by the
respondent court of an alleged false affidavit of loss, which alleged fraud is intrinsic
in character. THUS, AS THE ALLEGED FRAUD COMMITTED BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT IS NOT EXTRINSIC IN CHARACTER, THE INSTANT PETITION FOR
ANNULMENT OF THE SAID DECEMBER 1, 1990 ORDER OF THE LOWER COURT
SHOULD BE DISMISSED.

ISSUE: WON CA is correct in denying the pet to annul RTC judgment

HELD: NO.

8. TAMA sa fraud na pwede na annul. The use of the alleged false affidavit of
loss by private respondent is similar to the use during trial or forged instruments
or perjured testimony.

9. But a judgment otherwise final may be annulled not only on the ground of
extrinsic fraud but also because of lack of jurisdiction of the court which rendered
it.

10. In Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, on facts analogous to those involved in this
case, this Court already held that if A CERTIFICATE OF TITLE HAS NOT BEEN LOST
but is in fact in the possession of another person, the RECONSTITUTED TITLE IS
VOID and the COURT RENDERING THE DECISION HAS NOT ACQUIRED
JURISDICTION. Consequently the decision may be attacked any time. Indeed, Rep.
Act No. 26, § 18 provides that "in case a certificate of title, considered lost or
destroyed be found or recovered, the same shall prevail over the reconstituted
certificate of title." It was, therefore, error for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the
petition for annulment of judgment of the petitioners.

11. FORUM SHOPPING: While they indeed alleged that private respondent had
obtained a second owner's duplicate of TCT T-65878 knowing that 2/3 of the land
covered by the certificate had been sold to them and that the "2nd owner's copy
should be cancelled and recalled considering the fact that the original is in fact still
existing and not lost, "the allegation was made more for the purpose of demanding
a partition, recognizing that private respondent is the owner of 1/3 of the land.
Petitioner's intervention is thus different from their action in the Court of Appeals
which is solely for the purpose of seeking the annulment of the judgment in CAD
Case No. T-1024 granting private respondent's petition for the issuance of a new
owner's duplicate certificate of title.

G.R. No. 145336. February 20, 2013 -Reso

Reynante Tadeja, et al. Vs. People of the Philippines

Facts:

The prosecution witnesses testified that they saw Ruben Bernardo on May 3, 1994
being hacked to death by the brothers Reynante, Ricky, Ricardo, and Ferdinand and
their first cousin Plaridel – all surnamed Tadeja (herein petitioners). As a result,
Ruben died. On the other hand, petitioners alleged that it was Ruben, together with
his sons, who first attacked Reynante. On 15 July 1994, an Information for homicide
for the death of Ruben was filed against Reynante, Ricky, Ricardo, Ferdinand, and
Plaridel.

The RTC issued a decision finding herein petitioners guilty of homicide. Except for
Plaridel, who absconded, all the other accused (petitioners herein) appealed to the
Court of Appeals (CA). CA sustained the decision. SC issued a Decision dated 21
July 2006 affirming the Decision of the CA. On 23 October 2006, SC denied the
motion with finality.

On 6 November 2006, petitioners filed a Motion with Leave of Court to Vacate

Judgment to remand the case to the RTC for further reception of evidence. Later,
petitioners filed a Supplemental Motion to Motion with Leave of Court to Vacate
Judgment Due to Supervening Event alleging that on 29 November 2006, the
police had finally arrested Plaridel. Attached was a statement executed by Plaridel
admitting therein that he had killed Ruben. SC treated the motion as a second
motion for reconsideration of the 21 July 2006 Decision and denied it on the
ground that it was a prohibited pleading under the Rules. In a letter addressed to
then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, Ferdinand prayed for the reopening of the case
on the basis of the confession of Plaridel.
Issue: Whether or not there reopening of the case is permitted by law in the case
at bar.

Held: No, it is not. We resolve to DENY petitioners’ motion to reopen the case for
reception of further evidence in the trial court. Section 1 of Rule 121 of the Rules
of Court provides that a new trial may only be granted by the court on motion of
the accused, or motu proprio with the consent of the accused "(a)t any time
before a judgment of conviction becomes final." In this case, petitioners’ judgment
of conviction already became final and executory on 26 July 2007 – the date on
which the Decision of this Court denying the petition and affirming the ruling of
the CA was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments. Thus, pleas for the
remand of this case to the trial court for the conduct of a new trial may no longer
be entertained.

Furthermore, petitioners premise their motion for a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence, i.e. Plaridel’s extrajudicial confession. Newly
discovered evidence refers to that which (a) is discovered after trial; (b) could not
have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; (c) is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or
impeaching; and (d) is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment
if admitted.

The most important requisite is that the evidence could not have been discovered
and produced at the trial even with reasonable diligence; hence, the term "newly
discovered." The confession of Plaridel does not meet this requisite. He
participated in the trial before the RTC and even gave testimony as to his defense.
It was only after he and petitioners had been convicted by the trial court that he
absconded. Thus, the contention that his confession could not have been obtained
during trial does not hold water.
SJS v Lim – RESOLUTION

25 Nov 2014 dec - declared Ordinance 8187(continued stay of oil terminals)

UNCONSTITUTIONAL and INVALID

intervenor oil companies – MR, Clarification

MR by Shell:

 not supported by evidence

o reliance on the factual pronouncements
o Adoption of "imagined fears
o no substantial difference between the conditions in 2001 and the
present setup

SC: MR Must be DENIED

 grounds relied on being mere reiterations of the issues

 effect and disposition of a motion for reconsideration:
o R52- does not impose on the Court the obligation to deal individually
and specifically with the grounds relied upon <- useless formality or
ritual invariably

As succinctly put by then Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa in Ortigas and Co. Ltd.
Partnership v. Judge Velasco8 on the effect and disposition of a motion for
reconsideration:

The filing of a motion for reconsideration, authorized by Rule 52 of the Rules of

Court, does not impose on the Court the obligation to deal individually and
specifically with the grounds relied upon therefor, in much the same way that the
Court does in its judgment or final order as regards the issues raised and submitted
for decision. This would be a useless formality or ritual invariably involving merely
a reiteration of the reasons already set forth in the judgment or final order for
rejecting the arguments advanced by the movant; and it would be a needless act,
too, with respect to issues raised for the first time, these being, as above stated,
deemed waived because not asserted at the first opportunity. It suffices for the
Court to deal generally and summarily with the motion for reconsideration, and
merely state a legal ground for its denial (Sec. 14, Art. VIII, Constitution); i.e., the
motion contains merely a reiteration or rehash of arguments already submitted to
and pronounced without merit by the Court in its judgment, or the basic issues have
already been passed upon, or the motion discloses no substantial argument or
cogent reason to warrant reconsideration or modification of the judgment or final
order; or the arguments in the motion are too unsubstantial to require
consideration, etc.

In anticipation of further attempts to delay the enforcement of this Court's Decision

dated 25 November 2014, the parties to these cases are hereby REMINDED of the
pronouncements in Ortigas and Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Judge Velasco23 on the
import of the denial of a motion for reconsideration. Thus:

The denial of a motion for reconsideration signifies that the grounds relied upon
have been found, upon due deliberation, to be without merit, as not being of
sufficient weight to warrant a modification of the judgment or final order. It means
not only that the grounds relied upon are lacking in merit but also that any other,
not so raised, is deemed waived and may no longer be set up in a subsequent
motion or application to overturn the judgment; and this is true, whatever may be
the title given to such motion or application, whether it be "second motion for
reconsideration" or "motion for clarification" or "plea for due process" or "prayer
for a second look," or "motion to defer, or set aside, entry of judgment," or xxx,
etc..24 (Emphasis supplied)

This Resolution is final. Under pain of contempt, no further pleadings, motions or

papers in the guise of the above-enumerated submissions shall, thus, be
entertained in these cases.