SPL Case Digest

Special Penal Laws
A. Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103)

1. People vs. Aquino; GR No.125906, 16 January 1998 (ISLAW, not
applicable to RP)
Facts: Accused Juanito Aquino was charged before the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City with Murder for allegedly killing Primitivo Lazatin. The accused
denied the charged he was at Imelda Valley Camp in Palayan City, Nueva Ecija,
more than thirty (30) kilometers from the scene of the crime in San Felipe, Llanera,
Nueva Ecija. He was then working as an informer of the 79 th Infantry Batallion
headed by Col. Juanito Sibayan.
The trial court convicted the accused for murder and imposed on him an
indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1day of prision mayor as minimum to 18
years and 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum and ordered him
to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as indemnity, funeral and burial expenses
moral damages.
Accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals a7rmed the
judgment of conviction but found the penalty imposed by the trial court to be
erroneous. The Court of Appeals thus modi8ed the decision of the trial court and
changed the penalty to reclusion perpetua, in accordance with Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The Court of Appeals elevated the instant case to this Court pursuant to the second
paragraph of Section 13 of Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether the penalty imposed by the trial court is correct?
Ruling: No. The property penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant should be

reclusion perpetua. At the time the crime was committed, the imposable penalty
for murder was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.Since there was
neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attending commission of the crime,
the penalty should be imposed in its medium period,that is, reclusion perpetua.
Accused-appellant cannot avail of the bene8ts of the Indeterminate Sentence Law

because Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply to persons convicted of
o?enses punishable with reclusion perpetua.
2. People vs. Corral, 74 Phil 359, G.R. No. 48938, September 27, 1943
(ISLAW, conditional pardon)
Facts: Corral was previously convicted for falsi8cation of a public document. When
he had 8ve years more to serve his sentence of imprisonment, he was released, on
July 31, 1913, in virtue of a conditional pardon extended to him by Governor-
General Forbes with the following conditions: (1) "that he shall not reside in the city
of Manila nor in the province of Rizal hereafter during the period of his sentence and
(2) shall not again be guilty of any infraction of the law punishable by imprisonment
for one year or more.
Despite his legal disquali8cation on account of previous conviction, he voted in the

general elections of June 5, 1934 hence prosecuted for illegal voting and perjury in
election matter. On his defense, he contended that that said condition should be
interpreted as being limited to the duration of his sentence. According to the trial
court, the two conditions of the pardon and pointed out that while the 8rst condition
regarding the choice of residence was limited to the duration of the sentence
against the prisoner, no such limitation was made as to the second condition
regarding any future infraction of the law punishable by imprisonment for one year
or more. As the counsel for the accused criticized the interpretation of the trial
court, he argued that such interpretation will result to perpetual torture.
Issue: Whether the accused violated that condition of his pardon that he "shall not
again be guilty of any infraction of the law punishable by imprisonment for one year
or more” in view of subsequent conviction for violation of the Election Law?
Ruling: Yes. The condition that the prisoner shall not again violate the law even
after the expiration of the time during which he would have been con8ned were it
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not for the pardon, is perfectly reasonable. Christ Himself in His divine mercy
imposed it when He pardoned a sinner and said: "Go and sin no more." The court
fails to see any injustice in it. In the 8rst place, if the injunction against future
violation of law were to be limited to the time of the sentence against the prisoner,
society would gain nothing by the remission of that sentence; it could protect itself
better against his possible recidivism or relapse into criminality during that period of
time by not remitting his sentence. In the second place, a conditional pardon is
ordinarily granted on the basis of the prisoner’s good behavior in the
penitentiary and on the assumption that he has been su5ciently reformed
and that if released he would become law-abiding; and to fortify such
assumption it is driven home to him that a relapse on his part would
subject him to two punishments as indicated by counsel. Therefore, in his
case the sword of Damocles is but a sword of Justice, pointing to him the road that
leads away from the penal institution towards the goal of happiness and freedom. It
would seem an aberration to regard such constant admonition to be good as "an
eternal condemnation."
3. People vs. Jaranilla, L-28547, 22 Feb. 1974 (ISLAW, applicable to

recidivist)
Facts: Elias Jaranilla, Ricardo Suyo and Franco Brillantes, including Gorriceta went
to Mandurriao using the truck of the latter. Upon arrival to their destination, Janilla,
Suyo and Brillantes alighted the truck, and after 20 mins. came back, hurriedly
towards the truck while carrying two 2 cocks each. They ordered Gorriceta to drive
fast because someone were chasing them. But traversing the detour road near the
airport, two 2 individuals tried to stop them, Patrol man Jabatan and Castro.
However, as Jabatan approached them with a warning shot of his calibre gun,
Jaranilla suddenly shot him with his revolver. Thereafter, Gorriceta immediately
started the engine and drove away. But still Jaranilla kept on shooting the Patrol
man until they are already away from the premises.
Being guilty of the said crime, Grorriceta confess to his uncle of what has transpire
on that day, thereafter, surrendered to the police o7cer and narrated again the said
o?enses. Thus, one witness saw the incident.
After all this things, the 3 are apprehended and now convicted of robbery with
homicide.
Issues: 1. Whether or not the ACCUSED were validly convicted of robbery

with homicide? NO.
2. Whether they can be bene=ted of the provision of Indeterminate
Sentence Law, notwithstanding the aggravating circumstance of
recidivism among them? NO.
Ruling: There is no evidence that in taking the six roosters from their coop or cages
in the yard of Baylon's house violence against or intimidation of persons was
employed. Hence, no robbery but only theft.
In the instant case, the chicken coop where the six roosters were taken cannot be
considered a building within the meaning of article 302. Not being a building, it
cannot be said that the accused entered the same in order to commit the robbery
by means of any of the 8ve circumstances enumerated in article 302.
Mere presence at the scene of the crime does not necessarily make a person a co-
principal thereof. Only Jaranilla must be convicted of robbery with homicide.
Therefore, the taking of the six roosters from their coop should be characterized as
theft and not robbery. The assumption is that the accused were animated by single
criminal impulse. The conduct of the accused reveals that they conspired to steal
the roosters. The taking is punishable as a single o?ense of theft. Thus, it was held
that the taking of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion cannot
give rise to two crimes of theft.
Also to be appreciated against appellants Suyo and Brillantes is the aggravating

circumstance of recidivism which was alleged in the information. They admitted
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their previous convictions for theft (130, 132 tsn; Exhs. I and J; Art. 14[9], Revised
Penal Code).
The theft of six roosters valued at six hundred pesos is punishable by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods (Art. 309[3], Revised Penal Code).
That penalty should be imposed in its maximum period because only aggravating
circumstances are present (Art. 64[3], Revised Penal Code).
Although recidivists, appellants Suyo and Brillantes are not habitual delinquents.
They are entitled to an indeterminate sentence (Sec. 2, Act No. 4103).
As co-principals with Elias Jaranilla in the theft of the six 8ghting cocks, they are (a)
each sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor as
minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum
and (b) ordered to indemnify solidarily the complainant, Valentin Baylon, in the sum
of 8ve hundred pesos (P500). Each appellant should pay one-third of the costs.
4. People vs. Martinado, GR 92020, 19 October 1992, 214 SCRA 712

(ISLAW, not applicable to escapee)
Facts: Eliseo and Hemogenes Martinado were found guilty of the crime of
robbery with homicide. The promulgation of the decision was made in his absence
because he had earlier escaped, exactly 8ve (5) days after the defense rested its
case, from the Kalookan City Jail. The escape, however, was reported to the trial
court only on 8 August 1988. Consequently, the trial court issued a warrant for his
arrest which was returned unserved because "per information gathered from the
resident thereat revealed that accused cannot be seen for long period of time." It
was only on 10 April 1989 that Eliseo was re-arrested in Palo, Leyte by a Special
Action Team of the Kalookan Police Station. They interposed an appeal
Issue: Whether the accused is entitled to the ISLAW?
Ruling: No. Accused Eliseo Martinado, however, shall not be entitled to the
bene8ts of the Indeterminate Sentence Law as he had escaped from con8nement.
Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to su?er the penalty of imprisonment of
Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of reclusion temporal
maximum.The indemnity for the death of the deceased Juan Matias is hereby
increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.
5. People vs. Angeles, GR 132376, 11 April 2002 (ISLAW; Imposition;

max-min)
Facts: Angeles was charged with 4 counts of Estafa and 1 count of Illegal
recruitment for having deceived Maria and Marciliano by means of false
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representation that she had the power & authority to recruit and employ them, and
that he could process the papers for them. Angeles was able to obtain money from
them for the processing.
Trial court found her guilty of the crimes charged. She was sentenced to life
imprisonment and a 8ne of 10K; 12 yrs and 1day to 20 yrs and was ordered to
reimburse 107K; another 12 yrs and 1 day to 20 yrs and reimbursement of 190K;
12 yrs and 1 day to 20 yrs and reimbursement of 61, 200; and 12 yrs and 1 day to
20 yrs, and reimbursement of 61, 200
Issue: W/N the penalty may be reduced
Ruling: Yes. Under the ISLAW the maximum term of penalty shall be “that whch, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed” under the rpc, and
the minimum shall be within the range of penalty next lower should be based on the
penalty prescribed by the code for the o?ense, without 8rst considering any
modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The
determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the
court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any
reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying
circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as

follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 94-140485, accused-appellant Samina Angeles is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and
sentenced to su?er a prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and is ORDERED to indemnify Maria Sardeña the
amount of P107,000.00.

sentenced to su?er a prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and is ORDERED to indemnify Marceliano Tolosa
the amount of P190,000.00.

sentenced to su?er a prision term of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eleven (11) years of prision mayor, as
maximum, and
is ORDERED to indemnify Precila Olpindo the amount of P61,200.00.
6. People vs. Alberto Anticamara, et.al., GR No. 178771, 08 June 2011

(ISLAW)
Facts: Sulpacio Abad is the family driver of the Estrellas who resides in the Estrella
compound together with “AAA”, also an employee of the Estrellas. Anticamara,
together with the others entered the premises, tied and blindfolded them and later
brought to the 8shpond of the Estrellas. The group brought Abad outside the vehicle
and led him away. Later, alias “Fred” returned telling the group, “Make a decision
now, Abad has already four bullets in his body, and the one left is for this girl.” The
group went to San Miguel, Tarlac along with AAA where Lando Calaguas resided.
They kept AAA and Lando sexually molested her while they were in the hotel.
Tanedo and Calaguas transferred AAA to Riles, Tarlac where Fred repeatedly ravish
AAA.
AAA escaped and proceeded to Isabel, Leyte and sought the help of her friend,
Susana. Susana called her brother who later fetched AAA and brought her to
Mandaue City. They immediately reported the incident to the police authorities.
Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (Lando) and Alberto Anticamara (Al) were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder for killing Sulpacio Abad,
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family driver of the Estrella’s and the crime of Kidnapping and Serious illegal
detention of “AAA”.
Lando, Al, Dick Tanedo (Bet), Marvin Lim (Marvin), Necitas Ordeniza-Tanedo (Cita)
and Fred Doe are charged with the crimes of Murder and of Kidnapping/serious
Illegal Detention in two separate Informations.
Calaguas and Anticamara 8led an appeal for the decision of the CA 8nding them
guilty with a penalty of death or reclusion perpetua.
Issue: Whether ISLAW is applicable to this case.
Ruling: No. *there is no discussion about ISLAW in the case* (This case falls on the
exception of ISLAW Section 2 since the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death)
Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed because of the prohibition in R.A.
9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is proper, because it is not dependent on
the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the
commission of the o?ense.—In Criminal Case No. 4498-R, the award of civil
indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof
other than the commission of the crime. In People v. Quiachon, 500 SCRA 704
(2006), even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed because of the prohibition
in R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is proper, because it is not
dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that
qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended
the commission of the o?ense. As explained in People v. Salome, while R.A. No.
9346 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the fact remains that the penalty
provided for by law for a heinous o?ense is still death, and the o?ense is still
heinous. Accordingly, the award of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is
proper.
Same; Murder; Damages; Moral damages are mandatory in cases of murder,

without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim.—Anent
moral damages, the same are mandatory in cases of murder, without need of
allegation and proof other than the death of the victim. However, consistent with
recent jurisprudence on heinous crimes where the imposable penalty is death but
reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, the award of moral
damages should be increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.
Same; Same; Same; Rape; The rape victim is entitled to civil indemnity in line with
prevailing jurisprudence that civil indemni8cation is mandatory upon the 8nding of
rape.—In addition, AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the
Civil Code, without the necessity of additional pleadings or proof other than the fact
of rape. Moral damages is granted in recognition of the victim’s injury necessarily
resulting from the odious crime of rape. Such award is separate and distinct from
the civil indemnity. However, the amount of P100,000.00 awarded as moral
damages is reduced to P75,000.00, in line with current jurisprudence.
A. Probation Law (PD 968)
7. Heirs of Francisco Abueg vs. CA, 219 SCRA 78 (Probation; eAect of

=lling)
Facts: private respondent Joselito Oraña, while driving a Yamaha Enduro motorcycle
travelling on the highway within the territorial jurisdiction of the municipality of
Silang, Cavite, bumped a bicycle driven by one Francisco Abueg, resulting in his
death. Consequently, he was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property.
Private respondent 8led an application for probation alleging, in essence, that he is

quali8ed to avail of the bene8ts of the Probation Law and that he is sincerely
remorseful and penitent for the o?ense committed and, if granted probation, he is
willing to undergo supervision under such terms and conditions that may be
imposed. The application was granted for a period of 6 years by probation o7cer
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Sidlacan, but on trial, it was denied. Thus a petition with restraining order before the
Court of Appeals was 8led and later on granted.
Hence, the instant petition arguing that the temporary restraining order of the Court
of Appeals issued on is unavailing since private respondent was already serving his
sentence of imprisonment on said date. Consequently, there was no pending action
in the court below which may be restrained.
Issue: whether the CA erred in granting the petition 8led by private respondent;
setting aside the 8nal and duly executed orders of the Hon. Court a Quo and giving
due course to the application for probation and directing the Hon. Court a quo to
immediately release the prisoner under his original bond?
Ruling: No. There is no question that the decision of the trial court 8nding
respondent guilty as charged has become 8nal but it is incorrect to say that it has
become executory. In Palo vs. Militante, the Court held that Section 7, Rule 12 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure is explicit that a judgment in a criminal case
becomes 8nal when the accused has applied for probation. This is totally in accord
with Section 4 of Presidental Decree No. 968, otherwise known as the Probation Law
of 1976, as amended, which in part provides that the 8ling of an application for
probation is deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. In other words, the judgment
ipso facto attains 8nality, although it is not executory pending resolution of the
application for probation.
Under Section 24 of the Rules on Probation, the order of the court granting or
denying probation is not appealable. Since there being no appeal, private
respondent has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law against the denial of his application for probation except for the special civil
action of certiorari with preliminary mandatory injunction and restraining order
which he timely 8led before the respondent appellate court on March 27, 1990. With
the 8ling of the original petition for certiorari, it is clear that the denial of probation
has not become 8nal and executory.
8. Michael Padua vs. People, GR 168546, 23 July 2008
Facts: Michael Padua was charged before the RTC of Pasig of violating Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165 (CDDA). Padua who was then a minor (17 years old) assisted by
his counsel de o8cio initially entered a plea of not guilty but later on withdrawn the
plea. Padua’s counsel manifested that his client enter a plea of guilty to avail the
bene8ts granted to 8rst time o?enders under Section 70 of R.A. 9165. The
prosecution interposed no objection. RTC found Padua guilty of the crime charged.
Padua subsequently 8led a Petition for Probation alleging that he is a minor and a
8rst time o?ender who desires to avail of the bene8ts of probation under P.D. 968.
He further alleged that he possesses all the quali8cations and none of the
disquali8cations under the said law. The lower court denied his Petition for Probation
on the ground that Section 24 of RA 9165 provides that any person convicted of
drug tra7cking cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law. Padua
appealed in the CA which was denied. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether Court of Appeals erred in a7rming the denial of the petition for
probation.
Ruling: No. The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person
convicted for drug tra7cking or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot
avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law. The intention of the legislators in
Section 24 of RA 9165 is to provide sti?er and harsher punishment for those
convicted of drug tra7cking or pushing. While drug tra7ckers and pushers, like
Padua, are categorically disquali8ed from availing the law on probation, youthful
drug dependents, users and possessors alike, are given the chance to mend their
ways. If the intention of the legislators to exempt from the application of Section 24
the drug tra7ckers and pushers who are minor and 8rst time o?enders, the law
could have declared so.
9. Lagrosa vs. People, GR 152044, 03 July 2003, 405 SCRA 357

(Probation; eAect of =lling)
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Facts: The Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, Branch 2, rendered a

decision 8nding petitioners Domingo Lagrosa and Osias Baguin guilty of violation of
Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended (The Revised Forestry Code), for having in their
possession forest products without the requisite permits. The trial court sentenced
them to su?er the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from 2years, 4 months
and one 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as
maximum. The RTC denied the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the
decision.
Petitioners appealed their conviction to the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeal

a7rmed the conviction of the petitioners, with the modi8cation as to the penalty
imposed. The decision became 8nal and executory.
Petitioners 8led an Application for Probation with the trial court, it was
denied. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the trial
court. Hence, petitioners 8led a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
Court of Appeals rendered the decision a7rming the resolutions of the trial court.
Issue: Whether the application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction?
Ruling: Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of

imprisonment or a 8ne only. An application for probation shall be 8led with the trial
court. The 8ling of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
Upon interposing an appeal, more so after asserting their innocence therein,

petitioners should be precluded from seeking probation. By perfecting their appeal,
petitioners ipso facto relinquished the alternative remedy of availing of the
Probation Law, the purpose of which is simply to prevent speculation or opportunism
on the part of an accused who, although already eligible, does not at once apply for
probation, but did so only after failing in his appeal
10. Vicoy vs. People, GR 138203, 03 July 2002 (Probation; eAect of

=lling)
Facts: Accused herein was convicted by Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
Tagbilaran of violating city ordinance for peddling 8sh outside the Agora Public
Market and for the crime of Resistance and Serious Disobedience to Agents of a
Person in Authority. She 8led an application for probation. After less than a month,
petitioner 8led a motion to withdraw her application for probation and
simultaneously 8led a notice of appeal. MTCC granted petitioner’s withdrawal of her
application for probation but denied her notice of appeal for having been 8led out of
time. Her motion for reconsideration of the denial of her appeal was denied. He 8led
a petition for certiorari before the RTC. He was ordered by the trial court to furnish
the City Prosecutor’s O7ce with a copy of her memorandum and assailed judgment.
The RTC dismissed her petition for certiorari for not complying with the said order.
Hence, she 8led this petition.
Issue: Whether the petition for certiorari was validly dismissed by the Regional Trial
Court?
Ruling: Yes. Every court has the power to enforce and compel obedience to its
orders, judgments, and processes in all proceedings pending before it. The Regional
Trial Court’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action, therefore, was but a valid
exercise of said power.
Moreover, even assuming that the Regional Trial Court did not order the said
dismissal, petitioner’s special civil action, questioning the denial of her notice of
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appeal, would still fail. Note that petitioner 8led an application for probation. Section
7, Rule 120, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is explicit that a judgment in a
criminal case becomes 8nal when the accused has applied for probation. This is
totally in accord with Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law of
1976, as amended), which in part provides that the 8ling of an application for
probation is deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. Thus, there was no more
opportunity for petitioner to exercise her right to appeal, the judgment having
become =nal by the =ling of an application for probation.
11. ArnelColinares vs. People, GR 182748, 13 December 2011

(Exemption - Probation after appeal)
Note: Wala to sa lumang syllabus
12. Tolentino vs. Alconcel, GR No. 63400, 18 March 1983

(Probation a mere privilege)
Facts: Eduardo Tolentino was charged of violation of Section 4, Article II of RA.

6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Pleaded not guilty.
Thereafter, manifest his change of plea to that of guilty, without objection of the
prosection and lessens the crime to a violation under Section 8 of Article II of RA.
6425. He applied for probation. But the HON. AMANTE Q. ALCONCEL, Judge of Circuit
Criminal Court denied it.
Issue: Whether or not accused’s Probation be granted?
Ruling: NO. Probation is a mere privilege and its grant rests solely upon the
discretion of the court. As aptly noted in U.S. vs. Durken, this discretion is to be
exercised primarily for the bene8t of organized society and only incidentally for the
bene8t of the accused.
"The conclusion of respondent judge that "probation will depreciate the seriousness
of the o?ense committed" is based principally on the admission by the petitioner
himself, as reUected in the report of the probation o7cer, that he [petitioner] was
actually caught in the act of selling marijuana cigarettes. Petitioner did not deny or
dispute the veracity of the fact that he was caught in agrante delicto of selling
marijuana cigarettes. He merely attempted to justify his criminal act by explaining
in his motion for reconsideration that "he did it only to make some money for the
family during Christmas. Such admission renders a hearing on the application for
probation an unnecessary surplusage and an Idle ceremony.
Proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country has remained a serious threat to the
well-being of the people. It has necessitated an all-out intensi8ed campaign on the
part of the law-enforcers against users as well as pushers thereof. If only to
emphasize the gravity of the drug menace, the Batasan Pambansa has seen 8t to
increase the penalty for violation of Section 8, Article II of Rep. Act 6425. Thus, while
under Rep. Act 6425, as amended by P.D. 44, possession or use of marijuana was
punishable by imprisonment of 6 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months and a
8ne ranging from P600.00 to P6,000.00-the penalty imposed upon petitioner herein-
possession and use thereof is now punishable by imprisonment ranging from 6
years and 1 day to 12 years and 8ne ranging from P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 under
B.P. Blg. 179.
13. Pablo Francisco vs. C.A., GR No. 108747; 6 April 1995

(Probation in multiple conviction)
Facts: Petitioner's woes started when as President and General Manager of ASPAC
Trans. Company he failed to control his outburst and blurted invectives against the
employees. Thus for humiliating his employees he was accused of multiple grave
oral defamation in 8ve (5) separate Informations instituted by 8ve (5) of his
employees, each Information charging him with gravely maligning them on four
di?erent days, i.e., from 9 to 12 April 1980.
After 10 years, he was found guilty of grave oral defamation in four (4) of the 8ve
(5) cases 8led against him. The case was then set for execution of judgment by the
MeTC which, as a consequence, issued a warrant of arrest. But·before he could be
arrested petitioner 8led an application for probation which the MeTC denied In the
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present recourse, petitioner squirms out of each ground and seeks this Court's
compassion in dispensing with the minor technicalities which may militate against
his petition as he now argues before us that he has not yet lost his right to avail of
probation notwithstanding his appeal from the MeTC to the RTC since "[t]he reason
for his appeal was precisely to enable him to avail himself of the bene8ts of the
Probation Law because the original Decision of the (Metropolitan) Trial Court was
such that he would not then be entitled to probation." He contends that "he
appealed from the judgment of the trial court precisely for the purpose of reducing
the penalties imposed upon him by the said court to enable him to qualify for
probation."
Issue: Whether petitioner is still quali8ed to avail of probation even after appealing
his conviction to the RTC which a7rmed the MeTC except with regard to the
duration of the penalties imposed.
Ruling. No. Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation.
Multiple prison terms imposed against an accused found guilty of several o?enses in
one decision are not, and should not be, added up. And, the sum of the multiple
prison terms imposed against an applicant should not be determinative of his
eligibility for, nay his disquali8cation from, probation. The multiple prison terms are
distinct from each other, and if none of the terms exceeds the limit set out in the
Probation Law,i.e., not more than six (6) years, then he is entitled to probation,
unless he is otherwise speci8cally disquali8ed. The number of o?enses is immaterial
as long as all the penalties imposed, taken separately, are within the probationable
period.
Probation Law, as amended, disquali8es only those who have been convicted of
grave felonies as de8ned in Art. 9 in relation to Art. 25 of The Revised Penal Code,
and not necessarily those who have been convicted of multiple o?enses in a single
proceeding who are deemed to be less perverse. Hence, the basis of the
disquali8cation is principally the gravity of the o?ense committed and the
concomitant degree of penalty imposed. Those sentenced to a maximum term not
exceeding six (6) years are not generally considered callous, hard core criminals,
and thus may avail of probation.
Petitioner thus proceeds on an erroneous assumption that under the MeTC Decision
he could not have availed of the bene8ts of probation. Since he could have,
although he did not, his appeal now precludes him from applying for probation.
14. Manuel Bala vs. Martinez, G.R. No. 67301, 29 January 1990,
(Probation; Termination)
Facts: The petitioner had been indicted for removing and substituting the picture of
Maria Eloisa Criss Diazen which had been attached to her United States of America
passport, with that of Florencia Notarte, in e?ect falsifying a genuine public or
o7cial document.
After the case had been remanded to the court of origin for execution of
judgment, 2 the petitioner applied for and was granted probation by the respondent
judge in his order dated August 11, 1982. The petitioner was then placed under
probation for a period of one (1) year, subject to the terms and conditions
enumerated therein.
On September 23, 1982, the probationer (petitioner) asked his supervising

probation o7cer for permission to transfer his residence from BF Homes to Phil-Am
Life Subdivision in Las Piñas speci8cally 33 Jingco Street which the probation o7cer
verbally granted.
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Probation should have expired on aug 10, 1983, 1 year after it was issued, however,
the order of 8nal discharge could not be issued because the respondent o7cer had
not yet submitted his 8nal report on the conduct of his charge.
Respondent People of the Phil 8led a motion to revoke petitioner’s probation on the
ground that he had violated the terms thereof. The petitioner opposed and alleged
that he was no longer under probation, as such, no valid reason existed to revoke
the same.
Issue: W/n probation is revocable
Ruling: yes. Probation is revocable before the 8nal discharge of the probationer by
the court, contrary to the petitioner's submission.
8
Section 16 of PD 968 is clear on this score:
See. 16. Termination of Probation. — After the period of probation and

upon consideration of the report and recommendation of the probation
o7cer, the court may order the 8nal discharge of the probationer upon
8nding that he has ful8lled the terms and conditions of his probation
and thereupon the case is deemed terminated.
Thus, the expiration of the probation period alone does not automatically terminate
probation. Nowhere is the ipso facto termination of probation found in the provisions
of the probation law. Probation is not coterminous with its period. There must 8rst
be issued by the court of an order of 8nal discharge based on the report and
recommendation of the probation o7cer. Only from such issuance can the case of
the probationer be deemed terminated.
15. Urbano vs. COMELEC, et.al., GR 168550, 10 August 2006 (EAect

of Final Discharge of Probation)
Facts: Norma L. Mejes 8led a petition to disqualify Urbano M. Moreno from running
for Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by 8nal judgment
on the crime of Arbitrary Detention and was su?ered to su?er imprisonment of 4
months and 1 day to 2 yrs and 4 months. Moreno contended that there is no cause
of action because he was already granted probation and the 8nal discharge of the
same shall operate to restore him all civil rights he lost as a result of his conviction,
including the right to vote and to be voted in July 2002 elections.
According to COMELEC, section 40 of the LGC provide that those sentenced by 8nal
judgment for an o?ense involving moral turpitude of for an o?ense punishable by 1
year or more imprisonment, within 2 yrs after serving sentence, are disquali8ed
from running for any elective local position. Since Moreno was released from
probation on December 2000, disquali8cation shall commence on this date and end
2 yrs thence. The grant of probation t Moreno merely suspended the execution of
his sentence but did not a?ect his disquali8cation from running for an elective local
o7ce.
In this petition, Moreno argues that the disquali8cation under Sec. 40(a)1 of the
Local Government Code (LGC) applies only to those who have served their sentence
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and not to probationers because the latter do not serve the adjudged sentence. He
alleges that he applied for and was granted probation within the period speci8ed
therefore. He never served a day of his sentence as a result. Hence, the
disquali8cation under the LGC does not apply to him.
Issue: Whether probation law is an exception to LGC.
Ruling: Yes. The fact that the trial court already issued an order 8nally discharging
Moreno forti8es his position. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that “[t]he 8nal
discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or
suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any 8ne
imposed as to the o?ense for which probation was granted.” Thus, when Moreno
was 8nally discharged upon the court’s 8nding that he has ful8lled the terms and
conditions of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all civil rights lost
or suspended as a result of his conviction were restored to him, including the right
to run for public o7ce.
The SC agreed with Moreno that the Probation Law should be construed as an
exception to the Local Government Code. While the Local Government Code is a
later law which sets forth the quali8cations and disquali8cations of local elective
o7cials, the Probation Law is a special legislation which applies only to
probationers. It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in
its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not a?ect
the special provisions of such earlier statute.
B. Anti-Fencing Law (PD 1612)
16. Tan vs. People, GR No. 1343298, August 1999; (Fencing;

elements)
Facts: Manuelito Mendez, a former employee of Bueno Metal Industries, was

arrested for stealing product materials from the company warehouse. Mendez
admitted the accusation and pointed to Ramon Tan as the one who bought the
stolen items. Mendez was forgiven by complainant but Tan was charged with
violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. After trial, Tan was convicted of the crime charged,
and on appeal, the Court of Appeals a7rmed the same. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: whether or not the prosecution has successfully established the elements of
fencing as against petitioner.
Ruling: The Court resolved the issue in the negative. Noted is the fact that the loss
was never reported to the police. In Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People of the
Philippines, the Court set out the essential elements of the crime of fencing as
follows: “1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed; “2. The accused, who is
not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft,
buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and
sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which
has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime; “3. The accused knows or
should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and “4. There is on the
part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.”
And as the complainant reported no loss, it cannot be held for certain that the crime
of theft or robbery was committed. Thus, the 8rst element of the crime of fencing is
absent. The extra-judicial confession of Manuelito cannot be considered as evidence
against the accused as there must be corroboration by evidence of corpus delicti to
sustain a 8nding of guilt. Further, there was no showing at all that the accused knew
or should have known that the very stolen articles were the ones sold to him.
Consequently, the prosecution, having failed to establish the essential elements of
fencing, petitioner is entitled to an acquittal.
17. Capili vs. CA, 15 August 2000 (Fencing; elements)
Facts: Michael Manzo, a former houseboy, stole several jewelries and money from
Christine Diokno with the alleged value of P3M. Diokno spoked with Manzo who
admitted the commission of the stealing and that he sold the items to Gabriel Capili
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and his wife for P50,000. During the frisking and searching at the station, police
o7cers found pearls and old coins from Gabriel Capili (alias Boy Recto). The police
likewise found a pair of earrings being worn by the wife of Capili, which one of the
jewelries stolen. Manzo testi8ed against Boy Recto for buying the jewelries and
coins he stole. Capili denied any knowledge about the charge against him and
declared that what Michael Manzo stated in court is not true. They were found guilty
of the violation. Gabriel Capili appealed to the Court of Appeals which a7rmed the
decision of the RTC. The accused contended that the actual value of the fenced
articles were not correctly established by the prosecution, hence, the guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: Whether CA erred in a7rming the lower court’s decision 8nding Capili guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for the o?ense of Fencing.
Ruling: No. All the elements are present in the case at bench. Fencing is the act of
any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive,
possess, keep, acquire, conceal sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any
manner deal in any article, item, object, or anything of value which he knows, or
should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft. The essential elements of the crime of fencing are:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or an accomplice in the commission of the

crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any
article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the
proceeds of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery
or theft; and
4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
The law does not require proof of purchase of the stolen articles by the accused as
mere possession thereof is enough to give rise to a presumption of fencing. Manzo
established that he sold the stolen items to Gabriel Capili for an amount of money
and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, said amount is presumed to be
the value thereof as it is the only value established by the prosecution. Besides, the
valuation of the stolen items made by the trial court is a factual issue and factual
8nds of the trial court especially when a7rmed by the Court of Appeals are entitled
to great weight and generally should not be disturbed on appeals.
18. Francisco vs. People; GR 146584, 12 July 2004 (Prima Facie

evidence of fencing)
Facts: Pacita Linghon, Macario’s sister was hired as a household helper of Jovita
Rodriguez who was engaged in a business as a general contractor. Jovita and her
husband acquired several pieces of jewelry which were placed inside a locked
cabinet in a locked room in their main house. Pacita swept and cleaned the room
periodically.
Sometime in October 1991, Pacita contacted her brother Macario and asked him to
sell some pieces of jewelry owned by a friend of hers. Macario agreed and went to
the shop of petitioner Ernesto “Erning” Francisco in Meycauyan, Bulacan. Macario
o?ered to sell to Ernesto two rings and one bracelet. Ernesto agreed to buy the
jewelry for P25,000, and paid the amount to Macario. He also gave Macario P300 as
a tip.
Another transaction happened in November 1991 where he o?ered to sell to Ernesto

the pair of earrings for P18,000. Ernesto agreed and paid Macario the amount.
Jovita was shocked when she found that the box containing her jewelry was empty
and noticed that the loc to the cabinet was not broken. Among the pieces of jewelry
missing were one pair of diamond heart-shaped earrings worth P400,000; one heart-
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shaped diamond ring worth P100,000; one white gold bracelet with diamond stones
worth P150,000; and one ring with a small diamond stone worth P5,000. She
suspected that it was Pacita who stole her jewelry.
Jovita 8led a complaint for theft against Pacita and her mother Adoracion Linghon. A
team of police investigators, including PO1 Santiago Roldan, Jr. of the Counter-
Intelligence Group, invited Pacita and Adoracion to Camp Crame, Quezon City, for
investigation in connection with Jovita’s complaint.
Pacita gave a sworn statement to PO1 Roldan, Jr., admitting that she sold one pair of
heart-shaped earrings with diamond, one white gold bracelet, one heart-shaped
diamond ring, and one ring "with big and small stones" to "Mang Erning" of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, for the total price of P50,000 to cover the cost of her father’s
operation and for food. When asked about the full name of the person to whom the
jewelry was sold, Pacita replied that she knew him only as "Mang Erning." Petitioner
was invited for questioning in Camp Crame.
Pacita was charged with quali8ed theft and Adoracion was also charged with
violating P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law). A criminal complaint against the
petitioner for violation of P.D. No. 1612 was 8led. During the preliminary
investigation, Pacita and Macario testi8ed that they sold a set of earrings, bracelet
and two rings to the petitioner for P50,000 at his shop in Meycauayan, Bulacan. The
court found probable cause against the petitioner, and issued a warrant for his
arrest.
Judgment was rendered 8nding Pacita guilty of quali8ed theft and Adoracion guilty
of fencing under PD No 1612, beyond reasonable doubt. While the trial court
rendered judgment 8nding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating PD No 1612, which was a7rmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence this
petition.
Issue: Whether the trial court and Court of Appeals erred in 8nding the petitioner
guilty for violation of Anti–Fencing Law?
Ruling: Yes. The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a
crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a
principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys,
receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells,
or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused
knew or should have shown that the said article, item, object or anything of value
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and, (4) there
is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a prima facie presumption
of fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item,
object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or theft, and
prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property. The stolen property
subject of the charge is not indispensable to prove fencing. It is merely
corroborative of the testimonies and other evidence adduced by the prosecution to
prove the crime of fencing.
19. Jaime Ong y Ong v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 190475,
10 April 2013 (Proof of legitimate transaction; Presumption of
possession; disputable )
Facts: Francisco Azajar, private complainant, was the owner of forty-four (44)
Firestone truck tires which he acquired from Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation,
Private complainant marked the tires using a piece of chalk before storing them
inside the warehouse. After he sold six tires, thirty-eight (38) tires remained inside
the warehouse. private complainant learned that all thirty eight tires were stolen.
Pending the police investigation, private complainant canvassed from numerous
business establishments and chanced upon Jong's Marketing, a store selling tires
owned and operated b y the accused. Private complainant inquired and accused
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brought out a tire 8tting the description which private complainant recognized as
one of the tires stolen from his warehouse, based on the chalk marking and the
serial number thereon. Private complainant asked appellant if he had any more of
such tires in stock, which was again answered in the a7rmative. He informed the
police o7cers who conducted a buy-bust operation which resulted to the arrest of
the accused. He was convicted for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612 also
known as Anti-Fencing Law. In his defense, he denied any knowledge that he was
selling stolen tires. The CA a7rmed RTC’s decision.
Issue: Whether accused is guilty for violating Anti-Fencing Law?
Ruling: Yes. Fencing is de8ned in Section 2(a) of P.D. 1612 as the “act of any
person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive,
possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any
manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or
should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft.”
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery
or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or on
accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any
manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or
should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and (4) there is, on the
part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another.
Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand tires. Section 6 of P.D.
1612 requires stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buying and selling of
any good, article, item, object or anything else of value obtained from an unlicensed
dealer or supplier thereof to secure the necessary clearance or permit from the
station commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or city where that
store, establishment or entity is located before o?ering the item for sale to the
public. In fact, Ong has practiced the procedure of obtaining clearances from the
police station for some used tires he wanted to resell but, in this particular
transaction, he was remiss in his duty as a diligent businessman who should have
exercised prudence.
Note: Etong nasa baba lang talaga yung may kinalaman sa topic.
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of
fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item,
object or anything of value, which has been the subject of robbery or theft; and
prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.
The RTC and the CA correctly computed the imposable penalty based on P5,075 for
each tire recovered, or in the total amount of P65,975. Records show that Azajar
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had purchased forty-four (44) tires from Philtread in the total amount of P223,40
1.81.26 Section 3 (p) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court provides a disputable
presumption that private transactions have been fair and regular. Thus, the
presumption of regularity in the ordinary course of business is not
overturned in the absence of the evidence challenging the regularity of
the transaction between Azajar ,and Phil tread.
20. People vs. Guzman; GR No. 77368 (Robbery-Fencing,

diAerence)
Facts: On 09 September 1985, robbery was committed in Quezon City in the house
of Jose L. Obillos, Sr., where various pieces of precious jewelry alleged to be worth
millions of pesos were taken. An information, dated 30 September 1985, was
instituted against the perpetrators in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
101, docketed thereat asCriminal Case No. G.R. No. 42078.
Subsequently, an information, dated 22 October 1985, for violation of Presidential

Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the "Anti-Fencing Law," was also 8led with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, docketed as Criminal Case No.
42433, against herein respondent spouses Danilo A. Alcantara and Isabelita
Esguerra-Alcantara, from whose possession the jewelries stolen were recovered in
Antipolo, Rizal.
The trial court, acting on the motion to quash 8led by the accused, issued the now
questioned order that since the alleged act of fencing took place in Antipolo, Rizal,
outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, and considering that all criminal
prosecutions must be instituted and tried in the Municipality or Province where the
o?ense took place, this Court, necessarily, does not have jurisdiction over the
instant case.
Issue: Is the crime of "fencing" a continuing oAense that could allow the
=ling of an information therefor in the place where the robbery or theft is
committed and not necessarily where the property, unlawfully taken is
found to have later been acquired?
Ruling: NO. A "continuous crime" is a single crime consisting of a series of facts

arising from a single criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of division.
Robbery is the taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain,
by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon
anything. "Fencing", upon the other hand, is the act of any person who, with intent
to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire,
conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any
article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to
him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
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The crimes of robbery and fencing are clearly then two distinct o?enses. The law on
fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to
commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of
robbery or theft. Neither is the crime of robbery or theft made to depend on an act
of fencing in order that it can be consummated. True, the object property in fencing
must have been previously taken by means of either robbery or theft but the place
where the robbery or theft occurs is inconsequential. It may not be suggested, for
instance, that, in the crime of bigamy which presupposes a prior subsisting
marriage of an accused, the case should thereby be triable likewise at the place
where the prior marriage has been contracted.
21. Caoili vs. C.A., GR No. 128369; 22 December 1997

(Presumption of possession; when not applied)
Facts: An Information was 8led with the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”) of Manila.
Petitioner, Rodolfo “Rudy” Caoili, was charged, along with a certain Tony Yip, with
violation of Presidential Decree (“P.D.”) No. 1612. Petitioner sought a review by the
Secretary of Justice of the resolution of Assistant Prosecutor Antonio R. Rebagay that
had found a prima facie case against petitioner that served as the basis for the
information.
Issue: Whether or not there is su7cient evidence to indict Caoili.
Ruling: Yes. As correctly stated by the CA: “To be liable for violation of P.D. 1612,
Section 2 thereof requires that the o?ender buys or otherwise acquires and then
sells or disposes of any object of value which he knows or should be known to him
to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
The allegations of Atule and Azuela do not indicate that respondent Caoili acquired
the skiving machines in question knowing that the same were stolen
property. The prima facie presumption of fencing from possession of stolen property
does not apply to Caoili as complainant reacquired the subject skiving machines not
from respondent Caoili but from Yip. It is di7cult to give credence to the claim of
Atule and Azuela that respondent Caoili told them that he purchased the stolen
skiving machines which he in turn sold to Yip. It is simply contrary to common
human behavior that a person would intimate to another or others an unlawful act
that he purchased stolen items and then dispose of it at a pro8t. Evidence to be
believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be
credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances.”
C. Obstruction of Justice (PD No. 1829)
22. Juan Ponce Enrile vs. Judge Omar Amin, GR 93335, 13

September 1990 (PD 1829 absorbed in rebellion)
Facts: enrile was charged with violation of Sec. 1 PD No. 1829 for allegedly
entertained Honasan by giving him food and comfort in his house, knowing that
Honosan is a fugitive from justice. Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have
Honasan arrested, and because of such failure, the petitioner prevented Honasan’s
arrest.
The rebellion charges against him were based from the a7davits executed by 3
employees of the Silahis International Hotel which states that Honasa and some 100
rebel soldiers attended the mass and bday party held at Enrile’s house. the
Prosecution concluded that Enrile’s act of talking with Honasan in his own house in
the presence of rebels, can be inferred that they were co-conspirators in the failed
December coup.
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Respondent judge sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding

the rebellion case earlier 8led against Enrile
Issue: W/n the petitioner could be separately charged for vilation of pd 1829
notwithstanding the rebellion case
Ruling: No. being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioners alleged act of harboring
or concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion
thus constitute a component thereof. it was motivated by the single intent or
resolution to commit the crime of rebellion. As held in People v. Hernandez, supra:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political
order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve
a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive.
All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere
components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed
in the crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as separate crimes in
themselves. Thus:
This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a
crime form part and parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the
same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by the
application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. ... (People v.
Hernandez, supra, at p. 528)
The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the
crime of rebellion. These common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as
murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in the Revised Penal Code. The
attendant circumstances in the instant case, however, constrain us to rule that the
theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not con8ne itself to common crimes but
also to o?enses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the
political o?ense.
23. Roger Posadas v. Ombudsman, GR 131492, 29 September 2000

(No PD 1829 in illegal arrest)
Facts: Petitioner Roger Posadas, then chancellor of UP Diliman asked the director of
NBI Orlando Dizon for assistance in determining the persons responsible for the
death of Dennis Venturina, a member of the Sigma Rho, killed in a rumble between
his fraternity and another fraternity.
NBI agents attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag as
suspects. Petitioners Poadas and Atty Villamor, counsel for the suspects objected on
the ground that the NBI did not have warrants of arrest against them. As a result of
intervention, the suspects were not arrested on that day.
Dizon 8led a complaint against Petitioner and Atty Villamor for violation of PD 1829
which makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of
criminal o?enders.
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The o7ce of the Ombudsman directed the Special Prosecutor to proceed with the
prosecution of petitioners in the Sandiganbayan hence this petition.
Issue: (1) Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the NBI could
be validly made without a warrant; and (2) Whether there was probable cause for
prosecuting petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829.
Ruling: The Supreme Court answered the questions in the negative. The attempted
arrest does not fall in any of the exception in a warrantless arrest.
The Court noted that at the time the deceased UP student Dennis Venturina was
killed in a fraternity-related incident, the NBI agents were nowhere near the scene
of the crime. When the NBI agents attempted to arrest UP students Taparan and
Narag, the latter were not committing a crime nor were they doing anything that
would create the suspicion that they were doing anything illegal. On the contrary,
Taparan and Narag, under the supervision of the U.P. police, were taking part in a
peace talk called to put an end to fraternity-related violence on the campus.
In this case, petitioners’ objection to the arrest of the students cannot be construed
as a violation of P.D. No. 1829, §l(c) without rendering it unconstitutional. Petitioners
had a right to prevent the arrest of Taparan and Narag at the time because their
attempted arrest was illegal. Indeed, they could not have interfered with the
prosecution of the guilty parties because in fact petitioner Posadas had asked the
NBI for assistance in investigating the death of Venturina. On the other hand, just
because petitioners had asked for assistance from the NBI did not authorize
respondent Dizon and his men to disregard constitutional requirements.
Hence, the Court saw no other recourse but to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the
Ombudsman from proceeding with the case against petitioners..
24. Prudente Soller, et.al., GR 144261-62, 9 May 2001 (PD 1829,

person liable)
Facts: Petitioners were charged with Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution

of Criminal O?enders as de8ned and penalized under P.D. No. 1829.
It appears that Jerry Macabael a municipal guard, was shot and killed along the
national highway at Oriental Mindoro while driving a motorcycle together with
petitioner Soller’s son, Vincent M. Soller. His body was brought to a medical clinic
located in the house of petitioner Dr. Prudente Soller, the Municipal Mayor, and his
wife Dr. Preciosa Soller, who is the Municipal Health O7cer. The incident was
reported to and investigated by petitioner SPO4 Mario Matining.
On the basis of the foregoing incident, a complaint was later 8led against the
petitioners by the widow of Jerry Macabael with the O7ce of the Ombudsman
charging them with conspiracy to mislead the investigation of the fatal shootout of
Jerry Macabael by (a) altering his wound (b) concealing his brain; (c) falsely stating
in police report that he had several gunshot wounds when in truth he had only one;
and d) falsely stating in an autopsy report that there was no blackening around his
wound when in truth there was.
The O7ce of the Ombudsman then recommended the 8ling of an Information for
Obstruction of Justice , and two (2) Informations were 8led with the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners 8led a Motion to Quash on the principal ground that the Sandiganbayan
had no jurisdiction over the o?enses charged. In its assailed Order, the
Sandiganbayan denied petitioners’ Motion to Quash and stated that “the accused is
the Mayor of the municipality where the alleged incident took place and, therefore,
any attempt to deviate or to present false evidence in connection with a criminal
o?ense committed in his municipality for which he is charged would be an o?ense
also in which the accused Mayor would be probably held accountable before this
Court.”
Issue: Whether Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case.
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Ruling: The Informations fail to allege that petitioners had committed the o?enses
charged in relation to their o7ces. Neither are there speci8c allegations of facts to
show the intimate relation/connection between the commission of the o?ense
charged and the discharge of o7cial functions of the o?enders, i.e. that the
obstruction of and apprehension and prosecution of criminal o?enders was
committed in relation to the o7ce of petitioner Prudente Soller, whose o7ce as
Mayor is included in the enumeration in Section 4 (a) of P.D. 1606 as amended.
Although the petitioners were described as being “all public o7cers, then being the
Municipal Mayor, Municipal Health O7cer, SPO II, PO I, Sanitary Inspector and
Midwife,” there was no allegation that the o?ense of altering and suppressing the
gunshot wound of the victim with intent to impair the veracity, authenticity and
availability as evidence in the investigation of the criminal case for murder (Criminal
Case No. 25521) or of giving false and fabricated information in the autopsy report
and police report to mislead the law enforcement agency and prevent the
apprehension of the o?ender (Criminal Case No. 25522) was done in the
performance of o7cial function. Indeed the o?enses de8ned in P.D. 1829 may be
committed by any person whether a public o7cer or a private citizen, and
accordingly public o7ce is not an element of the o?ense. Moreover, the Information
in Criminal Case No. 25522 states that the fabrication of information in the police
and autopsy report “would indicate that the victim was shot by Vincent Soller, the
son of herein petitioners spouses Prudente and Preciosa Soller.” Thus there is a
categorical indication that the petitioners spouses Soller had a personal motive to
commit the o?enses and they would have committed the o?enses charged even if
they did not respectively hold the position of Municipal Mayor or Municipal Health
O7cer.
A cursory reading of the duties and functions of the Municipal Mayor as enumerated
in Section 444 of the Local Government Code will readily show that the preparation
of police and autopsy reports and the presentation and gathering of evidence in the
investigation of criminal cases are not among such duties and functions, and the
broad responsibility to maintain peace and order cannot be a basis for construing
that the criminal acts imputed to petitioner Mayor fall under his functions as
Municipal Mayor.16 What is obvious is that petitioners spouses probably acted as
the parents of the alleged assailant and if at all, were motivated by personal
reasons rather than o7cial duty.
Consequently, for failure to show in the informations that the charges were
intimately connected with the discharge of the o7cial functions of accused Mayor
Soller, the o?enses charged in the subject criminal cases fall within the exclusive
original function of the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan.
E. Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act of 2002 (RA No. 9165)
25. People vs. Fernando Villamin, G.R. No. 175590, 09 February,

2010 (Buy-bust)
Facts: Members of the Drug Enforcement Unit of San Jose del Monte Police Station
received a report from a civilian informant and from the Barangay Captain that a
certain Fernando Villamin was engaged in the sale of shabu in that same place. A
team was formed to conduct a buy-best operation of shabu. In that operation, police
o7cers found several people sni7ng shabu inside the house and was sold a plastic
sachet by Villamin which was proven to be shabu. He was charged 3 counts of
violation of the Dangerous Drug Act but was convicted with only one. He appealed
to the Court of Appeals contending that his constitutional right against searches and
seizure was violated during the buy-bust operation. But the CA a7rmed the ruling of
the lower court.
Issue: Whether the buy-bust operation violated the constitutional right against
searches and seizure.
Ruling: A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been
accepted as a valid and e?ective mode of apprehending drug pushers. In a buy-bust
operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the o?ender, without anybody
inducing or prodding him to commit the o?ense. If carried out with due regard for
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constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation deserves judicial sanction.

Thus, from the very nature of a buy-bust operation, the absence of a warrant does
not make the arrest illegal.
26. People vs. Salvador Sanchez, GR 17832, 15 October 2008 (buy-

bust/Seizure and custody/chain of custody/inventory under RA 9165)
–
Facts: While he was on Station 3 duty at Talipapa, Novaliches, Quezon City, a

con8dential informant arrived at around 4:30 noon and reported that there is a
person who has been selling shabu. An entrapment team was formed consisting of
himself as poseur buyer, SPO1 Brigido An, PO3 Virgilio Bernardo, PO2 Manny Paulilis
and PO1 Cecil Collado. A pre-operational report was submitted of the undertaking.
The team was dispatched to the target area – at the far end Lualhati Street,
Manotok Subd., Baesa, Quezon City. PO Sevilla put his initial "LS" on the money
given to him to be used at the entrapment. At the place, which is a squatter's
colony, PO Sevilla and his informant walked towards the place pointed by the
informant and met the drug pusher. The informant introduced PO Sevilla to the
pusher. The informant and the pusher talked for a while. Thereafter, PO Sevilla
talked to the latter. He told him that he badly needs shabu para pumayat. PO Sevilla
then gave the pusher P100.00 and in return the pusher gave him a plastic sachet of
shabu. After receiving the plastic sachet, PO Sevilla scratched his head as a pre-
arranged signal to his colleagues who were deployed nearby. Said other policemen
rushed to the crime scene while PO Sevilla grabbed the right hand of the accused
and introduced himself as a cop. The accused was frisked and PO Sevilla recovered
the P100.00 marked money bill in the right side pants pocket of the accused who
was later brought to Station 3. The RTC found the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The CA
a7rmed the RTC decision.
Issue: Whether PO2 Sevilla comply with the strict procedures required by Article II
of RA 9165, regarding the validity of a buy bust operation made by him.
Ruling: No. The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is
embodied in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and con8scation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
con8scated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public o7cial
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof. [Emphasis ours]
This is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and

Regulations of R.A. No. 9165, which reads:
(a) The apprehending o7cer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and con8scation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were con8scated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public o7cial who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof: x x x Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements
under justi8able grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending o7cer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
The last sentence of the implementing rules provides that "non-compliance with
these requirements under justi8able grounds, as long as the integrity and the
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evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
o7cer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items." Thus, non-compliance with the strict directive of Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution’s case; police procedures in the
handling of con8scated evidence may still have some lapses, as in the present case.
These lapses, however, must be recognized and explained in terms of their
justi8able grounds and the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized
must be shown to have been preserved.
In the present case, the prosecution apparently did not want to accept that the
police had committed lapses in the handling of the seized materials and thus did
not bother to present any explanation to justify the non-observance of the
prescribed procedures. It likewise failed to prove that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the items adduced were not tainted as the discussions below will show. The
non-observance by the police of the required procedure cannot therefore be
excused.
27. People vs. Noel Bartolome, G.R. No. 191726, 6 February 2013
(Buy-bust operation; surveillance; entrapment not instigation)
Facts: An informant went to the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Unit (ADSOU)
in Caloocan City to report the illicit drug dealings of the accused on Reparo Street,
Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. Acting on the report, Police Inspector Cesar Cruz of
ADSOU immediately instructed some of his men to conduct a buy-bust operation
against the accused. During the pre-operation brie8ng, the buy-bust team
designated PO1 Borban Paras as the poseur-buyer. Paras was given a P100.00 bill
that he marked with his initials BP. It was agreed that the informant would drop a
cigarette butt in front of the suspect to identify him to Paras; and that Paras would
scratch his head to signal to the buy-bust team that the transaction with the
suspect had been consummated. The operation was coordinated with the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency.
Upon arriving at the target area at around 2:00 a.m., the team members positioned
themselves in the vicinity of a store. The informant then approached a person who
was standing in front of the store and dropped a cigarette butt in front of the
person. Paras, then only two meters away from the informant, saw the dropping of
the cigarette butt. Paras went towards the suspect and said to him: Pre pa-iskor
nga. The suspect responded: Pre, piso na lang tong hawak magkano ba kukunin
mo? Paras replied: Ayos na yan, piso lang naman talaga ang kukunin ko, after which
he handed the marked ₱100.00 bill to the suspect, who in turn drew out a plastic
sachet containing white substances from his pocket and gave the sachet to Paras.
With that, Paras scratched his head to signal the consummation of the sale. As the
other members of the team were approaching, Paras grabbed the suspect. PO3
Rodrigo Antonio, another member of the team, con8scated the marked ₱100.00 bill
from the suspect, who was identi8ed as Noel Bartolome y Bajo. Paras immediately
marked the sachet at the crime scene with Bartolome’s initials NBB.
Insp. Cruz later requested in writing the PNP Crime Laboratory in Caloocan City to
conduct a laboratory examination of the contents of the plastic sachet seized from
Bartolome. PO2 Rolando De Ocampo, another member of the buy-bust team,
brought the request and the sachet and its contents to the laboratory. In due
course, Forensic Chemical O7cer Jesse Abadilla Dela Rosa of the PNP Crime
Laboratory con8rmed in Physical Science Report No. D-1038-03 that the plastic
sachet contained 0.06 gram of methamphetamine hydrocholoride or shabu, a
dangerous drug.
On his part, the accused claimed that the arresting o7cers had framed him up
because they wanted to extort a substantial amount from him in exchange for his
release.
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The RTC convicted Bartolome of the crime charged. The CA promulgated its assailed
decision, rejecting the assigned errors of the accused, and a7rmed his conviction
Issue: Whether a buy bust operation is a form of entrapment?
Ruling: Yes. A buy-bust operation has been recognized in this jurisdiction as a

legitimate form of entrapment of the culprit. It is distinct from instigation, in that the
accused who is otherwise not predisposed to commit the crime is enticed or lured or
talked into committing the crime. While entrapment is legal, instigation is not. In
entrapment, prior surveillance is not necessary to render a buy-bust operation
legitimate, especially when the buy-bust team is accompanied to the target area by
the informant. Also, the presentation of an informant as a witness is not regarded as
indispensable to the success of a prosecution of a drug-dealing accused in view of
the need to protect the informant from the retaliation of the culprit arrested through
his e?orts. Only when the testimony of the informant is considered absolutely
essential in obtaining the conviction of the culprit should the need to protect his
security be disregarded. Here, the police o7cer, who acted as a poseur-buyer,
asked the accused if he could buy shabu, and the latter, in turn, quickly transacted
with the former, receiving the marked bill from the police o7cer and turning over
the sachet of shabu he took from his pocket. The accused was shown to have been
ready to sell the shabu without much prodding from the police o7cer. There is no
question that the idea to commit the crime originated from the mind of the accused.
Also, the informant’s testimony as a witness against the accused would only be
corroborative of the su7cient testimony of the police o7cer as the poseur-buyer;
hence, such testimony was unnecessary.
28. People vs. Hong Yeng, et.al. GR 181826, 9 January 2013 (sale
includes possession, RA 9165)
Facts: Suñega , a Special Investigator of The National Bureau of Investigation was

ordered him to place accused Yen E under surveillance and arrange a possible buy-
bust involving him. Subsequently, pre-arranged meeting with Yen E was held
wherein Yen E agreed to sell two kilograms of shabu to Suñega to be delivered in
the evening of the following day at the same place. As agreed, Yen E arrived but
requested the police buyers to meet him at Lai-Lai Restaurant. Before he left, Yen E
took a peek at the money. At the Lai-Lai Restaurant, Chua and Ang arrived and
approached Yen E. Upon the latter’s instruction, Chua handed over the plastic bags
she had to Suñega. Convinced that these contained shabu, Suñega lit his cigarette,
the signal that the buy-bust had been completed. Separate charged were 8led
against the two accused. Yen E and Chua denied the charges and complained of
being a victim of "hulidap" that the arresting o7cers demanded P2 million for their
release. The two accused were convicted of illegal sale of prohibited drugs. The CA
A7rmed the same. Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether there is consummation of illegal sale of prohibited drugs in the

absence of possession?
Ruling: No. To prove the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the
prosecution's evidence should establish the following elements: (1) the identity of
the buyer and seller, object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment. Absent any of these two elements, the prosecution’s case must
fail.
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It is material in illegal sale of dangerous drugs that the sale actually took place.
What consummates the buy-bust transaction is the delivery of the drugs
to the poseur-buyer and, in turn, the seller’s receipt of the marked money.
While the parties may have agreed on the selling price of the shabu and delivery of
payment was intended, these do not prove consummated sale. Receipt of the
marked money, whether done before delivery of the drugs or after, is required.
Here, while SI Suñega claimed that Yen E o?ered to sell to him two kilograms of
shabu for P1.2 million and that he agreed to buy the same, the sale was not
consummated. SI Suñega admitted that the back-up team immediately arrested the
appellants before he could deliver the buy-bust money to the appellants.
The elements of illegal possession of prohibited drugs are as follows: (a) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which is identi8ed to be a prohibited
drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the prohibited drug.
Although the plastic bags containing shabu were found solely in the possession of
Chua, it was evident that Yen E had knowledge of its existence. As the records
would show, Yen E negotiated for the sale of dangerous drugs. When Chua arrived in
the vicinity, she approached Yen E before delivering the shabu to Suñega. These
acts of the accused indubitably demonstrate a coordinated plan on their part to
actively engage in the illegal business of drugs. When conspiracy is shown, the act
of one is the act of all conspirators. Direct evidence of conspiracy is not necessary
as it can be clearly deduced from the acts of the accused.
Dispositive: The decision of the Court of was MODIFIED. The Court 8nds the
accused guilty of illegal possession of prohibited drugs.
29. People vs. Dante Dumalag GR 180514, 17 April 2013 (Marking-

chain of custody)
Facts: A female police informant from Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte went to the o7ce of
the Special Operations Group (now Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations
Team or PAID-SOT reported that a certain Dato Dumalag, a known drug personality
of Brgy. 2, Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte was at Sexy Beach Resort owned by Bebot Ferrer
selling shabu to customers. Acting upon the report, police o7cers organized a team
to conduct a buy bust operation against the suspect. PO3 Albano was assigned to
act as poseur buyer while the rest of the team will act as perimeter back up. PO3
Albano was also tasked to mark the two pieces of P100 bills provided by Inspector
Battulayan to be used as buy bust money and placed the letter "R" between the
letters G and P of Republika Ng Pilipinas on the face of the bills. The pre-operation
activity was also recorded in the police blotter. Afterwards, the team proceeded to
the target place.
Upon reaching the place at around 3:00 o’clock, the police asked the caretaker of
the beach resort if a person is occupying Room 03 as reported by the asset. The
caretaker who was with another caretaker and both of whom were female gave
them the information that indeed a male person was occupying the said room. After
they prepared for the plan and have surveyed the area for 8ve to seven minutes,
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they proceeded with the drug bust. In the meantime, after PO2 Valdez received the
miss call of PO3 Albano, he and his companions rushed inside the room of the
suspect. PO3 Albano had already handcu?ed the suspect by then and was holding
him at that time. While PO3 Albano frisked the accused where he con8scated a P50
bill in which three other sachets of suspected shabu were inserted, PO2 Valdez
searched the room and con8scated some items which were on top of the dresser,
such as 8ve crumpled aluminum foil, stick of cigarette, cigarette foil, a lighter and a
cellphone. Afterwards, they brought the suspect and the con8scated items to their
headquarters in Laoag City where PO3 Albano marked the sachet of shabu bought
from the suspect with his initials "RA". He also marked the other three sachets and
the P50 bill in which he found the said sachets with the letter "R" on one side and
the letters "DD" on the other side. He also prepared the con8scation receipt which
the accused signed and the post operation report. On the other hand, PO2 Valdez
marked the items that he con8scated with his initials "DUV". They then brought the
con8scated items for laboratory examination together with a letter request.
Accused-appellant insisted that he is innocent and that the charges against him
were merely fabricated. According to accused-appellant, the prosecution failed to
establish the factual details which led to his arrest. Accused-appellant further
argued that the police o7cers who arrested him and purportedly con8scated the
sachets of shabu from his possession failed to strictly comply with the mandated
procedure under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The said provision of the law
and jurisprudence on the matter require that the marking of the drugs be done
immediately after they are seized from the accused; otherwise, reasonable doubt
arises as to the authenticity of the seized drugs. Accused-appellant claimed that the
sachets of shabu supposedly seized from his possession were marked when he was
already at the police station and not at the place of his arrest.
Issue: Whether or not the marking of evidence was invalid, that would a?ect the
arrest and invalidate it too?
Ruling: No. For a prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug to prosper,
it must be shown that (a) the accused was in possession of an item or an object
identi8ed to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (b) such possession is not authorized
by law; and (c) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession
of the drug.
In the prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the following
elements must concur: (1) the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof. What
is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually occurred, coupled with the presentation in court of the
substance seized as evidence.
Furthermore, the Court 8nds that the chain of custody of the sachets of shabu
seized from accused-appellant had been duly established by the prosecution, in
compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. As pertinently summarized by
the Court of Appeals, the prosecution had proven each and every link of the chain of
custody of the sachets of shabu from the time they were seized from accused-
appellant, kept in police custody then transferred to the laboratory for examination,
and up to their presentation in court, to wit:
It has been established that: after the police o7cers reached appellant’s room at
the Sexy Beach Resort, and PO3 Albano acted as poseur-buyer, he was handed one
(1) heat-sealed plastic sachet containing shabu. After accused was arrested, the
police o7cers were able to retrieve from appellant’s possession the marked money,
as well as three (3) other heat-sealed plastic sachets containing shabu. They
brought appellant to their o7ce, together with the con8scated items, and prepared
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the necessary documents for the 8ling of the cases against him. PO3 Albano and
PO2 Valdez signed the Certi8cation of Seized Items (Exhibit "L") dated 05 January
2005. The team leader, Police Inspector Rolando Battulayan, prepared the Request
for Laboratory Examination (Exhibit "E") dated 05 January 2005 of said heat-sealed
plastic sachets containing alleged shabu, with the necessary markings on them, to
determine if said items contain methamphetamine hydrochloride. The one (1) heat-
sealed plastic sachet, subject of the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, was marked
with letters "RA," while the three (3) heat-sealed plastic sachets, subject of the
illegal possession of dangerous drugs, were marked with the letter
"R" on one side and "DD" (initials of appellant), on the other side. PO3 Albano was
the one who made said markings and delivered the same to the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Crime Laboratory O7ce, Camp Capt. Valentin.
Accused-appellant’s insistence that the police o7cers broke the chain of custody
rule when they failed to mark the seized items immediately upon their con8scation
at the place where he was apprehended lacks legal basis.
It has already been settled that the failure of police o7cers to mark the items
seized from an accused in illegal drugs cases immediately upon its con8scation at
the place of arrest does not automatically impair the integrity of the chain of
custody and render the con8scated items inadmissible in evidence. Jurisprudence
tells us that the failure to immediately mark seized drugs will not automatically
impair the integrity of chain of custody.
The failure to strictly comply with Sec. 21(1), Art. II of RA 9165 does not necessarily
render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized or con8scated from him
inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
As we held in People v. Cortez, testimony about a perfect chain is not always the
standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.
Accused-appellant broaches the view that SA Isidoro’s failure to mark the

con8scated shabu immediately after seizure creates a reasonable doubt as to the
drug’s identity. People v. Sanchez, however, explains that RA 9165 does not specify
a time frame for "immediate marking," or where said marking should be done:
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify
is the matter of "marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that
the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory
and photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station rather
than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires
that the "marking" of the seized items – to truly ensure that they are the same
items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones o?ered in evidence – should
be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon
con8scation.
To be able to create a 8rst link in the chain of custody, then, what is required is that
the marking be made in the presence of the accused and upon immediate
con8scation. "Immediate con8scation" has no exact de8nition. Thus, in People v.
Gum-Oyen, testimony that included the marking of the seized items at the police
station and in the presence of the accused was su7cient in showing compliance
with the rules on chain of custody. Marking upon immediate con8scation
contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or o7ce of the
apprehending team.
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There is no question herein that the con8scated sachets of shabu and related
paraphernalia were inventoried and marked in the presence of accused-appellant at
the police station where he was brought right after his arrest.
30. People vs. Paterno Lorenzo, G.R. No. 184760, 23 April 2010
(Illegal possession of drugs, elements) –
Facts: The appellants were caught in a buy bust operation following an information
against them that they have in their possession a substance called shabu- an illegal
drug. They were accosted in San Mateo, Province of Rizal they were charged with
violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. On arraignment, both
accused, with the assistance of counsel, entered ‘NOT GUILTY’ pleas. A sole witness
was presented by the prosecution, the police o7cer, stating that the accused was
peddling shabu in Daangbakal, Dulongbayan. After taking the marked money,
Lorenzo handed the shabu to the informant. PO3 Pineda and SPO1 Arellano alighted
from the tricycle and approached Lorenzo, and introduced themselves as police
o7cers. They arrested Lorenzo and subsequently Estanislao whom the latter was
talking to. A sachet f shabu was also found in him. Both interposed the defense of
frame up. Detained accused Conrado Estanislao y Javier is ordered released from
detention at the San Mateo Jail unless detained for some other lawful cause.
The plastic sachets of shabu subject matter of the instant cases are ordered
forfeited in favor of the government and the O7cer-In-Charge of the Court is hereby
ordered to safely deliver or cause the safe delivery of the same to the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition. The Trial court ruled that
both were guilty and gave more veracity on the prosecution’s version that Lorenzo
was caught in Uagrante delicto
Issue: Whether the prosecution discharged its burden of proving Lorenzo’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged.
Ruling: No. The prosecution’s case fails for failure to establish the identity of the
prohibited drug with moral certainty.
In order to successfully prosecute an accused for illegal sale of drugs, the

prosecution must be able to prove the following elements: (1) identities of the buyer
and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment therefor. Material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale had actually taken place, coupled with
the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti. The term corpus
delicti means the actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged.
On the other hand, in illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are: (1)
the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identi8ed to be a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the said drug. Similarly, in this case, the evidence
of the corpus delicti must be established beyond doubt.
In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs, conviction cannot be
sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The identity of
the prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing
that the elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that the substance
illegally possessed and sold in the 8rst place is the same substance o?ered in court
as exhibit must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that
needed to sustain a guilty verdict.
While buy-bust operations have been proven to be an e?ective way to Uush out
illegal transactions that are otherwise conducted covertly and in secrecy, a buy-bust
operation is susceptible to police abuse. Thus, courts have been mandated to be
extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to su?er the
unusually severe penalties for drug o?enses.
Taking the aforementioned into consideration, speci8c procedures relating to the

seizure and custody of drugs have been laid down under the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) for Republic Act No. 9165 and it is the prosecution’s burden to
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adduce evidence that these procedures have been complied with in proving the
elements of the o?ense. The procedure for the custody and disposition of
con8scated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, among others, is provided
under Section 21 (a), paragraph 1 of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, to wit:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and con8scation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
con8scated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public o7cial
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof;
Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act
No. 9165, which implements said provision, reads: (a) The apprehending team
having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
con8scation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were con8scated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public o7cial who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, further that
non-compliance with these requirements under justi8able grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending o7cers/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items.
Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR o?ers some Uexibility in complying with the
express requirements. Indeed, the evident purpose of the procedure is the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt of or innocence of the accused.
Thus, the proviso stating that non-compliance with the stipulated procedure, under
justi+able grounds, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items, for as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending o,cers.
The Court also observes that the prosecution did not present the poseur-buyer who
had personal knowledge of the transaction. The lone prosecution witness was at
least four meters away from where accused-appellant and the poseur-buyer were.
From this distance, it was impossible for him to hear the conversation between
accused-appellant and the poseur-buyer.
31. People vs. Joel Gaspar, G.R. No. 192816, 06 July 2011 (Illegal
possession of drugs)
Facts: San Juan Police Station DEU received an information via text message that
sale of shabu was in progress at the house of a person named Joel Gaspar.
Inspector Marso after being iformed of the message, directed PO1 Soreta,
PO1 Magumcia, PO1 Je?rey Timado, and PO1 Dave Loterte to verify the report and,
if necessary, to conduct a buy-bust operation.
Upon reaching the house, they saw Gaspar handed something to San Antonio. They
asked San Antonio about it and he opened his hand, and there was a sachet of
Shabu. Consequently, San Antonio was arrested. PO1 Soreta then approached
Gaspar and told him “Joel pa-iskor naman ng dalawang piso.” Gaspar went out and
asked for payment. After receiving the amount of P200.00, Gaspar took out from his
right pocket a small transparent plastic sachet and handed it to PO1 Soreta.
PO1 Soreta introduced himself as a police o7cer and arrested and handcu?ed
Gaspar. The police o7cers recovered from Gaspar’s possession two other small
transparent plastic sachets, as well as drug paraphernalia inside the house, which
were in plain view from the widely open door. Gaspar and San Antonio were brought
to the San Juan Police Station for investigation and 8ling of charges. RTC found
Gaspar and San Antonio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of RA 9165.
The CA a7rmed with modi8cation the decision of the RTC. The CA found that the
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prosecution fully discharged its burden of establishing all the elements of the crimes
charged.
Issue: Whether or not Gaspar’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt?
Ruling: Yes. Under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, the elements of the o?ense of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object which is identi8ed to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said
drug. All of these elements were duly proven. PO1 Soreta properly identi8ed
appellant as the one he transacted with in the buy-bust operation and later arrested
after the sale took place. After being arrested in agrante delicto, the police o7cers
found in appellant’s possession two small transparent plastic sachets each
containing 0.04 gram of shabu, a prohibited drug, which appellant was not
authorized to possess.
32. People vs. Amadeo Tira, GR 139615, 430 SCRA 134, 28 May
2004 (Illegal Possession, actual v. constructive)
Facts: A criminal complaint was 8led by P/Supt. Wilson R. Victorio against Amadeo
Tira and Connie Tira for violation of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended. After 8nding
probable cause, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ru8no A. Moreno 8led an
Information against the Tira Spouses for illegal possession of shabu and marijuana,
in violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 6425.
The residence of the Tira’s were search after conducting a surveillance of the
premises and positively observing that there was sale of illegal drugs in their
residence.
The respondents denied the charge. The RTC found the respondent guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession of drugs and upheld the validity of the search
warrant. The appellants further assert that the prosecution failed to prove that they
owned the prohibited drugs, and that the same were in their possession and control
when found by the policemen. They insist that it cannot be presumed that they
were in control and possession of the said substances/articles simply because they
owned the house where the same were found, considering that the room was
occupied by Chris Tira and his live-in partner, Gemma Lim.
Hence this present appeal.
Issue: whether the respondents are guilty of the crime charged.
Ruling: Yes. Before the accused may be convicted of violating Section 8 of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659, the prosecution is burdened to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the essential elements of the crime, viz.: (1) the
actual possession of an item or object which is identi8ed to be a prohibited drug; (2)
such possession is not authorized by law; and, (3) the accused freely or consciously
possessed the said drug. The essential elements of the crime of possession of
regulated drugs are the following: (a) the accused is found in possession of a
regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted
authorities; and, (c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated
drug. This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential
element. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to
possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only
actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when
the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the
other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion
and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and
control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not
necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and
dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with another.
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Thus, conviction need not be predicated upon exclusive possession, and a showing
of non-exclusive possession would not exonerate the accused. Such fact of
possession may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and any reasonable
inference drawn therefrom. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused
had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drug in the place under his
control and dominion and the character of the drug. Since knowledge by the
accused of the existence and character of the drugs in the place where he exercises
dominion and control is an internal act, the same may be presumed from the fact
that the dangerous drug is in the house or place over which the accused has control
or dominion, or within such premises in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.
In this case, the prohibited and regulated drugs were found under the bed in the
inner room of the house of the appellants where they also resided. The appellants
had actual and exclusive possession and control and dominion over the house,
including the room where the drugs were found by the policemen. The appellant
Connie Tira cannot escape criminal liability for the crime charged simply and merely
on her barefaced testimony that she was a plain housewife, had no involvement in
the criminal actuations of her husband, and had no knowledge of the existence of
the drugs in the inner room of the house. She had full access to the room, including
the space under the bed. She failed to adduce any credible evidence that she was
prohibited by her husband, the appellant Amadeo Tira, from entering the room,
cleaning it, or even sleeping on the bed.
33. People vs. EdelmaLagata, GR 135323, 404 SCRA 671, 25 June

2003 (Animus possidendi)
Facts: Edelma Lagata was accused of having in her possession, custody and control
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or “shabu” without authority of law.
He was then found by the trial court guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the o?ense
of Violation of Section 16 Article III in relation to Section 20 Republic Act 6425, as
amended by Republic Act 7659.
The record shows that on December 10, 1996, while appellant was tending her
mother’s store, a short and dark complexioned man wearing jeans and a pair of
slippers approached and asked her to deliver a package wrapped in newspaper and
placed in plastic bag to a certain Chinggay, a boarder in her mother’s
house. Fernando Hernandez, one of the defense witnesses, was at the store buying
softdrinks. Appellant did not examine the contents of the package and the man
hurriedly left the store. She entered the living room of the house to give the
package to Chinggay, who was in one of the rooms of the house, when she saw two
men sitting on the sofa. The men approached her and introduced themselves as
agents of the National Bureau of Investigation. The men took the package from her
and opened it. To her surprise, it contained shabu. The NBI agents immediately
arrested her.
Appellant does not deny the fact that at the time of her arrest she was in possession
of the package which turned out to contain shabu. However, she denied knowledge
of the contents of the package handed to her by the unidenti8ed man.
Issue: Whether appellant is guilty of the crime charged against her.
Ruling: No. Possession of illegal drugs must be with knowledge of the accused or
that animus possidendi existed together with the possession or control of said
articles. Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness of a fact. Since courts
cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and thereafter state its perceptions with
certainty, resort to other evidence is necessary. Animus possidendi, as a state of
mind, may be determined on a case-to-case basis by taking into consideration the
prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding
circumstances. Its existence may and usually must be inferred from the attendant
events in each particular case. The existence of animus possidendi is only prima
facie. Thus, it is subject to contrary proof and may be rebutted by evidence that the
accused did not in fact exercise power and control over the thing in question, and
did not intend to do so.
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Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case, The Court 8nds that
appellant’s explanation of how she came into possession of the package without
knowing that it contained “shabu” is credible and su7cient to rebut the prima
facie presumption of animus possidendi. Simply put, she just happened to be at the
wrong place at the wrong time.
Appellant’s lack of knowledge of the contents of the plastic bag becomes all the
more credible considering that when the NBI agents conducted a test buy to
validate the tip given to them by their con8dential informant, they relied entirely on
the information that a certain “Baby” and “Chinggay” were selling “shabu”. NBI
agents had no personal knowledge that herein appellant was peddling shabu.
34. People vs. Jaime Gatlabayan, G.R. No. 186467, 13 July

2011(Sale of prohibited drugs, elements)
Facts: Members of PNP Intelligence Operative Division of Rodriguez, Rizal received

an information from an asset that appellant Jaime Gatlabayan was rampantly selling
illegal drugs. On the basis of said information, the police o7cers immediately
decided to form a composite team for the conduct of a buy-bust operation against
appellant. Upon consummation of the sale, the police o7cer gave the pre-arranged
signal of waiving his hand. The other police around the area rushed to the locus
criminis and simultaneously introduced themselves as police o7cers and arrested
the accused. The latter was brought to the nearby police station for invetigation.
Gatbalayan denied that he was caught in Uagrante selling shabu and claimed that
he was just a victim of police frame up. The lower court and the CA ruled against
the accused. Gatbalayan contended that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. He avers that both the RTC and the CA were mistaken in
upholding the presumption of regularity in the performance of o7cial functions of
the police o7cers. He posits that the prosecution failed to establish the material
details of said entrapment operation and that his arrest was invalid.
Issue: Whether su7cient evidence exists to support the conviction of the accused
for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA No. 9165.
Ruling: Jurisprudence has 8rmly entrenched that in prosecution of illegal sale of

dangerous drugs, the following essential elements must be established: (1) the
transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented
as evidence; and (3) the buyer and seller were identi8ed. Implicit in all these is the
need for proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the con8scated prohibited or regulated drug as evidence.
The narcotic substance itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the o?ense and
the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction. It is therefore of
prime importance that the identity of the dangerous drug be likewise established
beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise stated, it must be proven with exactitude that
the substance bought during the buy-bust operation is the same substance o?ered
in evidence before the court. Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the o?ense
must be established. The chain of custody requirement ensures that unnecessary
doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
35. People vs. GatudanBalag-ey, GR 141532, 14 April 2004, 427

SCRA 384 (Sale of prohibited drugs, elements) –
Facts: NARCOM, with o7ce at DPS Compound, Baguio City, received a con8dential
information from Roger Imasa that a certain Gatudan of La Trinidad, Benguet, was
engaged in the sale of marijuana. He was allegedly looking for buyers. Police
Senior Inspector formed a team for the possible arrest of Gatudan. SPO1 Natividad
was designated as poseur buyer with SPO1 Rabago and PO2 Lingbawan as back-up.
SPO1 Natividad was given the boodle money.
Later in the morning of the same day, SPO1 Natividad and Imasa were able to
locate Gatudan at the Universal Martial Arts Gym along Zandueta Street, Baguio
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City. Imasa introduced SPO1 Natividad to Gatudan as a friend and a drug user.
After a brief conversation, he agreed to sell to SPO1 Natividad all of his available
marijuana, about 20 kilos in all, at P1,000.00 per kilo. They agreed to meet at 8ve
in the afternoon in front of Jollibee at the Session Road. The buy-bust team was
alerted and briefed.
About 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day, they proceeded to the meeting place
on board a taxi. Gatudan alighted from a Tamaraw FX Taxi. His companion, co-
accused Aliong, remained inside the taxi with the cigarette box marked Philip Morris
at the back compartment of the taxi. After seeing Gatudan, SPO1 Natividad
approached him and inquired about the deal. Gatudan told him that the stu? was
ready and opened the back compartment of the taxi. He noticed the plastic straw
and opened the cigarette box containing the marijuana bricks. After con8rming the
contents, SPO1 Natividad gave the pre-arranged signal by removing his bull cap.
They all rushed to the scene. After identifying themselves as police o7cers, they
arrested Balag-ey and Aliong. They were informed of their constitutional rights. The
box was con8scated and SPO1 Natividad put his initials on it for identi8cation. They
were brought to the NARCOM o7ce in the same Tamaraw FX taxi driven by Vicente
Garbo.
Issue: Whether there was a selling of prohibited drugs done by the accused in the
buy-bust operation.
Ruling: None.
Well-established is the rule that the presentation of a con8dential informant in a

buy-bust operation is not always required, especially when the sale was actually
witnessed and adequately proved by other prosecution witnesses. This rule admits
of exceptions, however, as when the appellant vehemently denies selling prohibited
drugs; and when there are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
arresting o7cers.
For like reason, the presentation of the buy-bust money and proof of its actual
payment -- pieces of evidence that are otherwise not indispensable -- become
necessary if the constitutional presumption of innocence is to be overcome. In the
present case, the material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witness and the non-presentation of the buy-bust money raise reasonable doubts
about the occurrence of a buy-bust operation.
36. People vs. ArnelClarite y Salazar, G.R. No. 187157, 15 February

2012 (Sale of Prohibited drug)
Facts: Romano received information from his “asset,” Cedeño, that a certain Arnel,
a supplier of illegal drugs from Cavite, is looking for a buyer of shabu. Romano
directed Cedeño to negotiate the sale.
Cedeño communicated with accused-appellant, and the latter agreed that he would
be arriving in Naga City in the morning of July 11, 2002. Accused-appellant would
be carrying 50 grams of shabu, which will be sold to Cedeño’s “8nancier”
for P45,000.00. With the authority of Atty. Jose Doloiras, the immediate superior of
Romano, the NBI special investigators devised a plan to entrap said Arnel. Romano
and Jimenez prepared what they called “budol money,” counterfeit notes made out
of photocopied P1000 and P500 bills. The counterfeit bills, representing a total
value of P50,000.00, were dusted with Uuorescent powder at the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Regional Crime Laboratory, Camp Simeon Ola, Legaspi City. On July 10,
2002, Romano was able to con8rm with Cedeño that said “Arnel” was de8nitely
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arriving the following day at 8:00 a.m. at the Central Business District (CBD)
terminal, Naga City.
Romano, Jimenez, Dizon and Cedeño proceeded to the CBD terminal where they
posted themselves in strategic locations.
Accused-appellant arrived, carrying a small bag. The informant introduced Romano

to accused-appellant. Romano asked for the shabu. When said shabu was handed
to Romano, accused-appellant asked for the money. This was when accused-
appellant noticed that the money was fake. Romano then removed his sunglasses to
signal the completion of the transaction to Jimenez and Dizon.
The NBI investigators arrested and handcu?ed accused-appellant, and thereafter

brought the latter to the NBI O7ce in Naga City. Therein, accused-appellant was
booked, 8ngerprinted and photographed. Accused-appellant was then brought to
the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory at Camp Simeon Ola, Legaspi City. P/Insp.
Clemen examined the dorsal and palmar areas of accused-appellant’s hands, as well
as the plastic sachets handed by him to Romano. Both hands of accused-appellant
were found positive for the presence of bright orange ultraviolet Uuorescent
powder. The plastic sachets, which had a total weight of 45.8712 grams, were
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Accused-appellant denied that the buy-bust operation took place. Instead, he

narrated that he was aboard a tricycle at 6:00 a.m. on July 11, 2002, on his way to
the Civic Center, when Romano and Jimenez apprehended him, forced him into their
car and blindfolded him. While still blindfolded, Romano and Jimenez brought him to
a hotel. He was told to contact his employer through a cellular phone and inform
her of his arrest and that the arresting o7cers needed money to pay for their hotel
bills. The NBI operatives were extorting money equivalent to the value of 50% of
the 100 grams of shabu. After the accused-appellant was able to speak brieUy with
his employer, the latter turned o? her phone and cannot be contacted again. The
NBI operatives, showing him the marked money, threatened that a drug case would
be 8led against him. The NBI operatives told him to hold the marked money, but he
refused and was not able to hold it. Accused-appellant was brought to the NBI O7ce
in Naga City, then to Camp Ola in Legaspi City, where he was subjected to a para7n
test. Accused-appellant was later brought back to the NBI O7ce when someone told
him that his employer was sending money to settle his case. Accused-appellant
admitted that since October 2001, he accompanied his employer around 8ve or six
times to deliver shabu to the aforementioned Ching Lo.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City rendered its Decision 8nding accused-
appellant guilty.
The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision a7rming with modi8cation the RTC
Decision. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether the accused is engaged in the sale of prohibited drug?
Ruling: Yes. Jurisprudence holds that the elements of the crime of illegal sale of
drugs are the following: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor.
The testimonies of Romano, corroborated by his fellow NBI investigators Jimenez

and Dizon and informant Cedeño established the sale and delivery by accused-
appellant Clarite to Romano of what was initially believed to be 50 grams
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of shabu in four plastic sachets, in exchange for what Clarite thought

was P50,000.00. Romano positively identi8ed accused-appellant Clarite as the
person who sold the plastic sachets of shabu to him.
37. People vs. Simpresueta M. Seraspe, G.R. No. 180919, 9 January

2013 (Exculpatory causes-sale of Illicit drugs)
Facts: Acting on the information received of Espirutu’s drug tra7cking activities,

P/Chief Insp. Dandan was tasked to create a team and conduct an operation relative
thereto. Carla was to act as the poseur-buyer and PO3 Cariño as her husband. After
the introductions, negotiation for the sale of shabu followed. Carla ordered two kilos
of shabu and promised to call once the shabu becomes available. Carla proceeded
to the agreed place while Espiritu arrived thereat together with appellant. Espiritu
directed Aileen to give a sample of the shabu to Carla inside the rest room so the
latter could examine it. After several communication as to when the shabu will be
available, the day came and they proceeded to meet again. After ascertaining from
Carla if she brought the money, Espiritu ordered Aileen to get the shabu. Aileen left
and returned 30 minutes later with her mother, Seraspe, who was carrying a bag.
Aileen took it from here and handed it to Espiritu. Espiritu together with Carla,
proceeded to the restroom to examine the contents thereof. When Carla emerged
from the restroom, she made the pre-arranged signal by scratching her head. The
arrest was made and the marked money was recovered from Espiritu. The three
accused were charged for illegal sale of dangerous drugs. As a defense, they
claimed that they were merely induced by the PAOCTF operatives to sell the
dangerous drug by repeatedly approaching them to sell shabu. the trial court found
that all the accused conspired to deliver and sell and that their arrest was the result
of a valid entrapment operation. Aside from Aileen, the two accused applied for
executive clemency in view of her old age and illness which was granted. Thus,
appellant was the only one left pursuing the appeal. The CA upheld the decision of
RTC.
Issue: Whether the police o7cer’s act of soliciting drugs from Aileen will exculpate
the latter?
Ruling: No. Instigation means luring the accused into a crime that he, otherwise,
had no intention to commit, in order to prosecute him." It di?ers from entrapment
which is the employment of ways and means in order to trap or capture a
criminal. In instigation, the criminal intent to commit an o?ense originates from the
inducer and not from the accused who had no intention to commit and would not
have committed it were it not for the prodding of the inducer. In entrapment, the
criminal intent or design originates from the accused and the law enforcers merely
facilitate the apprehension of the criminal by using ruses and schemes. Instigation
results in the acquittal of the accused, while entrapment may lead to prosecution
and conviction.
Here, the evidence clearly established that the police operatives employed
entrapment, not instigation, to capture appellant and her cohorts in the act of
selling shabu. It must be recalled that it was only upon receipt of a report of the
drug tra7cking activities of Espiritu from the con8dential informant that a buy-bust
team was formed and negotiations for the sale of shabu were made. Also, appellant
testi8ed that she agreed to the transaction of her own free will when she saw the
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same as an opportunity to earn money. Notably too, appellant was able to quickly
produce a sample. This con8rms that she had a ready supply of the illegal drugs.
Clearly, she was never forced, coerced or induced through incessant entreaties to
source the prohibited drug for Carla and PO3 Cariño and this she even categorically
admitted during her testimony.
Moreover, a police o7cer’s act of soliciting drugs from appellant during the buy-bust
operation, or what is known as the "decoy solicitation," is not prohibited by law and
does not invalidate the buy-bust operation. In People v. Legaspi, this Court
pronounced that in a prosecution for sale of illicit drugs, any of the following
will not exculpate the accused: "(1) that facilities for the commission of
the crime were intentionally placed in his way; or (2) that the criminal act
was done at the solicitation of the decoy or poseur-buyer seeking to
expose his criminal act; or (3) that the police authorities feigning
complicity in the act were present and apparently assisted in its
commission." Hence, even assuming that the PAOCTF operatives repeatedly asked
her to sell them shabu, appellant’s defense of instigation will not prosper. This is
"especially true in that class of cases where the o?ense is the kind that is habitually
committed, and the solicitation merely furnished evidence of a course of conduct.
Mere deception by the police o7cer will not shield the perpetrator, if the o?ense
was committed by him free from the inUuence or instigation of the police o7cer."
Dispositive: AFFIRMED.
38. People vs. Zheng Bai Hui, GR No. 127580, 22 August 2000
(presentation of Informant)
Facts: In the morning of October 24, 1994, a police informant code-named

“Stardust” arrived at the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) in Camp Ricardo Papa,
Bicutan, Taguig, and informed Police Sr. Insp. Franklin Moises Mabanag of two
Chinese nationals who were supposedly “big time” drug pushers. She claimed to
have regular contact with one of the alleged drug pushers, a certain Carlos Tan Ty.
Stardust, the informant, was a woman who had previously provided the police with
information that led to the con8scation of one (1) kilo of shabu.
Acting on the information furnished by Stardust, the NARCOM agents organized a

buy-bust operation to apprehend the reputed drug pushers
SPO3 Santos and Police Sr. Insp. Mabanag then prepared the “boodle money”
consisting of seven (7) bundles of newspaper cuttings that was supposed to
represent the P500,000 purchase money. A genuine P500 billwas placed on top of
one of the bundles and another P500 bill at the bottom of the same bundle. SPO3
Santos initialed the red portion of the Philippine Uag in each of the bills. Between
the bills were the newspaper cuttings. The bundles, each about three (3) inches
thick, were wrapped with straps from the United Coconut Planters Bank and tied
with a rubber band. The boodle money was then placed in plastic and sealed with
scotch tape. SPO3 Santos rehearsed how he would show the drug pushers the
boodle money.
The team then proceeded to the meeting area for reconnaissance.
The suspects arrived at around 6:00 in the evening. Stardust pointed to SPO3
Santos two (2) Chinese nationals, later identi8ed as the accused, alighting from a
tax. SPO3 Santos stepped out of the store and introduced himself to the two (2)
Chinese nationals as the person whom they talked with over the phone that
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morning. He told the suspects that he brought the money with him, and showed the
accused the boodle money by opening the wrapper and showing half of the bundle
with the P500 bill on top. He then gave the money to one of the Chinese nationals,
later identi8ed as the accused Carlos Tan Ty. The latter’s companion, later identi8ed
as accused Nelson Hong Ty, in turn handed SPO3 Santos a blue plastic bag with the
marking of “SM” or “Shoemart.” The two looked at the money while SPO3 Santos
opened the bag handed to him by Nelson Hong Ty. SPO3 Santos found a yellowish
substance sealed in transparent plastic and wrapped in newspapers. The accused
identi8ed the substance as shabu. Thereupon, SPO3 Santos held Carlos by the
hand as the other members of the team came to help him e?ect the arrest of the
two suspects, who were later brought to Camp Crame, Quezon City.
The accused was convicted of the said crime. The latter requested upon motion that
the accusation was fabricated and the trial court acted in excess of its power in not
allowing the presentation of informant as requested by the accused.
Issue: Whether the refusal allow disclosure of the identity of the informer deprived
appellants of their right to confront and cross-examine said witness?
Ruling: No. Appellants contend that the trial court erred in sustaining the refusal by
Sr. Insp. Mabanag to divulge the identity of Stardust, the woman who informed the
police about the two accused. It is claimed that such refusal violated the right of
the accused to confront and cross-examine said witness.
As a rule, informers are not presented in court because of the need to preserve their
cover so they can continue their invaluable service to the police. Equally strong
reasons include the maintenance of the informant’s health and safety and the
encouragement of others to report wrongdoing to police authorities. The rule
against disclosure is not absolute, however. What is usually referred to as the
informer’s privilege is in reality the Government’s privilege to withhold from
disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to
o7cers charged with enforcement of that law. The purpose of the privilege is the
furtherance and protection of the public interest in e?ective law enforcement. The
privilege recognizes the obligation of citizens to communicate their knowledge of
the commission of crimes to law-enforcement o7cials and, by preserving their
anonymity, encourages them to perform that obligation.
The scope of the privilege is limited by its underlying purpose. Thus, where the
disclosure of the contents of a communication will not tend to reveal the identity of
an informer, the contents are not privileged. Likewise, once the identity of the
informer has been disclosed to those who would have cause to resent the
communication, the privilege is no longer applicable.
We believe that no 8xed rule with respect to disclosure is justi8able. The problem is
one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the Uow of information
against the individual’s right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance
renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of
each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the
possible signi8cance of the informer’s testimony, and other relevant factors.
Before disclosure of the informer’s identity may be allowed, however, the defense
must, before or during the trial, request the production of the con8dential informant
or his identi8cation.
Appellants nevertheless failed to show at the time of their request how the identity
of the informer or her production was essential to their defense
The Supreme Court of Washington held that the trial court did not commit error in
ruling thus. It held:
In the instant case, the request came from the defendant at the time and in the
manner hereinabove set out, and was not in any fashion thereafter renewed. The
defendant, at the time of the request, did not advise the trial court of his proposed
defense of entrapment nor undertake, in any way, to enlighten the trial court as to
the materiality of relevancy of the requested disclosure. The ruling at that
35 Team Soul
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particular stage of the proceedings was to the e?ect that disclosure would not be
required at that time. The door was thus open to subsequent showing and request.
Under the circumstances of the instant case, we hold the trial court did not commit
error in the ruling complained of.
Like in Driscoll, the defense in this case did not renew their request for the
production of the informer’s identity. Nor did they advise the trial court of their
defense or the relevancy of such disclosure when they demanded the production of
Stardust’s identity. When Sr. Insp. Mabanag was put on the stand, there was no hint
that the accused was going to raise frame-up, extortion, and instigation as
defenses. The accused had not yet testi8ed; neither had appellant Carlos Tan Ty’s
wife, Mary Ann. The defense did not raise the question of the informer’s identity
again after these witnesses testi8ed.
The burden of showing need for disclosure is upon defendants. The necessity for
disclosure depends upon “the particular circumstances of each case, taking into
consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible signi8cance of
the informer’s testimony, and other relevant factors.” Appellants did not develop
any such criteria with reference to the merits of the case. A mere request during a
witness’ examination indicates speculation on the relevancy of his testimony; and
mere speculation an informer may be helpful is not enough to carry the burden and
overcome the public interest in the protection of the informer. Hence, the trial court
did not err in sustaining the refusal of the witness to reveal the identity of Stardust.
39. People vs. Noel Bartolome y Bajo, G.R. No. 191726, 6 February
2013 (Informant; when necessary)
Facts: The case at bar arises from the buy bust operation n Caloocan City, Metro
Manila, Philippines. On August 10, 2003, at around 1:00 a.m., an informant went to
the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Unit (ADSOU) in Caloocan City to report the
illicit drug dealings of the accused on Reparo Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City.
Acting on the report, Police Inspector Cesar Cruz of ADSOU immediately instructed
some of his men to conduct a buy-bust operation against the accused. During the
pre-operation brie8ng, the buy-bust team designated PO1 Borban Paras as the
poseur-buyer. Paras was given a P100.00 bill that he marked with his initials BP. It
was agreed that the informant would drop a cigarette butt in front of the suspect to
identify him to Paras; and that Paras would scratch his head to signal to the buy-
bust team that the transaction with the suspect had been consummated. The
operation was coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency.
Upon execution of the buy bust operation, the sachet of methampethamine

hydrochloride or shabu was immediately marked by the intitials of the respondent
Noel Bartolome with “NBB”. Insp. Cruz later requested in writing the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Caloocan City to conduct a laboratory examination of the contents of
the plastic sachet seized from Bartolome. PO2 Rolando De Ocampo, another
member of the buy-bust team, brought the request and the sachet and its contents
to the laboratory. Forensic Chemical O7cer Jesse Abadilla Dela Rosa of the PNP
Crime Laboratory con8rmed that the plastic sachet contained 0.06 gram of
methamphetamine hydrocholoride or shabu, a dangerous drug.
Respondent on the other hand averred that the buy bust operation against him was
not an entrapment but an instigation, contending that without the proposal and
instigation of the poseur buyer Paras no transaction would have happened.
Furthermore, the absence of prior surveillance and the failure to present the
informant and the failure to comply with the requirements of section 21, Article II,
Republic Act No. 9165 were fatal for the prosecution of the said case.
Issue: Whether or not the buy bust operation was an instigation. Whether or not
prior surveillance; the presentation of the informant and the requirement of section
21, Article II, RA 9165 are indispensable for the prosecution of the case.
Ruling: No. The buy bust operation was not an instigation. There was no
proposal from the poseur buyer to buy shabu from the accused. Rather all the
elements for the crime of illegal sale of shabu to prove reasonable doubt on the part
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of accsed which are: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the identity of the
object and the consideration of the sale; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and of
the payment for the thing. What is material is the proof showing that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the
thing sold as evidence of the corpus delicti. He was caught in Uagrante delicto
during an entrapment through buy-bust. Here, Paras asked the accused if he could
buy shabu, and the latter, in turn, quickly transacted with the former, receiving the
marked bill from Paras and turning over the sachet of shabu he took from his
pocket. The accused was shown to have been ready to sell the shabu without much
prodding from Paras.
No. The buy bust operation does not require having a prior surveillance operation
nor presenting the informant as witness. The presentation of an informant as a
witness is not regarded as indispensable to the success of a prosecution of a drug-
dealing accused. As a rule, the informant is not presented in court for security
reasons, in view of the need to protect the informant from the retaliation of the
culprit arrested through his e?orts. Thereby, the con8dentiality of the informant's
identity is protected in deference to his invaluable services to law enforcement.
Only when the testimony of the informant is considered absolutely essential in
obtaining the conviction of the culprit should the need to protect his security be
disregarded. Here, however, the informant's testimony as a witness against the
accused would only be corroborative of the su7cient testimony of Paras as the
poseur-buyer; hence, such testimony was unnecessary.
Furthermore, Strict compliance with section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is not required.
As long as there was proper preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized shabu. The State showed here that the chain of custody of the shabu
was 8rm and unbroken. The buy-bust team properly preserved the integrity of the
shabu as evidence from the time of its seizure to the time of its presentation in
court.
40. People vs. Salvador Sanchez, GR No. 175832, 15 October 2008

(Venue, chain of custody)
Facts: According to the prosecution witness, an entrapment was formed by virtue of
an information received. At the target place, PO Sevilla and his informant walked
towards the place pointed by the informant and met the drug pusher. The informant
introduced PO Sevilla to the pusher. The informant and the pusher talked for a
while. Thereafter, PO Sevilla talked to the latter. He told him that he badly needs
shabu para pumayat. x x x PO Sevilla then gave the pusher P100.00 (the marked
money) and in return the pusher gave him a plastic sachet of shabu. After receiving
the plastic sachet, PO Sevilla scratched his head as a pre-arranged signal to his
colleagues who were deployed nearby. Said other policemen rushed to the crime
scene while PO Sevilla grabbed the right hand of the accused and introduced
himself as a cop. The accused was frisked and PO Sevilla recovered the P100.00
marked money bill (Exh. G) in the right side pants pocket of the accused who was
later brought to Station 3. PO Sevilla identi8ed the transparent plastic sachet on
which he placed his initial "LS" and the initial "SS" of the accused. Consequently, a
criminal charge was 8led against the accused with violation of Section 5, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165.
The defense harps, on the prosecution’s failure to prove that the sachets allegedly
recovered from the appellant were the ones submitted to the forensic chemist for
examination, as well as its failure to follow the proper chain of custody in handling
the seized evidence. It was only the arresting o7cer who testi8ed that he
con8scated the sachet from the accused. The police o7cer who conducted the
subsequent investigation and to whom the con8scated sachet was allegedly turned
over was not identi8ed nor presented as witness. Hence the identity of the evidence
presented against the appellant is doubtful.
Issue: Whether or not the Chain of Custody rule was complied with as to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt?
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Ruling: No. While the 8rst sentence of Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 states that "the apprehending o7cer/team having
initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
con8scation, physically inventory and photograph the same," the second sentence
makes a distinction between warrantless seizures and seizures by virtue of a
warrant, thus:
(a) x x x Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be

conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest o5ce of the apprehending
o5cer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under
justi8able grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending o7cer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. [Emphasis supplied]
Thus, the venues of the physical inventory and photography of the seized items
di?er and depend on whether the seizure was made by virtue of a search warrant or
through a warrantless seizure such as a buy-bust operation.
In seizures covered by search warrants, the physical inventory and photograph

must be conducted in the place where the search warrant was served. On the other
hand, in case of warrantless seizures such as a buy- bust operation, the
physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the nearest police station
or o7ce of the apprehending o7cer/team, whichever is practicable; however,
nothing prevents the apprehending o7cer/team from immediately conducting the
physical inventory and photography of the items at the place where they were
seized, as it is more in keeping with the law’s intent of preserving their integrity and
evidentiary value.
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify
is the matter of "marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that
the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory
and photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station rather
than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires
that the "marking" of the seized items – to truly ensure that they are the same
items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones o?ered in evidence – should
be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately
upon con=scation. This step initiates the process of protecting innocent persons
from dubious and concocted searches, and of protecting as well the apprehending
o7cers from harassment suits based on planting of evidence under Section 29 36 and
on allegations of robbery or theft.37
For greater speci8city, "marking" means the placing by the apprehending o7cer or
the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the item/s seized. If the
physical inventory and photograph are made at the nearest police station or o7ce
as allowed by the rules,38 the inventory and photography of the seized items must
bemade in accordance with Sec. 2 of Board Resolution No. 1, Series of 2002, 39 but
in every case, the apprehended violator or counsel must be present. Again, this is in
keeping with the desired level of integrity that the handling process requires.
Thereafter, the seized items shall be placed in an envelope or an evidence bag
unless the type and quantity of the seized items require a di?erent type of handling
and/or container. The evidence bag or container shall accordingly be signed by the
handling o7cer and turned over to the next o7cer in the chain of custody.
it is clear that no physical inventory and no photograph of the seized items

were taken in the presence of the accused or his counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and an elective o7cial. Based on the
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above testimony, SPO2 Sevilla - the prosecution’s lone witness - also did not mark
the plastic sachet of shabu immediately upon seizure; it was only marked upon
arrival at the police station. Thus, other than the stipulation regarding the handling
and results of the specimen at the forensic laboratory, SPO2 Sevilla’s testimony and
the evidence he identi8ed constitute the totality of the evidence for the prosecution
on the handling of the allegedly seized items
41. Lopez vs. People, G.R. No. 172953, 30 April 2008 (chain of
custody)
Facts: A team of 8ve police o7cers conducted a search in the residence of the
Petitioner in the presence of the kagawad o7cer. The o7cers positively found drugs
in their residence and thereafter found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The
petitioner assails the validity of the search and the evidence presented by the police
o7cers because it was only police o7cer Esternon and barangay kagawad Licup
conducted the search and the rest of them were outside the house to assure that
nobody Uees. Further, Petitioner was then asked by a police o7cer to buy cigarettes
at a nearby store and when he returned from the errand. They contend that there
are certain irregularities with the search conducted by the police o7cers.
Issue: Whether the chain of custody of the evidence is complied with?
Ruling: No. As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule

requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence su7cient to
support a 8nding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It
would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item
was picked up to the time it is o?ered into evidence, in such a way that every
person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition
in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link
in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure
that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for
someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. While testimony about a
perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to
obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when
the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identi+able, or when its
condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to
observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is
susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and
exchange. In other words, the exhibit’s level of susceptibility to fungibility,
alteration or tampering—without regard to whether the same is advertent or
otherwise not—dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of
custody rule. Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an
exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical
characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to
people in their daily lives.
In the present case the lack of conclusive identi8cation of the illegal drugs allegedly
seized from petitioner, coupled with the irregularity in the manner by which the
same were placed under police custody before o?ered in court, strongly militates a
8nding of guilt.
Petitioner Junie Malillin y Lopez is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and is

accordingly ordered immediately released from custody unless he is being lawfully
held for another o?ense.
42. People vs. Linda Alviz y Yatco and Elizabeth Dela Vega y
Bautista, G.R. 177158, 6 February 2013 (chain of custody of the
seized drugs in a buy-bust operation is su5ciently established;
proof)
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Facts: Alviz aka “Peking” (Linda) and Elizabeth B. de la Vega aka “Beth” (Elizabeth)
was charged of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise
known as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 for unlawfully selling,
dispensing, delivering, transporting, distributing or acting as broker in the said
transaction, 0.02 gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
The prosecution narrated that a con8dential informant arrived at Police Station 1, La

Loma, Quezon City and talked to the O7cer-in-Charge. Thereafter, the O7cer-in-
Charge formed a team to conduct surveillance and buy-bust operations on the
subject place. Upon arrival, PO2 Ibasco and the con8dential informant approached
Alviz. The con8dential informant told Linda that PO2 Ibasco was deeply in need of
shabu. After a while, Elizabeth came out and handed a plastic sachet to Linda. Linda
gave the P100.00 bill to Elizabeth and the plastic sachet to PO2 Ibasco. PO2 Ibasco
then gave the pre-arranged signal. SPO4 Reb[riano, then rushed to the group,
arrested Elizabeth and recovered from the latter the buy-bust money, while PO2
Ibasco arrested Linda. The police o7cers brought Linda and Elizabeth to the police
station. A request for laboratory examination of the white crystalline substance was
then made.
The defense, on the hand denied the accusation and argued that the same was
frame-up. Elizabeth insists that there was no buy-bust operation and what actually
took place was an unlawful warrantless arrest. Elizabeth further argues that the
police o7cers blatantly ignored the mandatory provisions of Section 21, paragraph
1 of Republic Act No. 9165, particularly, the requirements on making an inventory
report and taking photographs of the seized drugs in the presence of the accused or
the latter’s representative or counsel.
Issue: whether the lower court gravely erred in 8nding the accused-appellants
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165
Ruling: No. The chain of custody of the seized drugs in a buy-bust operation is
su7ciently established when there is proof of the following: +rst, the seizure and
marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending o7cer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending o7cer to the investigating o7cer; third, the turnover by the
investigating o7cer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized from the forensic chemist to the court. The failure of the police o7cers to
make an inventory report and to photograph the drugs seized from Linda and
Elizabeth, as required by Article II, section 21, paragraph 1 of R.A. 9165, are not
automatically fatal to the prosecution’s case, as it was able to trace and prove the
chain of custody of the same -- after arresting Linda and Elizabeth during the buy-
bust operation, the police o7cers brought the two women to the police station; at
the police station, PO2 Ibasco, who acted as the poseur-buyer, marked the sachet of
suspected shabu he received from Linda and Elizabeth during the buy-bust with his
initials “EV-LA” and turned over the same to P/Insp. Villanueva; P/Insp. Villanueva
prepared the Request for Laboratory Examination of the contents of the sachet; PO2
Ibasco delivered the Request for Laboratory Examination and the sachet of
suspected shabu to the PNP Crime Laboratory, CPDCLO, Quezon City, where the
Request and specimen were received by PO2 Plau; the contents of the sachet were
examined by Forensic Analyst Jabonillo, who prepared Chemistry Report No. D-198-
2003, con8rming that the specimen tested positive for shabu;28 and lastly, during
the trial, the marked sachet of shabu, as well as the marked money used in
purchasing the same, were presented as evidence and identi8ed by PO2 Ibasco and
SPO4 Reburiano.
43. Francisco Imson vs. People, G.R. No. 193003, 13 July 2011
(chain of custody, eAect)
Facts: A con8dential informant advised the police o7cers that Imson was selling
shabu at Raja Matanda Street, Navotas. The o7cers formed a team to conduct a
buy bust operation, with Pajares acting as poseur buyer. They arrived at the said
location and saw Imson talking with Dayao. Thereafter, they saw Imson giving
Dayao a transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. Pajares
40 Team Soul
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approached the two men and introduced himself. He immediately apprehended

Imson while Pineda ran after Dayao who tried to escape. The policemen con8scated
two plastic sachets containing the suspected shabu. Two informations were 8led
against them for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. RTC found Imson and Dayao
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. CA a7rmed the RTC's decision explaining that
there was no merit in appellant's contention that they should be acquitted because
of the allegedly procedural lapses committed by the police operatives who failed to
conduct a physical inventory of the subject specimen and to photograph the same
resulting in the failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt of the crime charged.
Issue: Whether the two plastic sachets containing shabu were inadmissible in
evidence because the integrity of the chain of custody was impaired.
Ruling: No. The failure of the policemen to make a physical inventory and to
photograph the two plastic sachets containing shabu do not render the con8scated
items inadmissible in evidence. In People v. Campos, 629 SCRA 462 (2010), the
Court held that the failure of the policemen to make a physical inventory and to
photograph the con8scated items are not fatal to the prosecution’s cause. The Court
held that: The alleged procedural lapses in the conduct of the buy-bust operation,
namely the lack of prior coordination with the PDEA and the failure to inventory and
photograph the con8scated items immediately after the operation, are not fatal to
the prosecution’s cause. x x x x The absence of an inventory of personal e?ects
seized from appellant becomes immaterial to the legitimacy of the buy-bust
operation for it is enough that it is established that the operation was indeed
conducted and that the identity of the seller and the drugs subject of the sale are
proven. The presumption is that the policemen performed their o7cial duties
regularly. In order to overcome this presumption, Imson must show that there was
bad faith or improper motive on the part of the policemen, or that the con8scated
items were tampered. Imson failed to do so.
44. People vs. Rolando Laylo, GR 192235, 6 July 2011

(Attemp/conspiracy, Sec. 26 RA 9165)
Facts:PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor, both wearing civilian clothes, were conducting
anti-drug surveillance operations at Lozana Street, Calumpang, Binangonan, Rizal.
While the police o7cers were in front of a sari-sari store, appellant Laylo and his
live-in partner, Ritwal, approached them and asked, “Gusto mong umiskor ng
shabu?” PO1 Reyes replied, “Bakit mayroon ka ba?” Laylo then brought out two
plastic bags containing shabu and told the police o7cers, “Dos (P200.00) ang isa.”
Upon hearing this, the police o7cers introduced themselves as cops. PO1 Reyes
immediately arrested Laylo. Ritwal, on the other, tried to get away but PO1 Pastor
caught up with her. PO1 Pastor then frisked Ritwal and found another sachet of
shabu in a SIM card case which Ritwal was carrying.
PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor marked the three plastic sachets of shabu recovered
from Laylo and Ritwal and forwarded them to the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory for forensic testing. The police o7cers charged Laylo for attempted sale
of illegal drugs and used the two plastic sachets containing shabu as basis while
Ritwal was charged for possession of illegal drugs using as basis the third sachet
containing 0.02 grams of shabu.
The defense, on the other hand, presented di?erent versions of the facts.
Laylo testi8ed that while he and his common-law wife, Ritwal, were walking on the
street, two men grabbed them. The two men, who they later identi8ed as PO1
Reyes and PO1 Pastor, dragged them to their house. Once inside, the police o7cers
placed two plastic sachets in each of their pockets. Afterwards, they were brought to
the police station where, despite protests and claims that the drugs were planted on
them, they were arrested and charged.
41 Team Soul
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The RTC found Laylo and Ritwal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violations of RA
9165. CA a7rmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue: Whether the accused are guilty of attempted conspiracy of selling prohibited
drugs.
Ruling: Yes. The sale was not consummated but merely attempted. Thus, appellant
was charged with attempted sale of dangerous drugs. Section 26(b), Article II of RA
9165 provides:
Section 26. Attempt or Conspiracy. – Any attempt or conspiracy to commit the

following unlawful acts shall be penalized by the same penalty prescribed for the
commission of the same as provided under this Act:
xxx
(b) Sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and

transportation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical;
xxx
Here, appellant intended to sell shabu and commenced by overt acts the
commission of the intended crime by showing the substance to PO1 Reyes and PO1
Pastor. The sale was aborted when the police o7cers identi8ed themselves and
placed appellant and Ritwal under arrest. From the testimonies of the witnesses, the
prosecution was able to establish that there was an attempt to sell shabu. In
addition, the plastic sachets were presented in court as evidence of corpus delicti.
Thus, the elements of the crime charged were su7ciently established by evidence.
45. People vs. FlordelizaArriola y De Lara, G.R. No. 187736,

February 8, 2012 (Defense of alibi and frame)
Facts: An information was received by Col. Makusi, the Chief of Police of San Jose
del Monte, Bulacan, from a barangay tanod that men were going in and out of the
house and that Arriola was peddling shabu therein.
A buy-bust operation team was formed to act on the intelligence report they had
gathered. SPO4 Abelardo Taruc (SPO4 Taruc) was designated as the poseur-buyer
and he was to be assisted by four (4) police aides and a civilian asset. Before going
to the target site, they prepared the marked money that would be used. Two (2) one
hundred (₱100) peso bills with serial numbers LE627251 and FP609651 were
marked by placing SPO4 Taruc’s initial “AT” on the bills.
When the team reached Arriola’s house, the civilian asset told Arriola that “Iiscore
daw siya,” referring to SPO4 Taruc who was just beside him. Arriola replied by
asking, “Magkano?” The asset answered, “₱200.00 po,” and then simultaneously
handed over the marked money. In exchange for the amount, Arriola gave them four
(4) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing crystalline substance. After
the exchange of the marked money and the merchandise, SPO4 Taruc arrested
Arriola. Upon her arrest,he recovered the marked money that was earlier paid to
her. The asset, on the other hand, turned over the four (4) sachets that Arriola gave
in exchange for the ₱200.00 paid to her.
After the operation, the buy-bust team brought Arriola and the seized articles to the
police station, where the four (4) con8scated sachets of shabu were marked “AT”
and “FA,” the initials, of SPO4 Taruc and that of Flordeliza Arriola, respectively.
Thereafter, they reported to the o7ce of the Bulacan provincial police the
successful buy-bust operation which resulted in the apprehension of Arriola. Also, a
laboratory examination request for the seized articles was prepared and the said
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four (4) sachets of shabu were then brought to the Bulacan Provincial Crime
Laboratory O7ce.
The resident forensic chemical o7cer, P/Insp. Nelson Cruz Sta. Maria (P/Insp. Sta.
Maria), conducted a qualitative examination of the specimen submitted. His 8ndings
contained in Chemistry Report No. D-742-2002, showed that the four (4) sachets
with markings AT-FA, Exhibits A-1 to A-4, containing white crystalline substance
yielded a positive result of the presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.
Arriola, however, has a di?erent version of what happened on the day of the buy-
bust operation. According to her, at around2:00 o’clock in the afternoon
of December 13, 2002, she was at home with her child resting when all of a sudden
policemen with 8rearms kicked the door of her house. She tried to block the door
but she was shoved aside by one of the men. She told them not to push because
she was pregnant but to no avail since one of them simply said, “Wala akong
pakialam.” She also testi8ed that one of the men asked her if she knew the
whereabouts of a certain Ogie dela Cruz. When she answered that the man they
were looking for was not residing in her house but in the “kanto” or corner, she was
the one who was brought to the precinct.
Arriola further testi8ed that while at the police station, they entered the o7ce of the
Chief of Police, Col. Makusi, where she was asked her name and her address. Then,
he brought out a plastic sachet which he took from another room. Later, she was
brought outside the o7ce and escorted to a room with a group of men where she
was made to point at the plastic sachet. Afterwards, she was brought back to the
o7ce of Col. Makusi but this time SPO4 Taruc was already inside. It was at this
moment when he asked her, “Gusto mong makalaya? Pagbigyan mo lang ako ng
kahit isang gabi.” Arriola replied by saying that she would not agree to his proposal
because, to begin with, she did not commit any crime. This reply angered SPO4
Taruc. In sum, she was saying that there was no valid buy-bust operation as
everything was a set-up. The drugs as well as the marked money were all just taken
from the table of Col. Makusi and not from her as claimed by the prosecution.
The RTC rendered the assailed decision convicting Arriola.
CA denied the appeal and a7rmed the RTC decision based on the testimony of SPO4
Taruc whom the said court considered to be the best witness as he was the poseur-
buyer.
Issue: Whether the alibi of Arriola is tenable
Ruling: No. Time and again, this Court has ruled that alibi and frame up are weak
forms of defense usually resorted to in drug-related cases. In this regard, the Court
is careful in appreciating them and giving them probable value because this type of
defense is easy to concoct. This Court is, of course, not unaware of instances when
our law enforcers would utilize means like planting evidence just to extract
information, but then again the Court does realize the disastrous consequences on
the enforcement of law and order, not to mention the well-being of society, if the
courts, solely on the basis of the police o7cers' alleged rotten reputation, accept in
every instance this form of defense which can be so easily fabricated. It is precisely
for this reason that the legal presumption that o7cial duty has been regularly
performed exists. Bare denial cannot prevail over the positive identi8cation by SPO4
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Taruc of Arriola as the one who sold them the shabu.[8] For the defense position to
prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the
presumption that government o7cials have performed their duties in a regular and
proper manner. This, unfortunately, Arriola failed to supply. What she made was a
bare allegation of frame-up without presenting any credible witness that would
support her claim.
F. Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Law (RA 10591)
46. People vs. Candido, GR Nos. 134072-73, 10 June 2002, SCRA

296 (Illegal possession of =rearms)
Facts: Accused, an overseer” in the peryahan (mini carnival) behind the Camelot
Hotel at Scout Tuazon, Barangay South Triangle, Quezon City, alighted from a taxi as
if he was looking for somebody. He walked towards the victim, Nelson Daras, and
positioned himself behind him. Then, he immediately pulled out a gun (.38 revolver)
and 8red at the victim, hitting him in the lower portion of the breast. ]The victim fell.
Not satis8ed, he came closer to the victim, then, 8red at him twice hitting him once
on the right side of his chest. Wasting no time, he made his getaway and ran
towards the direction of Scout Tuazon, Quezon City. In the meantime, SPO1 Wilfredo
Red and SPO1 Malang were on patrol duty in the area and heard three (3)
successive shots 8red. They went to the direction where the shots were 8red and
came upon the accused-appellant running away from the said direction and holding
a gun. SPO1 Red chased and was able to subdue him. Separate information for
murder aggravated by the use of an unlicensed 8rearm and for illegal possession of
8rearm was 8led against the accused. He was found guilty for both charges. On his
defense, he admitted that he killed the victim but in self-defense as the victim
approached him angrily when the accused closed the latter’s stall as no one was
there to look over it. He averred that the victim boxed him and drew a gun. He
added that the gun 8red hitting the victim during the course of the struggle for
possession of the gun. He was found guilty for both charges. Now the accused
alleged that the court erred in disregarding his version that he was acting in self-
defense and in not applying the provision of RA 8294 in convicting him for the two
separate o?enses.
Issue: Whether illegal possession of 8rearms should be appreciated as an

aggravating circumstance in the murder case, instead of treating it as a separate
crime?
Ruling: Yes. Although R.A. No. 8294 took eAect on July 6, 1997, or after the
crimes involved in the case at bar were committed on October 9, 1994, it
is advantageous to the accused, hence, it should be given retrospective
application insofar as it spares the accused-appellant from a separate
conviction for the crime of illegal possession of =rearm.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 8294 further amended Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, which in
part, provides:
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of unlicensed 8rearm, such use of
an unlicensed 8rearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
Under the aforequoted section, where murder or homicide is committed with

the use of an unlicensed =rearm, the separate penalty for illegal
possession of =rearm shall no longer be meted out since it becomes
merely a special aggravating circumstance. The penalty for illegal possession
of 8rearms shall be imposed in all other cases where none of the crimes
enumerated under R.A. No. 8294 is committed. The intent of Congress is to treat the
o?ense of illegal possession of 8rearm and the commission of homicide or murder
with the use of unlicensed 8rearm as a single o?ense.
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In the case at bar, although the prosecution was able to establish that the crime of
illegal possession of 8rearm under P.D. No. 1866 had been committed by the
accused-appellant, R.A. No. 8294 merely considers the use of an unlicensed 8rearm
as a special aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, and not as a separate
o?ense. Fortunately for the accused-appellant, the use of an unlicensed =rearm
in the killing of the victim was not alleged in the information for murder.
Such being the case, the same could not be used as an aggravating
circumstance to warrant the imposition of the death penalty against the
accused-appellant. (Right to be informed)
Self-defense Issue (walang kinalaman to sa topic pero sinama ko lang):

It is highly improbable for the victim to have been shot at the back if the
gun accidentally =red in the course of the struggle for its possession, as
this would assume that the victim’s hand holding the gun was twisted
abnormally to reach his back with the gun muzzle pointed at his back
when the gun exploded. Accused-appellant did not testify that such an
impossible scenario took place. What is clear is that the nature and location of the
gunshot wounds are physical evidence that demonstrate a determined e?ort to kill
the victim and not just defend oneself.
A plea of self-defense cannot be justi=ably appreciated where it is not

only uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence, but also
extremely doubtful by itself. Here, accused-appellant was presented as the sole
witness for the defense.
47. Agote vs. Lorenzo, G.R 142675, 22 July 2005 (Illegal possession
absorbed in other crimes)
Facts: On April 27, 1996, on an election period, Vicente Agote y Matol violates
Illegal Possession of Firearm (P.D. No. 1866), for having in control of a one .38 Cal.
Rev. with four (4) live bullets without 8rst having secured from the proper
authorities the necessary license therefor, and COMELEC Resolution on gun ban for
having carrying the said gun without 8rst securing the written authority from the
COMELEC. Eventually, trial court rendered a judgement of conviction on both case.
Meanwhile, onn June 6, 1997, Republic Act No. 8294 was approved into law. Pointing
out, among others, that the penalty for illegal possession of 8rearms under P.D. No.
1866 has already been reduced by the subsequent enactment of Rep. Act No. 8294,
hence, the latter law, being favorable to him, should be the one applied in
determining his penalty for illegal possession of 8rearms, petitioner moved for a
reconsideration of the May 18, 1999 decision of the trial court. However, it was
denied for it would be a retroactive application. On appeal, it was dismissed for
improper proceeding and lack of jurisdiction. An MR was 8led but the same was
denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether Illegal possession is absorbed in another crime.
Ruling: Yes. In the light of the existing rulings and jurisprudence on the matter, the
present case takes center stage presenting, this time, another twist, so to speak.
Petitioner, who was charged of illegal possession of 8rearms was also charged of
another o?ense: Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 (Gun Ban), but the
unlicensed 8rearm was not “used” or discharged in this case. The question then
which appears to be of 8rst impression, is whether or not the unlicensed 8rearm
should be actually “used” and discharged in the course of committing the other
crime in order that Sec. 1, Rep. Act No. 8294 will apply so that no separate crime of
illegal possession of 8rearms may be charged.
Let us take a look at the jurisprudence once again. In Cupcupin vs. People,[25] the
accused was charged and convicted for two (2) separate crimes of illegal possession
of 8rearms, and illegal possession of prohibited drugs. In the more recent case
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of People vs. Almeida,[26] however, although the accused was acquitted of the
separate charge of illegal possession of 8rearm for lack of evidence, the Court
nevertheless made the following clear pronouncement:
Furthermore, in any event, the Court has ruled in previous cases that in view of the
enactment of Republic Act No. 8294, there can be no separate oAense of
illegal possession of =rearms and ammunition if there is another crime
committed such as, in this case, that of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. In Almeida, it should be noted that the unlicensed 8rearm was merely found
lying around, together with the prohibited drugs, and therefore, was not being
“used” in the commission of an o?ense.
In People vs. Walpan M. Ladjaalam, this Court, interpreting the subject proviso in
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 8294, applied the basic principles in criminal law, and
categorically held:
xxx A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed =rearm is used in

the commission of any crime, there can be no separate oAense of simple
illegal possession of =rearms. Hence, if the ‘other crime’ is murder or homicide,
illegal possession of 8rearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a
separate o?ense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was
committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal possession
of 8rearms.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case,
the plain meaning of RA 8294’s simple language is most favorable to herein
appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justi8ed, for the language of the new law
demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused. Accordingly, appellant
cannot be convicted of two separate o?enses of illegal possession of 8rearms and
direct assault with attempted homicide. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx The law is
clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of
rearms, provided that ‘no other crime was committed by the person
arrested’. If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to
homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third
paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.(Emphasis
supplied).
48. People vs. Castillo; GR 131592-93, 15 February 2000

(Elements of illegal possession of =rearms)
Facts: Julian Castillo y Lumayro was charged with Murder and Illegal Possession of
Firearms. The scene of the crime was in the then on-going construction site of
Gaisano Building in Lapaz, Iloilo City. Accused was a lead man in the construction
site. Witnesses testi8ed that Accused shot Abawag three times despite Abawag’s
imploration and Ued leaving the latter to death. Thereafter, the police and the
brother-in-law of the victim located Castillo on a vessel for Cebu. Castillo tried to
escape at 8rst, when he was confronted he denied the killing but was found in his
possession the .38 caliber. Further inquiry revealed that the accused owned the gun
but had no license to possess it. The police then took the accused into custody and
charged him for the murder of Abawag and for illegal possession of 8rearm. Accused
was held by the trial court guilty of Homicide, as the prosecution failed to prove
the alleged qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery, and
of Illegal Possession of Firearm, aggravated by homicide. He was sentenced
as follows: "1) For the crime of homicide, he is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Twelve (12) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months of
reclusion temporal, as maximum; "2) For illegal possession of =rearm
which is aggravated by homicide, he is sentenced to a penalty of death; x
x x On automatic review by this Court, appellant impugns solely his conviction for
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illegal possession of 8rearm for which he was sentenced to the supreme penalty of
death. The appellant anchors his present appeal on the assertion that his conviction
was unwarranted as no proof was adduced by the prosecution that he was not
licensed to possess the subject 8rearm.
Issue: Whether Julian Castillo is guilty in the illegal possession of 8rearms? Whether
the correct denomination for the crime is Illegal Possession of Firearm, aggravated
by homicide?
Ruling: NO. Two (2) requisites are necessary to establish illegal possession of
8rearms: =rst, the existence of the subject 8rearm, and second, the fact that the
accused who owned or possessed the gun did not have the corresponding license or
permit to carry it outside his residence. The onus probandi of establishing these
elements as alleged in the Information lies with the prosecution. [11]
The 8rst element -- the existence of the 8rearm -- was indubitably established by
the prosecution. Prosecution eyewitness Acaso saw appellant shoot the victim thrice
with a .38 caliber revolver.[12] Appellant himself admitted that he did not turn over
the gun to the security guards in the building after the shooting. [13] The same gun
was recovered from the appellant and o?ered in evidence by the prosecution.
However, no proof was adduced by the prosecution to establish the second element
of the crime, i.e., that the appellant was not licensed to possess the 8rearm. This
negative fact constitutes an essential element of the crime as mere possession, by
itself, is not an o?ense. The lack of a license or permit should have been proved
either by the testimony or certi8cation of a representative of the PNP Firearms and
Explosives Unit that the accused was not a licensee of the subject 8rearm [14] or that
the type of 8rearm involved can be lawfully possessed only by certain military
personnel.[15] Indeed, if the means of proving a negative fact is equally within the
control of each party, the burden of proof is on the party averring said negative fact.
As the Information alleged that the appellant possessed an unlicensed gun, the
prosecution is duty-bound to prove this allegation. It is the prosecution who has the
burden of establishing beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime
charged, consistent with the basic principle that an accused is presumed innocent
until proven guilty.[16] Thus, if the non-existence of some fact is aconstituent
element of the crime, the onus is upon the State to prove this negative allegation of
non-existence.[17] kirsten
Hence, in the case at bar, although the appellant himself admitted

that he had no license for the gun recovered from his possession, his
admission will not relieve the prosecution of its duty to establish beyond
reasonable doubt the appellant's lack of license or permit to possess the
gun
(2) NO. P.D. 1866, which codi8ed the laws on illegal possession of 8rearms, was
amended on June 6, 1997 by Republic Act 8294. Aside from lowering the penalty for
said crime, R.A. 8294 also provided that if homicide or murder is committed
with the use of an unlicensed =rearm, such use shall be considered as a
special aggravating circumstance.[7] This amendment has two (2)
implications: =rst, the use of an unlicensed 8rearm in the commission of homicide
or murder shall not be treated as a separate o?ense, but merely as a special
aggravating circumstance; second, as only a single crime (homicide or murder with
the aggravating circumstance of illegal possession of 8rearm) is committed under
the law, only one penalty shall be imposed on the accused. [
Based on the facts of the case, the crime for which the appellant may be charged
is homicide, aggravated by illegal possession of =rearm, the correct
denomination for the crime, and not illegal possession of =rearm, aggravated
by homicide as ruled by the trial court, as it is the former o?ense which
aggravates the crime of homicide under the amendatory law.
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49. People vs. Reynaldo Cruz, GR No. 76728, 03 August 1988

(ownership not necessary in illegal poss.)
Facts: Acting upon an information that a stolen car was to be sold somewhere
in Magalanes, Makati, the CRIG team nabbed Romeo Fernandez and Joey Flores at
the intersection of EDSA and Timog Street and brought them to headquarters. The
two disclosed that other members of the carnap gang were waiting in 61 Mabituan
Street, Masambong, Quezon City for their shares of the proceeds from the sale of a
vehicle. The team went there and in an apartment owned by the appellant’s sister,
saw the appellant sleeping on the Uoor with his gangmates. The team also found a
clutch bag containing a caliber .38 paltik revolver, one (1) live ammunition and a
hand grenade under a bar, located one (1) meter away from the slumbering
appellant. After waking him up, sgt. Reynaldo Cachuela confronted him at once with
these exhibits. Appellant, in the presence of all the eight-man CRIG team and
gangmates admitted ownership of the bag, 8rearm, bullet and grenade. The team
arrested appellant and the rest of his group, as well as con8scated the items of the
crime.
Lilian Lauron of the Legal Research Branch of the Firearms and Explosives
Unit, Camp Crame, Quezon City, in answer to a police inquiry, made a thorough
check of her records and determined that appellant Reynaldo Cruz y Santos of No.
40 Sto. Cristo, Balintawak, Quezon City was not a licensed holder of caliber .
38 paltik revolver. As to hand grenades, she declared that only military personnel
were authorized to carry them. The accused, upon the other hand, denied
ownership or possession of the 8rearm and hand grenade, as well as the bag which
contained the same. Thus, the RTC was charged with the crime of Illegal Possession
of Firearm and Ammunition.
Issue: Whether or not ownership is necessary for the conviction of the crime
of Illegal Possession of 8rearm?
Held: No. Ownership is not an essential element of the o?ense charged. What the
law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual physical possession
but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one's control and
management. 7
In the instant case, PC Lt. Noel Manabat, leader of the PC team that arrested
the accused and his companions for "carnapping," declared that after 8nding the
bag containing the revolver and the hand grenade under the bar in the apartment
of the sister of the accused, he asked the "carnapping" suspects to whom the bag
belonged and they replied that it belonged to the herein accused Reynaldo Cruz,
and when he confronted the accused with the revolver and hand grenade, the
accused readily admitted that they belonged to him.
50. People vs. Solayao, G.R. No. 119220, September 20, 1996
(Elements of illegal possession of =rearms)
Facts: Nilo Solayao was charged with crime of illegal possession of 8rearm and
ammunition1 de8ned and penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1866.
The police o7cers conducted intelligence patrol when they observed that the group
of the respondents were drunk and Ued when they saw the o7cers. Police O7cer
Niño told accused-appellant not to run away and introduced himself as “PC,” after
which he seized the dried coconut leaves which the latter was carrying and found
wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade 8rearm locally known as “latong.” When he
asked accused-appellant who issued him a license to carry said 8rearm or whether
he was connected with the military or any intelligence group, the latter answered
that he had no permission to possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Niño con8scated
the 8rearm and turned him over to the custody of the policemen of Caibiran who
subsequently investigated him and charged him with illegal possession of 8rearm.
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The accused denied the charge. The RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of illegal possession of 8rearm. It found that accused-appellant did not contest the
fact that SPO3 Niño con8scated the 8rearm from him and that he had no permit or
license to possess the same.
Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of the crime charged.
Ruling: No. This Court, in the case of People v. Lualhati ruled that in crimes
involving illegal possession of 8rearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving
the elements thereof, viz: (a) the existence of the subject 8rearm and (b) the fact
that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding
license or permit to possess the same.
In the case at bar, the prosecution was only able to prove by testimonial evidence
that accused-appellant admitted before Police O7cer Niño at the time that he was
accosted that he did not have any authority or license to carry the subject 8re-arm
when he was asked if he had one. In other words, the prosecution relied on accused-
appellant’s admission to prove the second element.
By its very nature, an “admission is the mere acknowledgment of a fact or of

circumstances from which guilt may be inferred, tending to incriminate the speaker,
but not su7cient of itself to establish his guilt.” In other words, it is a “statement by
defendant of fact or facts pertinent to issues pending, in connection with proof of
other facts or circumstances, to prove guilt, but which is, of itself, insu7cient to
authorize conviction.”From the above principles, this Court can infer that an
admission in criminal cases is insu5cient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
commission of the crime charged.
Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao is hereby ACQUITTED for insu7ciency of evidence.
51. People vs. FeliscimoNarvasa, et.al., GR No. 128618, 16

November 1998 citing People vs. Arsenio Ferrera, GR L-66965, 18
June 1987 (Proof of =rearm; presentation not necessary)
Facts: Appellants Felicisimo Narvasa and Jimmy Orania seek the reversal of the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan, in Criminal Case,
8nding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of 8rearms in its
aggravated form and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua.
The prosecution narrates that Villamor Laderas and Ernesto Nagal, councilmen of
Quinaoayanan, Bani, Pangasinan, acting on a report that there were missing
carabaos, pigs and goats, repaired to the far-Uung Sitio Bugtong of the town of Bani
and to Sitio Patar of the adjoining town of Agno in Pangasinan, which they reached
at around 5:30 that afternoon. Then Laderas and Nagal patrolled the area. Along
their way, the two chanced upon the gang of appellants. Unluckily for the goons, the
two councilmen met the two policemen, SPO3 Primo Camba and PO2 Simeon
Navora who were on patrol and they reported what they saw.
“The two policemen were also responding to a report about the missing animals and
they suggested that all of them should track down the armed goons.
“After walking some distance, the four responding men saw the house of appellant
Felicisimo Narvasa on a hilly portion around 100 meters away from their path. They
decided to investigate at the house but before they could negotiate the distance,
they were met by a volley of gun8re. In the process of the retreat, Camba [bled]
profusely and he died even before he could be brought out from the scene of the
crime.
The trial court held that though unlicensed 8rearms were not presented as
evidence, the trial court, citing People v. Ferrera, ruled that appellants may still be
convicted of illegal possession of 8rearms. Hence, the present appeal was 8led.
Issue: whether the trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite the
insu7ciency of the prosecution’s evidence to warrant conviction of the accused-
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appellants beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of aggravated illegal possession of

8rearm
Ruling: The appeal is not meritorious. In light of Republic Act 8294, however,
appellants should be convicted only of homicide, with the special aggravating
circumstance of the use of illegally possessed 8rearms.
In People v. Orehuela, the Court held that the existence of the 8rearm can be
established by testimony, even without the presentation of the said 8rearm. As to
proof that appellants had no license or permit to possess the 8rearms in question,
the Court held in People v. Villanueva that the second element of illegal possession
of 8rearms can be proven by the testimony or the certi8cation of a representative of
the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused was not a licensee of the
8rearm in question.
In People v. Molina, Court en banc explained that RA 8294 considers the use of an
unlicensed 8rearm only an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, viz.: x
x x Under RA 8294, appellants can be held liable only for homicide and penalized
with reclusion temporal. Pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, RA 8294
should be given retroactive e?ect.
52. People vs. Arsenio Ferrera, GR L-66965, 18 June 1987 (Proof of

=rearm)
Facts: Arsenio Ferrera and three others were charged with murder after killing
Pascual Patiag, a moterola driver, by shooting him with high-powered guns thereby
inUicting upon the latter mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause
of his death, after which said accused cut o? the hears of the deceased and
mutilated the other parts of the body, committing the o?ense with ignominy and
which crime was committed by said accused in relation to their respective o7ces or
duties. The trial court found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt after taking
consideration the testimony of four witnesses. Arsenio Ferrera asserts that the
carbine with which the victim was shot should have been presented in evidence as
part of the corpus delicti.
Issue: Whether the corpus delicti has ben established by su7cient proof.
Ruling: Yes. The three eye-witnesses described in detail how the victim was 8rst
manhandled, stabbed, chased like an animal, then shot in cold blood by the
appellant with a carbine. The fourth witness also provided proof of the criminal act
of the appellant. From the statements of the four witnesses, there is no mistaking
that Pascual Patiag was the man who was tortured and slain by the appellant and
company. There could not be any better proof of the corpus delicti than the
foregoing testimonies which describe in detail the perpetration of the crime and
which establish beyond reasonable doubt that the person killed by the appellant
and his companions was Pascual Patiag. The corpus delicti has thus been proved
through the positive declarations of the state witnesses, corpus delicti being the
fact of the commission of the cime - the death caused by a criminal act.
Likewise, the presentation or non-presentation of the weapons in evidence (the

knife used in stabbing and the carbine used in shooting the victim) is not vital to the
cause of the prosecution. Corpus delicti means the fact of the crime or that a crime
has actually been perpetrated. It does not refer to the corpse of the victim or the
weapon used to kill him. It is not therefore imperative that the weapons used in the
commission of a crime be presented in court. It need not in fact be alleged that the
body of the deceased was actually found. In the case at bar, the people's evidence
has already established that the decased died as a result of gunshot wounds.
53. P/Insp. Ariel Artilero v. Orlando Casimiro, et.al. GR 190569, 25

April 2012 (PD 1866)
Facts: Petitioner is the Chief of Police of the Municipal Station of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) in Ajuy, Iloilo. According to him, the municipal station received
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information that successive gun 8res had been heard in Barangay Lanjagan, Ajuy
Iloilo. Thus, petitioner, together with Police Inspector Hermoso, and Senior Police
O7cer (SPO1) Lanaque, immediately went to the area to investigate. Upon arriving,
they saw Paquito standing beside the road, wearing a black sweat shirt with a
“Barangay Tanod” print. They asked Paquito if he had heard the alleged gunshots,
but he answered in the negative. Hermoso, and Lanaque decided to investigate
further, but before they could proceed, they saw that Paquito had “turned his back
from us that seemed like bragging his 8rearm to us Uagrantly displayed/tucked in
his waist which we observed to be under the inUuence of intoxicating odor.” Then,
they frisked him to “verify the 8rearm and its supporting documents.” Paquito then
presented his Firearm License Card and a Permit to Carry Firearm Outside
Residence. Thereafter, they spotted two persons walking towards them, wobbling
and visibly drunk. They further noticed that one of them, Aguillon, was openly
carrying a riUe, and that its barrel touched the concrete road at times. Petitioner
and Hermoso disarmed Aguillon. According to petitioner and Hermoso, although
Aguillon was able to present his Firearm License Card, he was not able to present a
PTCFOR.
Petitioner arrested Paquito, Aguillon and his companion Aldan Padilla, and brought
them to the Ajuy Municipal Police Station.
Paquito was released on the same night, because he was deemed to have been able
to comply with the requirements to possess and carry 8rearm. Thereafter, Aguillon
was detained at the police station, but was released from custody the next day.
Aguillon executed an A7davit swearing that petitioner had unlawfully arrested and
detained him for illegal possession of 8rearm. He further claims that he was duly
authorized by law to carry his 8rearm within his barangay.
Issue: Whether Aguillon guilty of illegal possession of 8rearm.
Ruling: No. It is true therefore, that, as petitioner claims, a barangay captain is not
one of those authorized to carry 8rearms outside their residences unless armed with
the appropriate PTCFOR under the Guidelines.
However, we 8nd merit in respondents’ contention that the authority of Aguillon to

carry his 8rearm outside his residence was not based on the IRR or the guidelines of
P.D. 1866 but, rather, was rooted in the authority given to him by Local Government
Code (LGC).
In the performance of his peace and order functions, the punong barangay shall be
entitled to possess and carry the necessary 8rearms within his territorial jurisdiction
subject to existing rules and regulations on the possession and carrying of 8rearms.
Republic Act No. 7160, the LGC of 1991, repealed B.P. 337. It retained the foregoing
provision as reUected in its Section 389 (b), viz:
CHAPTER 3 - THE PUNONG BARANGAY

SEC. 389. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, and Functions.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) In the performance of his peace and order functions, the punong barangay shall
be entitled to possess and carry the necessary 8rearm within his territorial
jurisdiction, subject to appropriate rules and regulations.
54. Elenita Fajardo v. People, GR 190889, 10 January 2011

(=rearms-ownership)
Facts: Petitioner, Elenita Fajardo, and one Zaldy Valerio charged with violation of
P.D. No. 1866, as amended, before the RTC, Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan. When
arraigned, both pleaded not guilty to the o?ense charged.
The case arose when members of the Provincial Intelligence Special Operations
Group (PISOG) were instructed by Provincial Director Police Superintendent Edgardo
Mendoza (P/Supt. Mendoza) to respond to the complaint of concerned citizens
residing on Ilang-Ilang and Sampaguita Roads, Park Homes III Subdivision, Barangay
Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan, that armed men drinking liquor at the residence of
petitioner were indiscriminately 8ring guns. PISOG along with the members of the
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Aklan Police Provincial O7ce proceeded to the area. Upon arrival thereat, they
noticed that several persons scampered and ran in di?erent directions. The
responding team saw Valerio holding two .45 caliber pistols. He 8red shots at the
policemen before entering the house of petitioner. Petitioner was seen tucking a .45
caliber handgun between her waist and the waistband of her shorts, after which,
she entered the house and locked the main door.
To prevent any violent commotion, the policemen desisted from entering

petitioner’s house but, in order to deter Valerio from evading apprehension, they
cordoned the perimeter of the house as they waited for further instructions from
P/Supt. Mendoza. A few minutes later, petitioner went out of the house and
negotiated for the pull-out of the police troops. No agreement materialized.
The warrant was served on petitioner at 9:30 a.m. Together with

a barangay captain, barangay kagawad, and members of the media, as witnesses,
the police team proceeded to search petitioner’s house. The team found and was
able to con8scate the following:
1. Two (2) pieces of Short Magazine of M16 Armalite RiUe;
2. Thirty 8ve (35) pieces of live M16 ammos 5.56 Caliber; and
3. Fourteen (14) pieces of live ammos of Caliber 45 pistol.
Since petitioner and Valerio failed to present any documents showing their authority
to possess the con8scated 8rearms and the two recovered receivers, a criminal
information for violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8294, was 8led against them.
Petitioner and Valerio argued that the issuance of the search warrant was defective
because the allegation contained in the application 8led and signed by SPO1 Tan
was not based on his personal knowledge and further asserted that the execution of
the search warrant was in8rm since petitioner, who was inside the house at the time
of the search, was not asked to accompany the policemen as they explored the
place, but was instead ordered to remain in the living room (sala).
Petitioner disowned the con8scated items. She refused to sign the inventory/receipt
prepared by the raiding team, because the items allegedly belonged to her brother,
Benito Fajardo, a sta? sergeant of the Philippine Army. She denied that she had a .
45 caliber pistol tucked in her waistband when the raiding team arrived.
Petitioner and Valerio were convicted of illegal possession of 8rearms and

explosives, punishable under paragraph 2, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended
by R.A. No. 8294. Petitioner then 8led a Notice of Appeal with the CA. The CA
concurred with the factual 8ndings of the RTC, but disagreed with its conclusions of
law, and held that the search warrant was void. Resultantly, all 8rearms and
explosives seized inside petitioner’s residence were declared inadmissible in
evidence. However, the 2 receivers recovered by the policemen outside the house
of petitioner before the warrant was served were admitted as evidence, pursuant to
the plain view doctrine.
Petitioner and Valerio were convicted of illegal possession of a part of a

8rearm, punishable under paragraph 1, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied in the CA
Resolution dated December 3, 2009. Hence, the present recourse.
Issue: Whether the petitioner is guilty for violation of illegal possession of 8rearm?
Ruling: No. The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal
possession of 8rearms and ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession
which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive possession
or the subjection of the thing to one's control and management. This has to be so if
the manifest intent of the law is to be e?ective. The same evils, the same perils to
public security, which the law penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a
prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this law
the proprietary concept of the possession can have no bearing whatsoever.
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But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession su7cient to convict a

person for unlawful possession of 8rearms or must there be an intent to possess to
constitute a violation of the law? This query assumes signi8cance since the o?ense
of illegal possession of 8rearms is a malum prohibitum punished by a special law, in
which case good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses.
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is
not necessary. It is su7cient that the o?ender has the intent to perpetrate the act
prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate
the act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to
commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very
nature of things, the crime itself. In the 8rst (intent to commit the crime), there
must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that
the prohibited act is done freely and consciously.
In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and
intent to possess. While mere possession, without criminal intent, is su7cient to
convict a person for illegal possession of a 8rearm, it must still be shown that there
was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused. Such
intent to possess is, however, without regard to any other criminal or felonious
intent which the accused may have harbored in possessing the 8rearm. Criminal
intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit an o?ense with the use
of an unlicensed 8rearm. This is not important in convicting a person under
Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a
violation of the decree, it is su7cient that the accused had no authority or license to
possess a 8rearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such
possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent.
Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of

a 8rearm cannot be considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of
this kind of weapon, such as Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is
physical or constructive possession, for as long as the animus possidendi is absent,
there is no o?ense committed.
Certainly, illegal possession of 8rearms, or, in this case, part of a 8rearm, is

committed when the holder thereof:
(1) possesses a 8rearm or a part thereof
(2) lacks the authority or license to possess the 8rearm.
We 8nd that petitioner was neither in physical nor constructive possession of the
subject receivers. The testimony of SPO2 Nava clearly barred that he only saw
Valerio on top of the house when the receivers were thrown. None of the witnesses
saw petitioner holding the receivers, before or during their disposal.
At the very least, petitioner’s possession of the receivers was merely incidental
because Valerio, the one in actual physical possession, was seen at the rooftop of
petitioner’s house. Absent any evidence pointing to petitioner’s participation,
knowledge or consent in Valerio’s actions, she cannot be held liable for illegal
possession of the receivers.
Petitioner’s apparent liability for illegal possession of part of a 8rearm can only
proceed from the assumption that one of the thrown receivers matches the gun
seen tucked in the waistband of her shorts earlier that night. Unfortunately, the
prosecution failed to convert such assumption into concrete evidence.
Mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish
the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. The rule is the same whether the
o?enses are punishable under the Revised Penal Code, which are mala in se, or in
crimes, which are malum prohibitum by virtue of special law. The quantum of proof
required by law was not adequately met in this case in so far as petitioner is
concerned.
55. People vs. DiosdadoCamat, GR 188612, 30 July 2012 (Illegal

possession-proof)
Facts: Between 3:00 o’clock and 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, the victims (the
hidalgos and others), were in front of the yard Anastacio Hidalgo seated and talking
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to each other when gun8re coming from the back of and directed at the group of
Aurelio suddenly erupted. After shooting their victims, accused and their
companions left the place going westward. Aurelio recalled that prior to the
shooting incident; one of the accused hacked the house of Juanito Hidalgo, Aurelio’s
brother, with a bolo, and had the hacking incident blottered at the barangay. The
trial court found Camat guilty of two counts of the crime of Murder with the Use of
Unlicensed Firearm and four counts of Attempted Murder. On the other hand, the
trial court found Dulay guilty of two counts of Murder with the Use of Unlicensed
Firearm and one count of Frustrated Murder.
Issue: Whether the use of unlicensed 8rearm was not duly proven by the
prosecution?
Ruling: Yes. The Court found that the use of unlicensed 8rearm was not duly proven
by the prosecution. The evidence indicates that none of the 8rearms used in the
massacre were ever recovered and presented in the trial court. Nevertheless, there
is jurisprudence which states that the existence of the =rearm can be
established by testimony, even without the presentation of the
=rearm. The testimony of the prosecution witnesses had established that appellant
Camat used a long 8rearm of unknown make and caliber to shoot his victims but
that would still be insu7cient to attribute to his felonious act the qualifying
circumstance of use of unlicensed 8rearm in light of jurisprudence which asserts
that in order for the same to be considered, adequate proof, such as written or
testimonial evidence, must be presented showing that the appellant was
not a licensed =rearm holder. There was no such proof in the case at bar.
56. Ernesto Cuenco vs. People; GR L-27586, 26 June 1970, 33 SCRA

522 (Animus Possidendi)
Facts: Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals a7rming that the CFI of
Manila, convicting appellant Ernesto Cuenca, who at the time of arrest of arrest on
January 3, 1963 was on duty at the Philippine Savings Bank as a special watchman
and security guard of the Bataan Veterans Security Agency to which the 8rearm,
and Ithaca .45 pistol, of the crime of illegal possession of 8rearm and seven rounds
of ammunition and sentencing him to imprisonment for one year and to pay the
costs. Appellant's main argument for defense was that in his employment with the
above-mentioned security agency made him to believe that the license to possess
the 8rearm in question was with the owner of the agency, Jose Forbes.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals convicted appellant herein, despite his
protests of good faith, upon the ground that the crime of illegal possession of a
8rearm and ammunition is not malum in se, but malum prohibitumand that it,
accordingly, requires neither malice nor evil purpose or intent. It should be noted,
however, that the Bataan Veterans Security Agency is duly licensed to operate as
such. Consequently, it may legally engage the service of competent persons to
discharge the duties of special watchmen and security guards, and provide them, as
such, with the corresponding 8rearms and ammunitions. The agency is thus
supposed to obtain the license necessary therefor. Had it done so, there would be
no question about the absence of any criminal liability on the part of appellant
herein for the possession of the 8rearm and ammunition in question, even though
the license were not in his name, but in that of the agency or its owner and
operator, Jose Forbes.
Issue: Whether appellant is guilty of the crime charged owing to the failure of Jose
Forbes to comply with his duty to obtain such license, before he got said 8rearm
and ammunition and delivered the same to his employee.
Ruling: NO. The reason is that appellant was entitled to assume that his
employer had the requisite license to possess said =rearm and
ammunition and to turn them over to him while he was on duty as one of
the regular security guards of the Bataan Veterans Security Agency, the same
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being a duly licensed security agency. As such, those dealing with it, either as
clients or as employees thereof, are entitled to presume, in the absence of indicia to
the contrary — and there were none in the present case — that it has complied with
pertinent laws, rules and regulations. What is more, Jose Forbes had told
appellant that the =rearm and ammunition in question were duly licensed,
and, as an employee of the agency, appellant could not be expected to
demand from his employer proof of the veracity of the latter's assertion
before relying thereon.
57. Eugene C. Firaza vs. People, G.R. No. 179319, 18 September

2009 (Mission Order)
Facts: Eugene C. Firaza was appointed as a con8dential agent of the NBI, Caraga
Regional O7ce. He was issued a 8rearm and a mission to gather and report to the
NBI such information as may be relevant to investigations undertaken by it. In his
private capacity, petitioner served as manager for RF Communications in
connection with which he dealt with Christopher Rivas, Provincial Auditor of Surigao
del Sur, for the establishment of a Public Calling O7ce in the Municipality of Lianga,
Surigao del Sur. In the course of a meeting between petitioner and Rivas at the
latter’s restaurant regarding the delivery of a defective machine for the Public
Calling O7ce, a heated exchange ensued during which petitioner is alleged to have
pointed a gun at Rivas. Later, they discovered that his permit to carry 8rearm
outside residence had expired more than a month earlier or on July 5, 2000. Hence,
a criminal complaint was 8led against him. MCTC convicted accused of the crime
“Unauthorized Carrying of Licensed Firearm Outside Residence,” penalized under
Section 1 of Republic Act 8294. . Said was a7rmed by RTC and Court of appeals.
Hence this case.
Petitioner, justi8es, his carrying of the 8rearm outside his residence with the 60-day
July 26, 2000 Mission Order issued to him by the NBI.
Issue: Whether’s contention is tenable.
Ruling: NO. Petitioner is mistaken. Permit to carry 8rearm is not the same as
permit to carry licensed 8rearm outside one’s residence. Under the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866, a Mission Order is de8ned as “a written
directive or order issued by government authority as enumerated in Section 5
hereof to persons who are under his supervision and control for a de+nite purpose
or objective during a speci+ed period and to such place or places as therein
mentioned which may entitle the bearer thereof to carry his duly issued or licensed
+rearms outside of residence when so specied therein.”
The Mission Order issued to petitioner authorized him to carry 8rearms “in
connection with con8dential (illegible) cases assigned to [him].” Admittedly,
petitioner was at Rivas’ restaurant in connection with a private business
transaction. Additionally, the Mission Order did not authorize petitioner to carry his
duly issued 8rearm outside of his residence.
AT ALL EVENTS, Sayco v. People,[8] citing Section 6(a) of The Implementing Rules
and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 and Memorandum Circular No. 8 dated October 16,
1986 issued by the Department (then Ministry) of Justice, should put to rest any
nagging doubts on the liability of petitioner, a con8dential civilian agent who was
not shown to be in the regular plantilla of the NBI.
First, special or con8dential civilian agents who are not included in the
regularplantilla of any government agency involved in law enforcement or receiving
regular compensation for services rendered are not exempt from the requirement
under P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, of a regular license to possess
8rearms and a permit to carry the same outside of residence.
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xxxx
Third, said special or con8dential civilian agents do not qualify for mission
orders to carry 8rearms (whether private-owned or government-owned) outside of
their residence.
x x x x (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
G. Anti-Carnapping Law (RA No. 6539)
58. Izon vs. People, GR No. L-51370, 31 August 1981 (carnapping)
Facts: Armed with bladed weapon which they pointed to one Reynaldo Togorio
and used in stabbing him and the accused Amado Izon y Bartulo who helped in
mauling him thereby inUicting upon said Reynaldo Togorio, and then wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away one (1) motorized tricycle, the
petitioners were charged with Robbery with Violence Against Person and were
sentenced to the penalty provided in Republic Act No. 6539 known as Anti-Car-
napping Act of 1972.
The Petitioners alleged that the court a quo erred in imposing the penalty
prescribed in the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 instead of that prescribed in the
Revised Penal Code for simple robbery with violence, because the information did
not allege that the motorized tricycle stolen was using the public highway, so as to
make it a motor vehicle as the term is de8ned in the carnapping law, and therefore
failed to inform them that they were being charged under the cited statute, in
violation of their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against the petitioners came to this Court with the instant petition for
review.
Issue: Whether a motorized tricycle is a motor vehicle within the de8nition

given to the term by the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972.
Ruling: Yes. Highways are always public, free for the use of every person.
There is nothing in the law that requires a license to use a public highway to make
the vehicle a "motor vehicle" within the de8nition given the anti-carnapping law. If a
vehicle uses the streets with or without the required license, same comes within the
protection of the law, for the severity of the o?ense is not to be measured by what
kind of streets or highway the same is used; but by the very nature of the vehicle
itself and the use to which it is devoted. Otherwise, cars using the streets but still
unlicensed or unregistered as when they have just beet bought from the company,
or only on test runs, may be stolen without the penal sanction of the anti-
carnapping statute, but only as simple robbery punishable under the provision of
the Revised Penal Code. This obviously, could not have been the intention of the
anti-carnapping law.
Going over the enumerations of excepted vehicle, it would readily be noted that any
vehicle which is motorized using the streets which are public, not exclusively for
private use, comes within the concept of motor vehicle. A tricycle which is not
included in the exception, is thus deemed to be that kind of motor vehicle as
de8ned in the law the stealing of which comes within its penal sanction.
In any event, it is a matter of judicial notice that motorized tricycles are running in
droves along highways admittedly public, as those going to the north like Baguio
City. Those motorized tricycles certainly come within the de8nition of the law, even
under the restricted construction that petitioners would want given to it. If these
tricycles are "motor vehicles" then, there is no cogent reason to treat the tricycle in
question di?erently.
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59.
People vs. Garcia; GR No. 138470, 01 April 2003 (Elements of
carnapping: not ownership)
Facts: Artemio Garcia, Jr. and Regalado Bernabe were charged with the crime of
Carnapping with Homicide as de8ned in Republic Act No. 6539.
The accused approached Cortez, a taxicab operator to borrow a car for their trip in
Bicol but the latter refused because it is unavailable. Instead, the approached
Ignacio which agreed to lease the Tamaraw FX for two days. Wilfredo Elis was the
driver of the leased car. Four days have passed but they did not hear from the two
accused so they reported to the police station. The two accused were seen in front
of a store in Nueva Ecija. When they failed to produce documents of ownership over
the Tamaraw FX, they were brought to the Moncada Police Station for investigation.
Garcia and Bernabe admitted to the Moncada Police that they attempted to sell the
Tamaraw FX belonging to Ferdinand Ignacio. They also admitted the killing of Elis.
The court rendered a decision 8nding them guilty of the crime charged. The two
accused appealed to the decision holding that the court erred in its decision that the
elements of carnapping was not established. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether the accused were guilty of the crime charged.
Ruling. Yes. Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as “An Act Preventing and
Penalizing Carnapping”, de8nes “carnapping” as “the taking, with intent to gain, of
a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter’s consent, or by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.” More
speci8cally, the elements of the crime are as follows: (1) That there is an actual
taking of the vehicle; (2) That the o?ender intends to gain from the taking of the
vehicle; (3) That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the o?ender himself;
and (4) That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the
taking was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or
by using force upon things.
Unlawful taking is the taking of a vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things;
it is deemed complete from the moment the o?ender gains possession of the thing,
even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. In the case at bar, it cannot
be denied that the nature of the appellant’s possession of the Tamaraw FX was
initially lawful. Nevertheless, the unlawful killing of the deceased for the purpose of
taking the vehicle radically transformed the character of said possession into an
unlawful one. Cortez categorically stated that during his 8rst visit to the Moncada
Police Station where appellant and his co-accused were detained, the two
separately admitted to him that they killed the deceased when the latter refused to
join their plan to sell the vehicle. Their confession, having been freely and
voluntarily given to Cortez, a private individual, is admissible against the appellant.
Thus, the duration of the lease of the Tamaraw FX, whether for an inde8nite period
as contended by the defense, or only for 4 days, as claimed by the prosecution, has
no bearing on the culpability of the appellant. It does not matter whether the
unlawful taking occurred within the period of the lease. What is decisive here is the
purpose of appellant and his co-accused in killing the victim. Such is the vital point
on which the crime and the nature thereof is to be determined. To reiterate, the
prosecution was able to establish that appellant and his co-accused stabbed the
victim to death because he refused to join them in their plan to appropriate the
vehicle. This undoubtedly satis8ed the element of unlawful taking through violence,
rendering appellant liable for the crime charged.
60.
People vs. Tan, GR No. 135904; 21 January 2000 (Felonious taking)
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Facts: In this petition for review, petitioner Alvin Tan seeks his acquittal by a
reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals which a7rmed his conviction for
violating Republic Act No. 6539, An Act Preventing and Penalizing Carnapping.
Private complainant Philip See is the registered owner of a 1987 Mitsubishi Gallant
four-door. Sometime in March 1992, accused Alvin Tan was introduced to Philip by
Alvin’s 8ancee, one Vienna Yu, and from then on, Philip and Alvin became friends
and started to see each other on several occasions thereafter. On November 7,
1992, Philip together with his wife Ruby See and Robert Chua (a neighbor) was at
his place of residence x x x when Alvin arrived thereat. He made it known to Philip
that he was intending to buy Philip’s aforesaid car and that he wanted to test-drive
it to which the latter agreed to said request. On thus getting hold of the car, Alvin
sped away and never returned. In vain, Philip waited for Alvin to show up and return
the car; Alvin simply did not show up, much less cause the return of the car.
Meanwhile, sometime on March 5, 1993, with the assistance of some personnel of

the Land Transportation O7ce (LTO), Philip was able to cause the car’s 1993
renewal registration in the absence of the vehicle and he was issued the
corresponding o7cial receipt therefor. Still failing to recover his car, Philip on or
about June 2, 1993, formally lodged a complaint for carnapping against Alvin before
the QC police station. Some two days later, or on June 4, 1993, Philip reported the
loss of his car to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Tra7c Management Command
and he accordingly signed the corresponding complaint sheets.
Issue: whether the accused is guilty as charged
Ruling: No. The accused is acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt. There is no

arguing that the anti-carnapping law is a special law, di?erent from the crimes of
robbery and theft included in the Revised Penal Code. It particularly addresses the
taking, with intent of gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the
latter’s consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things. But a careful comparison of this special law with the crimes
of robbery and theft readily reveals their common features and characteristics, to
wit: unlawful taking, intent to gain, and that personal property belonging to another
is taken without the latter’s consent. However, the anti-carnapping law particularly
deals with the theft and robbery of motor vehicles. Hence, a motor vehicle is said to
have been carnapped when it has been taken, with intent to gain, without the
owner’s consent, whether the taking was done with or without violence or
intimidation of persons or with or without the use of force upon things. Without the
anti-carnapping law, such unlawful taking of a motor vehicle would fall within the
purview of either theft or robbery which was certainly the case before the
enactment of said statute.
Even solely from this testimony, the Court 8nds that there was no unlawful taking. A
felonious taking may be de8ned as the act of depriving another of the possession
and dominion of movable property without his privity and consent and without
animus revertendi. Thus, an unlawful taking takes place when the owner or juridical
possessor does not give his consent to the taking; or, if the consent was given, it
was vitiated; or in the case of Roxas, Trinidad and de Vera, where an act by the
receiver soon after the actual transfer of possession constitutes unlawful taking. In
the last scenario, the receiver’s act could be considered as having been executed
without the consent of the giver. SEE’s testimony clearly evinced his assent to TAN’s
taking of the car not only at the time he yielded the physical possession thereof for
the alleged test-driving but even thereafter, for he neither withheld his consent nor
withdrew the same during the seven month period the car was with TAN. At the very
least, SEE tolerated TAN’s possession of the car. A contrary conclusion inspires only
disbelief. For if the car was truly carnapped, why did SEE wait for seven months
before he reported the same? Further, TAN’s alleged refusal to meet SEE despite his
repeated attempts to do so should have su7ciently alerted him of the former’s
supposed malevolent intent, yet he still did not report the taking. Even if he failed to
report the taking, months after the alleged test-driving, he had allegedly seen his
car in the initial stages of dismemberment on 19 May 1993 yet, again, he did not
report the carnapping on that day nor on the next, but much later on 7 June 1993 or
almost a month thereafter.
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SEE said he believed and expected that the car would inevitably be returned to him.
This is not only unsatisfactory but irreconcilable and contradictory with his
imputations of carnapping. For if he believed that the vehicle would be returned to
him for friendship’s sake then he could not have at the same time also believed that
this friend carnapped his car. Clearly, SEE’s behavior immediately preceding,
contemporaneous and subsequent to the alleged unlawful taking was de8nitely not
the distraught conduct of a man whose car was carnapped. He was even able to
register the averred stolen vehicle without sounding the alarm.
61.
People vs. Bustinera, GR No. 148233, 08 June 2004 (Felonious
taking, animus lucrandi)
Facts: ESC Transport hired Luisito Bustinera as a taxi driver. It was agreed that
appellant would drive the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m., after which he would
return it to ESC Transport's garage and remit the boundary fee in the amount of
P780.00 per day. On December 25,1996, appellant admittedly reported for work and
drove the taxi, but he did not return it on the same day as he was supposed to. The
owner of ESC reported the taxi stolen. On January 9, 1997, Bustinera's wife went to
ESC Transport and revealed that the taxi had been abandoned. ESC was able to be
recovered. The trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of quali8ed
theft.
Issue: Whether the court erred in concluding without concrete basis that the
accused-appellant has intent to gain when he failed to return the taxi to its garage.
Ruling: Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the
unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important
consideration is the intent to gain. The term “gain” is not merely limited to
pecuniary bene8t but also includes the bene8t which in any other sense may be
derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the
thing which was taken without the owner’s consent constitutes gain.
Please take note of the ruling of the Supreme Court.
Wherefore the judgment of the Regional Trial Court 8nding appellant Luisito
Busintera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of quali8ed theft, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and another judgment entered in its place, 8nding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping under R.A. No. 6539, as amended and
sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of...
62.
People vs. Lobitania, GR No. 142380, 05 September 2002 (Quali=ed
Carnapping)
Facts: Sanchez was a cargador at the Navotas Fishport. He 8rst met accused-
appellant, Danilo Lobitania, outside a beerhouse at the 8shport. Accused-appellant
o?ered him a job as a helper in an ice plant in Pangasinan. Sanchez agreed and,
together with accused-appellant and his companions, they boarded a bus bound for
Urdaneta, Pangasinan at around nine o’ clock in the evening. The group alighted at
Barangay Nancayasen and Uagged down a tricycle driven by victim Alexander de
Guzman. Daniel and Jr. Subarin rode at the back of the driver while accused-
appellant, Montolo and Sidro were inside the tricycle with Sanchez in the sidecar.
The driver turned left at an alley and after traveling a short distance, the driver was
shot at the right side of his chest below the armpit. Sidro then grabbed the driver
from his seat, tied his hands behind his back and then shoved him out of the
tricycle. Sanchez and Jr. Saburin tried to help the driver but Montolo and accused-
appellant poked their guns at them and threatened that the same thing would
happen to them if they did not go with accused-appellant’s group.
The group took the tricycle, now driven by Daniel and proceeded towards the
direction of Manila. At the 8sh market, Sanchez and Jr. Saburin were told by
accused-appellant to stay and wait. However, after two hours of waiting, Sanchez
and Jr. Saburin decided to leave and head back for Manila.
After Sanchez’ arrival at his house, accused-appellant’s companion, Daniel, arrived
and warned him not to squeal lest something happened to him. Sanchez then went
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out to look for Jr. Saburin whom he later found out was at the Presidential Anti-
Organized Task Force (PAOCTF) in Camp Crame. Sanchez decided to follow Jr.
Saburin and there they revealed what they knew of the incident in Pangasinan.
Accused-appellant likewise puts up the defense of denial and alibi. At the trial, he
presented defense witness, the leader of the SMART-SWAT Team to which accused-
appellant belongs, who testi8ed that accused-appellant reported for work from eight
o’clock in the morning until eight o’clock at night. Accused-appellant also presented
his wife, Valeriana Lobitania, to corroborate his alibi that, on the night of the
incident, he was at home in Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, from ten o’clock
onwards. The trial court rendered a decision 8nding accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of aggravated carnapping with murder and sentenced him
to su?er the supreme penalty of death.
Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of carnapping on its quali8ed circumstance.
Ruling: Based on the facts proven, the o?ense committed by accused-appellant is

the special complex crime of quali8ed carnapping or carnapping in an aggravated
form under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1992, as
amended by Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659, the Death Penalty Law.
Section 2 of R. A. 6536 as amended, de8nes the crime of carnapping as the taking,

with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter’s
consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using
force upon things. It becomes quali8ed when in the course of the commission or on
occasion of the carnapping, the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle
is killed or raped. When the carnapping is quali8ed, the penalty imposable is
reclusion perpetua to death. In the case at bar, all the elements were duly proven
by the prosecution. Based on the testimony of Sanchez, accused-appellant and his
companions shot the driver of the tricycle, abandoned him and took possession of
the vehicle. The testimony of Sanchez that the driver was unknown to the group
clearly establishes the fact that the motive of accused-appellant was to steal the
tricycle and that the killing of the driver was incidental thereto.
Furthermore, the defense failed to prove that Sanchez was not present at the scene
of the crime. The witness’ testimony thus leaves no other conclusion but that he,
indeed, witnessed the killing of victim de Guzman and the taking of his tricycle.
63. People vs. Mejia, GR Nos.118940-411, 01 July 1997 (Quali=ed

Carnapping; not complex crime)
Facts: In the evening of March 10, 1994, along the expressway at Barangay
Ventinilla, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, several persons on board a passenger jeepney
driven by Teo8lo Landingin attacked by the accused-appellants and a passenger,
Virgilio Catugas, thereby inUicting upon them multiple stab wounds. Landingin was
pulled out from his seat and dumped on the shoulder of the road. One of the
attackers took the wheel of the jeepney and drove away. Catugas was thrown out to
the middle of the road when the jeepney started to move away. Landingin died as a
consequence of the injuries he sustained. Catugas survived.
Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Pedro Paraan, Joseph Fabito, Romulo Calimquim, one
alias Dennis, Alex Mamaril, one alias Mondragon, and another unidenti8ed person
were held to account on the said acts. Mejia and Benito were taken into police
custody a few hours after the incident, Paraan, the following day; and Fabito, 8ve
days after while the others remained at large. Three separate criminal complaints
for murder, frustrated murder, and violation of R.A. No. 6539 (Anti Carnapping Act of
1992, as amended) were 8led against them with the Municipal Trial Court of Sta.
Barbara, Pangasinan.
Despite service on them of subpoenas requiring submission of counter-a7davits,

accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito did not submit their counter-a7davits. As
a consequence, Judge Lilia C. Espanol issued an order declaring the accused “to
have waived their right to be heard in preliminary investigation”; 8nding a prima
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facie case against the accused; recommending that they be charged with and
prosecuted for the crimes of murder, frustrated murder, and violation of R.A. No.
6539, as amended; and ordering that the records of the cases be forwarded to the
O7ce of the Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.
After appropriate proceedings, the O7ce of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan

8led with the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City three separate informations for
murder, frustrated murder, and violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as
amended, against the aforenamed persons.
The 8rst two were assigned to Branch 44 of the RTC of Dagupan City presided by
Judge Crispin C. Laron (LARON court) and thereafter consolidated and jointly
tried. The third was assigned to Branch 43 of the said court presided by Judge
Silverio Q. Castillo (CASTILLO court).
The LARON court convicted accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito of the crime
of murder and of frustrated murder, with treachery as the qualifying circumstance
and nighttime and band as aggravating circumstances.
The CASTILLO court then convicted accused Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Pedro
Paraan, and Joseph Fabito guilty of the violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972,
as amended.
After they 8led separate Appellants’ Briefs in G.R. Nos. 118940-41 and in G.R. No.
119407, the appellants 8led a motion for the consolidation of these cases, which
was granted.
Issue: Whether the accused appellants should be convicted for three separate
crime of murder, frustrated murder, and violation of R.A. No. 6539 (Anti Carnapping
Act of 1992, as amended).
Ruling: No. Three amendments have thus been made, viz: (1) the change of the
penalty of life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape, and (3)
the change of the phrase “in the commission of the carnapping” to “in the course of
the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.” The latter makes
clear the intention of the law to make the o?ense a special complex crime, by way
of analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code on
robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. As such, the killing (or the
rape) merely quali8es the crime of carnapping which for lack of speci8c
nomenclature may be known as quali8ed carnapping or carnapping in an
aggravated form. In short, considering the phraseology of the amended Section
14, the carnapping and the killing (or the rape) may be considered as
a single or indivisible crime or a special complex crime which, however, is not
covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
Since Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539 uses the words “IS KILLED,” no distinction must be
made between homicide and murder. Whether it is one or the other which is
committed "in the course of carnapping or on the occasion thereof” makes no
di?erence insofar as the penalty is concerned.
It follows then that the killing of the driver, Teo8lo Landingin -- whether it be
homicide or murder -- cannot be treated as a separate o?ense, but should only be
considered to qualify the crime of carnapping.
Nonetheless, although there could only be one single o?ense of quali8ed

carnapping or carnapping in an aggravated form, the prosecution had still to prove
the essential requisites of the homicide or murder of Landingin and that of
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carnapping. This should have been another reason for the consolidation of the
carnapping case in the CASTILLO court with the cases before the LARON court.
But do the words "IS KILLED" in the last clause of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539, as
amended, include the crime of frustrated murder or homicide? Put a little
di?erently, does murder or homicide in its frustrated stage also qualify carnapping if
it is committed “in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof”? The answer must be in the negative in light of the use in said
Section 14 of the words “IS KILLED.” The unmistakable import thereof is that it
refers only to the consummated felony of either murder or homicide.
If attempted or frustrated murder or homicide is committed “in the course of the

commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof,” then it must be deemed
to fall under the clause (of Section 14) “when the carnapping is committed by
means of violence against or intimidation of any person.”
64. People vs. ArnelNocum, GR 179041, 1 April 2013 (Carnapping

with Homicide)
Facts: Mahilac was a member of "FX gang," a syndicate notorious for carjacking
Toyota FX vehicles. Nocum led the syndicate’s criminal activities in Metro Manila
while Pangandag, who was the head of the Land Transportation O7ce in Lanao Del
Norte, led the Mindanao operations.Ramos, Posadas and Mallari were members of
the gang. Mallari, Ramos and Posadas arrived on board the Toyota FX taxi that
Mallari Uagged down in Muntinlupa City. Mallari told Mahilac not to board the said
vehicle because its back portion reeked of the dried blood of the FX taxi driver, Erico
Medel, who was stabbed to death while resisting the group. Mallari also informed
Mahilac that Medel’s corpse was dumped somewhere in Atimonan, Quezon. The
gang continued to engage in this nefarious activity until Mahilac’s arrest by law
enforcement o7cers. In the meantime, a cadaver in advance state of
decomposition was found along Zigzag Road, Barangay Malinao Ilaya, Atimonan,
Quezon. Based on the four extracted teeth and a piece of white "FILA" shoe, the
mother and the wife of the victim positively identi8ed the cadaver to be that of
Medel. Consequently, Mahilac was placed under the Witness Protection Program of
the Department of Justice (DOJ). He confessed the forgoing circumstances. The
accused, herein, were found guilty of the crime of carnapping with homicide. Mallari
appealed and argued that the court erred in convicting him despite the lack of
evidence other than the mere allegation by the lone prosecution witness.
Issue: Whether the crime of carnapping with homicide is established?

Ruling: Section 2 of RA 6539 de=nes carnapping as "the taking, with intent
to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter’s
consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things." The crime of carnapping with homicide is punishable
under Section 14 of the said law, as amended by Section 20 of RA 7659. To prove
the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not
only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original
criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." Thus, the prosecution in
this case has the burden of proving that: (1) Mallari took the Toyota FX taxi; (2)
his original criminal design was carnapping; (3) he killed the driver, Medel;
and (4) the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof."
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The crime of carnapping with homicide, as well as the identity of Mallari as

one of the perpetrators of the crime, is duly established by circumstantial
evidence.
The culpability of Mallari for the complex crime of carnapping with homicide is duly
established by the conUuence of circumstantial evidence. Mahilac testi8ed that he
was present when Mallari and his co-accused, all members of the "FX Gang,"
gathered in Muntinlupa City to plan and conspire to steal vehicles and sell them to
unscrupulous buyers in Mindanao. Immediately after said meeting, Mahilac saw
Mallari hail the FX taxi driven by Medel, talk to him, board it together with two other
conspirators, and head south towards the direction of Quezon province. A few days
later, Mallari and his companions met Mahilac in Cagayan De Oro City on board the
same FX taxi they rode in Muntinlupa City. All these show that Mallari’s original
criminal design was to carnap the taxi and that he accomplished his purpose
without the consent of its owner. In addition, when the vehicle was brought to
Cagayan de Oro City, its driver, Medel, was no longer with them. The vehicle also
reeked of dried human blood. Upon inquiry by Mahilac, Mallari admitted that the
dried blood belonged to Medel who had to be killed for resisting the group. Mallari
also told him that Medel’s body was dumped along Zigzag Road in Atimonan,
Quezon. Mallari and his co-accused received P250,000.00 upon delivery of the FX
taxi to its 8nal destination. These prove that Medel was killed in the course of the
commission of the carnapping.
The identity of Medel as the driver of the taxi was established by his mother and
wife who both stated that he was the driver of the taxi on the day it was stolen by
Mallari and his co-conspirators. The two later on identi8ed his corpse when it was
discovered in the same vicinity which Mallari told Mahilac to be the place where
they dumped the dead body of Medel.
H. Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law (PD No. 532)
65. Caoili vs. C.A., GR No. 128369; 22 December 1997 (Knowledge

important in fencing)
Facts: Rodolfo “Rudy” Caoili, was charged, along with a certain Tony Yip, with
violation of Presidential Decree (“P.D.”) No. 1612. Petitioner sought a review by the
Secretary of Justice of the resolution, of Assistant Prosecutor Antonio R. Rebagay
that had found a prima facie case against petitioner that served as the basis for the
information.
Issue: Whether or not there is su7cient evidence to indict Caoili?
Ruling: YES. To be liable for violation of P.D. 1612, Section 2 thereof requires that
the o?ender buys or otherwise acquires and then sells or disposes of any object of
value which he knows or should be known to him to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The allegations of Atule and Azuela do
not indicate that respondent Caoili acquired the skiving machines in question
knowing that the same were stolen property. The prima facie presumption of
fencing from possession of stolen property does not apply to Caoili as complainant
reacquired the subject skiving machines not from respondent Caoili but from Yip. It
is di7cult to give credence to the claim of Atule and Azuela that respondent Caoili
told them that he purchased the stolen skiving machines which he in turn sold to
Yip. It is simply contrary to common human behavior that a person would intimate
to another or others an unlawful act, that he purchased stolen items and then
dispose of it at a pro8t. Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances.”
66. People vs. Cerbito, GR No. 126397, 01 February 2000 (No

speci=c victim in brigandage)
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Facts: On September 3, 1992, passengers of Phillipine Rabbit Bus travelling on the

North Expressway on its way to Manila were victimized in a hold-up committed by
four men who boarded the bus as it was approaching the Tabang tollgate. The said
accused were Daniel Cerbito, Vicente Acedera and JImboy Morales and a 16 year old
boy. The said accused announced hold up on the passengers of the said bus and
during the said robbery on highway, a shootout had happened against a police
o7cer-passenger of the bus Patrolman Edgar Ponce and of the accused. Vicente
Acedera was shot at the stomach but the police o7cer was shot by Jimboy Morales
in the neck and was 8nally shot in the head by Daniel Cerbito. The accused were
successful in robbing the passengers of the bus and dropped o? at Malinta Exit.The
accused were personally identi8ed by the witnesses Concordia Pagdanganan and a
student Amor Masangkay during the court trial.
On the other hand, the accused raised the defense of denial and alibi. Daniel
Cerbito testi8ed that he was in Northern Samar attending the town 8esta in
Marubay, Laoang on the date in question. Jimboy Cerbito Morales declared that he
was in his hometown at Candawit, Laoang, Northern Samar where he farmed copra
as a source of livelihood and where he was arrested on March 19, 1993. Vicente
Acedera claimed that he was at his brother's house at 1-C Calamansi St. corner
Luzon Ave., Quezon City on September 3, 1992, and that he sustained the gunshot
wound as he was walking through a street going to the house of his cousin in
Navotas.
The trial court held that the evidence presented by the accused was not su7cient to
refute the evidence presented by the prosecution. Hence they were found guilty of
two o?enses: 8rst, violation of P. D. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Highway
Robbery Act and second, homicide under Revised Penal Code Art. 249 for the death
of Patrolman Ponce.
Issue: Whether or not the accused herein are guilty in violating Presidential Decree
532 otherwise known as Anti-Highway Robbery Act.
Ruling: Yes. Highway robbery/brigandage is de8ned in Section 2(e) of P. D. 532

entitled \"Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law\" as \"(t)he seizure of any
person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the
property of another by means of violence against or intimidation of person or force
upon things or other unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine
Highway.\" The robbery must be directed not only against speci8c, intended or
preconceived victims, but against any and all prospective victims.
All the above elements were established. The testimonies of the two passengers
who witnessed the robbery and the homicide, namely Concordia Pagdanganan and
Amor Magsakay who identi8ed all three accused-appellants in court are of vital if
not decisive value. The defense of alibi for the reason that said defense cannot
prevail over the positive identi8cation made by the two eyewitnesses presented by
the prosecution. Confronted with contradictory declarations and statements, the
trial court cannot be faulted for giving greater weight to the positive testimonies of
the witnesses who have not been shown to have any motive to falsely implicate the
accused-appellants, and whose credibility has not been placed in doubt. Alibi has
generally been regarded with disfavor by the court because it is easily fabricated
and we have no reason to deviate from this rule.
67. People vs. Mendoza, GR No. 104461, 254 SCRA 61 (victim in

highway robbery)
Facts: . Grace and Ramilyn Zulueta , were on their way home when they
boarded a passenger jeepney bound for Cubao via Aurora Blvd. When the jeepney
reached the dark portion of Aurora Blvd, someone announced a hold-up. 8 Both
Mendoza and Rejali had guns while Jack was armed with a knife. The accused were
able to get the amount of P30.00 from Gloria Oropeo and on the occasion of said
robbery (hold-up), the accused held Ramilyn who started kicking, trying to extricate
herself from their grasp. This prompted Mendoza to hit her on the head with his
gun. He boxed and kicked her, causing Ramilyn to fall out of the jeepney and died
thereafter. Mendoza then held Grace by her right arm. As she struggled in an
attempt to call the attention of the drivers of the other vehicles on the road, one of
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the accused hit Grace on the head with a gun causing her to lose consciousness. By
Uuke of fate, it was Grace herself who brought about the apprehension of Mendoza.
The trial court convicted them with Violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-
Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974).
Issue: whether the accused should be convicted of highway robbery with homicide
punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532, or of robbery with homicide under
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.
Held: In People vs. Puno 43, this Court, speaking through the learned Mr. Justice
Florenz D. Regalado, explained the purpose of brigandage as follows:
In 8ne, the purpose of brigandage is inter alia, indiscriminate highway

robbery. If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery,
or robbery in band if there are at least four armed participants. ( citing U.S. vs.
Feliciano, 3 Phil. 422 [1904].) . . .
. . . Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage

only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any
person or persons on Philippine highways as de8ned therein, and not acts of
robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim, . . .
Consistent with the above, to obtain a conviction for highway robbery, the
prosecution should have proven that the accused, in the instant case, were
organized for the purpose of committing robbery indiscriminately. There, however,
was a total absence of such proof. There was also no evidence of any previous
attempts at similar robberies by the accused to show the "indiscriminate"
commission thereof.Thus, the appellants herein should be liable for the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code,
robbery having been duly established beyond reasonable doubt by the asportation
of thirty pesos from Glory Oropeo. It is immaterial that Ramilyn Zulueta's death was
accidental because it was produced by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery. The physical injuries inUicted upon Grace Zulueta during the commission
of the crime are absorbed in the crime of robbery with homicide.
68. People vs. Reanzares, GR No. 130656, 29 June 2000 (purpose

of highway robbery law)
Facts: Two (2) Informations were 8led against accused Armando Reanzares and
three (3) John Does in relation to the incident. The 8rst was for violation of PD 532
otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974 for
allegedly conspiring, with intent to gain and armed with bladed weapons and a .38
caliber revolver, to rob and carry away one (1) Seiko wristwatch owned by Gregorio
Tactacan and P1,000.00 cash of Lilia Tactacan, and on the occasion thereof, killed
her. The second was for violation of RA 6539, An Act Preventing and Penalizing
Carnapping, for taking away by means of violence and intimidation of persons one
(1) passenger-type jeepney with Plate No. DBP 235 owned and driven by Gregorio
Tactacan and valued at P110,000.00. Only the accused Armando Reanzares was
arrested. The other three (3) have remained unidenti8ed and at large.
The court declared him guilty of Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD 532 and
sentenced him to death. The accused insists before us that his conviction for
Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD 532 is erroneous as his guilt was not
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: Whether he accused is guilty of the crime charged.
Ruling: Indeed the accused is guilty. But that the accused was guilty of Highway
Robbery with Homicide under PD 532 was erroneous.
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As held in a number of cases, conviction for highway robbery requires proof that
several accused were organized for the purpose of committing it indiscriminately.
There is no proof in the instant case that the accused and his cohorts organized
themselves to commit highway robbery. Neither is there proof that they attempted
to commit similar robberies to show the “indiscriminate” perpetration thereof. On
the other hand, what the prosecution established was only a single act of robbery
against the particular persons of the Tactacan spouses. Clearly, this single act of
depredation is not what is contemplated under PD 532 as its objective is to
deter and punish lawless elements who commit acts of depredation upon
persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel
from one place to another thereby disturbing the peace and tranquility of
the nation and stunting the economic and social progress of the people.
Consequently, the accused should be held liable for the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA
765914 as the allegations in the Information are enough to convict him therefor.
I.Anti-Cattle Rustling Law (PD No. 533)
69. Canta vs. People; GR No. 140937, 28 February 2001 (Elements

of cattle rustling)
Facts: The case is a petition of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
which a7rmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court Southern Leyte, 8nding
petitioner Exuperancio Canta guilty of violation of P.D. No. 533, otherwise known as
the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974.
It records show that Narciso Gabriel acquired from his half-sister Erlinda Monter a
cow, subject of the case, upon its birth and the same remained under the care of
Erlinda Monter for sometime. Subsequently, Narciso gave the care and custody of
the animal, 8rst, to Generoso Cabonce, then to Maria Tura, from and lastly, to
Gardenio Agapay, when it was lost. It appears that Agapay took the cow to graze in
the mountain of Pilipogan in Barangay Candatag. However, when he came back for
it, Agapay found the cow gone. He found hoof prints which led to the house of
Filomeno Vallejos. He was told that petitioner Exuperancio Canta had taken the
animal. Narciso Gabriel reported the matter to the police of Malitbog, Southern
Leyte. As a result, Narciso and petitioner Exuperancio were called to an
investigation. Petitioner admitted taking the cow but claimed that it was his and
that it was lost. He presented two certi8cates of ownership, one dated March 17,
1986 and another dated February 27, 1985, to support his claim.
Narciso also presented a certi8cate of ownership issued on March 9, 1986, signed
by the municipal treasurer, in which the cow was described as two years old and
female.
Issue: whether petitioner is guilty as charged
Ruling: Yes. The crime is committed if the following elements concur: (1) a large
cattle is taken; (2) it belongs to another; (3) the taking is done without the consent
of the owner; (4) the taking is done by any means, methods or scheme; (5) the
taking is with or without intent to gain; and (6) the taking is accomplished with or
without violence or intimidation against person or force upon things.
These requisites are present in this case. First, there is no question that the cow
belongs to Narciso Gabriel. Petitioner’s only defense is that in taking the animal he
acted in good faith and in the honest belief that it was the cow which he had lost.
Second, petitioner, without the consent of the owner, took the cow from the custody
of the caretaker, Gardenio Agapay, despite the fact that he knew all along that the
latter was holding the animal for the owner, Narciso. Third, petitioner falsi8ed his
Certi8cate of Ownership of Large Cattle by asking Telen to antedate it prior to the
taking to make it appear that he owned the cow in question. Fourth, petitioner
adopted “means, methods, or schemes” to deprive Narciso of his possession of his
cow, thus manifesting his intent to gain. Fifth, no violence or intimidation against
persons or force upon things attended the commission of the crime.
Indeed, the evidence shows that the Certi8cate of Ownership of Large Cattle which
petitioner presented to prove his ownership was falsi8ed. Franklin Telen, the janitor
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in the municipal treasurer’s o7ce, admitted that he issued the certi8cate to

petitioner 10 days after Narciso’s cow had been stolen. Although Telen has
previously executed a sworn statement claiming that he issued the certi8cate on
February 27, 1985, he later admitted that he antedated it at the instance of
petitioner Exuperancio Canta, his friend, who assured him that the cow was his.
In any event, petitioner was not justi8ed in taking the cow without the knowledge
and permission of its owner. If he thought it was the cow he had allegedly lost, he
should have resorted to the court for the settlement of his claim.
J. Anti-Hijacking Law (PD No. 6235)

Highjacking of passenger plane
Carrying prohibited cargo
K. Anti-Alias Law, as amended (CA No. 142; RA 6085)
70. Ursua vs. CA, GR 112170, 10 April 1996 (Use of alias/=ctitious

name)
Facts: Cesario Ursua was charged with violation of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142, as
amended by RA 6085, otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases.”
Ursua, an environmental o7cer, together with others, were being investigated

before the Ombudsman regarding their involvement in the illegal cutting of
mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the Cotobato area.
Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the O7ce of the Ombudsman
requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint against petitioner Ursua. Atty.
Palmones then asked his client Ursua to take his letter-request to the O7ce of the
Ombudsman because his law 8rm's messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some
personal matters. Ursua talked to Oscar Perez and told him that he was reluctant to
personally ask for the document since he was one of the respondents before the
Ombudsman. However, Perez advised him not to worry as he could just sign his
(Perez) name if ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint.
When Ursua visited the O7ce of the Ombudsman, he signed the name “Oscar
Perez” in the visitor logbook and when acknowledging receipt of the copy of
complaint.
When administrative o7cer Loida Kahulugan learned through a co-worker (who was
also an acquaintance of Ursua) that the person who introduced himself as "Oscar
Perez" was actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, she reported the same which led to
the present charges being 8led.
The trial court found Ursua guilty of violating the Anti-Alias Law which conviction
was a7rmed in the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the lower court erred in 8nding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
Ruling: An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by

him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real
name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the 8rst time orsubstitute name
authorized by a competent authority. A man's name is simply the sound or sounds
by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish
him but sometimes a man is known by several di?erent names and these are known
as aliases.
Hence, the use of a 8ctitious name or a di?erent name belonging to another person
in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known
by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the
prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.
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The use of the name "Oscar Perez" was made by petitioner in an isolated
transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity. Even
if Ursua used a false name, he would still be entitled to obtain a copy of the
complaint which is part of the public records. Also, there is no evidence showing
that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition
to his real name.
71. Anselmo Lim Hok Albano vs. Republic, GR L-10912, 31 October

1958 (Naturalization, use of alias)
Facts: The appellant, Anselmo Lim Hok Albano, alias Lim Hok, alias Lim Hok
Anselmo Albano, 8led a petition for naturalization which, after due trial, was granted
by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. Upon the expiration of the two-year
probational period required, a petition was 8led for the appellant's oath-taking and
the issuance of his naturalization certi8cate. After hearing, the lower court denied
the petition and a subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal. The
appealed order of denial was based on the argument that the appellant has been
using aliases in violation of Commonwealth Act No. 142. In the petition for
naturalization it was alleged that appellant's full name is Anselmo Lim Hok Albano,
alias Lim Hok alias Lim Hok Anselmo Albano; and it is contended for the appellant
that any opposition based on the alleged illegal used by the appellant of aliases
should have been interposed during the hearing and before the granting of the
petition for naturalization.
Issue: Whether appellant's use of aliases comes within the contemplation of

Commonwealth Act No. 142, otherwise known as the Anti-Alias Law.
Ruling: It is noteworthy that this law is not violated if one uses a name with which
he was christened or by which he has been known since childhood. It is a matter of
record that the name "Lim Hok" is one by which the appellant has been known since
childhood and that, although he was baptized as Anselmo Lim Hok, he has always
added "Albano", the surname of his godfather, Dionisio Albano, in connection with
his business and social dealings, merely to emphasize his identity. There is no
showing that confusion or prejudice ever was or has been caused by the addition of
that surname, the e?ect that Commonwealth Act No. 142 seeks to prevent. We are
not thus prepared to hold that the appellant has violated the Anti-Alias Law.
72. People vs. Estrada, GR 164368-69, 2 April 2009 (exemption to

CA 142; intent)
Facts: On April 4, 2001, an Information for was 8led with the Sandiganbayan
against respondent Estrada, among other accused. A separate Information for illegal
use of aliasas likewise 8led against him. In the Information, it was alleged that on or
about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then President of the Republic of the Philippines, without
having been duly authorized, judicially or administratively, taking advantage of his
position and committing the o?ense in relation to o7ce, i.e., in order to CONCEAL
THE ill-gotten wealth HE ACQUIRED during his tenure and his true identity as THE
President of the Republic of the Philippines, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS ‘JOSE VELARDE’ IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS
AND use and employ the SAID alias “Jose Velarde” which IS neither his registered
name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI
Bank and/or other corporate entities.
Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest that the
Sandiganbayan issued. A Special Division in the Sandiganbayan was made to try,
hear, and decide the charges of plunder and related against respondent Estrada. At
the trial, the People presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the
allegations of the Information for plunder, illegal use of alias, and perjury.
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After the People rested in all three cases, the defense moved to be allowed to 8le a
demurrer to evidence in these cases. In its Joint Resolution, the Sandiganbayan only
granted the defense leave to 8le demurrers in illegal use of alias and perjury. The
Sandiganbayan ruled that the people failed to present evidence to prove the
Estrada’s commission of the o?ense.
Issue: Whether Estrada is liable for violation of CA No. 142
Ruling: No. Albeit for a di?erent reason, with the Sandiganbayan position that the
rule in the law of libel – that mere communication to a third person is publicity –
does not apply to violations of CA No. 142. Our close reading of Ursua – particularly,
the requirement that there be intention by the user to be culpable and the historical
reasons we cited above – tells us that the required publicity in the use of alias is
more than mere communication to a third person; the use of the alias, to be
considered public, must be made openly, or in an open manner or place, or to cause
it to become generally known. In order to be held liable for a violation of CA No.
142, the user of the alias must have held himself out as a person who shall publicly
be known under that other name. In other words, the intent to publicly use the alias
must be manifest.
The presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and
opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be
publicly known henceforth as Jose Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and
Chua were not part of the public who had no access to Estrada’s privacy and to the
con8dential matters that transpired in Malacañan where he sat as President;
Lacquian was the Chief of Sta? with whom he shared matters of the highest and
strictest con8dence, while Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath of o7ce and
ties of friendship to keep and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his a?airs. Thus,
Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for
public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the
room at that time. The same holds true for Estrada’s alleged representations with
Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for these representations to be
admissible. All of Estrada’s representations to these people were made in privacy
and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity.
73. Ong Hock Lian vs. Republic, GR L-21197, 19 May 1966 (Use of
non-registered birth name; CA 142)
Facts: Ong Hock Lian alias Julian Ong was applying for naturalization. He was a
citizen of the Republic of China, arrived in the Philippines on April 30, 1927. He used
to reside in Zamboanga City but since March 1, 1940 he has been living in
Dumaguete City. He is married to Tan Ko Kiem, also known as Alice Tan, a Chinese
national, by whom he has three children. He speaks the English, language and the
Cebuano-Visayan dialect. He is a merchant. He has a store in Colon Street,
Dumaguete City where he sells rice, corn and general merchandise. To prove that
he has none of the disquali8cations enumerated in the Naturalization Law, he
presented tax and police clearances; clearances from the Philippine Constabulary,
the City Fiscal, the Provincial Fiscal, the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental
and the Municipal Court of Dumaguete City; and a medical certi8cate of the City
Health O7cer. Trial Court granted his application which is the reason of this appeal
by the Solicitor General. Among of his contention was that lower court erred in not
holding that Ong Hock Lian uses an alias without court authority and in violation of
the Anti-Alias Law.
Issue: Whether Ong Hock Lian was without authority in using of alias Julian Ong.
Ruling: YES. Under the law, except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no
person shall use any name diAerent from the one with which he was
christened or by which he has been known since childhood, or such
substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court
(Section 1, Commonwealth Act 142). Aside from the name "Ong Hock Lian,"
appellee is using the alias "Julian Ong." There is no evidence that appellee has
been baptized with the latter name or that he has been known by it since
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childhood, or that the court has authorized the use thereof. Appellee has
therefore committed a violation of the Anti-Alias Law.
L. Access Device Regulation Act (RA No. 8484)
74. Ermitano vs. CA, GR 127246, 21 April 1999 (Notice in case of

loss access device)
Facts: In dispute is the validity of the stipulation embodied in the standard

application form for credit cards furnished by private respondent. The stipulation
makes the cardholder liable for purchases made through his lost or stolen credit
card until (a) notice of such loss or theft has been given to private respondent and
(b) the latter has communicated such loss or theft to its member-establishments.
Petitioner Luis Ermitaño applied for a credit card from private respondent BPI
Express Card Corp. (BECC) with his wife, Manuelita, as extension cardholder. The
spouses were given credit cards with a credit limit of P10,000.00. They often
exceeded this credit limit without protest from BECC. On August 30, 1989
Manuelita’s bag was snatched from her as she was shopping. Among the items
inside the bag was her BECC credit card. That same night she informed, by
telephone, BECC of the loss. The call was received by BECC o7ces through a
certain Gina Banzon. This was followed by a letter dated August 30, 1989. She also
surrendered Luis’ credit card and requested for replacement cards. In her letter,
Manuelita stated that she “shall not be responsible for any and all charges incurred
[through the use of the lost card] after August 29, 1989.” However, when Luis
received his monthly billing statement from BECC. The charges included amounts
for purchases made on August 30, 1989 through Manuelita’s lost card. Despite all of
these the BECC still renewed their credit line and still includes on the bill the
purchases made on the lost card. Subsequently, BECC cancelled the spouses’ credit
cards and advised them to settle the account immediately or risk being sued for
collection of said account.
Issue: Whether or not the said stipulation of the parties in this case valid?
Ruling: NO. In this case, the cardholder, Manuelita, has complied with what was
required of her under the contract with BECC. She immediately noti8ed BECC of the
loss of her card on the same day it was lost and, the following day, she sent a
written notice of the loss to BECC. That she gave such notices to BECC is admitted
by BECC in the letter sent to Luis by Roberto L. Maniquiz, head of BECC’s Collection
Department.
Having thus performed her part of the noti8cation procedure, it was reasonable for
Manuelita -- and Luis, for that matter -- to expect that BECC would perform its part
of the procedure, which is to forthwith notify its member-establishments. It is not
unreasonable to assume that BECC would do this immediately, precisely to avoid
any unauthorized charges.
The cardholder was no longer in control of the procedure after it has noti8ed BECC
of the card’s loss or theft. It was already BECC’s responsibility to inform its
member-establishments of the loss or theft of the card at the soonest possible time.
We note that BECC is not a neophyte 8nancial institution, unaware of the intricacies
and risks of providing credit privileges to a large number of people. It should have
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anticipated an occurrence such as the one in this case and devised e?ective ways
and means to prevent it, or otherwise insure itself against such risk.
Prompt notice by the cardholder to the credit card company of the loss or theft of
his card should be enough to relieve the former of any liability occasioned by the
unauthorized use of his lost or stolen card. The questioned stipulation in this case,
which still requires the cardholder to wait until the credit card company has noti8ed
all its member-establishments, puts the cardholder at the mercy of the credit card
company which may delay inde8nitely the noti8cation of its members to minimize if
not to eliminate the possibility of incurring any loss from unauthorized purchases.
Or, as in this case, the credit card company may for some reason fail to promptly
notify its members through absolutely no fault of the cardholder. To require the
cardholder to still pay for unauthorized purchases after he has given prompt notice
of the loss or theft of his card to the credit card company would simply be unfair and
unjust. The Court cannot give its assent to such a stipulation which could clearly
run against public policy.
M. Bouncing Checks Law (BP No. 22)
75. Edgardo Medalla vs. People, GR 193362, 18 January 2012 (BP

22-novation)
FACTS: Medalla issued to Laxa (respondent) a Far East Bank in the amount
of P742,000.00 as payment of the loan which he obtained from the latter. However,
when the said check was deposited by the respondent, the same was dishonored as
the account from which it was drawn had already been closed. The respondent
verbally informed the petitioner of the dishonor of the said check and subsequently
sent him a demand letter. Nevertheless, the petitioner failed to pay the amount of
the said check. Consequently, the petitioner was charged with violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Metro
Manila. METC, rendered a Decision 8nding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged.
The petitioner appealed to the RTC of Quezon City. He pointed out that, during the
pendency of the case with the MeTC of Metro Manila, he and the respondent
entered into a new agreement with respect to the civil aspect of the case pursuant
to which, substantial payments were made by him, with onlyP25,000.00 left unpaid.
RTC rendered a Decision a7rming the decision of the MeTC with modi8cation. The
petitioner’s defense of novation, the RTC of Quezon City held that the substantial
payments made by the petitioner to the respondent would not a?ect his criminal
liability for violation of B.P. 22 since what is punished by the said law is the
issuance per se of a worthless check and not the failure to pay his obligation.
Petitioner then 8led a petition for review with the CA. CA dismissed the petition for
review 8led by the petitioner Decision of the RTC. The CA found that, for novation to
prevent criminal liability, it must occur prior to the 8ling of Information in court.
ISSUE: W/N the novation subsequently entered between Medalla and the Laxa
extinguished the former’s criminal liability?
RULING: No. The petitioner ought to be reminded that novation is not a mode of
extinguishing criminal liability. Novation may only prevent the rise of criminal
liability if it occurs prior to the 8ling of the Information in court. In other words,
novation does not extinguish criminal liability but may only prevent its rise.
The fact the petitioner had already made substantial payments to the respondent
and that only P25,000.00 out of his total obligation in favor of the respondent
remains unpaid is immaterial to the extinguishment of the petitioner’s criminal
liability. The gravamen of the o?ense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and
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issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes.
76. Amada Resterio vs. People, GR 177438, 24 September 2012

(BP22-notice of dishonor)
Facts: The petitioner was charged with a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
in the MTCC in Mandaue City after having issued a ChinaBank Check bearing No.
AO141332, dated June 3, 2002, in the amount of P 50,000.00 payable to the order
of Bernardo T. Villadolid to apply on account or for value. However, when presented
for encashment, the check was dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason
"ACCT. CLOSED" or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid reason ordered the bank to stop payment, and despite
notice of dishonor and demands for payment, said accused failed and refused and
still fails and refuses to redeem the check or to make arrangement for payment in
full by the drawee of such check within 5 banking days after receiving the notice of
dishonor. After trial the MTCC found the petitioner guilty as charged. The petitioner
appealed, but the RTC a7rmed the conviction. By petition for review, the petitioner
appealed to the CA, however, such petition was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this
petition where petitioner alleges that the CA erred since there was NO NOTICE OF
DISHONOR ACTUALLY SENT to her .
Issue: Whether or not is guilty of the crime charged?
Held: No. To establish the existence of the second element, the State should
present the giving of a written notice of the dishonor to the drawer, maker or issuer
of the dishonored check. The notice of dishonor required by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
to be given to the drawer, maker or issuer of a check should be written. If the
service of the written notice of dishonor on the maker, drawer or issuer of the
dishonored check is by registered mail, the proof of service consists not only in the
presentation as evidence of the registry return receipt but also of the registry
receipt together with the authenticating a7davit of the person mailing the notice of
dishonor. Without the authenticating a7davit, the proof of giving the notice of
dishonor is insu7cient unless the mailer personally testi8es in court on the sending
by registered mail. A notice of dishonor received by the maker or drawer of the
check is thus indispensable before a conviction can ensue. The notice of dishonor
may be sent by the o?ended party or the drawee bank. The notice must be in
writing. A mere oral notice to pay a dishonored check will not su7ce. The lack of a
written notice is fatal for the prosecution
Inasmuch as this element involves a state of mind of the person making, drawing or
issuing the check which is di7cult to prove, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 creates a prima
facie presumption of such knowledge. The presumption is brought into existence
only after it is proved that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor and that
within 8ve days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to
make arrangements for its payment. The presumption or prima facie evidence as
provided in this section cannot arise, if such notice of nonpayment by the drawee
bank is not sent to the maker or drawer, or if there is no proof as to when such
notice was received by the drawer, since there would simply be no way of reckoning
the crucial 5-day period.
The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity

to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly
enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a
right to demand – and the basic postulate of fairness require – that the notice of
dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to a?ord her the opportunity to
avert prosecution under B.P. 22.
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In light of the foregoing, the proof of the guilt of the petitioner for a violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for issuing to Villadolid the unfunded Chinabank Check No.
LPU-A0141332 in the amount of P 50,000.00 did not satisfy the quantum of proof
beyond reasonable doubt
77. Sia vs. People, GR 149695, 28 April 20054 (Worthless check;

BP22)
Facts: Consolidated Orient Leasing and Finance Corporation (COLF), as Lessor, and
Willy G. Sia, the sole proprietor of WGS Construction Specialists, as Lessee,
executed a Lease Agreement,1 for a period of eighteen (18) months, covering
construction equipments. Under the lease agreement, Sia was obliged to deposit
with the COLF, upon the execution thereof, the amount of P216,250.00 to guaranty
the payment of, inter alia, the agreed rental of P44,980.00 a month payable in the
COLF o7ce.
Sia remitted to the COLF the agreed guaranty deposit of P216,250.00. He also
issued and delivered to the COLF, upon the execution of the lease agreement in
1982, eighteen (18) postdated checks in the amount of P44,980.00 each, payable to
the COLF drawn against his account with the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(RCBC). Each check was to be encashed or deposited by the COLF in its account on
their respective due dates in payment of the monthly rental of the equipment. At
the time, the bank had extended credit facilities to the petitioner.
This check was, however, dishonored by the drawee bank for “insu7cient funds.”
The COLF wrote Sia on January 5, 1983, informing the latter of the dishonor of the
check and requesting for the replacement thereof. For the month of March and April,
the checks were also dishonored for being “account closed”. The COLF again
informed Sia.
The COLF 8led a complaint for replevin and damages against Sia and also crime of
BP 22 for the reason of dishonored checks. Sia alleged that he never received the
January 5, 1983, March 7, 1983 and April 6, 1983 letters of the COLF, and that the
latter never noti8ed him that the checks postdated January 4, 1983, March 3, 1983
and April 4, 1983, respectively, were deposited with the drawee bank, and that the
same were subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank and NOTICE OF DISHONOR
IS NECESSARY IN A CRIMINAL CASE FOR VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22.
Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of the crime charged.
Ruling: No. The act sought to be prevented by the law is the act of making and
issuing a check with the knowledge that, at the time of issue, the drawer issuing the
check does not have su7cient funds in or credit with the bank for payment and the
check was subsequently dishonored upon presentment. What the law punishes is
the issuance of a worthless check and not the purpose for which such check was
issued nor the terms or conditions relating to its issuance. The thrust of the law
is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless
checks and putting them in circulation. The crime is one against public order
and is malum prohibitum. The law is intended to safeguard the interests of the
banking system and the legitimate checking account user.39 It is not intended nor
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt,40 nor to favor or encourage those who
seek to enrich themselves through manipulation and circumvention of the purpose
of the law .
To hold a person liable, the prosecution must prove that the accused knew, at the
time of issue, that he does not have su7cient funds in or credit for the full
payment of such check upon its presentment. The prosecution must rely on the
strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the
accused.
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In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that the COLF or the drawee bank ever
sent any written notice of dishonor of the subject checks to the petitioner and that
the latter received the same.
Accused acquitted.
78. Bayani vs. People, GR 154947, 11 August 2004 (Elements of

BP22)
Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in a7rming on appeal the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena
City convicting the accused therein, now the petitioner, for violation of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22.
The records show that Alicia Rubia arrived at the grocery store of Dolores
Evangelista and asked the latter to rediscount Philippine Savings Bank (PSBank)
Check 054936 in the amount of P55,000.00. The check was drawn by Leodegario
Bayani against his account with the PSBank and postdated August 29, 1992.
Evangelista then agreed to rediscount the check. After Rubia endorsed the check,
Evangelista gave her the amount of P55,000.00. However, when Evangelista
deposited the check in her account with the Far East Bank & Trust Company on
September 11, 1992, it was dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason that on
September 1, 1992, Bayani closed his account with the PSBank. Evangelista then
informed Rubia of the dishonor of the check and demanded the return of her
P55,000.00. Rubia replied that she was only requested by Bayani to have the check
rediscounted and advised Evangelista to see him. When Evangelista talked to
Bayani, she was told that Rubia borrowed the check from him.
On the other hand, Bayani contends that his wife lost four (4) blank checks, one of
which was Check No. 05493613 which formed part of the checks in the checkbook
issued to him by the PSBank. He reported such loss to the bank after Evangelista
demanded the refund of the P55,000.00 from his wife. He then closed his account
with the bank on September 11, 1992, but was informed that he had closed his
account much earlier. He denied ever receiving the amount of P55,000.00 from
Rubia.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court rendered judgment 8nding Bayani guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22. On appeal, the
petitioner averred that the prosecution failed to adduce evidence that he a7xed his
signature on the check or received from Rubia the amount of P55,000.00, thus
negating his guilt of the crime charged. CA a7rmed the decision of trial court.
Hence, the instant petition was 8led.
Issue: whether the CA erred in a7rming the conviction of the petitioner

notwithstanding that the prosecution failed to prove that the check was issued for a
valuable consideration
Ruling: No. the petition is denied. For the accused to be guilty of violation of
Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22, the prosecution is mandated to prove the essential
elements thereof, to wit: 1. That a person makes or draws and issues any check; 2.
That the check is made or drawn and issued to apply on account or for value; 3.
That the person who makes or draws and issues the check knows at the time of
issue that he does not have su7cient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment; 4. That the check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insu7ciency of funds or credit, or
would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
In this case, the prosecution adduced documentary evidence that when the
petitioner issued the subject check on or about August 20, 1992, the balance of his
account with the drawee bank was only P2,414.96. During the conference in the
o7ce of Atty. Emmanuel Velasco, Evangelista showed to the petitioner and his wife
a photocopy of the subject check, with the notation at its dorsal portion that it was
dishonored for the reason “account closed.” Despite Evangelista’s demands, the
petitioner refused to pay the amount of the check and, with his wife, pointed to
Rubia as the one liable for the amount. The collective evidence of the prosecution
points to the fact that at the time the petitioner drew and issued the check, he knew
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that the residue of the funds in his account with the drawee bank was insu7cient to
pay the amount of the check.
79. De Villa vs. CA, 195 SCRA 722, 8 April 1991 (Foreign Checks
covered-BP22)
Facts: Cecilio S. de Villa was charged with violation of Batas Pambansa No. 22 or
the Bouncing Checks Law for issuing in favor of Roberto Lorayez a Depositors Trust
Company Check No. 3371 antedated March 31, 1987 for USD 2,500 equivalent to
P50,000 which was dishonored on the ground of “insu7cient funds”, and despite
notice to him by complainant, he failed to make arrangement for full payment of the
same within 8ve banking days after receiving said notice.
Petitioner De Villa moved to dismiss the Information on the ground that (1) since the
check was drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank, the
court has no jurisdiction over the same or with accounts outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines; and (2) no o?ense was committed since the check
involved was payable in dollars, hence, the obligation created is null and void
pursuant to Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to Assure Uniform Value of Philippine Coin
and Currency).
The court denied the motion to dismiss and reasoned that “'under the Bouncing
Checks Law, foreign checks, provided they are either (1) drawn and issued in the
Philippines though payable outside thereof, or (2) made payable and dishonored in
the Philippines though drawn and issued outside thereof, are within the coverage of
said law. The law likewise applied to checks drawn against current accounts in
foreign currency.'
The Court of Appeals a7rmed the resolution of the lower court. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether Bouncing Checks Law applies to Foreign Currency Checks
Ruling: Under the Bouncing Checks Law, foreign checks, provided they are either
drawn and issued in the Philippines though payable outside thereof . . . are within
the coverage of said law. It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that
where the law does not distinguish courts should not distinguish. Parenthetically,
the rule is that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except
something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it
80. Chang vs. IAC, 146 SCRA 464 (Prima facie evidence of bounced
check)
Facts: Appellant Paulino Chang was introduced to complainant Kiat Reaport as a

very rich businessman by Johnson Sy. He told Reaport and others with them that he
was importing handtractors from the People's Republic of China which he then sells
to the government. Also, according to appellant, Reaport’s own business is too
small. He invited it to invest in appellant's importation business with the assurance
of a thirty percent (30%) pro8t in three months. Appellant's method in convincing
Reaport to come up with his investment was a marvel. Aside from the Mercedes
Benz and the bodyguard, appellant disclosed to Reaport, that he personally know
high ranking o7cials in the government. Reaport agreed to make an investment.
Inside the co?ee shop, Reaport handed to appellant the cash contained in a paper
bag. In turn, appellant gave to him check drawn against appellant's current account
with the Bank of the Philippine Island Escolta Branch and postdated October 2,
1980. This represents the amount invested by Reaport plus the 30% pro8t.
Appellant explained that P50 was deducted from the actual total "for luck." The
check was deposited by Reaport on October 29, 1980. After three days, the check
was returned to Reaport by the drawee bank unpaid and stamped "payment
stopped" as the reason for the dishonor. Reaport personally informed appellant of
the dishonor of the check and demanded that he replace it with cash. Appellant
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refused to comply with the demand because he had no money. As a consequence,

CHANG was charged in two separate Informations before the former Court of First
Instance of Manila for Violation of BP Blg. 22 and for Estafa.
Issue: Whether there is a prima facie evidence that Chang is guilty of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 or Bouncing Checks Law.
Ruling: Yes. There is no question that the check issued by CHANG bounced for
insu7ciency of funds, so that he should be held guilty of violation of BP Blg. 22.
Bank's statement of accounts respecting that of appellant would indicate that on ,
the date of the check, the balance of appellant's account was only P73.95 as of
October 29, 1980 his debit balance was P96.05; at the end of November, 1980, the
balance was P28.96; as of December 1980, the debit balance was P6.06. CHANG
issued the check in payment of an obligation to return the money he got from
REAPORT, including a 30% pro8t, It was not by way of guaranteeing Reaports
investment. It was the inducement to convince Reaport of a sure return of his
money plus the pro8t promised.
We 8nd as established that CHANG had employed deceit to induce REAPORT to

deliver the sum for investment not only through his acts of misrepresentation that
led REAPORT to believe that CHANG was moneyed and had inUuence and
connections in high places, but also in that simultaneously with the delivery of the
sum by REAPORT, CHANG resorted to the deceitful practice of issuing an unfunded
check for P88,350.00, ostensibly with a pro8table return on investment, to
perpetrate the fraud. It turned out that he never had this money in the bank. He
was never able to make good the dishonored check despite notice.
81. Rosa Lim vs. People GR 130038, 18 September 2000 (Penalties,

BP22)
Facts: On August 25, 1990, petitioner bought various kinds of jewelry worth
P300,000.00 from Maria Antonia Seguan. She wrote out a check with the same
amount, dated August 25, 1990, payable to “cash” drawn on Metrobank and gave
the check to Seguan.
The next day, petitioner again went to Seguan’s store and purchased jewelry valued
at P241,668.00. Petitioner issued another check payable to “cash” dated August 16,
1990 drawn on Metrobank in the amount of P241,668.007 and sent the check to
Seguan through a certain Aurelia Nadera.
Seguan deposited the two checks with her bank. The checks were returned with a
notice of dishonor. Petitioner’s account in the bank from which the checks were
drawn was closed.
Upon demand, petitioner promised to pay Seguan the amounts of the two
dishonored checks, but she never did.
On June 5, 1991, an Assistant City Prosecutor of Cebu 8led with the RTC, Cebu City,
Branch 23, two informations against petitioner for violations of BP No. 22.
After due trial, on December 29, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision in the two
cases convicting petitioner. Judgment rendered convicting the accused, Rosa Lim
and sentencing her in Criminal Case No. CBU-22127, to su?er the penalty of
imprisonment for a period of ONE (1) YEAR and a 8ne of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P200,000.00) PESOS and in Criminal Case No. CBO-22128, the same penalty of
imprisonment for ONE YEAR and 8ne of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00) is
likewise imposed.
"The accused is hereby ordered to pay private complainant Maria Antonia Seguan,
the sum of P541,668.00 which is the value of the jewelries bought by the accused
from the latter with interest based on the legal rate to be counted from June 5,
1991, the date of the 8ling of the informations, or return the subject jewelries.
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Petitioner appealed to the CA, but the same was dismissed by the CA in its October
15, 1996 Decision wherein it a7rmed in toto the RTC’s Decision.
Issue: Whether the penalty imposed to Lim is proper
Ruling: No. We resolve to modify the penalty imposed on petitioner. B.P. No. 22
provides a penalty of "imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than
one year or a 8ne of not less than, but not more than double, the amount of the
check which 8ne shall in no case exceed two hundred thousand pesos, or both such
8ne and imprisonment at the discretion of the Court."
In determining the penalty to be imposed for violation of B.P. No. 22, the philosophy
underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies. The philosophy is to redeem
valuable human material, and to prevent unnecessary deprivation of personal
liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social
order. There, we deleted the prison sentence imposed on petitioners. We imposed
on them only a 8ne double the amount of the check issued. We considered the fact
that petitioners brought the appeal, believing in good faith, that no violation of B.P.
No. 22 was committed, "otherwise, they would have simply accepted the judgment
of the trial court and applied for probation to evade prison term." We do the same
here. We believe such would best serve the ends of criminal justice.
Consequently, we delete the prison sentences imposed on petitioner. The two 8nes
imposed for each violation, each amounting to P200,000.00 are appropriate and
su7cient.
82. Varca vs. CA, GR 131714 (Preference in the imposition of

Penalties, BP 22)
Facts: Petitioner Eduardo R. Vaca is the president and owner of Ervine International,
Inc. (Ervine), which is engaged in the manufacture and sale of refrigeration
equipment, while his son-in-law, petitioner Fernando Nieto, is the 8rm's purchasing
manager. On March 10, 1988, petitioners issued a check for P10,000.00 to the
General Agency for Reconnaissance, Detection, and Security, Inc. (GARDS) in partial
payment of the security services rendered by GARDS to Ervine. The check was
drawn on the China Banking Corporation (CBC). When deposited in the Philippine
Commercial International Bank (PCIBank) branch at Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong,
the check was dishonored for insu7ciency of funds. GARDS wrote Ervine a letter
which it demanded payment in cash but petitioners did not pay within the time
given. Subsequently, Petitioners issued another check for P19, 860.16 to GARDS
which was drawn on Associated Bank. In the voucher accompanying it, it was stated
therein that it is for replacement for the dishonored check and remaining was for
outstanding balance. GARD did not return the dishonored check.
Thereafter, GARDS operation manager 8led a complaint against petitioners for

violations of BP 22 but it was dismissed on ground that Ervine paid the amount of
check. Subsequently, GARDS 8led another complaint for violation of B.P. Bldg. 22
against petitioners. This resulted in the 8ling of an information against petitioners in
the RTC, Q.C. After trial, petitioners were found guilty of the charge and each was
sentenced to su?er one (1) year imprisonment and to pay a 8ne of P10,000.00 and
the costs. On appeal it a7rmed RTC’s decision. It subsequently denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. Petitioners pray that the case
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against them be dismissed or, in the alternative, that the decision of the trial court
be modi8ed by sentencing each to an increased 8ne but without imprisonment.
Issue: Whether penalty prayed by petitioners may be modi8ed.
Ruling: YES. B.P. Blg. 22, §1, par. 1 provides a penalty of "imprisonment of not less
than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a 8ne of not less than, but not
more than double, the amount of the check which 8ne shall in no case esceed two
hundred thousand pesos, or both such 8ne and imprisonment at the discretion of
the Court." Petitioners are 8rst-time o?enders. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who
presumably contribute to the national economy. Apparently, they brought this
appeal, believing in all good faith, although mistakenly, that they had not
committed a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise, they could simply have accepted
the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade a prison term. It
would best serve the ends of criminal justice if in =xing the penalty within
the range of discretion allowed by §1, par. 1, the same philosophy
underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of
redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary
deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard
to the protection of the social order. 10 In this case we believe that a 8ne in an
amount equal to double the amount of the check involved is an appropriate penalty
to impose on each of the petitioners.
SC AFFIRMED the CA’s decision with modi=cation hat the sentence of

imprisonment is deleted and petitioners are each ordered to pay a 8ne of
P20,000.00 equivalent to double the amount of the check.
(if ever kylangan po)
Issue: Whether petitioners were guilty of BP 22
Ruling: YES. The elements of the o?ense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22 are: (1)
making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (2)
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not
have su7cient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check
in full upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the
drawee bank for insu7ciency of funds or credit, or dishonor of the check for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
paymnent. 4 The maker's knowledge is presumed from the dishonor of the check for
insu7ciency of funds.
In this case, after being noti8ed on March 29, 1988 of the dishonor of their previous
check, petitioners gave GARDS a check for P19,860.16. They claim that this check
had been intended by them to replace the bad check they had previously issued to
the GARDS. Based on the testimony of a GARDS accountant, however, the Court of
Appeals found that the check was actually payment for two bills, one for the period
of January 16 to January 31, 1988 in the amount of P9,930.08 and another one for
the period of March 16 to March 31, 1988 in the same amount. But even if such
check was intended to replace the bad one, its issuance on April 13, 1988
— 15 days after petitioners had been noti=ed on March 29, 1988 of the
dishonor of their previous check — cannot negate the presumption that
petitioners knew of the insu7ciency of funds to cover the amount of their previous
check. Sec. 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 requires that such check be given within 8ve (5) days
from the notice of dishonor to them.
83. People vs. Ma. Theresa Pangilinan, GR 152662, 13 June 2012

(BP 22; prescription under Act 3326)
Facts: In 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) 8led an a7davit-

complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma.
Theresa Pangilinan with the O7ce of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The
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complaint alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount
of (P9,658,592.00) in favor of private complainant which were dishonored upon
presentment for payment. Then Secretary of Justice Sera8n P. Cuevas reversed the
resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and ordered the 8ling of
informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent in connection with her
issuance of City Trust Check No. 127219 in the amount of P4,129,400.00 and RCBC
Check No. 423773 in the amount of P4,475,000.00, both checks totaling the
amount of P8,604,000.00. The estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 charges involving
the seven other checks included in the 1 st complaint 8led, however, dismissed.
In 2000, consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, were 8led against
respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan before the O7ce of the Clerk of Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City. Respondent 8led an “Omnibus Motion
to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest”. She
alleged that her criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription.
Issue: Whether the 8ling of the a7davit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP
Blg. 22 against respondent with the O7ce of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on
1997 interrupted the period of prescription of such o?ense?
Ruling: YES. Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of

imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a
8ne for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the
aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled
upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person. In fact, in the case of
Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, which is in all fours with the instant case,
this Court categorically ruled that commencement of the proceedings for the
prosecution of the accused before the O7ce of the City Prosecutor e?ectively
interrupted the prescriptive period for the o?enses they had been charged under BP
Blg. 22. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and
actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to su?er unnecessarily further
simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused’s delaying
tactics or the delay and ine7ciency of the investigating agencies.
There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by
special laws with respect to the interruption of the period of prescription. Cases
involving special laws, this Court held that the institution of proceedings for
preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the period of prescription.
Courts even ruled that investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission for violations of the Revised Securities Act and the Securities
Regulations Code e?ectively interrupts the prescription period because it is
equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases.
N. Hazing Regulation Act (RA No. 8049)
84. ArtemioVillareal v. People of the Philippines/People of the

Philippines v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al/FidelitonDizon v.
People of the Philippines/Gerarda H. Villa v. Manuel Lorenzo
Escalona II, et al, G.R. No. 151258/G.R. No. 154954/G.R. No.
155101/G.R. Nos. 178057 and G.R. No. 178080, February 1, 2012
(Lenny Villa hazing case)
FACTS: Seven Freshmen Law students of Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
have been initiated by the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity on February 1991. The
initiation rites started when the neophytes were met by some members of the
mentioned fraternity at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They were
consequently brought to a house and briefed on what will be happening during the
days when they will be initiated. They were informed that there will be physical
beatings and that the neophytes can quit anytime they want. They were brought to
another house to commence their initiation. The neophytes were insulted and
threatened even before they got o? the van. Members of the fraternity delivered
blows to the neophytes as they alighted from the van. Several initiation rites were
experienced by the neophytes like the Indian run, Bicol express and rounds. They
were asked to recite provisions and principles of the fraternity and were hit
everytime they made a mistake. Accused fraternity members, Dizon and Villareal,
asked the head of the initiation rites (Victorino) to reopen the initiation. Fraternity
members subjected neophytes to paddling and additional hours of physical pain.
After the last session of beatings, Lenny Villa could not walk. Later that night, he
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was feeling cold and his condition worsened. He was brought to the hospital but was
declared dead on arrival.
Criminal case was 8led against 26 fraternity members and was subsequently found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and penalized with
reclusion perpetua. On January 10 2002, CA modi8ed the criminal liability of each of
the accused according to individual participation. 19 of the the accused were
acquitted, 4 of the appellants were found guilty of slight physical injuries, and 2 of
the accused-appellants (Dizon and Villareal) were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide.
ISSUE/S: W/n accused can be punishable under Anti Hazing Law? W/n accused are
criminally liable?
RULING: . 1. No. Although courts must not remain indi?erent to public

sentiments, in this case the general condemnation of a hazing-related death, they
are still bound to observe a fundamental principle in our criminal justice system –
“[N]o act constitutes a crime… unless it is made so by law . Nullum crimen, nulla
poena sine lege. Even if an act is viewed by a large section of the populace as
immoral or injurious, it cannot be considered a crime, absent any law prohibiting its
commission. As interpreters of the law, judges are called upon to set aside emotion,
to resist being swayed by strong public sentiments, and to rule strictly based on the
elements of the o?ense and the facts allowed in evidence. Anti hazing law came to
e?ect 4 years after the death of Lenny Villa
2. Yes but not of Homicide but Reckless imprudence resulting to homicide.

There is a lack of intent on the part of dizon and Villareal to cause the death of Villa.
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of
the Revised Penal Code, the employment of physical injuries must be coupled
with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is
fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer – iniuria ex
a@ect facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found
guilty of an intentional felony.
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the
accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised
Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa).
According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill. Reckless imprudence or
negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which an
immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an
inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing
it. In this case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the actor.
O. Human Security Act of 2007 (RA No. 9372)
85. Southern Hemisphere Engagement network Inc., et.al. vs. Anti-

Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, 05 October 2010 (Human
Security act)
Facts: Following the e?ectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007, 2 petitioner
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a non-government organization,
and Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, 8led a
petition for certiorari and prohibition on July 16, 2007 docketed as G.R. No. 178552.
Petitioners assail the law for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly
broad the de8nition of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like
“underspread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace,” and “coerce
the government to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving law
enforcement agency with no standard to measure prohibited acts. They contend
that the element of “unlawful demand” in the de8nition of terrorism must
necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the
speech clause.
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Issue: Whether or not RA 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act
of 2007 is constitutional?
Held: Petitioners failed to show that the challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid
constitutionally protected conduct or activity that they seek to do. No demonstrable
threat has been established, much less a real and existing one.
What the law seeks to paralyze is conduct, not speech. Before a charge for
terrorism may be 8led under RA 9372, there must 8rst be a predicate crime actually
committed to trigger the operation on the key qualifying phrases on the other
element of the crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to an
“unlawful demand”. Given the presence of 8rst element, any attempt singing out or
highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot recategorize
the unprotected conduct into protected speech.
P. Law on Counterfeit Drugs (RA No. 8203)
86. Roma Drug vs. Glaxo Smith Kline, GR 149907, 16 April 2009
(Law on counterfeit drugs)
Facts: Roma Drug, owned by Rodriguez, was raided by the NBI upon request of
Smithkline – a pharmaceutical company (now Glaxo Smithkline). RD is apparently
one of 6 pharmacies who are directly importing medicines produced by Smithknline
from abroad. RD is not purchasing those medicines via local Smithkline – the
authorized distributor of Smithkline in the Philippines. Smithkline Phil avers that
because the medicines were not purchased from a Philippine registered counterpart
of Smithkline then the products imported by RD are considered as counterfeit or
“unregistered imported drug product” – as de8ned by RA 8203 “Special Law on
Counterfeit Drugs.” Notwithstanding RD’s motion for reconsideration, the provincial
prosecutor recommended that Rodriguez be tried. Rodriguez assails the
constitutionality of RA 8203 averring, among other things, that it has violated
his right to equal protection as it banned him access from such medicines.
Issue: Whether the law on counterfeit drugs is constitutional.
Ruling: Universally Accessible Cheaper and Quality Medicines Act of 2008 (Republic
Act No. 9502); Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9502 amends Section 72 of the
Intellectual Property Code in that the later law unequivocally grants third persons
the right to import drugs or medicines whose patent were registered in the
Philippines by the owner of the product.
It may be that Rep. Act No. 9502 did not expressly repeal any provision of the SLCD.
However, it is clear that the SLCO’s classi=cation of “unregistered imported
drugs” as “counterfeit drugs,” and of corresponding criminal penalties
therefore are irreconcilably in the imposition conVict with Rep. Act No.
9502 since the latter indubitably grants private third persons the unquali8ed right
to import or otherwise use such drugs. Where a statute of later date, such as Rep.
Act No. 9502, clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a
prior act on the subject that intention must be given e?ect. When a subsequent
enactment covering a 8eld of operation coterminus with a prior statute cannot by
any reasonable construction be given e?ect while the prior law remains in operative
existence because of irreconcilable conUict between the two acts, the latest
legislative expression prevails and the prior law yields to the extent of the conUict.
Irreconcilable inconsistency between two laws embracing the same subject may
exist when the later law nulli8es the reason or purpose of the earlier act, so that the
latter loses all meaning and function. Legis posteriors priores contrarias abrogant.
Q. Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (RA 10175)
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87. Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr.et.al. v. Secretary of DOJ, GR 203335,

et.al, 18 February 2014 (cybercrime; double jeopardy)
Facts: These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic

Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the
cyberspace. Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for
regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional
rights. The government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably
put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful
attacks on the system. One of the provisions assailed by petitioner is Section 7
which provides:
Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws. — A prosecution under this Act shall be without
prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, or special laws.
The Solicitor General points out that Section 7 merely expresses the settled doctrine
that a single set of acts may be prosecuted and penalized simultaneously under two
laws, a special law and the Revised Penal Code. When two di?erent laws de8ne two
crimes, prior jeopardy as to one does not bar prosecution of the other although both
o?enses arise from the same fact, if each crime involves some important act which
is not an essential element of the other. With the exception of the crimes of online
libel and online child pornography, the Court would rather leave the determination
of the correct application of Section 7 to actual cases.
Issue: whether the assailed provision is unconstitutional for the same is a violation
of the proscription against double jeopardy.
Ruling: Yes. Online libel as to which, charging the o?ender under both Section 4(c)
(4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a
violation of the proscription against double jeopardy; as well as Child pornography
committed online as to which, charging the o?ender under both Section 4(c)(2) of
Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009
also constitutes a violation of the same proscription, and, in respect to these, is
VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Online libel is di?erent. There should be no question that if the published material
on print, said to be libelous, is again posted online or vice versa, that identical
material cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The two o?enses, one a
violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of
Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same elements and are in fact
one and the same o?ense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel under
Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already punished under Article 353.
Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the computer system as another means of
publication. Charging the o?ender under both laws would be a blatant violation of
the proscription against double jeopardy.
The same is true with child pornography committed online. Section 4(c)(2) merely
expands the ACPA’s scope so as to include identical activities in cyberspace. As
previously discussed, ACPA’s de8nition of child pornography in fact already covers
the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means."
Thus, charging the o?ender under both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would likewise be
tantamount to a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
R. Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. 3019, as amended)
88. Villa vs. Sandiganbayan, et.al., GR 87186, 24 April 1992 (Sec.

3a, RA 3019)
Facts: Investigation of alleged anomalous transactions at the Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA), Mactan International Airport, led to the 8ling in 1975 of
criminal charges in the Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu City against Casimiro David,
administrative assistant at CAA, Mactan, and chairman of the Bidding Committee;
Estanislao Centeno, cash aide; Fernando Dario, airport attendant; and Sera8n
Robles, janitor, for violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a) and (b) of R.A. 3019 in
relation to the Unnumbered Presidential Memorandum dated April 22, 1971, as well
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as Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Section 1(x) of Presidential
Decree No. 6 dated September 27, 1972.
The case involved questionable payments made by the CAA Mactan to Rocen
Enterprises and Sprayway Corp., dealers in paper products and printed matter, for
the purchase of electrical items and the cost of their installation, in the total amount
of P299,175.00.
The decision of the trial court included 8ndings that Arturo Jimenez; Rodolfo
Montayre, assistant airport general manager for operations; Camilo Villa, chief,
logistics section; Jose8na Sucalit, technical inspector, COA, assigned at CAA Mactan;
Hereto Leonor, acting chief accountant; and Manuel Bustamante, regional auditor of
Region 7, COA, conspired and were equally liable with the convicted accused.
Issue: Whether there is violation of sec 3 paragraph a of the RA 3019.
Held: YES, Jose8na Sucalit, who was sent by Jimenez to Manila to make a canvass,
inexplicably delivered an advertisement for Rocen Enterprises, which was not a
reputable supplier of' the needed items. In her Travel Report, she certi8ed that she
made a canvass from reputable suppliers.
These acts and omissions of Jimenez and Sucalit violated paragraph (a) of Section 3
of R.A. 3019 in relation to the Unnumbered Presidential Memorandum. They were
persuaded, induced or inUuenced, and persuaded, induced or inUuenced each other,
to award the purchase of electrical items to an entity which was not even a supplier
of electrical items in disregard of the Presidential Memorandum directing that
procurement of supplies by government o7ces should be from reputable suppliers.
Rocen was not a "reputable supplier" as it was dealing only in paper products and
printed matter at the time of the transaction in question.
The circumstances of the case are su7cient to establish conspiracy between

Jimenez and Sucalit in violating the pertinent provisions of R.A. 3019 adverted to
above. Direct evidence is not necessary to prove such conspiracy, for as we held
in People vs. Roa:
A resort to circumstantial evidence is in the very nature of things, a necessity.

Crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions where concealment is
highly probable; and to require direct testimony would in many cases result in
freeing criminals and would deny proper protection to society. (20 Am. Jur, 261)
89. Baviera vs. Zoleta et.al., GR 169098, 12 October 2006 (Sec. 3a,
RA 3019)
Facts: Manuel V. Baviera 8led several complaints against o7cers or directors of the
Standard Chartered Bank (SCB), Philippine Branch, including Sridhar Raman, an
Indian national who was the Chief Finance O7cer of the bank, as respondents with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for Securities Regulation Code,
Corporation Code of the Philippines, and/or Various Rules and Regulations of the
SEC, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) for Violations of General Banking Law of
2000, Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) for Violation of Anti-Money Laundering
Ac, National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for Illegal Dismissal, and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) for Syndicated Estafa. Baviera claimed that he was a
former employee of the bank, and at the same time, an investor who was victimized
by the o7cers or directors of SCB, all of whom conspired with one another in
defrauding him as well as the investing public by soliciting funds in unregistered
and unauthorized foreign stocks and securities.
Counsel, requested the Secretary of Justice for the issuance of a Hold Departure
Order (HDO) against some of the o7cers and directors of SCB, including Raman.
Then Secretary of Justice Datumanong issued an Order granting the request of
Baviera. A copy of the order was served on the Bureau of Immigration (BI) for
implementation. Meanwhile, Secretary Datumanong went to Vienna, Austria, to
attend a conference. Undersecretary Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez was designated
as Acting Secretary of the DOJ. Raman arrived at NAIA for his trip to Singapore but
was apprehended by BI agents and NAIA o7cials. However, the next day, he was
able to leave the country via Singapore Airlines. He was to attend a conference in
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Singapore and to return to the Philippines. It turned out that Acting Secretary of
Justice had verbally allowed the departure of Raman. On the same day, through
counsel, he wrote Secretary Datumanong for the lifting of the HDO insofar as his
client was concerned. Acting Secretary Gutierrez issued an Order allowing Raman to
leave the country. Baviera 8led a Complaint-A7davit with the O7ce of the
Ombudsman charging Undersecretary Gutierrez for violation of Section 3(a), (e),
and (j) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, as amended.
The complainant alleged, inter alia, in his complaint that upon verbal instruction of
respondent Gutierrez to the BI agents and NAIA o7cials, Raman was allowed to
leave the country despite the HDO issued by Secretary Simeon Datumanong. He
averred that the actuations of respondent Gutierrez were illegal, highly irregular and
questionable.
Issue: Whether respondents are guilty of Section 3 paragraph (a) of RA 3019 or

known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Ruling: No.With respect to the charge of violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act
3019, there is no evidence, documentary or testimonial, to show that respondent
GUTIERREZ has received material remuneration as a consideration for her alleged
use of inUuence on her decision to allow Mr. RAMAN to travel abroad.
Henceforth, following the logic and intention of the sponsor of the aforecited
provision, respondent GUTIERREZ did not commit a violation of the same as there is
no proof that she received consideration in exchange for her decision to allow Mr.
Raman to travel abroad.
90. Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 155574, 20 November 2006

(Elements, section 3b RA 3019)
Facts: The instant case stemmed from the Complaint of Maria Lourdes Miranda
against petitioner, then Regional Director, Land Transportation O7ce (LTO), Region
X, Gilbert G. Nabo and Nery Tagupa, employees of the same o7ce, for violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for their alleged frequent borrowing of
motor vehicles from Oro Asian Automotive Center Corporation (Company). Finding
probable cause for violation thereof, Graft Investigation O7cer II Gay Maggie F.
Balajadia-Violan recommended that petitioner, Gilbert G. Nabo and Nery Tagupa be
indicted for violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended.
57 Informations were 8led with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner, Gilbert G.
Nabo and Nery Tagupa for violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended. The Sandiganbayan issued orders for the arrest of the three
accused[5] and for the holding of their departure from the country. On 6 October
1997, petitioner posted a consolidated surety bond for his provisional liberty. When
arraigned, petitioner and accused Tagupa, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded
“not guilty” to the charges. Accused Nabo remains at large. Pre-trial was concluded,
thereafter, trial ensued.
Petitioner testi8ed that he was the Regional Director of the 10 th Regional O7ce of
the LTO from August, 1987 to December, 1994. He denied borrowing any motor
vehicle from the Company arguing that his signatures never appeared in the
Delivery Receipts submitted by the prosecution. He admitted, though, that the
Company has been continually transacting business with his o7ce properly and
o7cially, and has not, even for a single instance, violated any rules with respect to
assembly of motor vehicles, and that there was no reason for the owners of the
Company to harbor any ill-feelings against him. He further admitted that he had
known Atty. Aurora Chiong, Vice-President and General Manager of the Company,
even before he became Regional Director when he was still the Chief of the
Operations Division. He added that employees of the LTO are used to borrowing
vehicles from their friends and that this practice has been going on prior to his
being Regional Director. He claimed he repeatedly warned his subordinates about
the illegality of the same but they merely turned a deaf ear. Lastly, he said his
driver, accused Nabo, had, on several occasions, driven motor vehicles and visited
him at his farm, and that he rode with him in going home without allegedly knowing
that the vehicles driven by Nabo were merely borrowed from his friends.
The Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed decision convicting petitioner of 8fty-
six counts of violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
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amended. Accused Tagupa was acquitted, while the cases against accused Nabo,
who remained at large, were archived.
Issue: Whether Garcia is guilty for violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, otherwise known as the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”
Ruling: No. In any criminal prosecution, it is necessary that every essential

ingredient of the crime charged must be proved beyond reasonable doubt in order
to overcome the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent. To be
convicted of violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, the
prosecution has the burden of proving the following elements: (1) the o?ender is a
public o7cer; (2) who requested or received a gift, a present, a share a percentage,
or a bene8t (3) on behalf of the o?ender or any other person; (4) in connection with
a contract or transaction with the government; (5) in which the public o7cer, in an
o7cial capacity under the law, has the right to intervene.
The prosecution miserably failed to prove the existence of the fourth element. It is
very clear from Section 3(b) that the requesting or receiving of any gift, present,
share, percentage, or bene8t must be in connection with “a contract or
transaction” wherein the public o7cer in his o7cial capacity has to intervene under
the law. In the case at bar, the prosecution did not specify what transactions the
Company had with the LTO that petitioner intervened in when he allegedly borrowed
the vehicles from the Company. It is insu7cient that petitioner admitted that the
Company has continually transacted with his o7ce. What is required is that the
transaction involved should at least be described with particularity and proven. To
establish the existence of the fourth element, the relation of the fact of requesting
and/or receiving, and that of the transaction involved must be clearly shown. This,
the prosecution failed to do. The prosecution’s allegation that the Company
regularly transacts with petitioner’s LTO O7ce for the registration of its motor
vehicles, in the reporting of its engine and chassis numbers, as well as the
submission of its vehicle dealer’s report, and other similar transactions, will not
su7ce. This general statement failed to show the link between the 56 alleged
borrowings with their corresponding transactions.
Failing to prove one of the other elements of the crime charged, we 8nd no need to
discuss the presence or absence of the elements.
91. Merencillo vs. People, GR 142369-70, 13 April 2007 (Section

3b, RA 3019-bribery)
Facts: Juanito Merencillo was charged of violation of Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 and
Direct bribery. Petitioner demanded from private complainant Ma. Angeles Ramasola
Cesar P20,000.00 in exchange for the approval of the Certi8cate Authorizing
Registration (CAR). Due to the repeated demand of the petitioner and delaying the
release of CAR, private complainant seek the help of the authorities. As a result,
petitioner was caught in the entrapment instituted by the police. After trial, the RTC
found petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner appealed the decision to the
Sandiganbayan which was denied a7rming the RTC decision. Hence, this petition for
review of certiorari, contending that he was twice in jeopardy when he was
prosecuted for violation of Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 and for direct bribery.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was placed in double jeopardy?
Ruling. NO.
Section 3(b) of RA 3019 begins with the following statement: Sec.3 In addition to
acts or omissions of public o7cers already penalized by existing law, the following
acts shall constitute corrupt practices of any public o7cer and are hereby declared
unlawful.
One may therefore be charged with violation of RA 3019 in addition to a felony
under the RPC for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or subsequent
to being charged with a felony under the RPC. There is no double jeopardy if a
person is charged simultaneously of successively for violation of the Sec.3 of RA
3019 and the RPC. The rule against double jeopardy prohibits twice placing a person
in jeopardy of punishment for the same o?ense.
The elements of the crime penalized under Section 3(b) of RA 3019 are:
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(1) the o?ender is a public o7cer;

(2) he requested or received a gift, present, share, percentage or
bene8t;
(3) he made the request or receipt on behalf of the o?ender or any
other person;
(4) the request or receipt was made in connection with a contract or
transaction with the government and
(5) he has the right to intervene, in an o7cial capacity under the law,
in connection with a contract or transaction has the right to
intervene.
On the other hand, direct bribery has the following essential elements:
(1) the o?ender is a public o7cer;

(2) the o?ender accepts an o?er or promise or receives a gift or
present by himself or through another;
(3) such o?er or promise be accepted or gift or present be received
by the public o7cer with a view to committing some crime, or in
consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute
a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing
something which it is his o7cial duty to do and
(4) the act which the o?ender agrees to perform or which he
executes is connected with the performance of his o7cial duties.
A comparison of the elements of the crime of direct bribery de8ned and

punished under RPC and those violation of Sec.3 (b) of RA 3019 shows that there is
neither identity nor necessary inclusion between the two o?enses although the two
charges against the petitioner stemmed from the same transaction, the same act
gave rise to two separate and distinct o?ense.
92. Cadiao-Palacios vs. People, GR 168544, 31 March 2009 (Sec.

3b, RA 3019)
Facts: Petitioner was the mayor of the Municipality of Culasi, Province of Antique
from July 1998 to June 2001. During her administration, there were infrastructure
projects that were initiated during the incumbency of her predecessor, then Mayor
Aida Alpas, which remained partially unpaid. These included the Dams and Roads
which were contracted by L.S. Gamotin Construction with a total project cost of P2
million. For the said projects, the municipality owed the contractor P791,047.00.
Relative to the aforesaid projects, petitioner, together with Venturanza, then the
Municipal Security O7cer, was indicted in an Information for violation of Section
3(b), R.A. No. 3019.
Issue: Whether or not the accused were guilty?
Ruling: YES. To be convicted of violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019, the
prosecution has the burden of proving the following elements: 1) the o?ender is a
public o7cer; 2) who requested or received a gift, a present, a share, a percentage,
or bene8t; 3) on behalf of the o?ender or any other person; 4) in connection with a
contract or transaction with the government; 5) in which the public o7cer, in an
o7cial capacity under the law, has the right to intervene.
At the time material to the case, petitioner was the mayor of the Municipality of
Culasi, Antique. As mayor, her signature, both in the vouchers and in the checks
issued by the municipality, was necessary to e?ect payment to contractors (for
government projects). Since the case involved the collection by L.S. Gamotin of the
municipality’s outstanding obligation to the former, the right of petitioner to
intervene in her o7cial capacity is undisputed. Therefore, elements 1, 4 and 5 of
the o?ense are present.
Section 3(b) penalizes three distinct acts – 1) demanding or requesting; 2) receiving;

or 3) demanding, requesting and receiving – any gift, present, share, percentage, or
bene8t for oneself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or
transaction between the government and any other party, wherein a public o7cer
in an o7cial capacity has to intervene under the law. Each of these modes of
committing the o?ense is distinct and di?erent from one another. Proof of existence
of any of them su7ces to warrant conviction.
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The Sandiganbayan viewed the case as one, the resolution of which hinged
primarily on the matter of credibility. It found Super8cial and her testimony worthy
of credence, that petitioner demanded “grease money” as a condition for the
release of the 8nal payment to L.S. Gamotin. Aside from the demand made by
petitioner, the Sandiganbayan likewise concluded that, indeed, she received the
“grease money” through Venturanza. Therefore, petitioner was convicted both for
demanding and receiving “grease money.”
93. Mendoza-Ong vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 146368-69, 23 October

2003 (Sec. 3c, RA 3019)
Facts: Sangguniang Bayan of Laoang, Northern Samar, passed Resolution No.

93-132, authorizing the municipality to borrow heavy equipment from the Philippine
Army’s 53rd Engineering Battalion, to be utilized in the improvement of Laoang’s Bus
Terminal. Resolution No. 93-132 likewise mandated the municipal government to
shoulder the expenses for fuel, oil, and the subsistence allowances of the heavy
equipment operators for the duration of the project. Allegedly, however, the
borrowed Army equipment was diverted by the petitioner, who was then the town
mayor of Laoang, to develop some of her private properties. Consequently, Poso,
Sr., 8led a complaint against petitioner and nine (9) other municipal o7cers with the
O7ce of the Ombudsman (OMB), for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. Two informations were 8led against her before the Sandiganbayan for violating
Section 3 (c) of R.A. 3019. petitioner 8led a Motion to Quash with
the Sandiganbayan alleging that the informations especially in Criminal Case No.
23848, failed to allege facts constituting an o?ense. The Sandiganbayan denied the
motion, as well as her MR. Hence, this petition where petitioner alleged that Sec.
3(c) of R.A. 3019 requires that the gift received should be “manifestly excessive” as
de8ned by Section 2(c) of the same Act. She adds that it is imperative to specify
the exact value of the 8ve drums of diesel fuel allegedly received by Mayor Ong as
public o7cer to determine whether such is “manifestly excessive” under the
circumstances.
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in denying petitioner’s Motion

to Quash the information?
Held: No. The elements of the o?ense charged in the assailed information are as
follows: (1) the o?ender is a public o7cer; (2) he has secured or obtained, or would
secure or obtain, for a person any government permit or license; (3) he directly or
indirectly requested or received from said person any gift, present or other
pecuniary or material bene8t for himself or for another; and (4) he requested or
received the gift, present or other pecuniary or material bene8t in consideration for
help given or to be given.
In the instant case, the information in Crim. Case No. 23848 alleged that: (1)
accused Madeleine Mendoza-Ong, a public o7cer, being then the Municipal Mayor
of Laoang, (2) committed the crime charged in relation to, while in the performance
and taking advantage of her o7cial functions, (3) did request or receive directly or
indirectly, a gift, present or other pecuniary or material bene8t in the form of 8ve
drums of diesel fuel, for herself or for another, from spouses Mr. and
Mrs. Chupo Lao, persons for whom accused Mendoza-Ong, (4) has secured or
obtained, or will secure or obtain, a Municipal Government permit or license anent
the operation of the bus company, JB Lines, owned by said spouses, in consideration
for help given or to be given by the accused.
Section 3 (c) earlier quoted in the present case applies regardless of whether
the gift’s value is manifestly excessive or not, and regardless of the occasion. What
is important here, in our view, is whether the gift is received in consideration for
help given or to be given by the public o7cer. The value of the gift is not
mentioned at all as an essential element of the o?ense charged under Section 3 (c),
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and there appears no need to require the prosecution to specify such value in order
to comply with the requirements of showing a prima facie case.
94. Valera vs. Ombudsman, GR 167278, 27 February 2008 (Sec. 3d,

RA 3019)
Facts: Atty.Gil Valera was appointed by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as

Deputy Commissioner of Customs in charge of the Revenue Collection Monitoring
Group. He 8led for and on behalf of the Bureau of Customs, a collection case with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment for the collection of
unpaid duties and taxes against Steel Asia Manufacturing Corporation (SAMC.
Consequently, a writ of preliminary attachment was issued against SAMC however,
the latter and Atty. Gil entered into a compromise agreement. Thus, the Director of
the Criminal Investigation and Detention Group of the PNP, 8led a letter-complaint
against petitioner with the Ombudsman for entering into a compromise agreement
without authority and approval of the President. The Investigation further disclosed
that the petitioner directly and indirectly had 8nancial or pecuniary interest in the
CACTUS CARGOES SYSTEMS a brokerage whose line of business or transaction, in
connection with which, he intervenes or takes part in his o7cial capacity by way of
causing the employment of his brother-in-law. Special First Division of the CA set
aside the preventive suspension order of Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio against the
petitioner, however the OMB-MOLEO perfected an appeal from this decision and it
was ra`ed o? to the 2nd Division of this Court, and was eventually elevated motu
proprio to the Court En Banc. In the meantime, the respondent Deputy Ombudsman
issued a Decision 8nding the petitioner administratively liable for grave misconduct
and decreeing his dismissal from the service. Respondet alleged that petitioner
petitioner not only used his "o7cial ascendancy" to cause the employment of his
brother-in-law with CCSI, but they further claimed that petitioner was a co-owner of
CCSI as shown by the fact that he invited his close friends and relatives to the
blessing of the brokerage 8rm and also asserted that CCSI is a customs brokerage
8rm which necessarily deals on a regular basis with petitioner's o7ce. While
petitioner contends that under Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 3019, a brother-in-law is not
included within the scope of the word "family" and therefore, he cannot be found
liable under the said law. In arguing so, petitioner refers to the de8nition of the word
"family" found under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 6713.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner violated Sec. 3(d) of RA 3019 for causing
the employment of his brother-in-law?
Held: Yes. The Court notes that petitioner did not deny that CCSI has regular
transactions with his o7ce. Neither did he deny that Ariel Monongdo is his brother-
in-law. Under Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, mere acceptance by a
member of his family of employment with a private enterprise which has pending
o7cial business with the o7cial involved is considered a corrupt practice. It is clear,
therefore, that mere acceptance by Ariel Manongdo, a family member, of the
employment with CCSI rendered petitioner liable under the law. The Court,
therefore, agrees with respondent Deputy Ombudsman when he held that:
"Moreover, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019)

prohibits the public o7cer's act of accepting or having any member of
his family accept employment in a private enterprise which has
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pending o7cial business with him during the pendency thereof or

within one year after its termination. Ariel N. Manongdo, as brother-in-
law of respondent Valera falls squarely within the de8nition of family
under Section 4 of the same law." (Rollo, p. 70)
What petitioner fails to mention is that R.A. No. 6713 itself prohibits the act of public
o7cials and employees during their incumbency to recommend any person to any
position in a private enterprise which has a regular or pending o7cial transaction
with their o7ce. Certainly, the de8nition of the word "family" under said law would
unduly limit and render meaningless Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 3019 if applied to the
latter. In fact, family relation is de8ned under Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019which,
according to the said section, "shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity
or a7nity in the third civil degree."
95. Anuncio C. Bustillo, et al. vs. People, G.R. No. 160718, 12 May
2010 (Sec. 3e, RA 3019)
Facts: Congressman Ceferino Paredes, Jr. (Congressman Paredes) used a portion of

his Countryside Development Fund (CDF) to purchase one unit of Toyota Tamaraw
FX and six units of Kawasaki motorcycles. All vehicles were registered in the name
of the Municipality of Bunawan and were turned over to the municipality through its
mayor, herein petitioner Anuncio C. Bustillo (Bustillo).
The Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed Resolution No. 95-274 which

authorized the transfer without cost of the aforesaid vehicles to the San Francisco
Water District (SFWD. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur passed a
Resolution disapproving the Sangguniang Bayan’s Resolution No. 95-27 for being
violative of Section 3817 of RA 7160 or the Local Government Code. On August 17,
1995, it passed Resolution No. 2468 canceling and declaring the Deed of Transfer as
null and void for being highly irregular and grossly violative of Section 381 of RA
7160.
On May 23, 1996, a complaint was 8led charging Bustillo, Vice-Mayor Agustin
Billedo, Jr. (Billedo), and Sangguniang Bayan members Teogenes Tortor (Tortor),
Emilio Sumilhig, Jr. (Sumilhig), Ruth C. Orot (Orot), and Ernesto Amador, Jr., with
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of the violation of Sec 3(e) of RA 3019.
Ruling: No. The elements of the o?ense are as follows: (1) that the accused are
public o7cers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said
public o7cers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of their o7cial
duties or in relation to their public positions; (3) that they caused undue injury to
any party, whether the Government or a private party; (4) that such injury is caused
by giving unwarranted bene8ts, advantage or preference to such parties; and (5)
that the public o7cers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence.25
In this case, only the 8rst element was proven. At the time material to this case, all
the petitioners are public o7cers, namely, Bustillo as Municipal Mayor, Billedo as
Vice Mayor, and Sumilhig as member of the Sangguniang Bayan.
All the other elements were not present. It cannot be denied that the transfer of the
vehicles to SFWD was made in furtherance of the purpose for which the funds were
released which is “to help in the planning, monitoring and coordination of the
implementation of the waterworks projects located throughout the Province of
Agusan del Sur.” The Deed of Donation expressly provided that the subject vehicles
shall be used for the same purpose for which they were purchased.
96. Buencamino Cruz v. Sandiganbayan, et.al. citing Mejorada

doctrine, GR 134493, 16 August 2005 (Sec.3e)
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Facts: Petitioner Buencamino Cruz served as municipal mayor of the town in 1991
until his term ended in the middle of 1992. Following the May 1992 local elections
and his proclamation as mayor-elect of the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, Victor
Miranda sought an audit investigation of the municipality’s 1991-1992 8nancial
transactions.
Acting on the request, the Commission on Audit issued COA Order No. 19-
1700 constituting a Special Audit Team. In the course of the investigation, the
Special Audit Team discovered that certain anomalous and irregular transactions
transpired during the covered period, the most serious being the purchase of
construction materials evidenced by Sales Invoices No. 131145 and 131137 in the
aggregate amount of P54,542.56, for which payment out of municipal funds was
e?ected twice. The double payments were made in favor of Kelly Lumber and
Construction Supply and were accomplished through the issuance of two (2)
disbursement vouchers (DVs), i.e., DV No. 101-92-06-1222 and DV No. 101-92-01-
195. Petitioner signed the vouchers and encashed the two (2) corresponding PNB
checks, both of which were payable to his order.
The 8ndings of the Audit Team were embodied in a 336-page SAO Report No.
93-28, on the basis of which petitioner was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019. The Information against petitioner, was 8led before the Sandiganbayan.
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of “Not Guilty”. In time, trial ensued. In
a decision, the respondent court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 and sentenced him “to serve imprisonment of
Seven (7) years, and One (1), month as minimum, to Ten (10) years of prision mayor
as maximum, with consequent perpetual disquali8cation from holding public o7ce,
as provided by law.” With his motion for reconsideration having been denied, per
the graft court’s resolution, petitioner is now with us via the instant recourse.
Issue: Whether the petitioner is guilty for the crime charged
Ruling: Yes. Petitioner maintains, anent the 8rst issue, that the Information 8led
against him was fatally defective in that it did not allege that he is an o7cer
“charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.”
Petitioner’s contention is Uawed by the very premises holding it together. For,

it presupposes that Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 covers only public o7cers vested with
the power of granting licenses, permits or similar privileges. Petitioner has
obviously lost sight, if not altogether unaware, of our ruling in Mejorada vs.
Sandiganbayan, where we held that a prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of the
Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of whether or not the accused public o7cer is
“charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions”. Following is an
excerpt of what we said in Mejorada:
Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the

corrupt practices of any public o7cers (sic) declared unlawful. Its
reference to “any public o7cer” is without distinction or quali8cation
and it speci8es the acts declared unlawful. We agree with the view
adopted by the Solicitor General that the last sentence of paragraph
[Section 3] (e) is intended to make clear the inclusion of o7cers and
employees of o7cers (sic) or government corporations which, under
the ordinary concept of “public o7cers” may not come within the
term. It is a strained construction of the provision to read it as
applying exclusively to public o,cers charged with the duty of
granting licenses or permits or other concessions.
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Lest it be overlooked, the o?ense de8ned under Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019
may be committed even if bad faith is not attendant, the elements of the crime
being:
(1) that the accused are public o7cers or private persons charged in
conspiracy with them;
(2) that the prohibited act/s were done in the discharge of the public o7cer’s
o7cial, administrative or judicial functions;
(3) that they cause undue injury to any party, whether Government or a
private person;
(4) that such injury is caused by giving any unwarranted bene8ts, advantage
or preference to such party; and
(5) that the public o7cers acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence.
Given the above perspective, it is abundantly clear that a violation of Section

3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed even through negligence provided that said
negligence is both gross and inexcusable.
97. Catindig vs. People, et.al. GR 183141, 18 September 2009 (Sec.

3e, RA 3019-good faith)
Facts: Commission on Audit (COA) audit team onducted a rate audit of Calamba
Water Districts (CWD) covering its operations and 8nancial transactions for calendar
year 200 to determine the reasonableness of the water rate increase granted by the
Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) to the water districts to cover Power
Cost Adjustment (PCA) and Foreign Exchange Cost Adjustment (FECA). They found
that the Board of Directors of CWD passed several resolutions granting bene8ts and
allowances to o7cers, employees and members of its Board of Directors in the total
amount of P15,455,490.14 supposedly without legal basis and beyond the allowable
limit. On the basis thereof, Herein petitioner Catindig (the incumbent member of the
Sangguniang Pambayan of Calamba City, Laguna) 8led a Complaint before the
Ombudsman against private respondent Atty. Fandiño (the duly elected Chairman of
the Board of Directors of CWD) and the other members of the Board of Directors of
CWD for a series of acts of gross violation of Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 3019 in
conspiracy with one another, and in relation to their duties as public o7cers of
CWD, with a prayer for immediate preventive suspension against all of them. The
RTC, 8nding probable cause, issued warrants of arrest and suspension orders
against private respondents and all other members if the Board of Directors in CWD.
Only private respondent who elevated the case to the CA. The CA granted the
petition and ruled that accused had received the disputed allowances and bene8ts
long before this Court declared as illegal such payment of additional compensation;
thus, it could be reasonably concluded that private respondent and his co-accused
in the case below received the same in good faith. in the absence of bad faith,
private respondent and his co-accused in the case below cannot be held liable for
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether CA erred in pronouncing that the accused acted in good faith?
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Ruling: No. The elements of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, are as follows: (1) the accused must be a public o7cer discharging
administrative, judicial or o7cial functions; (2) he must have acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and (3) his action caused
undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party an
unwarranted bene8t, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination

or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. "Evident bad faith"
connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and
dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse
motive or ill will. "Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of mind a7rmatively
operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for
ulterior purposes. "Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence
characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with conscious indi?erence to consequences insofar as other persons
may be a?ected.
Bad faith is never presumed, while good faith is always presumed; and the chapter
on Human Relations of the Civil Code directs every person, inter alia, to observe
good faith, which springs from the fountain of good conscience.
In the absence of manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence in

passing several resolutions granting bene8ts and allowances, there can be no
probable cause to prosecute the private respondent and the other members of the
Board of Directors of CWD for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended. Consequently, there was also no probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against them.
98. DelaChica vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 144823, 8 December 2003

(Sec. 3e –two way to commit:MP/EBF/GIN)
Facts: Accused, Municipal Mayor Graciano P. Dela Chica and Municipal Engineer
Evan C. Aceveda, of the Municipality of Baco, Oriental Mindoro, while in the
performance of their o7cial functions, and taking advantage of the same, acting in
conspiracy with one another, cause undue injury to the government by making
revisions in the completion of the municipal building without prior approval by the
proper authorities resulting to cost de8ciency of P375,682.32, to the damage and
injury of the government, in the amount afore stated. Petitioners were arraigned
and both entered a plea of not guilty.
Petitioners thereafter sought to question the su7ciency of the information praying
that the prosecution be directed to specify the persons referred to in the information
as "proper authorities." This was, however, denied by the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners thereafter 8led an opposition thereto, on the ground that the information
is invalid as not all the essential elements of the o?ense charged were alleged
therein, particularly the element of "evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross
inexcusable negligence."
The Sandiganbayan handed down the 8rst assailed resolution ordering petitioners’
suspension pendente lite for 90 days. It ruled that in its previous order denying
petitioners’ motion for bill of particulars, it in e?ect upheld the su7ciency of the
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information, hence the mandatory suspension pendent lite of petitioners is called

for. Petitioners 8led a motion for reconsideration, which respondent court denied in
its subsequent resolution.
Issue: Whether petitioners are guilty of Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA 3019 or Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Ruling: No. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be stated in the
information must be determined by reference to the de8nitions and the essentials of
the speci8c crime. Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, under which petitioners are
charged, provides:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public o7cers – In addition to acts or omissions of public

o7cers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public o7cer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted bene8ts, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his o7cial, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to o7cers and
employees of o7ces or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions.
Evidently, the information failed to allege that petitioners, in causing undue injury to
the government by revising the completion of the municipal building without prior
approval of the proper authorities, did the same through "manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence," an essential element of the
crime charged. Neither did the information embody words which would have
characterized the elements, such as "partiality," or bias which excites a disposition
to see and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are; "bad
faith," which connotes not only bad judgment or negligence but also a dishonest
purpose or conscious wrongdoing; or "gross negligence," which is negligence
characterized by the want of even slight care, or acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act willfully and intentionally, with a conscious
indi?erence to consequences as far as other persons are concerned.
This Court has ruled that in order that one may be held criminally liable under
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the act of the accused which caused undue injury must
have been done with evident bad faith or with gross inexcusable negligence. This
draws more signi8cance considering that good faith and regularity are always
presumed in the performance of o7cial duties by public o7cers. Therefore,
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence must be
alleged with particularity in the information su7ciently to inform the accused of the
charge against him and to enable the court properly to render a decision.
99. Mejorada vs. Sandiganbayan, 151 SCRA 399 (Sec. 3e, RA 3019)
Facts: The accused, being employed in the O7ce of the Highway District Engineer,
Pasig, Metro Manila, as Right-of-Way-Agent conspired with two others to directly
intervene to the approval of one Isagani de Leon's claim for the payment in the
removal and reconstruction of his house and a part of his land expropriated by the
government having been a?ected by the proposed Pasig-Sta Cruz-Calamba Road.
Rizal, while the accused, Arturo A. Mejorada is in the discharge of his o7cial and/or
administrative functions and after said claim was approved and the corresponding
PNB Check was issued and encashed appropriating to themselves the amount of
P6,200.00, thereby causing damage and prejudice to Isagani de Leon and the
government in the aforementioned amount of P6,200.00.
Issue: Whether or not the essential elements constituting the o?ense penalized by
section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act have been clearly and convincingly proven by the prosecution;
Ruling: Yes. They are duly proven.
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Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public o7cers. In addition to acts or omissions of public

o7cers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public o7cer and are hereby declared to be unlawful. xxx (e)
Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
his o7cial administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to o7cers and
Petitioner enumerated three elements which, in his opinion, constitute a violation of

Section 3(e). First, that the accused must be a public o7cer charged with the duty
of granting licenses or permits or other concessions. Second, that such public o7cer
caused undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any private
party unwarranted bene8ts, advantage or preference in the discharge of his o7cial
administrative or judicial functions. Third, the injury to any party, or giving any
private party any unwarranted bene8ts, advantage or preference was done through
manifest, partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
We agree with the view adopted by the Solicitor General that the last sentence of
paragraph (e) is intended to make clear the inclusion of o7cers and employees of
o7cers or government corporations which, under the ordinary concept of "public
o7cers" may not come within the term. It is a strained construction of the provision
to read it as applying exclusively to public o7cers charged with the duty of granting
licenses or permits or other concessions. The 8rst element, therefore, of Section 3
(e) is that the accused must be a public o7cer. This, the informations did not fail to
allege.
Contrary to their claims, the government su?ered undue injury as a result of the
petitioner's having inUated the true claims of complainants which became the basis
of the report submitted by the Highway District Engineer to the Regional Director of
the Department of Highways and which eventually became the basis of payment.
His contention that he had no participation is belied by the fact that as a right-of-
way-agent, his duty was precisely to negotiate with property owners who are
a?ected by highway constructions for the purpose of compensating them. On the
part of the complainants, the injury caused to them consists in their being divested
of a large proportion of their claims and receiving payment in an amount even lower
than the actual damage they incurred. They were deprived of the just compensation
to which they are entitled.
The Sandiganbayan established the fact that the petitioner took advantage of his
position as a right-of-way-agent by making the claimants sign the aforementioned
agreements to demolish and sworn statements which contained falsi8ed
declarations of the value of the improvements and lots. There was evident bad faith
on the part of the petitioner when he inUated the values of the true claims and
when he divested the claimants of a large share of the amounts due them.
In view of the above holding. We also dispose of the fourth issue which relates to
the allegation that petitioner cannot be convicted for a violation of the Anti-Graft
Law because the evidence adduced by the prosecution is not the violation of
Section 3 (e) but the crime of robbery. Contrary to the petitioner averment. We 8nd
no variance between the o?ense charged in the information and the o?ense proved.
The prosecution was able to establish through the corroborating testimonies of the
witnesses presented how through evident bad faith, petitioner caused damage to
the claimants and the Government. The manner by which the petitioner divested
the private parties of the compensation they received was part of' the scheme
which commenced when the petitioner approached the claimants and informed
them that he could work out their claims for payment of the values of their lots
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and/or improvements a?ected by the widening of the Pasig-Sta. Cruz-Calamba

Road. The evidence presented by the prosecution clearly establish a violation of
Section 3(e).
100. Go vs. O5ce of the Ombudsman, GR No. 139399, 17 October

2003 (Sec 3e; undue injury)
Facts: Petitioner is the Treasurer and Vice-President of Wear Me Garment

Manufacturing Inc. Due to a 8re that gutted down her factory as well as its
machineries and stocks, petitioner 8led separate insurance claims against 14
insurance companies.
Feeling that the resolutions of her claims have been unduly delayed, petitioner
sought the assistance of the Insurance Commission. The insurers manifested their
o7cial stance to deny the claims of petitioner. Petitioner then sought the
intercession of several members and committees of the Legislature, accusing the
Commission of acting in conspiracy with the insurance companies in denying and
delaying her claims.
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the administrative case for revocation/suspension of
license of respondents, petitioner 8led with the O7ce of the Ombudsman a
Complaint-A7davit against Commissioner Malinis and Hearing O7cer Castro of the
Regulation Division, charging them of Violation of Section 3 [e] of Rep. Act No. 3019.
The OMB denied the charges against the respondent, hence, the instant petition
was 8led.
Issue: whether respondent can be held liable under Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019
Ruling: The Court 8nds the petition devoid of merit. To establish probable cause for
Violation of Section 3[e] of R.A. 3019, the following elements must be present: (1)
The accused is a public o7cer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the
former; (2) The said public o7cer commits the prohibited acts during the
performance of his or her o7cial duties or in relation to his or her public positions;
(3) That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a
private party; (4) Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted bene8ts,
advantage or preference to such parties; and (5) That the public o7cer has acted
with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
The causing of undue injury or the giving of any unwarranted bene8ts, advantage or
preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence constitutes the very act punished under the foregoing section.
Jurisprudence has consistently interpreted the term “undue injury” as synonymous

to “actual damage.” In Llorente, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, it was explained the concept
of “undue injury” as an element of the o?ense punishable under Section 3 [e] of
Rep. Act No. 3019, to wit: ... Undue has been de8ned as “more than necessary, not
proper, [or] illegal”; and injury as “any wrong or damage done to another, either in
his person, rights, reputation or property[;] [that is, the] invasion of any legally
protected interest of another.” Actual damage, in the context of these de8nitions, is
akin to that in civil law.
A review of the records shows that petitioner failed to prove her claim such that
respondents may not be indicted for the acts complained of. As aptly found by the
Ombudsman, there was no concrete evidence presented by petitioner to
substantiate her charge. The fact that the Commission suspended the proceedings
due to the pendency of Civil Casedoes not constitute an indictable o?ense under
Section 3 [e] of R.A. No. 3019.
101. Arias vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 81563, 19 December 1989

(Reasonable reliance doctrine-Sec.3e)
Facts: Accused Cresencio D. Data, being then the district Engineer of the province
of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works, and as such, headed and supervised the
acquisition of private lands for the right-of-way of the Mangahan Floodway Project of
the Government at Sitio Mangahan, Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila; accused Priscillo
G. Fernando, Supervising Engineer who acted as assistant of accused Cresencio D.
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Data in the same Project; accused Ladislao G. Cruz, then the Senior Engineer;
accused Carlos L. Jose then the Instrumentman; accused Claudio H. Arcaya, then
the Administrative O7cer I; and accused Amado C. Arias, then the Auditor.
They are all taking advantage of their public and o,cial positions, and conspiring,
with accused Natividad C. Gutierrez, the attorney-in-fact of Benjamin Agleham, with
accused Ladislao G. Cruz, Carlos L. -Jose and Claudio Arias, acting with evident bad
faith, while accused Cresencio D. Data, Priscillo G. Fernando and Amado C. Arias,
acting with manifest partiality in the discharge of their o7cial public and/or
administrative functions, approved the illegal and irregular disbursement and
expenditure of public funds in favor of and in the name of Benjamin P. Agleham in
the amount of P1,520,320.00 under General Voucher No. 8-047, supported by a
certi8cation, dated September 14, 1978, which was purportedly issued by the
Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, and certi8ed xerox copies of Tax Declarations Nos.
47895 and A-018-0091 1, both in the name of Benjamin P. Agleham, and an alleged
owner's copy of Tax Declaration No. 49948, in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, said supporting documents having been falsi+ed by the accused to
make it appear that the land mentioned in the above-stated supporting papers is a
residential land with a market value of P80.00 per square meter and that 19,004
square meters thereof were transferred in the name of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines under Tax Declaration No. 49948, when in truth and in
fact, the afore-stated land is actually a riceland with a true and actual market value
of P5.00 per square meter only and Tax Declaration No. 49948 was truly and
o7cially registered in the names of spouses Moises Javillonar and So8a San Andres,
not in the name of the Government, and refers to a parcel of land at Sagad, Pasig,
Metro Manila; that the foregoing falsities were committed by the accused to conceal
the fact that the true and actual pace of the 19,004 square meters of land of
Benjamin P. Agleham, which was acquired in behalf of the Government by way of
negotiated purchase by the accused o7cials herein for the right of way of the
Mangahan Floodway project at an overprice of P1,520,320.00 was P92,020.00 only;
and 8nally, upon receipt of the overpriced amount, the accused misappropriated,
converted and misapplied the excess of the true and actual value of the above-
mentioned land, i.e., P1,428,300.00 for their own personal needs, uses and bene8ts,
to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount of P1,428,300.00.
Ruling: YES. SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public O7cers-In addition to acts or

omissions of public o7cers already penalized by existing law. the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public o7cer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
xxxxxxxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted bene8ts, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his o7cial administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to o7cers and employees of o7ces or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
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It must be stressed that the petitioners are not charged with conspiracy in the
falsi8cation of public documents or preparation of spurious supporting papers. The
charge is causing undue injury to the Government and giving a private party
unwarranted bene8ts through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable
negligence.
The alleged undue injury in a nutshell is the Government purchase of land in Pasig,
Rizal for P80.00 a square meter instead of the P5.00 value per square meter
appearing in the tax declarations and 8xed by the municipal assessor, not by the
landowner.
A negotiated purchase may usually entail a higher buying price than one arrived at
in the course of expropriation proceedings. The main reason for the judgment of
conviction, for the 8nding of undue injury and damage to the Government is the
alleged gross overprice for the land purchased for the Uoodway project.
102. Jovito C. Plameras vs. People, G.R. No. 187268, 4 September

2013 (Mode of commission; Sec 3e)
FACTS: there was a project known as the "Purchase of School Desks Program"
piloted by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) Central O7ce,
through the Poverty Alleviation Fund (PAF) for the purpose of giving assistance to
the most depressed provinces in the country. The Province of Antique was among
the bene8ciaries, with a budget allocation of P5,666,667.00. Petitioner Jovito
Plameras at that time was the Governor if said province.He received 2 checks from
DECS-PAF in the total amount of P5,666,667.00drawn against LBP for the purchase
of school desks and armchairs. checks werevdeposited to LBP, San Jose, Antique
branch and was later drawn and deposited to LBP pasig branch. thereafter, he
signed a purchaser-seller agreement for the supply with CKL Enterprises, the same
enterprise which the DECS Central O7ce had entered into, through a negotiated
contract for the supply of desks, sometime in 1996. consequently, he applied with
the LBP Head O7ce for the opening of an Irrevocable Domestic Letter of Credit4 in
behalf of the Provincial School Board of Antique in the amount of P5,666,600.00 in
favor of CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz. Such application was approved by the LBP; thus,
the issuance of Letter of Credit. petitioner demanded from CKL Enterprises/Dela
Cruz, the complete delivery of the purchased items. Unheeded, the petitioner, in a
letter dated 5 March 1998,10 requested the LBP for the copies of pertinent
documents pertaining to the Letter of Credit in favor of CKL Enterprises as well as
debit memos or status of the fund deposited therein. In addition, the petitioner, in a
separate letter dated 26 November 1998,11 asked assistance from the LBP to
compel CKL Enterprises to complete the delivery of the purchased items under the
Letter of Credit and to settle the case amicably, claiming some deception or
misrepresentation in the execution of the sales invoice.
For failure to settle the matter, a case was 8led by the Province of Antique,
represented by its new Governor, Exequiel B. Javier before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 12 of San Jose, Antique docketed as Civil Case No. 99-5-312112 to
compel CKL Enterprises to refund the amount of P5,666,600.00 with interests at the
legal rate.
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While the civil case was pending in court, Governor Javier likewise instituted a
criminal complaint before the O7ce of the Ombudsman against petitioner Plameras
for Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
In its Resolution dated 18 May 2000, the O7ce of the Ombudsman for Visayas found
probable cause to indict petitioner for the o?ense charged. It concluded, among
others, that:
The purchase of 1,356 desks and 5,246 armchairs by the Province of Antique was
made in apparent violation of existing rules and regulations as evident [sic] by the
following facts:
1. Payment was made before the desks and chairs were delivered;
2. Procurement was made without the required authorization from the Provincial
School Board;
3. Proper procedure was disregarded, there being no bidding process.
As a result thereof, delivery of desks and armchairs was delayed and the said desks
and armchairs delivered are defective. Moreover, the remaining 3,468 desks and
chairs amounting to P2,697,168.00 have not been delivered by the supplier despite
demands. Unwarranted bene8t was thus given to the supplier and undue injury was
caused to the government.
ISSUE: whether plamera should be held guilty of Sec 3e RA 3019
RULING: YES. Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, provides:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public o7cers. - In addition to acts or omissions of

public o7cers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public o7cer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
his o7cial administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross in excusable negligence. This provision shall apply to o7cers and
For the aforecited provision to lie against the petitioner, the following elements
must concur:
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1) The accused must be a public o7cer discharging administrative, judicial or

o7cial functions;
2) He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence; and
3) That his action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or
giving any private party unwarranted bene8ts, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions. We focus on the next elements, there being no dispute
that the 8rst element of the o?ense is present.
The second element provides the di?erent modes by which the crime may be
committed, that is, through "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith, "or "gross
inexcusable negligence." this Court explained that Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be
committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or
manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused committed gross inexcusable
negligence. There is "manifest partiality" when there is clear, notorious, or plain
inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. "Evident
bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently
fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for
some perverse motive or ill will. "Evident bad faith "contemplates a state of mind
a7rmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill
will or for ulterior purposes. "Gross in excusable negligence" refers to negligence
characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with conscious indi?erence to consequences insofar as other persons
may be a?ected.
As correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, certain established rules, regulations

and policies of the Commission on Audit and those mandated under the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) were knowingly sidestepped and ignored
by the petitioner which enabled CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz to successfully get full
payment for the school desks and armchairs, despite non-delivery – an act or
omission evidencing bad faith and manifest partiality.
It must be borne to mind that any procurement or "acquisition of supplies or

property by local government units shall be through competitive public bidding"50
This was reiterated in the Local Government Code of 1991.
The petitioner admitted in his testimony51 that he is aware of such requirement,

however, he proceeded just the same due to the alleged advice of the unnamed
DECS representative that there was already a negotiated contract – a representation
or misrepresentation he willfully believed in, without any veri8cation. As a Governor,
he must know that negotiated contract can only be resorted to in case of failure of a
public bidding. As it is, there is no public bidding to speak of that has been
conducted. Intentionally or not, it is his duty to act in a circumspect manner to
protect government funds. To do otherwise is gross inexcusable negligence, at the
very least, especially so, that petitioner acted on his own initiative and without
authorization from the Provincial School Board. This can be proved by his failure to
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present even a single witness from the members of the Board whom he consulted
as he claimed.
The same thing can be said about the act of petitioner in signing the sales invoice
and the bank draft knowing that such documents would cause the withdrawal by
CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz of the corresponding amount covered by the Irrevocable
Domestic Letter of Credit. A Letter of Credit in itself, is not a prohibited form of
payment.
This Court, therefore, is not persuaded that petitioner deserves to be exonerated.

On the contrary, evidence of undue injury caused to the Province of Antique and
giving of unwarranted bene8t, advantage or preference to CKL Enterprises/Dela
Cruz committed through gross in excusable negligence was beyond reasonable
doubt, proven.
103. People vs. Aristeo Atienza, et.al. GR 171671, 18 June 2012

(Sec. 3e, RA 3019-dolo/culpa)
Facts: Edmund, the owner of Hondura Beach Resort in Puerto Galera,

Oriental Mindoro, caused the construction of a fence on his resort. The fence was
destroyed, thus he caused another construction for it. However, it was again
destroyed by Engr. Manogong upon the order of the then Mayor Atienza reasoning
that it was not good for Puerto Galera since the place was a tourist destination and
that the land was intended for the 8sherman association. Thus, Engr. Manogong
destroyed the fences for lack of permit. A complaint charging them with violation of
Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 was 8led before the Sandiganbayan.
On January 9, 2006, Mayor Atienza and Engr. Manongsong 8led a Demurrer to

Evidence (Motion to Acquit), and maintain that the evidence presented were not
su7cient to hold them guilty of the o?ense charged. The motion was granted. The
Sandiganbayan ratiocinated that not all the elements of the crime charged were
established by the prosecution, particularly the element of manifest partiality on the
part of respondents. The Sandiganbayan held that the evidence adduced did not
show that the respondents favored other persons who were similarly situated with
the private complainant.
Issue: Whether or not the respondents should be held liable for violating Sec.
3€ of RA 3019 for causing the destruction of the fence?
Held: No. This crime has the following essential elements: (1) The accused must be
a public o7cer discharging administrative, judicial or o7cial functions; (2) He must
have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and (3) His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or gave any private party unwarranted bene8ts, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions. In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan
granted the Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to
establish the second element of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
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The second element provides the di?erent modes by which the crime may be
committed, that is, through "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," or "gross
inexcusable negligence." In Uriarte v. People, this Court explained that Section 3 (e)
of RA 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with
evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused
committed gross inexcusable negligence. There is "manifest partiality" when there
is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person
rather than another. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also
palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or
conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. "Evident bad faith"
contemplates a state of mind a7rmatively operating with furtive design or with
some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. "Gross inexcusable
negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest
care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with conscious indi?erence to
consequences insofar as other persons may be a?ected.
104. Dr. Roger Posadas and Dr. Rolando Dayco v. Sandiganbayan,

G.R. Nos. 168951& 169000, 17 July 2013 (Sec. 3e-essential elements)
Facts: Dr. Posadas was Chancellor of the University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman
when he formed a Task Force on Science and Technology Assessment, Management
and Policy. Acting on the Task Force’s proposal, UP established the UP Technology
Management Center (UP TMC) the members of which nominated Dr. Posadas for the
post of Center Director. He declined the nomination, however, resulting in the
designation of Professor Jose B. Tabbada as acting UP TMC Director.
Shortly after, Dr. Posadas worked for the funding of the ten new graduate courses of
UP TMC.
On November 7, 1995, his last day as OIC Chancellor, Dr Dayco appointed Dr.
Posadas as “Project Director of the TMC Project from September 18, 1995 to
September 17, 1996.” In an undated letter, Dr. Dayco also appointed Dr. Posadas
consultant to the project. The appointments were to retroact to September 18, 1995
when the project began.
About a year later, the COA issued a Notice of Suspension to the UP TMC personnel
including Dr. Posadas. Notwithstanding the lifting of the suspension, UP President
Javier constituted an Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal to hear and decide the
administrative complaint that he himself 8led against Dr. Posadas and Dr. Dayco for
grave misconduct and abuse of authority. Sandiganbayan found Dr. Posadas and
Dr. Dayco both guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019. Hence this
petition.
Issue: Whether the two accused were guilty of the crime charged.
Ruling: No. The bad faith that Section 3(e) of Republic 3019 requires, said this
Court, does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It imputes a dishonest
purpose, some moral obliquity, and a conscious doing of a wrong. Indeed, it
partakes of the nature of fraud. Here, admittedly, Dr. Dayco appears to have taken
advantage of his brief designation as OIC Chancellor to appoint the absent
Chancellor, Dr. Posadas, as Director and consultant of the TMC Project. But it cannot
be said that Dr. Dayco made those appointments and Dr. Posadas accepted them,
fraudulently, knowing fully well that Dr. Dayco did not have that authority as OIC
Chancellor.
The prosecution also failed to prove that Dr. Dayco gave Dr. Posadas “unwarranted
advantage” as a result of the appointments in question. The honoraria he received
cannot be considered “unwarranted” since there is no evidence that he did not
discharge the additional responsibilities that such appointments entailed.
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105. Antonio B. Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 187340, 14 August 2013

(sec 3e-causing undue injury)
Facts: An information was 8led which dtates that petitioner Head of City
Engineering O7ce in the performance of his o7cial functions, with deliberate intent
and manifest partiality evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence, di then
and wilfully, unlawfully and criminally the construction of a dike whoch traversed
the lot owned by Lucia Nordela without consent of the owner thereof, therby taking
the said property without due process, depriving Lucia of the use of the property
thereby giving unwarranted bereft to the city og cebu, to the undue damage, injury
and prejudice of Lucia Nadela.
Issue: WON petioner is guilty of the crime charged
Held: The Sandiganbayan correctly found the concurrence of the three elements.
First, petitioner, being the city engineer of Cebu, is undisputedly a public o7cer.
Second, the failure of petitioner to validate the ownership of the land on which the
canal was to be built because of his unfounded belief that it was public land
constitutes gross inexcusable negligence.
Petitioner cannot hide behind the Arias doctrine, because it is not on all fours with
his case. In Arias, six people comprising heads of o7ces and their subordinates
were charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019. The accused therein
allegedly conspired with one another in causing, allowing, and/or approving the
illegal and irregular disbursement and expenditure of public funds. In acquitting the
two heads of o7ces, the Court ruled that they could not be held liable for the acts of
their dishonest or negligent subordinates because they failed to personally examine
each detail of a transaction before a7xing their signatures in good faith.
106. Isabelo A. Braza v. Sandiganbayan [1st Division], GR 195032,

20 February 2013 (Sec. 3e-second mode; damage not an element)
Facts: The case at bar arises from the AEAN Summit-related projects to be
undertaken were one is the installation of street lights systems along the perimeters
of Cebu International Convention Center in Mandaue City-Cebu. The subject
transaction of this case Contract ID 06H00050, involving the installation of lights
along Mandaue-Mactan Bridge to Punta Engano Section in Lapu-Lapu City with an
estimated project cost of P83,950,000.00. Another is where three other projects
were bidded out only on November 28, 2006 or less than two (2) weeks before the
scheduled start of the Summit. Thereafter, the DPWH and FABMIK executed a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) whereby FABMIK obliged itself to implement the
projects at its own expense and the DPWH to guarantee the payment of the work
accomplished. FABMIK was able to complete the projects within the deadline of ten
(10) days utilizing its own resources and credit facilities.
A fact-8nding body issued its Evaluation Report recommending the 8ling of charges
for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practice Act, against the DPWH o7cials and employees in Rehion
VII and the cities of Mandaue and Lapu-Lapu and private contractors FABMIK and
GAMPIK construction and Development, Inc. (GAMPIK) before the O7ce of the
Ombudsman-Visayas for the conduct of a preliminary investigation. OMB-Visayas
after the preliminary investigation 8led several informations before the
Sandiganbayan for violation of Sec (g) of RA 3019 against the said o7cials. On June
6, 2008, Braza was arraigned as a precondition to his authorization to travel abroad.
He entered a plea of "not guilty."
Braza 8led a motion for reinvestigation anchored on the following grounds: (1) the
import documents relied upon by the OMB-Visayas were spurious and falsi8ed; (2)
constituted new evidence, if considered, would overturn the 8nding of probable
cause; and (3) the 8nding of overpricing was bereft of factual and legal basis as the
same was not substantiated by any independent canvass of prevailing market
prices of the subject lampposts. He prayed for the suspension of the proceedings of
the case pending such reinvestigation.
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Braza also 8led a manifestation to make of record that he was maintaining his
previous plea of "not guilty" without any condition. The Sandiganbayan eventually
granted the reinvestigation of the saidcase, however, Braza 8led a motion in
support of the abandonment of reinvestigation as it would only a?ord the
prosecution a second round of preliminary investigation which would be vexatious,
oppressive and violative of his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his
case, warranting its dismissal with prejudice.
After concluding its reinvestigation of the case, the OMB-Visayas issued its
Resolution, dated May 4, 2009, (Supplemental Resolution) which upheld the 8nding
of probable cause but modi8ed the charge from violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No.
301914 to violation of Sec. 3(e) of the same law. Accordingly, the prosecution 8led
its Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information on May 8, 2009.
Braza, in his comment pleaded to be discharged and/or dismissed of the case. That
in case the second information will be 8led after being arraigned from the 8rst
information has placed him in double jeopardy. That there was also violation of
Information was still 8led against Braza and was arraigned for the second time for
violating of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 301914. Braza 8led a motion to quash the amended
information but was denied.
Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in

sustaining the withdrawal of the Information in violation of the constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy, as the elements of the o?ense for the 8rst
charge are the same as that of the second o?ense.
Whether or not the second information is insu7cient of allegations as there were no

indications of any actual and quanti8able injury su?ered by the government.
Ruling: To substantiate a claim for double jeopardy, the accused has the
burden of demonstrating the following requisites: (1) a 8rst jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second; (2) the 8rst jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same o?ense as in the
8rst. As to the 8rst requisite, the 8rst jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid
indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment, (d) when a valid
plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the
case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. The test
for the third element is whether one o?ense is identical with the other or is an
attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether the second o?ense
includes or is necessarily included in the o?ense charged in the 8rst information.
In the case at bench, there is no dispute that the two charges stemmed from the
same transaction. A comparison of the elements of violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No.
3019 and those of violation of Sec. 3(e) of the same law, however, will disclose that
there is neither identity nor exclusive inclusion between the two o?enses. For
conviction of violation of Sec. 3(g), the prosecution must establish the following
elements: 1. The o?ender is a public o7cer; 2. He entered into a contract or
transaction in behalf of the government; and 3. The contract or transaction is
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.
On the other hand, an accused may be held criminally liable of violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, provided that the following elements are present: 1. The
accused must be a public o7cer discharging administrative, judicial or o7cial
functions; 2. The accused must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and 3. His action caused undue injury to any
party, including the government or gave any private party unwarranted bene8ts,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
With regard to insu7ciency of the second information 8led against him. There are
two ways on how to violate section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the performance of his
functions, namely: (1) by causing undue injury to any party, including the
Government; or (2) by giving any private party any unwarranted bene8t, advantage
or preference. The accused may be charged under either mode or under both. The
disjunctive term "or" connotes that either act quali8es as a violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019. In other words, the presence of one would su7ce for conviction. To
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be found guilty under the second mode, it su7ces that the accused has given
unjusti8ed favor or bene8t to another, in the exercise of his o7cial, administrative
and judicial functions." The element of damage is not required for violation of
Section 3(e) under the second mode.
107. Juan Coronado vs. Sandiganbayan; GR No.94955; 18 August

1993 (Sec. 3f, RA 3019)
Facts: The Regional Trial Court of Rizal issued an Order denying plainti?s' motion
for reconsideration of the order that dismissed the complaint in Civil Case No. 290-
A, entitled "Pinagkamaligan Indo-Agro-Development Corporation, et al. v. Mariano
Lim et al." The complaining witness Mariano Lim, one of the defendants in the
above civil case, learned the rendition of the Order and the fact that it had not yet
then been served upon the plainti?s. Lim left "agitated about the loss of eleven
days before the decision's period of 8nality had commenced to run," and he,
therefore, made representations with the Executive Judge, the Hon. Antonio
Benedicto, to have the Order served on Atty. Patrocinio Palanog, the counsel for the
plainti?s. The accused, a process server, was directed to e?ect the service. His 8rst
attempt was unsuccessful because he could not locate the address of Atty. Palanog.
The accused again tried, and although this time he found the address, Atty. Palanog
and his entire family had apparently gone out for the weekend. The accused found
only a woman, not a member of the family of Atty. Palanog, who had only been
asked to watch over the house. Accused Coronado did not thus leave the Order. Lim
went back to the courthouse where he was informed that the case had meanwhile
been sent to the archives together with 29 other cases. Lim returned to the
courthouse and, examining the records, he observed additional unnumbered pages
that include, among other things, a) a return, signed by accused Coronado stating
the plainti?'s counsel, Atty. Palanog, could not be contacted; b) an entry at the foot
of the Order the e?ect that Atty. Palanog had received the Order ; and (c) a return,
that the Order had indeed been served on plainti?s. On the basis of the foregoing,
particularly the 5-month delay in the service of the court order, the Sandiganbayan
convicted herein petitioner of having violated Section 3 (f) of Republic Act No. 3019.
Issue: Whether the failure of the petitioner to successfully serve the 11 July 1984
Order warrants his conviction under Section 3(f) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
Ruling: No. To warrant conviction for a violation of Section 3 (f) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, the law itself additionally requires that the accused
dereliction, besides being without justi8cation, must be for the purpose of (a)
obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some
pecuniary or material bene8t or advantage in favor of an interested party or (b)
discriminating against another interested party. The severity of the penalty imposed
by the law leaves no doubt that the legislative intent is to consider this element to
be indispensable.
The record is bereft of evidence, albeit alleged, to indicate that the petitioner's
failure to act was motivated by any gain or bene8t for himself or knowingly for the
purpose of favoring an interested party or discriminating against another. It is not
enough that an advantage in favor of one party, as against another, would result
from one neglect or refusal. It has always been the avowed policy of the law that
before an accused is convicted of a crime, his guilt must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt, and the burden of that proof rests upon the prosecution. The
stringency with which we have scrupulously observed this rule needs no further
explanation; su7ce it to say that it behooves us to do no less whenever at stake is
the life or liberty of a person.
108. Joey P. Marquez vs. The Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 182020-24,

02 September 2009 (Sec 3g, RA 3019)
FACTS:
Marquez and Caunan, along with four other local government o7cials of
Parañaque City and private individual Antonio Razo (Razo), were charged with 8ve
Information. Joey Marquez and others acting as such and committing the o?ense in
relation to their o7cial duties and taking advantage of their o7cial positions,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and with the accused
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private individual ANTONIO RAZO, the owner and proprietor of ZARO Trading, with
evident bad faith and manifest did enter into manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous transactions., of overpricing of sale of ”walis ting ting” to be sold
in markets of Paranaque. As per COA report it should only be 11 php but was sold on
the amount of 25 php and there is a vilation for non compliance with the
Commission on Audit Rules and Regulations and other requirements on Procurement
and Public Bidding.
Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioners and the other local
government o7cials of Parañaque City for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
Consequently, the 8ve (5) Informations against petitioners, et al. were 8led before
the Sandiganbayan. After trial and a Uurry of pleadings, the Sandiganbayan
rendered judgment 8nding petitioners Caunan and Marquez, along with Silvestre de
Leon and Marilou Tanael, guilty of violating Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
ISSUE:
WON erred in 8nding petitioners guilty of violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No.
3019?
RULLING:
Yes. Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 provides:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public o,cers—In addition to acts or omissions of

public o,cers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public o,cer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:x x x
x
(g) Entering on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction,

manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public
o,cer pro+ted or will pro+t thereby.
For a charge under Section 3(g) to prosper, the following elements must be present:
(1) that the accused is a public o7cer; (2) that he entered into a contract or
transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. 17
The presence of the 8rst two elements of the crime is not disputed. The agree
with petitioners that the fact of overpricing is embedded in the third criminal
element of Section 3 (g) of R.A. No. 3019. Given the factual milieu of this case, the
subject contracts would be grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government if characterized by an overpriced procurement. However, the gross and
manifest disadvantage to the government was not su7ciently shown because the
conclusion of overpricing was erroneous since it was not also adequately proven.
In criminal cases, to justify a conviction, the culpability of an accused must be

established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden of proof is on the
prosecution, as the accused enjoys a constitutionally enshrined disputable
presumption of innocence. Notably, however, and this the petitioners have
consistently pointed out, the evidence of the prosecution did not include a signed
price quotation from the walis tingting suppliers of Parañaque City.
109. Morales vs. People, GR No. 144047, 26 July 2002 (Sec. 3g;
Manifest/gross)
Facts: Accused Eulogio Morales, a public o7cer, being then the duly appointed
General Manager of the Olongapo City Water District, a government agency,
conspiring and confederating with accused Wilma Hallare, Finance O7cer of the
said water district and the former’s wife Rosalia Morales, did then and there, wilfully
and unlawfully sell, transfer and convey a 1979 Model Gallant car Sigma with Motor
No. 2M-08206, with an assessed value of P75,000.00 on behalf of the Olongapo City
Water District, to [Petitioner] Wilma Hallare for only P4,000.00, which amount is
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the Olongapo City Water District and on
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even date, accused Wilma Hallare again sell, transfer and convey the same vehicle
to accused Rosalia Morales, thus showing accused Eulogio Morales and Wilma
Hallare having become directly and/or indirectly pecuniarily interested in the said
transaction, wherein they intervened in their o7cial capacities as General Manager
and Finance O7cer, respectively of the Olongapo City Water District..
Issue: Whether the acts purportedly constituting the crime charged are not actually
criminal or felonious, hence no violation of Section 3 par. (g) in relation to par. (h) of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, has been committed by the petitioners.
Held: Petitioners contend that their conviction under Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft
Law was erroneous, because the sale price had not been grossly or manifestly
disadvantageous to the government. They aver that the subject car was already
junk and was no longer in good running condition.
We disagree. The elements of the crime of violating Section 3(g) of RA No. 3019, as
amended, are as follows: (1) the o?ender is a public o7cer, (2) who enters into a
contract or transaction on behalf of the government, and (3) the contract or
transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government. Manifest means “obvious to the understanding, evident to the mind x x
x and is synonymous with open, clear, visible, unmistakable, indubitable, evident
and self-evident.”]Gross means “Uagrant, shameful, such conduct as is not to be
excused.”
As earlier discussed, Petitioners Eulogio Morales and Wilma Hallare -- being the
general manager and the 8nance o7cer, respectively, of the OCWD -- are public
o7cers. Petitioner Rosalia Morales is the wife of the general manager of OCWD and
the subsequent buyer of the same car under the second Deed of Sale. The subject
car in this case was sold to Hallare by Eulogio Morales in his o7cial capacity -- via
the August 20, 1986 Deed of Sale (Exh. “C”) -- for only P4,000, when its book value
at the time of the sale was P16.088 (Exh. “B-1”)
Petitioners tried to persuade us that, at the time of sale, the subject car was already
junk with a net value of only P3,000. But this contention was rebutted by Plant
Account Assistant Jose Tupi, who testi8ed that it was still in good running condition a
day before it was sold. Moreover, the Subic Water District and the Olongapo
Commuter Auto Supply were also interested in acquiring the car (Exhs. “6” and “6-
a”). This fact proves that it could not be considered as “junk.”
The gross and manifest disadvantage of the sale to the government is shown by the
following facts, which were stated in the Operations Audit Report: (1) the subject car
was sold at a very low price, well below its book value; (2) there was no attempt to
obtain a better price in a formal auction; (3) the supporting bids were dated ten
months prior to the date of sale without any indication of the particulars of the item
for bidding, and those bids were submitted by individuals considered to be close to
petitioners; (4) there was no board resolution declaring the item as unserviceable
and disposable, and neither was a formal assessment or evaluation made by an
independent body; (5) no extraordinary loss was recognized by the water district
upon the consummation of the sale; and (5) the existence of the second Deed of
Absolute Sale shows the simulated nature of the 8rst, while the execution of both
documents on the same date proves that the interested party was no less than the
general manager.
110. Luciano vs. Estrella, 34 SCRA 769 (1970) (sec. 3g –validity of

contract)
Facts: Accused were charged with violation of Sections 3-G and 4-B of Republic Act
No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
The accused are Maximo Estrella, then the Municipal Mayor of Makati, Rizal; Teotimo
Gealogo, Justino Ventura, Pedro Ison, Ignacio Babasa, Bernardo Nonato, then
Municipal Councilors of Makati, Rizal; Eduardo Francisco, then Municipal Treasurer of
Makati, Rizal; Cirilo Delmo, then Assistant Municipal Treasurer of Makati, Rizal;
Lutgardo Ambrosio, then Chief of Tra7c Control Bureau, Makati Police Department;
Ciriaco Alano, then con8dential Private Secretary to the Municipal Mayor, Gualberto
San Pedro, then Provincial Auditor of the Province of Rizal; Jose Gutierrez and Franco
A. Gutierrez, owner and/or representatives of the JEP Enterprises, respectively,
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conspiring, on behalf of the Municipal Government of Makati, Rizal, enter into a

contract or transaction with the JEP Enterprises, represented by Jose Gutierrez and
Franco A. Gutierrez, for the delivery and installation by the JEP Enterprises to the
Municipal Government of Makati, Rizal of 8fty-nine (59) units of tra7c deUectors
valued at (P1,426.60) each unit, that thirty-four (34) units were delivered, installed
and paid for by the Municipality of Makati in favor of the JEP Enterprises in the
amount of (P48,841.00), less ten percent (10%) retention, which contract or
transaction is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the Municipal Government
of Makati, Rizal, to the damage and prejudice of the latter. Jose Gutierrez and Franco
C. Gutierrez, being the owner, manager and/or representatives of the JEP
Enterprises, being private persons, did knowingly induce or cause the above-
mentioned public o7cials and o7cers to enter into the aforementioned contract or
transaction.
Ruling: YES. Respondent municipal o7cials were charged with violation of

Republic Act 3019 under its Section 3(g), or speci8cally, for having entered, on
behalf of the government, into a contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government. It is not at all di7cult to see that to determine
the culpability of the accused under such provision, it need only be established that
the accused is a public o7cer; that he entered into a contract or transaction on
behalf of the government; and that such contract or transaction is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to that government. In other words, the act treated
thereunder partakes of the nature of a malum prohibitum; it is the commission of
that act as de8ned by the law, not the character or e?ect thereof, that determines
whether or not the provision has been violated. And this construction would be in
consonance with the announced purpose for which Republic Act 3019 was enacted,
which is the repression of certain acts of Republic o7cers and private persons
constituting graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. Note that the law
does not merely contemplate repression of acts that are unlawful or corrupt per se,
but even of those that may lead to or result in graft and corruption. Thus, to require
for conviction under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act that the validity of the
contract or transaction be 8rst proved would be to enervate, if not defeat, the
intention of the Act. For what would prevent the o7cials from entering into those
kinds of transactions against which Republic Act 3019 is directed, and then
deliberately omit the observance of certain formalities just to provide a convenient
leeway to avoid the clutches of the law in the event of discovery and consequent
prosecution? In the present case, assuming arguendo that the absence of
certi8cation by the municipal treasurer as to availability of covering funds would
materially a?ect the validity of the contract, that matter would be immaterial to the
determination of respondents’ liability under Republic Act 3019; so that the
discovery of such fact would not constitute a proper ground to support a motion for
the reopening and retrial of the case.
111. Duterte vs. Sandiganbayan, 289 SCRA 721 (1998) (Sec. 3g-
eAect of invalidated contract)
Facts: The Davao City Local Automation Project was launched by the city
government of Davao for the purpose of making Davao City a leading center for
computer systems and technology development and provide consultancy and
training services and to assist all local government units in Mindanao set up their
respective computer systems. The City Council (Sangguniang Panlungsod) of Davao
passed Resolution and Ordinance approving the proposed contract for
computerization between Davao City and Systems Plus, Inc. (SPI), exclusive
distributor in the Philippines of Goldstar Computers manufactured by Goldstar
Information and Communication, Ltd., South Korea .The Sanggunian authorized
Rodrigo R. Duterte, the City Mayor, to sign the said contract for and in behalf of
Davao City. A complaint (Civil Case) was instituted before the Regional Trial Court by
Dean Pilar Braga, et. al. against Duterte and De Guzman et. al. for the judicial
declaration of nullity of the resolutions and ordinances and the computer contract
executed.
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During the pendency of the civil case, Goldstar proposed to Duterte for the
cancellation of the computerization contract. The Sanggunian issued Resolution and
ordinance accepting Goldstar's o?er to cancel the computerization contract
provided the latter return the advance payment. They mutually rescinded the
contract and the down payment was duly refunded. With the intent on pursuing its
computerization plan, the city government acquired Philips computers following the
recommendation of Special Audit Team of the Commission on Audit and with the
assistance of the National Computer Center . The civil case was eventually
dismissed.
Miguel C. Enriquez 8led an unveri8ed complaint with the Ombudsman against

Duterte and De Guzman et. al. alleging that the latter, in entering into the
computerization contract, violated RA 3019. Accused were duly charged under Sec.
3(g) of RA 3019 "for having entered into a contract manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government, the elements of pro8t, unwarranted bene8ts or
loss to government being immaterial." Duterte, et. al. 8led a motion for
reconsideration n the ground that, among others, "petitioners were deprived of their
right to a preliminary investigation, due process and the speedy disposition of their
case." The same was denied hence this petition.
Issue: Whether probable cause is established for charging petitioners for violation
of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019?
Ruling: No. When the contract subject of a complaint for alleged violation
of Sec. 3(g) of RA 3019 was rescinded before the complaint was =led, the
said contract became in contemplation of law, non-existent, as if not
contract was ever executed and the second element of the crime – that the
accused public o5cers entered into a contract in behalf of the government
– is absent.
Under the facts of the case, there is no basis in the law or in fact to charge
petitioners for violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. To establish probable cause
against the o?ender for violation of Sec. 3(g), the following elements must be
present: (1) the o?ender is a public o7cer; (2) he entered into a contract or
transaction in behalf of the government; (3) the contract or transaction is grossly
and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. The second element of the
crime – that the accused public o7cers entered into a contract in behalf of the
government – is absent. The computerization contract was rescinded on 6 May
1991 before SAR No. 91-05 came out on 31 May 1991 and before the Anti-Graft
League 8led its complaint with the Ombudsman on 1 August 1991. Hence, at that
time the Anti-Graft League instituted their complaint and the Ombudsman issued its
Order on 12 November 1991, there was no longer any contract to speak of. The
contract, after 6 May 1991 became in contemplation of the law, non-existent, as if
no contract was ever executed.
112. Froilan vs. Sandiganbayan, 328 SCRA 351 (2000) (Sec. 3g-
guranteed contract)
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Facts: Bohol Agricultural College, a government educational institution,

purchased chemicals for its laboratory priced at Php 10 633 from JDS traders. As
required in the procurement of government supplies, an RIV (Requisition and Issue
Voucher) was prepared on May 30, 1984 by Benigno V. Mandin, Supply O7cer, and
approved by Mateo M. Limbago, Superintendent of the school. Purchase Order No.
84-61 was approved by accused Mateo M. Limbago. The purchase order, however,
appears to have been received by accused Julius Froilan, the supplier, who signed a
certi8cation stamped on the order, stating that he will refund the di?erence if the
prices are found to be overpriced. The price turned to be overpriced. Upon demand,
Froilan refunded the full amount of the disallowance of Php 5 323.87. This,
notwithstanding, an information for the violation of Sec 3 (g) of RA 3019 was 8led
against all the accused.
Issue: Whetheror notthe petitioner is guilty of Sec. 3(g) of RA 3019
Held: No.One of the principal reasons for Mr. Limbago’s acquittal was the fact that
the government – the only entity which the law seeks to protect – was amply
protected by virtue of the written undertaking issued by petitioner, as the winning
bidder, to refund whatever amount may be found as the overpriced. Petitioner,
being the one who gave the written guarantee and who saved the government from
any perceived injury, must likewise be acquitted.
Readily, the Court found that the third element is missing. The government was
amptly protected in the subject transaction and consequently the contract was not
manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
113. Caballero et.al. vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 137355-58, 25

September 2005 (Sec. 3h, RA 3019)
Facts: During Caballero’s incumbency as municipal mayor in 1993, the Municipality

of Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte conducted committee hearings on tax ordinance
and seminar-workshop on budget, undertakings which required the purchase of
materials for use therefor and catering services for the meals and snacks of the
participants. For the purpose, a public bidding was held by the Committee on
Awards, during which awards were made to the lowest bidder, namely, Genty
General Merchandise for the supply of materials, and GP’s Food Catering Services
for the supply of meals and snacks. Both entities were admittedly owned and
operated by the mayor’s wife, Theresa Caballero. Thereafter, a letter-complaint was
8led by one Crisologo Decierdo before the O7ce of the Auditor in Roxas,
Zamboanga del Norte charging Mayor Caballero and his wife Theresa, Municipal
Treasurer Semie Torres and Municipal Accountant Nerita Cuento of violating Republic
Act (RA) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
State Auditor Morales recommended in his Report the dismissal of the complaint
against Mayor Caballero, et al. for lack of su7cient basis. However, despite Morales’
8ndings and recommendation, the O7ce of the Ombudsman-Mindanao proceeded
with the investigation of the same complaint and 8led four informations all for
violation of Section 3(h) of RA No. 3019, were 8led. Petitioners 8led a motion to
quash the information against them but subsequently denied by the
Sandiganbayan, hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the petitioners were guilty of the crime charged.
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Ruling: No. Under settled jurisprudence, the following elements need to be proven
in order to constitute a violation of Section 3(h) of RA No. 3019: 1. The accused is a
public o7cer; 2. He has a direct or indirect 8nancial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract, or transaction; and 3. He either (a) intervenes or takes part in
his o7cial capacity in connection with such interest, or (b) is prohibited from having
such interest by the Constitution or by any law.
The informations alleged that Mayor Caballero “willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
approved the award to GP’s Food Catering Services and Genty General Merchandise
which were both registered in the name of Ma. Theresa Caballero, the wife of Mayor
Caballero.” A reading of the informations would disclose that the third element of
the o?ense was not su7ciently alleged. As it were, the informations failed to state
the mode by which Mayor Caballero supposedly violated Section 3(h) of the Anti-
Graft Law. While it may be deduced therefrom that Mayor Caballero was indicted via
the 8rst mode, that is, by intervening or taking part in his o7cial capacity in
connection with his 8nancial or pecuniary interest in the subject transactions, still
there was no statement in the said informations that Mayor Caballero actually
intervened in awarding the contract in favor of his wife’s businesses, which is an
element necessary to constitute a violation of Section 3(h) of RA No. 3019. It is
essential that the information states the ultimate facts needed to constitute the
o?ense charged, so that the accused may be properly apprised of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
What is contemplated in Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law is the actual intervention
in the transaction in which one has 8nancial or pecuniary interest in order that
liability may attach. For the law aims to prevent dominant use of inUuence,
authority and power. The act of a mayor in inhibiting himself from taking part in the
Committee’s proceedings clearly shows that he had never intended to inUuence or
pressure the members of the Committee on Awards to favor his wife’s bid.
114. Teves vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 154182, 17 December 2004,

447 SCRA 309 (Sec. 3h, RA 3019)
Facts: Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd
legislative district of Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections. On March
30, 2007, respondent Herminio G. Teves 8led a petition to disqualify petitioner on
the ground that in Teves v. Sandiganbayan, he was convicted of violating Section
3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for
possessing pecuniary or 8nancial interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under
Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, and was sentenced to
pay a 8ne of P10,000.00. Respondent alleged that petitioner is disquali8ed from
running for public o7ce because he was convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disquali8cation from
public o7ce.
On May 11, 2007, the COMELEC First Division disquali8ed petitioner from running for
the position of member of House of Representatives and ordered the cancellation of
his Certi8cate of Candidacy. It appears, however, that [petitioner] lost in the last 14
May 2007 congressional elections for the position of member of the House of
Representatives of the Third district of Negros Oriental thereby rendering the instant
Motion for Reconsideration moot and academic.
The petitioner 8led a petition which the court found to have merit.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves
moral turpitude.
Ruling: Sec. 12. Disquali8cations. - Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by 8nal
judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any o?ense for which he has
been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disquali8ed to be a candidate and to hold any o7ce,
unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disquali8cations to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed

upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had
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been removed or after the expiration of a period of 8ve years from his service of
sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disquali8ed.
Moral turpitude has been de8ned as everything which is done contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private
and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.
Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 of which petitioner was convicted, reads:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public o7cers. — In addition to acts or omissions of
xxxx
(h) Directly or indirectly having 8nancial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his
o7cial capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from
having any interest.
The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The
accused is a public o7cer; 2) he has a direct or indirect 8nancial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract or transaction; 3) he either: a) intervenes or takes
part in his o7cial capacity in connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited from
having such interest by the Constitution or by law.
Thus, there are two modes by which a public o7cer who has a direct or indirect
8nancial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate
Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The =rst mode is when the public o7cer intervenes or
takes part in his o7cial capacity in connection with his 8nancial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract, or transaction. The second mode is when he is
prohibited from having such an interest by the Constitution or by law.
Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. – (a) It shall be unlawful for
any local government o7cial or employee, directly or indirectly, to:
xxxx
(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local
government unit….
The o?ense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the
Anti-Graft Law, which is possession of a prohibited interest.
However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the
same involved moral turpitude. A determination of all surrounding circumstances of
the violation of the statute must be considered. Besides, moral turpitude does not
include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their
being positively prohibited, as in the instant case.
Thus, petitioner, as then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his inUuence, authority or
power to gain such pecuniary or 8nancial interest in the cockpit. Neither did he
intentionally hide his interest in the subject cockpit by transferring the management
thereof to his wife considering that the said transfer occurred before the e?ectivity
of the present LGC prohibiting possession of such interest.
The crime committed by petitioner (violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019) did not
involve moral turpitude.
115. Socrates vs. Sandiganbayan, et. al. GR 116259-60, 118896-97,

20 February 1996 (Sec. 3h-actual intervention
Facts: An information was 8led against petitioner for violation of Sec 3(h) of the
anti – graft law. Petitioner now invokes alleged defects in the information citing the
case of Trieste, Sr. vs. Sandiganbayanwhere it was held that “what is contemplated
in Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual intervention in the transaction in
which one has 8nancial or pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach.”
Issue: whether petitioner may be held liable under Sec. 3 (h) of the anti-graft law
Ruling: In the cited case, however, the Court found that the petitioner therein did
not, in any way, intervene in making the awards and payment of the purchases in
question since he signed the voucher only after all the purchases had already been
made, delivered and paid for by the municipal treasurer. The purchases involved
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therein were previously ordered by the municipal treasurer without the knowledge
and consent of the accused municipal mayor, were subsequently delivered by the
supplier, and were thereafter paid by the treasurer again without the knowledge
and consent of the mayor. The only participation of the accused mayor in the
transaction involved the mechanical act of signing the disbursement vouchers for
record purposes only. Thus, the Court did not consider the act therein of the
accused mayor to be covered by the prohibition under Section 3(h) of the law.
Contrariwise, in the present cases, petitioner Socrates stands charged with a

violation of Section 3(h) for intervening in his o7cial capacity as Governor of
Palawan in reviewing and approving the disbursement voucher dated August 2,
1982 for payment in favor of ERA Technology Resources Corporation where he was
one of the incorporators and members of the board of directors. Such allegation
clearly indicates the nature and extent of petitioner’s participation in the questioned
transaction. Without petitioner’s approval, payment could not possibly have been
e?ected.
(Note:the main case is all about violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019
& Section 3(a) and (g) of the same law. The assigned topic (sec. 3h) was slightly
discussed in the “ruling” portion.)
116. Trieste vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 70332-43, 13 November 1986

(Sec. 3h-actual intervention)
Facts: In the municipality of Numancia, Aklan, accused, being then the Municipal
Mayor and member of the Committee on Award of the Municipality of Numancia,
Aklan and as such, had administrative control of the funds of the municipality and
whose approval is required in the disbursements of municipal funds, have 8nancial
or pecuniary interest in a business, contract or transaction in connection with which
said accused intervened or took part in his o7cial capacity and in which he is
prohibited by law from having any interest, to wit the purchases of construction
materials by the Municipality of Numancia, Aklan from Trigen Agro-Industrial
Development Corporation, of which the accused is the president, incorporator,
director and major stockholder paid by then and there awarding the supply and
delivery of said materials to Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation and
approving payment thereof to said corporation in violation of the Anti-Graft and
corrupt Practices Act. The Sandiganbayan rendered convicting the petitioner in all
the twelve (12) criminal cases.
After the petition for review was 8led in this case and pending the submission by
respondent of its comment to the petition, herein petitioner presented to this Court,
an urgent petition to lift the order of the Sandiganbayan , suspending him from
O7ce as the elected Municipal Mayor of Numancia, Aklan. No objection to the
petition for the lifting of the suspension order was interposed by the Solicitor
General. Accordingly, and pursuant to the resolution of this Court, petitioner's
preventive suspension was lifted and his reinstatement as Municipal Mayor of
Numancia, Aklan was ordered to take e?ect immediately.
Issue: Whether Generoso Trieste, Sr. is guilty of the violations of Section 3

paragraph (h) of Republic Act 3019.
Ruling: No. What is contemplated in Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual
intervention in the transaction in which one has 8nancial or pecuniary interest in
order that liability may attach. The o7cial need not dispose his shares in the
corporation as long as he does not do anything for the 8rm in its contract with the
o7ce. For the law aims to prevent the don-tenant use of inUuence, authority and
power.
There is absolutely no evidence that petitioner had, in his capacity as Mayor, used
his inUuence, power, and authority in having the transactions given to Trigen. He
didn't ask anyone-neither Treasurer Vega nor Secretary Maravilla for that matter, to
get the construction materials from Trigen.
117. Edgar Teves vs. Comelec, GR180363, 28 April 2009 (Sec. 3h, RA
3019-two modes)
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FACTS: Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd
legislative district of Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections. On March
30, 2007, respondent Herminio G. Teves 8led a petition to disqualify petitioner on
the ground that in Teves v. Sandiganbayan, he was convicted of violating Section
3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for
possessing pecuniary or 8nancial interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under
Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, and was sentenced to
pay a 8ne of P10,000.00. Respondent alleged that petitioner is disquali8ed from
running for public o7ce because he was convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disquali8cation from
public o7ce.
On May 11, 2007, the COMELEC First Division disquali8ed petitioner from running for
the position of member of House of Representatives and ordered the cancellation of
his Certi8cate of Candidacy. It appears, however, that [petitioner] lost in the last 14
May 2007 congressional elections for the position of member of the House of
Representatives of the Third district of Negros Oriental thereby rendering the instant
Motion for Reconsideration moot and academic.
The petitioner 8led a petition which the court found to have merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves
moral turpitude.
RULING: Sec. 12. Disquali8cations. - Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by 8nal
judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any o?ense for which he has
been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disquali8ed to be a candidate and to hold any o7ce,
unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disquali8cations to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed

upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had
been removed or after the expiration of a period of 8ve years from his service of
sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disquali8ed.
Moral turpitude has been de8ned as everything which is done contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private
and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.
Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 of which petitioner was convicted, reads:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public o7cers. — In addition to acts or omissions of
xxxx
(h) Directly or indirectly having 8nancial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his
o7cial capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from
having any interest.
The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The
accused is a public o7cer; 2) he has a direct or indirect 8nancial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract or transaction; 3) he either: a) intervenes or takes
part in his o7cial capacity in connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited from
having such interest by the Constitution or by law.
Thus, there are two modes by which a public o7cer who has a direct or indirect
8nancial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate
Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The =rst mode is when the public o7cer intervenes or
takes part in his o7cial capacity in connection with his 8nancial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract, or transaction. The second mode is when he is
prohibited from having such an interest by the Constitution or by law.
Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. – (a) It shall be unlawful for
any local government o7cial or employee, directly or indirectly, to:
xxxx
(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local
government unit….
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The o?ense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the
Anti-Graft Law, which is possession of a prohibited interest.
However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the
same involved moral turpitude. A determination of all surrounding circumstances of
the violation of the statute must be considered. Besides, moral turpitude does not
include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their
being positively prohibited, as in the instant case.
Thus, petitioner, as then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his inUuence, authority or
power to gain such pecuniary or 8nancial interest in the cockpit. Neither did he
intentionally hide his interest in the subject cockpit by transferring the management
thereof to his wife considering that the said transfer occurred before the e?ectivity
of the present LGC prohibiting possession of such interest.
The crime committed by petitioner (violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019) did not
involve moral turpitude.
118. Villa vs. Sandiganbayan, 208 SCRA 283 (1992) (Sec. 3i RA

3019)
FACTS: A case was 8led against petitioner and his co-accused. The case involved
transactions made by civil aeronautics administration and Rocon Enterprise for the
purchased of electrical items.
In this case, the Bidding Committee approved the lowest bid, which was that of
Roces. On the same day, a purchase order was prayed. Upon investigation on
overpricing was discovered. Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 3(i) of
RA 3019,
Villo, a member of the bidding committee argued that he did not participate in the
canvass of the requisitioned items.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is liable under sec 3 (i)
RULING: The failure to ascertain the reputability of Rosen constituted a violation of

the rules and regulation promulgated by competent authority and comes under
paragraph a.
Villo did not take part in the canvassing of supplies it is true that he was a
member of the bidding committee and he signed the abstract of bid. However, this
act cannot be consider criminal as he relied in fact on the canvass made. Such
reliance may have constituted negligence but certainly not the gross inexcusable
negligence punished by law.
Paragaraph (i) wa not violated because the bidding committee did not
exercise discretion in the award of the contract for purchase of the equipment.
119. People vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 162748-50, 28 March 2006 (Sec.

3j –good defense)
Facts: Private respondents then Calamba Mayor Severino J. Lajara and his fellow
local public o7cials Dennis Lanzanas, Apolonio A. Elasigue, Senador C. Alcalde,
Emilio C. Rodriguez, Efren M. Garcia, Frisco L. Ona, Renato A. Bunyi, Diosdado M.
Lajara, Crispin M. Contreras, Jorge M. Javier were, together with Jesus V. Garcia,
President of Australian Professional Realty (APRI), charged before the
Sandiganbayan under three separate informations for violation of Sections 3(e), (g)
and (j) of Republic Act No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). That
while in the performance of his o7cial function, conniving and confederating,
criminally grant to Austalian Professional Realty, Inc.,the privilege of constructing
the shopping center located at Calamba, Laguna despite knowledge that the said
construction 8rm is not quali8ed not being accredited by the Philippine Contractor’s
Accreditation Board (PCAB) as Class AAA contractor because it has only a paid-up
capital of (P125,000.00), Philippine Currency, when the subject project would cost
from P200 Million to P300 Million, to the prejudice of the government. The terms and
conditions being manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the Municipality of
Calamba such that the actual operation and management of the said shopping
center and the income derived therefrom for a period of twenty 8ve (25) years will
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be directly under the control and supervision of the Australian Professional Realty,
Inc., thus causing undue injury to the Government.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused were guilty?
RULING: NO. The quali8cation of APRI to enter into the MOA with the municipality
having been duly established, private respondents could no longer be held
accountable under Section 3 (j) which punishes the act of public o7cers of
knowingly granting a license, permit, privilege or advantage to a person not
quali8ed or legally entitled thereto.
(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or bene8t in favor
of any person not quali8ed for or not legally entitled to such license, permit,
privilege or advantage or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so
quali8ed or entitled.
120. Mendiola vs. People, 207 SCRA 85 (1992) (Sec. 3j-defense of

good faith)
Facts: The case arises from the issued temporary business permits to the
former stall holders of the Public Angono Market to erect and construct temporary
market stalls on the public grounds where the old market used to stand which was
destroyed by 8re sometime in 1993. These grounds together with the temporary
public market was called Angono Public Market phase I (hereinafter “APM-Phase I”).
Among the stallholders of APM-Phase I granted business permits were Zenaida
Ortillada, Marlon Rosales and Ruben Blanco.
On January 20, 1987, the Angono Municipal Council enacted Resolution No. 7-
1987. It authorizes the construction of Angono Public Market Phase II on a property
owned by the Municipality of Angono adjacent to APM Phase I.
The construction of APM-Phase II was to be 8nanced by a novel scheme: a

contract was entered into between (a) a building contractor (Jose Capistrano), (b) a
Construction Committee representing the stall awardees of APM-Phase II
approximately 157 in number selected by some mode not revealed in the record,
and (c) OIC Miranda, Sr., signing on behalf of the Municipality of Angono. Notably, no
public bidding for the construction of the new market building was contemplated or
provided for in the scheme.
A conUict eventually arises on the preference between the existing temporary

stall holders in APM I and APM II awardees. Thus, resulting to civil case 8led before
the RTC of Binangonan, Rizal for writ of preliminary injunction on the construction of
the new building. Eventually, the new elected o7cers of the newly elected Municipal
council of Angono assailed the validity of Resolution N0. 7-1987 which hold in
abeyance by the Rizal Provincial Board.
On 3 May 1988, the contractor of APM-Phase II, with the aid of the military,
demolished the market stalls of Ortillada, Rosales and Blanco, ostensibly under the
authority of Resolution No. 42-1987 of the Angono Municipal Council and the written
instructions of OIC Miranda. Sr. issued ten (10) months earlier directing demolition
of the market stalls of Ortillada and Rosales. The demolition of all three (3) stalls
was carried out without prior hearing or a court order and without a demolition
permit from petitioner building o7cial. The market stall of Blanco which, like the
stalls of Ortillada and Rosales, was physically in the way of the new building, was
demolished without even being mentioned in Resolution No. 42-1987 and the
written instructions of Miranda, Sr.
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After the said demolition, Zenaida Ortillada, Marlon Rosales and Ruben Blanco
applied for authority of the demolished market stalls. Petitioner issued temporary
renovation building permits to the three (3), subject to the condition set forth in an
accompanying letter of the petitioner, that should the courts or proper higher
authority stop the applicants from renovating or reconstructing the temporary
market stalls, the renovation building permits so issued would thereupon become
ine?ective.
Upon 80% completion of APM Phase II, the contractor requested to the
petitioner for the issuance of certi8cate of partial occupancy. However, petitioner
refused to issue such certi8cates on the reason of the legal impediments due to the
case 8led on the validity of the construction of APM Phase II and the illegal
demolition of those awarded in APM Phase I.
Because of this, DPWH Regional Director 8led 2 criminal case before the
Sandiganbayan: Section 3(j) RA 3019 of the statute includes among the acts of
public o7cers penalized thereunder the following: "Knowingly approving or granting
any license, permit, privilege or bene8t in favor of any person not quali8ed for or
not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or a mere
representative or dummy of one who is not so quali8ed or entitled." and; Section
3(e) of the same statute: “Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted bene8ts, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his o7cial, administrative or judicial functions
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to o7cers and employees of o7ces or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.”
Petitioner was convicted for these two crimes.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was guilty of violating Section 3(j) and 3(e) of RA
3019 for granting license to the three temporary stall holders and causing undue
injury to the government for the delay in partially awarding of spaces on the new
building constructed under APM Phase II.
Ruling: No. When he issued the renovation permits to Zenaida Ortillada,

Marlon Rosales and Ruben Blanco, petitioner Mendiola acted in “good faith under a
mistake of judgment.” Whether Ortillada, Rosales and Blanco were legally entitled
to the temporary renovation permits presented a substantial question of law and it
is well to recall that mistake on a doubtful or di7cult question of law may be the
basis of good faith.
The factors tending to show good faith on the part of petitioner Mendiola
include the following: Firstly, the permits issued by petitioner to Ortillada, Rosales
and Blanco upon their application were merely temporary renovation permits that
authorized the renovation of the stalls demolished by the Phase II contractor. As
pointed out earlier, these renovation permits were quali8ed by the terms of an
accompanying transmittal letter issued by petitioner Mendiola stating that the
renovation permits would become ine?ective should the courts or proper higher
authority retrain the three (3) permittees from renovating their makeshift market
stalls. Secondly, the three (3) permittees were long-time stallholders, having been
so at least since the 8re which had destroyed the old Angono Public Market. They
were not strangers to the Angono Public Market, since they were stallholders, with
temporary stalls, in APM-Phase I. Thirdly, the three (3) permittees had outstanding
and paid-up municipal business permits when petitioner issued them their stall
renovation permits. Fourthly, the permitees' temporary stalls had been demolished
without prior hearing or a court order, or a demolition order from the authorized
building o7cial which was petitioner Mendiola himself.
Furthermore, there are pending suits on the validity of the construction of

APM Phase II. That by allowing or issuing certi8cate of partial occupancy would also
subject him to administrative and criminal o?enses for allowing such occupancy
without attaining clear legal authority.
121. Liberato M. Carabeo vs. C.A., et al., G.R. No. 178000 & G.R. No.
178003, 04 December 2009 (purpose of SALN)
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Facts: Department of Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection Service (DOF-

RIPS), composed of private respondents, 8led a complaint with the O7ce of the
Ombudsman against Carabeo, O7cer-in-Charge (OIC) of the O7ce of the Treasurer
of Parañaque City stating that The net worth of CARABEO, based on his Statements
of Assets Liabilities and Net Worth (SALNs), from the time he commenced
employment at the Parañaque Treasurer’s O7ce in 1981 has ballooned
fromP114,900.00 to approximately P7.5 Million in the year 2004. Equally noticeable
as the drastic increase in his net worth is the steady accumulation of various
expensive properties by CARABEO and his spouse ranging from real properties to
vehicles to club shares ownership. In the last nine years, CARABEO and/or his
spouse was able to purchase numerous real properties. Also, various expensive
vehicles were found to be currently owned by CARABEO and that they were able to
acquire a property in Tagaytay. However, CARABEO did not declare most of the
foregoing vehicles and the property in Tagaytay in his SALNs Thus, CARABEO’s
failure to disclosure amounts to a violation of Section 7 of RA 3019 and Section 8(A)
of RA 6713 requiring him to 8le under oath the true and detailed statement of his
assets as well as those of his spouse. Carabeo was placed under preventive
suspension. Aggrieved, he 8led petitions before the CA, but both are dismissed.
Issue: Whether or not Carabeo’s non-disclosure of assets in his SALNs

constitutes violation of Section 7 of RA 3019 and Section 8(A) of RA 6713?
Held: Yes.InOmbudsman v. Valeroso, the Court explained full the signi8cance of

Section 7 of RA 3019 and 8A of RA 6713, to wit:
Section 8 above, speaks of unlawful acquisition of wealth, the evil sought to be

suppressed and avoided, and Section 7, which mandates full disclosure of wealth in
the SALN, is a means of preventing said evil and is aimed particularly at curtailing
and minimizing, the opportunities for o7cial corruption and maintaining a standard
of honesty in the public service. "Unexplained" matter normally results from "non-
disclosure" or concealment of vital facts. SALN, which all public o7cials and
employees are mandated to 8le, are the means to achieve the policy of
accountability of all public o7cers and employees in the government. By the SALN,
the public are able to monitor movement in the fortune of a public o7cial; it is a
valid check and balance mechanism to verify undisclosed properties and wealth.
Signi8cantly, Carabeo failed to show any requirement under RA 3019 that prior
notice of the non-completion of the SALN and its correction precede the 8ling of
charges for violation of its provisions. Neither are these measures needed for the
charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct, which Carabeo presently faces.
122. Cruz vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 134493, 16 August 2005, 467

SCRA 52 (rule on refund of stolen amount)
Facts: The mayor-elect of the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, Victor Miranda sought
an audit investigation of the municipality’s 1991-1992 8nancial transactions.
Petitioner Buencamino Cruz served as municipal mayor of the town in 1991 until his
term ended in the middle of 1992.
The special audit team discovered that certain anomalous and irregular transactions
transpired during the covered period, the most serious being the purchase of
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construction materials evidenced by Sales Invoices for which payment out of

municipal funds was e?ected twice.
Petitioner pleaded not guilty of the crime charged but the respondent court found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
He nonetheless urges the setting aside of the assailed decision, anchoring his
virtual plea for acquittal on four (4) basic issues, to wit: (1) the fatally Uawed
Information 8led against him; (2) the applicability in his favor of what he tagged as
the Arias Doctrine; (3) the absence of bad faith on his part; and (4) the refund of the
amount representing overpayment. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether the petitioner is guilty of the crime charged.
Ruling: Yes. Refund of the amount subject of the prosecution is not one of
those enumerated under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code which would
totally extinguish criminal liability. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code applies
in a suppletory character as provided for under Article 10 of the same Code.
Lest it be overlooked, the o?ense de8ned under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be
committed even if bad faith is not attendant, the elements of the crime being: (1)
that the accused are public o7cers or private persons charged in conspiracy with
them; (2) that the prohibited act/s were done in the discharge of the public o7cer’s
o7cial, administrative or judicial functions; (3) that they cause undue injury to any
party, whether Government or a private person; (4) that such injury is caused by
giving any unwarranted bene8ts, advantage or preference to such party; and (5)
that the public o7cers acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. In Sistoza vs. Desierto, et al., we held: xxx Evidently, mere
bad faith or partiality and negligence per se are not enough for one to be held liable
under the law since the act of bad faith or partiality must in the 8rst place be
evident or manifest, respectively, while the negligent deed should both be gross
and inexcusable. x x x Given the above perspective, it is abundantly clear that a
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed even through negligence
provided that said negligence is both gross and inexcusable.
123. Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan; 177 SCRA 354 (preventive

suspension)
FACTS:
Special Prosecution O7cer II, Dionisio A. Caoili, conducted a preliminary
investigation of the charge against the petitioner, Quintin S. Doromal, a former
Commissioner of the PCGG, for- violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his shareholdings and position as president
and director of the Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC) which
submitted bids to supply P61 million worth of electronic, electrical, automotive,
mechanical and airconditioning equipment to the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports (or DECS) and the National Manpower and Youth Council (or NMYC).
Accused Doromal, a public o7cer, being then a Commissioner of the

Presidential Commission on Good Government, did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully, participate in a business through the Doromal International Trading
Corporation, a family corporation of which he is the President, and which company
participated in the biddings conducted by the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports and the National Manpower & Youth Council, which act or participation is
prohibited by law and the constitution. He 8led a motion to quah which was then
denied by the Sandiganbayan, and ordered his suspension pendente lite from his
position as PCGG Commissioner and from any other o7ce he may be holding.
ISSUE:
WON the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in suspending the
petitioner from o7ce despite the President's having previously approved his
inde8nite leave of absence "until 8nal decision" in this case?
RULING:
NO. But was ordered that his suspension to be lifted. Section 13 of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) provides:
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SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of bene+ts.-Any public o,cer against

whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this
Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is
pending in court, shall be suspended from o,ce. Should he be
convicted by +nal judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity
bene+ts under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and bene+ts which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been +led against him.
Since the petitioner is an incumbent public o7cial charged in a valid

information with an o?ense punishable under the Constitution and the laws (RA
3019 and PD 807), the law's command that he "shall be suspended from
o7ce"pendente lite must be obeyed. His approved leave of absence is not a bar to
his preventive suspension for, as indicated by the Solicitor General, an approved
leave, whether it be for a 8xed or inde8nite period, may be cancelled or shortened
at will by the incumbent.
Nevertheless, as we held in Layno, Sr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 136 SCRA 536

(1985), a preventive suspension for an inde8nite period of time, such as one that
would last until the case against the incumbent o7cial shall have been 8nally
terminated, would outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression" and
a denial of due process.
The petitioner herein is no less entitled to similar protection. Since his

preventive suspension has exceeded the reasonable maximum period of ninety (90)
days provided in Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines (P.D. 807),
it should now be lifted.
124. Gov. Antonio M. Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan, GR 110503, 4

August 1994 (maximum period of preventive suspension/purpose)
Facts: The above-named accused ANTONIO M. BOLASTIG, PEDRO ASON and

PRUDENCIO MACABENTA, all public o7cers, duly appointed and quali8ed as
such, being the OIC Governor, Provincial Treasurer and Property O7cer
respectively, all of the Province of Samar, and being members of Bids and
Awards Committee responsible for the purchase of o7ce supplies for the
Provincial Government of Samar and while in the performance of their respective
positions, confederating and mutually helping one another and through manifest
partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully enter
into a purchase contract with REYNALDO ESPARAGUERRA, a private citizen, for
the purchase of certain o7ce supplies, namely: one hundred (100) reams of
Onion Skin size 11" x 17" at a unit price of Five Hundred Fifty pesos (P550.00) or
a total price of Fifty-Five Thousand Pesos (P55,000.00), which contract was
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government as the prevailing unit
price for said item was only Fifty-Five Pesos (P55.00) or a total price of Five
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P5,500.00), thereby causing undue injury to the
government in the total amount of Forty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P49,500.00).
Petitioner was arraigned on January 5, 1993, whereupon he entered a plea of

"not guilty."
On January 25, 1993, Special Prosecution O7cer III Wilfredo Orencia moved for
petitioner's suspension, citing sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 which provides in
part:
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Sec. 13. Suspension and loss of bene+ts. — Any incumbent public o7cer
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act
or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any o?ense involving
fraud upon government or public funds or property, whether as a simple or as a
complex o?ense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation,
is pending in court, shall be suspended from o7ce.
Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its discretion in

issuing its resolution despite the failure of the prosecution to show any public
interest to be served, or injury to be prevented, or any other compelling factual
circumstance which justi8es the preventive suspension of petitioner.
Held: The petitioner's contention has no merit. The court trying a case has neither
discretion nor duty to determine whether preventive suspension is required to
prevent the accused from using his o7ce to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his
prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in o7ce. The presumption is that
unless the accused is suspended he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further
acts of malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon a 8nding that there is
probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest
of the accused. The law does not require the court to determine whether the
accused is likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction of the court.
It is to be noted that the ninety-day period of preventive suspension is not

found in sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 but was adopted from sec. 42 of the Civil
Service Decree (P.D. No. 807), 7 which is now sec. 52 of the Administrative Code of
1987. This latter provision states:
Sec. 52. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. —
When the administrative case against the o7cer or employee under preventive
suspension is not 8nally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of
ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a
presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the
service: Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the
fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be
counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
The duration of preventive suspension is thus coeval with the period prescribed for
deciding administrative disciplinary cases. If the case is decided before ninety days,
then the suspension will last less than ninety days, but if the case is not decided
within ninety days, then the preventive suspension must be up to ninety days only.
Similarly, as applied to criminal prosecutions under Republic Act No. 3019,
preventive suspension will last for less than ninety days only if the case is decided
within that period; otherwise, it will continue for ninety days.
The duration of preventive suspension will, therefore, vary to the extent that it is
contingent on the time it takes the court to decide the case but not on account of
any discretion lodged in the court, taking into account the probability that the
accused may use his o7ce to hamper his prosecution.
Indeed, were the Sandiganbayan given the discretion to impose a shorter period of
suspension, say, 80, 70 or 60 days, as petitioner asserts, it would lie in its power not
to suspend the accused at all. That, of course, would be contrary to the command of
sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019.
125. Torres vs. Garchitorena, GR 153666, 27 December 2002 (pre-

suspension hearing necessary)
Facts: Susana Realty, Incorporated (SRI for brevity) is the registered owner of two
(2) parcels of land located at Noveleta, Cavite. These parcels of land are adjacent to
the sea and over time portions thereof were submerged by sea water. SRI installed
Domingo Fernandez as its caretaker on the property. Mayor Dionisio Torres of
Noveleta, Cavite caused the leveling and reclamation of the submerged portion of
SRI’s property for the relocation of displaced squatters from Tirona, Cavite who were
living along river banks and esteros. Domingo Fernandez protested to the Mayor
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informing him that his employer owned the property being levelled and reclaimed at
the instance of the Mayor. However, the latter ignored the protests of Fernandez
and continued with the leveling and reclamation of the property. Representatives of
SRI conferred with the Mayor and furnished him with copies of its titles over the
property. The SRI had the property surveyed to con8rm that the portions of the land
reclaimed by the Mayor were within the perimeter of its titled property. SRI sent a
letter to the Mayor formally protesting the leveling and reclamation of the
submerged portion of its property and demanding that the Mayor desist from
continuing with said reclamation. The Mayor and representatives of SRI had a
conference during which the Mayor informed SRI that he had already spent
P1,000.000,00 for the reclamation and o?ered to help SRI in connection with its
other projects in Cavite provided that SRI will no longer 8le the suit to enjoin the
reclamation. SRI requested for the deferment of the reclamation project to enable it
to study the o?er of the Mayor. However, SRI learned that in the interim, 8ve
families of squatters had already occupied portions of the reclaimed area; and that
more squatters were due to arrive.
SRI 8led a petition with the Regional Trial Court for prohibition with a plea for
injunctive relief against the Mayor, the Municipal Building O7cial and Municipal
Engineer Enrico Alvarez to enjoin them from reclaiming and leveling the property. In
their Answer to the petition, Torres and Alvarez alleged inter alia that they were not
aware that the subject property was titled in the name of SRI and that the records of
the Assessor’s O7ce failed to show that the property had been declared for taxation
purposes under the name of SRI. The Mayor insisted that SRI abandoned the
property and justi8ed his acts on the ground that the reclamation of the property
was for the socialized housing program of his constituents.
Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in

ordering their suspension from o7ce pendente lite without the conduct of a full-
blown hearing.
Ruling: No. As to the submission of the accused that a full-blown pre-suspension

hearing be 8rst conducted before the resolution of the motion to suspend accused,
su7ce it to state that the requisite pre-suspension hearing is precisely intended
solely to determine the applicability of Section 13, of R.A. 3019, and this we now do.
What is required only is that the accused be given a fair and adequate opportunity
to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings against him and this
requirement has been complied with when the accused was heard on the matter
through various pleadings as heretofore stated.
Besides, a requirement that the guilt of the accused must 8rst be established in the
pre-suspension proceeding before trial proper can proceed would negate the ruling
of the court that the ‘xxx mandatory suspension .... requires at the same time that
the hearing be expeditious, and not unduly protracted such as to thwart the prompt
suspension envisioned by the Act’ and make the trial proper a surplusage.’
We are in full accord with the disquisitions and ratiocinations of the Sandiganbayan.
The suspension pendente lite by the Sandiganbayan of petitioners who were
accorded full opportunity to ventilate the issue of the insu7ciency of the
information for said court, through the 8ling of pleadings, is inevitable and
unassailable, considering our a7rmation of the validity of the information 8led
against them.
126. Rios vs. Sandiganbayan, 279 SCRA 581 (period of preventive

suspension under LGU)
Facts: An information was 8led against petitioner who is the incumbent Mayor of
the Municipality of San Fernando, Romblon for alleged unauthorized disposition of
con8scated lumber, in violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Before his arraignment, petitioner 8led a “Motion to
Quash Information and Recall Warrant of Arrest on the ground that the information
was invalid as there was no probable cause to hold him liable for violation of Section
3(e), R.A. No. 3019.
The OSP 8led a “Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite,” to which

petitioner 8led an “Opposition,” reiterating the same ground stated in his motion to
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quash. The Sandiganbayan overruled the argument in its resolution. Thereupon,

petitioner 8led a veri8ed petition with this Court for alleged invalidity of the
information. The court denies this petition on the ground that Sandiganbayan
committed no grave abuse of discretion in rendering the questioned judgment.
When petitioner was arraigned, he entered a plea of “not guilty” no longer
questioning the validity of the information against him. Sandiganbayan granted the
OSP’s motion to suspend. Petitioner 8led a motion for reconsideration which was
subsequently denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred when it provided for a suspension of 90

days in clear disregard of the provision of Local Government Code
Ruling: Yes. The Sandiganbayan erred in imposing a 90 day suspension upon

petitioner for the single case 8led against him. Under Section 63 (b) of the Local
Government Code, “any single preventive suspension of local elective o7cials shall
not extend beyond sixty (60) days.”
127. Villasenor, et.al. vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 180700, 4 March 2008

(preventive suspension under admin and criminal cases)
Facts: The Quezon City Manor Hotel went ablaze resulting in the death of seventy-
four (74) people and injuries to scores of others. Investigation into the tragedy
revealed that the hotel was a veritable 8re trap. Petitioners, together with other
o7cials of the City Engineering O7ce of Quezon City, are presently
facing criminal charges before the 5th Division of the Sandiganbayan for the crime
of multiple homicide through reckless imprudence and for violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019. They were also charged administrativelywith gross negligence,
gross misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service in connection
with the Manor Hotel inferno. In the administrative case, petitioners Villaseñor and
Mesa were preventively suspended for a period of six (6) months. During the
pendency of the criminal case, respondent special prosecutor Louella Mae Oco-
Pesquera 8led a motion for suspension pendente lite of petitioners. Petitioners
oppose the motion, contending that they had already been suspended for six (6)
months relative to the administrative case, based on the same facts and
circumstances. They posited that any preventive suspension that may be warranted
in the criminal case was already absorbed by the preventive suspension in the
administrative case because both the criminal and administrative cases were
anchored on the same set of facts. The trial court granted the suspension for a
period of ninety (90) days. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether preventive suspension in an administrative proceedings bar

preventive suspension in a criminal case founded on the same facts and
circumstances?
Ruling: No. The criminal and administrative cases are distinct from each other. The
settled rule is that criminal and civil cases are altogether diAerent from
administrative matters, such that the =rst two will not inevitably govern
or aAect the third and vice versa. Verily, administrative cases may proceed
independently of criminal proceedings.
Signi8cantly, there are three kinds of remedies that are available against a
public o5cer for impropriety in the performance of his powers and the
discharge of his duties: (1) civil, (2) criminal, and (3) administrative. These
remedies may be invoked separately, alternately, simultaneously or
successively. Sometimes, the same oAense may be the subject of all three
kinds of remedies.
Defeat of any of the three remedies will not necessarily preclude resort to
other remedies or aAect decisions reached thereunder, as diAerent
degrees of evidence are required in these several actions. In criminal cases,
proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed whereas a mere preponderance of
evidence will su7ce in civil cases. In administrative proceedings, only substantial
evidence is required.
Syllabus:
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Preventive suspension under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 is

mandatory. The court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to determine
whether preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his
o7ce to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continuing committing
malfeasance in o7ce.
Preventive suspension not a penalty

Imposed during the pendency of proceedings, preventive suspension is not a
penalty in itself. It is merely a measure of precaution so that the employee who is
charged may be separated, for obvious reasons, from o7ce. Thus, preventive
suspension is distinct from the penalty. While the former may be imposed on a
respondent during the investigation of the charges against him, the latter may be
meted out to him at the 8nal disposition of the case.
Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 3019 not a penal provision but a procedural one
It is petitioners’ contention that as a penal statute, the provision on preventive
suspension should be strictly construed against the State and liberally in their favor.
We cannot agree. Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 on preventive suspension is not a
penal provision. It is procedural in nature. Hence, the strict construction rule 8nds
no application.
Automatic lift of suspension after ninety (90) days

It must be borne in mind that the preventive suspension of petitioners will only last
ninety (90) days, not the entire duration of the criminal case like petitioners seem to
think. Indeed, it would be constitutionally proscribed if the suspension were to be of
an inde8nite duration or for an unreasonable length of time. The Court has thus laid
down the rule that preventive suspension may not exceed the maximum period of
ninety (90) days, in consonance with Presidential Decree No. 807, 36 now Section 52
of the Administrative Code of 1987
128. Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan, 288 SCRA 328 [1998] ( Public

o5cials, application of RA 3019)
Facts: Petitioners -- Perla Segovia, Reynaldo Santiago, and Winifredo SM Pangilinan

-- all hold regular executive positions in the National Power Corporation (NPC). They
-- together with two other o7cers who have since resigned from the NPC, namely:
Gilberto A. Pastoral and Cecilia D. Vales -- were designated by the NPC Board to
compose the Contracts Committee for said NPC’s “Mindanao Grid LDC &
SCADA/EMS System Operation Control Center and Facilities Project.”
The Contracts Committee thus constituted conducted the prequali8cation and

bidding procedures for the project. The lowest and second lowest bidders were the
Joint Venture of INPHASE and T & D, and Urban Consolidated Constructors, Inc.,
respectively. The Technical Task Force on Bid Evaluation of the NPC reviewed all the
bids submitted and recommended approval of the results. The contracts Committee,
however, declared the lowest bidder (Joint Venture) disquali8ed after veri8cation
from the Philippines Contractors Accredition Board that that group, as well as the
second lowest bidder (Urban) had been “downgraded,” thereby rending both
ineligible as bidders.
The Contracts Committee also stated that since a review of relevant factors
disclosed that the other bids had exceeded the Approved Agency Estimates and the
Allowable Government Estimates for Options A and B of the Project, it was was
needful for the NPC Board to declare a failure of bidding and direct a re-bidding. The
recommendation was unanimously approved by the NPC Board; but for reasons not
appearing on record (and, in any event, not relevant to the inquiry), the project was
eventually cancelled.
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Obviously feeling aggrieved by the turn of events, Urban 8led a complaint with the
O7ce of the Ombudsman against the Chairman and Members of the Board of
Directors of NPC
They are charged with a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 of having in “one way
or the other extended undue advantage to Joint Venture through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence
The Sandiganbayan handed down its Resolution by suspending them for a period of
ninety (90) days. The Sandiganbayan held that the suspension was mandated
under the law upon a 8nding that a proper preliminary investigation had been
conducted , the information was valid, and the accused were charged with any of
the crimes speci8ed in the law.
Issue: Whether it is mandatory or discretionary for the Sandiganbayan to place

under preventive suspension public o7cers who stand accused before it, pursuant
to said Section 13 of RA.3019?
Ruling: YES. The 8rmly entrenched doctrine is that under Section 13 of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Law, the suspension of a public o7cer is mandatory
after a determination has been made of the validity of the information in a pre-
suspension hearing conducted for that purpose.
“This Court has ruled that under Section 13 of the anti-graft law, the suspension of a
public o7cer is mandatory after the validity of the information has been upheld in a
pre-suspension hearing conducted for that purpose. This pre-suspension hearing is
conducted to determine basically the validity of the information, from which the
Court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on
the merits of the case, or withhold the suspension of the latter and dismissed the
case, or correct any part of the proceeding which impairs its validity. That hearing
may be treated in the same manner as a challenge to the validity of the information
by way of a motion to quash (See People vs. Albano, etc., et. al., L-45376-77, July
28, 1988, 163 SCRA 511)
129. Halili vs. CIR, 136 SCRA 112 (1985) (violation of section 4b, RA
3019)
Facts: The cases involve disputes regarding claims for overtime of more than 500
bus drivers and conductors of Halili Transit. Litigation initially commenced with the
8ling of a complaint for overtime with the defunct Court of Industrial Relations.
While the case was before the Court of Industrial Relations, the union of the workers
and the employer executed an agreement whereby Halili Transit bound itself to
deliver a parcel of land and P25k to the Union, as full settlement. So a deed of
conveyance was executed transferring the land to the union, in trust for the
members therein.
The union, through Atty. Pineda 8led an urgent motion with the Ministry of Labor
requesting for the authority to sell the land. Motion was granted but the buyer was
hesitant to purchase the land because there was a law that requires an order from a
court as authority to sell properties in trust. So Atty. Pineda 8led a motion with the
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SC requesting authority to sell. The SC merely noted the motion in a resolution.

Nevertheless, Atty. Pineda 8led and was granted an authority to sell by the labor
arbiter
Now, Atty. Espinas, alleged original counsel for the union 8led a motion for a
temporary mandatory restraining order to require both Atty. Pineda and the union to
deposit the amounts received by them with the NLRC. Manila Bank was impleaded.
Thereafter, the SC issued the temporary mandatory restraining order. Later on, the
SC also declared the decision of the labor arbiter to grant the authority to sell null
and void.
Issue: whether a private attorney may be held liable criminally under the Anti-Graft
Act for knowingly inducing a public o7cial to commit an o?ense.
Ruling: Atty. Benjamin Pineda could be held liable under Section 4(b) of R.A. No.
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) which makes it unlawful for any person
knowingly to induce or cause any public o7cial to commit any of the o?enses
de8ned in Section 3 of said act. Section 3 enumerates the corrupt practices which
public o7cers may be prosecuted for. Atty. Pineda knowingly induced or caused
Labor Arbiter Valenzuela to issue the questioned orders without or beyond the
latter’s authority and to which orders the former was not entitled, considering that
he was not the sole and proper representative.
130. Engr. Ricardo Santillano v. People, GR 175045-46, 3 March 2010

(private oAender-Sec. 9 RA 3019)
Facts: Sandiganbayan found Santilliano guilty guilty of three counts of

violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019 in the informations 8led
before it. In Criminal case No. 24467 involves the construction of a public market
wherein Ecleo entered into a contract with Santilliano for phases II to IV of the
project. Also, Ecleo and Navarra approved and released funds to santilliano. Further,
it was shown that there was overpayment to Santilliano.
Santilliano in his defense, argued that he was justi8ed in collecting additional

payments because of additional work. Such argument was rejected by the
Sandiganbayan.
Issue: Whether or not Santilliano is guilty of violating 3(e) of RA 3019?
Held: Yes. Santilliano was indisputably on the receiving end of the overpayments
and even issued receipts for them. He was unable to justify the excessive payment
by showing a written agreements with the municipality pursuant to the
implementing rules and regulations of P.D. 1694
Clearly, under section 9 of RA 3019, the law punishes not only public o7cers who
committed prohibited acts under section 3, but also those who induce or cause the
public o7cer to commit those o?enses.
131. People vs. Sandiganbayan and Alas; 16 February 2005, 451

SCRA 413 (Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan)
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Facts: Two separate informations1 for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019,

otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, were 8led with the
Sandiganbayan against Efren L. Alas. The charges emanated from the alleged
anomalous advertising contracts entered into by Alas, in his capacity as President
and Chief Operating O7cer of the Philippine Postal Savings Bank (PPSB), with
Bagong Buhay Publishing Company which purportedly caused damage and
prejudice to the government.
Alas 8led a motion to quash the informations for lack of jurisdiction, which motion
was vehemently opposed by the prosecution. After considering the arguments of
both parties, the respondent court ruled that PPSB was a private corporation and
that its o7cers, particularly herein respondent Alas, did not fall under
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction.
Dissatis8ed, the People, through the O7ce of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), 8led a
petition arguing, in essence, that the PPSB was a government-owned or controlled
corporation as the term was de8ned under Section 2(13) of the Administrative Code
of 1987. Likewise, in further de8ning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, RA 8249
did not make a distinction as to the manner of creation of the government-owned or
controlled corporations for their o7cers to fall under its jurisdiction. Hence, being
President and Chief Operating O7cer of the PPSB at the time of commission of the
crimes charged, respondent Alas came under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether the case falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Ruling: Yes. Section 2(13) of EO 292 de8nes government-owned or controlled

corporations as follows: x x x From the foregoing, PPSB +ts the bill as a government-
owned or controlled corporation, and organized and incorporated under the
Corporation Code as a subsidiary of the Philippine Postal Corporation (PHILPOST).
More than 99% of the authorized capital stock of PPSB belongs to the government
while the rest is nominally held by its incorporators who are/were themselves
o7cers of PHILPOST. The creation of PPSB was expressly sanctioned by Section 32
of RA 7354, otherwise known as the Postal Service Act of 1992, for purposes of,
among others, “to encourage and promote the virtue of thrift and the habit of
savings among the general public, especially the youth and the marginalized sector
in the countryside x x x” and to facilitate postal service by “receiving collections and
making payments, including postal money orders.”
The legislature, in mandating the inclusion of “presidents, directors or trustees, or

managers of government-owned or controlled corporations” within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, has consistently refrained from making any distinction with
respect to the manner of their creation. The deliberate omission, in our view, clearly
reveals the intention of the legislature to include the presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of both types of corporations within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan whenever they are involved in graft and corruption. Had it been
otherwise, it could have simply made the necessary distinction. But it did not.
132. Carabeo vs. Court of Appeals, GR 178000-178003, 4 December

2009 (Correction of SALN)
FACTS: The Department of Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection Service 8led a

complaint with the O7ce of the Ombudsman against Carabeo, O7cer-in-Charge of
the O7ce of the Treasurer of Paranaque City. The complaint alleged that based on
his SALN, Carabeo's net worth has ballooned a huge amount in the year 2004.
Equally noticeable as the drastic increase of his net worth is the steady
accumulation of various expensive properties by CARABEO and his spouse ranging
from real properties to vehicles to club shares ownership. Carabeo did not declare
most of his vehicles in his SALNs. Carabeo's failure to disclose his and his spouse'
ownership of the Tagaytay property and vehicles in the pertinent SALNs amounts to
a violation of Section 7 of RA 3019 and Section 8(A) of RA 6713 requiring him to 8le
under oath the true and detaile statement of his assets as well as those of hsis
spouse. The DOF-RIPS prayed that the O7ce of the Ombudsman issue an order
8ling the appropriate criminal informations against Carabeo. Secretary Teves was
directed to place Carabeo under preventive suspension for a period not to exceed
six months without pay. CA issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining ORder enjoining
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the enforcement of Carabeo's preventive suspension and subsequently dismissed

the petitions 8led by Carabeo.
ISSUE: Whether Carabeo's non-disclosure of assets in his SALN constitutes a

violation of RA 3019.
RULING: Yes. While Section 10 of RA 6713 indeed allows for corrective measures,
Carabeo is charged not only with violation of RA 6173, but also with violation of the
RA 3019. Carabeo failed to show any requirement under RA 3019 that prior notice of
the non-completion of the SALN and its correction precede the 8ling of charges for
violation of its provisions. Neither are these measures needed for the charges of
dishonesty and grave misconduct, which Carabeo presently faces. Carabeo cannot
claim any right against, or damage or injury that he is bound to su?er from the
issuance of the preventive suspension order, since there is no vested right to a
public o7ce, or even an absolute right to hold it. Public o7ce is not property but a
“public trust or agency.” While their right to due process may be relied upon by
public o7cials to protect their security of tenure which, in a limited sense, is
analogous to property, such fundamental right to security of tenure cannot be
invoked against a preventive suspension order which is a preventive measure, not
imposed as a penalty. An order of preventive suspension is not a demonstration of a
public o7cial’s guilt, which can be pronounced only after a trial on the merits.
S. Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards (R.A. No. 6713)

133. Dr. Roger Posadas and Dr. Rolando Dayco vs. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. Nos. 168951& 169000, 17 July 2013 (Public o5ce-public trust;
private practice of profession)
FACTS: Dr. Roger Posadas was the Chancellor of UP Diliman. Dr. Dayco appointed
him as Project Director of TMC Project and as consultant of the same. The COA
conducted an investigation and suspended the payment of P30,000 honorarium per
month to Dr. Posadas.
The Sandiganbayan found both Dr. Posadas and Dr. Dayco guilty of violation
of R.A. 3019 and RA 6713
ISSUE: Whether petitioner are criminally liable
RULING: NO. The misstep was essentially of the administrative kind. The worst that
could be said of Dr. Dayco and Dr. Posadas is they showed no sensitivity to the fact
that, although Dr. Dayco may have honestly believed that he had the authority to
make those appointments, he was actually appointing his own superior, the person
who made him OIC Chancellor, however quali8ed he might be, to those enviable
positions. But this should have been treated as a mere administrative o?ense.
All indications are that they acted in good faith. They were scientists, not lawyers,
hence unfamiliar with Civil Service rules and regulations. The world of the academe
is usually preoccupied with studies, researches, and lectures. Thus, those
appointments appear to have been taken for granted at UP. It did not invite any
immediate protest from those who could have had an interest in the positions. It
was only after about a year that the COA Resident Auditor issued a notice of
suspension covering payments out of the Project to all UP personnel involved,
including Dr. Posadas.
134. Brgy. Chairman Rodomiel J. Domingo vs. Ombudsman, et.al.,

GR 176127, 30 January 2009 ( No penalty under Sec 4, RA 6713)
Facts: A complaint-a7davit was 8led before the O7ce of the Ombudsman by

Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) o7cials (respondents) against petitioner as Barangay
Chairman and Barangay Treasurer Lao, for malversation, falsi8cation of public
document, dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Respondents alleged that petitioner and Lao misappropriated the cash advance
taken by respondents from the SK funds in the year 2002. They added that
petitioner gave a false statement in his Justi8cation supporting the 2003 Barangay
Budget and Expenditures by declaring that his barangay had no incumbent SK
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o7cials at that time contrary to the fact that respondents are duly elected and
incumbent SK o7cials of the barangay. Petitioner denied the allegations in his
counter-a7davit and asserted that all 8nancial transactions of the Barangay,
particularly the expenditures, were supported by pertinent documents and properly
liquidated. The OMB rendered judgment 8nding petitioner guilty of violation of
Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713.
The charge of misappropriation was dismissed for being premature since the audit
of the subject barangay transaction had not been concluded by the O7ce of the
City Auditor. The OMB also dismissed the charge of falsi8cation of public document
on the ground that questions pertaining to the authenticity of a signature in a
document necessitate judicial determination. Respondents did not appeal from the
dismissal of these charges.
However, petitioner was held administratively liable for the irregular submission of a
falsi8ed instrument to the Manila Barangay Bureau (MBB) in connection with his
barangay’s 2003 budget.
Petitioner 8led a motion for reconsideration which the OMB denied. After denial of
his motion for reconsideration, petitioner 8led a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court denied the petition and a7rmed the OMB’s decision in
toto.
Issue: Whether petitioner is guilty of violation of Section 4(b) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6713 and is subject for penalty.
Ruling: No. The charge of violation of Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 deserves further
comment. The provision commands that "public o7cials and employees shall
perform and discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence,
professionalism, intelligence and skill." Said provision merely enunciates
"professionalism as an ideal norm of conduct to be observed by public servants, in
addition to commitment to public interest, justness and sincerity, political neutrality,
responsiveness to the public, nationalism and patriotism, commitment to
democracy and simple living. Following this perspective, Rule V of the Implementing
Rules of R.A. No. 6713 adopted by the Civil Service Commission mandates the grant
of incentives and rewards to o7cials and employees who demonstrate exemplary
service and conduct based on their observance of the norms of conduct laid down in
Section 4. In other words, under the mandated incentives and rewards system,
o7cials and employees who comply with the high standard set by law would be
rewarded. Those who fail to do so cannot expect the same favorable treatment.
However, the Implementing Rules does not provide that they will have to be
sanctioned for failure to observe these norms of conduct. Indeed, Rule X of the
Implementing Rules a7rms as grounds for administrative disciplinary action only
acts "declared unlawful or prohibited by the Code." Rule X speci8cally mentions at
least twenty-three (23) acts or omissions as grounds for administrative disciplinary
action. Failure to abide by the norms of conduct under Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713
is not one of them.
135. Filipina Samson vs. Julia Restrivera, GR 178454, 28 March 2011

(No penal clause under Sec 4, RA 6713 but corresponding
administrative liabiltity)
Facts: Petitioner is a government employee, being a department head of the

Population Commission with o7ce at the Provincial Capitol, Trece Martirez City,
Cavite. Sometime in March 2001, petitioner agreed to help her friend, respondent
Julia A. Restrivera, to have the latter’s land located in Carmona, Cavite, registered
under the Torrens System. Petitioner said that the expenses would reach P150,000
and accepted P50,000 from respondent to cover the initial expenses for the titling of
respondent’s land. However, petitioner failed to accomplish her task because it was
found out that the land is government property. When petitioner failed to return
the P50,000, respondent sued her for estafa. Respondent also 8led an
administrative complaint for grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a public
o7cer against petitioner before the O7ce of the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of violating Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713
and suspended her from o7ce for six months without pay. The Ombudsman ruled
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that petitioner failed to abide by the standard set in Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713
and deprived the government of the bene8t of committed service when she
embarked on her private interest to help respondent secure a certi8cate of title over
the latter’s land
Issue: WON petitioner is not guilty of misconduct
Held: It is wrong for petitioner to say that since the estafa case against her was
dismissed, she cannot be found administratively liable. It is settled that
administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings, and may
continue despite the dismissal of the criminal charges.
In the context of Section 4 (A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713, the observance of

professionalism also means upholding the integrity of public o7ce by endeavoring
"to discourage wrong perception of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue
patronage.
While it may be true that she did not actually deal with the other government
agencies for the processing of the titles of the subject property, petitioner’s act of
accepting the money from respondent with the assurance that she would work for
the issuance of the title is already enough to create a perception that she is a 8xer.
the Implementing Rules does not provide that they will have to be sanctioned for
failure to observe these norms of conduct
136. Ombudsman vs. Madriaga and Bernardo, GR 164316, 27

September 2006 (Sec 5 RA 6713-duty to reply letters)
Facts: The case at bar is the decision of the O7ce of the Ombudsman for the
suspension of private respondents for 6 months for the violation of Section 5(a) of
Republic Act No. 6713. Private respondents were school principal and classroom
teacher who was designated as canteen manager of San Juan Elementary School.
Private respondents failed to promptly provide for the requested 8nancial
statements for the period from February to August 2000.
Graft Investigation O7cer Helen M. Acuña, by Decision of May 28, 2001,

found respondents guilty of violation of Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 6713 reading:
SEC. 5. Duties of Public O,cials and Employees. - In the performance of their

duties, all public o7cials and employees are under obligation to:
(a) Act promptly on letters and requests. - All public o7cials and employees
shall, within =fteen (15) working days from receipt thereof, respond to
letters, telegrams or other means of communications sent by the
public. The reply must contain the action taken on the request, and imposed upon
them the penalty of reprimand.
Hence, they were found guilty of conduct grossly prejudicial to the best
interest of the service under section 22(t) of Rule XIV, of the Omnibus Rule
Implementing Book V of EO 292, the penalty is 6 months suspension. A copy of the
said decision was sent to the DECS for proper implementation.
Motion for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation was both denied.
Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the authority to impose administrative
functions to Public O7cials.
Ruling: No. The authority of the Ombudsman to impose penalty to public

o7cials are merely recommendatory. Article XI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution
grants petitioner administrative disciplinary power to: (1) Investigate on its own, or
on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public o7cial, employee,
o7ce or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper,
or ine7cient, (3) Direct the o7cer concerned to take appropriate action against a
public o7cial or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension,
demotion, 8ne, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
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Section 15(3) of R.A. No. 6770 echoes the constitutional grant to petitioner of
the power to "recommend" the imposition of penalty on erring public o7cials and
employees; “Direct the o7cer concerned to take appropriate action against a public
o7cer or employee at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty
required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, 8ne, censure,
or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith…”
The word "recommend" must be taken in conjunction with the phrase "and
ensure compliance therewith." The proper interpretation should be that the
Ombudsman has the authority to determine the administrative liability of
a public o5cial or employee at fault, and direct and compel the head of
the o5ce or agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed.
137. Wilfredo PenaVor vs. Ligorio Naval, CA-G.R. SP No. 59574, 29

May 2001 (Sec 5 RA 6713-duty to reply to letters)
FACTS: Respondent Ligorio Naval wrote a letter 2 to the then Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Ernesto Garilao, regarding the Alleged
Fake/Spurious Land Use Conversion Order presented by the Household Development
Corporation . On April 15, 1999, respondent Naval 8led a complaint before the
O7ce of the Ombudsman against Ricardo San Andres, Director of the Center for
Land Use, Policy, Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI-2) and petitioner Wilfredo
PeñaUor, Assistant Secretary for Policy, Planning and Legal A?airs, both of the DAR,
for violation of Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards of Public O7cials and Employees. Naval's allegation therein was that San
Andres and PeñaUor failed to answer respondent's letter concerning the forgery of a
DAR conversion order supposedly signed by then Undersecretary Hector D. Soliman
on January 7, 1997. Respondents WILFREDO M. PEÑAFLOR, and RICARDO SAN
ANDRES both of the Department of Agrarian Reform guilty of violation of Section 5
(a) of Republic Act 6713. , PenaUor 8led his Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision on the ground that the O7ce of the Ombudsman seriously erred in failing
to consider that Naval had already been informed by DAR of its action on the matter
subject of his request. DAR o7cials, including the petitioner, have substantially
complied with the requirements of Section 5 (a) of RA 6713. The petitioner also
submitted that under the law, the complainant is not entitled as a matter of right to
a status report on the matter that is the subject of an investigation.
ISSUE: WON the O7ce of the Ombudsman erred in not 8nding that the DAR
and the petitioner have substantially complied with the duty imposed under Section
5(a), RA 6713?
RULING: Yes, but still the case is 8nal and executory and not anymore appealable.
The O7ce of the Ombudsman erred in not 8nding that the DAR and the petitioner
have substantially complied with the duty imposed under Section 5(a), RA 6713. As
the records show, DAR has not been remiss in its duty to the respondent, since it
had replied and informed the respondent of the action it had taken when it issued
him a copy of the First Indorsement dated July 13, 1998. It had therefore su7ciently
complied with the 8rst duty imposed by RA 6713 by acknowledging complainant's
letter.
The sanction attached to Section 5 (a) of RA 6713 should only be made to

bear on public o7cials for requests or communications that are legitimate. Without
this condition, the potential for the provision's abuse is endless. Public o7cials, like
the petitioner, who are already saddled with a multitude of concerns, will be
deluged with all kinds of requests, including frivolous and indulgent ones, which
they must acknowledge under the pain of administrative sanction. The respondent
had already known that the matter was under investigation by the DAR as he was
informed thru a copy of the indorsement that his letter-request had been referred to
the proper channels. His rights under RA 6713 has been satis8ed. Since the
investigation was still ongoing, the petitioner should not be penalized
(NOTE: di sya part ng RA6713 pero eto lng ung rayionale bkit dismissed ung case)
However the other arguments of the petitioner as the decision appealed from is
already 8nal and executory. A judgment becomes "8nal and executory" by operation
of law. Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act provides that any order, directive or
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decision of the O7ce of the Ombudsman imposing a penalty of public censure or

reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month's salary shall be 8nal and
unappealable. 9 In this case, the petitioner has no more recourse in law due to the
fact that the decision has been rendered 8nal and unappealable.
138. Gil Valera vs. Ombudsman, GR 167278, 27 February 2008 (Sec.

5 –recommending relative to a private enterprise)
FACTS: Valera was appointed by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as Deputy

Commissioner of Customs in charge of the Revenue Collection Monitoring Group. He
8led in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, for and on behalf of the Bureau of
Customs, a collection case with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment in unpaid duties and taxes against Steel Asia Manufacturing Corporation
(SAMC), which utilized fraudulent tax credit certi8cates in the payment of its duties.
Petitioner and SAMC entered into a compromise agreement wherein the latter
o?ered to pay on a staggered basis through thirty (30) monthly equal installments
duties and taxes sought to be collected in the civil case. Director of the Criminal
Investigation and Detention Group of the Philippine National Police 8led a letter-
complaint against petitioner with the Ombudsman that the latter had compromised
the case against the Steel Asia Manufacturing Corporation without proper authority
from the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. Such illegal acts of Atty. Gil A.
Valera indeed caused undue injury to the government by having deprived the
government of its right to collect the legal interest, surcharges, litigation expenses
and damages and gave the Steel Asia unwarranted bene8ts. Further investigation
disclosed that Atty. Gil A. Valera while being a Bureau of Customs o7cial directly
and indirectly had 8nancial or pecuniary interest in the CACTUS CARGOES SYSTEMS
a brokerage whose line of business or transaction, in connection with which, he
intervenes or takes part in his o7cial capacity by way of causing the employment of
his brother-in-law, Ariel Manongdo, thus, violating 3(h) of RA 3019 and RA 6713 and
Section 4, RA 3019 as against Ariel Manongdo. The 4 th Division of Court of Appeals
found enough evidence to substantiate the second and third charges and issued
and promulgated its assailed decision a7rming the decision of respondent Deputy
Ombudsman 8nding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is guilty of recommending a “family” in a private

enterprise.
HELD: The Matillano letter-complaint as well as its supporting a7davits made clear
allegations under oath that petitioner recommended his brother-in-law, Ariel
Manongdo, for employment with Cactus Cargoes Systems, Inc. (CCSI), a customs
brokerage 8rm which necessarily deals on a regular basis with petitioner’s o7ce.
Further, the Matillano letter-complaint also categorically asserted that petitioner
traveled to Hongkong without obtaining the proper clearance. These allegations
under oath constitute substantial evidence required in administrative proceedings.
On the other hand, petitioner did not deny that Ariel Manongdo is his brother-
in-law or that CCSI has regular transactions with his o7ce. Neither did he deny that
he failed to comply with the requirement of presidential authority to travel abroad.
It is thus unfortunate that instead of demonstrating that he is innocent of the
charges, the petitioner instead resorted to unavailing technicalities to disprove the
allegations. The Supreme Court cannot weigh once more the evidence submitted
not only before the O7ce of the Ombudsman but also before the Court of Appeals.
All told, we are convinced that there is substantial evidence to hold petitioner liable
for the second and third charges against him.
R.A. No. 6713 itself prohibits the act of public o7cials and employees during
their incumbency to recommend any person to any position in a private enterprise
which has a regular or pending o7cial transaction with their o7ce. In fact, family
relation is de8ned under Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 which, according to the said
section, “shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or a7nity in the
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third civil degree.” Thus, we need not look beyond the provisions of R.A. No. 3019
to hold that a brother-in-law falls within the de8nition of family under Section 3(d)
thereof.
139. Anonuevo, Jr. et.al, vs. CA, GR 152998, 23 September 2003

(Solicitation of gifts-RA 6713)
Facts: Sgt. Rodrigo Almazan and Giovanni Gumalo, both of the O7ce of the
Resident Ombudsman for Manila International Airport Authority-Ninoy Aquino
International Airport/Duty Free Phils., Inc. 8led a complaint against Simon Añonuevo,
Jr., Acting Examiner, Vicente Estrella, Customs Operations O7cer I, Nora Linda
Cosme, Customs Operations O7cer V, and Ricardo Concha, Acting Principal
Customs Appraiser, all of the Bureau of Customs, NAIA, Pasay City for violation of
Section 7(d) of Republic Act No. 6713. They alleged that in the evening of October
12, 1999, petitioners, while assigned at the NAIA customs lanes numbers 9 and 10,
received money handed directly or inserted in the passport of arriving passengers of
the Northwest Airlines Uight from Detroit, USA, and the Canadian Airlines
Uight. They further alleged that Cosme and Concha received their share of the
money collected by the petitioners. The Resident Ombudsman Team was able to
record on video a segment of the incident using the surveillance camera of the
Emergency Operations Center of the NAIA.
The Ombudsman placed the four o7cials under preventive suspension for six
months without pay, considering that the evidence against them was strong. The
said o7cials 8led their Joint A7davit and an Urgent Motion to Lift Order of
Preventive Suspension.
Ombudsman issued an order 8nding the petitioners guilty of violation of

Section 7(d) of Republic Act No. 6713 (Solicitation or Acceptance of Gifts) with the
penalty of one (1) year suspension without pay. The Ombudsman denied the Motion
for Reconsideration of the above decision. Petitioners 8led a special civil action for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals which was dismissed. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied the same. Hence, this petition for
review.
Issue: Whether the petitioners are guilty of violation of Section 7(d) of Republic Act
No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
o7cials and Employees.
Ruling: Yes. Petitioners are guilty of violation of Section 7(d) of Republic Act No.
6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
o7cials and Employees.
Solicitation or acceptance of gifts.- Public o7cials and employees shall not solicit or
accept, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or
anything of monetary value from any person in the course of their o7cial duties or
in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may
be a?ected by the functions of their o7ce.
The 8rst video tape of the monitoring sortie of October 12, 1999, in V8 format
contained relevant segments of the footage depicting petitioners receiving sums of
money from arriving passengers of the Canadian Airlines Uight. The second video
tape, as recorded in VHS format, depicted petitioners receiving sums of money from
arriving passengers, putting the money collected in their pockets while dividing
some of the money received by them. Airport Police Department employee
Luzviminda A. Gabriel, who recorded the video, con8rmed that petitioners, while
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manning Customs Lanes 9 and 10 at the NAIA, received and divided between them
money directly handed or inserted in the passport of the incoming passengers.
Furthermore, the Memorandum submitted by Resident Ombudsman Atty. Rainier C.
Almazan to Ombudsman Aniano Desierto strengthened the testimony of Gabriel.
All told, the Decision of the Ombudsman 8nding petitioners guilty of

solicitation or acceptance of gifts in violation of Section 7 (d) of Republic Act No.
6713 is supported by substantial evidence.
140. Mabini vs. Raga, et.al., AM P-06-2150, 21 June 2006

(Solicitation of gifts, requirements)
FACTS: An administrative complaint was 8led by Prosecutor Mabini against

spouses Eustacio C. Raga, Jr., o7cer-in-charge and legal researcher of Branch 27;
and Lilia C. Raga, process server of Branch 28, both of the Regional Trial Court
of Catbalogan, Samar. Mabini’s letter-complaints charged respondent spouses with
gross misconduct, participation in partisan political activity, violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and quali8ed theft, committed by allegedly
extorting money from litigants and lawyers and solicit contributions from politicians
and businessmen using the name of the court, stealing a set of jewelry from the
former Clerk of Court, RTC, Catbalogan, Samar, inducing the IBP Treasurer tofund for
catering expenses of the IBP Samar Chapter Christmas party and others, which the
respondent spouses denied.
The OCA found no evidence to implicate respondent Eustacio C. Raga, Jr. in the theft
of the stenographic machine. Hence, it recommended the dismissal of the complaint
against him. As for respondent Lilia C. Raga, she was found administratively liable
for grave misconduct and dishonesty. The OCA recommended the dismissal of Lilia
C. Raga from service. Respondent Lilia contends that her receipt of the governor’s
Christmas gift cannot be considered an unlawful solicitation, which is prohibited by
OCA Circular No. 4-91, because the gift was unsolicited and not intended for a fund-
raising project.
ISSUE: Whether the spouses must be held liable for violation of RA 6713.
HELD: NO. OCA Circular No. 4-91 is not limited to fund-raising solicitations. It
prohibits all forms of solicitations and receipt of contributions, as indicated in its
circular quoted below:
“Henceforth, all personnel of the lower courts under the

administrative supervision of the O7ce of the Court Administrator are
strictly enjoined from makingany form of solicitation for contributions
as it is strictly prohibited by law. Consequently, all those found
soliciting for and/or receiving contributions, in cash or in kind, from any
person, whether or not a litigant or lawyer, will be dealt with severely
in accordance with the sanctions prescribed by law.”
This broad interpretation is further supported by the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards, which is the law that prohibits solicitations by public o7cials and
employees. Section 7 (d) of the code states thus:
“Public o7cials and employees shall not solicit or accept, directly or

indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of
monetary value from any person in the course of their o7cial duties or
in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any
transaction which may be a?ected by the functions of their o7ce.”
Clearly, a gift is covered by the prohibition, so long as it has more than nominal
monetary value. It is not necessary for the solicitation to be for a fund-raising
project. Lilia cannot take refuge in the fact that the gift was actually unsolicited,
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because the mere receipt of gifts is prohibited. Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6713
de8nes “receiving any gift” as follows:
“[T]he act of accepting directly or indirectly, a gift from a person

other than a member of his family or relative x x x if the value of the
gift is neither nominal nor insigni+cant, or the gift is given in
anticipation of, or in exchange for, a favor.”
The foregoing provision does not distinguish between solicited and unsolicited
gifts. As stated earlier, the mere receipt of gifts is prohibited, so long as the value
of the gift is neither nominal nor insigni8cant; or the gift is given in anticipation of,
or in exchange for, a favor.
In other words, the mere fact that the gift received was unsolicited cannot, by
itself, su7ce to exonerate the recipient. It would only su7ce to exonerate the
recipient if the unsolicited gift is also nominal in value and not given in anticipation
of, or in exchange for, a favor. In such a situation, the gift would fall outside the
purview of RA 6713, which expressly provides that the term “gift” does “not include
an unsolicited gift of nominal or insigni8cant value[;] not given in anticipation of, or
in exchange for, a favor from a public o7cial or employee.”
In this regard, there is no proof whatsoever that a solicitation took

place. Tthe cash gift of P1,500.00 was received not by respondent Lilia alone, but
together with eleven other employees of Branch 28, to purchase lechonfor their
Christmas party; hence, the individual bene8t of the employees may be considered
nominal. Neither does it appear from the evidence that the nominal gift was given
in anticipation of, or in exchange for, a favor.
Thus, respondent Lilia cannot be held liable under Republic Act No. 6713
because the governor’s gift, aside from being unsolicited, was also nominal or
insigni8cant in value; and not given in anticipation of, or in exchange for, a
favor. The receipt of the gift does not fall within the ambit of Section 7(d) of RA
6713, in relation to Sections 3(c) and (d).
T. Anti-Plunder Law (RA No. 7080)

141. People vs. Sendaydiego, et.al.; G.R. No. L-32252-54, 20 January
1978 (Conspiracy in plunder cases)
FACTS: In these three cases of malversation through falsi8cation, the prosecution's
theory is that in 1969 Licerio P. Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan,
in conspiracy with Juan Samson y Galvan, an employee of a lumber and hardware
store in Dagupan City, and with Anastacio Quirimit, the provincial auditor, as an
accomplice, used six (6) forged provincial vouchers in order to embezzle from the
road and bridge fund the total sum of P57,048.23.
The falsity of that provincial voucher is proven by the following intances: that there
was no project for the repair of the bridge; that the amount of P16,727.52 was
never received by the Carried Construction Supply Co and the alleged o7cial receipt
No. 3025 of the company is forged; that the lumber and materials were never
delivered; that in the provincial voucher, the signatures of the engineers were
forged and many others.
In connection with the six vouchers, Sendaydiego, Samson and Quirimit were
charged with malversation through falsi8cation. After trial the lower court acquitted
the auditor, Quirimit and found Sendaydiego and Samnson guilty of malversation
through falsi8cation of public or o7cial documents. Sendaydiego and Samson
appealed but pending resolution, Sendaydiego died.
ISSUE: Whether Sendaydiego and Samson conspired with each other to

commit the crimes charged.
HELD: YES. After examining the questioned and genuine signatures and analyzing
the evidence and contentions of the parties, we 8nd that the expert is correct in
declaring that (as admitted by the trial court) there are radical di?erences between
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the questioned and authentic signatures. The evidence conclusively proves that
Samson, as the representative or collector of the supposed creditor, Carried
Construction Supply Co., hand-carried the vouchers in question to the o7ces of the
provincial engineer, treasurer and auditor and then back to the treasurer's o7ce for
payment. He actually received the cash payments. Under those circumstances,
Samson is presumed to be the forger of the vouchers.
The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsi8ed document and be made
use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and pro8ting thereby, the presumption is
that he is the material author of the falsi8cation. This is especially true if the use or
uttering of the forged documents was so closely connected in time with the forgery
that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing the
forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity
in the forgery. the fact that Sendaydiego allowed payment in cash shows "his
collission with Samson. Under the said circumstances, it cannot be contended that
there was no malversation after Sendaydiego admtte that Samson acknowledged in
the six vouchers that he received from Treasurer Sendaydiego the total sum of
P57,048.23.
The unavoidable conclusion is that Sendaydiego and Samson were in cahoots to

defraud the provincial government and to camouUage the defraudation by means of
the six vouchers which have some genuine features and which appear to be
extrinsically authentic but which were intrinsically fake. Each falsi8cation of a
voucher constitutes one crime. The falsi8cation of six vouchers constitutes six
separate or distinct o?enses. And each misappropriation as evidenced by a
provincial voucher constitutes a separate crimes of malversation were committed.
Appellant Samson is a co-principal in each of the said twelve o?enses.
As already stated, he is presumed to be the author of the falsi8cation because he

was in possession of the forged vouchers and he used them in order to receive
public monies from the provincial treasurer. He is a co-principal in the six crimes of
malversation because he conspired with the provincial treasurer in committing
those o?enses. The trial court correctly ruled that a private person conspiring with
an accountable public o7cer in committing malversation is also guilty of
malversation.
142. Jose Jingoy Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, 148965, 26 January

2002 (Plunder – Conspiracy with private person)
Facts: In November 2000, as an o?shoot of the impeachment proceedings against

Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then President of the Republic of the Philippines, 8ve
criminal complaints against the former President and members of his family, his
associates, friends and conspirators were 8led with the respondent O7ce of the
Ombudsman. One of the Informations was for the crime of plunder under Republic
Act No. 7080 and among the respondents was herein petitioner Jose “Jinggoy”
Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Petitioner faults the respondent Sandiganbayan for “sustaining the charge against
petitioner for alleged o?enses and with alleged conspirators, with which and with
whom he is not even remotely connected – contrary to the dictum that criminal
liability is personal, not vicarious – results in the denial of substantive due process.
The Solicitor General argues, on the other hand, that petitioner is charged not only
with the predicate act in sub-paragraph (a) but also with the other predicate acts in
sub-paragraphs (b), (c) & (d) because he is indicted as a principal and as co-
conspirator of the former President.
Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in “sustaining the charge against

petitioner for alleged o?enses and with alleged conspirators,
Ruling: In the crime of plunder, di?erent parties may be united by a common

purpose. In the case at bar, the di?erent accused and their di?erent criminal acts
have a commonality—to help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
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gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the
di?erent participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the
conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive protection
money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco
excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle
Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly
enriched himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of
them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former
President Estrada.
143. Serapio vs. Sandiganbayan, et.al., GR 148468, 28 January 2003

(Plunder – predicate acts)
Facts: Petitioner Edward Serapio was a member of the Board of Trustees and the
legal counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. Sometime 2000, petitioner
received on its behalf a donation in the amount of Php 200M through Chavit
Singson. Petitioner received the donation worth the Foundation’s account. In 2000,
Chavit Singson publicly accused President Estrada and his family members and
friends of engaging in several illegal activities which triggered the 8ling with the
O7ce of the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against the petitioner, Joseph
Estrada and his son.
On April 4, 2001, Ombudsman 8led with the Sandiganbayan Informations against

the former president, one of which, for plunder. No bail was recommended for the
provisional release of all the accused including the petitioner. The case was ra`ed
to a special division which was subsequently created by the Supreme Court. On 25
April 2001, Sandiganbayan issued a resolution 8nding probable cause to justify the
issuance of warrants of arrest for the accused. Arraignment was set on 27 January
2001. In the meantime, petitioner 8led with Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for
bail, which was set for hearing on May 4, 2001. Petitioner’s co-accused Jinggoy
Estrada 8led a motion alleging that he was entitle to bail as a matter of right.
During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioner’s Urgent Petition for Bail, the
prosecution moved for the resetting of the arraignment of the accused earlier than
the June 27 schedule. However, Sandiganbayan denied the motion of the
prosecution and issued an order declaring that the petition for bail can and should
be heard BEFORE petitioner’s arraignment on 27 June. On June 1, Sandiganbayan
issued a resolution requiring the attendance of petitioner as well as all the other
accused during the hearing on the petitioner for bail considering that under Section
8, Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Court, whatever evidence adduced during the
hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial.
The people insist that arraignment is necessary before bail hearings may be
commenced because it is only upon arraignment that the issues are joined. The
people further stress the it is only when an accused pleads not guilty may he 8led a
petition for bail and if he pleads guilty, then there would be no need for him to 8le
said petition. It is also the contention of the people that it is only during
arraignment that the accused is informed of the precise charge against him. He
must then be arraign 8rst prior to bail hearings to prevent him from late on assailing
the validity of the bail hearings on the ground that he was not properly informed of
the charge considering that under section 8 of Rule 114, evidence presented during
bail hearings are reproduce in the trial. Arraignment before bail hearings also
diminished the possibility of accused’s Uight since trial in absentia may be had only
if an accused escapes after he has been arraigned.
However, the bail hearing again did not proceed because the petitioner 8led with
the information a motion to quash the amended information on the grounds that as
against him, the amended information does not allege a combination of series of
over or criminal acts constitutive of plunder.
Issue: Whether the accused are guilty of the crime of plunder.
Ruling: The essence of the law on plunder lies in the phrase “combination or
series of overt or criminal acts.” The determining factor of R.A. No. 7080, as can
be gleaned from the Record of the Senate, is the plurality of the overt acts or
criminal acts under a grand scheme or conspiracy to amass ill-gotten wealth. Thus,
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even if the amassed wealth equals or exceeds =fty million pesos, a person
cannot be prosecuted for the crime of plunder if he performs only a single
criminal act. When certain persons unite to perform certain acts, and some of
them unite with others who are engaged in totally di?erent acts, it is error to join
them in an information. Otherwise stated, defendants charged with two separate
conspiracies having one common participant are not, without more, properly joined,
and similarity of acts alone is insu5cient to indicate that series of acts exist.
Joinder may be permitted when the connection between the alleged o?enses and
the parties is the accused’s awareness of the identity and activity of the other
alleged participants. There must be a showing of one overall common goal to which
the participants bind themselves.
*this case involves bail mostly*
144. Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 148560, 19 November

2001, 369 SCRA 394 (Plunder, mala in se)
FACTS: Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act De8ning and Penalizing the
Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so
defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the
valid from the constitutionally in8rm. His contentions are mainly based on the
e?ects of the said law that it su?ers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with
the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the
element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code
saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused. The focal point of
the case is the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly,
this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this,
the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.
ISSUE: whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se
RULING: must be deemed to have been resolved in the a7rmative by the decision
of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight
penalty in R.A. No. 7659.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the signi8cance and
implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political
and economic context in which the state 8nds itself to be struggling to develop and
provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt
tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population,
the Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of
corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched
itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the
government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to
its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds
translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the
very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous
are the e?ects and repercussions of crimes like quali8ed bribery, destructive arson
resulting in death, and drug o?enses involving government o7cials, employees or
o7cers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction
and damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous o?ense implies
that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or
inherently wrong, they are mala in se[37]and it does not matter that such acts are
punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate
crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for
plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check
Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the
inherent wrongness of the acts.
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145. Wellex Group vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 187951, 25 June 2012

(Plunder-forfeiture-prescription)
Facts: Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26558 convicted former President

Estrada of the crime of plunder under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended. In
convicting him in the plunder case the court unmasked him as the bene8cial owner
of the Jose Velarde accounts adjudged as ill-gotten wealth. It was also established
during the trial of that case that the P 500 million lent to herein petitioner came
from the former President and was coursed through the said trust account.
Sandiganbayan unduly expanded the scope of its 12 September 2007 Decision
when it issued the Resolutions that speci8ed the forfeiture of the assets of the
subject IMATrust Account, including the Waterfront and Wellex shares owned by
petitioner.
Issue: WON the subject shows of stock should be forfeited
Held: Forfeiture in a criminal case is considered in personam, similar to a money

judgment that runs against a defendant until it is fully satis8ed. 36 This criminal
forfeiture is considered part of the criminal proceedings against the defendant,
rather than a separate proceeding against the property itself. 37 The scope of
criminal forfeiture by the government includes any property, real or personal,
involved in the crime or traceable to the property. The term "involved in" has
consistently been interpreted broadly by courts to include any property involved in,
used to commit, or used to facilitate the crime.
Section 6 likewise authorizes the forfeiture of these ill-gotten wealth and any assets
acquired therefrom even if they are in the possession of other persons.
U. Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001 (RA No. 9160, as amended)

146. Republic rep. by Anti-Money Laundering Council v. Cabrini
Green & Ross, Inc., GR 154522, 5 May 2006 (Jurisdiection of CA to
AMLA/freeze order)
Facts: The Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) issued freeze orders

against various banks of the herein respondents. The said frozen accounts were
prima facie found to be related to unlawful activities of the herein respondents.
Such issuances were issued based on section 10 of RA 9160 “Anti-Money Laundering
Act of 2001”.
Under RA 9160, a freeze order issued by the AMLC is e?ective for a period not
exceeding 15 days unless extended "upon order of the court." Accordingly, before
the lapse of the period of e?ectivity of its freeze orders, the AMLC 8led with the
Court of Appeals (CA) various petitions for extension of e?ectivity of its freeze
orders. The AMLC interpreted the phrase "upon order of the court" to refer to the
Court of Appeals. They belive that the Court of Appeals is given power given to the
CA to issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of injunction against any
freeze order issued by the AMLC carried with it the power to extend the e?ectivity of
a freeze order.
However, the CA disagreed with the AMLC and dismissed the petitions. It
uniformly ruled that it was not vested by RA 9160 with the power to extend a freeze
order issued by the AMLC.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has the power to extend the period of
e?ectivity of the freeze order and issue a temporary restraining order.
Ruling: Yes. The Court of Appeals has the power to extend the period of
e?ectivity of the freeze order and issue a temporary restraining order. RA 9194
ammended RA 9610 that clari8es the power of the Court of Appeals to extend the
freeze order issued by the AMLC as stated:
SEC. 7. Section 10 of [RA 9160] is hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 10. Freezing of Monetary Instrument or Property. - The Court of Appeals,

upon application ex parte by the AMLC and after determination that probable cause
exists that any monetary instrument or property is in any way related to an unlawful
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activity as de8ned in Sec. 3(i) hereof, may issue a freeze order which shall be
e?ective immediately. The freeze order shall be for a period of twenty (20)
days unless extended by the court.
Section 12 of RA 9194 further provides:
SEC 12. Transitory Provision. - Existing freeze orders issued by the AMLC shall
remain in force for a period of thirty (30) days after the e?ectivity of this Act, unless
extended by the Court of Appeals.
V. Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits (RA No. 1405, as amended)

147. PNB vs. Gancayco, 15 SCRA 91 (1965) (exception to bank
secrecy-sec.8 RA 3019)
Facts: The case arose when defendants Emilio A. Gancayo and Florentino Flor, as
special prosecutor of the DOJ, required the plainti? PNB to produce at a hearing to
be held on Feb. 20, 1961 the records of the bank deposits of Ernesto T. Jimenez,
former administrator of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Administration, who
was under investigation for unexplained wealth. However, the bank decline and
invoke RA 1405 particularly Sec. 2 and Sec. 5 of the said Law. On the other hand,
the defendants cited RA 3019, in support of their claim of authority and demanded
anew that plainti? Romualdez as bank president, produce records or he would be
cited for contempt.
Issue: Whether Republic Act No. 3019 provides an additional ground for the
examination of bank deposits?
Ruling: Yes. The truth is that these laws are so repugnant to each other than no
reconciliation is possible. x x x. The only conclusion possible is that section 8 of the
Anti-Graft Law is intended to amend section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 by providing
additional exception to the rule against the disclosure of bank deposits.
With regard to the claim that disclosure would be contrary to the policy making
bank deposits con8dential, it is enough to point out that while section 2 of Republic
Act 1405 declares bank deposits to be "absolutely con8dential," it nevertheless
allows such disclosure in the following instances: (1) Upon written permission of the
depositor; (2) In cases of impeachment; (3) Upon order of a competent court in
cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public o7cials; (4) In cases where the
money deposited is the subject matter of the litigation. Cases of unexplained wealth
are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no reason is seen why these
two classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank deposits
con8dential. The policy as to one cannot be di?erent from the policy as to the other.
This policy express the motion that a public o7ce is a public trust and any person
who enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as
relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny.
148. Ejercito vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 157294-95, 30 November 2006

(Plunder-exemption to RA 1405)
Facts: Joseph Victor G. Ejercito is the owner of Trust Account No. 858 which was
originally opened at Urban Bank but which is now maintained at Export and Industry
Bank, which is the purchaser and owner now of the former Urban Bank and
Urbancorp Investment, Inc. He is also the owner of Savings Account No. 0116-
17345-9 which was originally opened at Urban Bank but which is now maintained at
Export and Industry Bank, the purchaser and owner of the former Urban Bank and
Urbancorp Investment, Inc.
Estrada was subsequently charged with Plunder. The Sandiganbayan a

Request for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum for the issuance of a subpoena
directing the President of Export and Industry Bank (EIB, formerly Urban Bank) or
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his/her authorized representative to produce various document related to the

investigation.
The Special Prosecution Panel also 8led a Request for Issuance of Subpoena
Duces Tecum/Ad Testi8candum directed to the authorized representative of
Equitable-PCI Bank to produce statements of account pertaining to certain accounts
in the name of “Jose Velarde” and to testify thereon.
The Sandiganbayan granted both requests by Resolution and subpoenas

were accordingly issued. The Special Prosecution Panel 8led still another Request for
Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testi8candum for the President of EIB or
his/her authorized representative to produce the same documents subject of the
8rst Subpoena Duces Tecum and to testify thereon on the hearings scheduled and
subsequent dates until completion of the testimony. The request was likewise
granted by the Sandiganbayan. A Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testi8candum was
accordingly issued. Ejercito 8led various motions to quash the various Subpoenas
Duces Tecum/Ad Testi8candum previously issued. In his Motion to Quash, he
claimed that his bank accounts are covered by R.A. No. 1405 (The Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Law) and do not fall under any of the exceptions stated therein. He further
claimed that the speci8c identi8cation of documents in the questioned subpoenas,
including details on dates and amounts, could only have been made possible by an
earlier illegal disclosure thereof by the EIB and the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation (PDIC) in its capacity as receiver of the then Urban Bank. The
disclosure being illegal, he concluded, the prosecution in the case may not be
allowed to make use of the information. Before the motion was resolved by the
Sandiganbayan, the prosecution 8led another
Issue: Whether the Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9
are excepted from the protection of R.A. 1405.
Ruling: No. The protection a?orded by the law is, however, not absolute, there
being recognized exceptions thereto, as above-quoted Section 2 provides. In the
present case, two exceptions apply, to wit: (1) the examination of bank accounts is
upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public
o7cials, and (2) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation. Ejercito contends that since plunder is neither bribery nor dereliction of
duty, his accounts are not excepted from the protection of R.A. 1405.
Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of

duty and no reason is seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted from
the rule making bank deposits con8dential. The policy as to one cannot be di?erent
from the policy as to the other. This policy expresses the notion that a public o7ce
is a public trust and any person who enters upon its discharge does so with the full
knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny.
Undoubtedly, cases for plunder involve unexplained wealth. The crime of bribery
and the overt acts constitutive of plunder are crimes committed by public o7cers,
and in either case the noble idea that “a public o7ce is a public trust and any
person who enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life,
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so far as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny” applies with equal
force. Plunder being thus analogous to bribery, the exception to R.A. 1405
applicable in cases of bribery must also apply to cases of plunder.
Also, the plunder case now pending with the Sandiganbayan necessarily
involves an inquiry into the whereabouts of the amount purportedly acquired
illegally by former President Joseph Estrada. Republic Act No. 1405 allows the
disclosure of bank deposits in cases where the money deposited is the subject
matter of the litigation. Hence, these accounts are no longer protected by the
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law, there being two exceptions to the said law applicable
in this case, namely: (1)the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a
competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public o7cials, and
(2)the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. Exception
(1) applies since the plunder case pending against former President Estrada is
analogous to bribery or dereliction of duty, while exception (2) applies because the
money deposited in Ejercito’s bank accounts is said to form part of the subject
matter of the same plunder case.
149. Banco Filipino vs. Purisima, 161 SCRA 576 (1988) (Bank inquiry
extended to other persons)
Facts: This case stems when the TANODBAYAN conducted a preliminary

investigation through the accusation of BIR against Customs Special Agent Manuel
Caturla. When the said TANODBAYAN issued a subpoena duces tecum on the bank
records of the herein accused and her immediate family members. Subsequently on
this case, Banco Filipino took over from Caturla in the e?ort to nullify the said
Subpeona and contend that whether its compliance with the subpoenae duces
tecum would constitute an infringement of the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of R.A.
No. 1405 in relation to Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019. Judge Purisima who is the
assigned judge in this case issued an order denying the case of Banco Filipino.
Hence, Banco Filipino questions the Order of Judge Purisima by 8ling a petition for
certiorari.
Issue: Whether the subpoena/inquiry to the bank statements may be extended to

other persons?
Ruling: Yes, The inquiry into illegally acquired property — or property NOT
"legitimately acquired" — extends to cases where such property is concealed by
being held by or recorded in the name of other persons. This proposition is made
clear by R.A. No. 3019 which quite categorically states that the term, "legitimately
acquired property of a public o7cer or employee shall not include .. property
unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but its ownership is concealed by its being
recorded in the name of, or held by, respondent's spouse, ascendants, descendants,
relatives or any other persons."
150. Republic vs. Eugenio, GR 174629, 14 February 2008 (Bank

Inquiry Order, Provisional remedies, AMLA)
FACTS: After the Agan v. PIATCO ruling, a series of investigations concerning the
award of the NAIA 3contracts to PIATCO were undertaken by theOmbudsman and
the Compliance and Investigation Sta? (“CIS”) of the Anti-Money Laundering Council
(“AMLC”). The OSG wrote AMLC requesting AMLC’s assistance “in obtaining more
evidence to completely reveal the 8nancial trail of corruption surrounding the NAIA
3 Project,” and also noting that the Republic was presently defending itself in two
international arbitration cases. The CIS conducted an intelligence data base search
on the 8nancial transactions of certain individuals involved in the award, including
Alvarez (Chairman of the Pre-Quali8cation Bids and Awards Technical Committee).
By this time, Alvarez had already been charged by the Ombudsman with violation of
Section 3(J) of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The search revealed that
Alvarez maintained 8 bank accounts with 6 di?erent banks.
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Under the authority granted by the Resolution, the AMLC 8led an application to
inquire into or examine the deposits or investments of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson
and Cheng Yong before the RTC of Makati. The application was docketed as AMLC
No. 05-005. The Makati RTC heard the testimony of the Deputy Director of the
AMLC, Richard David C. Funk II, and received the documentary evidence of the
AMLC. Thereafter, the Makati RTC rendered an Order (Makati RTC bank inquiry order)
granting the AMLC the authority to inquire and examine the subject bank accounts
of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong, the trial court being satis8ed that
there existed p]robable cause [to] believe that the deposits in various bank
accounts, details of which appear in paragraph 1 of the Application, are related to
the o?ense of violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act now the subject of
criminal prosecution before the Sandiganbayan as attested to by the Informations.
Pursuant to the Makati RTC bank inquiry order, the CIS proceeded to inquire and
examine the deposits, investments and related web accounts of the four.
Meanwhile, the Special Prosecutor of the O7ce of the Ombudsman, wrote a letter
requesting the AMLC to investigate the accounts of Alvarez, PIATCO, and several
other entities involved in the nulli8ed contract. The letter adverted to probable
cause to believe that the bank accounts were used in the commission of unlawful
activities that were committed in relation to the criminal cases then pending before
the Sandiganbayan. Attached to the letter was a memorandum on why the
investigation of the accounts is necessary in the prosecution of the above criminal
cases before the Sandiganbayan. In response to the letter of the Special Prosecutor,
the AMLC promulgated Resolution No. 121 Series of 2005, which authorized the
executive director of the AMLC to inquire into and examine the accounts named in
the letter, including one maintained by Alvarez with DBS Bank and two other
accounts in the name of Cheng Yong with Metrobank. The Resolution characterized
the memorandum attached to the Special Prosecutors letter as extensively
justifying the existence of probable cause that the bank accounts of the persons and
entities mentioned in the letter are related to the unlawful activity of violation of
Sections 3(g) and 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended.
ISSUE: Whether the bank accounts of respondents can be examined.
RULING: YES. Any exception to the rule of absolute con8dentiality must be

speci8cally legislated. Section 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions
whereby these bank accounts may be examined by any person, government o7cial,
bureau or o7cial; namely when: (1) upon written permission of the depositor; (2) in
cases of impeachment; (3) the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a
competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public o7cials; and (4)
the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. Section 8 of
R.A. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, has been recognized by
this Court as constituting an additional exception to the rule of absolute
con8dentiality, and there have been other similar recognitions as well.
The AMLA also provides exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act. Under Section
11, the AMLC may inquire into a bank account upon order of any competent court in
cases of violation of the AMLA, it having been established that there is probable
cause that the deposits or investments are related to unlawful activities as de8ned
in Section 3(i) of the law, or a money laundering o?ense under Section 4 thereof.
Further, in instances where there is probable cause that the deposits or investments
are related to kidnapping for ransom, [certain violations of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,hijacking and other violations under R.A. No. 6235,
destructive arson and murder, then there is no need for the AMLC to obtain a court
order before it could inquire into such accounts. It cannot be successfully argued the
proceedings relating to the bank inquiry order under Section 11 of the AMLA is a
litigation encompassed in one of the exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act which is
when money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. The
orientation of the bank inquiry order is simply to serve as a provisional
relief or remedy. As earlier stated, the application for such does not entail
a full-blown trial. Nevertheless, just because the AMLA establishes additional
exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act it does not mean that the later law has
dispensed with the general principle established in the older law that all deposits of
whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines x x x are
hereby considered as of an absolutely con8dential nature. Indeed, by force of
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statute, all bank deposits are absolutely con8dential, and that nature is unaltered
even by the legislated exceptions referred to above.
X. Anti-Torture Act of 2009 (RA No. 9745)

Physical Torture
Mental Torture
Other cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment (OCIDTOP)
Safeguards/ remedy of victims
Doctrine of Command responsibility
Y. Anti-Wiretapping Act (RA No. 4200)

151. Ramirez vs. CA, GR 93833, 28 September 1995 (Prohibited
wiretapping, consent is required)
Facts: A civil case damages was 8led by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S.
Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's o7ce, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner o?ensive to
petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy." In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the
event.
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of
secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent 8led a criminal case
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200,
entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes."
Issue: whether Republic Act 4200 applies to the taping of a private conversation by
one of the parties to the conversation.
Ruling: Section 1 of R.A. 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly
record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no
distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to
be a party other than or di?erent from those involved in the private communication.
The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the quali8er “any.” Consequently, as respondent Court of
Appeals correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a communication who
records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter
(will) qualify as a violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200.
152. Gaanan vs. IAC, 1986, 145 SCRA 112 (Wiretapping-phone

extension)
FACTS: Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were discussing the terms
for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault 8led with the O7ce of the City
Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico after demanding P 8,000.00 from him. This
demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone extension as requested by
Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the settlement. Atty.
Pintor was subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the
money. since Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without
complainant's consent, complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of
the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200).
ISSUE: Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices

in Sec. 1 of RA 4200 such that its use to overheard a private conversation would
constitute an unlawful interception of communication between two parties using a
telephone line.
HELD: No. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a

dictaphone or dictagraph, or other devvices enumerated in Sec. 1 of the law as the
use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line.
this section refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be
presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature,
they are of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting,
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or recording a telephone conversation. The telephone extension in this case was not
installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary o7ce use.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly

in favor of the accused. Thus in the case of doubt as in this case, on whether or not
an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement" the penal
statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Record shows that our lawmakers

intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as government
authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order
to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some
unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of
listeneing , in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the
enumerated devices in RA 4200 or other similar nature.
Z. Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 (RA No. 7877)
153. Aquino vs. Acosta, A.M. CTA-01-1, 02 April 2002 (casual buss
on the cheek, not SH)
Facts: Atty. Susan Aquino, Chief of the Legal and Technical Sta? of the Court of Tax
Appeals 8led an a7davit-complaint alleged six instances when Judge Acosta,
Presiding Judge of the same court, sexually harassed her. These incidents were
casual buss on the cheek of the complainant. During the last incident, respondent
asked complainant to see him in his o7ce to discuss the Senate bill on the CTA.
Thereupon, he tried to grab her and complainant instinctively raised her hands to
protect herself but respondent held her arms tightly, pulled her towards him and
kissed her. She pushed him away, then slumped on a chair trembling. Complainant
left crying and locked herself inside a comfort room. After that incident, respondent
went to her o7ce and tossed a note stating, “sorry, it won’t happen again.”
In his comment, respondent judge denied complainant’s allegation that he sexually

harassed her six times. He claimed that he has always treated her with respect,
being the head of the CTA Legal Sta?. In fact, there is no strain in their professional
relationship. Regarding the last incident, he approached complainant to give her a
casual buss on the cheek. But she suddenly stood and raised her arms to cover her
face, causing her to lose her balance. So he held her arms to prevent her from
falling. Her rejection came as a surprise to him and made him feel quite
embarrassed. Shortly, complainant excused herself and left the room. Stunned at
the thought that she might misinterpret his gesture, he sent her a short note of
apology. Respondent further explained that the structure of his o7ce, being seen
through a transparent glass divider, makes it impossible for anyone to commit any
improper conduct inside.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime of sexual harassment as

de8ned and punished under R.A. 7877?
Ruling: No. The elements of sexual harassment are as follows: (1) The employer,
employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor,
professor, coach, trainor, or any other person has authority, inUuence or moral
ascendancy over another; (2) The authority, inUuence or moral ascendancy exists in
a working environment; (3) The employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of
the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, or any other person having
authority, inUuence or moral ascendancy makes a demand, request or requirement
of a sexual favor.
What we perceive to have been committed by respondent judge are casual

gestures of friendship and camaraderie, nothing more, nothing less. In
kissing complainant, we 8nd no indication that respondent was motivated by malice
or lewd design. Evidently, she misunderstood his actuations and construed them as
work-related sexual harassment under R.A. 7877
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Indeed, from the records on hand, there is no showing that respondent judge
demanded, requested or required any sexual favor from complainant in exchange
for “favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotion or privileges” speci8ed
under Section 3 of R.A. 7877. Nor did he, by his actuations, violate the Canons of
Judicial Ethics or the Code of Professional Responsibility.
While we exonerate respondent from the charges herein, however, he is

admonished not to commit similar acts against complainant or other
female employees of the Court of Tax Appeals, otherwise, his conduct may
be construed as tainted with impropriety.
154. Digitel Telecom Phils vs. Mariquit Soriano, GR 166039, 26 June

2006 (Proper conduct of victim)
FACTS: Mariquit Soriano (Soriano) was hired as Director of Marketing by Digitel

Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (Digitel). Soriano worked under Vice President
for Business Division Eric J. Severino (Severino) and Senior Executive Vice President
Johnson Robert L. Go (Go). Following a professional dispute against Severino and
Go, Soriano 8led a resignation letter which was accepted by her superiors.
After her resignation, Soriano 8led a suit for illegal termination alleging that she was
forced to resign due to professional and sexual harassment. Mariquit alleged that
Go crept his hand under a throw pillow and “poked” her vagina several times. . She
justi8ed her failure to Uee by claiming that she was “hemmed in by the arm of the
sofa.” ; that Mariquit danced on the same occasion with Go, albeit allegedly thru
force, during which he pressed her close to him and moved his hand across her
back to feel her body; that while dancing, in order to free herself from Go’s hold, she
maneuvered to turn to the beat of the music. It was at this time, according to her,
that Go “reached out his hand and groped [her] breast, caressed [her] back and
reached inside [her] blouse to rub [her] from up [her] brassieres down to [her]
buttocks.”; and as to severino, she often caught him looking at her legs up to the
back of her thighs on several occasions.
She alleged that her superiors are preventing her former colleagues in testifying to
the sexual harassment. She produced an a7davit by one of the persons involved
with Digitel stating that the employees of the company were being forced not to
testify against Go and Severino. In defense, Go and Severino provided witnesses
that testi8ed that the acts alleged by Soriano din not happen.
The Labor Arbiter held that Mariquit voluntarily resigned, thus dismissing the
complaint. On appeal, the NLRC a7rmed the 8ndings of the Labor Arbiter. The Court
of Appeals reversed the decision of NLRC. Hence,this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the alleged sexual harassment are true and Mariquit’s conduct was
proper.
RULING: NO. While, as this Court stated in Philippine Aelous, there is, strictly
speaking, no 8xed period within which an alleged victim of sexual harassment may
8le a complaint, it does not mean that she or he is at liberty to 8le one anytime she
or he wants to. Surely, any delay in 8ling a complaint must be justi8able or
reasonable as not to cast doubt on its merits.
At all events, it is settled that the only test of whether an alleged fact or
circumstance is worthy of credence is the common experience, knowledge and
observation of ordinary men.
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As New Jersey Vice Chancellor Van Fleet stated in the often-cited case
of Daggers v. Van Dyck:[67] “Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from
the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself – such as the
common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its
conformity to our knowledge, observation, and experience. Whatever is repugnant
to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside of judicial cognizance.” [68]
From the earlier-quoted narration of alleged facts by Mariquit, this Court 8nds
that it does not pass the test of credibility.
Mariquit claimed that as regards petitioner Severino, she often caught him looking
at her legs up to the back of her thighs on several occasions. If to her the acts
amounted to sexual harassment, why did she not bring the matter to the attention
of any company o7cial to make sure that they won’t happen again and she be
spared of any disgrace or vexation?
Following Mariquit’s narration, it would appear that the earliest harassment

committed by Severino took place in January 1999 “when he intentionally pointed to
[her] legs to a fellow company o7cer who also looked at them,” while the earliest
committed by Go occurred in May 1999 during a cocktail party at the Manila Galleria
Suites. Yet, she claimed to have reported and expressed to, oddly enough,
Severino, who was the 8rst to allegedly harass her, her disgrace and outrage over
the “sexual advances” made by Go, and only during the party of Pau on November
19, 1999, a claim denied by Severino.
As regards the 8ve incidents of sexual harassment attributed to Go, a

discussion of even only one of them betrays its non-conformity to human
experience.
In paragraphs 12 to 15 of her April 25, 2002 A7davit which were quoted

earlier, Mariquit, narrating the November 19, 1999 incident which allegedly took
place at the residence of Pau, claimed that she was cornered by Go on a sofa in
such a way that she was virtually pinned against its side, making it impossible for
her to elude his advances. It is not disputed that it was raining at the time and that
the about 60 guests had no choice but to stay in the living room and covered lanai
of Pau’s residence. Could not have at least one noticed the incident? She
presented no one, however. On the other hand, Pau belied her claim.
Mariquit went on to claim that Go crept his hand under a throw pillow and
“poked” her vagina several times. She justi8ed her failure to Uee by claiming that
she was “hemmed in by the arm of the sofa.” But if indeed Go did such
condemnable act, could she not have slapped him or stood up and/or left?
Yet still, by her claim, Mariquit danced on the same occasion with Go, albeit
allegedly thru force, during which he pressed her close to him and moved his hand
across her back to feel her body. Any woman in her right mind, whose vagina had
earlier been “poked” several times without her consent and against her will, would,
after liberating herself from the clutches of the person who o?ended her, raise
hell. But Mariquit did not.
Mariquit claimed that while dancing, in order to free herself from Go’s hold,
she maneuvered to turn to the beat of the music. It was at this time, according to
her, that Go “reached out his hand and groped [her] breast, caressed [her] back and
reached inside [her] blouse to rub [her] from up [her] brassieres down to [her]
buttocks.” Since this alleged incident occurred while Mariquit and Go were
dancing, and surely there were a lot of people around in the well lighted small area
as stated by house owner Pau, would Go be that maniacal to forego the respect
accorded to him by virtue of his high position? To be sure, a person who holds a
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very exalted position would normally behave at social gatherings, unless he is a

proven maniac, to deserve that respect.
Petitioners Go and Severino, on the other hand, presented a7davits of

persons who were present during the time when alleged incidents took place and
who declared in e?ect that no such incidents did take place and could have taken
place. The appellate court dismissed the claim of these a7ants, however, as
“obviously biased in favor of [petitioners], their superior and employer.” [69]
155. Domingo vs. Rayala, GR No. 155831, 18 February 2008

(employment related sexual harassment)
Facts: The case at bar is a complaint 8led by Domingo against respondent

Rayala, who was then NLRC chief, for sexual harassment on the basis of
administrative order no. 250, the rules and regulations implementing RA 7877 in the
Department of Labor and Employment which was then referred to the O7ce of the
president.
The o7ce of the president through then secretary Laguesma found

respondent guilty of sexual harassment as provided in RA 7877 and recommended
for suspension of 6 months and 1 day. However, through Executive Secretary
Ronaldo Zamora expressed that a public servant must exhibit at all times the
highest sense of honesty and integrity, and "utmost devotion and dedication to
duty" (Sec. 4 (g), RA 6713), respect the rights of others and shall refrain from doing
acts contrary to law, and good morals (Sec. 4(c)). No less than the Constitution
sancti8es the principle that a public o7ce is a public trust, and enjoins all public
o7cers and employees to serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and e7ciency (Section 1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution). Hence, stricter
standards must apply being the highest o7cial [of] the NLRC - had shown an
attitude, a frame of mind, a disgraceful conduct, which renders him un8t to remain
in the service. Therefore, respondent Rogelio I. Rayala, Chairman, National Labor
Relations Commission, is found guilty of the grave o?ense of disgraceful and
immoral conduct and is hereby dismissed from the service e?ective upon receipt of
this Order.
On a motion for reconsideration, the petition was referred to the Court of

Appeals for appropriate action. The Court of Appeals a7rmed the 8ndings of guilt of
respondent Rayala but modi8ed the penalty to a maximum period of 1 year was
imposed. A motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied.
Both parties 8led a petition for review before the Supreme Court. Invoking
Aquino v. Acosta, Rayala argues that the case is the de8nitive ruling on what
constitutes sexual harassment. Thus, he posits that for sexual harassment to exist
under RA 7877, there must be: (a) demand, request, or requirement of a sexual
favor; (b) the same is made a pre-condition to hiring, re-employment, or continued
employment; or (c) the denial thereof results in discrimination against the
employee. Petitioner failed to prove as such. That the O7ce of the President
erroneously relied on Administrative Order 250 expanding the scope of RA 7877.
The law did not delegate to the employer the power to promulgate rules which
would provide other or additional forms of sexual harassment, or to come up with its
own de8nition of sexual harassment.
Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of sexual harassment on the basis of
administrative order no. 250, the rules and regulations implementing RA 7877 and
the penalty to provide thereof.
Ruling: Yes. Basic in the law of public o7cers is the three-fold liability rule,
which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public o7cer may give rise to
civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can proceed
independently of the others. This rule applies with full force to sexual
harassment. The CA, thus, correctly ruled that Rayala's culpability is not to be
determined solely on the basis of Section 3, RA 7877, because he is charged with
the administrative o?ense, not the criminal infraction, of sexual harassment. It
should be enough that the CA, along with the Investigating Committee and the
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O7ce of the President, found substantial evidence to support the administrative

charge.
The events of this case shows that the administrative charges against Rayala
were for violation of RA 7877; that the O7ce of the President assumed jurisdiction
over administrative cases; that the participation of the DOLE, through the
Committee created by the Secretary, was limited to initiating the investigation
process, reception of evidence of the parties, preparation of the investigation
report, and recommending the appropriate action to be taken by the O7ce of the
President. Hence, being the said case at hand to be administrative, mala in se or
mala prohibitum is immaterial. The administrative case was not based on AO 250.
Lastly, there was no violation of his right to due process. He accuses the
Committee on Decorum of railroading his trial for violation of RA 7877. He also
scored the OP's decision 8nding him guilty of "disgraceful and immoral conduct"
under the Revised Administrative Code and not for violation of RA 7877. Considering
that he was not tried for "disgraceful and immoral conduct," he argues that the
verdict is a "sham and total nullity."
We hold that Rayala was properly accorded due process. In previous cases, this
Court held that:
[i]n administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the
following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of
proceedings which may a?ect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to
be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and
evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with
competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to a?ord a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a
8nding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the
parties a?ected.
The records of the case indicate that Rayala was a?orded all these procedural due
process safeguards. Although in the beginning he questioned the authority of the
Committee to try him, he appeared, personally and with counsel, and participated in
the proceedings.
156. Jacutin vs. People, GR No. 140604, 6 March 2002 (sexual

harassment)
FACTS: Juliet Q. Yee, then a 22-year old fresh graduate of nursing, averred that
on 28 November 1995 her father accompanied her to the o7ce of petitioner at the
City Health O7ce to seek employment. Jacutin informed her that there was a
vacancy in a family planning project for the city and that, if she were interested, he
could interview her for the job. Petitioner then started putting up to her a number
of questions. When asked at one point whether or not she already had a boyfriend,
she said “no’’. Petitioner then invited her to go bowling. Petitioner told her to meet
him at Borja Street so that people would not see them on board the same car
together. While driving, petitioner casually asked her if she already took her bath,
and she said she was so in a hurry that she did not 8nd time for it. Petitioner then
inquired whether she had varicose veins, and she said “no.” Petitioner told her to
raise her foot and lower her pants so that he might con8rm it. She felt assured that
it was all part of the research. Petitioner still pushed her pants down to her knees
and held her thigh. He put his hands inside her panty until he reached her pubic
hair. Surprised, she exclaimed “hala ka!” and instinctively pulled her pants
up. Petitioner then touched her abdomen with his right hand saying words of
endearment and letting the back of his palm touch her forehead. He told her to
raise her shirt to check whether she had nodes or lumps. She hesitated for a while
but, eventually, raised it up to her navel. Petitioner then fondled her
breast. Shocked at what petitioner did, she lowered her shirt and embraced her bag
to cover herself, telling him angrily that she was through with the research. He
begged her not to tell anybody about what had just happened. Before she alighted
from the car, petitioner urged her to reconsider her decision to quit. He then
handed over to her P300.00 for her expenses.
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The Sandiganbayan, through its Fourth Division, rendered its decision, 8nding
the accused, Dr. Rico Jacutin, guilty of the crime of Sexual Harassment under
Republic Act No. 7877.
ISSUE: WON Petitioner can be convicted of the crime of sexual harassment

under Republic Act No. 7877 in the case at bar?
RULING: Yes. Section 3 of Republic Act 7877 provides:

“SEC. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment De+ned. – Work,
education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer,
employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor,
professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, inuence or
moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment,
demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other,
regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is
accepted by the object of said Act.
“(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed

when:
“(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment,
re-employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said
individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or
the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying
the employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely a@ect said employee.”
While the City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in appointing city
personnel, it should stand to reason, nevertheless, that a recommendation from
petitioner in the appointment of personnel in the municipal health o7ce could carry
good weight. Indeed, petitioner would not have been able to take undue liberalities
on the person of Juliet had it not been for his high position in the City Health O7ce
of Cagayan de Oro City.
AA. Anti-Tra5cking in Persons Act of 2003 (RA No. 9208)

157. People vs. HadjaLalli, GR 195419, 12 October 2011
(recruitment and tra5cking-prostitute; no double jeopardy)
FACTS:
This is a consolidated criminal case 8led against the accused-appellants for the
crimes of Illegal Recruitment and Tra7cking in Persons. The facts revealed that
Ronnie Aringoy asked Lolita Plando if she wants to work as restaurant entertainer in
Malaysia. Since Lolita is interested, she inquired how she could apply. Ronnie
brought Lolita to Nestor Relampagos and Hadja Lalli. The latter accompanied Lolita
and other women in Malaysia by boat from Zamboanga to Sandakan, Malaysia and
then boarded a van going to Kota Kinabalu. They were forced to work as prostitutes
in Pipen Club in Labuan, Malaysia. Lolita worked as a prostitute from June 14 to July
8, 2005. Every night, a customer used her. She had at least one customer or more a
night, and at most, she had around 8ve customers a night. They all had sexual
intercourse with her. Lolita was saved by her brother-in-law who acted as a
customer. Lolita was advised to 8le a complaint with the police regarding her ordeal
in Malaysia.
The RTC found the accused guilty of Illegal Recruitment and Tra7cking in Persons,
which the CA a7rmed. Aringoy claims that he cannot be convicted of the crime of
Tra7cking in Persons because he was not part of the group that transported Lolita
from the Philippines to Malaysia on board the ship M/V Mary Joy. In addition, he
presented his niece, Rachel, as witness to testify that Lolita had been travelling to
Malaysia to work in bars. On the other hand, Lalli denies any involvement in the
recruitment and tra7cking of Lolita, claiming she only met Lolita for the 8rst time
on board M/V Mary Joy going to Malaysia.
ISSUE:
Whether Lalli, Relampagos and Aringoy are guilty of syndicated illegal recruitment
and tra7cking in persons.
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HELD:
YES. It is clear that a person or entity engaged in recruitment and placement
activities without the requisite authority from the DOLE, whether for pro8t or not, is
engaged in illegal recruitment. The POEA issues the authority to recruit under the
Labor Code. The commission of illegal recruitment by three or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one another is deemed committed by a syndicate
and constitutes economic sabotage. In this case, the trial court, as a7rmed by the
appellate court, found Lalli, Aringoy and Relampagos to have conspired and
confederated with one another to recruit and place Lolita for work in Malaysia,
without a POEA license. The three elements of syndicated illegal recruitment are
present in this case, in particular: (1) the accused have no valid license or authority
required by law to enable them to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement
of workers; (2) the accused engaged in this activity of recruitment and placement
by actually recruiting, deploying and transporting Lolita to Malaysia; and (3) illegal
recruitment was committed by three persons, conspiring and confederating with
one another.
Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208 (RA 9208), otherwise known as the Anti-
Tra7cking in Persons Act of 2003, de8nes Tra7cking in Persons, as follows:
Tra,cking in Persons – refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or

harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or
other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position,
taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of
payments or bene8ts to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the
exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced
labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
The testimony of Aringoy’s niece, Rachel, that Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia
to work in bars cannot be given credence. Lolita did not even have a passport to go
to Malaysia and had to use her sister’s passport when Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos
8rst recruited her. It is questionable how she could have been travelling to Malaysia
previously without a passport, as Rachel claims. Moreover, even if it is true that
Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars, the crime of Tra7cking in
Persons can exist even with the victim’s consent or knowledge under Section 3(a) of
RA 9208.
Tra7cking in Persons under Sections 3(a) and 4 of RA 9208 is not only limited to
transportation of victims, but also includes the act of recruitment of victims for
tra7cking. In this case, since it has been su7ciently proven beyond reasonable
doubt, as discussed in Criminal Case No. 21930, that all the three accused (Aringoy,
Lalli and Relampagos) conspired and confederated with one another to illegally
recruit Lolita to become a prostitute in Malaysia, it follows that they are also guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Quali8ed Tra7cking in Persons committed
by a syndicate under RA 9208 because the crime of recruitment for prostitution also
constitutes tra7cking.
When an act or acts violate two or more di?erent laws and constitute two di?erent
o?enses, a prosecution under one will not bar a prosecution under the other. The
constitutional right against double jeopardy only applies to risk of punishment twice
for the same o?ense, or for an act punished by a law and an ordinance. The
prohibition on double jeopardy does not apply to an act or series of acts constituting
di?erent o?enses.
BB. Anti-Violence against Women and their Children Act (RA No. 9262)
158. People vs. MarivicGenosa, GR 135981, 29 September 2000 &
GR 135982, 15 Jan 2004 (Battered woman syndrome; exculpating
circumstance)
Facts: The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed toward
his family, particularly to his wife. The Report continued: "At 8rst, it was verbal and
emotional abuses but as time passed, he became physically abusive. Marivic
claimed that the viciousness of her husband was progressive every time he got
drunk. It was a painful ordeal Marivic had to anticipate whenever she suspected that
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her husband went for a drinking [spree]. They had been married for twelve years[;]
and practically more than eight years, she was battered and maltreated relentlessly
and mercilessly by her husband whenever he was drunk.
One night while Ben was sleeping, Marivic took a steel pipe and hit Ben in the head,
which caused his death. Marivic was charged and found guilty of parricide. Marivic
used the defense of Buttered Woman’s Syndrome.
Issue: WON Marivic may be excusable
Held: A battered woman has been de8ned as a woman "who is repeatedly

subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to
coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights.
Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with
men. Furthermore, in order to be classi8ed as a battered woman, the couple must
go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may 8nd herself in an
abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in
the situation, she is de8ned as a battered woman.
the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called "cycle of

violence,"27 which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute
battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the "cycle of violence"
supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt
there were acute battering incidents. In relating to the court a quo how the fatal
incident that led to the death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the
tension-building phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail the
typical characteristics of this stage. However, that single incident does not prove
the existence of the syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove that in at least
another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.
159. Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan vs. Sps. Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L.
Tan, GR 168852, 30 September 2008 (OAender in VAWC; application
of conspiracy under RPC)
FACTS:
Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan and Steven L. Tan were married. They have two daughters,
Kyra Danielle and Kristen Denise. Barely six years into the marriage, petitioner 8led
a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order against
Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan
(respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with
respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in
violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004."
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the
provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the suppletory
application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on
"conspiracy" under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262;
that Steven and respondents had community of design and purpose in tormenting
her by giving her insu7cient 8nancial support; harassing and pressuring her to be
ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally,
mentally and physically; that respondents should be included as indispensable or
necessary parties for complete resolution of the case.
On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262
since Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that the o?ender should be related to the
victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that
allegations on the conspiracy of respondents require a factual determination which
cannot be done by this Court in a petition for review; that respondents cannot be
characterized as indispensable or necessary parties, since their presence in the
case is not only unnecessary but altogether illegal, considering the non-inclusion of
in-laws as o?enders under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262.
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ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW
OF SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A
PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262.
HELD:
YES. Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 de8nes ''violence against women and their
children'' as "any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman
who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her
child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which
result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or su?ering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty." While the said provision provides
that the o?ender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former
marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of
the principle of conspiracy under the RPC. Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262
expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC.
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a
supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No.
9262, in which the special law is silent on a particular matter.
It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law and that this intent must be
e?ectuated by the courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No.
9262 reUects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure
the attainment of the object of the law according to its true intent, meaning and
spirit - the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and children.
160. Rustan P. Ang v. CA and Irish Sagud, No. GR 182835, 20 April

2010 (RA 9262- single harassment by naked picture sent through
phone)
FACTS:
This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against women
when a former boyfriend sent to the girl the picture of a naked woman, not her, but
with her face on it. After she got the obscene picture, Irish (petitioner) got other text
messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly
scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture he sent through
the internet.
Rustan argues that the one act of sending an o?ensive picture should not be
considered a form of harassment. He claims that such would unduly ruin him
personally and set a very dangerous precedent. Rustan alleges that today’s women,
like Irish, are so used to obscene communications that her getting one could not
possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial emotional or
psychological distress. He claims having previously exchanged obscene pictures
with Irish such that she was already desensitized by them.
After trial, the RTC found Irish’s testimony completely credible, given in an honest
and spontaneous manner, and found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of
R.A. 9262.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the picture with her
face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inUicting anguish, psychological distress,
and humiliation on her in violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
HELD:
YES. The elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment
are:
1. The o?ender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the o?ended
woman;
2. The o?ender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of
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acts of harassment against the woman; and

3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological
distress to her.
Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that constitutes
violence against women. This means that a single act of harassment, which
translates into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women
and children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would license
isolated ones. The Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based
on Rustan’s low regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of today’s youth. What is
obscene and injurious to an o?ended woman can of course only be determined
based on the circumstances of each case. Here, the naked woman on the picture,
her legs spread open and bearing Irish’s head and face, was clearly an obscene
picture and, to Irish a revolting and o?ensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who
is not in the pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees herself
in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish testi8ed, Rustan
sent the picture with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see. That must have
given her a nightmare.
161. Karlo Angelo Dabalos y San Diego vs. Regional Trial Court,
Branch 59, Angeles City, et al, G.R. No. 193960, 7 January 2013 (RA
9262, elements of VAWC through harassment)
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262. After examining the
supporting evidence, the RTC found probable cause and consequently, issued a
warrant of arrest against petitioner. The latter posted a cash bond for his provisional
liberty and 8led a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to
Quash the Information. Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged incident he
was no longer in a dating relationship with private respondent; hence, RA 9262 was
inapplicable. Private respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner had
ended prior to the subject incident. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City,
Branch 59 denied petitioner’s Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause
with Motion to Quash the Information.
Petitioner insists that the act which resulted in physical injuries to private
respondent is not covered by RA 9262 because its proximate cause was not their
dating relationship. Instead, he claims that the o?ense committed was only slight
physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code which falls under the jurisdiction of
the Municipal Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in denial petitioner’s motion.
HELD:
NO. Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads:
SEC. 3. De8nition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and
their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against
a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person
has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family
abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
su?ering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x x x.
The law is broad in scope but speci8es two limiting quali8cations for any act or
series of acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women through
physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her child and the
woman is the o?ender’s wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or
dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is
likely to result in physical harm or su?ering.
The elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment, to wit:
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1. The o?ender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the o?ended
woman;
2. The o?ender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of
acts of harassment against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological
distress to her.
Notably, while it is required that the o?ender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship with the o?ended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not
indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of such relationship.
Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the rule on
statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the
courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women
with whom the o?ender has or had a sexual or dating relationship. As correctly
ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as
there is su7cient evidence showing the past or present existence of such
relationship between the o?ender and the victim when the physical harm was
committed.
While the degree of physical harm under RA 9262 and Article 266 of the Revised
Penal Code are the same, there is su7cient justi8cation for prescribing a higher
penalty for the former. Clearly, the legislative intent is to purposely impose a more
severe sanction on the o?enders whose violent act/s physically harm women with
whom they have or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their children with
the end in view of promoting the protection of women and children.
Accordingly, the Information having su7ciently alleged the necessary elements of

the crime, such as: a dating relationship between the petitioner and the private
respondent; the act of violence committed by the petitioner; and the resulting
physical harm to private respondent, the o?ense is covered by RA 9262 which falls
under the jurisdiction of the RTC in accordance with Sec. 7 of the said law.
CC. Anti-Child Abuse Law (RA No. 7610, as amended)

162. People vs. Patricio Rayon, Sr. GR 194236, 30 January 2013 (RA
7610-other sexual abuse)
Facts: XYZ and appellant begot 5 children. XYZ sees appellant embracing AAA and
spreading his legs, this put his hands on AAA’s breast, inserted his other hand inside
her underwear and touched her vagina. BBB revealed to XYZ that the appellant had
raped her. The petitioner was charged with violation of Section 10(a) Article v1 of RA
no. 7610.
Issue: WON Section 10 (a) article v1 of RA no. 7610 is the proper charge
Held: This “provision punishes not only those enumerated under Article 59 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child
cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to
the child's development.”24 We stress that Section 10 refers to acts of child abuse
other than child prostitution and other sexual abuse under Section 5, attempt to
commit child prostitution under Section 6, child tra7cking under Section 7, attempt
to commit child
tra7cking under Section 8, and obscene publications and indecent shows under
Section 9.
Sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 has three elements:
(1) the accused commits an act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse; and
(3) the child is below 18 years old.
In the present case, all the elements of violation of section 5(a)
163. People vs. Jover Matias, GR 186469, 13 June 2012 (RA 7610-
sexual abuse v. statutory rape)
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Facts: Jover Matias was charged of raping a minor, it was alleged that AAA (victim)
was was on her way to the vegetable stall (“gulayan”) of a certain “Manuela” to buy
something when, all of a sudden, appellant pulled her towards a house that was
under construction. There, he forced her to lie on a bamboo bed (“papag”),
removed her shorts and underwear, and inserted 8rst, his 8nger, and then his penis
into her vagina. Appellant threatened to kill her if she should report the incident to
anyone. Upon reporting the incident to the police he was arrested. In his defense,
he claimed in the evening of the incident, he and his uncle, Romeo Matias, were
doing construction work at the house of his aunt, also located at Sto. Nino St.,
Barangay San Antonio, Quezon City.
Issue: Whether the accused should be convicted of rape under RA 7610?
Ruling: Yes, Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 provides:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or
female, who for money, pro8t, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
inUuence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed upon the following:
(a) x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a
child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; xxx
In the case of People v. Pangilinan,8 which a7rmed the doctrines enunciated in the
cases of People v. Dahilig9 and People v. Abay,10 the Court explained:
Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of
sexual abuse is below 12 years of age, the o?ender should not be prosecuted for
sexual abuse but for statutory rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal
Code and penalized with reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, if the victim is 12
years or older, the o?ender should be charged with either sexual abuse under
Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the
Revised Penal Code. However, the o?ender cannot be accused of both crimes for
the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person
cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act. Likewise,
rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under Section
48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal
Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed with an o?ense penalized by a special
law.
In this case, the RTC, as a7rmed by the CA, convicted appellant for "rape" under
Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, upon a
8nding that AAA was a minor below 12 years old at the time of the commission of
the o?ense on June 6, 2004. However, a punctilious scrutiny of the records shows
that AAA was born on April 23, 1991, which would make her 13 years old at the time
of the commission of the o?ense on June 6, 2004. Thus, appellant can be
prosecuted and convicted either under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 for sexual
abuse, or under Article 266-A of the RPC, except for rape under paragraph 1(d).11 It
bears pointing out that the penalties under these two laws di?er: the penalty for
sexual abuse under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 is reclusion temporal medium to
reclusion perpetua, while rape under Article 266-A of the RPC is penalized with
reclusion perpetua
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164. People vs. HeracleoAbello, GR 151952, 25 March 2009 (RA

7610-child de=ned)
Facts: The accused was charged of raping his stepdaughter a 21 year old, AAA
(Victim) was sleeping in their house in Kalyeng Impiyerno, Navotas, Metro Manila
along with her sister-in-law and nephew. She was suddenly awakened when Abello
… mashed her breast. Come July 2, 1999 at around 3:00 a.m. Abello again mashed
the breast of AAA practically under the same previous situation while the latter was
sleeping. In these two occasions AAA was able to recognize Abello because of the
light coming from outside which illuminated the house. Then on July 8, 1998, at
around 2:00 a.m., Abello this time placed his soft penis inside the mouth of AAA.
The latter got awaken when Abello accidentally kneeled on her right hand. AAA
exclaimed "Aray" forcing the accused to hurriedly enter his room. AAA nevertheless
saw him. The victim on the same date reported the incident to her sister-in-law and
mother. Amidst the accusation of raping and twice sexually abusing AAA, Abello
interposed the defense of denial. In all of the instances, Abello claimed that he
merely stepped on the victim at the sala on his way to his room after retiring home.
The RTC and CA found him guilty of the charged.
Issue: Whether the victim is considered child under RA 7610?
Ruling: No, AAA cannot be considered a child under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7610
which reads:
(a) "Children" refers to person below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but
are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental
disability or condition; [Emphasis supplied]
The implementing rules elaborated on this de8nition when it de8ned a "child" as

one who is below 18 years of age or over said age who, upon evaluation of a
quali8ed physician, psychologist or psychiatrist, is found to be incapable of taking
care of herself fully because of a physical or mental disability or condition or of
protecting herself from abuse.
While the records show that the RTC, the CA and the investigating prosecutor who
8led the corresponding Informations, considered AAA’s polio as a physical disability
that rendered her incapable of normal function, no evidence was in fact presented
showing the prosecution’s compliance with the implementing rules. Speci8cally, the
prosecution did not present any evidence, testimonial or documentary, of any
medical evaluation or medical 8nding from a quali8ed physician, psychologist or
psychiatrist attesting that AAA’s physical condition rendered her incapable of fully
taking care of herself or of protecting herself against sexual abuse. Under the
circumstances, we cannot consider AAA a child under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7610.
In arriving at this conclusion, we consider that since R.A. No. 7610 is a special law
referring to a particular class in society, the prosecution must show that the victim
truly belongs to this particular class to warrant the application of the statute’s
provisions. Any doubt in this regard we must resolve in favor of the accused.
165. People vs. Dina Dulay, GR 193854, 24 September 2012 (child

prostitution for pro=t; Section 5a; elements)
Facts: AAA was 12 years old when the whole incident happened. AAA's sister
introduced the appellant to AAA as someone who is nice. Thereafter, appellant
convinced AAA to accompany her at a wake at GI San Dionisio, Parañaque City.
Before going to the said wake, they went to a casino to look for appellant's
boyfriend, but since he was not there, they went to Sto. Niño at Don Galo. However,
appellant's boyfriend was also not there. When they went to Bulungan Fish Port
along the coastal road to ask for some 8sh, they saw appellant's boyfriend.
Afterwards, AAA, appellant and the latter's boyfriend proceeded to the Kubuhan
located at the back of the Bulungan Fish Port. When they reached the Kubuhan,
appellant suddenly pulled AAA inside a room where a man known by the name
"Speed" was waiting. AAA saw "Speed" give money to appellant and heard "Speed"
tell appellant to look for a younger girl. Thereafter, "Speed" wielded a knife and tied
AAA's hands to the papag and raped her. AAA asked for appellant's help when she
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saw the latter peeping into the room while she was being raped, but appellant did
not do so. After the rape, "Speed" and appellant told AAA not to tell anyone what
had happened or else they would get back at her. AAA went to San Pedro, Laguna
after the incident and told it to his family and latter on 8led a complaint to
authorities.
Issue: whether the accused is guilty of violating sec. 5 of RA 7610?
Ruling: Yes, In this light, while this Court does not 8nd appellant to have committed
the crime of rape as a principal by indispensable cooperation, she is still guilty of
violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610, or the Special Protection of Children Against
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, which states that:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. – Children, whether male or
sexual abuse.
(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which
include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
(2) Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral

advertisements or other similar means;
(3) Taking advantage of inUuence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;
(4) Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or
(5) Giving monetary consideration goods or other pecuniary bene8t to a child with
intent to engage such child in prostitution.21
The elements of paragraph (a) are:
1. the accused engages in, promotes, facilitates or induces child prostitution;
2. the act is done through, but not limited to, the following means:
a. acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
b. inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral

advertisements or other similar means;
c. taking advantage of inUuence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;
d. threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or
e. giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary bene8t to a child with

intent to engage such child in prostitution;
3. the child is exploited or intended to be exploited in prostitution and
4. the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
166. People vs. IreneoBonaagua, GR 188897, 6 June 2011 (Acts of

lasciviousness, Sec. 5b RA 7610)
Facts: Ireno was charged by the O7ce of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City with
four (4) counts of Rape under Paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended, in
relation to R.A. No. 7610, for inserting his tongue and his 8nger into the genital of
his minor daughter, AAA.
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The RTC convicted hi, of the crime charged. The Ca rendered a decision a7rming
the decision of the RTC and 8nding Ireno guilty of acts of lasciviousness under
Section 5(b) of RA 7610 instead of rape, since the prosecution failed to establish the
act of insertion of 8nger in to the vagina of AAA.
Issue: WON the decision of the CA is correct
Held: Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, de8nes and
penalizes acts of lasciviousness committed against a child as follows:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. -- Children,

whether male or female, who for money, pro8t, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or inuence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct,
are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse.
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious

conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual
abuse; Provided, That when the victims is under twelve (12) years of
age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph
3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised
Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may
be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its
medium period.[38]
Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with
a child exploited in prostitution, but also with a child subjected to other sexual
abuses. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for pro8t, but also
where one  through coercion, intimidation or influence  engages in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child. [39]
However, pursuant to the foregoing provision, before an accused can be

convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct committed against a minor
below 12 years of age, the requisites for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of
the RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5
of R.A. No. 7610.[40]
Acts of Lasciviousness, as de8ned in Article 336 of the RPC, has the following
elements:
(1) That the o?ender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;

(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the o?ended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or
c. When the o?ended party is under 12 years of age; and
(3) That the o?ended party is another person of either sex. [41]
In addition, the following elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A.
No. 7610 must be established:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious

conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
167. People vs. Ernesto A. Fragante, G.R. No. 182521, 9 February

2011( sexual abuse/acts of lasciviousness)
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Facts: Fragante was charged with 9 counts of acts of lasciviousness and 1 count of
rape all committed against his own minor daughter. It was 8nd out that that the
accused on many occasion molest her daughter and after the last incident together
with his mother they proceed to NBI and report the incidents. Later on his
arraignment the accused entered separate pleas of Not Guilty to all the crimes
charged. The accused was later on found guilty of beyond reasonable doubts.
Issue: whether the accused was guilty of violating Sec. 5 of RA 7610?
Ruling: Yes, Appellant was charged with violation of Article 336 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610.
These provisions state:
Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. — Any person who shall commit any act of
lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances
mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional.
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. – Children, whether male or
sexual abuse.
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse of lascivious conduct with a
child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when
the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted
under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may
be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 7610
are as follows:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to

sexual abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.31
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, all the elements of sexual abuse under
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 are present here.
168. Salvador Flordeliz v. People, GR 186441, 3 March 2010 (Sec 5b

RA 7610-elements)
Facts: The case at bar is on the conviction of the accused for 9 counts of rape
and 1 count of acts of lasciviousness.
In April 1995, while the petitioner’s children, AAA and BBB, were sleeping,
petitioner woke up AAA, then 14 years old, touched her vagina and played with it.
Petitioner told AAA not to tell it to anyone otherwise she would be harmed.
Eventually, petitioner was convicted for homicide and imprisoned in

Muntinlupa City. Afterwards, he was released on parole and would be visited by her
children. After his release, he committed again the same acts on several occasions
from 2002 to 2003 to her then second child BBB, then was 11 years old. She was
also told not to tell it to anyone or else she would be harmed as well but inserted his
8ngers inside BBB’s vagina.
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AAA and BBB had the chance to reveal their horrifying experiences when
their mother ABC arrived for a vacation. AAA immediately told ABC what petitioner
did to her. When confronted by ABC, BBB likewise admitted the repeated abuses
committed by petitioner. ABC forthwith reported the incidents to the National
Bureau of Investigation.
Petitioners was found by the Regional Trial Court with lewd design and
deliberate intent to cause malice and satisfy his lascivious desire, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously touched and play the private part of
o?ended party AAA, a minor, against her will and consent. The petitioner was
convicted for Act of Lasciviousness.
On the other hand, petitioner by means of force and intimidation and taking
advantage of his moral ascendancy over the private o?ended party he being the
biological father of said o?ended party, did there and there remove the pants and
underwear of the o?ended party and thereupon fondled her private part and forcibly
inserted his 8nger into the vagina of the o?ended party BBB, a minor, against her
will and consent. The accused was convicted of 9 counts of sexual assault with
aggravating circumstance due to the relationship against the accused.
The Court of Appeals likewise a7rmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court.
Issue: Whether or not that the Regional Trial Court conviction for the o?enses of Act
of Lasciviousness and sexual assault are proper.
Ruling: With regard to the sexual assault, the said conviction is proper.
However, on the judgment of Act of Lasciviousness, the case was modi8ed for
violating R.A. No. 7610 or "The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act" instead.
It de8nes sexual abuse of children and prescribes the penalty therefor in its
Article III, Section 5, to wit:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or
sexual abuse.
x x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That
when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815,
as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case
may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period.
Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with
a child exploited in prostitution, but also with a child subjected to other sexual
abuses. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for pro8t, but also
where one -- through coercion, intimidation or inUuence -- engages in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child.
However, pursuant to the foregoing provision, before an accused can be

convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct committed against a minor
below 12 years of age, the requisites for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of
the RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5
of R.A. No. 7610.
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The crime of Acts of Lasciviousness, as de8ned in Article 336 of the RPC, has
the following elements:
(1) That the o?ender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the o?ended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the o?ended party is under 12 years of age; and
(3) That the o?ended party is another person of either sex.[46]
In addition, the following elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A.
No. 7610 must be proven:
(1) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(2) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse; and
(3) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
Based on the foregoing de8nition, petitioner's act of touching AAA's vagina

and playing with it obviously amounted to lascivious conduct. Considering that the
act was committed on a child less than twelve years old and through intimidation, it
is beyond cavil that petitioner is guilty under the aforesaid laws.
Furthermore, failure to designate the o?ense by statute or to mention the

speci8c provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous speci8cation of the law
violated, does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged therein clearly recite
the facts constituting the crime charged. The character of the crime is not
determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor by the speci8cation of
the provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by the recital of the ultimate
facts and circumstances in the complaint or information.
169. Clement John Ferdinand M. Navarrete v. People, GR 147913, 31

January 2007 (Section 5b, RA 7610 in rel. Art. 336, RPC)
FACTS:
Clement John Ferdinand M. Navarrete was charged with the crime of statutory rape
of BBB. The RTC absolved petitioner of statutory rape as there was no clear and
positive proof of the entry of petitioner’s penis into the labia of the victim’s vagina.
However, it convicted petitioner for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 (Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act). On
appeal, the CA a7rmed the decision of the RTC. Petitioner asserts that he cannot be
convicted of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, a
crime not speci8cally alleged in the information which charged him with statutory
rape. Otherwise, his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him would be violated. He likewise contends that his guilt for
the said o?ense was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner insists that
Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 refers only to those who commit the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution and argues
that this does not apply in this case since the victim is not a child exploited in
prostitution.
ISSUE:
Whether the conviction of petitioner for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 is
proper.
HELD:
YES. The law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for pro8t but also
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one in which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in any lascivious

conduct. The very title of Section 5, Article III (Child Prostitution and Other Sexual
Abuse) of RA 7610 shows that it applies not only to a child subjected to prostitution
but also to a child subjected to other sexual abuse. A child is deemed subjected to
"other sexual abuse" when he or she indulges in lascivious conduct under the
coercion or inUuence of any adult. Here, BBB was sexually abused because she was
coerced or intimidated by petitioner (who poked her neck with a knife) to indulge in
lascivious conduct.
Petitioner was found guilty of violating Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section
5(b), Article III of RA 7610:
Sec. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether male or
sexual abuse.
Just like in the case of People v. Bon, the accused was charged with the rape of a
six-year old girl. The Court ruled that rape was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt. However, it was held that the accused was "liable for the crime of acts of
lasciviousness, as de8ned and penalized under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to
RA 7610" since all the elements of this o?ense were established. Petitioner cannot
therefore successfully argue that his constitutionally protected right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated when he was
found guilty under Section 5 of RA 7610.
Both lower courts also found that petitioner poked victim’s vagina with a stick with
cotton and watched a pornographic movie with her. These acts are undoubtedly acts
of lasciviousness or lewdness.
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 that must be proven
in addition to the elements of acts of lasciviousness are as follows:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.

2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution
or subjected to other sexual abuse.
"Lascivious conduct" is de8ned under Section 2 (h) of the rules and regulations of
RA 7610 as:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with
an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire
of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic
area of a person.
The aforestated acts of petitioner undeniably amounted to lascivious conduct under

this law.
170. People vs. DoneyGaduyon y Tapispisan, G.R. No. 181473, 11

November 2013 (Sexual abuse includes…)
Facts: Appellant is married to the mother of "AAA" with whom he has three
daughters. Their eldest child is "AAA," who at the time material to this case was
only 12 years old.
On August 21, 2002, the mother and sisters of "AAA" attended the wake of her
auntie in Caloocan City. "AAA" and her father, the appellant, were thus the only
ones left in the family residence in San Mateo, Rizal. At around 9:00 p.m. of the said
date, "AAA" was lying in her bed in the family room located at the upper portion of
their house when appellant fondled her breasts and touched her arms. 10 Appellant
threatened "AAA" not to tell her mother about the incident or else something bad
might happen to the latter.11
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At around 11:00 p.m. of the following day, August 22, 2002, and while her mother
and sisters were still in Caloocan City, "AAA" was awakened when appellant lowered
her shorts and panty. 12 Appellant spread her legs and inserted his penis into her
vagina.13 "AAA" felt pain but could do nothing but cry. 14 Appellant pulled out his
penis and inserted it again into "AAA’s" vagina. When he was done, appellant put
her shorts and panty back on and again threatened "AAA
Accused was charged with for secual abuse for touching AAA’s breast and Quali8ed
Object Rape for inserting his 8nger into the genital ori8ces of AAA.
Issue: WON Gaduyon was held liable
Held: Appelaant is guilty of 2 kinds of rape under Art 2666 a of RPC and Sexual
abuse under RA 7610.
rape under paragraph 2 of the above-quoted article is commonly known as rape by

sexual assault. The perpetrator, under any of the attendant circumstances
mentioned in paragraph 1, commits this kind of rape by inserting his penis into
another person’s mouth or anal ori8ce, or any instrument or object into the genital
or anal ori8ce of another person. It is also called "instrument or object rape", also
"gender-free rape", or the narrower "homosexual rape.
On the other hand, RA 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act", de8nes and penalizes
child prostitution and other sexual abuse. "Sexual abuse includes the employment,
use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or
assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the
molestation, prostitution, or incest with children. Lascivious conduct means the
intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin,
breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia,
anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent
to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of
a person.
171. JojitGaringarao vs. People, G.R. No. 192760, 20 July 2011

(Sexual abuse)
FACTS:
AAA, 16 years of age, was admitted to the Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center due to
fever and abdominal pain. The next day, her parents left the said hospital to process
AAA’s Medicare papers and to attend to their store respectively, leaving her alone.
When her father returned to the hospital, AAA told him that she wanted to go home.
The doctor allowed them due to AAA’s insistence but instructed that she should
continue medications. At home, she then told her parents that Jojit Garingarao, the
nurse on duty that day, sexually abused her. AAA testi8ed during trial that,
Garingarao, entered her room to check her medications and if she was still
experiencing pains. Garingarao lifted AAA’s bra and touched her left breast and
insisted that he was only examining her. Garingarao also slid his 8nger inside AAA’s
private part and only stopped when he saw that AAA really had her monthly period.
Garingarao alleged that, assuming the charges were correct, there was only one
incident when he touched AAA and as such, he should have been convicted only of
Acts of Lasciviousness and not of Violation of R.A. 7610. The RTC of San Carlos City,
Pangasinan found Garingarao guilty as charged, which was a7rmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the single lascivious incident was enough to hold the accused liable
for Violation of R.A. 7610.
HELD:
Yes. The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 are the
following:
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1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;

2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected
to other sexual abuse; and
Under Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7610,
lascivious conduct is de8ned as follows:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with
the intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or
pubic area of a person.
In this case, the prosecution established that Garingarao touched AAA’s breasts and
inserted his 8nger into her private part for his sexual grati8cation. Garingarao used
his inUuence as a nurse by pretending that his actions were part of the physical
examination he was doing. Garingarao persisted on what he was doing despite
AAA’s objections. AAA twice asked Garingarao what he was doing and he answered
that he was just examining her.
The Court has ruled that a child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse when the
child is the victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or inUuence of any adult.
In lascivious conduct under the coercion or inUuence of any adult, there must be
some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise
of the o?ended party’s free will. In this case, Garingarao coerced AAA into
submitting to his lascivious acts by pretending that he was examining her.
It is inconsequential that sexual abuse under RA 7610 occurred only once. Section
3(b) of RA 7610 provides that the abuse may be habitual or not. Hence, the fact that
the o?ense occurred only once is enough to hold Garingarao liable for acts of
lasciviousness under RA 7610.
172. People vs. CA and Gaspar Olayon, GR 171863, 20 August 2008

(Child abuse-section 5 v. Section 10)
FACTS:
The then 22-year old Gaspar Olayon was charged with violation of Section 10(a)of
Republic Act No. 7610 before the RTC, of which the then 14-year old AAA was
alleged to be the victim, whom it was alleged that he had sexual intercourse with
and commited lewd and lascivious acts. Respondent was also charged for acts of
lasciviousness for the same victim. Having found that AAA consented to the sexual
intercourse, after trial, he was acquitted of acts of lasciviousness but convicted of
violation of Section 10 (a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 for having taken
advantage of AAA's minority. The RTC said that even if they were with her consent,
consent is not an accepted defense in said special law.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, answering in the negative the issue of whether
consensual sexual intercourse with a minor is classi8ed as child abuse under
Section 10 of RA No. 7610, reversed the trial court’s decision and acquitted
respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in acquitting the respondent for violation of Sec. 10 of RA
7610.
HELD:
NO. In the case at bar, even if respondent were charged under Section 5(b), instead
of Section 10(a), respondent would just the same have been acquitted as there was
no allegation that an element of the o?ense – coercion or inUuence or intimidation –
attended its commission.
Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 under which respondent was charged in each of the
two cases provides:
SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other
ConditionsPrejudicial to the Child's Development. —
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(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's
development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No.
603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
shall su?er the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. (Underscoring
supplied),
Section 5(b), upon the other hand, provides:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether male
or female, who for money, pro8t, or any other consideration or due to the
coercion or inUuence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua

shall be imposed upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with
a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided,
That when the victims is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators
shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336
of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious
conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious
conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion
temporal in its medium period; (Italics in the original, emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As Section 10 refers to acts of child abuse prejudicial to the child’s development

other than child prostitution and other sexual abuse under Section 5, attempt to
commit child prostitution, child tra7cking, attempt to commit child tra7cking, and
obscene publications and indecent shows, the Court of Appeals did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in holding that "x x x ‘sexual abuse’ [as de8ned under
Section 5] x x x is a completely distinct and separate o?ense from ‘child abuse’ [as
de8ned under Section 10]."
Consensual sexual intercourse or even acts of lasciviousness with a minor who is 12
years old or older could constitute a violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. For
Section 5(b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child
exploited in prostitution but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuse.
For consensual sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a minor, who is not
exploited in prostitution, to thus fall within the purview of Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610, "persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion" of the child must be
present.
173. People vs. Candaza, 524 Phil. 589 [2006] (Section 5b)
Facts: Alex Candaza was accused of raping his relative Kristine Dorado. That the
incident happen in their house located at Valenzuela City. It was alleged that the
victim was raped and molest not only once but several times by the accused. Upon
discovering of the incident by her father they later go to the police station to report
the incident and thereafter, they 8led separate two information of rape and acts of
lasciviousness against the accused. The accused plead not guilty and trial ensued.
Subsequently, the accused herein was found by the court to be guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of Sec 5(b) of RA 7610?
Ruling: Yes, prosecution proved that appellant committed acts of lasciviousness

upon the victim under Article III, Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Kristine, who was 13 years
old when the criminal acts complained of occurred, was sexually abused by
appellant since she was coerced and intimidated by the latter to indulge in
lascivious conduct.[38]
As correctly found by the trial court, the penalty for simple rape through force and
intimidation is reclusion perpetua. Civil indemnity and moral damages in the
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amount of P50,000.00 each are also awarded to victims of rape in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence.
However, the penalty for acts of lasciviousness performed on a child under Section
5(b) of R.A. 7610 is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed on appellant
should thus fall within the range of prision mayor medium to reclusion temporal
minimum, as minimum, to reclusion temporal maximum, as maximum. Hence,
appellant is sentenced to su?er an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17)
years, four (4) months and (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Consistent
with previous rulings of the Court, appellant must also indemnify the victim in the
amount of P15,000.00 as moral damages and pay a 8ne in the same amount.
174. Amployo vs. People, 496 Phil. 747 [2005] (section 5b)
Facts: Kristine Joy Mosquera was eight years old on 27 June 1997 , [8] having
celebrated her eighth year the day before. A grade III student, she was walking to
school (which was just a short distance from her house) at around seven oclock in
the morning when she was met by petitioner who emerged from hiding from a
nearby store. Petitioner and Kristine Joy were neighbors. Petitioner approached
Kristine Joy, touched her head, placed his hand on her shoulder where it then
moved down to touch her breast several times. Petitioner thereafter told Kristine
Joy not to report to anybody what he did to her. Petitioner was charged with
violation of Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610.
Petitioner argues that lewd design cannot be inferred from his conduct 8rstly
because the alleged act occurred at around seven oclock in the morning, in a street
very near the school where people abound, thus, he could not have been prompted
by lewd design as his hand merely slipped and accidentally touched Kristine Joy's
breast. Furthermore, he could not have been motivated by lewd design as the
breast of an eight year old is still very much undeveloped, which means to say there
was nothing to entice him in the 8rst place. Finally, assuming that he indeed
intentionally touch Kristine Joy's breast, it was merely to satisfy a silly whim.
Petitioner contends that even assuming that the acts imputed to him amount to
lascivious conduct, the resultant crime is only acts of lasciviousness under Article
336 of the RPC and not child abuse under Section 5(b) of Rep. Act No. 7610 as the
elements thereof have not been proved.
Issue: WON petitioner liable under RA 7610
Held: Terrifying an eight-year old school girl, taking advantage of her tender age
with his sheer size, invading her privacy and intimidating her into silence, in our
book, can never be in satisfaction of a mere silly whim.
The second element is likewise present. As we observed in People v. Larin, Section

5 of Rep. Act No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for
pro8t, but also one in which a child engages in any lascivious conduct through
coercion or intimidation. As case law has it, intimidation need not necessarily be
irresistible. It is su7cient that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or
subdues the free exercise of the will of the o?ended party. This is especially true in
the case of young, innocent and immature girls who could not be expected to act
with equanimity of disposition and with nerves of steel. Young girls cannot be
expected to act like adults under the same circumstances or to have the courage
and intelligence to disregard the threat.
As to the third element, there is no dispute that Kristine Joy is a minor, as she was
only eight years old at the time of the incident in question.
175. People vs. Sumingwa, G.R. No. 183619, 13 October 2009

(section 5b)
Facts: Salvino Sumingwa was charged with two (2) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness,
four (4) counts of Rape, three (3) counts of Unjust Vexation, one (1) count of Other
Light Threats, one (1) count of Maltreatment, and one (1) count of Attempted Rape
for acts committed against his minor11 daughter AAA from 1999-2001.
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Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of violating Sec (5b) of RA 7610?
Ruling: Yes, Appellant is guilty of two (2) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness under
Section 5(b), Article III, R.A. 7610 committed against AAA on the second week of
August 1999 and on the 8rst week of September 1999. AAA testi8ed that in August,
appellant, with lewd design, inserted his hands inside her shirt then fondled her
breasts; and in September, he forced her to hold his penis until he ejaculated.
The trial and the appellate courts were correct in giving credence to the victim’s
testimony, in dismissing appellant’s defense of denial and alibi, and in disbelieving
that AAA initiated the criminal cases only upon the prodding of the latter’s
grandmother. Settled jurisprudence tells us that the mere denial of one’s
involvement in a crime cannot take precedence over the positive testimony of the
o?ended party.
We are not unmindful of the fact that appellant was speci8cally charged in an
Information for Acts of Lasciviousness de8ned and penalized by Article 336 of the
RPC. However, the failure to designate the o?ense by statute, or to mention the
speci8c provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous speci8cation of the law
violated, does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts
constituting the crime charged.55 The character of the crime is not determined by
the caption or preamble of the information nor from the speci8cation of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by the recital of the ultimate
facts and circumstances in the complaint or information.56
In the present case, the body of the information contains an averment of the acts
alleged to have been committed by appellant which unmistakably refers to acts
punishable under Section 5(b), Article III, R.A. 7610.
Appellant should, therefore, be meted the same penalties and be made to answer
for damages as in Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and 1654.
176. Michael Padua vs. People, GR 168546, 23 July 2008

(Suspension of sentence of minor)
Facts: Petitioner, who was then 17 years old, was involved in selling illegal drugs.
Initially in his arraignment he pleaded not guilty but re-entered his plea of guilty to
avail the bene8ts of 8rst time o?enders. Subsequently, he applied for probation but
was denied. In his petition for certiorari, the court said that probation and
suspension of sentence are di?erent and provisions in PD 603 or RA 9344 cannot be
invoked to avail probation. It is speci8cally stated that in drug tra7cking,
application for probation should be denied. As aside issue, the court discussed the
availment of suspension of sentence under RA 9344.
ISSUE: Whether suspension of sentence under RA9344 can still be invoked given the
fact that the accused is now 21 years old.
Ruling: No. The suspension of sentence under Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 could
no longer be retroactively applied for petitioner’s bene8t. Section 38 of Rep. Act No.
9344 provides that once a child under 18 years of age is found guilty of the o?ense
charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place
the child in conUict with the law under suspended sentence. Section 40 of Rep. Act
No. 9344, however, provides that once the child reaches 18 years of age, the court
shall determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of sentence, or
extend the suspended sentence for a certain speci8ed period or until the child
reaches the maximum age of 21 years. Petitioner has already reached 21years of
age or over and thus, could no longer be considered a child for purposes of applying
RA 9344. Thus, the application of sec. 38 and 40 appears moot and academic as far
as his case concerned.
177. People vs. MelchorCabalquinto, GR 167693, 19 September

2006 (Con=dentiality of records-RA 7610 and RA 9262)
167 Team Soul

Special Penal Laws
Facts: ABC, the common-law wife of Cabalquinto, was on her way home. As she was
approaching the house, she noticed that the door was closed although the lights
were on. Since there is a half-inch gap between the door and the wall, she peeped
through the gap and saw Cabalquinto lying face down making pumping motions on
their daughter, AAA, who was lying underneath him with her panties pulled
down. When she heard Cabalquinto tell AAA to open her legs (“ibuka mo”), she
kicked and pounded the door. Cabalquinto immediately lay down. AAA then stood
up and opened the door. ABC entered the room and confronted Cabalquinto who
only denied her accusation. She then asked AAA what her father did to her. AAA did
not say anything but looked pale. ABC, as advised by her sister and the barangay
o7cials, 8led a complaint. AAA was 8 years old then. AAA testi8ed that she was
raped several times when her mother was abroad. Accused claimed that ABC’s
frequent spats with his brother motivated her to 8le the rape cases against him and
there were inconsistencies with regard to the testimonies of ABC and AAA. Accused
was found guilty of rape. ABC wrote a letter to the Chief Justice expressing anxiety
over the posting of full text decisions of the Supreme Court on its Internet Web
Page.
Issue: Whether the Court should refrain from posting in its Internet Web Page the
full text of decisions in cases involving child sexual abuse?
Ruling: Yes. Sec. 29 of RA 7610 provides:
Sec. 29. Con+dentiality.—at the instance of the o?ended party,

his name may be withheld from the public until the court acquires
jurisdiction over the case.
It shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher, and reporter or

columnist in case of printed materials, announcer or producer in the
case of television and radio broadcasting, producer and director in the
case of the movie industry, to cause undue and sensationalized
publicity of any case of a violation of this Act which results in the moral
degradation and su?ering of the o?ended party.
Sec. 44 and Sec. 40 of RA 9262 similarly provides:
Sec. 44. Con+dentiality.—All records pertaining to cases of

violence against women and their children including those in the
barangay shall be con8dential and all public o7cers and employees
and public or private clinics or hospitals shall respect the right to
privacy of the victim. Whoever publishes or causes to be published, in
any format, the name, address, telephone number, school, business
address, employer, or other identifying information of a victim or an
immediate family member, without the latter’s consent, shall be liable
to the contempt power of the court.
Any person who violates this provision shall su?er the penalty of
one (1) year imprisonment and a 8ne of not more than Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
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Special Penal Laws
Sec. 40. Privacy and con+dentiality of proceedings.—All hearings

of cases of violence against women and their children shall be
conducted in a manner consistent with the dignity of women and their
children and respect for their privacy.
Records of the cases shall be treated with utmost con8dentiality.

Whoever publishes or causes to be published, in any format, the name,
address, telephone number, school, business address, employer or
other identifying information of the parties or an immediate family or
household member, without their consent or without authority of the
court, shall be liable for contempt of court and shall su?er the penalty
of one year imprisonment and a 8ne of not more than Five Hundred
Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos.
Taking all these opinions into account and in view of recent enactments which
unequivocally express the intention to maintain the con=dentiality of
information in cases involving violence against women and their children,
in this case and henceforth, the Court shall withhold the real name of the
victim-survivor and shall use =ctitious initials instead to represent
her. Likewise, the personal circumstances of the victims-survivors or any other
information tending to establish or compromise their identities, as well those of
their immediate family or household members, shall not be disclosed.
DD. Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (RA No. 9344)
Exemption from criminal liability; exemption to the exemption
Diversion and intervention programs
Treatment of child in conVict with the law
EE. Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 (RA No. 9775)

178. Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr.et.al. v. Secretary of DOJ, GR 203335,
et.al, 18 February 2014 (Anti-child porn-online; no double jeopardy)
Facts: Petitioner sought to declare several provisions of RA 10175, the Cybercrime

Prevention act of 2012, unconstitutional and void. Petitioner contended that it
intrudes in to the area of protected speech and expressions, creating a chilling
e?ect and deterrent e?ect on these guaranteed freedoms.that it transgress the
freedom of the press, that the grant to law enforecement agencies of the power to
collect or record data in real time as tendin to curtail civil liberties or provide
opportunities for o7cial abuse.
Issue: WON RA 10175 is unconstitutional
Held: the Court 8nds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the
strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in
punishing what is essentially a condemnable act – accessing the computer system
of another without right. It is a universally condemned conduct. It simply punishes
what essentially is a form of vandalism, 8 the act of willfully destroying without right
the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic
document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed
freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems and
private documents.
Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an
obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is
actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal
code, already punishes it.
The State has a compelling interest in enacting the cybercrime law for there is a
need to put order to the tremendous activities in cyberspace for public good. 82 To do
this, it is within the realm of reason that the government should be able to monitor
tra7c data to enhance its ability to combat all sorts of cybercrimes.
169 Team Soul

Special Penal Laws
Formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy of the law to
"prevent and combat such [cyber] o?enses by facilitating their detection,
investigation, and prosecution at both the domestic and international levels, and by
providing arrangements for fast and reliable international cooperation." 105 This
policy is clearly adopted in the interest of law and order, which has been considered
as su7cient standard.106 Hence, Sections 24 and 26(a) are likewise valid.
FF. Anti-Photo and Video Voyeurism Act of 2009 (RA No. 9995)
Elements of violation (taking photo and video)
GG. Prescriptive period of SPL
PRESCRIPTION OF CRIMES UNDER ACT 3326 (Special laws) 1
2 MONTHS – if the crime is violation of Municipal ordinance;

1 YEAR – with penalty of Fine or imprisonment of 1-30 days;
4 YEARS – imprisonment of 1 month to two (2) years;
8 YEARS – imprisonment of two (2) years to six (6) years;
12 YEARS – imprisonment of six (6) years or more
20 YEARS – if the crime committed is treason.
179. Republic vs. Eduardo Cojuangco, et.al. GR 139930, 26 June

2012 (Prescription)
FACTS: Teodoro D. Regala, Victor P. Lazatin, Eleazar B. Reyes, Eduardo U. Escueta

and Leo J. Palma incorporated the United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. (UNICOM )[1] with an
authorized capital stock of P100 million divided into one million shares with a par
value of P100 per share. UNICOM had several amendments in its capitalization.
The Board of Directors of the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) composed
of respondents Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, Maria Clara L. Lobregat,
Jose R. Eleazar, Jr., Jose C. Concepcion, Rolando P. Dela Cuesta, Emmanuel M.
Almeda, Hermenegildo C. Zayco, Narciso M. Pineda, Iñaki R. Mendezona, and Danilo
S. Ursua approved Resolution 247-79 authorizing UCPB, the Administrator of the
Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CII Fund), to invest not more than P500 million
from the fund in the equity of UNICOM for the bene8t of the coconut farmers.
Thereafter several amendments which increases the capital stock without par value
until on September 18, 1979 a new set of UNICOM directors, composed of
respondents Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, Maria Clara L. Lobregat,
Jose R. Eleazar, Jr., Jose Concepcion, Emmanuel M. Almeda, Iñaki R. Mendezona,
Teodoro D. Regala, Douglas Lu Ym, Sigfredo Veloso, and Jaime Gandiaga, approved
another amendment to UNICOM’s capitalization.
About 10 years later or on March 1, 1990 the O7ce of the Solicitor General
(OSG) 8led a complaint for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.)
3019[6] against respondents, the 1979 members of the UCPB board of directors,
before the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The OSG alleged
that UCPB’s investment in UNICOM was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the government since UNICOM had a capitalization of only P5 million and it had no
track record of operation. In the process of conversion to voting common shares,
the government’s P495 million investment was reduced by P95 million which was
credited to UNICOM’s incorporators. The PCGG subsequently referred the complaint
to the O7ce of the Ombudsman which disquali8ed the PCGG from conducting the
preliminary investigation in the case.
About nine years later or on March 15, 1999 the O7ce of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP) issued a Memorandum, [8] stating that although it found su7cient
basis to indict respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the action has
already prescribed. Respondents amended UNICOM’s capitalization a third time on
1 If the law does not provide for prescriptive period.
170 Team Soul

Special Penal Laws
September 18, 1979, giving the incorporators unwarranted bene8ts by increasing

their 1 million shares to 100 million shares without cost to them. But, since UNICOM
8led its Certi8cate of Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) on February 8, 1980, making public respondents’
acts as board of directors, the period of prescription began to run at that time and
ended on February 8, 1990. Thus, the crime already prescribed when the OSG 8led
the complaint with the PCGG for preliminary investigation on March 1, 1990.
In a Memorandum[9] dated May 14, 1999, the O7ce of the Ombudsman

approved the OSP’s recommendation for dismissal of the complaint. It additionally
ruled that UCPB’s subscription to the shares of stock of UNICOM on September 18,
1979 was the proper point at which the prescription of the action began to run since
respondents’ act of investing into UNICOM was consummated on that date. It could
not be said that the investment was a continuing act. The giving of undue bene8t
to the incorporators prescribed 10 years later on September 18, 1989. Notably,
when the crime was committed in 1979 the prescriptive period for it had not yet
been amended. The original provision of Section 11 of R.A. 3019 provided for
prescription of 10 years. Thus, the OSG 8led its complaint out of time. The OSG
8led a motion for reconsideration on the O7ce of the Ombudsman’s action but the
latter denied the same;[10] hence, this petition,
ISSUE: Whether the action already prescribed as such respondents are not
guilty of the charge,
RULING: YES. Notably, Section 11 of R.A. 3019 now provides that the o?enses
committed under that law prescribes in 15 years. Prior to its amendment by Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 195 on March 16, 1982, however, the prescriptive period for
o?enses punishable under R.A. 3019 was only 10 years. [16] Since the acts
complained of were committed before the enactment of B.P. 195, the prescriptive
period for such acts is 10 years as provided in Section 11 of R.A. 3019, as originally
enacted.[17]
Now R.A. 3019 being a special law, the 10-year prescriptive period should be
computed in accordance with Section 2 of Act 3326, [18] which provides:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission
of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from
the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The above-mentioned section provides two rules for determining when

the prescriptive period shall begin to run: rst, from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, if such commission is known;
and second, from its discovery, if not then known, and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.[19]
Petitioner points out that, assuming the o?ense charged is subject to prescription,
the same began to run only from the date it was discovered, namely, after the 1986
EDSA Revolution. Thus, the charge could be 8led as late as 1996.
In the prosecution of cases of behest loans, the Court reckoned the prescriptive
period from the discovery of such loans. The reason for this is that the government,
as aggrieved party, could not have known that those loans existed when they were
made. Both parties to such loans supposedly conspired to perpetrate fraud against
the government. They could only have been discovered after the 1986 EDSA
Revolution when the people ousted President Marcos from o7ce. And, prior to that
date, no person would have dared question the legality or propriety of the loans. [20]
Those circumstances do not obtain in this case. For one thing, what is questioned
here is not the grant of behest loans that, by their nature, could be concealed from
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the public eye by the simple expedient of suppressing their documentations. What
is rather involved here is UCPB’s investment in UNICOM, which corporation is
allegedly owned by respondent Cojuangco, supposedly a Marcos crony. That
investment does not, however, appear to have been withheld from the curious or
from those who were minded to know like banks or competing businesses. Indeed,
the OSG made no allegation that respondent members of the board of directors of
UCPB connived with UNICOM to suppress public knowledge of the investment.
Prescription of actions is a valued rule in all civilized states from the beginning of
organized society. It is a rule of fairness since, without it, the plainti? can postpone
the 8ling of his action to the point of depriving the defendant, through the passage
of time, of access to defense witnesses who would have died or left to live
elsewhere, or to documents that would have been discarded or could no longer be
located. Moreover, the memories of witnesses are eroded by time. There is an
absolute need in the interest of fairness to bar actions that have taken the plainti?s
too long to 8le in court.
Respondents claim that, in any event, the complaint against them failed to show
probable cause. They point out that, prior to the third amendment of UNICOM’s
capitalization, the stated value of the one million shares without par value, which
belonged to its incorporators, was P5 million. When these shares were converted to
5 million shares with par value, the total par value of such shares remained at P5
million. But, the action having prescribed, there is no point in discussing the
existence of probable cause against the respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019.
180. Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto,

GR 135715 (prescription, counting)
Facts:Mindanao Coconut Oil Mills (MINCOCO) applied for a Guarantee Loan

Accommodation with the National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC)
for the amount of approximately P30.4 Million which the NIDC's Board of Directors
approved on June 23, 1976.
The guarantee loan was both undercapitalized and under-collateralized

because MINCOCO's paid up capital then was only P7 million and its assets worth is
P7 Million. This notwithstanding, MINCOCO further obtained additional Guarantee
Loan Accommodations from NIDC worth over P20 million.
When MINCOCO defaulted, Eduardo Cojuangco issued a memorandum dated

July 18, 1983, bearing the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos' marginal note,
disallowing the foreclosure of MINCOCO's properties. The government banks were
not able to recover any amount from MINCOCO and President Marcos' marginal note
was construed by the NIDC to have e?ectively released MINCOCO, including its
owners, from all of its 8nancial liabilities.
These transactions were, however, discovered only in 1992 after then

President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 136 creating the Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans.
The Committee found that MINCOCO, together with 20 other corporations,

obtained behest loans. The Committee 8led with the Ombudsman a sworn
complaint against MINCOCO's O7cers and NIDC's Board of Directors for violation of
Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019,9 as amended.
The Ombudsman, by Resolution, motu prorio dismissed the complaint on the

following grounds: (1) insu7ciency of evidence, and (2) prescription of the o?enses.
The Ombudsman held that the acts should be governed by the law in force at the
time of their commission, which is the old R.A. No. 3019 before its amendment by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 in March 1982. The old law provided a 10 year
prescriptive period. Prescription commenced to run in 1976 when the assailed
transaction happened, hence, when the case was 8led in September 1997, the
o?enses have long prescribed.
172 Team Soul

Special Penal Laws
On the other hand, the Committee argues that the right of the State to
recover behest loans as ill-gotten wealth is imprescriptible under Section 15, Article
XI of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, assuming that prescription applies, the
period should be counted from the time of discovery of behest loans or sometime in
1992 when the Committee was constituted.
Issues: Whether or not State can still recover behest loans for being imprescriptible
as provided in the Constitution that claims for ill-gotten wealth are imprescriptible.
Ruling: The State can still recover behest loan although they only found the
said transaction in 1992.
The provision found in Section 15, Article XI of the 1987

Constitution that "the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired
by public o7cials or employees, from them or from their nominees or
transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppels," applies only
to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases.
Section 1126 of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended by Batas Pambansa

Blg. 195, provides that the o?enses committed under Republic Act No. 3019 shall
prescribe in =fteen (15) years; However, for crimes committed PRIOR to the
eAectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which was approved on March 16,
1982, (or under the old Republic Act No. 3019), the prescriptive period was only
ten (10) years. The period of prescription for the subject crime committed in 1976
and prior to the amendment of Republic Act No. 3019, is ten (10) years.
The time as to when the prescriptive period starts to run for crimes
committed under Republic Act No. 3019, a special law, is covered by Act No.
3326, Section 2 of which provides that:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the

commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for
its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted

against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy.
Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the
crime is committed. That an aggrieved person "entitled to an action has no
knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises," does not
prevent the running of the prescriptive period.
An exception to this rule is the "blameless ignorance" doctrine,

incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326. Under this doctrine, "the statute of
limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will
support a cause of action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the
statute of limitations where the plainti? does not know or has no reasonable means
of knowing the existence of a cause of action." xxx Thus, we held in a catena of
cases, that if the violation of the special law was not known at the time of
its commission, the prescription begins to run only from the discovery
thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.
Hence, the prescriptive period for the subject crimes commenced from the
date of its discovery in 1992 after the Committee made an exhaustive investigation.
When the complaint was 8led in 1997, only 8ve years have elapsed, and, hence,
prescription has not yet set in. The rationale for this is that "it was well-high
impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known these crimes
committed prior to the 1986 EDSA Revolution, because of the alleged connivance
and conspiracy among involved public o7cials and the bene8ciaries of the loans."
181. People vs. Arturo Paci=cador, GR 139405, 13 March 2001

(applying prescriptive period)
173 Team Soul

Special Penal Laws
FACTS: Arturo and co-accused, Jose T. Marcelo, were charged before the
Sandiganbayan with the crime of violation of Republic Act No. 3019. The
information in this case, dated October 19, 1988, was 8led with the Sandiganbayan
on October 27, 1988 on which date the existing jurisprudence on matters of
prescription of the o?ense was the ruling enunciated in Francisco v. Court of
Appeals (May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 538) to the e?ect that the 8ling of the complaint
with the 8scal’s o7ce also interrupts the period of prescription of the o?ense.
The o?ense charged was allegedly committed from December 16, 1975 to
January 6, 1976. The running of the period of prescription of the o?ense may have
started on January 6, 1976 but was interrupted by the 8ling of the complaint with
the appropriate investigating body. Sandiganbayan reconsidered its Resolution of
November 10, 1998 and dismissed the Information in Criminal Case No. 139405
against the respondent on the ground of prescription. For Instead of applying Act
No. 3326, as amended, xxx, SB utilized Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code. In this
case, as the o?ense involved is the violation of R.A. 3019, a special law, it follows
that in computing the prescriptive period of the o?ense, it is not the provision
contained in the Revised Penal Code that should govern but that of Act No. 3326.
Petitioner argues on prescription of o?enses punishable under special laws is

not applicable to the instant criminal case for the reason that Republic Act No. 3019
provides for its own prescriptive period. Section 11 thereof provides that o?enses
committed and punishable under the said law shall prescribe in 8fteen (15)
years. However, inasmuch as Republic Act No. 3019 does not state exactly when
the 8fteen-year prescriptive period begins to run, Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code should be applied suppletorilyArticle 91 of the Revised Penal Code, which
adopts the “discovery rule” for the prescription of o?enses
ISSUE: WON the prosecution of the crime charged is time-barred by

prescription as shown by facts and circumstances on record and of judicial notice?
RULING: Yes. It has been settled that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 governs the
computation of prescription of o?enses de8ned and penalized by special laws. In
the case of People v. Sandiganbayan, this Court ruled that Section 2 of Act No. 3326
was correctly applied by the anti-graft court in determining the reckoning period for
prescription in a case involving the crime of violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended.
Sec. 2. Prescription should begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive
period shall commence to run on the day it was committed. The petitioner denies
having any knowledge of the crime at the time it was allegedly committed by the
respondent. This Court takes notice of the fact that the subject Deed of Sale dated
December 29, 1975 relative to the sale of the parcels of land by the National Steel
Corporation to the Philippine Smelters Corporation, was registered shortly thereafter
in the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Camarines Norte. While petitioner may
not have knowledge of the alleged crime at the time of its commission, the
registration of the subject Deed of Sale with the Registry of Deeds constitutes
constructive notice thereof to the whole world inlcuding the petitioner.
174 Team Soul

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Special Penal Laws

A. Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103)

Issue: Whether the penalty imposed by the trial court is correct?

Ruling: No. The property penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant should be

Accused-appellant cannot avail of the bene8ts of the Indeterminate Sentence Law

Despite his legal disquali8cation on account of previous conviction, he voted in the

3. People vs. Jaranilla, L-28547, 22 Feb. 1974 (ISLAW, applicable to

Issues: 1. Whether or not the ACCUSED were validly convicted of robbery

Also to be appreciated against appellants Suyo and Brillantes is the aggravating

4. People vs. Martinado, GR 92020, 19 October 1992, 214 SCRA 712

Issue: Whether the accused is entitled to the ISLAW?

5. People vs. Angeles, GR 132376, 11 April 2002 (ISLAW; Imposition;

Issue: W/N the penalty may be reduced

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as

(2) In Criminal Case No. 94-140486, accused-appellant Samina Angeles is

(3) In Criminal Case No. 94-140487, accused-appellant Samina Angeles is

6. People vs. Alberto Anticamara, et.al., GR No. 178771, 08 June 2011

Issue: Whether ISLAW is applicable to this case.

Same; Murder; Damages; Moral damages are mandatory in cases of murder,

A. Probation Law (PD 968)

7. Heirs of Francisco Abueg vs. CA, 219 SCRA 78 (Probation; eAect of

Private respondent 8led an application for probation alleging, in essence, that he is

8. Michael Padua vs. People, GR 168546, 23 July 2008

9. Lagrosa vs. People, GR 152044, 03 July 2003, 405 SCRA 357

Facts: The Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, Branch 2, rendered a

Petitioners appealed their conviction to the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeal

Ruling: Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of

Upon interposing an appeal, more so after asserting their innocence therein,

10. Vicoy vs. People, GR 138203, 03 July 2002 (Probation; eAect of

11. ArnelColinares vs. People, GR 182748, 13 December 2011

Note: Wala to sa lumang syllabus

12. Tolentino vs. Alconcel, GR No. 63400, 18 March 1983

Facts: Eduardo Tolentino was charged of violation of Section 4, Article II of RA.

13. Pablo Francisco vs. C.A., GR No. 108747; 6 April 1995

Ruling. No. Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation.

On September 23, 1982, the probationer (petitioner) asked his supervising

Issue: W/n probation is revocable

See. 16. Termination of Probation. — After the period of probation and

15. Urbano vs. COMELEC, et.al., GR 168550, 10 August 2006 (EAect

Issue: Whether probation law is an exception to LGC.

B. Anti-Fencing Law (PD 1612)

16. Tan vs. People, GR No. 1343298, August 1999; (Fencing;

Facts: Manuelito Mendez, a former employee of Bueno Metal Industries, was

17. Capili vs. CA, 15 August 2000 (Fencing; elements)

1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;

2. The accused, who is not a principal or an accomplice in the commission of the

18. Francisco vs. People; GR 146584, 12 July 2004 (Prima Facie

Another transaction happened in November 1991 where he o?ered to sell to Ernesto

Issue: Whether accused is guilty for violating Anti-Fencing Law?

20. People vs. Guzman; GR No. 77368 (Robbery-Fencing,

Subsequently, an information, dated 22 October 1985, for violation of Presidential

Ruling: NO. A "continuous crime" is a single crime consisting of a series of facts

21. Caoili vs. C.A., GR No. 128369; 22 December 1997

Issue: Whether or not there is su7cient evidence to indict Caoili.

C. Obstruction of Justice (PD No. 1829)

22. Juan Ponce Enrile vs. Judge Omar Amin, GR 93335, 13

Respondent judge sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding

23. Roger Posadas v. Ombudsman, GR 131492, 29 September 2000

24. Prudente Soller, et.al., GR 144261-62, 9 May 2001 (PD 1829,

Facts: Petitioners were charged with Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution

Issue: Whether Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case.

E. Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act of 2002 (RA No. 9165)

25. People vs. Fernando Villamin, G.R. No. 175590, 09 February,