EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES; ACCIDENT
the trial court that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position had attended the
The elements of accident are as follows: 1) the accused was at the time performing a lawful
act with due care; 2) the resulting injury was caused by mere accident; and 3) on the part of
the accused, there was no fault or no intent to cause the injury.
G.R. No. 150647 September 29, 2004
ROWENO POMOY vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
 In January 1990, Tomas Balboa, a master teacher of the Concepcion College of
Science and Fisheries in Iloilo, was arrested allegedly in connection with a robbery
which took place in the municipality in December 1989.
 He was taken and detained in the Headquarters. Later that day, petitioner, who is a
police sergeant (and the one who filed the robbery case), went near the door of the
jail where Balboa was detained and directed the latter to come out, purportedly for
tactical interrogation at the investigation room.
 At that time, petitioner had a gun, a .45 caliber pistol, tucked in a holster which was
hanging by the side of his belt. The gun was fully embedded in its holster, with only
the handle of the gun protruding from the holster.
 When petitioner and Balboa reached the main building and were near the
investigation room, two (2) gunshots were heard. When the source of the shots was
verified, petitioner was seen still holding a .45 caliber pistol, facing Balboa, who was
lying in a pool of blood, about two (2) feet away. When the Commanding Officer of
the Headquarters arrived, he disarmed petitioner and directed that Balboa be
brought to the hospital. Dr. Palma happened to be at the crime scene as he was
visiting his brother in the Philippine Constabulary. When Dr. Palma examined Balboa,
he (Dr. Palma) said that it was unnecessary to bring Balboa to the hospital for he was
dead.
DEFENSE:
Witness Basa: that she saw the accused and victim grappling for the possession of the gun,
and then there was explosion; she was not certain who pulled the gun
Accused: that when he took Balboa from the stockade he did not tell him that he (Balboa) was
to be investigated in the investigation room; his gun was in its holster when the victim tried to
grab it (gun); from the time he sensed that the victim tried to grab his gun, he locked the
victim; the hand of the victim was on top of his hand and he felt the victim was attempting to
get his gun; that the entire handle of his gun was exposed when placed inside its holster; he
cannot tell whether the victim, while struggling with him, was able to hold any portion of his
gun from the tip of its barrel to the point where its hammer is located; during the incident his
gun was fully loaded and cocked
TRIAL COURT: finding Pomoy (petitioner) guilty of the crime of HOMICIDE (hindi nkalagay
ung penalty)
CA: modified the decision of the TC as to the penalty (the CA disagreed with the conclusion of
commission of the crime.) - POMOY is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six
(6) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects
ISSUE: WON the shooting of Tomas Balboa was the result of an accident
HELD: YES
 Exemption from criminal liability proceeds from a finding that the harm to the victim
was not due to the fault or negligence of the accused, but to circumstances that
could not have been foreseen or controlled.17 Thus, in determining whether an
"accident" attended the incident, courts must take into account the dual standards of
lack of intent to kill and absence of fault or negligence. This determination inevitably
brings to the fore the main question in the present case: was petitioner in control of
the .45 caliber pistol at the very moment the shots were fired?
Petitioner Not in Control of the Gun When It Fired
 Petitioner did not have control of the gun during the scuffle. The deceased
persistently attempted to wrest the weapon from him, while he resolutely tried to
thwart those attempts. That the hands of both petitioner and the victim were all over
the weapon was categorically asserted by the eyewitness. In the course of grappling
for the gun, both hands of petitioner were fully engaged -- his right hand was trying
to maintain possession of the weapon, while his left was warding off the victim. It
would be difficult to imagine how, under such circumstances, petitioner would coolly
and effectively be able to release the safety lock of the gun and deliberately aim and
fire it at the victim.
Release of the Gun’s Safety Lock and Firing of the Gun Both Accidental
 It is undisputed that both petitioner and the victim grappled for possession of the
gun. This frenzied grappling for the weapon -- though brief, having been finished in
a matter of seconds -- was fierce and vicious. The eyewitness account amply
illustrated the logical conclusion that could not be dismissed: that in the course of the
scuffle, the safety lock could have been accidentally released and the shots
accidentally fired.
 That there was not just one but two shots fired does not necessarily and
conclusively negate the claim that the shooting was accidental, as the
same circumstance can easily be attributed to the mechanism of the .45 caliber
service gun.
Alleged Grappling Not Negated by Frontal Location of Wounds
 Ordinarily, the location of gunshot wounds is indicative of the positions of the parties
at the precise moment when the gun was fired. Their positions would in turn be
relevant to a determination of the existence of variables such as treachery,
aggression and so on.
  In the factual context of the present case, however, the location of the wounds  Self-defense is inconsistent with the exempting circumstance of accident, in which
becomes inconsequential. Where, as in this case, both the victim and the there is no intent to kill. On the other hand, self-defense necessarily contemplates a
accused were grappling for possession of a gun, the direction of its nozzle may premeditated intent to kill in order to defend oneself from imminent
continuously change in the process, such that the trajectory of the bullet when the danger.28 Apparently, the fatal shots in the instant case did not occur out of any
weapon fires becomes unpredictable and erratic. In this case, the eyewitness conscious or premeditated effort to overpower, maim or kill the victim for the
account of that aspect of the tragic scuffle shows that the parties’ positions were purpose of self-defense against any aggression; rather, they appeared to be the
unsteady, and that the nozzle of the gun was neither definitely aimed nor pointed at spontaneous and accidental result of both parties’ attempts to possess the firearm.
any particular target.
 Since the death of the victim was the result of an accidental firing of the service gun
of petitioner -- an exempting circumstance as defined in Article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code -- a further discussion of whether the assailed acts of the latter
Presence of All the Elements of Accident
constituted lawful self-defense is unnecessary.
 At the time of the incident, petitioner was a member -- specifically, one of the
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision REVERSED. Petitioner
investigators -- of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at the Iloilo Provincial
is ACQUITTED.
Mobile Force Company. Thus, it was in the lawful performance of his duties as
investigating officer
 it was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer that petitioner tried to
defend his possession of the weapon when the victim suddenly tried to remove it
from his holster. As an enforcer of the law, petitioner was duty-bound to prevent the
snatching of his service weapon by anyone, especially by a detained person in his
custody. Such weapon was likely to be used to facilitate escape and to kill or maim
persons in the vicinity, including petitioner himself.
 Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence. He exercised all the necessary
precautions to prevent his service weapon from causing accidental harm to others.
As he so assiduously maintained, he had kept his service gun locked when he left his
house; he kept it inside its holster at all times, especially within the premises of his
working area.
 At no instance during his testimony did the accused admit to any intent to cause
injury to the deceased, much less kill him. Furthermore, Nicostrato Estepar, the
guard in charge of the detention of Balboa, did not testify to any behavior on the part
of petitioner that would indicate the intent to harm the victim while being fetched
from the detention cell.
 The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victim’s death was limited only to acts
committed in the course of the lawful performance of his duties as an enforcer of the
law. The removal of the gun from its holster, the release of the safety lock, and the
firing of the two successive shots -- all of which led to the death of the victim -- were
sufficiently demonstrated to have been consequences of circumstances beyond the
control of petitioner. At the very least, these factual circumstances create serious
doubt on the latter’s culpability.

SELF-DEFENSE
 Petitioner advanced self-defense as an alternative. Granting arguendo that he
intentionally shot Balboa, he claims he did so to protect his life and limb from real and
immediate danger.
Exempting Circumstances; Irresistible force  The confession of his supposed liability and guilt, made before an official of the
division of information of the Constabulary, Enrique Calderon, as the latter states
G.R. No. 1352 March 29, 1905 when testifying as a witness, cannot be considered as legal proof, because the same
witness says that Roberto Baculi was the only one of the defendants who made a
THE UNITED STATES, vs. APOLONIO CABALLEROS, ET AL., confession to him voluntarily.
 It appears besides, from the statements of another witness for the prosecution,
FACTS: Meliton Covarrubias, that the confession of Apolonio Caballeros was made through
the promise made to him and to the other defendants that nothing would be done to
 Robert Baculi and Apolonio Caballeros were convicted as accessories to the crime them.
of assassination or murder of four American school-teachers, having buried the  Confessions which do not appear to have been made freely and voluntarily, without
corpses of the victims to conceal the crime. They were allegedly coerced. force, intimidation, or promise of pardon, cannot be accepted as proof on a trial.
(Sec. 4, Act No. 619 of the Philippine Commission).
 Defendants alleged that they took part in the burial of the victims’ corpses by reason
of irresistible force. The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration of the crime,
which seems to be one of the motives for the conviction and which the court below takes into
CFI: penalty of seven years of presidio mayor as accessories to the crime of murder consideration in his judgment, is not punished by the Penal Code and therefore that cannot
render the defendants criminally liable according to law.
ISSUE: WON the defendants should be acquitted by reason of irresistible force.
By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with a reversal of the judgment
HELD: YES appealed from, we acquit the defendants, appellants, with the costs de oficio in
both instances.
As to DEFENDANT BACULI:
 although he confessed to having assisted in the burial of the corpses, it appears that
he did so because he was compelled to do so by the murderers of the four teachers.
 And not only does the defendant affirm this, but he is corroborated by the only
eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro Sabate, who, by the way, is a witness for the
prosecution.
 This witness says he was present when the Americans were killed; that Roberto
Baculi was not a member of the group who killed the Americans, but the he was in a
banana plantation on his property gathering some bananas; that when he heard the
shots he began to run; that he was, however, seen by Damaso and Isidoro, the
leaders of the band; that the latter called to him and striking him with the butts of
their guns they forced him to bury the corpses.

As to DEFENDANT CABALLEROS:
 there is no proof that he took any part in any way in the execution of the crime with
which he has been charged; there is conclusive proof to the contrary, since Baculi,
as well as one of the witnesses for the prosecution, Teodoro Sabate, expressly
declare that he, Caballeros, did not take any part in the burial of the aforesaid
corpses, nor was he even in the place of the occurrence when the burial took place.
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES- UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR armed with guns or revolvers; that these men bound him and took him into the forest and
there compelled him by threats of death to sign the documents now on page 2 of the
G.R. No. 1481 February 17, 1904 record; that thereupon they allowed him to go upon promise to return. This defendant
testified that Antero Villano and Tomas Rivera saw him while on the road in the hands of
the thieves. Both the accused testified that as soon as they were released they presented
THE UNITED STATES, vs. LIBERATO EXALTACION, ET AL.
themselves to the president, Don Tomas Testa, in the presence of witnesses, and
subsequently went to Bonifacio Morales, a lieutenant of volunteers, and reported to him
Accused were charged with the crime of rebellion for swearing allegiance to the Katipunan the fact that they had been captured.
Society, which aimed to overthrow the Government of the United States governing the
Philippine Islands. The two, however, contend that they were captured by brigands, who
ISSUE: WON DEFENDANTS WERE RELIEVED FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY ON THE GROUND
compelled them to take an oath supporting the Katipunan Society under threats of death.
OF UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR FROM THE BRIGANDS

FACTS:
HELD: YES.

Liberato Exaltacion and Buenaventura Tanchinco were charged with the crime of
The evidence for the prosecution, and especially the two documents above referred to, signed
rebellion, in that they, subsequently to the 4th day of November, 1901, willfully and
by the accused, is not sufficient to prove the guilt of the latter or to justify the imposition upon
illegally bound themselves to take part in a rebellion against the Government of the
them of the penalty inflicted by the judgment of the court below.
United States in these Islands, swearing allegiance to the Katipunan Society, the
purpose of which was to overthrow the said Government by force of arms, this against
the statute in the case made and provided. The facts, established by the evidence, that the defendants were kidnapped by
brigands who belonged to the Contreras band, and that they signed the said
documents under compulsion and while in captivity, relieve them from all
In the course of the trial Don Pablo Tecson, the provincial governor of Bulacan, testified
criminal liability from the crime of rebellion of which they are charged. The
under oath that the two defendants were arrested in the month of March, 1903, the
conduct of the defendants in presenting themselves first to the local president of Meycauayan
police some days before having captured a number of documents in the encampment of
and subsequently to Lieut. Bonifacio Morales, of the Bulacan Government Volunteers, as soon
one Contreras, as so-called general of bandits, situated in a town of Meycauayan, among
as they were released by the bandits is corroborative of their testimony, and is the best
which documents appeared the papers now on pages 2 and 3 of the record, signed by
demonstration of their innocence. This conclusion is not overcome by the trifling discrepancy
the said Exaltacion and Tanchinco, who recognized the said documents when they were
between the testimony of the witness Yusay and that of the defendant Tanchinco nor the fact
exhibited to them; that the said defendants stated to the witness that they had
the Exaltacion was unable to determine the date when he was captured or that on which he
signed the said documents under compulsion;
appeared before President Testa.

That the purpose of the Katipunan Society was to obtain the independence of the
The guilt of the defendants of the crime defined and punished by Act No. 292 not having
Philippines.
been established at the trial beyond a reasonable doubt, we are of the opinion
that the judgment below must be reversed and the defendants acquitted with the
The two accused, under oath, testified to having signed the said documents and alleged costs de oficio. The judge below will be informed of this decision and a copy of the judgment
that they did so under compulsion and force while they were held as captives by the entered herein will be furnished him for his information and guidance. So ordered.
thieves; that the defendant Tanchinco was captured in the fields one day when he was
going to work on his farm by three armed men, unknown to him, who asked him if he was
an agent or friend of President Testa, and upon his replying in the negative they
compelled him in view of his denial to sign a document, now on page 3 of the record.

The defendant Tanchinco cited Lazaro Yusay to testify to the fact that he was captured at
a place called Kaibiga in the township of Novaliches, and that on the day following his
release, having been unable to pay the $300 which was demanded of him, he reported to
the president, Tomas Testa. The defendant Liberato Exaltacion under oath testified that
he was captured near Meycauayan by five persons, unknown, dressed as policemen and
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE; INSUPERABLE CAUSE
-failure to perform an act when prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause
G.R. No. L-6082 March 18, 1911
THE UNITED STATES vs. ISIDRO VICENTILLO
FACTS:
Vicentillo, a policeman, was found guilty by the lower court of “illegal and arbitrary
detention” of the complaining witness for a period of three days and sentenced to pay a fine
of 625 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the
trial.
Complainant alleges that defendant arbitrarily and without legal authority, cause the
complaining witness to be detained for a period of three days without having him brought
before the proper judicial authority for the investigation and trial of the charge on which he
was arrested.
However, it was conclusively proven at the trial that at the time of the arrest neither the local
justice of the peace nor his auxiliary were in the municipality, and to reach the justice of the
peace of either of the two adjoining municipalities, it was necessary to take a long journey by
boat.
ISSUE: WON the defendant should be relieved from criminal responsibility on the ground of
insuperable cause
of proof we must assume that in this respect the officers in charge were
controlled by local conditions, changes in the weather, or the like, which,
as appears from the uncontradicted evidence of record, made the journey
by boats safer and more commodious sometimes to one and sometimes to
the other of the two adjoining municipalities.
 It may be that the defendant was not friendly to the arrested man, and that he was
not sorry to see him exposed to considerable inconvenience and delay in the
proceedings incident to his trial, but there is nothing in this record upon which
to base a finding that his defendant caused the arrest and the
subsequent detention of the prisoner otherwise than in the due
performance of his official duties; and there can be no doubt of his lawfully
authority in the premises.
 The trial judge lays great stress upon the trivial nature of the offense for which the
arrest was made, but keeping in mind the fact that there was no judicial officer in the
remote community where the incident occurred at the time of the arrest, and no
certainty of the early return of the absent justice of the peace, or his auxiliary, we are
not prepared to hold, in the absence of all the evidence on this point that in a
particular case of a defiance of local authority by the willful violation of a local
ordinance, it was not necessary, or at least expedient, to make an arrest and send
the offender forthwith to the justice of the peace of a neighboring municipality, if
only to convince all would-be offenders that the forces of law and order were
supreme, even in the absence of the local municipal judicial officers.
DISPOSITIVE: The judgment of the lower court convicting and sentencing the defendant
must be reversed and he is hereby acquitted of the offense with which he is charged, with the
costs in both instances de oficio. So ordered.

HELD:

 There can be no doubt of the lawful authority of the defendant, in the exercise of his
functions as municipal president, to make arrest of the complaining witness which
resulted in his alleged unlawful detention. As we understand the evidence, the
alleged offense with which the complaining witness in this case was charged was
committed by him in the presence of the municipal president, who must be held to
have had all the usual powers of a police officer for the making of arrest without
warrant.

 The fact that he was brought before a justice of the peace as soon as
practicable after his arrest and that with all practicable dispatch, the prisoner
was forwarded first to one and then to the other of the adjoining municipalities for
trial, the failure to secure trial on the first occasion being due to the fact
that the written complaint, which was intrusted to the policeman in
charge of the prisoner, was either lost or stolen. It does not appear why the
prisoner was not sent to the same municipality on both occasions, but in the absence
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES; INSUPERABLE CAUSE
G.R. No. 45186 September 30, 1936
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.JOSEFINA BANDIAN
FACTS:
 In the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin Aguilar saw his neighbor, Josephina
Bandian, go to a thicket about four or five brazas from her house, apparently to
respond to a call of nature because it was there that the people of the place used to
go for that purpose.
 A few minutes later, he again saw her emerge from the thicket with her clothes
stained with blood both in the front and back, staggering and visibly showing signs
of not being able to support herself.
 He ran to her aid and, having noted that she was very weak and dizzy, he supported
and helped her go up to her house and placed her in her own bed.
 Upon being asked before Aguilar brought her to her house, what happened to her,
the appellant merely answered that she was very dizzy.
 Not wishing to be alone with the appellant in such circumstances, Valentin Aguilar
called Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby, to help them, and later requested him to
take bamboo leaves to stop the hemorrhage which had come upon the appellant.
 Comcom had scarcely gone about five brazas when he saw the body of a
newborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket where the appellant had
gone a few moments before.
 Comcom informed Aguilar of it and latter told him to bring the body to the
appellant's house.
 Upon being asked whether the baby which had just been shown to her was hers or
not, the appellant answered in the affirmative.
 Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno, president of the sanitary division of Talisayan, Oriental
Misamis, went to the appellant's house and found her lying in bed still bleeding.
 Basing his opinion upon said facts, the physician in question declared that the
appellant gave birth in her house and in her own bed; that after giving
birth she threw her child into the thicket to kill it for the purpose of
concealing her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she had
theretofore been living maritally, because the child was not his but of
another man with whom she had previously had amorous relations.
 To give force to his conclusions, he testified that the appellant had admitted to him
that she had killed her child, when he went to her house at the time and on the date
above-stated.
 it should be stated that there is no evidence showing how the child in question died.
 Dr. Nepomuceno himself affirmed that the wounds found in the body of the child
were not caused by the hand of man but by bites animals, the pigs that usually
roamed through the thicket where it was found.
 The prosecuting attorney and the lower court giving absolute credit to Dr.
Nepomuceno whose testimony was not corroborated but, on the contrary, was
contradicted by the very witnesses for the prosecution and by the appellant, as will
be stated later, they were of the opinion and the lower court furthermore held, that
the appellant guilty of infanticide.
 The Solicitor-General, however, does not agree with both. On the contrary, he
maintains that the appellant may be guilty only of abandoning a minor
under subsection 2 of article 276 of the Revised Penal Code, the abandonment
having resulted in the death of the minor allegedly abandoned.
TRIAL COURT: guilty of the CRIME OF INFANTICIDE and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and the corresponding accessory penalties, with the costs of the suit
ISSUE: WON Josefina should be exempted from any criminal liability on the ground of
insuperable cause
HELD: YES
RE INFANTICIDE (SIDE ISSUE ONLY)
 Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed
wilfully or consciously, or at least it must be result of a voluntary, conscious and free
act or omission.
 The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in causing her
child's death in one way or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did
so wilfully, consciously or imprudently.
 She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair with
a former lover, which was not unknown to her second lover, Luis Kirol, took place
three years before the incident; her married life with Kirol — she considers him her
husband as he considers her his wife — began a year ago; as he so testified at the
trial, he knew that the appellant was pregnant and he believed from the beginning,
affirming such belief when he testified at the trial, that the child carried by the
appellant in her womb was his, and he testified that he and she had been eagerly
waiting for the birth of the child.
 The appellant, therefore, had no cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy
to Kirol.
RE INSUPERABLE CAUSE
 If to the foregoing facts is added the testimony of the witnesses Valentin Aguilar and
Adriano Comcom that the child was taken from the thicket and carried already dead
to the appellant's house after the appellant had left the place, staggering, without
strength to remain on her feet and very dizzy, to the extent of having to be as in fact
she was helped to go up to her house and to lie in bed, it will clearly appear how far
from the truth were
  Dr. Nepomuceno's affirmation and conclusions. Also add to all these the fact that
the appellant denied having made any admission to said physician and that from the
time she became pregnant she continuously had fever.

 This illness and her extreme debility undoubtedly caused by her long illness as well
as the hemorrhage which she had upon giving birth, coupled with the circumstances
that she is a primipara, being then only 23 years of age, and therefore
inexperienced as to childbirth and as to the inconvenience or difficulties usually
attending such event; and the fact that she, like her lover Luis Kirol — a mere
laborer earning only twenty-five centavos a day — is uneducated and could supplant
with what she had read or learned from books what experience itself could teach
her, undoubtedly were the reasons why she was not aware of her childbirth, or if
she was, it did not occur to her or she was unable, due to her debility or dizziness,
which causes may be considered lawful or insuperable to constitute the
seventh exempting circumstance (art. 12, Revised Penal Code), to take
her child from the thicket where she had given it birth, so as not to leave
it abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing its life.

 The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by going into the
thicket, according to her, to respond to call of nature, notwithstanding
the fact that she had fever for a long time, was perfectly lawful.

 If by doing so she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that
same place and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any
other reason than that she was overcome by strong dizziness and
extreme debility, she should not be blamed therefor because it all
happened by mere accident, from liability any person who so acts and behaves
under such circumstances (art. 12, subsection 4, Revised Penal Code).

DISPOSITIVE: In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and considerations,
and granting that the appellant was aware of her involuntary childbirth in the
thicket and that she later failed to take her child therefrom, having been so
prevented by reason of causes entirely independent of her will, it should be held
that the alleged errors attributed to the lower court by the appellant are true; and it
appearing that under such circumstances said appellant has the fourth and seventh
exempting circumstances in her favor, is hereby acquitted of the crime of which she had
bee accused and convicted, with costs de oficio, and she is actually confined in jail in
connection with this case, it is ordered that she be released immediately. So ordered.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; LACK OF INTENTION TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A
WRONG
G.R. No. L-30801 March 27, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DOMINGO URAL
FACTS:
Domingo Ural, a policeman, was convicted with the crime of MURDER, based on the
testimony of Brigido Alberto, a 26 y/o former detention prisoner who was accused of murder
but out on bail.
On July 31, 1996, Alberto intended to go to his residence at Barrio Upper Lamari, Buug but
night overtook him in the town. He decided to sleep in the Buug municipal building where
there would be more security.
Upon arrival in the municipal building, he saw Policeman Ural boxing the detention prisoner,
Felix Napola. As a consequence of the fistic blows, Napola collapsed on the floor. Ural, the
tormentor, stepped on his prostrate body.
Ural went out of the cell. After a short interval, he returned with a bottle. He poured its
contents on Napola's recumbent body. Then, he ignited it with a match and left the cell.
Napola screamed in agony. He shouted for help. Nobody came to succor him.
Doctor Luzonia R. Bakil, who treated the victim, certified that the thirty-year old victim,
sustained second-degree burns on the arms, neck, left side of the face and one-half of the
body including the back.
On Aug 25, 1996, Napola died. Death Certificate indicated burn as the cause of death.
During the trial,the prosecution failed to present the detention prisoners who saw the burning
of Napola as witnesses as well as the wife of the deceased.
TRIAL COURT - Nevertheless, Ural was convicted of Murder (by means of fire) and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and was ordered to pay the cost.
- with Aggravating circumstance: the accused took advantage of his public position (Par.
1, Art. 14, RPC). He could not have maltreated Napola if he was not a policeman on guard
duty. Because of his position, he had access to the cell where Napola was confined. The
prisoner was under his custody.
Ural had his version of his story. According to him, he heard a scream for help from Napola
whose shirt was in flames when found by him. He removed the shirt but did not summon the
doctor because he thought the burns were not serious.
-this statement cannot prevail over the testimony of Alberto
-This statement does not prove that that he was not the one who burned Napola, at
most this could only mean that he was alarmed by the consequence of his evil act.
In assailing the credibility of Alberto as witness, Ural pointed out that he was not listed as
prosecution witness and that he was convicted of murder.
- would not preclude Alberto from being a credible witness.
- since there is no police investigation (accused is a police officer), the investigation that
ensued was done by a special counsel of the fiscal’s office. A possible explanation of
Alberto not being listed at first.
-the statements of the witnesses for the defense were not inconsistent with that of
Alberto’s
This case is covered by article 4 of the RPC which provides that "criminal liability shall be
incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended". ((he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the
evil caused))
ISSUE: WON the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong can
be appreciated in the case at bar.
HELD: YES (but offset by the aggravating circumstance as correctly held by the Trial Court)
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONVICTING URAL FOR MURDER
RE: MITIGATING CIRCUMTANCE
“But the trial court failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance "that the offender had no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed" (Par. 3, Art. 13, Revised Penal
Code). It is manifest from the proven facts that appellant Ural had no intent to kill
Napola. His design was only to maltreat him may be because in his drunken
condition he was making a nuisance of himself inside the detention cell. When
Ural realized the fearful consequences of his felonious act, he allowed Napola to
secure medical treatment at the municipal dispensary.”
Since the mitigating circumstance OFFSET the aggravating circumstance, trial
court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua which is the medium
period of the penalty for murder.