1. G.R. No.
173180 August 24, 2011
ALBERT TISON
vs.
SPS. GREGORIO POMASIN
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS: A tractor-trailer and a jitney collided along
Maharlika Highway in Albay. LaarniPomasin was the
driver of the jitney while the tractor was driven by
Claudio Jabon. Multiple death and injuries to those in
the jitney resulted. Albert Tison, the owner of the
truck, extended financial assistance to respondents
and P200,000.00 to Cynthia Pomasin, sister of
Laarni. Cynthia, in turn, executed an Affidavit of
Desistance.
Still, respondents filed a complaint for damages
before the RTC of Antipolo. They alleged that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence,
imprudence and carelessness of petitioners. In their
Answer, petitioners countered that it was Laarnis
negligence which proximately caused the
accident. They further claimed that Cynthia was
authorized by Spouses Pomasin to enter into an
amicable settlement by executing an Affidavit of
Desistance.
Petitioners subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint in view of the Affidavit of Desistance
executed by Cynthia. However, the motion was
denied. The trial court ruled in favor Tison giving
more credence to the testimony of Jabon. The CA
disagreed with the trial court and ruled that the
reckless driving of Jabon caused the vehicular
collision based on the gravity of the damage caused
to the jitney. Also, it was noted that the restriction in
Jabon’s driver’s license was violated, thus, giving rise
to the presumption that he was negligent at the time
of the accident. Tison was also held liable for
damages for his failure to prove due diligence in
supervising Jabon after he was hired as driver of the
truck.
ISSUE: Whether CA is correct in its findings.
RULING: NO. Petitioners are not negligent.According
to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
To sustain a claim based onquasi-delict, the following
requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the
plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant; and (c)
connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by
the plaintiff. These requisites must be proved by a
preponderance of evidence. The claimants,
respondents in this case, must, therefore, establish
their claim or cause of action by preponderance of
evidence, evidence which is of greater weight, or
more convincing than that which is offered in
opposition to it.
Driving without a proper license is a violation of
traffic regulation. Under Article 2185 of the Civil
Code, the legal presumption of negligence arises if at
the time of the mishap, a person was violating any
traffic regulation. However, inSanitary Steam
Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the court held that a
causal connection must exist between the injury
received and the violation of the traffic regulation. It
must be proven that the violation of the traffic
regulation was the proximate or legal cause of the
injury or that it substantially contributed thereto.
Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation
of law, like any other negligence, is without legal
consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the
injury. Likewise controlling is our ruling in Añonuevo
v. Court of Appeals where we reiterated that
negligence per se, arising from the mere violation of a
traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in
establishing liability for damages. In said
case, Añonuevo, who was driving a car, did not
attempt “to establish a causal connection between
the safety violations imputed to the injured cyclist,
and the accident itself. Instead, he relied on a putative
presumption that these violations in themselves
sufficiently established negligence appreciable
against the cyclist. Since the onus on Añonuevo is to
conclusively prove the link between the violations
and the accident, we can deem him as having failed to
discharge his necessary burden of proving the
cyclist’s own liability.”
The rule on negligence per se must admit
qualifications that may arise from the logical
consequences of the facts leading to the mishap. The
doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is
undeniably useful as a judicial guide in adjudging
liability, for it seeks to impute culpability arising from
the failure of the actor to perform up to a standard
established by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should not
be rendered inflexible so as to deny relief when in
fact there is no causal relation between the statutory
violation and the injury sustained. Presumptions in
law, while convenient, are not intractable so as to
forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. After all, tort law is
remunerative in spirit, aiming to provide
compensation for the harm suffered by those whose
interests have been invaded owing to the conduct of
other.
In the instant case, no causal connection was
established between the tractor-trailer driver’s
restrictions on his license to the vehicular collision.
Furthermore, Jabon was able to sufficiently explain
that the Land Transportation Office merely erred in
not including restriction code 8 in his license.
#2 JONAS AONUEVO, petitioner vs. HON. COURT
OF APPEALS and JEROME VILLAGRACIA,
respondent [G.R. No. 130003. October 20, 2004]
Facts: At the intersection of Boni Avenue and
Barangka Drive in Mandaluyong (now a city).
Villagracia was traveling along Boni Avenue on his
bicycle, while Aonuevo, traversing the opposite lane
was driving his Lancer car with plate number PJJ 359.
The car was owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the
employer of Aonuevos brother, Jonathan. Aonuevo
was in the course of making a left turn towards
Libertad Street when the collision occurred.
Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result,
which necessitated his hospitalization several times
in 1989, and forced him to undergo four (4)
operations.
Villagracia instituted an action for damages against
Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and Aonuevo before
the RTC.. Trial on the civil action ensued, and in a
Decision dated 9 March 1990, the RTC rendered
judgment against Procter and Gamble and Aonuevo,
ordering them to pay Villagracia.
The Court of Appeals Fourth Division affirmed the
RTC Decision in toto.Aonuevo points out that
Villagracias bicycle had no safety gadgets such as a
horn or bell, or headlights, as invoked by a 1948
municipal ordinance.[ Nor was it duly registered with
the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, as required by
the same ordinance. Finally, as admitted by
Villagracia, his bicycle did not have foot brakes.
Issue:Whether Article 2185 of the New Civil Code,
which presumes the driver of a motor vehicle
negligent if he was violating a traffic regulation at
the time of the mishap, should apply by analogy
to non-motorized vehicles.
Ruling: A motorized vehicle operates by reason of a
motor engine unlike a non-motorized vehicle, which
runs as a result of a direct exertion by man or beast of
burden of direct physical force. A motorized vehicle,
unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion.is
capable of greater speeds and acceleration than non-
motorized vehicles. At the same time, motorized
vehicles are more capable in inflicting greater injury
or damage in the event of an accident or collision.
This is due to a combination of factors peculiar to the
motor vehicle, such as the greater speed, its relative
greater bulk of mass, and greater combustability due
to the fuels that they use.
There long has been judicial recognition of the
peculiar dangers posed by the motor vehicle.
The Code Commission was cognizant of the
difference in the natures and attached
responsibilities of motorized and non-motorized
vehicles. Art. 2185 was not formulated to compel or
ensure obeisance by all to traffic rules and
regulations. If such were indeed the evil sought to be
remedied or guarded against, then the framers of the
Code would have expanded the provision to include
non-motorized vehicles or for that matter,
pedestrians. Yet, that was not the case; thus the need
arises to ascertain the peculiarities attaching to a
motorized vehicle within the dynamics of road travel.
The fact that there has long existed a higher degree of
diligence and care imposed on motorized vehicles,
arising from the special nature of motor vehicle, leads
to the inescapable conclusion that the qualification
under Article 2185 exists precisely to recognize such
higher standard. Simply put, the standards applicable
to motor vehicle are not on equal footing with other
types of vehicles.
Thus, we cannot sustain the contention that Art. 2185
should apply to non-motorized vehicles, even if by
analogy.
3. Professional Services v. Agana GR no.
126297 January 31, 2007
Facts: Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical
City General Hospital (Medical City Hospital) because
of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal
discharge. After a series of medical examinations, Dr.
Miguel Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from
"cancer of the sigmoid." An operation was conducted
by Dr. Fuentes of the same hospital- a procedure
called Hysterectomy. However, a Nurse’s record
confirmed that the operation was flawed. Natividad
suffered pains but was advised by both doctors that
those were only the result of the surgery. The
spouses went to the U.S for further treatment and
was told that she was free of cancer. Upon returning
to the Philippines, she suffered even greater pain. Her
daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her
vagina. They contacted Dr. Ampil to remove the said
cloth. The doctor did so but then it was found out that
a piece of gauze still remained from her vagina which
caused the excretion of stool in the said region. The
Spouses filed a complaint against the Hospital and
the doctors Ampil and Fuentes. Pending the case,
Natividad died.
Issue: Whether the said doctors are guilty of Gross
Negligence.
Ruling: Yes. Both acted with negligence.
Dr. Fuentes’ Liability: (Res Ipsa Loquitur)
Literally, res ipsa loquitur means "the thing speaks
for itself." It is the rule that the fact of the occurrence
of an injury, taken with the surrounding
circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a
presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s
prima facie case, and present a question of fact for
defendant to meet with an explanation. Stated
differently, where the thing which caused the injury,
without the fault of the injured, is under the exclusive
control of the defendant and the injury is such that it
should not have occurred if he, having such control
used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in
the absence of explanation that the injury arose from
the defendant’s want of care, and the burden of proof
is shifted to him to establish that he has observed due
care and diligence.
From the foregoing statements of the rule, the
requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur are: (1) the occurrence of an injury; (2)
the thing which caused the injury was under the
control and management of the defendant; (3) the
occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of
things, would not have happened if those who had
control or management used proper care; and (4) the
absence of explanation by the defendant. Of the
foregoing requisites, the most instrumental is the
"control and management of the thing which caused
the injury."
We find the element of "control and management of
the thing which caused the injury" to be wanting.
Hence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not lie.
Under theis"Captain
surgeon of thein Ship"
the person rule, the
complete operating
charge of the
surgery room and all personnel connected with the
operation. Their duty is to obey his orders. As stated
before, Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon. In other
words, he was the "Captain of the Ship." That he
discharged such role is evident from his following
conduct: (1) calling Dr. Fuentes to perform a
hysterectomy; (2) examining the work of Dr. Fuentes
and finding it in order; (3) granting Dr. Fuentes’
permission to leave; and (4) ordering the closure of
the incision. To our mind, it was this act of ordering
the closure of the incision notwithstanding that two
pieces of gauze remained unaccounted for, that
caused injury to Natividad’s
and management body.
of the thing Clearly,
which causedthethe
control
injury
was in the hands of Dr. Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes.
In this jurisdiction, res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of
substantive law, hence, does not per se create or
constitute an independent or separate ground of
liability, being a mere evidentiary rule.In other
words, mere invocation and application of the
doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of
proof of negligence. Here, the negligence was proven
to have been committed by Dr. Ampil and not by Dr.
Fuentes.
(Note:
nilagay May
kasi liability din po si
mas importnte sa Dr. Ampil.
theme Di ko lang
of discussion
ung kay Dr. Fuentes. Pa- refer na lang po sa Original)
4. G.R. No. 73998 November 14, 1988
PEDRO T. LAYUGAN, vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, GODOFREDO ISIDRO, and
TRAVELLERS MULTI-INDEMNITY CORPORATION,
SARMIENTO, J.:
FACTS: on May 15, 1979 while at Baretbet, Bagabag,
Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff and a companion were
repairing the tire of their cargo truck with Plate No.
SU-730 which was parked along the right side of the
National Highway; that defendant's truckdriven
recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff,
that as a result, plaintiff was injured and hospitalized
at Dr. Paulino J. Garcia Research and Medical Center
and the Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital; that he spent
TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Pl0,000.00) and will incur
more expenses as he recuperates from said injuries;
that because of said injuries he would be deprived of
a lifetime income in the sum of SEVENTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P70,000.00); and that he agreed to pay his
lawyer the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS
Defendant not
bystander, countered
a truck that thebeing
helper plaintiff was merely a
a brother-in-law
law of the driver of said truck; that the truck
allegedly being repaired was parked, occupying
almost half of the right lane towards Solano, Nueva
Vizcaya, right after the curve; that the proximate
cause of the incident was the failure of the driver of
the parked truck in installing the early warning
device, hence the driver of the parked car should be
liable for damages sustained by the truck
On May 29, 1981, a third-party complaint was filed
by the defendant against his insurer,
amply supported by the evidence on record, the trial
court rendered its decision and ordered defendat to
pay damages
Intermediate Appellate Court as earlier stated
reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed
the complaint, the third-party complaint, and the
counter- claims of both appellants.
ISSUE: WON CA CORRECT? WHO WAS NEGLIGENT?
CA wrong isidro was negligent
HELD: The test by which to determine the existence
of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used
in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. The law here in effect adopts the
standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary
conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman
law
ISIDROS CLAIM: Respondent Isidro posits that any
immobile object along the highway, like a parked
truck, poses serious danger to a moving vehicle
which has the
that since the parked
right tocargo
be ontruck
the highway. He argues
in this case was a
threat to life and limb and property, it was incumbent
upon the driver as well as the petitioner, who claims
to be a helper of the truck driver, to exercise extreme
care so that the motorist negotiating the road would
be properly forewarned of the peril of a parked
vehicle. Isidro submits that the burden of proving
that care and diligence were observed is shifted to
the petitioner, for, as previously claimed, his
(Isidro's) Isuzu truck had a right to be on the road,
while the immobile cargo truck had no business, so to
speak, to be there. Likewise, Isidro proffers that the
petitioner must show to the satisfaction of a
reasonable mind that the driver and he (petitioner)
himself, provided an early warning device, like that
required by law, or, by some other adequate means
that would properly forewarn vehicles of the
impending danger that the parked vehicle posed
considering the time, place, and other peculiar
circumstances of the occasion. Absent such proof of
care, as in the case at bar, Isidro concludes, would,
under the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur, evoke the
presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of
the parked cargo truck as well as his helper, the
petitioner herein, who was fixing the flat tire of the
said truck.
COURTS ANSWER: The evidence on record discloses
that three or four meters from the rear of the parked
truck, a lighted kerosene lamp was placed and
Whether the cargo truck was parked along the road
or on half the shoulder of the right side of the road
would be of no moment taking into account the
warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene
lamp placed three or four meters from the back of the
truck.
IAC WRONG:From its finding that the parked truck
was loaded with ten (10) big round logs the Court of
Appeals inferred that because of its weight the truck
could not have been driven to the shoulder of the
road and concluded that the same was parked on a
portion of the road at the time of the accident.
Consequently, the respondent court inferred that the
mishap was due to the negligence of the driver of the
parked truck. The inference or conclusion is
manifestly erroneous. In a large measure, it is
grounded on speculation, surmise, or conjecture.
How the respondent court could have reversed the
finding of the trial court that a warning device was
installed (res ipsaliquitor not applicable ca was
applying it. It merely determines and regulates what
shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates
the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty
of due care) once the actual cause of injury is
established beyond controversy, whether by the
plaintiff or by the defendant, no presumptions will be
involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable
when the circumstances have been so completely
eludicated that no inference of defendant's liability
can reasonably be made, whatever the source of the
evidence,
ISIDROS driver’s claim while driving Isuzu truck at
Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya and at KM 285, I
met another vehicle who (sic) did not dim his (sic)
lights which cause (sic) me to be blinded with intense
glare of the light that's why I did not notice a parked
truck who (sic) was repairing a front flat tire. When I
was a few meters away, I saw the truck which was
loaded with round logs. I step (sic) on my foot brakes
but it did not function with my many attempts. I have
(sic) found out later that the fluid pipe on the rear
right was cut that's why the breaks did not function.
The private respondent or his mechanic, who must be
competent, should have conducted a thorough
inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to
drive it. In the light of the circumstances obtaining in
the case, we hold that Isidro failed to prove that the
diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision of his employees which would exculpate
him from solidary liability with his driver to the
petitioner. RTC reinstated
5. Luz Tan vs Jam Transit
Facts:Luz Palanca Tan (Tan) alleged that she was the
owner of a passenger-type jitney with plate number
DKF-168.On March 14, 1997, at around 5:00 a.m., the
said jitney figured in an accident at an intersection
along Maharlika Highway, Barangay Bangyas,
Calauan, Laguna, as it collided with a JAM Transit
passenger bus bound for Manila, bearing plate
number DVG-557 and body number 8030.The bus
was driven by Eddie Dimayuga (Dimayuga).At the
time of the collision, Tans jitney was loaded with
quail eggs and duck eggs (balot and salted eggs).It
was driven by Alexander M. Ramirez (Ramirez).Tan
alleged that Dimayuga was reckless, negligent,
imprudent, and not observing traffic rules and
regulations, causing the bus to collide with the jitney
which was then, with care and proper light direction
signals, about to negotiate a left turn towards the
feeder orLaguna
Calauan, barangay road
going toof Barangay
the Bangyas,
Poblacion.The jeepney
turned turtle along the shoulder of the road and the
cargo of eggs was destroyed.Ramirez and his helper
were injured and hospitalized, incurring expenses for
medical treatment at thePagamutang Pangmasain
Bay, Laguna.Tan prayed for damages in the amount of
P400,000.00 for the damaged jitney,P142,210.00 for
the destroyed shipment,P20,000.00 for moral
damages, attorneys fees of P20,000.00 plus P1,000.00
per court appearance of counsel, and other reliefs
warranted under the premises.In its Answer with
Counterclaim, respondent
admitted ownership of theJAM Transit,
subject Inc. (JAM)
passenger bus and
that Dimayuga was under its employ.However, it
denied the allegations in the Complaint, and claimed
that the accident occurred due to the gross
negligence of Ramirez.As counterclaim, JAM sought
payment of P100,000.00 for the damages sustained
by the bus,P100,000.00 for loss of income, and
P50,000.00 as attorneys fees plusP3,000.00 per court
appearance of counsel. The RTC ruled in favor of Tan
and the CA ruled in favor of JAM Transit,There was
no evidence as to who between Ramirez and
Dimayuga was negligent in connection with the
vehicular accident.The CA held that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur can only be invoked when direct
evidence is nonexistent or not accessible.
Issue:Whether direct evidence is needed to prove the
omission or negligence of Jam Transit. receipts or other documentary proofs of the actual
amount expended.However, considering that it was
Holding:No,Verily, although there was no direct
duly proven that the jitney was damaged and had to
evidence that the JAM passenger bus was overtaking
be repaired, as it was repaired, and that the cargo of
the vehicles running along the right lane of the
eggs was indeed destroyed, but the actual amounts
highway from the left lane, the available evidence
expended or lost were not proven, we deem it
readily points to such fact.There were two continuous
appropriate to award P250,000.00 by way of
yellow lines at the center of the highway, which
temperate damages.Under Article 2224 of the Civil
meant that no vehicle in the said area should
Code,temperate damages may be recovered when
overtake another on either side of the road.The
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
double yellow center lines regulation, which this
cannot be proved with certainty. WHEREFORE, the
Court takes pavement
recognized judicial notice of as anwas
regulation, internationally
precisely petition is GRANTED.The Decision dated June 2, 2008
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89046 is
intended to avoid accidents along highways, such as
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.The Decision dated
what happened in this case.This prohibition finds
December 20, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court,
support in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4136 (Land
Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, Laguna in Civil Case No. SC-3838
Transportation and Traffic Code), Section
is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION.
41(e).Furthermore, it is observed that the area of
collision was an intersection.Section 41(c) of R.A. No.
4136, likewise, prohibits overtaking or passing any
other vehicle proceeding in the same direction at any 6. COLLEGE ASSURANCE V. BELFRANIT CASE
intersection of highways, among others.Thus, by DIGEST
overtaking on the left lane, Dimayuga was not only
violating the double yellow center lines regulation, FACTS:Belfrant Development Inc. (BDI) was the
but also the prohibition on overtaking at highway owner of Belfrant building in Angeles City, Pampanga.
intersections.Consequently, negligence can be It leased to College Assurance Plan Phil and
attributed only to him, which negligence was the Comprehensive Annuity Plans and Pension
proximate cause of the injury sustained by
petitioner.This prima facie finding of negligence was Corporation (Petitioners) several units on the 2nd and
not sufficiently rebutted or contradicted by 3rd floors of the building. Fire destroyed portions of
Dimayuga. Therefore, a finding that he is liable for the building, including the 3rd floor units being
damages to petitioner is warranted.Whenever an occupied by the petitioners. A field investigation
employees negligence causes damage or injury to report by an unnamed arson investigator assigned to
another, there instantly arises a presumptionjuris the case disclosed:
tantum that the employer failed to exercise
diligentissimi patris families in the section (culpa in Origin of the fire: store room occupied by the
eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando)of its CAP located at the 3rd floor
employees.To avoid liability for a quasi-delict
committed by its employee, an employer must Cause of fire: accidental (overheated coffee
overcome the presumption, by presenting convincing percolator)
proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and These findings were reiterated in the certification,
supervision of his employee.To warrant an award of
actual or compensatory damages for repair to which the BFP City Fire Marshal, Insp. issued to
damage sustained, the best evidence should be the petitioners as a supporting document for the latter’s
insurance claim. BDI sent to petitioners a Notice to
Vacate the leased premises to make way for repairs
and to pay reparation estimated at 1.5million.
Petitioners vacated the premises including the units
in the 2nd floor but they did not act on the demand for
reparation. After succeeding demands went
unheeded, BDI filed a complaint for damages.Both
trial and appellate court ruled against the petitioner
ISSUE:whether the petitioners are liable for damages
RULING: Yes. The Court applied the doctrine of res
ipsaloquitor in this case, even if there were
documents emanating from the BFP that were
presented as evidence as to the cause of fire.
The court ruled that The CA correctly applied the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur under which expert
testimony may be dispensed with [35] to sustain an
allegation of negligence if the following requisites
obtain: a) the accident is of a kind which does not
ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; b) the
cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of
the person in charge and c) the injury suffered must
not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured.
The fire that damaged Belfranlt Building was not a
spontaneous natural occurrence but the outcome of a
human act or omission. It srcinated in the store
room which petitioners had possession and control
of. Respondent had no hand in the incident. Hence,
the convergence of these facts and circumstances
speaks for itself: petitioners alone having knowledge
of the cause of the fire or the best opportunity to
ascertain it, and
out for itself, it is respondent
sufficient forhaving no means
the latter to find
to merely
allege that the cause of the fire was the negligence of
the former and to rely on the occurrence of the fire as
proof of such negligence.[37] It was all up to
petitioners to dispel such inference of negligence, but
their bare denial only left the matter unanswered.
7. GR No. 137873 April 20, 2001
Consunji vs. Court of Appeals
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RULE (RES IPSA
LOQUITUR)
FACTS: Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M.
Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance
Tower, Pasig City to his death. . Juego together with
Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo [were] performing
their work as carpenter[s] at the elevator core of the
14th floor of the Tower D, Renaissance Tower
Building on board a [p]latform made of channel beam
(steel) measuring 4.8 meters by 2 meters wide with
pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires attached to
its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block,
when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely
inserted to connect the chain block with the
[p]latform, got loose xxx causing the whole
[p]latform assembly and the victim to fall down to
the basement of the elevator core, Tower D of the
building under construction thereby crushing the
victim of death, save his two (2) companions who
luckily jumped out for safety. Juego’s widow, Maria,
filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a
complaint for damages against the deceased’s
employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc.
Res ipsa loquitur became an issue in relation to DM
Consunji’s objection to PO3 Villanueva’s testimony.
What Consunji took particular exception to is PO3
Villanueva’s testimony that the cause of the fall of the
platform was the loosening of the bolt from the chain
block. Petitioner claimed that such portion of the
testimony is mere opinion. Subject to certain
exceptions,18 the opinion of a witness is generally not
admissible.
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the
requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur, but
argues that the presumption or inference that it was
negligent did not arise since it "proved that it
exercised due care to avoid the accident which befell
respondent’s husband."
ISSUE: WON CA erred in holding that the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitor [sic] is applicable to prove
negligence on the part of petitioner.
HELD: The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been
explained in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or
presumed, and while the mere happening of an
accident or injury will not generally give rise to an
inference or presumption that it was due to
negligence on defendant’s part, under the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or
transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction,
that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the
facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may
be such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit
an inference of negligence on the part of the
defendant,
negligence.or some other person who is charged with
x x x where it is shown that the thing or
instrumentality which caused the injury complained
of was under the control or management of the
defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the
injury was such as in the ordinary course of things
would not happen if those who had its control or
management used proper care, there is sufficient
evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable
evidence, in the absence of explanation by the
defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused
by the defendant’s want of care.21
One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its
necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence is absent or
not available.22
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon
the theory that the defendant in charge of the
instrumentality which causes the injury either knows
the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity
of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such
knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege
negligence in general terms and to rely upon the
proof of the happening of the accident in order to
establish negligence. The inference which the
doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the
chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or
innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant
but inaccessible to the injured person.
It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
furnishes a bridge by which a plaintiff, without
knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant
who knows or should know the cause, for any
explanation of care exercised by the defendant in
respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains.
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine, another court has said,
is a rule of necessity, in that it proceeds on the theory
that under the peculiar circumstances in which the
doctrine is applicable, it is within the power of the
defendant to show that there was no negligence on
his part, and direct proof of defendant’s negligence is
beyond plaintiff’s power. Accordingly, some court
add to the three prerequisites for the application of
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the further
requirement that for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to
apply, it must appear that the injured party had no
knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause of
the accident, or that the party to be charged with
negligence has superior knowledge or opportunity
for explanation of the accident.
Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural
effect of the doctrine. As stated earlier, the
defendant’s negligence is presumed or
inferred25 when the plaintiff establishes the
requisites for the application of res ipsa
loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie
case of all the elements, the burden then shifts to
defendant to explain.26 The presumption or inference
may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and,
under appropriate circumstances disputable
presumption, such as that of due care or innocence,
may outweigh the inference.27 It is not for the
defendant to explain or prove its defense to prevent
the presumption or inference from arising. Evidence
by the defendant of say, due care, comes into play
only after the circumstances for the application of the
doctrine has been established.1âwphi1.nêt
Petitioner is correct. Fabro’s sworn statement is
hearsay and inadmissible. Affidavits are inadmissible
as evidence under the hearsay rule, unless the affiant
is placed on the witness stand to testify
thereon.28 The inadmissibility of this sort of evidence
is based not only on the lack of opportunity on the
part of the adverse party to cross-examine the affiant,
but also on the commonly known fact that, generally,
an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself but
by another who uses his own language in writing the
affiant’s statements which may either be omitted or
misunderstood by the one writing them.29 Petitioner,
therefore, cannot use said statement as proof of its
due care any more than private respondent can use it
to prove the cause of her husband’s death.
Regrettably, petitioner does not cite any other
evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of
negligence arising from the application ofres ipsa
loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the
incident.
8. DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and LYDIA UMALI, respondents.
FACTS: dr. Ninevetchcruz was aanaesthesiologist and
surgeon in in perpetual C Help Clinic and General
Hospital. LYDIA Umali, deceased respondent, was her
patient who was accompanied by respondent
daughter umali. She was examined by dr. Cruz and
found a " myoma" in her uterus and was thereafter
scheduled for hysterectomy operation. Rowena and
her mother slept in the clinic and noticed the
untidiness if the clinic. Rowena tried to pursuade her
mother to postponed the operation. When Lydia
asked Dr. Cruz, the latter ingormed that she had must
be operated. Thereafter, the operation proceeded
while the relatives of Lydia where waiting, Dr. Ercilla
instructed them to buy a blood for Lydia. After lapse
of hours, they were informed that the operation was
finished. But again instructed to buy a blood,
unfortunately there were no blood A in the blood
bank of the clinic. Rowena noticed that her mother
was attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breath.
Apparently the oxygen run out of supply and Rowena
had to go to another hospital to gerkxgen.
Lydia was given fresh supply of oxygen but
later she went into shock had unstable vondition
which necessitated her to transfer to San Pablo
District Hospital. Such was without prior consent of
rowena nor of other relatives. Thereafter, she was
reoperated but Dr. Angeles, Head of Obstetrics and
Gynecology Department informed them that there
was nothing he can do as Lydia ws already in shock
as her blood pressure was 0/0. MTCC found dr.
Cruzand Dr. Ercilla guilty of negligence. The RTC
reiterated the abovementioned findings of the MTCC
and upheld the latter's declaration of "incompetency,
negligence and lack of foresight and skill of appellant
(herein petitioner) in handling the subject patient
before and after the operation."[24] And likewise
affirming the petitioner's conviction, the Court of
Appeals echoed similar observations.hence, this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not a physician has committed an
"inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of
his patient is to be determined according to the
standard of care observed by other members of the
profession in good standing[ under similar
circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of
the profession at the time of treatment or the present
state of medical science.]
RULING NO. In the recent case of Leonila Garcia-
Rueda v. Wilfred L. Pacasio, et. al.,[27] this Court
stated that in accepting a case, a doctor in effect
represents that, having the needed training and skill
possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in
the same field, he will employ such training, care and
skill in the treatment of his patients. He therefore
has a duty to use at least the same level of care
that any other reasonably competent doctor
would use to treat a condition under the same
circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical
malpractice
establish notthat expert
only testimony ofis care
the standard essential to
of the
profession but also that the physician's conduct in
the treatment and care falls below such standard.[28]
Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries
involved in malpractice actions are determinable
only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been
recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary
to support the conclusion as to causation.[29]
Immediate
For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the
requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his
patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert
opinion.[30] The deference of courts to the expert
opinion of qualified physicians stems from its
realization that the latter possess unusual technical
skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of
intelligently evaluating.[31] Expert testimony should
have been offered to prove that the circumstances
cited by the courts below are constitutive of conduct
falling below the standard of care employed by other
physicians in good standing when performing the
same operation
In litigations involving medical negligence,
the plaintiff has the burden of establishing
appellant's negligence and for a reasonable
conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of
breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a
casual connection of such breach and the resulting
death of his patient.[33] In Chan Lugay v. St Luke's
Hospital, Inc.,[34] where the attending physician was
absolved of liability for the death of the
complainant's wife and newborn baby, this court held
that: "In order that there may be a recovery for an
injury, however, it must be shown that the 'injury for
which recovery is sought must be the legitimate
consequence of the wrong done; the connection
between
direct andthe negligence
natural andofthe
sequence injuryunbroken
events, must bebya
intervening efficient causes.' In other words, the
negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury.
For, 'negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot
create a right of action unless it is the proximate
cause of the injury complained of.' And 'the
proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.''
9. Cayao-Lasam vs. Sps. Ramolete
FACTS: On July 28, 1994, respondent, three months
pregnant Editha Ramolete (Editha) was brought to
the Lorma Medical Center (LMC) in San Fernando, La
Union due to vaginal bleeding. Upon advice of
petitioner relayed via telephone, Editha was admitted
to the LMC on the same day. A pelvic sonogram was
then conducted on Editha revealing the fetus’ weak
cardiac pulsation. The followingday, Editha’s repeat
pelvic sonogram showed that aside from the fetus’
weak cardiac pulsation, no fetal movement was also
appreciated. Due to persistent and profuse vaginal
bleeding, petitioner advised Editha to undergo a
Dilatation and Curettage Procedure (D&C) or "raspa."
The procedure was performed by the petitioner and
Editha was discharged the next day. On September
16, 1994, Editha was once again brought at the LMC,
as she was suffering from vomiting and severe
abdominal pains. She was found to have a massive
intra-abdominal hemorrhage and a ruptured uterus.
Thus, Editha had to undergo a procedure for
hysterectomy and as a result, she has no more chance
to bear a child. Respondents: first, petitioner’s failure
to check up, visit or administer medication on Editha
during her first day of confinement at the LMC;
second, petitioner recommended that a D&C
procedure be internal
conducting any performed on Editha
examination priorwithout
to the
procedure; third, petitioner immediately suggested a
D&C procedure instead of closely monitoring the
state of pregnancy of Editha. Petitioner: it was
Editha’s gross negligence and/or omission in
insisting to be discharged against doctor’s advice and
her unjustified failure to return for check-up as
directed by petitioner that contributed to her life-
threatening condition on; that Editha’s hysterectomy
was brought about by her very abnormal pregnancy
known as placenta increta, which was an extremely
rare and very that
implantation; unusual case or
whether of not
abdominal
a D&C placental
procedure
was done by her or any other doctor, there would be
no difference at all because at any stage of gestation
before term, the uterus would rupture just the same.
RULING: Medical malpractice is a particular form
of negligence which consists in the failure of a
physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of
medicine that degree of care and skill which is
ordinarily employed by the profession generally,
under similar conditions, and in like surrounding
circumstances. There are four elements involved in
medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injury and
proximate causation. In the present case,
respondents did not present any expert testimony to
support their claim that petitioner failed to do
something which a reasonably prudent physician or
surgeon would have done. Petitioner, on the other
hand, presented the testimony of Dr. Augusto M.
Manalo, who was clearly an expert on the subject. He
testified that the rupture occurred minutes prior to
the hysterectomy or right upon admission on
September 15, 1994 which is about 1 ½ months after
the patient was discharged, after the D&C was
conducted. It is evident that the D&C procedure was
not the proximate cause of the rupture of Editha’s
uterus.
providedThe defenses
for under in 2179
Article an action for Code
of the Civil damages,
are:
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was
the immediate and proximate cause of his injury he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was
only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due
care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.
An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act
or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the
evidence in the case that the act or omission played a
substantial part in bringing about or actually causing
the injury or damage; and that the injury or damage
was either a direct result or a reasonably probable
consequence of the act or omission. The Court notes
the findings of the Board of Medicine: When
complainant was discharged on July 31,1994, herein
respondent advised her to return on August 4, 1994
or four (4) days after the D&C. This advise was clear
in complainant’s Discharge Sheet. However,
complainant failed to do so. This being the case, the
chain of continuity as required in order that the
doctrine of proximate cause can be validly invoked
was interrupted. Had she returned, the respondent
could have examined her thoroughly. Contributory
negligence is the act or omission amounting to want
of ordinary care on the part of the person injured,
which, concurring with the defendant’s negligence, is
the proximate cause of the injury. Difficulty seems to
be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured
party shall be considered immediate causes of the
accident. Where the immediate cause of an accident
resulting in an injury is the plaintiff’s own act, which
contributed to the principal occurrence as one of its
determining factors, he cannot recover damages for
the injury.
10. PETER PAUL PATRICK LUCAS, FATIMA GLADYS
LUCAS, ABBEYGAIL LUCAS AND GILLIAN LUCAS,
Petitioners, v. DR. PROSPERO MA. C. TUAÑO,
Respondent.
Lucas v. Tuaño, G.R. No. 178763, April 21, 2009
Facts: The petitioners, Peter Lucas and his family, is
suing respondent,Dr. Prospero Ma. C.Tuaño, for
damages due to medical malpractice on the grounds
thatTuaño was negligent intreating Lucas’
conjunctivitis or “sore eyes” which led to glaucoma
which in turn made himirritable and unable to
support his family. Lucas consultedTuaño when he
had severe painin his right eye to which the
respondent performed an ocular routine examination
where hediagnosed Lucas to be suffering
conjunctivitis or “sore eyes” which developed
EpidemicKerato Conjunctivitis (EKC), a viral infection
to whichTuañoprescribed a steroid-basedeye drop
called Maxitrol which Lucas was using before. Lucas
couldn’t get a hold ofMaxitrol soTuañosuggested
Blephamide instead which was also steroid-based
and Lucaslater used Maxitrol when it became
available. Later on, Fatima Lucas, the wife, found
outfrom the accompanying literature of the medicine
that prolonged use of steroid-basedmedication can
result to glaucoma. Lucas’s right eye pain reduced for
a while but later onreturned and it became severe
thatTuaño referred him to another ophthalmologist,
Dr.Manuel B. Agulto, for a second opinion to which
Dr. ManielAgulto wrote a letter toTuañostating the
Lucas sustained significant glaucoma damage.The
Regional Trial Court denied thepetitioners’ claim for
damages due toinsufficient evidence provingTuaño’s
medical malpractice in treating Lucas because
theyfailed to present a medical expert that could
support their claim that whatTuañodid wasindeed
medical malpractice. Petitioners appealed to the
Court of Appeals to which the courtaffirmed the
Regional Trial Court’s decision. Hence, the petitioners
appealed to the SupremeCourt.
Issue:Whether respondent Dr. Prospero Ma. C.
Tuaño is guilty of medicalmalpractice.
Ruling:The Supreme Court ruled that respondent,Dr.
Prospero Ma. C. Tuaño, is not guiltyof medical
malpractice.
The Supreme Court emphasizes that in order for
medical malpractice to be proven, amedical expert
should be a witness to attest to the accused’s medical
malpractice.Petitioners’ complaint for damages is
merely based on a statement in the literature
ofMaxitrol identifying the risks of its use and Dr.
Agulto’s comment.
In this type of suit, the patient or his heirs, in order
to prevail, is required to prove by preponderance
of evidence that the physician failed to exercise
that degree of skill, care, and learning possessed by
other persons in the same profession; and that as a
proximate result of such failure, the patient or his
heirs suffered damages. Just as with the elements of
duty and breach of the same, in order to establish the
proximate cause [of the injury] by a preponderance
of the evidence in a medical malpractice action,
the patient must similarly use expert
testimony, because the question of whether the
alleged professional negligence caused the patient‘s
injury is generally one for specialized expert
knowledge beyond the knowledge of the average
layperson; using the specialized knowledge and
training of his field, theexpert‘s role is to present to
the court a realistic assessment of the likelihood that
the physician‘s alleged negligence caused the
patient‘s injury.The medical expert setsa standard
and when there is failure to present one, the courts
have no standard by which togauge the basic issue of
breach thereof by the physician or surgeon.
The deference of courts to the expert opinion of
qualified physicians or surgeons stems from the
former‘s realization that the latter possess unusual
technical skills which laymen in most instances are
incapable of intelligently evaluating; hence, the
indispensability of expert testimonies.
The qualifications of a physician are taken into
account and there is
inevitable presumption that he takes the necessary p
recaution and employs the best of his knowledgeand
skill in attending to his clients, unless the contrary is
sufficiently established. Therefore,a medical expert
as a witness in essential in medical malpractice cases
to give light to theerrors of the accused. Also, it
serves as a reminder for people in the medical field to
becautious and take the necessary precautions when
attending to their clients to avoid
medicalmalpractice.
11. G.R. No. 124354. December 29, 1999
ROGELIO E. RAMOS and ERLINDA RAMOS
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS: Erlinda Ramos, 47-year old robust woman
underwent on an operation to the stone at her gall
bladder removed after being tested that she was fit
for "cholecystectomy” operation performed by Dr.
OrlinoHozaka. Dr. Hosaka charged a fee of
P16,000.00, which was to include the
anesthesiologist's fee and which was to be paid after
the operation. He assured Rogelio E. Ramos, husband
that he will get a good anesthesiologist who was Dra.
Perfecta Gutierrez. Erlinda's hand was held
by Herminda Cruz, her sister -in-law who was the
Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical
Center together with her husband went down with
her to the operating room.
Instead of 9:30 am, Dr. Hosaka arrived at about 12:15
P.M.Herminda noticing what Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez
was doing, saw the nailbed of Erlinda becoming
bluish and Dr. Hosaka called for
another anesthesiologist Dr. Calderon.
She went out of the operating room to tell Rogelio
that something is wrong.
When she went back she saw Erlinda in
a trendelenburg position and at 3 p.m. she was taken
to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) where she stayed for
a month due to bronchospasm incurring P93,542.25
and she was since then comatosed.
She suffered brain damage as a result of the absence
of oxygen in her brain for four to five minutes.
She was also diagnosed to be suffering from "diffuse
cerebral parenchymal damage"
Monthly expenses ranged from P8,000 to P10,000.
Spouses Ramos and their minors filed against Dr.
Hosaka and Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez.
The trial court favored the Ramos' awarding P8,000
as actual monthly expenses totalling to P632,000 as
of April 15, 1992, P100,000 atty. fees, P800,000
moral damages,P200,000 exemplary damages and
cost of suit. The appellate court reversed ordering the
Ramos' to pay their unpaid bills of P93,542.25 plus
interest.
ISSUE: Whether respondents were negligent and
liable.
RULING: YES. Private respondents were all negligent
and are solidarily liable for the damages.
Res ipsa loquitur – a procedural or evidentiary rule
which means “the thing or the transaction speaks for
itself.” It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the
occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding
circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a
presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s
prima facie case, and present a question of fact for
defendant to meet with an explanation, where
ordinarily in a medical malpractice case, the
complaining party must present expert testimony to
prove that the attending physician was negligent.
This doctrine finds application in this case. On the
day of the operation, Erlinda Ramos already
surrendered her person to the private respondents
who had complete and exclusive control over her.
Apart from the gallstone problem, she was
neurologically sound and fit. Then, after the
procedure, she was comatose and brain damaged—
res ipsa loquitur—the thing speaks for itself!
Negligence – Private respondents were not able to
disprove the presumption of negligence on their part
in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the
proximate cause of her condition. One need not be an
anesthesiologist in order to tell whether or not the
intubation was a success. [resipsa loquitur applies
here]. The Supreme Court also found that the
anesthesiologist only saw Erlinda for the first time on
the day of the operation which indicates unfamiliarity
with the patient and which is an act of negligence and
irresponsibility.
The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was also negligent. He
failed to exercise the proper authority as the “captain
of the ship” in determining if the anesthesiologist
observed the proper protocols. Also, because he was
late, he did not have time to confer with the
anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery.
The hospital failed to adduce evidence showing that
it exercised the diligence of a good father of the
family in hiring and supervision of its doctors (Art.
2180). The hospital was negligent since they are the
one in control of the hiring and firing of their
“consultants”. While these consultants are not
employees, hospitals still exert significant controls on
the selection and termination of doctors who work
there which is one of the hallmarks of an employer-
employee reationship. Thus, the hospital was
allocated a share in the liability.
#12 December 23, 1914 JUAN BERNARDO,
plaintiff-appellant, vs. M. B. LEGASPI, defendant-
appellee G.R. No. L-9308
Facts:This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court
of First Instance of the city of Manila dismissing the
complaint on the merits filed in an action to recover
damages for injuries sustained by plaintiff's
automobile by reason of defendant's negligence in
causing a collision between his automobile and that
of plaintiff. The court in its judgment also dismissed a
cross-complaint filed by the defendant, praying for
damages against the plaintiff on the ground that the
injuries sustained by the defendant's automobile in
the collision referred to, as well as those to plaintiff's
machine, were caused by the negligence of the
plaintiff in handling his automobile.
Issue:Whether the negligence of the plaintiff
extinguishes the charge against the defendant.
Ruling :The court found upon the evidence that both
the plaintiff and the defendant were negligent in
handling their automobiles and that said negligence
was of such a character and extent on the part of both
as to prevent either from recovering.
The law applicable to the facts also requires an
affirmance of the judgment appealed from. Where the
plaintiff in a negligence action, by his own
carelessness contributes to the principal occurrence,
that is, to the accident, as one of the determining
causes thereof, he cannot recover. This is equally true
of the defendant; and as both of them, by their
negligent acts, contributed to the determining cause
of the accident, neither can recover.
13. PLDT v. CA GR. no. 57079 September
29, 1989
Facts: This case had its inception in an action for
damages instituted in the former Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental by private respondent
spouses against petitioner Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company (PLDT, for brevity) for the
injuries they sustained in the evening of July 30, 1968
when their jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell
into an open trench, an excavation allegedly
undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its
underground conduit system. The complaint alleged
that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the
open trench which was left uncovered because of the
creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light
or signs. As a result of the accident, respondent Gloria
Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs
and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek,
while the respondent husband suffered cut lips. In
addition, the windshield of the jeep was shattered. It
was found that the plaintif husband drived with
dimmed lights despite the drizzle and he also ran
quite fast as suggested by the tiremarks.
Issue: Whether or not PLDT acted with negligence, to
the injury of the Spouses Esteban.
Ruling: No. The above findings clearly show that the
negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not
only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife
but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the
accident, as one of its determining factors, and
thereby precludes their right to recover damages.
The perils of the road were known to, hence
appreciated and assumed by, private respondents. By
exercising reasonable care and prudence, respondent
Antonio Esteban could have avoided the injurious
consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that
there was some alleged negligence on the part of
petitioner.
It is basic that private respondents cannot charge
PLDT for their injuries where their own failure to
exercise due and reasonable care was the cause
thereof. It is both a societal norm and necessity that
one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution
for his own protection. Furthermore, respondent
Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or
opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding
the negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a
resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street
almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence
and location of the excavations there. It was his
negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger;
hence he is solely responsible for the consequences
of his imprudence.
A person claiming damages for the negligence of
another has the burden of proving the existence of
such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts
constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively
established by competent
relies on negligence evidence.
for his cause Whosoever
of action has the
burden in the first instance of proving the existence
of the same if contested, otherwise his action must
fail.
14.EN BANC
[G.R. No.L-8328. May 18, 1956.]
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, vs.
SOTERO REMOQUILLO, in his own behalf and as
guardian of the minors MANUEL, BENJAMIN,
NESTOR,
AURORA, MILAGROS, CORAZON,
all surnamed CLEMENTE
MAGNO, SALUD and and
MAGNO,
the COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division),
Respondents.
Montemayor J.

FACTS: On August 22, 1950, Efren Magno went to the
3-story house of Antonio Peñaloza, his stepbrother,
located on Rodriguez Lanuza Street, Manila, to repair
a “media agua” said to be in a leaking condition. The
“media agua” was just below the window of the third
story. Standing on said “media agua”, Magno received
from his son thru that window a 3’ X 6’ galvanized
iron sheet to cover the leaking portion, turned
around and in doing so the lower end of the iron
sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the
Manila Electric Company (later referred to as the
Company) strung parallel to the edge of the “media
agua” and 2 1/2 feet from it, causing his death by
electrocution. His widow and children fled suit to
recover damages from the company.
trial court rendered judgment in their favor CA
affirmed:
(MANILA electric lost)
ISSUE: WON CA CORRECT? NO company absolved
HELD: the death of Magno was primarily caused by
his own negligence and in some measure by the too
close proximity of the “media agua” or rather its edge
to the electric wire of the company by reason of the
violation of the srcinal permit given by the city and
the subsequent approval of said illegal construction
of the “media agua”.
the house owner disregarding the permit, exceeded
the one meter fixed by the same by 17 3/8 inches and
leaving only a distance of 2 1/2 feet between the (3
feet was the distance provided by the ordinance)
“Media agua” as illegally constructed and the electric
wires.
added to this violation of the permit by the house
owner, was its approval by the city through its agent,
possibly an inspector.
Consequently, we may not hold said company as
guilty of negligence or wanting in due diligence in
failing to insulate said wires. As to their proximity to
the house it is to be supposed that distance of 3 feet
was considered sufficiently safe by the technical men
of the city such as its electrician or engineer.
Plaintiff’s own act was the proximate and principal
cause of the accident which inflicted the injury in
turning around and swinging the galvanized iron
sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking
back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its
contacting said iron sheet, considering the latter’s
length of 6 feet.
“A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis
of an action if such remote cause did nothing more
than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion
by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and
the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and
efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury
would not have happened but for such condition or
occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such condition
was not the proximate cause. And if an independent
negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the circumstances which result in injury
because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.
the City of Manila authorities and the electric
company could get together and devise means of
minimizing this danger to the public. Just as the
establishment of pedestrian lanes in city
thoroughfares may greatly minimize danger to
pedestrians because drivers of motor vehicles may
expect danger and slow down or even stop and take
other necessary precaution upon approaching said
lanes, so, a similar way may possibly be found. Since
these high voltage wires cannot be properly insulated
and at reasonable cost, they might perhaps be strung
only up to the outskirts of the city where there are
few houses and few pedestrians and there step-down
to a voltage where the wires carrying the same to the
city could be properly insulated for the better
protection of the public.

15. M.H. Rakes vs The Atlantic Gulf and Pacific
Company
Facts:The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro
laborers in the employment of the defendant, was at
work transporting iron rails from a barge in the
harbor to the company's yard near the malecon in
Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was
used in this work. The defendant has proved that
there were two immediately following one another,
upon which were piled lengthwise seven rails, each
weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay
upon two crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but
without side pieces or guards to prevent them from
slipping off. According to the testimony of the
plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the car or
at its sides. According to that defendant, some of
them were also in front, hauling by a rope. At a
certain spot at or near the water's edge the track
sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or upset,
the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his
leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the
knee.This first point for the plaintiff to establish was
that the accident happened through the negligence of
the defendant. The detailed description by the
defendant's witnesses of the construction and quality
of the track proves that if was up to the general
stranded of tramways of that character, the
foundation consisting on land of blocks or
crosspieces of wood, by 8 inches thick and from 8 to
10 feet long laid, on the surface of the ground, upon
which at a right angle rested stringers of the same
thickness, but from 24 to 30 feet in length. On the
across the stringers the parallel with the blocks were
the ties to which the tracks were fastened. After the
road reached the water's edge, the blocks or
crosspieces were replaced with pilling, capped by
timbers extending from one side to the other. The
tracks were each about 2 feet wide and the two inside
rails of the parallel tracks about 18 inches apart. It
was admitted that there were no side pieces or
guards on the car; that where no ends of the rails of
the track met each other and also where the stringers
joined, there were no fish plates. the defendant has
not effectually overcome the plaintiff's proof that the
joints between the rails were immediately above the
joints between the underlying stringers.
Issue:Whether MH Rakes contributory negligence
will bar the action .
Holding:No, contributory negligence of the party
injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that
the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable
care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of
the injured party's negligence.There are may cases in
the supreme court of Spain in which the defendant
was exonerated, but when analyzed they prove to
have been decided either upon the point that he was
not negligent or that the negligence of the plaintiff
was the immediate cause of the casualty or that the
accident was due tocasus fortuitus. Of the first class
in the decision of January 26, 1887 (38Jurisprudencia
Criminal, No. 70), in which a railway employee,
standing on a car, was thrown therefrom and killed
by the shock following the backing up of the engine. It
was held that the management of the train and
engine being in conformity with proper rules of the
company, showed no fault on its part.Of the second
class are the decision of the 15th of January, the 19th
of February, and the 7th of March, 1902, stated in
Alcubilla's Index of that year; and of the third class
the decision of the 4th of June, 1888
(64Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 1), in which the breaking
down of plaintiff's dam by the logs of the defendant
impelled against it by the Tajo River, was held due to
a freshet as a fortuitous cause.The decision of the 7th
of March, 1902, on which stress has been laid, rested
on two bases, one, that the defendant was not
negligent, because expressly relieved by royal order
from the common obligation imposed by the police
law of maintaining a guard at the road crossing; the
other, because the act of the deceased in driving over
level ground with unobstructed view in front of a
train running at speed, with the engine whistle
blowing was the determining cause of the accident. It
is
hadplain thattothe
a right dotrain wasthe
and that doing
onlynothing
fault laybut what
with theit
injured man. His negligence was not contributory, it
was sole, and was of such an efficient nature that
without it no catastrophe could have happened.
Article 568 of the latter code provides:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an
act that if done with malice would constitute a grave
crime, shall be punished.And article 590 provides
that the following shall be punished:
Those who by simple imprudence or negligence,
without committing any infraction of regulations,
shall cause an injury which, had malice intervened,
would have constituted a crime or misdemeanor.
The cour de cassation held that the carelessness of the
victim did not civilly relieve the person without
whose fault the accident could not have happened,
but that the contributory negligence of the injured
man had the effect only of reducing the damages.
Austrian Code provides that the victim who is partly
changeable with the accident shall stand his damages
in proportion to his fault, but when that proportion is
incapable of ascertainment, he shall share the liability
equally with the person principally responsible.And
finally by articles 19 and 20, the liability of owners
and employers for the faults of their servants and
representatives is declared to be civil and subsidiary
in its character.he contributory negligence of the
injured man had the effect only of reducing the
damages. The French law, held that contributory
negligence did not exonerate the defendants whose
fault had been the immediate cause of the accident,
but entitled him to a reduction of damages. Other
similar cases in the provincial courts have been
overruled by appellate tribunals made up of common
law judges drawn from other provinces, who have
preferred to impose uniformally throughout the
Dominion the English theory of contributory
negligence.the judgment of the trial court, Court
ruled in Favor of MH Rakes but modified the award.
16. MAO-AO SUGAR V. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Julio Famoso was riding with a co-employee
with the caboose or “carbonera” of Ply-mouth No. 12,
a cargo train of Mao-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. when
the locomotive was suddenly derailed. Famoso and
his companion jumped off to escape injury, but the
train fell on its side, caught his legs by its wheels,
pinned him down and he died. Because claims for
death and other benefits were denied by Mao-ao,
HerminiaFamoso field a suit. The trial court ruled in
her favor but deducted 25% from the total damages
awarded because of Julio’s contributory negligence.
This was sustained by the appellate court except as to
the contributory negligence of the deceased and
disallowed the deduction.
ISSUE: whether Julio was guilty of contributory
negligence
RULING: No. Contributory negligence has been
defined as "the act or omission amounting to want of
ordinary care on the part of the person injured
which, concurring with the defendant's negligence, is
the proximate cause of the injury." It has been held
that "to hold a person as having contributed to his
injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act
that brought about his injuries in disregard of
warnings or signs of an impending danger to health
and body." There is no showing that thecaboose
where Famoso was riding was a dangerous place and
that he recklessly dared to stay there despite
warnings or signs of impending danger.
17. [G.R. No. 130003. October 20, 2004]
JONAS ANONUEVO, petitioner vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and JEROME VILLAGRACIA, respondent
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
FACTS: The present petition seeks to bar recovery by
an injured cyclist of damages from the driver of the
car which had struck him.
The accident in question occurred at the intersection
of Boni Avenue and Barangka Drive in Mandaluyong.
Villagracia was traveling along Boni Avenue on his
bicycle, while Aonuevo, traversing the opposite lane
was driving his Lancer car with plate number PJJ 359.
The car was owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the
employer of Aonuevos brother, Jonathan. Aonuevo
was in the course of making a left turn towards
Libertad Street
Villagracia whenserious
sustained the collision occurred.
injuries as a result,
which necessitated his hospitalization several times
in 1989, and forced him to undergo four (4)
operations.
Villagracia instituted an action for damages against
Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and Aonuevo before
the RTC. He had also filed a criminal complaint
against Aonuevo before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Mandaluyong, but the latter was subsequently
acquitted of the criminal charge.
Anonuevo insisted that Villagracia’s own fault and
negligence served to absolve the former of any
liability for damages. Anonuevo pointed out that
Villagracia’s bicycle had no safety gadgets such as a
horn or bell, or headlights, as required by a 1984
municipal ordinance, nor was it duly registered with
the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, as required by
the same ordinance. Furthermore, as admitted by
Villagracia, his bicycle did not have foot brakes.
Villagracia did not dispute these allegations but
directed the Court’s attention to the findings of
Anonuevo’s own negligence. Villagracia contended
that, assuming there was contributory negligence on
his part, such would not exonerate Anonuevo from
payment of damages.
ISSUE:WON Villagracias own fault and negligence
serves to absolve the Anonuevo of any liability for
damages.
HELD:The court held that Villagracia was not guilty
of contributory negligence. Itexplained:
To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries,
it must be shown that he performed an act that
brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or
signs of an impending danger to health and
body.[60] To prove contributory negligence, it is still
necessary to establish a causal link, although not
proximate, between the negligence of the party and
the succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is
contributory only when it contributes proximately to
the injury, and not simply a condition for its
[61]
occurrence.
18. G.R. No. 165969 November 27, 2008
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. HEIRS OF NOBLE CASIONAN, respondents.
FACTS: NkbleCasionan worked as a pocket miner
in Dalicno, Ampucao, Itogon, Benguet.
Sometime in the 1970’s, petitioner NPC
installed hightension electrical transmission lines
of 69 kilovolts (KV) traversing the trail.
Eventually, some of the transmission lines sagged
and dangled reducing their distance from the
ground to only about eight to ten feet. This posed
a great threat to passersby who were exposed to
the danger of electrocution especially during the
wet season. The danger it may cause was called for
by the Mayor though a letter sent to NPC.
On June 27, 1995, Noble and his co-pocket
miner, Melchor Jimenez, were at Dalicno. They cut
two bamboo poles for their pocket mining. Noble
carried the shorter pole while Melchor carried the
longer pole. Noble walked ahead as both passed
through the trail underneath the NPC high
tension transmission lines on their way to their
work place. As Noble was going uphill and turning
left on a curve, the tip of the bamboo pole he was
carrying touched one of the dangling high tension
wires. Melchor, who was walking behind him,
narrated that he heard a buzzing sound when the
tip of Noble’s pole touched the wire for only about
one or two seconds. Thereafter, he saw Noble fall
to the ground. Melchor rushed to Noble and
shook him but the latter was already dead. As such
parents of Noble filed a complaint against NPC.
NPC denied being negligent in maintaining the
safety of the high tension transmission lines.
RTC favored heirs of casionan. On appeal, ca
sustained its decision. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the mere presence of the
high tension wires above the trail did not cause
the victim’s death. Instead, it was Noble’s
negligent carrying of the bamboo pole that caused
his death. It insists that Noble was negligent
when he allowed the bamboo pole he was
carrying to touch the high tension wires. This is
especially true because other people traversing the
trail have not been similarly electrocuted.
ISSUE: Whether Noble is guilty of contributory
negligence as such damage should be deleted?
RULING: NO. Negligence is the failure to observe,
for the protection of the interest of another
person, that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury.11 On
the other hand, contributory negligence is
conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he
has suffered, which falls below the standard
which he is required to conform for his own
protection.12 There is contributory negligence
when the party’s act showed lack of ordinary
care and foresight that such act could cause
him harm or put his life in danger.
If indeed there was contributory negligence on the
part of the victim, then it is proper to reduce the
award for damages. This is in consonance with
the Civil Code provision that liability will be
mitigated in consideration of the contributory
negligence of the injured party. Article 2179 of
the Civil Code
In Ma-ao Sugar Central, it was held that to hold
a person as having contributed to his injuries,
it must be shown that he performed an act
that brought about his injuries in disregard of
warnings or signs on an impending danger to
health and body. This Court held then that the
victim was not guilty of contributory negligence
as there was no showing that the caboose where
he was riding was a dangerous place and that he
recklessly dared to stay there despite warnings or
signs of impending danger.16In this case, the
trail where Noble was electrocuted was
regularly used by members of the community.
There were no warning signs to inform
passersby of the impending danger to their
lives should they accidentally touch the high
tension wires. Also, the trail was the only
viable way from Dalicon to Itogon. Hence,
Noble should not be faulted for simply doing
what was ordinary routine to other workers
in the area.
19. M.H. Rakes vs. The Atlantic Gulf
7 Phil. 359 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Kinds of
Fault
M.H. Rakes was a black man working as a laborer for
Atlantic Gulf in the early 1900s. One day, they were
working in the company’s yard and they were
transporting heavy rails using two cars ( karitons?);
each car carrying the opposite ends of the rails. The
cars were pulled by rope from the front and other
workers are pushing the cars from behind. There
were no side guards installed on the sides of the cars
but the rails were secured by ropes. The track where
the cars move were also weakened by a previous
typhoon. It was alleged that Atlantic’s foreman was
notified of said damage in the tracks but the same
were left unrepaired. While the cars were being
moved and when it reached the depressed portion of
the track, and while Rakes was beside one of the cars,
the ropes gave in and the rails slipped thereby
crushing his leg and causing it to be amputated.
Rakes sued Atlantic Gulf and he won; he was awarded
5,000 pesos for damages ($2,500).
Atlantic assailed the decision of the lower court
alleging that they specifically ordered their workers
to be walking only before or after the cars and not on
the side of the cars because the cars have no side
guards to protect them in case the rails would slip.
Atlantic also alleged that Rakes should be suing the
foreman as it was him who neglected to have the
tracks repaired; that Rakes himself was negligent for
having known of the depression on the track yet he
continued to work.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atlantic is civilly liable.
HELD: Yes. Rakes as per the evidence could not have
known of the damage in the track as it was another
employee who swore he notified the foreman about
said damage. Further, his lack of caution in
continuing to work isonnot of a On
gross
constitute negligence his part. thenature as to
other hand
though, Rakes contributory negligence can be
inferred from the fact that he was on the side of the
cars when in fact there were orders from the
company barring workers from standing near the
side of the cars. His disobedient to this order does not
bar his recovery of damages though; the Supreme
Court instead reduced the award of damages from
5,000 pesos to 2,500 pesos.
In this case, the SC also elucidated the two kinds of
culpa which are:
1. Culpa as substantive and independent, which
on account of its srcin arises in an obligation
between two persons not formerly bound by
any other obligation; may be also considered
as a real source of an independent obligation
(extra-contractual or culpa aquiliana).
2. Culpa as an incident in the performance of an
obligation which cannot be presumed to exist
without the other, and which increases the
liability arising from the already existing
obligation (contractual or culpa contractual).
20. [G.R. NO. 160709 : February 23, 2005]
NELEN LAMBERT, assisted by her husband,
GLENROY ALOYSUIS LAMBERT, Petitioners, v. HEIRS
OF RAY CASTILLON, Represented by MARILOU T.
CASTILLON and SERGIO LABANG, Respondents.
Facts:In the evening of January 13, 1991, Ray
Castillon visited the house of his brother Joel
Castillon at Tambo,Iligan City and borrowed his
motorcycle. He then invited his friend, Sergio Labang,
to roam aroundIligan City. Ray drove the motorcycle
with Sergio as the backrider.At around past 10:00
p.m., after eating supper at Hona’s Restaurant and
imbibing a bottle of beer, theytraversed the highway
towards Tambo at a high speed. Upon reaching
Brgy.Sto. Rosario, they figuredin an accident with a
Tamarawjeepney, owned by petitioner Nelen
Lambert and driven by ReynaldoGamot, which was
traveling on the same direction but made a sudden
left turn. The incident resulted inthe instantaneous
death of Ray and injuries to Sergio.Respondents, the
heirs of Ray Castillon, thus filed an action for
damages with prayer for preliminaryattachment
against the petitioner Nelen Lambert. The complaint
was subsequently amended to includethe claim by
Joel Castillon for the damages caused to the
motorcycle.On June 29, 1993, after a full-blown trial,
the courta quorendered a decision in favor of the
Castillonheirs but reduced Lambert’s liability by 20%
in view of the contributory negligence of Ray. On
the claimof Joel Castillon, the evidence shows that he
is not the real owner of the motorcycle. He is not the
realparty in interest. Accordingly, his complaint is
dismissed.The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court.
Issue:Does the act of tailgating merely constitute con
tributory negligence?( Lambert insists that the
negligence of Ray Castillon was the proximate cause
of his unfortunate deathand therefore she is
not liable for damages.)
Held:Yes.The SC found it equitable to increase the
ratio of apportionment of damages on account
of thevictim’s negligence.
Article 2179 reads as follows:
When the plaintiff’s negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recoverdamages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of
the injurybeing the defendant’s lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts
shall mitigatethe damages to be awarded.The
underlying precept on contributory negligence is that
a plaintiff who is partly responsible for hisown injury
should not be entitled to recover damages in full but
must bear the consequences of his ownnegligence.
The defendant must thus be held liable only for the
damages actually caused by hisnegligence.
The determination of the mitigation of the
defendant’s liability varies depending on
thecircumstances of each case. In the case at bar, it
was established that Ray, at the time of the mishap:
(1)was driving the motorcycle at a high speed; (2)
was tailgating the Tamarawjeepney; (3) has imbibed
oneor two bottles of beer; and (4) was not wearing a
protective helmet.
These circumstances, althoughnot constituting the
proximate cause of his demise and injury to Sergio,
contributed to the sameresult. The contribution
of these circumstances are all considered and
determined in terms ofpercentages of the total
cause. Hence, pursuant toRakes v. AG & P, the heirs of
Ray Castillon shallrecover damages only up to 50% of
the award. In other words, 50% of the damage shall
be borne by theprivate respondents; the remaining
50% shall be paid by the petitioner.
21. G.R. No. 169891 November 2, 2006
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS
vs.
ETHEL BRUNTY and JUAN MANUEL M. GARCIA
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS: RhondaBrunty, daughter of respondent Ethel
Brunty and an American citizen, came to the
Philippines for a visit sometime in January 1980.
Prior to her departure, she, together with her Filipino
host Juan Manuel M. Garcia, traveled to Baguio City
on board a Mercedes Benz sedan with plate number
FU 799, driven by Rodolfo L. Mercelita. It was about
12:00 midnight, January 25, 1980. By then, PNR Train
No. T-71, driven by Alfonso Reyes, was on its way to
Tutuban, Metro Manila as it had left the La Union
station at 11:00 p.m., January 24, 1980.
By 2:00 a.m., Rhonda Brunty, Garcia and Mercelita
were already approaching the railroad crossing at
Barangay Rizal, Moncada, Tarlac. Mercelita, driving at
approximately 70 km/hr, drove past a vehicle,
unaware of the railroad track up ahead and that they
were about to collide with PNR Train No. T-71.
Mercelita was instantly killed when the Mercedes
Benz smashed into the train; the two other
passengers suffered serious physical injuries. A
certain James Harrow brought Rhonda Brunty to the
Central Luzon Doctor’s Hospital in Tarlac, where she
was pronounced dead after ten minutes from arrival.
Garcia, who had suffered severe head injuries, was
brought via ambulance to the same hospital. He was
transferred to the Manila Doctor’s Hospital, and later
to the Makati Medical Center for further treatment.
Ethel Brunty filed a complaint for damages against
the PNR before the RTC of Manila. The case was
raffled to Branch 20 and was docketed as Civil Case
No. 83-18645. They alleged that the death of
Mercelita and Rhonda Brunty, as well as the physical
injuries suffered by Garcia, were the direct and
proximate result of the gross and reckless negligence
of PNR in not providing the necessary equipment at
the railroad crossing in Barangay Rizal, Municipality
of Moncada, Tarlac. They pointed out that there was
no flagbar or red light signal to warn motorists who
were about to cross the railroad track, and that the
flagman or switchman was only equipped with a
hand flashlight. The Court of Manila ruled in favor of
Brunty and the CA affirmed the ruling of the court of
first instance, hence this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether Brunty and Mercelita has
contributory negligence barring them for claiming
damages.
RULING:No.Considering the circumstances prevailing
at the time of the fatal accident, it ruled that the
alleged safety measures installed by the PNR at the
railroad crossing were not merely inadequate– they
did not satisfy the well-settled safety standards in
transportation. However, we do not agree with the
RTC’s findings on the contributory negligence of
Mercelita, the driver of the Mercedes Benz. It held
that Mercelita could not have foreseen the harm that
would befall him and the two other passengers under
the prevailing circumstances, thus, could not be
considered guilty of contributory negligence.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a
prudent and reasonable man would not do.In Corliss
v. Manila Railroad Company,this Court held that
negligence is want of the care required by the
circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an
absolute, term and its application depends upon the
situation of the parties and the degree of care and
vigilance which the circumstances reasonably
require.In determining whether or not there is
negligence on the part of the parties in a given
situation, jurisprudence has laid down the following
test: Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act,
use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the
same situation? If not, the person is guilty of
negligence. The law, in effect, adopts the standard
supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of
the discreet pater familias of the Roman law.
Article 2176. Whoever, by act or omission, causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
In a long line of cases, the Court held that in order to
sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following
requisites must concur: (1) damage to plaintiff; (2)
negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or Ruling:The alleged contributory negligence of the
some person for whose acts he must respond was victim, if any, does not exonerate the accused. "The
guilty; and (3) connection of cause and effect defense of contributory negligence does not apply in
between such negligence and damage.
criminal cases committed through reckless
#22 GREGORIO GENOBIAGON, petitioner, vs. imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE another to evade the effects of his own negligence.
PHILIPPINES, respondents G.R. No. L-40452
23. Sicam v. Jorge GR no 159617 August 8,
October 12, 1989
2007
A rig driven by appellant bumped an old
Facts:
woman who was crossing T. Padilla St., Cebu City, at Facts: Lulu V. Jorge (respondent Lulu) pawned
several pieces of jewelry with Agencia de R. C. Sicam.
the right side of T. Padilla Market. The appellant's rig
However, two armed men entered the pawnshop and
was following another at a distance of two meters.
took away whatever cash and jewelry were found
The old woman started to cross when the first rig
inside the pawnshop vault. Petitioner Sicam sent
was approaching her, but as appellant's vehicle was
respondent Lulu a letter dated October 19, 1987
going so fast not only because of the steep down-
informing her of the loss of her jewelry due to the
grade of the road, but also because he was trying to
robbery incident in the pawnshop. Respondent Lulu
overtake the rig ahead of him, the appellant's rig
then wrote a letter to petitioner Sicam expressing
bumped the old woman, who as a consequence, fell at
disbelief stating that when the robbery happened, all
the middle of the road. The appellant continued to
jewelry pawned were deposited with Far East Bank
drive on, but a by-stander, one Vicente Mangyao, who
near the pawnshop since it had been the practice that
just closed his store in market in order to celebrate
the coming of the New Year, and who saw the before they could withdraw, advance notice must be
given to the pawnshop so it could withdraw the
incident right before him, shouted at the appellant to
jewelry from the bank. Respondent Lulu then
stop. He ran after appellant when the latter refused to
requested petitioner Sicam to prepare the pawned
stop. Overtaking the appellant, Mangyao asked him
jewelry for withdrawal but petitioner Sicam failed to
why he bumped the old woman and his answer was,
return the jewelry. Lulu filed a complaint against
'it was the old woman that bumped him.' The
Sicam but Sicam cuntered that they exercised due
appellant went back to the place where the old
diligence in protecting the jewelries. They contended
woman was struck by his rig. The old woman was
that the Robbery cannot be foreseen.
unconscious, and the food and viands she was
carrying were scattered on her body. The victim was Issue: Whether Sicam acted negligently to the injury
then loaded in a jeep and brought to the hospital of Jorge.
where she died three hours later. ). The trial court
found petitioner guilty of the felony charged. Ruling: Yes.Fortuitous events by definition are
extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable. It
Issue:Whether the reckless negligence of the is therefore, not enough that the event should not
victim was the proximate cause of the accident have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly
which led to her death. believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or
to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening
is not impossibility to foresee the same.
To constitute a fortuitous event, the following
elements must concur: (a) the cause of the
unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the
failure of the debtor to comply with obligations must
be independent of human will; (b) it must be
impossible to foresee the event that constitutes
the caso fortuito or, if it can be foreseen, it must be
impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such
as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill
obligations in a normal manner; and, (d) the obligor
must be free from any participation in the
aggravation of the injury or loss.
The burden of proving that the loss was due to a
fortuitous event rests on him who invokes it.And, in
order for a fortuitous event to exempt one from
liability, it is necessary that one has committed no
negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned
the loss.
It has been held that an act of God cannot be invoked
to protect
forestall thea possible
person adverse
who hasconsequences
failed to takeofsteps
such ato
loss. One's negligence may have concurred with an
act of God in producing damage and injury to
another; nonetheless, showing that the immediate or
proximate cause of the damage or injury was a
fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability.
When the effect is found to be partly the result of a
person's participation -- whether by active
intervention, neglect or failure to act -- the whole
occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules
applicable to acts of God.
. The very measures which petitioners had allegedly
adopted
was not show that to thembut
only foreseeable, the actually
possibility of robbery
foreseen and
anticipated. Petitioner Sicam’s testimony, in effect,
contradicts petitioners’ defense of fortuitous event.
Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a
fortuitous event. It does not foreclose the possibility
of negligence on the part of herein petitioners.The
fact that a thing was unlawfully and forcefully
taken from another's rightful possession, as in
cases of carnapping, does not automatically give
rise to a fortuitous event. To be considered as
such, carnapping entails more than the mere
forceful taking of another's property. It must be
proved and established that the event was an act
of God or was done solely by third parties and
that neither the claimant nor the person alleged
to be negligent has any participation. In
accordance with the Rules of Evidence, the
burden of proving that the loss was due to a
fortuitous event rests on him who invokes it —
which in this case is the private respondent.
24. G.R. No. L-45637 May 31, 1985
ROBERTO JUNTILLA, petitioner,
vs.
CLEMENTE FONTANAR, FERNANDO BANZON and
BERFOL CAMORO, respondents.
Valentin A. Zozobrado for petitioner.
Ruperto N. Alfarara for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS: the plaintiff was a passenger of the public
utility jeepney on the course of the trip from Danao
City to Cebu City. The jeepney was driven by
defendant BerfolCamoro. It was registered under the
franchise of defendant Clemente Fontanar but was
actually owned by defendant Fernando Banzon.
When the jeepney reached Mandaue City, the right
rear tire exploded causing the vehicle to turn turtle.
In the process, the plaintiff who was sitting at the
front seat was thrown out of the vehicle. Upon
landing on the ground, the plaintiff momentarily lost
consciousness. When he came to his senses, he found
that he had a lacerated wound on his right palm.
Aside from this, he suffered injuries on his left arm,
right thigh and on his back. (Exh. "D"). Because of his
shock and injuries, he went back to Danao City but on
the way, he discovered that his "Omega" wrist watch
was lost. Upon
immediately his arrival
entered in Danao
the Danao CityCity, he to
Hospital
attend to his injuries, and also requested his father-
in-law to proceed immediately to the place of the
accident and look for the watch. In spite of the efforts
of his father-in-law, the wrist watch, which he bought
for P 852.70 could no longer be found.
Petitioner Roberto Juntilla filed breach of contract
against Clemente Fontanar, Fernando Banzon and
BerfolCamoro in city court of cebu. Respondent said
such was beyond the control of the respondents
taking into account that the tire that exploded was
newly bought and was only slightly used at the time it
blew up. Civil Court of Cebu rendered judgment in
favor of the petitioner and against the respondents.
Judge Leonardo B. Canares court of first instance
cebureversed the judgment of the City Court of Cebu
upon a finding that the accident in question was due
to a fortuitous event.
ISSUE: WON it was FORTITOUS? NO
HELD: The records show that the passenger jeepney
turned turtle and jumped into a ditch immediately
after its right rear tire exploded. The evidence shows
that the passenger jeepney was running at a very fast
speed before the accident. We agree with the
observation of the petitioner that a public utility jeep
running at a regular and safe speed will not jump into
a ditch when its right rear tire blows up. There is also
evidence to show that the passenger jeepney was
overloaded at the time of the accident. The petitioner
stated that there were three (3) passengers in the
front seat and fourteen (14) passengers in the rear.
While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was
still good because the grooves of the tire were still
visible, this fact alone does not make the explosion of
the tire a fortuitous event. No evidence was
presented to show that the accident was due to
adverse road conditions or that precautions were
taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any
conditions liable to cause accidents. The sudden
blowing-up, therefore, could have been caused by too
much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by
the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and
speeding at the time of the accident. the cause of the
unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not
independent of the human will. The accident was
caused either through the negligence of the driver or
because of mechanical defects in the tire. Common
carriers should teach their drivers not to overload
their vehicles, not to exceed safe and legal speed
limits, and to know the correct measures to take
when a tire blows up thus insuring the safety of
passengers at all times. Relative to the contingency of
mechanical defects.
25. Southern College vs C.A.
Facts:Private respondents are owners of a house at
326 College Road, Pasay City, while petitioner owns a
four-storey school building along the same College
Road.On October 11, 1989, at about 6:30 in the
morning, a powerful typhoon Saling hit Metro
Manila.Buffeted by very strong winds, the roof of
petitioners building was partly ripped off and blown
away, landing on and destroying portions of the
roofing of private respondents house.After the
typhoon had passed, an ocular inspection of the
destroyed buildings was conducted by a team of
engineers headed by the city building official, Engr.
Jesus L. Reyna.Pertinent aspects of the latters Report
dated October 18, 1989 stated, as follows:
One of the factors that may have led to this
calamitous event is the formation of the buildings in
the area and the general direction of the
wind.Situated in the
shaped formation of peripheral lot is anThus,
4-storey building. almost U- the
with
strong winds having a westerly direction, the general
formation of the buildings becomes a big funnel-like
structure, the one situated along College Road,
receiving the heaviest impact of the strong winds.
Hence, there are portions of the roofing, those located
on both ends of the building, which remained intact
after the storm.Another factor and perhaps the most
likely reason for the dislodging of the roofings
structural trusses is the improper anchorage of the
said trusses to the roof beams. The 1/2 diameter
steel bars embedded on the concrete roof beams
which serve as truss anchorage are not bolted nor
nailed to the trusses.Still, there are other steel bars
which were not even bent to the trusses, thus, those
trusses are not anchored at all to the roof beams.
It then recommended that to avoid any further loss
and damage to lives, limbs and property of persons
living in the vicinity, the fourth floor of subject school
building be declared as a structural hazard.
Issue: Whether Southern College can use Article
1174 of the civil code as a defense against damages.
Holding: No,The antecedent of fortuitous event or
caso fortuito is found in the Partidas which defines it
as
notanhave
event which
been takes place by elaborates
foreseen.Escriche accident and could
it as an
unexpected event or act of God which could neither
be foreseen nor resisted.Civilist Arturo M. Tolentino
adds that Fortuitous events may be produced by two
general causes: (1)by nature, such as earthquakes,
storms, floods, epidemics, fires, etc. and(2)by the act
of man, such as an armed invasion, attack by bandits,
governmental prohibitions, robbery, etc.In order that
a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability,
it is necessary that he be free from any previous
negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss
may have been occasioned.An act of God cannot be
invoked for the protection of a person who has been
guilty of gross negligence in not trying to forestall its
possible adverse consequences.When a persons
negligence concurs with an act of God in producing
damage or injury to another, such person is not
exempt from liability by showing that the immediate
or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a
fortuitous event.When the effect is found to be partly
the result of the participation of man whether it be
from active intervention, or neglect, or failure to act
the whole occurrence is hereby humanized, and
removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.In
the case under consideration, the lower court
accorded full credence to the finding of the
investigating team that subject school buildings
roofing had no sufficient anchorage to hold it in
position especially when battered by strong
winds.Based on such finding, the trial court imputed
negligence to petitioner and adjudged it liable for
damages to private respondents.After a thorough
study and evaluation of the evidence on record, this
Court believes otherwise, notwithstanding the
general rule that factual findings by the trial court,
especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are
binding and conclusive upon this Court.After a careful
scrutiny of the records and the pleadings submitted
by the parties, we find exception to this rule and hold
that the lower courts misappreciated the evidence
proffered.There is no question that a typhoon or
storm is a fortuitous event, a natural occurrence
which may be foreseen but is unavoidable despite any
amount of foresight, diligence or care.In order to be
exempt from liability arising from any adverse
consequence engendered thereby, there should have
been no human participation amounting to a
negligent act.In other words, the person seeking
exoneration from liability must not be guilty of
negligence.Negligence, as commonly understood, is
conduct which naturally or reasonably creates undue
risk or harm to others.It may be the failure to observe
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand,or the omission to
do something which a prudent and reasonable man,
guided by considerations which ordinarily regulate
the conduct of human affairs.WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED and the challenged Decision is
REVERSED.The complaint of private respondents in
Civil Case No. 7314 before the trial court a quo is
ordered DISMISSED and the writ of execution issued
on April 1, 1993 in said case is SET
ASIDE.Accordingly, private respondents are
ORDERED to return to petitioner any amount or
property received by them by virtue of said writ.
26. AFIALDA v. HISOLE CASE DIGEST
FACTS: Loreto Afialda was employed by the
defendant spouses Hisole as caretaker of their
carabaos at a fixed compensation. While tending the
animals, he was gored by one of them and later died
as a consequence of his injuries.
Plaintiff (elder sister of deceased) seeks to hold
defendants liable under article 1905 of the Civil Code,
which reads:
The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the
same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if
such animal should escape from him or stray away.
This liability shall cease only in case, the damage
should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the
person who may have suffered it.
ISSUE: whether the owner of the animal is liable
when damage is caused to its caretaker.
RULING: No. The animal was in custody and under
the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his
work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's
business to try to prevent the animal from causing
injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And
being injured by the animal under those
circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation
which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he
must take the consequences.
27. G.R. No. L-53401 November 6, 1989
THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC
COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (First Division)
LILIAN JUAN LUIS, JANE JUAN YABES, VIRGINIA
JUAN CID, GLORIA JUAN CARAG, and PURISIMA
JUAN, respondents.
PLAINTIFF’s ASSUMPTION OF RISK
FACTS:The Court had occasion to rule when the
doctrine of assumption of risk was not available
against a person who braved a typhoon to save her
property. a strong typhoon by the code name
"Gening" buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte,
bringing heavy rains and consequent flooding in its
wake.After the typhoon had abated and when the
floodwaters were beginning to recede the deceased
Isabel Lao Juan, fondly called Nana Belen, ventured
out of the house of her son-in-law, Antonio Yabes,
and proceeded northward towards the direction of
the Five Sisters Emporium, of which she was the
owner and proprietress, to look after the
merchandise therein that might have been damaged.
Wading in waist-deep flood on Guerrero, the
deceased was followed by Aida Bulong, a Salesgirl at
the Five Sisters Grocery, also owned by the deceased,
and by Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket seller at the YJ
Cinema, which was partly owned by the deceased.
Aida and Linda walked side by side at a distance of
between 5 and 6 meters behind the deceased,
Suddenly, the deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly
sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help,
but fear dissuaded them from doing so because on
the spot where the deceased sank they saw an
electric wire dangling from a post and moving in
snake-like fashion in the water. Upon their shouts for
help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of
Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased,
but at four meters away from her he turned back
shouting that the water was grounded.
The heirs of the deceased filed an action for damages
against petitioner.
ISSUE:WON assumption of risk will apply in this
case?
HELD:NO. The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied
upon by petitioner finds no application in the case at
bar. It is imperative to note the surrounding
circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave
the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding
typhoon.
her right As such, shall
to protect herWe punish from
property her for
theexercising
floods by
imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that
she assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely
not. For it has been held that a person is excused
from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily
assents to a known danger he must abide by the
consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if
the life or property of another is in peril (65A C.S.C.
Negligence(174(5), p. 301), or when he seeks to
rescue his endangered property (Harper and James,
"The Law of Torts." Little, Brown and Co., 1956, v. 2,
p. 1167). Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the
deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was
faced withatanthe
deceased, impending loss.incident
time the fatal Furthermore, the was
occurred,
at a place where she had a right to be without regard
to petitioner's consent as she was on her way to
protect her merchandise. Hence, private respondents,
as heirs, may not be barred from recovering damages
as a result of the death caused by petitioner's
negligence
28. VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and
FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents
FACTS:Respondent Eliza Sunga was a college student
at Siliman University. She boarded a jeep driven by
Petitioner Vicente Calalas. That time the jeep was
already full yet she was given an extension seat, a
wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear
end of the vehicle. As she was seated at the rear
of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing
passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu
truck driven by IglecerioVerena and owned by
Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of
the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured.
Causing her onfinement in the hospital lasted from
August 23 to September 7, 1989. as a result she
filed a complaint against Calalas for damages, alleging
violation of the contract of carriage by the former
in
as failing to exercise
a common carrier. the diligence
Calalas, required
on the of him
other hand,
filed a third-party complaint against Francisco
Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.
The lower court rendered judgment against Salva
as third-party defendant and absolved Calalas of
liability, holding that it was the driver of the
Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of
the lower court was reversed on the ground that
Sunga's cause of action was based on a contract
of carriage, not quasidelict, and that the common
carrier failed to exercise the diligence required
under the Civil Code. The appellate court
dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva
and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case
No. 3490 that the negligence of Verena was the
proximate cause of the accident negates his
liability and that to rule otherwise would be to
make the common carrier an insurer of the safety
of its passengers. He contends that the bumping
of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was a
casofortuito.
ISSUE: (1) whether petitioner is negilent as such he
is liable on his contract of carriage.
(2)Whether the driver of jeepney carry Sunga
"safely as far as human care and foresight could
provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances" as required by Art. 1755?
RULING: (1) yes.in quasi-delict, the negligence
or fault should be clearly established because
it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach
of contract, the action can be prosecuted
merely by proving the existence of the
contract and the fact that the obligor, in this
case the common carrier, failed to transport
his passenger safely to his destination. 2 In case
of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of
the Civil Code provides that common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733
and 1755 of the Code. This provision
necessarily shifts to the common carrier the
burden of proof. There is, thus, no basis for
the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No.
3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena liable
for the damage to petitioner's jeepney, should
be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that
theproximate cause of the collision between
the jeepney and the truck was the negligence
of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate
cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-
delict, not in actions involving breach of
contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing
liability to a person where there is no relation
between him and another party. In such a
case, the obligation is created by law itself.
But, where there is a pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, it is the parties
themselves who create the obligation, and the
function of the law is merely to regulate the
relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of
carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by
the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence
required of common carriers with regard to the
safety of passengers as well as the presumption of
negligence
passengers. in cases of death or injury to
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the
accident, the presumption of negligence at once
arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to
prove that he had to observe extraordinary
diligence in the care of his passengers.
(2) no.Several factors militate against petitioner's
contention. First, as found by the Court of
Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked, its
rear portion being exposed about two meters
from the broad shoulders of the highway, and
facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal
angle.This is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as
amended, or the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code,
Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver
took in more passengers than the allowed seating
capacity of the jeepney, a violation of §32(a) of
the same law.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension
seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to
which the other passengers were exposed.
Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to
overcome the presumption of negligence
imposed on him for the injury sustained by
Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was
actually negligent in transporting passengers.
We find it hard to give serious thought to
petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking an
"extension seat" amounted to an implied
assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the
injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in
our seas should not be compensated merely
because those passengers assumed a greater risk
of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This
is also true of petitioner's contention that the
jeepney being bumped while it was improperly
parked constitutes casofortuito. A casofortuito is
an event which could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, was inevitable.3 xxx Petitioner
should have foreseen the danger of parking his
jeepney with its body protruding two meters
into the highway.
29. Nikko Hotel vs. Reyes
FACTS: Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila and Ruby Lim
assailed the decision of the Court of Appeals in
reversing the decision of RTC of Quezon City. CA held
petitioner liable for damages to Roberto Reyes aka
“Amang Bisaya”, an entertainment artist.
There are two versions of the story:
Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes
while having coffee at the lobby of Nikko Hotel was
approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years
back. According to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him
to join a birthday party at the penthouse for the
hotel’s former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka.
Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him
and carried a basket of fruits, the latter’s gift. He He
lined up at the buffet table as soon as it was ready but
to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, Ruby
Lim,
in a Hotel’s Executive
loud voice enoughSecretary, asked
to be heard byhim
thetopeople
leave
around them. He was asked to leave the party and a
Makati policeman accompanied him to step-out the
hotel. All these time, Dr Filart ignored him adding to
his shame and humiliation.
Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave
the party but not in the manner claimed by the
plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people
including Dr. Filart’s sister, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, if Dr.
Filart did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms.
Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr. Filart’s group. She
wasn’t able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since
the latter was talking over the phone and doesn’t
want to interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave
because the celebrant specifically ordered that the
party should be intimate consisting only of those who
part of the list. She even asked politely with the
plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party.
During the plaintiff’s cross-examination, he was
asked how close was Ms. Lim when she approached
him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered “very
close because we nearly kissed each other”.
Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lim’s
intention to relay the request only be heard by him.
It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing
everybody to know what happened.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in
asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.
HELD: Supreme Court held that petitioners did not
act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.
Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on
the part of Ms. Lim who did all the necessary
precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be
humiliated in requesting him to leave the party.
Considering almost 20 years of experience in the
hotel
know industry,
how to Ms.handle
Lim issuch
experienced
matters.enough
Hence,to
petitioners will not be held liable for damages
brought under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
30. POLO S. PANTALEON, PETITIONER,
VS.AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
RESPONDENT.
FACTS:
The petitioner, lawyer Polo Pantaleon, his wife,
daughter and son joined an escortedtour of Western
Europe in October of 1991. The tour group arrived in
Amsterdam in the afternoon of 25 October 1991,
thesecond to the last day of the tour. As the group
had arrived late in the city, theyfailed to engage in
any sight-seeing so they agreed that they would start
early thenext day to see the entire city before ending
the tour.The following day, the last day of the tour,
the group arrived at the Coster DiamondHouse. The
group had agreed that the visit to Coster should end
by 9:30 a.m. toallow enough time to take in a guided
city tour of Amsterdam.
While at Coster, Mrs. Pantaleon decided to purchase
some diamond pieces worth a total of US$13,826.00.
Pantaleon presented his American Express credit
card to the sales clerk to pay for this purchase. He
did this at around 9:15 a.m. The sales clerk swiped
the credit card and asked Pantaleon to sign the
charge slip, which was then electronically referred to
AMEX's Amsterdam office at 9:20 a.m. The clearance
took too long and at 9:40am, Pantaleon asked the
store clerk to cancel thesale to avoid further delaying
and inconveniencing the tour group. At around
10:00a.m, 30 minutes after the tour group was
supposed to have left the store, Costerdecided to
release the items even without respondent’s approval
of the purchase. Due to the delay, however, the city
tour of Amsterdam was to be canceled due to lack
of remaining time. The spouses Pantaleon allegedly
offered their apologies but weremet by their
tourmates with stony silence and visible irritation.
Mrs. Pantaleon endedup weeping, while her husband
had to take a tranquilizer to calm his nerves. Two
more instances similar to the Castor incident
happened when they proceeded to the United States
after the trip to Europe. Again, Pantaleon experienced
delay in securing approval for purchases using his
American Express credit card when he wanted to
purchase golf equipment in the amount of
US$1,475.00 at the Richard Metz Golf Studio in New
York on October 30, 1991. Another delay occurred
when he wanted to purchase children's shoes worth
US$87.00 at the Quiency Market in Boston.
After coming back to Manila, Pantaleonsent a
letterdemanding an apology for the"inconvenience,
humiliation and embarrassment he and his family
thereby suffered"for respondent’s refusal to
provide credit authorization for the
aforementionedpurchases.
Respondentrefused to give an apology, sent a letter
stating among others that thedelay in authorizing
the purchase from Coster was attributable to
the circumstancethat the charged purchase of US
$13,826.00 "was out of the usual charge
purchasepattern established."
Dissatisfied with this explanation, Pantaleon filed an
action for damages against the credit card company
with the Makati City RTC which he won. The CA
however reversed the award of damages in favor of
Pantaleon, holding that respondenthad not breached
its obligations to petitioner for the delay was not
attended by bad faith, malice, or gross negligence.
Respondent "had exercised diligent efforts to effect
the approval" of thepurchases, which were "not in
accordance with the charge pattern" petitionerhad
established for himself.
ISSUE:Whether respondent AMEX has committed a
breach of its obligations and is liable for damages.
RULING:Yes. The popular notion that credit card
purchases are approved “within seconds,” there
really is no strict, legally determinative point of
demarcation on how long must it take for a credit
card company to approve or disapprove acustomer’s
purchase, much less one specifically contracted upon
by the parties. One hour appears to be patently
unreasonable length of time to approve or
disapprove a credit card purchase.
The culpable failure of AmEx herein is not the failure
to timely approve petitioner’s purchase, but the more
elemental failure to timely act on the same, whether
favorably or unfavorably. Even assuming that AmEx’s
credit authorizers did not have sufficient basis on
hand to make a judgment, we see no reason why it
could not have promptly informed Pantaleon the
reason for the delay, and duly advised him that
resolving the same could take some time.
The reason why Pantaleon is entitled to damages is
not simply because AmEx incurred delay, but because
the delay, for which culpability lies under Article
1170, led to the particular injuries under Article 2217
of the Civil Code for which moral damages are
remunerative. The somewhat unusual attending
circumstances to the purchase at Coster – that there
was a deadline for the completion of that purchase by
petitioner before any delay would redound to the
injury of his several traveling companions – gave rise
to the moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and social humiliation sustained by
Pantaleon, as concluded by the RTC.
31. G.R. No. L-83524 October 13, 1989
ERNESTO KRAMER, JR. and MARIA KRAMER
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TRANS-ASIA
SHIPPING LINES, INC.
GANCAYCO, J.:
FACTS:On April 8, 1976, F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat
owned by petitioners Ernest Kramer, Jr. and Marta
Kramer was navigating its way from Marinduque to
Manila. Somewhere near the Maricabon Island and
Cape Santiago, the boat figured in a collision with an
inter-island vessel (M/V Asia Philippines) owned by
Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. Due to the collision,
F/B Marjolea sank, taking along its fish catch. The
captains of both vessels filed a protest with the Board
of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard for
the purpose of determining the proximate cuase of
the maritime collision. On October 19, 1981, the
Board concluded that the collision was due to the
negligence of the employees of private respondent
(Trans-Asia). On the basis of such decision, the
Philippine Coast Guard, on April 29, 1982, suspended
M/V Asia Philippines from pursuing his profession as
a marine officer. On May 30,1985, petitioners filed a
complaint for damages in the RTC, Pasay City. Private
respondent filed a MTD on the ground of prescription
based on Art. 1146 of the Civil Code which provides,
‘An action based upon quasi-delict must be instituted
within 4 years from the day the quasi-delcit was
committed. The RTC denied the MTD on the basis of
the Board’s resolution that there was a need to rely
on highly technical aspects attendant to such
collision, hence, the prescriptive period under the
law should begin to run only from April 29, 1982, the
date when the negligence of the crew of M/V Asia
Philippines had been finally ascertained. On appeal to
the CA, the said court reversed the RTC’s decision and
granted the MTD, hence the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE:Whether a complaint for damages instituted
by the petitioners against the private respondent
arising from a marine collision is barred by the
statute of limitations.
RULING:Yes. QUASI-DELICT; CAUSE OF ACTION;
ACCRUAL THEREOF TOLLED UPON OCCURRENCE OF
THE LAST
Español vs.ELEMENT
Chairman,OF CAUSE OF
Philippine ACTION.— In
Veterans
Administration, his Court held "The right of action
accrues when there exists a cause of action, which
consists of 3 elements, namely:
a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means
and under whatever law it arises or is created;
b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect
such right; and
c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant
violative of the right of the plaintiff . . . It is only when
the last element occurs or takes place that it can be
said in law that a cause of action has arisen . . ." It is
clear that the prescriptive period must be counted
when theof
the time last
theelement occursoforantakes
commission place,
act or that is,
omission
violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time
when the cause of action arises.
TORTS AND DAMAGES; ACTION BASED UPON A
QUASI-DELICT PRESCRIBES IN FOUR (4) YEARS.—
Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based
upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4)
years. The prescriptive period begins from the day
the quasi-delict is committed. In Paulan vs. Sarabia,
this Court ruled that in an action for damages arising
from the collision of two (2) trucks, the action being
based on a quasi-delict, the four (4) year prescriptive
period must be counted from the day of the collision.
ACTION FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM COLLISION
OF TWO VESSELS; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD COUNTED
FROM DAY OF COLLISION NOT FROM THE DATE OF
DETERMINATION BY AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY.—
In this action for damages arising from the collision
of two (2) vessels the four (4) year prescriptive
period must be counted from the day of the collision.
The aggrieved party need not wait for a
determination by an administrative body like a Board
of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was caused by
the fault or negligence of the other party before he
can file an action for damages. The ruling in Vasquez
does not apply in this case. Immediately after the
collision the aggrieved party can seek relief from the
courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the
owners, agents or personnel of the other vessel. Thus,
the respondent court correctly found that the action
of petitioner has prescribed. The collision occurred
on April 8, 1976. The complaint for damages was
filed in court only on May 30, 1985, was beyond the
four (4) year prescriptive period.
#32 Bataclan v. Medina G.R. No. L-10126
FACTS:On September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the
Medina Transportation, operated by its owner
defendant Mariano
Cavite, on its way toMedina, left driven
Pasay City, the town of Amadeo,
by its regular
chauffeur, ConradoSaylon. There were about
eighteen passengers, including the driver and
conductor. While the bus was running within the
jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires
burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into
a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and
turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to
leave, others had to be helped or pulled out, while the
three passengers seated beside the driver, named
Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman
behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get
out of the overturned bus. Some of the passengers,
after they had clambered up to the road, heard
groans and moans from inside the bus, particularly,
shouts for help from Bataclan and Lara, who said
they could not get out of the bus.
After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them
carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick
on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These
men presumably approach the overturned bus, and
almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and
all but consuming the bus, including the four
passengers trapped inside it. It would appear that as
the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and
escape from the gasoline tank on the side of the
chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of
the bus and the ground under and around it, and that
the lighted torch brought by one of the men who
answered the call for help set it on fire.
By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva,
in her name and in behalf of her five minor children,
brought the present suit to recover from Mariano
Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of
P87,150. After trial, the Court of First Instance of
Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as
attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the
merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City
for sale and which was lost in the fire. The plaintiffs
and the defendants appealed the decision to the
Court of Appeals,
to SC because but
of the the involved
value latter endorsed the appeal
in the claim in the
complaint.
ISSUE:Whether or not the defendant carrier is liable
for the death of Salud Villanueva and his wife.
HELD:YES. The only question is to what degree. The
trial court was of the opinion that the proximate
cause of the death of Bataclan was not the
overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that
burned the bus, including himself and his co-
passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the
time the fire started, Bataclan, though he must have
suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still
alive, and so damages were awarded, not for his
death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him.
The Court disagree. The Court cited American
jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their
brief. It is as follows:
. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred.'
Again citing American Jurisprudence, the Court
provide the definition of proximate cause
'the proximate
and producing legaleither
the injury, causeimmediately
is that actingorfirst
by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result
of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinary prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect
at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom.
Hence, the Court modified the damages awarded by
the trial court by increasing it from ONE THOUSAND
(P1,000) PESOS TO SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS,
and from SIX HUNDRED PESOS TO EIGHT HUNDRED
(P800) PESOS, for the death of Bataclan and for the
attorney's fees.

#33 MERCURY DRUG VS BAKING, GR NO. 156037,
25 May 2007
FACTS: Sebastian M. Baking, respondent, went to the
clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical check-up. On the
following day, after undergoing an ECG, blood, and
hematology examinations and urinalysis, Dr. Sy found
that respondents blood sugar and triglyceride were
above normal levels. Dr. Sy then gave respondent two
medical prescriptions Diamicron for his blood sugar
and Benalize tablets for his triglyceride.
Respondent then proceeded to petitioner Mercury
Drug Corporation (Alabang Branch) to buy the
prescribed medicines. However, the saleslady
misread the prescription forDiamicronas a
prescription forDormicum. Thus, what was sold to
respondent was Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet.
On November 8 or on the third day he took the
medicine, respondent figured in a vehicular
accident. The car he was driving collided with the car
of one Josie Peralta.Respondent fell asleep while
driving. He could not remember anything about the
collision nor felt its impact.
Suspecting that the tablet he took may have a bearing
on his physical and mental state at the time of the
collision, respondent returned to Dr. Sys clinic. Upon
being shown the medicine, Dr. Sy was shocked to find
that what was sold to respondent was Dormicum,
instead of the prescribed Diamicron.
Thus, the respondent filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 80 of Quezon City a complaint
for damages against petitioner which was decided in
his favor.
Both the appeal and reconsideration filed by the
petitioner were dismissed by the CA. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner was negligent, and if so,
whether such negligence was the proximate cause of
respondents accident
HELD:The Court disagreed with the petitioner’s
contention that the proximate cause of the accident
was respondents negligence in driving his car.
It further proceeded to define Proximate cause, as
any cause that produces injury in a natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, such that the result would not
have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is
determined from the facts of each case, upon a
combined consideration of logic, common sense,
policy, and precedent.
Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred
had petitioners employee been careful in reading Dr.
Sys prescription. Without the potent effects of
Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that
respondent would fall asleep while driving his car,
resulting in a collision.
# 34 Pilipinas Bank v. CA G. R. No. 105410
FACTS
As payments for the purchased shoe materials and
rubber shoes, Florencio Reyes issued postdated
checks to Winner Industrial Corporation for
P20,927.00 and Vicente Tui, for P11,419.50, with due
dates on October 10 and 12, 1979, respectively.
To cover the face value of the checks, plaintiff,
requested PCIB Money Shop's manager Mike
Potenciano to effect the withdrawal of P32,000.00
from his savings account therein and have it
deposited
Bank (thenwith his Bank),
Filman currentBiñan
account with Roberto
Branch. Pilipinas
Santos was requested to make the deposit.
In depositing in the name of FLORENCIO REYES, he
inquired from the teller the current account number
of Florencio Reyes to complete the deposit slip he
was accomplishing. He was informed that it was
"815" and so this was the same current account
number he placed on the deposit slip below the
depositor's name FLORENCIO REYES.
Nothing that the account number coincided with the
name Florencio, EfrenAlagasi, then Current Account
Bookkeeper of Pilipinas Bank, thought it was for
Florencio Amador who owned the listed account
number. He, thus, posted and deposited in the latter's
account not noticing that the depositor's surname in
the deposit slip was REYES.
When the check in favor of Winner Industrial
Corporation was presented for payment, it was
dishonored and the payee was advised to try it for
next clearing, but it was again dishonored. Hence, the
payee returned the same to Florencio Reyes and
demanded a cash payment of its face value which he
did if only to save his name.
Upon verification, the bank noticed the error. The
P32,000.00 deposit posted in the account of
Florencio
the accountAmador
of Reyeswas
uponimmediately
being clearedtransferred to
by Florencio
Amador that he did not effect a deposit in the amount
of P32,000.00.
On the basis of these facts, the trial court ordered
petitioner to pay to the private respondent: (1)
P200,000.00 as compensatory damages; (2)
P100,000.00 as moral damages; (3) P25,000.00 as
attorney's fees, and (4) the costs of suit. On appeal to
the respondent court, the judgment was modified as
aforestated. In his petition, the petitioner argued that
the Court of Appeals erred in not applying the first
sentence of Article 2179, New Civil Code, in view of
its own finding
representative that respondent
committed the mistakeReyes' own
in writing
down the correct account number.
HELD: The Court finds no merit in the petition
First. For Article 21793 of the Civil Code to apply, it
must be established that private respondent's own
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause
of his injury. The concept of proximate cause is well
defined in our corpus of jurisprudence as "any cause
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
result complained of and without which would not
have occurred and from which it ought to have been
forseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of
ordinary case that the injury complained of or some
similar injury, would result therefrom as a natural
and probable consequence." In the case at bench, the
proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of
petitioner's employee in erroneously posting the cash
deposit of private respondent in the name of another
depositor who had a similar first name.
35. Far Eastern Shipping Company vs C.A.
Facts: On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying
under the flagship of the USSR, owned and operated
by the Farsake),
brevity's Eastern Shipping
arrived at theCompany (FESC from
Port of Manila for
Vancouver, British Columbia at about 7:00 o'clock in
the morning. The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the
Manila International Port, as its berthing space.
Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked by the
Philippine Port Authority to supervise the berthing of
the vessel. Appellant Senen Gavino was assigned by
the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association (MPA for
brevity's sake) to conduct docking maneuvers for the
safe berthing of the vessel to Berth No. 4.Gavino
boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and
stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the
vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing
of
andGavino by Kavankov
its cargo, the vesseloflifted
the particulars
anchor from ofthe
the vessel
quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila
International Port. The sea was calm and the wind
was ideal for docking maneuvers.When the vessel
reached the landmark (the big church by the Tondo
North Harbor) one-half mile from the pier, Gavino
ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was
already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino
ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the
orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left
anchor, with two (2) shackles, were dropped.
However, the anchor did not take hold as expected.
The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion
ensued between the crew members. A brief
conference ensued between Kavankov and the crew
members. When Gavino inquired what was all the
commotion about, Kavankov assured Gavino that
there was nothing to it.After Gavino noticed that the
anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-
astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron,
noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast.
Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not
take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern"
code. Before the right anchor and additional shackles
could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into
the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to
the pier. The vessel sustained damage too, . Kavankov
filed his sea protest . Gavino submitted his report to
the Chief Pilot who referred the report to the
Philippine Ports Authority. Abellana likewise
submitted his report of the incident Per contract and
supplemental contract of the Philippine Ports
Authority and the contractor for the rehabilitation of
the damaged pier, the same cost the Philippine Ports
Authority the amount of P1,126,132.25. The RTC
ruled in favor of Philippine Ports Authority against
Far Eastern and Capt. Gavino liable and the CA
affirmed the trial courts decision.
Issue:
Whether Capt. Gavino and Far Eastern Company's
concurrent negligence was the proximate cause thus
making them liable for damages.
Holding:
Yes,the concurrent negligence of Capt. Gavino, the
harbor pilot, and Capt. Viktor Kabankov,shipmaster of
MV Pavlodar, as the basis of their solidary liability for
damages sustained by PPA. It posits that the vessel
was being piloted by Capt. Gavino with Capt.
Kabankov beside him all the while on the bridge of
the vessel, as the former took over the helm of MV
Pavlodar when it rammed and damaged the apron of
the pier of Berth No. 4 of the Manila International
Port. Their concurrent negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of the collision between the
vessel and the pier — Capt. Gavino, for his negligence
in the conduct of docking maneuvers for the safe
berthing of the vessel; and Capt. Kabankov, for failing
to countermand the orders of the harbor pilot and to
take over and steer the vessel himself in the face of
imminent danger, as well as for merely relying on
Capt. Gavino during the berthing procedure. The
vessel to be concurrently negligent and thus share the
blame for the resulting damage as joint
tortfeasors,but only under the circumstances
obtaining in and demonstrated by the instant
petitions.It may be said, as a general rule, that
negligence in order to render a person liable need not
be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his
negligence, concurring with one or more efficient
causes other than piaintiff's, is the proximate cause of
the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine
to produce injuries, a person is not relieved from
liability because he is responsible for only one of
them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the
person charged with injury is an efficient cause
without which the injury would not have resulted to
as great an extent, and that such cause is not
attributable to the person injured. It is no defense to
one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury
would not have resulted from his negligence alone,
without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other
concurrent rortfeasor.Where several causes
producing an injury are concurrent and each is an
efficient cause without which the injury would not
have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or
any of the causes and recovery may be had against
any or all of the responsible persons although under
the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one
of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed
by them to the injured person was not the same. No
actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause
merely because it does not exceed the negligence of
other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the
entire result and is liable as though his acts were the
sole cause of the injury.There is no contribution
between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary
since both of them are liable for the total damage.
Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or
omissions of two or more persons, although acting
independently, are in combination the direct and
proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it
is impossible to determine in what proportion each
contributed to the injury and either of them is
responsible for the whole injury. Where their
concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to
a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are
solidarily liable for the resulting damage under
Article 2194 of the Civil Code.Art. 1207 of the Civil
Code provides that there is solidary liability only
when the obligation expressly so states, or when the
law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity.
Plainly, Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65,
which as an implementing rule has the force and
effect of law, can validly provide for solidary liability.
WHEREFORE, in view of all of the foregoing, the
consolidated petitions for review are DENIED and the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED Counsel for FESC, the law firm of Del
Rosario and Del Rosario, specifically its associate,
Atty. Herbert A. Tria, is REPRIMANDED and WARNED
that a repetition of the same or similar acts of
heedless disregard of its undertakings under the
Rules shall be dealt with more severely.
36. Manila Electric vs. Remoquillo, GR No. L-8328,
May 18, 1956
Facts:
Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of
Antonio Peñaloza, his stepbrother to repair a “media
agua” said to be in a leaking condition. The “media
agua” was just below the win dow of the third story.
Standing on said “media agua”, Magno received from
his son thru that window a 3’ X 6’ galvanized iron
sheet to cover the leaking portion, turned around and
in doing so the lower end of the iron sheet came into
contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric
Company strung parallel to the edge of the “media
agua” and 2 1/2 feet from it, causing his death by
electrocution. His widow and children filed suit to
recover damages from the company. After hearing,
the trial court rendered judgment in their favor. On
appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed the
judgment. The electric company has appealed said
decision to us.
Issue: Whether or not Manila Electric Company
should be held guilty for negligence
Ruling: No. We are inclined to agree to the
contention of Petitioner Company that the death of
Magno was primarily caused by his own negligence
and in some measure by the too close proximity of
the “media agua” or rather its edge to the electric
wire of the company by reason of the violation of the
srcinal permit given by the city and the subsequent
approval of said illegal construction of the “media
agua”. We fail to see how the Company could be held
guilty of negligence or as lacking in due diligence. The
Company cannot be expected to be always on the
lookout for any illegal construction which reduces
the distance between its wires and said construction,
and after finding that said distance of 3 feet had been
reduced, to change the stringing or installation of its
wires so as to preserve said distance. Of course, in the
present case, the violation of the permit for the
construction of the “media agua” was not the direct
cause of the accident. It merely contributed to it. Had
said “media agua” been only one meter wide as
allowed by the permit, Magno standing on it, would
instinctively have stayed closer to or hugged the side
of the house in order to keep a safe margin between
the edge of the “media agua” and the yawning 2-story
distance or height from the ground, and possibly if
not probably avoided the fatal contact between the
lower end of the iron sheet and the wires. It is clear
that the principal and proximate cause of the
electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a
remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent
act of Magno in turning around and swinging the
galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution,
such as looking back toward the street and at the
wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet,
considering the latter’s length of 6 feet.
DOCTRINE:
“A prior and remote cause cannot be made
the basis of an action if such remote cause did
nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise
to the occasion by which the injury was made
possible, if there intervened between such prior or
remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even
though such injury would not have happened but for
such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the independent cause,
such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets
into operation the circumstances which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.”
37. Gabeto vs. Araneta, GR No. 15674, October 17,
1921
Facts: Ilano and Gayetano took a carromata to go to a
cockpit. When the driver of the carromata had turned
his horse and started in the direction indicated,
Araneta, stepped out into the street, and laying his
hands on the reins, stopped the horse, at the same
time protesting to the driver that he himself had
called this carromata first. Pagnaya, the driver,
replied to the effect that he had not heard or seen the
call of Araneta, and that he had taken up the two
passengers then in the carromata as the first who had
offered employment. At or about the same time
Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the
horse from the control of Araneta, in order that the
vehicle might pass on. Owing, however, to the
looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or to the
rottenness of the material of which it was made, the
bit came out of the horse's mouth; and it became
necessary for the driver to get out, which he did, in
order to find the bridle. The horse was then pulled
over to near the curb, by one or the other — it makes
no difference which — and Pagnaya tried to fix the
bridle. While he was thus engaged, the horse, being
free from the control of the bit, became disturbed and
moved forward, in doing which he pulled one of the
wheels of the carromata up on the sidewalk and
pushed Pagnaya over and bumping a telephone box
which crashed. Frightened, the horse ran at full
speed. Meanwhile one of the passengers, Ilano, had
alighted while the carromata was as yet alongside the
sidewalk; but the other, Gayetano, had unfortunately
retained his seat, and after the runaway horse had
proceeded up the street to a point in front of the
Mission Hospital, the said Gayetano jumped or fell
from the rig, and in so doing received injuries from
which he soon died.
Issue: Whether or not Araneta can be held liable for
the death of Gayetano
Ruling: No. We are of the opinion that the mere fact
that the defendant interfered with the carromata by
stopping the horse in the manner stated would not
make him liable for the death of Gayetano; because it
is admitted by Julio Pagnaya that he afterwards got
out of the carromata and went to the horse's head to
fix the bridle. The evidence is furthermore convincing
to the effect that, after Pagnaya alighted, the horse
was conducted to the curb and that an appreciable
interval of time elapsed — same witnesses say
several minutes — before the horse started on his
career up the street. It is therefore evident that the
stopping of the rig by Araneta in the middle of the
street was too remote from the accident that
presently ensued to be considered the legal or
proximate cause thereof. Moreover, by getting out
and taking his post at the head of the horse, the
driver was the person primarily responsible for the
control of the animal, and the defendant cannot be
charged with liability for the accident resulting from
the action of the horse thereafter.
DOCTRINE:
“The chronology of the events may be
considered to determine the proximate cause. A
cause too remote from the accident cannot be
considered a proximate cause.”
38. Phoenix Construction vs. IAC, GR No. L-65295,
March 10, 1987
Facts: Dionisio was on his way home from a
cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss, the
general manager of a marketing corporation. During
the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken
"a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his
Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection
of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at
Bangkal, Makati, when his car headlights suddenly
failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and
thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some
2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck,
owned by and registered in the name of Phoenix
Construction Inc. was parked on the right hand side
of General Lacuna Street facing the oncoming traffic.
The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to
the street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto
the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming
traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early
warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the
dump truck, front or rear. The dump truck had earlier
that evening been driven home by Carbonel, its
regular driver, with the permission of his employer
Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out
early the following morning, Dionisio claimed that he
tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the
left but it was too late and his car smashed into the
dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio
suffered some physical injuries including some
permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and
loss of two gold bridge dentures.
Dionisio commenced an action for damages in
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga basically
claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his
injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel
had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his
employer Phoenix. Phoenix and Carbonel, on the
other hand, countered that the proximate cause of
Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in
driving fast at the time of the accident, while under
the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and
without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to
establish that it had exercised due rare in the
selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.
Issue: Whether or not the truck driver can be held
liable for the injuries sustained by Dionisio
Ruling: We agree with the Court of First Instance and
the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and
proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's
injuries was the wrongful — or negligent manner in
which the dump truck was parked in other words, the
negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was a
reasonable relationship between petitioner
Carbonel's negligence on the one hand and the
accident and respondent's injuries on the other hand,
is quite clear. Put in a slightly different manner, the
collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a
natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck
driver's negligence. We hold that Dionisio's
negligence was "only contributory," one which was
not an efficient intervening cause and that the
"immediate and proximate cause" of the injury
remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and
negligence in parking and that consequently
respondent Dionisio may recover damages though
such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts
(Article 2179, Civil Code of the Philippines).