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G.R. No.

121234, August 23, 1995 voluntarily inhibited himself from the case to avoid any suspicion considering that he was with
NBI before his appointment to the bench. The case was re-raffled again to branch 274 with Judge
Hubert Webb, petitioner Tolentino who issued new warrants of arrest against the accused, then Webb with other accused
vs Hon. Raul de Leon voluntarily surrendered to the police.

Ponente:Puno

Facts: In their petitions, the petitioners contend: (1) Judge de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their
discretion when they failed to conduct PI before issuing warrants of arrest (2) DOJ panel gravely
June 1994, NBI filed with DOJ a letter-cvomplaint charging petitioner HUbert Webb, and other abused its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape
persons with the crime of rape with homicide. Forthwith, DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors and homicide (3) DOJ denied them their constitutional right to due process during the PI (40) DOJ
headed by assistant chief state prosecutor to conduct the PI of the charged witht the rape and panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the
killing of the ViZconde in their home in Paranaque. information as an accused.

During the PI, NBI presented: (1) sworn statement of their principal witness Alfaro who allgedly Ruling: Petition without merit. (1) 24 The terms are legally synonymous and their reference is not
saw the commission of the crime. (2) sworn statements of two former housemaids of the Webb (3) to a person with training in the law such as a prosecutor or a judge but to the average man on the
sworn statement of Cristobal who allegedly that he was a passenger of United Airlines bound for street. 25 It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs
New York adn expressed doubt on whether Webb was his co-passenger in the trip (4) sworn facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our technical rules of evidence of
statement of Birrer, former live-in partner of Biong, who narrated the manner of how Biong which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense of which all
investigated and tried to cover up the crime (5) sworn statements of two Vizconde maids, security reasonable men have an abundance. Misdescription of Alfaro did not erode the credibility of Alfaro.
guard and engineer. (6) Autopsy reports of the victims showing the number of stab wounds and (2) The voluminous number of exhibits submitted by respondent Webb to support his defense of
genital examination of the victims. denial and alibi notwithstanding, the panel, after a careful and thorough evaluation of the records,
believes that they cannot outweigh the evidence submitted by the complainant. Alibi cannot
Before submitting his counter-affidavit, Webb filed with DOJ panel a motion for production and prevail over the positive identification made by a prosecution witness. Verily, alibi deserves scant
examination of evidence and documents for the NBI to produce some documents like (1) consideration in the face of positive identification especially so where the claim of alibi is supported
certification of US FBI on the admission to and stay of HUbert Webb in the US from MArch 9, mainly by friends and relatives. The receipts of the bicycle purchase and the driver's license were
1991 to October 22, 1992 (2) Laboratory report of the medico legal officer (3) sworn statement of considered weak also compared to the affirmative testimonies of the witnesses affirming that Webb
Biong (4) photographs of the fingerprints lifted from the Vizconde residence taken during is in the country. (3) In arrest cases there must be probable cause that a crime has been committed
investigation (5) investigation of NBI and that the person to be arrested committed it, which of course can exist without any showing
that evidence of the crime will be found at premises under that person's control. With respect to
The motion was granted by DOJ and the NBI submitted the photocopies of the requested
warrants of arrest, section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that "upon filing of an information, the
documents. Then Webb filed a civil case in RTC of Makati for the purpose of obtaining the original
Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. That before issuing
of said sworn statement and has succeeded to obtain the original copy. This was submitted to the
warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty of guilt of
DOJ together with his other evidence. But Webb failed to obtain the document from US FBI.
an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of
During PI, Webb denied the crime as he went to the US and was not in the Philippines when the probable cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a
crime happened. This alibi was supported by the other persons accused and the documentary probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. (4) We reject these contentions. The
evidence of Webb's purchase of bicycle in the US, the driver's liscense State of California issued for records will show that the DOJ Panel did not conduct the preliminary investigation with indecent
him and the letter of the legal attache of the US embassy confirming his arrival at San Francisco, haste. Petitioners were given fair opportunity to prove lack of probable cause against them.
California on March 9, 1991. Petitioners cannot also assail as premature the filing of the Information in court against them for
rape with homicide on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse resolution of
The other respondents submitted their sworn statement as well. the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. The filing of said Information is in accord with
Department of Justice Order No. 223, series of 1993, dated June 25, 1993. We quote its pertinent
On August 1995, DOJ Panel issued a resolution finding probable cause to hold the respondents for
sections, viz.:
trial and recommending that an information for rape with homicide be filed against petitioners and
their co-respondents, which was complied on the same date with the RTC of Paranaque. The case Sec. 4. Non-Appealable Cases; Exceptions. — No appeal may be taken from a resolution of the
was raffled to branch 258 with Judge Escano, however it was Judge de Leon, pairing judge of Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor finding probable
Judge Escano who issued the warrant of arrest against the accused. BUt later, Judge Ecano causeexcept upon showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion. Notwithstanding the
showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, no appeal shall be entertained where the 29. Jessica Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable Ombudsman, G.R. No. 212593-94; Jessica
appellant had already been arraigned. If the appellant is arraigned during the pendency of the Lucila Reyes v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines, G.R.
appeal, said appeal shall be dismissed motu propio by the Secretary of Justice. Nos.213163-78, 15 March 2016

An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause, however, shall not Topic: Procedure of appeal to the Secretary of Justice from a Resolution on Preliminary
hold the filing of the information in court. Investigation| Ponente: J. Perlas-Bernabe | Author: Adobo

Sec. 2. When to appeal. — The appeal must be filed within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt Doctrine: Once the public prosecutor (or the Ombudsman) determines probable cause and thus,
of the questioned resolution by the party or his counsel. The period shall be interrupted only by the elevates the case to the trial court (or the Sandiganbayan), a judicial determination of probable
filing of a motion for reconsideration within ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution and shall cause is made in order to determine if a warrant of arrest should be issued ordering the detention
continue to run from the time the resolution denying the motion shall have been received by the of the accused.
movant or his counsel. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court in Mendoza v. People (Mendoza) clarified that the trial court (or the Sandiganbayan) is
Without doubt then, the said DOJ Order No. 223 allows the filing of an Information in court after given three (3) distinct options upon the filing of a criminal information before it, namely to: (a)
the consummation of the preliminary investigation even if the accused can still exercise the right to dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (b) issue a
seek a review of the prosecutor's recommendation with the Secretary of Justice. warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause
Next, petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for not including Alfaro in the Information considering her
alleged conspiratorial participation in the crime of rape with homicide. The non-inclusion of Alfaro
is anchored on Republic Act

No. 6981, entitled "An Act Providing For A Witness Protection, Security And Benefit Program And
For Other Purposes" enacted on April 24, 1991. . In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to Facts: Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the
the executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our anomalous Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam, involving, as reported by
laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right whistleblowers Benhur Luy (Luy), Marina Sula (Sula), and Merlina Suñas (Suñas), the illegal
to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of utilization and pillaging of public funds sourced from the PDAF of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
discretion — the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on (Senator Enrile) for the years 2004 to 2010, in the total amount of P172,834,500.00. The charges
a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not are contained in two (2) complaints, namely: (1) a Complaint for Plunder filed by the National
constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 vesting in the Department of Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on September 16, 2013, (NBI Complaint); and (2) a Complaint for
Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be Plunder and violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 filed by the Field Investigation Office of the
granted immunity from prosecution. (5) petitioners charge the NBI with violating their right to Ombudsman (FIO) on November 18, 2013, (FIO Complaint).
discovery proceedings during their preliminary investigation by suppressing the April 28, 1995 On March 28, 2014, OMB issued a 144-joint resolution finding probable cause against petitioners 1
original copy of the sworn statement of Alfaro and the FBI Report.41 Sections 10 and 11 of Rule count of Plunder and 15 counts of violation of Ra 3019.
117 do provide an accused the right to move for a bill of particulars and for production or inspection
of material evidence in possession of the prosecution. 42 But these provisions apply after the filing On June 4, 2014, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order denying, among others, the MR filed by
of the Complaint or Information in court and the rights are accorded to the accused to assist them petitioners. This led to the filing of the 4 petitions before this Court, docketed as G.R. Nos.
to make an intelligent plea at arraignment and to prepare for trial. We hold that the finding of a 212593-94, G.R. Nos. 213540-41, G.R. Nos. 213542-43, and G.R. Nos. 213475-76, commonly
probable cause by itself subjects the suspect's life, liberty and property to real risk of loss or assailing the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution and the June 4, 2014 Joint Order of the Ombudsman
diminution. In the case at bar, the risk to the liberty of petitioners cannot be understated for they in OMB-C-C-13-0318 and OMB-C-C-13-0396.
are charged with the crime of rape with homicide, a non-bailable offense when the evidence of guilt
is strong. Consequently, a total of sixteen (16) Informations were filed by the the Ombudsman before the
Sandiganbayan, charging, Reyes, Janet Napoles, and De Asis with one (1) count of Plunder; and
Reyes, Janet Napoles, the Napoles siblings, and De Asis with fifteen (15) counts of violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, which were raffled to the Sandiganbayan's Third Division.

On July 3, 2014, resolving Criminal Case, "along with several other related cases," the
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest
against "all the accused," stating that the filing of a motion for judicial determination of probable
cause was a mere superfluity given that it was its bounden duty to personally evaluate the The Court in Mendoza v. People (Mendoza) clarified that the trial court (or the Sandiganbayan) is
resolution of the Ombudsman and the supporting evidence before it determines the existence or given three (3) distinct options upon the filing of a criminal information before it, namely to: (a)
non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused. dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (b) issue a
warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor to present additional
On September 29, 2014, the Special Third Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in evidence in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause
Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM- 0241 to 0255, finding the existence of probable cause against
them, and several others, and consequently, setting their arraignment. The Napoles siblings Verily, when a criminal Information is filed before the trial court, the judge, motu proprio or upon
urgently moved for the MR of the judicial finding of probable cause against them and requested motion of the accused, is entitled to make his own assessment of the evidence on record to
that their arraignment be held in abeyance pending the resolution of their motion. However, the determine whether there is probable cause to order the arrest of the accused and proceed with the
Napoles siblings alleged that the Sandiganbayan acted on their MR through the latter's trial; or in the absence thereof, to order the immediate dismissal of the criminal case. This is in line
Resolution dated November 14, 2014, declaring that the presence of probable cause against them with the fundamental doctrine that "once a complaint or information is filed in court, any
had already been settled in its previous resolutions. Hence, the Napoles siblings caused the filing of disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused,
the petition, docketed as G.R. Nos. 215880-94, assailing the September 29, 2014 and November rests in the sound discretion of the court."
14, 2014 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
The conclusion that the requirement to personally evaluate the report of the Ombudsman, and its
Issue/s: WON there is a grave abuse of discretion in judicially determining the existence supporting documents, was discharged by the Sandiganbayan when it explicitly declared in its
of probable cause? Resolution dated July 3, 2014 that it had "personally read and evaluated the Information, the
Joint Resolution dated March 28, 2013 and Joint Order dated June 4, 2013 of the [Ombudsman],
Held: NO. There is no grave of discretion in judicially determining the existence of together with the above-enumerated documents, including their annexes and attachments, which
probable cause. are all part of the records of the preliminary investigation x x x." A similar pronouncement was
made by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated September 29, 2014, wherein it was said that
"[a]fter further considering the records of these cases and due deliberations, the Court finds the
existence of probable cause against the said accused x x x." Later on, in a Resolution dated
November 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan affirmed its earlier findings when it held that the presence
Ruling: of probable cause against all the accused "was already unequivocally settled x x x in its
[Resolution] dated July 3, 2014 x x x." Besides, the Sandiganbayan should be accorded with
Once the public prosecutor (or the Ombudsman) determines probable cause and thus, elevates the
the presumption of regularity in the performance of its official duties. This presumption
case to the trial court (or the Sandiganbayan), a judicial determination of probable cause is made
was not convincingly overcome by either Reyes or the Napoles siblings through clear and
in order to determine if a warrant of arrest should be issued ordering the detention of the
convincing evidence, and hence, should prevail. As such, the Ombudsman's finding of probable
accused. As discussed in the case of People vs Castillo,
cause against Reyes and the Napoles siblings was judicially confirmed by the Sandiganbayan when
There are two kinds of determination of probable case: executive and judicial. The executive it examined the evidence, found probable cause, and issued warrants of arrest against them.
determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that
Hence, overall, the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion in judicially determining
properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether
the existence of probable cause against Reyes and the Napoles siblings; and in denying Reyes's
probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined
Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings. Perforce, the dismissal of G.R. Nos. 213163-78 and G.R.
by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial
Nos. 215880-94 is in order.
authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that
function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a PETITIONS ARE ALL DISMISSED.
correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court
itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.

JINGGOY ESTRADA v. OMBUDSMAN - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

The executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with whether there is enough FACTS:
evidence to support an Information being filed. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the
other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman served on Sen. Estrada two (2)
criminal complaints for plunder, among others. Eighteen (18) of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in
the two complaints filed their counter-affidavits between 9 December 2013 and 14 March 2014.
On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter- right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.” Thus, the rights of a
Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings” (the respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to those granted by procedural law.
“Request”). Sen. Estrada’s request was made “[p]ursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to examine
the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished’ (Section 3[b], A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the
of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).” Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and
should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such
The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s Request, which is not the subject of the present certiorari evidence sufficient to “engender a well-founded belief” as to the fact of the commission of a crime
case. and the respondent’s probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the
full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only
ISSUE: as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is
WON petitioner Estrada was denied due process of law probably guilty thereof. We are in accord with the state prosecutor’s findings in the case at bar that
there exists prima facie evidence of petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime, it
HELD: being sufficiently supported by the evidence presented and the facts obtaining therein.

NO. The denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional right to due process. Third, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control
over the conduct of a preliminary investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary investigation
First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies could be waived by the accused, we find no compelling justification for a strict application of the
of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. evidentiary rules.
The SC cited in its decision Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Fourth, the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is not akin to those in
as well as Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the administrative proceedings as laid down in the landmark doctrine of Ang Tibay. The quantum of
Ombudsman, for ready reference. evidence needed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is greater than the evidence needed in a
preliminary investigation to establish probable cause, or to establish the existence of a prima facie
Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents
case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay refers to “substantial evidence,” while
violates his constitutional right to due process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule
the establishment of probable cause needs “only more than ‘bare suspicion,’ or ‘less than evidence
which states that it is a compulsory requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation that
which would justify . . . conviction’.” In the United States, from where we borrowed the concept of
the Ombudsman furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Neither
probable cause, the prevailing definition of probable cause is this:
Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen. Estrada’s claim. What the Rules In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities.
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to furnish the These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents at the time reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly
the order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent. This is clear from Section 4(b), correlative to what must be proved.
Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman when it states, "[a]fter such
affidavits [of the complainant and his witnesses] have been secured, the investigating officer shall Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial
issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a
the respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x." At preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally
this point, there is still no counter-affidavit submitted by any respondent. Clearly, what Section adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. However, in administrative cases, where rights and
4(b) refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits of the co- obligations are finally adjudicated, what is required is “substantial evidence” which cannot rest
respondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the co-respondents are not part of the supporting entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence. Substantial basis is not the same as substantial
affidavits of the complainant. No grave abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to the evidence because substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence while substantial basis can
Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order which denied Sen. Estrada’s Request. include hearsay evidence. To require the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, in
preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence required in determining probable
Second, it should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the cause from evidence of likelihood or probability of guilt to substantial evidence of guilt.
determination of probable cause, and “probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and
should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial Actually, the Ombudsman went beyond legal duty and even furnished Sen. Estrada with copies of
and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents whom he specifically named, as well as the counter-
affidavits of some of other co-respondents. In the 4 June 2014 Joint Order, the Ombudsman even
held in abeyance the disposition of the motions for reconsideration because the Ombudsman Facts:
granted Sen. Estrada five days from receipt of the 7 May 2014 Joint Order to formally respond to
the claims made by his co-respondents. The Ombudsman faithfully complied with the existing On December 16, 1995, at around 9 o'clock in the evening, the victim Enrico Villanueva, Jr.
Rules on preliminary investigation and even accommodated Sen. Estrada beyond what the Rules together with his friends Burnie Fuentebella (a prosecution witness), Butsoy Arenas, Raffy Gustilo,
required. Thus, the Ombudsman could not be faulted with grave abuse of discretion. Since this is a Nonoy Martinez, and Mark Anthony Merre, were seated inside the passenger jeepney owned by the
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, the Petition fails in the absence of grave abuse of discretion accused, Nelson Lai y Bilbao, which was parked at the back of Pala-pala, Brgy. 6, comer North
on the part of the Ombudsman. Capitol Road - San Juan Streets, Bacolod City, where they were waiting for a female friend of
theirs who was supposed to arrive at 9:30 o'clock of the same evening per their agreement. While
The constitutional due process requirements mandated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are not they were waiting for their friend to arrive, the accused Nelson Lai y Bilbao suddenly approached
applicable to preliminary investigations which are creations of statutory law giving rise to mere the vehicle and ordered all the persons who were seated inside (including the deceased Enrico
statutory rights. A law can abolish preliminary investigations without running afoul of the Villanueva, Jr.) to alight therefrom. After all of them have alighted from the jeepney, the accused
constitutional requirements of due process as prescribed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. The instantaneously grabbed the victim by the latter's left arm and accused him (the deceased) of
present procedures for preliminary investigations do not comply and were never intended to having stolen the antenna of his (Lai's) vehicle. Denying that he was responsible for the theft of the
comply, with Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. Preliminary investigations do not adjudicate with antenna, the victim was able to free himself from the hold of the accused and ran away towards the
finality rights and obligations of parties, while administrative investigations governed by Ang direction of the house of Christopher Padigos located at Purok Narra Bukid North, Brgy. 8, Bacolod
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, so adjudicate. Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, requires substantial City, across the Pala-pala. Upon arriving at the house of Christopher Padigos, the victim ran all
evidence for a decision against the respondent in the administrative case.In preliminary the way to the second floor room he shared with Jemuel V. Gepaya (a prosecution witness). Finding
investigations, only likelihood or probability of guilt is required. To apply Ang Tibay, as amplified his roommate inside the room, the victim confided to the former that Nelson Lai had just accused
in GSIS, to preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence required to establish him of stealing his (Lai's) car antenna and that he (the deceased) was grabbed and hit by the
probable cause. The respondent in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in accused at the neck but that he (the victim) was able to retaliate by kicking the accused. There the
GSIS, has the right to an actual hearing and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. In victim remained until about 11 :00 o'clock of the same evening when he left the house of
preliminary investigations, the respondent has no such rights. Christopher Padigos to go to the dancehall located at nearby Purok Azucena, Barangay 6, Bacolod
City where a benefit dance was being held.
Also, in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, the hearing officer
must be impartial and cannot be the fact-finder, investigator, and hearing officer at the same time. At around 11 :00 o'clock of the same evening, both the accused and the victim were inside the
In preliminary investigations, the same public officer may be the investigator and hearing officer dancehall, the latter being seated on a bench together with his friends while the former was
at the same time, or the fact-finder, investigator and hearing officer may be under the control and dancing to the tune of the cha-cha. After dancing the accused stood immediately in front at about
supervision of the same public officer, like the Ombudsman or Secretary of Justice. This explains one and a half arms length (sic.) from where the victim was seated. Thereafter, the accused stepped
why Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, does not apply to preliminary investigations. To now declare towards where the victim was seated. As the accused was about to approach the victim, a brownout
that the guidelines in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are fundamental and essential suddenly occurred. Immediately after the lights went out, a spark was seen and a gunshot rang out
requirements in preliminary investigations will render all past and present preliminary right in front where the victim was seated. Suddenly, the victim fell down bloodied. Immediately
investigations invalid for violation of constitutional due process. This will mean remanding for thereafter, the victim was rushed to the provincial hospital by his friends led by Burnie
reinvestigation all criminal cases now pending in all courts throughout the country. No preliminary Fuentebella, a prosecution witness, for treatment. Similarly, Jemuel V. Gepaya, a cousin of the
investigation can proceed until a new law designates a public officer, outside of the prosecution victim, also followed to the hospital after hearing the news that the victim was shot.
service, to determine probable cause. Moreover, those serving sentences by final judgment would
have to be released from prison because their conviction violated constitutional due process. Inside the Emergency Room of the Provincial Hospital, while the victim lay (sic) bleeding from a
gunshot wound in the neck and awaiting medical attention, he was able to tell Burnie Fuentebella
Thus, petition dismissed for being premature and it constitutes forum shopping. and Jemuel Gepaya, both prosecution witnesses, that the accused Nelson Lai was the one who shot
him. Moreover, the victim likewise shouted the name "Nelson Lai" when he was asked by PO3
Homer Vargas who shot him. Likewise, when Enrico Villanueva, Sr., the father of the victim,
arrived at the Emergency Room and asked the victim who shot him, the latter replied that it was
"Nelson Lai".
G.R. No. 175999 July 1, 2015
Held:
NELSON LAI y BILBAO, Petitioner,
vs. In this appeal, the petitioner continues to assail the conviction, but the Court has immediately
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. noted that the right to due process of the petitioner had been denied to him by Judge Elumba, the
trial judge, by not disqualifying himself from sitting on and trying Criminal Case No. 17446 Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice
despite having participated in the trial as the public prosecutor. Thus, it is necessary for the Court Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal
to first determine if the non-disqualification of Judge Elumba prejudiced the petitioner's right to a justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a
fair and impartial trial. judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone
the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are not orchestrated
As the records indicate, Judge Elumba had been assigned on March 23, 1998 as the public plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according
prosecutor in Branch 42 of the RTC in Negros Occidental to replace the previous public to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his
prosecutor,10 but became the Presiding Judge of Branch 42 on April 27, 2000. 11 Branch 42 was the conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the
trial court hearing and ultimately deciding Criminal Case No. 17446 against the petitioner. As established facts and the pertinent law
such, Judge Elumba should have disqualified himself from having anything to do with the case
once he became the trial judge because he was compulsorily disqualified. The petitioner pointed to To be clear, that Judge Elumba's prior participation as the public prosecutor was passive, or that
the need for Judge Elumba's disqualification in his Motion for Reconsideration, 12 but the latter he entered his appearance as the public prosecutor long after the Prosecution had rested its case
ignored his concerns upon the excuse that he had appeared in Criminal Case No. 17446 only after against the petitioner did not really matter. The evil sought to be prevented by the rules on
the Prosecution had rested its case. Judge Elumba argued that he did not personally prosecute the disqualification had no relation whatsoever with the judge's degree of participation in the case
case, and that, at any rate, the petitioner should have sought his disqualification prior to the before becoming the judge. He must be reminded that the same compulsory disqualification that
rendition of the judgment of conviction.13 applied to him could similarly be demanded of the private prosecutor or the defense lawyer, if
either of them should be appointed as the trial judge hearing the case. The purpose of this stricture
On appeal, the petitioner focused the CA's attention to the denial of due process to him by the non- is to ensure that the proceedings in court that would affect the life, liberty and property of the
disqualification of Judge Elumba, but the CA upheld Judge Elumba's justifications, stating: As to petitioner as the accused should be conducted and determined by a judge who was wholly free,
the fifth assigned error, appellant claims that he was denied due process because the judge who disinterested, impartial and independent. As the Court has amplified in Garcia v. De la Pena: 22
rendered the assailed decision was also, at one time, the public prosecutor of the instant case.
First, the record of this case shows that when the judge, who was then a public prosecutor, entered The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case where, as in the instant case, the
his appearance, the prosecution had already long rested its case, more specifically, he appeared respondent judge is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity rests
therein only when the last witness for the defense was presented, not to mention the fact that it on the salutary principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free,
was a private prosecutor who cross-examined the last witness, Merlyn Rojo. Thus, it cannot be said disinterested, impartial and independent. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision
that the presiding judge personally prosecuted the instant case, nor supervised the prosecution and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his
thereof when the same was still pending. Second, settled is the rule that a petition to disqualify a integrity. The law conclusively presumes that a judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in such a
judge must be filed before rendition of judgment by the judge. Having failed to move for the case and, for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear and decide it, in the
disqualification of the judge, appellant cannot thereafter, upon a judgment unfavorable to his absence of written consent of all parties concerned. The purpose is to preserve the people's faith
cause, take a total turn about (sic.) and say that he was denied due process. 'One surely cannot and confidence in the courts of justice. 23 (Emphasis supplied) Moreover, to say that Judge Elumba
have his cake and eat it too.'14 did not personally prosecute or supervise the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 17446 is to ignore
that all criminal actions were prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.
It is not disputed that the constitutional right to due process of law cannot be denied to any That a private prosecutor had appeared in the case was of no consequence, for such private
accused. The Constitution has expressly ordained that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty prosecutor still came under the direct control and supervision of the public prosecutor. In this
or property without due process of law." 15 An essential part of the right is to be afforded a just and connection, we note that it was only on May 1, 2002, or two years after Judge Elumba's
fair trial before his conviction for any crime. Any violation of the right cannot be condoned, for the appointment in the Judiciary, when Section 5,24 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, was amended by
impartiality of the judge who sits on and hears a case, and decides it is an indispensable requisite A.M. No. 02-2-07-SC in order to expressly authorize the intervention of the private prosecutor to
of procedural due process.16 The Court has said: prosecute a criminal case in case of heavy work load or lack of the public prosecutor, provided that
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded 'the cold neutrality of an impartial judge' as the private prosecutor was authorized in writing for the purpose by the Chief of the Prosecution
the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the Office or the Regional State Prosecutor. Even so, the records do not indicate that the private
judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the prosecutor who appeared in Criminal Case No. 17446 had been duly authorized in writing by the
parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecutor to prosecute the case by himself.
sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They Under the circumstances, Judge Elumba, despite his protestations to the contrary, could not be
must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of expected to render impartial, independent and objective judgment on the criminal case of the
fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no petitioner. His non-disqualification resulted in the denial of the petitioner's right to due process as
point in invoking his action for the justice they expect. the accused. To restore the right to the petitioner, the proceedings held against him before Judge
Elumba and his ensuing conviction have to be nullified and set aside, and Criminal Case No. 17446 Purportedly on the basis of the administrative complaint filed against Awayan and
should be remanded to the R TC for a partial new trial to remove any of the prejudicial Rodriguez, Judge Blancaflor summoned several witnesses including Tulali and heard their
consequences of the violation of the right to due process. The case shall be raffled to a Judge who is testimonies. On July 30, 2009, he issued an order summoning Rodriguez to appear before him for
not otherwise disqualified like Judge Elumba under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. For, the purpose of holding an inquiry on matters pertaining to his possible involvement in Tulali’s
as we said in Pimentel v. Salanga:30 filing of the ex-parte manifestation and the administrative complaint against Awayan, among
others.
This is not to say that all avenues of relief are closed to a party properly aggrieved. If a litigant is
denied a fair and impartial trial, induced by the judge's bias or prejudice, we will not hesitate to On August 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed his Motion for Clarification as to the purpose of Judge
order a new trial, if necessary, in the interest of justice. Such was the view taken by this Court in Blancaflor’s continued inquiries considering that the decision in the arson case had already been
Dais vs. Torres, 57 Phil. 897, 902-904. In that case, we found that the filing of charges by a party promulgated.
against a judge generated 'resentment' or the judge's part that led to his "bias or prejudice, which
is reflected in the decision." We there discoursed on the 'principle of impartiality, disinterestedness, After the submission of petitioners’ respective position papers, Judge Blancaflor issued the
and fairness on the part of the judge' which 'is as old as the history of courts.' We followed this with assailed October 13, 2009 Decision finding petitioners guilty of direct contempt. The penalty of
the pronouncement that, upon the circumstances obtaining, we did not feel assured that the trial indefinite suspension from the practice of law and a fine of P100,000.00 each were imposed upon
judge's finding were not influenced by bias or prejudice. Accordingly, we set them.

aside the judgment and directed a new trial.31

WHEREFORE, the Court ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on May 27, 2005 Petitioners argue that the contempt proceedings are null and void for contravening their
by the Court of Appeals and the judgment rendered on August 22, 2001 by the Regional Trial rights to due process of law. They claim that they were denied their rights to be informed of the
Court; REMANDS Criminal Case No. 17446 entitled People of the Philippines v. Nelson Lai y nature and cause of the accusation against them, to confront the witnesses and present their own
Bilbao to the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City with instructions to the Executive Judge of the evidence. According to petitioners, Judge Blancaflor’s disregard of due process constituted grave
Regional Trial Court to assign it to any Regional Trial Judge not disqualified under Section 1 of abuse of discretion which was further aggravated by the unlawful manner of simultaneously
Rule 137 of the Rules of Court; and INSTRUCTS the new trial judge to resume the trial in conducting suspension and contempt proceedings against them
Criminal Case No. 17446 starting from the stage just prior to the assumption of Judge Fernando R. Issue: Whether or not Judge Blancaflor did not observe due process in conducting the suspension
Elumba as the trial judge, and to hear and decide Criminal Case No. 17446 with reasonable and contempt proceedings against Rodriguez and Tulali.
dispatch.
Ruling: Yes, Judge Blancaflor did not observe due process in conducting the suspension and
contempt proceedings against Rodriguez and Tulali. It must be emphasized that direct contempt is
Rodriguez vs. Judge Blancaflor, GR No. 190171 adjudged and punished summarily pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules. Hence, hearings
and opportunity to confront witnesses are absolutely unnecessary
March 14, 2011
In the same vein, the petitioners’ alleged "vilification campaign" against Judge Blancaflor
Ponente: Mendoza, J.: cannot be regarded as direct contempt. At most, it may constitute indirect contempt, as correctly
concluded by the OSG. For indirect contempt citation to prosper, however, the requirements under
Facts: Previously pending before Judge Blancaflor was Criminal Case No. 22240 for arson (arson Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules must be satisfied, to wit:
case), entitled People of the Philippines v. Teksan Ami, in which Tulali was the trial prosecutor.
During the pendency of the case, Tulali was implicated in a controversy involving an alleged Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in
bribery initiated by Randy Awayan (Awayan), the driver assigned to Judge Blancaflor under the writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within
payroll of the Office of the Governor of Palawan, and one Ernesto Fernandez (Fernandez), to assure such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a
the acquittal of the accused, Rolly Ami (Ami), and the dismissal of the arson case. person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

On June 29, 2009, a day before the scheduled promulgation of the decision in the arson xxx
case, Tulali filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation withdrawing his appearance in the said case to
prevent any suspicion of misdemeanor and collusion. He attached to the said manifestation a copy (d) any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
of the administrative complaint against Awayan filed (but eventually withdrawn) by his superior, the administration of justice;
Rodriguez, before the Office of the Governor of Palawan. On June 30, 2009, Judge Blancaflor x x x.
rendered his decision acquitting Ami of the crime of arson.
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. — Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated HELD: The SC ruled that Consulta’s claim of being misrepresented cannot be given due course. He
motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other was assisted by two lawyers during the proceeding. In the earlier part, he was assisted by one Atty.
formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be Jocelyn Reyes who seemed not to be a lawyer. Granting that she indeed is not a lawyer, her
punished for contempt. withdrawal from the case in the earlier part of the case has cured the defect as he was
subsequently assisted by a lawyer coming from the PAO.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition
with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved
therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings
for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a Hermogenes Mortera vs Court of Industrial Relations
principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said 79 Phil. 345 – Labor Law – Labor Relations – Picketing – Illegal Picketing – Splitting of Unions
petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion Political Law – Constitutional Law – Freedom of Speech – Picketing
orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing
and decision. In December 1946, the Bisig ng Canlubang Union (BCU) demanded from the Canlubang Sugar
Estate (CSE) the salary increase of its employees and other benefits. CSE refused and so BCU
In the present case, Judge Blancaflor failed to observe the elementary procedure which staged a strike. A case was filed and ion February 1947, the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR)
requires written charge and due hearing. There was no order issued to petitioners. Neither was ordered the striking union to return to work and that any employee who shall fail to return to their
there any written or formal charge filed against them. In fact, Rodriguez only learned of the post shall be substituted by CSE with a new employee. The CIR also prohibited any form of
contempt proceedings upon his receipt of the July 30, 2009 Order, requiring him to appear before picketing while the case is pending. CSE was ordered to accept the returning employees and to
the Court in order to clarify certain matters contained in the said order. Tulali, on the other hand, maintain status quo. Both parties complied.
only learned of the proceedings when he was ordered to submit his compliance to explain how he
came in possession of the administrative complaint against Awayan. But during the pendency of the case, a new labor union, the Canlubang Worker’s Union
(abbreviated in the case as “CLO”) was formed headed by Hermogenes Mortera. This new union
In the case at bench, there was also no prior and separate notice issued to petitioners then conducted a strike against CSE. CSE sought the stoppage of the CLO strike but the CLO
setting forth the facts constituting the misconduct and requiring them, within a specified period averred that the CIR order does not cover them because the CLO was not a party to the case
from receipt thereof, to show cause why they should not be suspended from the practice of their pending before the CIR.
profession. Neither were they given full opportunity to defend themselves, to produce evidence on
their behalf and to be heard by themselves and counsel. Undoubtedly, the suspension proceedings ISSUE: Whether or not the CLO is covered by the order of the CIR to not hold any strike during
against petitioners are null and void, having violated their right to due process. the pendency of the case.

Likewise, Judge Blancaflor’s suspension order is also void as the basis for suspension is HELD: Yes. The CLO is covered by the order. The members of the CLO were the same members
not one of the causes that will warrant disciplinary action. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules comprising the BCU. They were the same BCU members who are party to the case pending with
enumerates the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar from his office as the CIR. When they seceded from BCU to form another, they remained to be workers of the
attorney, to wit: (1) deceit, (2) malpractice, (3) gross misconduct in office, (4) grossly immoral Canlubang Sugar Estate. To allow CLO’s stand would be giving approval to a scheme by which a
conduct, (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, (6) violation of the lawyer's oath, (7) workers’ union, in case of an adverse decision of the CIR or any labor court, may always make a
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, and for (8) willfully appearing as an mockery of orders and decisions of said court simply by forming a new union. Therefore, the CLO
attorney for a party without authority to do so. Judge Blancaflor failed to show that the suspension must comply with the CIR order.
was for any of the foregoing grounds.
The Supreme Court however clarified that the order of the CIR prohibiting any form of picketing
must be understood to prohibit only illegal picketing. Peaceful picketing cannot be prohibited. It is
part of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution.
Pedro Consulta vs People of the Philippines

Due Process
G.R. No. 211703 December 10, 2014
Consulta is charged for stealing a gold necklace worth 3.5k owned by a certain Silvestre. He was
convicted by the lower court. Consulta raised before the CA the issue that he was not properly EDELBERT C. UYBOCO, Petitioner,
arraigned and that he was represented by a non lawyer. vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not Consulta was denied of due process.
Facts: "general or implied authority" is regarded as an act of the client. While the application of this
general rule certainly depends upon the surrounding circumstances of a given case, there are
Petitioner asserts that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the existence of a conspiracy and in exceptions recognized by this Court: "(1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the
convicting him in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt of such conspiracy. More client of due process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the
importantly, petitioner finds fault in the Sandiganbayan's denial of his Motion to Reconsider the client’s liberty or property;or (3) where the interests of justice so require."
Decision of this Honorable Court (Promulgated on January 9, 2014) with a Plea to Re-Open the
Proceedings dated January 22, 2014. In his motion, petitioner prayed for the reopening of the The present case does not fall under the said exceptions. In Amil v. Court of Appeals, the Court
proceedings on the ground that his constitutional rights to due process and to competent counsel held that "to fall within the exceptional circumstance relied upon x x x, it mustbe shown that the
were violated when his former counsel, due to blatant error, abuse of discretion, and gross negligence of counsel must be so gross that the client is deprived of his day in court. Thus, where a
incompetence, did not present any evidence in his defense, causing serious prejudice to him. party was given the opportunity to defend its interests in due course, it cannot be said to have been
denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process." To
According to petitioner, he was "accorded grossly insufficient legal assistance by his former lawyer" properly claim gross negligence on the part of the counsel, the petitioner must show that the
who informed him that "there was no necessity for a preliminary investigation and to present any counsel was guilty of nothing short of a clear abandonment of the client’s cause. 17
evidence." His former counsel also "failed to cross examine the main prosecution witness because
said counsel was inexplicably absent on the trial date" and even "failed to prepare and file a In the present case, the Sandiganbayan correctly denied petitioner’s motion to re-open the
memorandum" and "merely relied on the defense presented by the lawyers of co-accused Valencia proceedings on the ground of violation of his due process, to wit:
and Maramot by adopting the defenses of the other accused and all their pleadings and
manifestations, even when these were clearly not applicable to petitioner’s defense." Thus, In the same vein, accused-movant Uyboco’s clear admission that "he had been given the
petitioner avers that his constitutional rights to procedural and substantive due process and of law opportunity to present his evidence" and despite said opportunity, he and his counsel decided/opted
and to competent counsel were violated. not to present any evidence for his defense, as shown by their written Manifestatio ndated
November 20, 2012, that "after earnest assessment and evaluation, the accused EDELBERT C.
Held: UYBOCO has deemed it unnecessary to present further evidence in his defense, thus he is waiving
his right to present further testimonial and documentary evidence," militates against his claim of
We find that the petition has no merit. miscarriage of justice, and hence, his motion to reopen proceedings must likewise fail. Accused-
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that petitions for review on certiorari shall raise movant Uyboco cannot attribute any serious misjudgment or fault or gross incompetence on his
only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the counsel aloneas the decision not to present further evidence in his defense bears his conformity as
Rules of Court should cover only questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable. A question shown by his signature in the said manifestation.18
of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A question of fact The Office of the Special Prosecutor correctly pointed out that petitioner was given an opportunity
exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. tobe heard during trial.1âwphi1 This opportunity to be heard is the essence of due process. While
Even if the foregoing rules were tobe relaxed in the interest of substantial justice, this Court petitioner claims that he was incorrectly advised by his former counsel that the presentation of
nevertheless finds no reason to disagree with the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan. A evidence is no longer necessary, this unfortunate mistake cannot qualify as gross negligence or
meticulous scrutiny of the records of the case persuades Us to conclude that the Sandiganbayan did incompetence that would necessitate a reopening of the proceedings. In fact, not once did petitioner
not err in its finding that petitioner is guilty of the crime charged. The evidence on record amply refute, or at the very least, address the Sandiganbayan’s finding that he had expressly consented to
supports the findings and conclusions of the Sandiganbayan and petitioner has shown no cause for the waiver of the presentation of evidence by affixing his signature as conformity to the
this Court to apply any of the foregoing exceptions. manifestation submitted by his former counsel.

As to petitioner’s claim that his right to due process was denied due to his former counsel’s error, Petitioner also erroneously claims that his former counsel "failed to prepare and file a
abuse of discretion or gross incompetence, We find no merit in this claim. Time and again, this memorandum for him" since the records show that petitioner’s former counsel had belatedly filed a
Court has ruled that a client is bound by his counsel’s conduct, negligence and mistake in handling memorandum on his behalf, which the Sandiganbayan had admitted in the interest of justice.
a case,13 and to allow a client to disownhis counsel’s conduct would render proceedings indefinite, Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in
tentative, and subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. 14 While this rule finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
has recognized exceptions,15 We find that there is no reason for this Court to deviate from the 3019.
findings of the Sandiganbayan. We held in Gotesco Properties, Inc. v. Moral: 16 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 9, 2014 and Resolution dated
The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of March 14, 2014 issued by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24461 are hereby AFFIRMED.
procedural technique. The basis is the tenet that an act performed by counsel withinthe scope of a SO ORDERED.
would be led to entertain doubts on the person’s character thereby affecting that person’s
reputation.
ALEJANDRO C. ALMENDRAS, JR. -versus- ALEXIS C. ALMENDRAS
3. A written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is
Facts: published and circulated among the public. His intention is clearly stated on the letter,
Alejandro C. Almendras sent letters to House Speaker Jose De Venecia, Jr. and Dr. Nemesio when he requested the assistance of the office of the recipient to circulate the information
Prudente, President of Oil Carriers, Inc. These letters were allegedly printed, distributed, to concerned officials and secretariat employees of the House of the Representatives. The
circulated and published by Alejandro Almendras, Jr. in Davao Del Sur and Quezon City, with publication brought discredit and shame to respondent’s reputation.
evident bad faith and manifest malice to destroy Alexis C. Almendras’ good name. Hence, the latter 4. Considering that the respondent sufficiently justified his claim for damages, he is entitled
filed an action for damages arising from libel and defamation againts petitioner in RTC, Digos to moral and exemplary damages. The award on attorney’s fees and litigation expenses are
City. not proper because the respondent failed to justify satisfactorily his claim.
RTC granted the complaint, awarding Alexis P5M as moral damages, P100T as exemplary
damages, P10T for litigation expenses and attorney’s fees in the amount of 25% of whatever
amounts actually received by plaintff for this judgment. After the denial of Motion for Office of the Court Administrator v. Pascual
Reconsideration and/or new trial, the case was elevated to CA.
259 SCRA 604
CA affirmed the decision of RTC.
Facts: Sometime in February, 1993, a certain Ceferino Tigas wrote a letter, addressed to Hon.
Issues: Reynaldo Suarez of the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court, charging that
irregularities and corruption were being committed by the respondent Presiding Judge of the
1. Whether or not petitioner was deprived due process. Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan.
2. Whether or not the letters are libelous in nature. On March 10, 1993, the letter was referred to the National Bureau of Investigation in order that an
3. Whether of not the letters fall within the purview of privileged communication; and investigation on the alleged illegal and corrupt practices of the respondent may be conducted.
Ordered to conduct a “discreet investigation” by the then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco were: SA
4. Whether or not respondent is entitled to moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees Edward Villarta, team leader, SI Reynaldo Olazo, HA Teofilo Galang, SI Florino Javier and SI Jose
and litigation expenses. Icasiano. They proceeded to Angat, Bulacan, in order to look for Ceferino Tigas, the letter writer.
Tigas, the NBI team realized was a fictitious character. In view of their failure to find Tigas, they
Ruling: proceeded to the residence of Candido Cruz, an accused in respondent’s sala.
1. Petitioner was given several opportunities to present his evidence or to clarify his medical In his affidavit executed on March 23, 1993 before SA Edward Villarta, Cruz declared that he was
constraints in court, but he did not do so, despite knowing fully well that he had a pending the accused in Criminal Case No. 2154, charged with the crime of Frustrated Murder. Respondent
case in court. In keeping the normal course of events, he should have taken the initiative judge, after conducting the preliminary investigation of the case, decided that the crime he
“of making the proper inquiries from his counsel and the trial court as to the status of his committed was only physical injuries and so, respondent judge assumed jurisdiction over the case.
case.” For his failure to do so, he has only himself to blame. The Court cannot allow Cruz believed that he was made to understand by the respondent that, in view of his favorable
petitioner the exception to the general rule just because his counsel admitted having no action, Cruz was to give to respondent the sum of P2,000.00. Respondent judge is believed to be a
knowledge of his medical condition. To do so will sit a dangerous precedent of never ending drunkard and, in all probability, would need money to serve his vice.
suits, so long as lawyers could allege their own fault or negligence to support the client’s
case and obtain remedies and reliefs already lost by the operation of law. In view of this statement, the NBI agents assigned to the case caused respondent judge to be
entrapped, for which reason, the judge was thought to have been caught in flagrante delicto. NBI
2. For imputation to be libelous under Art. 353 of the Revised Penal Code, the following agents Villarta and Olazo filed the following report:
requisites must be present: a) it must be defamatory; b)it must be malicious; c) it must be
given publicity; and d) the victim must be identifiable. Consequently, under Art. 354,
every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if true, if no good intention
and justifiable motive is shown. In the instant case, the letters tag respondent as a “On 25 March 1993, at about 4:00 in the afternoon, CANDIDO CRUZ met with Judge PASCUAL at
“reknown black mailer” a vengeful family member who filed cases againts his mother and the Colegio de Sta. Monica, near the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan, where Subject is
siblings, and with nefarious designs. Even impartial mind reading these descriptions attending the graduation of his daughter. CANDIDO CRUZ told Judge PASCUAL that he already
had the P2,000.00 which he (Judge PASCUAL) is asking him. However, Judge PASCUAL did not righteous case, did not come out in the open and instead wrote an anonymous letter. The letter-
receive the money because according to him there were plenty of people around. He then writer, naming himself as Ceferino Tigas, did not specify crimes committed or illegal acts
instructed CANDIDO CRUZ to see him (Judge PASCUAL) at his office the following day. perpetrated but charged respondent with anomalies in general terms. Respondent judge could not
have been expected to make a valid answer or to otherwise defend himself from such vague
At about 8:30 in the morning of the following day (26 March 1993), CANDIDO CRUZ proceeded to accusations.
the office of Judge PASCUAL at the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, and thereat handed
to him four (4) pieces of P500.00 bills contained in a white mailing envelope previously marked and While then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco, upon being apprised of the Tigas letter, ordered the
glazed with fluorescent powder. NBI investigating team to make a “discreet investigation” of respondent, the NBI team had instead
caused an instigation or the entrapment of respondent judge. Not having found letter-writer Tigas
In the meantime, the Undersigned stayed outside the court room and after about 15 minutes, and concluding that no such person exists, they sought out an accused before respondent’s court
CANDIDO CRUZ came out of the room and signaled to the Undersigned that Judge PASCUAL had who could possibly be respondent judge’s virtual victim. Approached by the NBI team was Candido
already received the marked money. The Undersigned immediately entered the room and Cruz, a person who had been brought before the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, for
informed Subject about the entrapment. Subject denied having received anything from CANDIDO preliminary investigation on the charge of Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge gave judgment to
CRUZ, but after a thorough search, the marked money was found inserted between the pages of a the effect that the crime committed by Candido Cruz was that of physical injuries merely. He
blue book on top of his table. declared then that he had original jurisdiction to try the case.
Subject was invited to the Office of the NBI-NCR, Manila wherein he was subjected to ultra violet But, respondent’s action in this regard was perpetrated some time before Candido Cruz was
light examination. After finding Subject’s right hand for the presence of fluorescent powder, he “persuaded to participate in what they (the NBI agents) called ‘entrapment operation.’” The
was booked, photographed and fingerprinted in accordance with our Standard Operating Procedure opportune time to bribe the respondent should have been before he acted in reducing Cruz’
(S.O.P.). criminal liability from Frustrated Murder to Physical Injuries. No bribe was asked then. It was
On even date, the results of our investigation together with the person of Judge FILOMENO unlikely that respondent would ask for it on the date of the entrapment on March 26, 1993, the
PASCUAL was referred to the Inquest Prosecutor of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, favorable verdict having been rendered already.
Ombudsman, with the recommendation that he be charged and prosecuted for Bribery as defined It is significant to note that NBI Agent Olazo admitted[8] that, despite the fact that he “scoured”
and penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines.” the table of the respondent in search of the envelope, with marked money in it, no envelope was
Issue: Whether or not the evidences presented against Judge Filomeno Pascual were strong found and so he had to call Candido Cruz who was already outside so that Cruz can locate the
enough to convict him. envelope.

Held: We find that the evidence on record does not warrant conviction. We note that the only In view of these antecedents, we find reason to favorably consider the allegations of respondent
bases for the Report and Recommendation submitted by Executive Judge Natividad G. Dizon judge in his defense that, at around 9:30 o’clock in the morning of March 26, 1993, Candido Cruz,
consist of: The Complaint, the Answer, the Memorandum of the respondent, and the transcript of along with the NBI agents, went to the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan. Candido Cruz,
stenographic notes of the hearing of the bribery case of respondent judge at the Sandiganbayan. alone, went inside respondent judge’s chambers, located thereat, and placed before respondent
The respondent was, therefore, not afforded the right to open trial wherein respondent can confront judge an envelope containing marked money. Respondent judge thought that what was placed
the witnesses against him and present evidence in his defense. before him was a pleading for filing and so, he told Candido Cruz to file it with the Office of the
Clerk of Court, that is, in a room adjacent to his chambers. Candido Cruz replied that it was the
This lapse in due process is unfortunate. The Rules, even in an administrative cases, demand that, money the judge was asking for. Upon hearing this reply, respondent judge suddenly erupted in
if the respondent judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the anger. He grabbed the envelope on the desk and hurled it at Candido Cruz. The envelope fell on
evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from direct knowledge. The the floor. Respondent judge then picked it up and inserted it inside the pocket of Cruz’ polo shirt
Judiciary to which respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its members could be and drove him out of his chambers. NBI Agents Villarta and Olazo immediately entered the door
faulted, it should be only after due investigation and after presentation of competent evidence, of the judge’s chambers, introduced themselves, and told respondent judge that the money that
especially since the charge is penal in character.[7] The above-quoted Report and Recommendation Cruz gave him was marked. Respondent judge told them that he did not receive or accept money
of the investigating judge had fallen short of the requirements of due process. from Candido Cruz. After respondent judge said this, the NBI Agents nevertheless proceeded to
search the room, examined tables, drawers, and every nook and cranny of respondent’s chambers,
The evidence aforesaid admits of irreconcilable inconsistencies in the testimonies of principal and the pockets of the pants of respondent judge. Even after rigid search of the chambers of
witness, Candido Cruz, and NBI Agent SI Reynaldo Olazo on several material points. respondent, the NBI Agents failed to find the envelope containing marked money allegedly given
by Candido Cruz to respondent judge.
It will be remembered that the charge was intimated by someone who must have had an ax to
grind against the respondent judge but who, by reason of cowardice or lack of evidence to put up a
join the ranks of professionals who would uphold truth at all costs so that justice may prevail.
Nadal has sufficiently proven to have violated his undertaking to divulge all information needed
Summary Dismissal Board vs Torcita GR 130442 06 April 2000 when he applied for the benefits of the STFAP. Unlike in criminal cases which require proof
Facts: Major Lazaro Torcita was offduty , coming from a party was driving and was overtaken by beyond reasonable doubt as basis for a judgment, in administrative or quasi-judiciall proceedings,
Mazda pick-up w/ afterwards pick up speed. Upon entering the compound of HDA Aimee , Torcita only substantial evidence is required, that which means a reasonable mind might accept a relevant
was denied entry. They complained that Torcita confronted them and that he was yelling and evidence as adequate to support a conclusion.
hurling incentives. They filed 12 complaints against him and was consolidated for “conduct
unbecoming of a police officer.” The board dismissed the complaint but found him guilty of simple
irregularity, suspending him for 20 days for being having alcoholic drink during the incident. Domingo v. Scheer
Torcita appealed and RTC / CA reversed the dispositive portion. Petitioner contend that “Conduct
Unbecoming of a Police Officer” is broad enough to include any act of an officer which tends to GR No. 154745
bring dishonor and disgrace to the PNP organization. January 29, 2004
Issue: Whether or not conviction is null on the ground of lack of procedural due process of law? Article 3
Decision: CA decision affirmed, dispositive portion of SDB decision annulled. It is glaringly FACTS:
apparent from a reading of the titles of the twelve administrative cases filed against C/Insp.
Torcita, earlier quoted, that none of the charges or offenses mentioned or made reference to the This is a petition for review under Rule 45, of the decision of the Court of Appeals granting the
specific act of being drunk while in the performance of official duty. The omission is fatal to the respondent’s petition for certiorari and prohibition annulling the order of arrest issued by
validity of the judgment finding him guilty of the offense for which he was not notified nor charged. petitioner, and permanently enjoining her from deporting the respondent from the Philippines. The
It is a requirement of due process that the parties be informed of how the litigation was decided appellate court reversed the Summary Deportation Order of the Board of Commissioners.
with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the Court
Respondent Scheer is a native of Germany, who was eventually granted a permanent
resident status in the Philippines. He eventually married here and started a family as well as a
business in Palawan. Vice Consul Hippelein informed the Philippine Ambassador to Germany that
UP BOARD OF REGENTS VS TELAN the respondent had police records and financial liabilities in Germany. The DFA receive from the
FACTS: THE UP Board of Regents imposed on Nadal the penalties of suspension for one year, non- German Embassy in Manila that the respondent is wanted in Germany, and requested to turn over
issuance of any certificate of good moral character during the suspension and/or as long as Nadal his German passport to the Embassy. Thereafter BOC issued a Summary Deportation Order dated
has not reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had received with 12% interest per annum and non September 27, 1997. It was stated that the deportation shall be held in abeyance pending
issuance of his transcript of records until he has settled his financial obligations with the respondent’s case and he shall remain in the custody of the bureau. In issuing this the BOC relied
university. The disciplinary action is meted after finally rendering a guilty verdict on Nadal’s on the statements of the German Vice Consul on the speculation that it is improbable that the
alleged willfull withholding of the following information in his application for scholarship respondent will be issued a new passport, the warrant of arrest for insurance fraud and alleged
tantamount to acts of dishonesty, viz: (1) that he has and maintains a car and (2) the income of his illegal activities in Palawan. Respondent nevertheless stayed in the Philippines after airing his
mother in the USA in support of the studies of his brothers. Nadal complained that he was not side to then BID Commissioner Verceles, the latter giving him time to apply for a clearance and a
afforded due process when, after the Board Meeting on his case on March 28, 1993 that resulted in new passport. Scheer eventually filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration stating that his right
a decision of “NOT GUILTY” in his favor, the Chairman of the UP Board of Regents, without notice to due process was violated, for there was no notice or chance to be heard before the issuance of the
to the petitioner, called another meeting the following day to deliberate on the Chairman’s Motion deportation order. Eventually the criminal case for physical injuries against the respondent was
for Reconsideration, which this time resulted in a decision of “GUILTY.” Upon petition, Nadal was dismissed, and he was issued a passport. He informed Commissioner Verceles about this matter
granted his action for mandamus with preliminary injunction. and reiterated the cancellation of the order, but the Commissioner did not respond. Thereafter
Commissioner Domingo assumed office and on June 6, 2002, she ordered the apprehension of the
ISSUE: WON Nadal was denied due process. respondent who was held in custody awaiting deportation. Shocked, respondent sought remedy
HELD: No. It is gross error to equate due process in the instant case with the sending of notice of with the CA, during the hearing of which the Solicitor General suggested that the respondent leave
the March 29, 1993 BOR meeting. University rules do not require the attendance in BOR meetings the country first then just re-apply. A decision was reached in favor of Scheer, permanently
of individuals whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board. At no time did enjoining Domingo from continuing the deportation, thus this petition.
respondent complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any of the regular and special BOR
meetings where his case was up for deliberation. Let it not be forgotten that respondent aspires to ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not the BOC was an indispensable party to the case. Globe Telecom, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission [G.R. No.143964. July
26, 2004]
2. Whether or not respondent’s arrest and detention was premature, unwarranted and
arbitrary. FACTS

HELD: Private respondent Smart Communications, Inc (Smart) filed with the NTC a Complaint to effect
the interconnection of their SMS or texting services with petitioner Globe Telecom, Inc. (Globe).
1. Yes – but not enough to invalidate the petition. Globe pointed out procedural defects in Smarts complaints and moved to dismiss the case. I
Petitioner argues that the respondent must have impleaded BOC as the respondent, and not also pointed out that another network, Islacom, was allowed to provide such service without prior
Commissioner Domingo alone. The Summary Deportation Order was issued by the BOC as a whole NTC approval. The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) ruled that both Smart and
and Domingo is just but one Commissioner so the petitioner argues that the action may be Globe were “equally blameworthy” and issued an Order penalizing both on the ground of providing
dismissed. The court ruled that it agrees with the petitioner that the BOC was an indispensable SMS under Value Added Services (VAS) without prior approval from the NTC. The Court of
party to the respondent’s petition in the CA. However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is Appeals sustained the NTC Order.
not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be added as ordered by the court and if the ISSUES
petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party, then the petition may be dismissed. In the
case at bar, CA did not require to implead BOC as the respondent so it does not warrant the Whether or not:
dismissal of respondent’s petition. The court may choose to amend the processes and the pleadings
by substituting as party-plaintiff the real party-interest, but the court also has the power to avoid (1) Globe may be required to secure prior NTC approval before providing SMS or texting services;
delay in the disposition of cases and it may just be unnecessary to still choose to implead BOC. The (2) SMS is a VAS under Public telecommunications Act (PTA) of 1995;
OSG has already represented the petitioner in instant proceedings thus the BOC cannot claim that
it was not afforded the opportunity to be in court. Proceedings may be to facilitate justice but they RULING
do not constitute the thing itself and they may be relaxed in certain cases.
(1) NO. The NTC may not legally require Globe to secure its approval for Globe to continue
2. Yes. providing SMS. This does not imply though that NTC lacks authority to regulate SMS or to classify
it as VAS. However, the move should be implemented properly, through unequivocal regulations
The Court ruled that BOC committed grave abuse of discretion in causing the arrest and detention applicable to all entities that are similarly situated, and in an even-handed manner. This should
of the respondent. Aliens may be deported from the Philippines only on grounds and in the proper not be interpreted, however, as removing SMS from the ambit of jurisdiction and review by the
manner provided by the Constitution. The United Nations Declaration on Human Rights grants NTC. The NTC will continue to exercise, by way of its broad grant, jurisdiction over Globe and
every person rights, and that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile. BOC Smart’s SMS offerings, including questions of rates and customer complaints. Yet caution must be
ordered respondent’s deportation without even conducting summary deportation proceedings, but had. Much complication could have been avoided had the NTC adopted a proactive position,
merely relied on the speculation of the German Embassy and the Vice Consul that it is improbable promulgating the necessary rules and regulations to cope up with the advent of the technologies it
that the respondent will be issued a new passport, warranting the deportation. The respondent superintends. With the persistent advent of new offerings in the telecommunications industry, the
was not afforded any hearing at all, and not given the opportunity to put up a defense for himself, NTC’s role will become more crucial than at any time before.
thus violating his right to due process. A deportation proceeding may not be a criminal action, but
since it affects the liberty of a person, the right to due process of a respondent must be respected. (2) NO. There is no legal basis under the PTA or the memorandum circulars promulgated by the
Even six years after the motion for reconsideration of the respondent which was still not attended NTC to denominate SMS as VAS, and any subsequent determination by the NTC on whether SMS
to, out of nowhere and arbitrarily the agents were ordered to arrest him. Even after being issued a is VAS should be made with proper regard for due process and in conformity with the PTA. The
new passport and even securing clearances from the PNP and NPA, the BOC still proceeded with Court realizes that the PTA is not intended to constrain the industry within a cumbersome
the deportation. BOC is required to resolve the motion of the respondent first, giving him the regulatory regime. The policy as pre-ordained by legislative fiat renders the traditionally
chance to be heard and present his evidence. The petitioner put up the defense that they cannot regimented business in an elementary free state to make business decisions, avowing that it is
review cases decided before the change of members, but since it is the same government entity, under this atmosphere that the industry would prosper. It is disappointing at least if the
they have the authority to review past cases. In addition, the court finds the contention of the OSG deregulation thrust of the law is skirted deliberately. But it is ignominious if the spirit is defeated
for the respondent to leave the country then just re-apply again ridiculous when there is no legal through a crazy quilt of vague, overlapping rules that are implemented haphazardly.
impediment for the respondent to continue his stay in the country.
THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and RAMON V. TIAOQUI, petitioners, - effect at the time the action was commenced, allows the filing of a case to set aside the actions of
versus- COURT OF APPEALS and TRIUMPH SAVINGS BANK, respondents. the Monetary Board which are tainted with arbitrariness and bad faith.

G.R. No. 76118 March 30, 1993 Contrary to the notion of private respondent, Sec. 29 does not contemplate prior notice and
hearing before a bank may be directed to stop operations and placed under
BELLOSILLO, J. receivership. When par. 4 (now par. 5, as amended by E.O. 289) provides for the filing of a case
Facts: within ten (10) days after the receiver takes charge of the assets of the bank, it is unmistakable
that the assailed actions should precede the filing of the case. Plainly, the legislature could
The subject matter of this case was the propriety of the resolution of the Monetary Board not have intended to authorize "no prior notice and hearing" in the closure of the bank and at the
to place the respondent bank under receivership despite lack of prior notice and hearing which are same time allow a suit to annul it on the basis of absence thereof.
conditions precedent for the order of receivership to prosper.
In the early case of Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. v. Arca [1965], We held that a previous hearing is
TSB filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as Civil nowhere required in Sec. 29 nor does the constitutional requirement of due process
Case No. Q-45139, against Central Bank and Ramon V. Tiaoqui to annul MB Resolution No. 596, demand that the correctness of the Monetary Board's resolution to stop operation and
with prayer for injunction, challenging in the process the constitutionality of Sec. 29 of R.A. 269, proceed to liquidation be first adjudged before making the resolution effective. It is
otherwise known as "The Central Bank Act,". The resolution was allegedly issued by reason of an enough that a subsequent judicial review be provided.
examination submitted by the Supervision and Examination Sector (SES), Department II, of the
Central Bank (CB) stating that: "that the financial condition of TSB is one of insolvency and its Even in Banco Filipino, We reiterated that Sec. 29 of R.A. 265 does not require a previous
continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors and creditors," hearing before the Monetary Board can implement its resolution closing a bank, since
its action is subject to judicial scrutiny as provided by law.
The trial court temporarily restrained petitioners from implementing MB Resolution No.
596 "until further orders", thus prompting them to move for the quashal of the restraining order Sec. 29 does not altogether divest a bank or a non-bank financial institution placed under
(TRO) on the ground that it did not comply with said Sec. 29, i.e., that TSB failed to show receivership of the opportunity to be heard and present evidence on arbitrariness and bad faith
convincing proof of arbitrariness and bad faith on the part of petitioners;' and, that TSB failed to because within ten (10) days from the date the receiver takes charge of the assets of the bank,
post the requisite bond in favor of Central Bank. resort to judicial review may be had by filing an appropriate pleading with the court. Respondent
TSB did in fact avail of this remedy by filing a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City on the 8th
On 19 July 1985, acting on the motion to quash the restraining order, the trial court granted the day following the takeover by the receiver of the bank's assets on 3 June 1985.
relief sought and denied the application of TSB for injunction. Subsequently, RTC in separate
orders denied petitioners' motion to dismiss and ordered receiver Tiaoqui to restore the This "close now and hear later" scheme is grounded on practical and legal considerations
management of TSB to its elected board of directors and officers, subject to CB comptrollership. to prevent unwarranted dissipation of the bank's assets and as a valid exercise of police
The CA upheld the findings of the trial court. power to protect the depositors, creditors, stockholders and the general public.

Issue: In Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, We stated that —

WON a Monetary Board resolution placing a private bank under receivership should be . . . due process does not necessarily require a prior hearing; a hearing or an opportunity to be
annulled on the ground of lack of prior notice and hearing. heard may be subsequent to the closure. One can just imagine the dire consequences of a prior
hearing: bank runs would be the order of the day, resulting in panic and hysteria. In the process,
Held: fortunes may be wiped out and disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire banking
community.
No, the subject monetary board resolution in the case at bar cannot be annulled merely on
the ground of lack of prior notice and hearing.

Under Sec. 29 of R.A. 265, the Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, is vested with We stressed in Central Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals that —
exclusive authority to assess, evaluate and determine the condition of any bank, and finding such
condition to be one of insolvency, or that its continuance in business would involve probable loss to . . . the banking business is properly subject to reasonable regulation under the police power of the
its depositors or creditors, forbid the bank or non-bank financial institution to do business in the state because of its nature and relation to the fiscal affairs of the people and the revenues of the
Philippines; and shall designate an official of the CB or other competent person as receiver to state (9 CJS 32). Banks are affected with public interest because they receive funds from the
immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities. The fourth paragraph, which was then in general public in the form of deposits. Due to the nature of their transactions and functions, a
fiduciary relationship is created between the banking institutions and their depositors. Therefore,
banks are under the obligation to treat with meticulous care and utmost fidelity the accounts of
those who have reposed their trust and confidence in them (Simex International [Manila], Inc., v. Facts: The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed
Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 360 [1990]). the Mirasols' sugar production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. The
Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate
It is then the Government's responsibility to see to it that the financial interests of those Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latter's
who deal with the banks and banking institutions, as depositors or otherwise, are sugar and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it.
protected. In this country, that task is delegated to the Central Bank which, pursuant to
its Charter (R.A. 265, as amended), is authorized to administer the monetary, banking President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing Philippine Exchange Co., Inc.
and credit system of the Philippines. Under both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, the Central (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's
Bank is tasked with providing policy direction in the areas of money, banking and credit; purchases. The decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be remitted to
corollarily, it shall have supervision over the operations of banks (Sec. 14, Art. XV, 1973 the government. Believing that the proceeds were more than enough to pay their obligations,
Constitution, and Sec. 20, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution). Under its charter, the CB is further petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners continued to
authorized to take the necessary steps against any banking institution if its continued operation avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from their accounts with said
would cause prejudice to its depositors, creditors and the general public as well. This power has bank. PNB asked petitioners to settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners,
been expressly recognized by this Court. conveyed to PNB real properties by way of dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB
The procedure prescribed in Sec. 29 is truly designed to protect the interest of all proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim.
concerned, i.e., the depositors, creditors and stockholders, the bank itself, and the
general public, and the summary closure pales in comparison to the protection afforded Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting that said proceeds, if
public interest. At any rate, the bank is given full opportunity to prove arbitrariness and properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in its
bad faith in placing the bank under receivership, in which event, the resolution may be stance that under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account since under said law, all earnings
properly nullified and the receivership lifted as the trial court may determine. from the export sales of sugar pertained to the National Government.

In sum, appeal to procedural due process cannot just outweigh the evil sought to On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and damages
be prevented; hence, We rule that Sec. 29 of R.A. 265 is a sound legislation promulgated in against PNB.
accordance with the Constitution in the exercise of police power of the state.
Consequently, the absence of notice and hearing is not a valid ground to annul a Monetary Issues:
Board resolution placing a bank under receivership. The absence of prior notice and
hearing cannot be deemed acts of arbitrariness and bad faith. Thus, an MB resolution (1) Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without
placing a bank under receivership, or conservatorship for that matter, may only be notice to the Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the
annulled after a determination has been made by the trial court that its issuance was resolution of the Trial Court.
tainted with arbitrariness and bad faith. Until such determination is made, the status
quo shall be maintained, i.e., the bank shall continue to be under receivership. (2) Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are unconstitutional.

PREMISES considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 07867 is (3) Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.
AFFIRMED.
Held: It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the
power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all
Regional Trial Courts.

The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to
decide whether or not his intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is
necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his
MIRASOL VS CA [351 SCRA 44; G.R. No. 128448; 1 Feb 2001] day in court. We must stress that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice requirement
is not limited to actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule itself provides
that such notice is required in "any action" and not just actions involving declaratory relief. Where GR No. 141010, Feb. 7, 2007
there is no ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is no room for construction. 15 In all
actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice Facts:
to the Solicitor General is mandatory. The Municipal Council of Parañaque enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 97-085 entitled, "An
Ordinance Prescribing the Comprehensive Land Use Plan & Zoning of the Municipality of
Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances are void for violating the due Parañaque Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991 and Other Pertinent Laws."
process clause and the prohibition against the taking of private property without just UBFHAI, several homeowners’ associations, and residents of BF Homes Parañaque filed with the
compensation. Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its power of judicial review. Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition with an application for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction. They questioned the constitutionality of Sections 11.5, 11.6, 15, 17, and
Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this power: First, there 19.6 of Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08. They alleged that the reclassification of certain portions of
must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the BF Homes Parañaque from residential to commercial zone is unconstitutional because it amounts
question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity to impairment of the contracts between the developer of BF Homes Parañaque and the lot buyers.
of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have Public respondents alleged that the passage of Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is a valid exercise of
been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very police power by the Municipal Council of Parañaque and that such ordinance can nullify or
lis mota of the case. supersede the contractual obligations entered into by the petitioners and the developer. However,
EL ACTO, intervened as respondent claiming that their members will be affected if the ordinance
will be declared unconstitutional. It also asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police
Espinocilla v. Bagong Tanyag Homeowners’ Assn., Inc. power. It further alleged that the instant petition should have been initially filed with the Regional
Trial Court in accordance with the principle of hierarchy of courts.
(529 SCRA 654)
Issue:
FACTS: Espinocillo and other petitioners who were former members of the Bagong Tanyag
Homeowners’ Inc (BAHATI), filed an appeal before the S.C and faults the appellate court in not Whether Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is a legitimate exercise of police power
declaring the acts of BAHATI as unconstitutional or contrary to Art. 13, (Social Justice and Human
Rights) sec 9 and sec 10 (under Urban Land Reform Housing ) in relation to RA 7279-An act to Held:
provide a comprehensive and continuing urban dev’t and housing program, establish a mechanism The Court has upheld in several cases the superiority of police power over the non-impairment
for its implementation ad for other purpose. clause.28 The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of
To give a brief history of the case, the petitioners contended that the property or lots which was the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare.
occupied by them, or adjacent to them where they planted crops or made improvements for some With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligations
time were subdivided without their consent, reassigned without due process of law and that their assumed by the defendant-appellee–referring to the restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale
names were omitted in the list as prospective beneficiaries. They filed a complaint before the and later in the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title issued to defendant-appellee–it should
HIGC and the HIGC declared that they were deprived of their property right without due process be stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the
of law. However upon petition of the respondents with HIGC, the latter reversed the decision and rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police
declared that the acts of the BAHATI was valid. power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
ISSUE: WON the Petioners were deprived of their property without due process of law education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people." Invariably described
as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" and "in a sense, the greatest
HELD: The petition fails and the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. and most powerful attribute of government," the exercise of the power may be judicially
inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable,
The record shows that the petitioners were given more sufficient notice and opportunity to be there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
heard before they were removed from the list of prospective beneficiaries and that even after they constitutional guarantee. As this Court held through Justice Jose P. Bengzon in Philippine
were delisted, they were given a new deadline for them to submit requirements and were sent Long Distance Company v. City of Davao, et al., police power "is elastic and must be responsive to
notices informing them of the consequences of noncompliance. various social conditions; it is not confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on
past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life." We were even more
emphatic in Vda. De Genuino v. The Court of Agrarian Relations, et al., when We declared: "We do
United BF Homeowners’ Asso., Inc., et. al. (UBFHAI) vs. The City Mayor of Paranaque
not see why the public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property Ÿ The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction
should not be made to prevail through the state’s exercise of its police power." based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount
shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is
Resolution No. 27. s-1960 declaring the western part of Highway 54, now E. de los Santos Avenue granted. Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value added
(EDSA, for short) from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone, tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject
was obviously passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police to proper documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the
people in the locality. Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area, Ÿ The DSWD, on May 8, 2004, approved and adopted the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
especially where Lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. The lots themselves not only front the highway; RA No. 9275, Rule VI, Article 8 which contains the proviso that the implementation of the tax
industrial and commercial complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery deduction shall be subject to the Revenue Regulations to be issued by the BIR and approved by the
which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an DOF. With the new law, the Drug Stores Association of the Philippines wanted a clarification of
endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the the meaning of tax deduction. The DOF clarified that under a tax deduction scheme, the tax
health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Having been expressly granted the power to deduction on discounts was subtracted from Net Sales together with other deductions which are
adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, through considered as operating expenses before the Tax Due was computed based on the Net Taxable
its Municipal Council, was reasonably, if not perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in Income. On the other hand, under a tax credit scheme, the amount of discounts which is the tax
passing the subject resolution. credit item, was deducted directly from the tax due amount.

It is not that we are saying that restrictive easements, especially the easements herein in question, Ÿ The DOH issued an Administrative Order that the twenty percent discount shall include both
are invalid or ineffective. As far as the Bel-Air subdivision itself is concerned, certainly, they are prescription and non-prescription medicines, whether branded or generic. It stated that such
valid and enforceable. But they are, like all contracts, subject to the overriding demands, needs, discount would be provided in the purchase of medicines from all establishments supplying
and interests of the greater number as the State may determine in the legitimate exercise of police medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens.
power. Our jurisdiction guarantees sanctity of contract and is said to be the "law
between the contracting parties," but while it is so, it cannot contravene "law, morals, Ÿ Drug store owners assail the law with the contention that granting the discount would result to
good customs, public order, or public policy." Above all, it cannot be raised as a loss of profit and capital especially that such law failed to provide a scheme to justly compensate
deterrent to police power, designed precisely to promote health, safety, peace, and the discount.
enhance the common good, at the expense of contractual rights, whenever necessary. ISSUE: WON Section 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act is unconstitutional or not violative
of Article 3 Section 9 of the Constitution which provides that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation and the equal protection clause of Article 3 Section 1.
CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP. vs. DSWD, ET. AL
HELD:
GR No. 166494, June 29, 2007
Ÿ The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking
FACTS: of private property for public use or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for which
petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation. Just compensation is defined
Ÿ Petitioners, belonging to domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The
Philippines, are praying for preliminary injunction assailing the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003.” On of the word compensation, and to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the
February 26, 2004, R.A. No. 9257, amending R.A. No. 7432, was signed into law by President property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and it became effective on March 21, 2004. Section 4(a) of the Act states:
Ÿ The law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for medical and dental services, and
SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following: diagnostic and laboratory fees; admission fees charged by theaters, concert halls, circuses,
(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of carnivals, and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement; fares for domestic land, air
services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and and sea travel; utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and
purchase of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, recreation centers; and purchases of medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens.
including funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens; As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments extending the twenty
percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction.
Ÿ The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, “SEC. 3-A. Rules and Regulations; Administrative sanctions for violation thereof. – The Bureau of
has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been Energy Utilization shall issue such rules and regulations as are necessary to carry into effect the
purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provisions of this Act, subject to the approval of the Minister of Energy, after consultation with the
provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus affected industry sectors. Said rules and regulations shall take effect fifteen (15) days from the
assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as “the most essential, insistent date of its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs.” It is “[t]he
power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of “The Bureau of Energy Utilization is empowered to impose in an administrative proceeding,
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not after due notice and hearing, upon any person who violates any provision of such rules and
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the regulations, a fine of not more than ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) or to suspend or remove the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.” license or permit of a hauler, marketer, refiller, dealer, sub-dealer or retail outlet: Provided, That
hearing in any administrative proceedings may be waived by respondent. Provided, Further, That
during the pendency of such administrative proceeding, the Bureau may suspend the business
operations of such hauler, marketer, refiller, dealer, sub-dealer or retailer or retail outlet operator
Perez v LPG Refillers (2006) when the suspension is consistent with public interest. …
Quisumbing, J. xxxx
FACTS: “The administrative sanction that may be imposed shall be without prejudice to the filing of a
 BP Blg. 33 was enacted to penalize illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing, adulteration, criminal action as the case may warrant.”
underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession for trade of o §23 of RA 8479 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1998):
adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)
cylinders. Section 23. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – The DOE, in coordination with the Board,
the DENR, DFA, Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Department of Health (DOH),
 The law sets a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000 as penalties. DOF, DTI, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and TLRC, shall formulate and
issue the necessary implementing rules and regulations within sixty (60) days after the effectivity
 The Department of Energy issued Circular No. 2000-06-010 to implement the law.
of this Act.
 Respondent LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines asked the DOE to set aside the
o §5(g) and §21 of RA 7638 (Department of Energy Act of 1992):
Circular for being contrary to law but to no avail, hence they filed an action before the
RTC to nullify the circular.

 RTC granted the petition and nullified the Circular on the ground that it introduced new (g) Formulate and implement programs, including a system of providing incentives and penalties,
offenses not included in the statute. for the judicious and efficient use of energy in all energy-consuming sectors of the economy;
o Moreover, in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis for each violation, there is xxx
a possibility that the P50,000 maximum penalty might be exceeded.
Subject to existing rules and regulations, the funds and monies collected or which the otherwise
o The Circular has a range of P1,000-5,000/cylinder for first offenses and a range of come into the possession of the Department and its bureaus from fees, surcharges, fines, and
P5,000-10k/cylinder for third offenses. For retails outlets, the max penalty is 20k. penalties which the Department and its bureaus may impose and collect under this Act
o Aside from the monetary fines, some offenses also include the recommendation ISSUES + RULING:
the closure of the business to the proper LGU.
WoN the Circular is valid/legal. YES.
 Meanwhile, petitioner Sec. Perez of the DOE argues that DOE is empowered by the ff.
provisions to penalize the acts it enumerated in the circular:  For an administrative regulation, to have the force of penal law, the following must
concur:
o BP Blg. 33, as amended:
o the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the
delegating statute itself; and
o the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179, with the pertinent provisions contain:
WHEREAS, the MMDA has recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus
 As for the first requirement: terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more convenient
access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass
o BP Blg 33 only states merely lists the various modes by which the said criminal
acts may be perpetrated, namely: no price display board, no weighing scale, no transport terminal facilities that would integrate the existing transport modes, namely the buses, the
tare weight or incorrect tare weight markings, no authorized LPG seal, no trade rail-based systems of the LRT, MRT and PNR and to facilitate and ensure efficient travel through
the improved connectivity of the different transport modes;
name, unbranded LPG cylinders, no serial number, no distinguishing color, no
embossed identifying markings on cylinder, underfilling LPG cylinders, Section 2. PROJECT OBJECTIVES. – In accordance with the plan proposed by MMDA
Section 3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTING AGENCY. – The Metropolitan Manila Development
tampering LPG cylinders, and unauthorized decanting of LPG cylinders.
Authority (MMDA), is hereby designated as the implementing Agency for the project.
o The acts and omissions stated in the circular are well within the modes
contemplated by the law and serve the purpose of curbing pernicious practices of As the above-quoted portions of the E.O. noted, the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro
Manila has been the numerous buses plying the streets and the inefficient connectivity of the
LPG dealers.
different transport modes; and the MMDA had “recommended a plan to decongest traffic by
 As for the second requirement: eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing
more and convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the
o The statute provides a minimum and maximum amount as penalties. provision of mass transport terminal facilities”which plan is referred to under the E.O. as the
Greater Manila Mass Transport System Project (the Project).
o The maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is P20,000, an amount within
The E.O. thus designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project.
the range allowed by law. While the circular is silent as to the max penalty for
Pursuant to the E.O., the Metro Manila Council (MMC), the governing board and policymaking
refillers, marketers, and dealers, such does not amount to violation of the
body of the MMDA, issued Resolution No. 03-07 series of 20037 expressing full support of the
statutory maximum limit.
Project. Recognizing the imperative to integrate the different transport modes via the
o The mere fact that the Circular provides penalties on a per cylinder basis does not establishment of common bus parking terminal areas, the MMC cited the need to remove the bus
in itself run counter to the law since all that B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes are the terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.8
minimum and the maximum limits of penalties. On February 24, 2003, Viron Transport Co., Inc. (Viron), a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of public transportation with a provincial bus operation, filed a petition for declaratory
 The law was intended to provide the DOE with increased administrative and penal relief before the RTC of Manila. Chairman Fernando, was “poised to issue a Circular,
measures with which to effectively curtail rampant adulteration and shortselling, as well Memorandum or Order closing, or tantamount to closing, all provincial bus terminals along EDSA
as other acts involving petroleum products, which are inimical to public interest. and in the whole of the Metropolis under the pretext of traffic regulation.” This impending move, it
stressed, would mean the closure of its bus terminal in Sampaloc, Manila and two others in Quezon
DISPOSITION: Petition granted.
City.
The trial court sustained the constitutionality and legality of the E.O. pursuant to R.A. No. 7924,
which empowered the MMDA to administer Metro Manila’s basic services including those of
transport and traffic management.

THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. VIRON ISSUE: W/N EO is unconstitutional
TRANSPORTATION CO., INC
HELD: YES. The authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project
Posted on June 30, 2013 by winnieclaire notwithstanding, the designation of the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project may
not be sustained. It is ultra vires, there being no legal basis therefor.
Standard
It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC,
G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007 and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as
the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish
FACTS: The present petition for review on certiorari, rooted in the traffic congestion problem, or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the
questions the authority of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to order the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and
closure of provincial bus terminals along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) and major administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of
thoroughfares of Metro Manila. transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as
the Project in question. The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting
By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of
ultra vires. the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the “principal accused” are government officals
with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
In another vein, the validity of the designation of MMDA flies in the absence of a specific grant of Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A.
authority to it under R.A. No. 7924. 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word
SECTION 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. — . . . “principal” from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process
exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which
Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the local government units concerning purely provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not
local matters begun as of the approval hereof.
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority
to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly designated Issues:
by the President to undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the (1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners’ right to due process and
elimination of respondents’ terminals the equal protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced
This Court commiserates with the MMDA for the roadblocks thrown in the way of its efforts at for the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.
solving the pestering problem of traffic congestion in Metro Manila. These efforts are
commendable, to say the least, in the face of the abominable traffic situation of our roads day in (2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.
and day out. This Court can only interpret, not change, the law, however. It needs only to be
reiterated that it is the DOTC ─ as the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, (3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was
implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the
transportation and communications ─ which has the power to establish and administer a determination whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s
transportation project like the Project subject of the case at bar. jurisdiction.

RULING:

301 SCRA 298; G.R. NO. 12809620 JAN 1999 Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal
protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing
LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETAR argument were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every classification made by the law is
presumed reasonable and the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness.
Facts: The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must rest on
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to
syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which
andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and are present in this case.
petitioner-intervenors. Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all cases involving” certain public officials
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation and under the transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any court.” Contrary to
Command, that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between petitioner and intervenors’ argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong
the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desiertoformed a Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan
panel of investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate but also in “any court.”
police operation. However, a review board modified the panel’s finding and recommended the There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive effect
indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal
charged as principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish
reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where penalties for their violations or those that define crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A.
petitioner was charged only as an accessory. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural
matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one
which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a
administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be deadlock between the parties.
challenged as unconstitutional.
ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a compromise in the NCMB, the matter
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the reached the DOLE which favored the School. Hence this petition.
office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in
the performance of his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information ISSUE:
which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local- hires.
upon examination of the amended information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the
shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their RULING:
official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said
accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor is entitled to “humane
stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate conditions of work.” These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace – the factory, the
the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not office or the field – but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.
established.
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 248
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to
intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original
The Constitution enjoins the State to “protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare, In
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.
Section 18, Article II of the constitution mandates “to afford labor full protection”. The State has
the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not
merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner, vs. HON. bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and
Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.
of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the
A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the
Superintendent of International School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC.,
entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve
respondents.,
the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000
The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the
FACTS: employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees’ interest, such as substantial
similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial
Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD 732, is a domestic Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment
educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s acceptability is whether or not it is
other temporary residents. The decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their
management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other collective bargaining rights.
nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations
attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped
employees. School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in
same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. the School also shows that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited
tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. Foreign-hires are also the same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not
paid a salary rate 25% more than local-hires. granted to local-hires such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel
allowances. These benefits are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the
When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a legitimate labor exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-
union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School, contested hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.
the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. Significantly, the results of the technical examination of the election records of SND are
determinative of the final outcome of the election protest against Dimaporo. The same cannot be
said of the precincts subject of Dimaporo’s motion.
DIMAPORO V. HRET It should be emphasized that the grant of a motion for technical examination is
subject to the sound discretion of the HRET. In this case, the Tribunal deemed it useful
in the conduct of the revision proceedings to grant Mangotara’s motion for technical
FACTS: This is a petition brought by Congressman Dimaporo seeking to nullify the twin examination. Conversely, it found Dimaporo’s motion unpersuasive and accordingly
Resolutions of the HRET which denied his Motion for Technical Evaluation of the Thumbmarks denied the same. In so doing, the HRET merely acted within the bounds of its
and Signatures Affixed in the Voters Registration Records and Motion for Reconsideration of Constitutionally-granted jurisdiction. After all, the Constitution confers full authority
Resolution Denying the Motion for Technical Examination of Voting Records. on the electoral tribunals of the House of Representatives and the Senate as the sole
judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
Pursuant to the 1998 HRET Rules Congressional candidate Mangotara Petition of respective members. Such jurisdiction is original and exclusive.
Protest (Ad Cautelam) seeking the technical examination of the signatures and thumb the
protested precincts of the municipality of Sultan Naga Dimaporo (SND). Mangotara alleged that 2. Anent Dimaporo’s contention that the assailed Resolutions denied him the right to
the massive substitution of voters and other electoral irregularities perpetrated by Dimaporo’s procedural due process and to present evidence to substantiate his claim of massive substitute
supporters will be uncovered and proven. From this and other premises, he concluded that he is the voting committed in the counter-protested precincts, suffice it to state that the HRET itself may
duly-elected representative of the 2nd District of Lanao del Norte. ascertain the validity of Dimaporo’s allegations without resort to technical examination. To this
end, the Tribunal declared that the ballots, election documents and other election paraphernalia
Noting that “the Tribunal cannot evaluate the questioned ballots because there are still subject to its scrutiny in the appreciation of evidence.
are no ballots but only election documents to consider” HRET granted Mangotara's motion and
permitted the latter to engage an expert to assist him in prosecution of the case, NBI conducted the It should be noted that the records are replete with evidence, documentary and
technical examination. testimonial, presented by Dimaporo. Dimaporo’s allegation of denial of due process is an
indefensible pretense.
ISSUE: 1. W/N Dimaporo was deprived by HRET of Equal Protection when the latter denied his
motion for technical examination. The instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

2. W/N Dimaporo was deprived of procedural due process or the right to present
scientific evidence to show the massive substitute voting committed
in counter protested precincts. [ GR NO. 129099, Jul 20, 2006 ]

MA. CHONA M. DIMAYUGA v. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN

RULING: 1. Resolution of HRET did not offend equal protection clause. Equal Petitioners Maria Chona Dimayuga, Noel Inumerable and Felipe Aguinaldo were employees of the
protection simply means that all persons and things similarly situated must be treated Traffic Regulatory Board (TRB) of [the] Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).
alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. It follows that the Petitioner Dimayuga used to be the TRB's executive director.
existence of a valid and substantial distinction justifies divergent treatment.
In June 1992, an anonymous complaint was filed against petitioners concerning certain
According to Dimaporo since the ballot boxes subject of his petition and that of transactions of the TRB from 1989 to May 1992. Consequently, a special audit was conducted by
Mangotara were both unavailable for revision, his motion, like Mangotara’s, should be granted. the Special Audit Office (SAO) of the Commission on Audit (COA).

The argument fails to take into account the distinctions extant in Mangotara’s The SAO report, detailing the audit of selected transactions of the TRB was finalized on November
protest vis-à-vis Dimaporo’s counter-protest which validate the grant of Mangotara’s motion and 4, 1994. As a consequence of said report, certain irregularities were uncovered, in which petitioners
the denial of Dimaporo’s. were implicated. It therefore recommended appropriate action against petitioners.
First. The election results in SND were the sole subjects of Mangotara’s protest.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of said report on February 28, 1995. The COA
The opposite is true with regard to Dimaporo’s counter-protest as he contested the election results
Chairman, however, denied the same on August 30, 1995. Undaunted, petitioners then filed a
in all municipalities but SND.
Notice of Appeal with a corresponding Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum on
Appeal before the COA Chairman. In a letter addressed to petitioner Dimayuga, the COA factual antecedents, it may pursue the investigation because it realizes that the decision of COA is
Chairman acknowledged receipt of said documents and granted petitioners' request for extension of irrelevant or unnecessary to the investigation and prosecution of the case. Since the Office of the
time to file their Memorandum on Appeal. Petitioners filed said Memorandum on Appeal on Ombudsman is granted such latitude, its varying treatment of similarly situated investigations
November 20, 1995. cannot by itself be considered a violation of any of the parties' rights to the equal protection of the
laws.
Meanwhile, the audit report was forwarded to the DPWH Secretary, who then indorsed the same
to respondent Ombudsman for appropriate action on February 16, 1995. Accordingly, petitioners Thus, petitioners have not shown that respondent committed a grave abuse of discretion
were charged with violation of the Anti-Graft Law or Republic Act 3019, docketed as OMB 0-95- amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying their motions to dismiss the case or to
0430. On June 15, 1995, respondent Ombudsman required state auditors Eleanor M. Tejada and suspend the proceedings.
Jose Rey Binamira of the COA's Special Action Team to submit their sworn complaint on the basis
of their report for purposes of initiating the preliminary investigation, which was set on June 28, WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
1995. In view of this, petitioners filed a Motion for Suspension of Preliminary Investigation on is DENIED. The temporary restraining order issued through the resolution dated August 20, 1997
June 26, 1996 with the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of respondent. In said is LIFTED and respondent Office of the Ombudsman may proceed with the preliminary
motion, petitioners argue that the SAO report was not yet final, considering that their appeal with investigation and/or any further proceedings in OMB 0-95-0430 entitled Commission on Audit v.
the Commission had not yet been resolved. Chona Dimayuga, et al.

Respondent, however, denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration on June 27, 1996 x x x.
GR No. 148208 | Central Bank Employees (Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Association vs
Unsatisfied with the said Order, petitioners filed an "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration" dated Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Executive Secretary | Dec 15, 2004
June 27, 1996, reiterating as ground therefor, the pendency of their appeal before the Comission.
In arguing for the suspension of the preliminary investigation before respondent, petitioners cited FACTS:
the supposedly similar case of COA v. Gabor, OMB-0-93-0718. The COA on the other hand,
through the Special Audit Office, filed a Manifestation with Motion dated September 9, 1996, The Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association Inc, filed a Petition for Prohibition against
concurring with the position of respondent Ombudsman, denying the previous Motion for BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from
Reconsideration of petitioners. further implementing the last provisio in Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, on the ground
that it is unconstitutional.
On November 18, 1996, respondent denied petitioners' Omnibus Motion x x x.
BACKGROUND:

Subsequent to these Motions, petitioners likewise filed a "Letter-Appeal" dated December 5, 1996, July 3, 1993, RA No 7653 (The New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central
addressed to Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, based on the same grounds stated in previous motions. Bank of the Philippines and created a new BSP.
Respondent denied said "Letter- Appeal" in an Order dated March 13, 1997 x x x. [4
Article II, Section 15 (c) RA 7653: A compensation structure based on job evaluation studies and
Issue: wage surveys and subject to the Boards approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of
the Bank Sentrals human resource development program. Provided that the Monetary Board shall
RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN VIOLATED PETITIONERS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
make its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under RA No
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS, GUARANTEED UNDER SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE II OF
6758 (Salary Standardization Act). Provided, however, that compensation and wage structure of
THE CONSTITUTION, IN NOT AFFORDING PETITIONERS THE SAME RELIEF IT
employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the
AFFORDED TO THE PUBLIC OFFICIAL INVOLVED IN COA V. GABOR, SUPRA.
rates prescribed under RA No 6758.
Held:
7 Subsequent Laws were enacted exempting all other rank-and-file employees of Government
As stated, the Office of the Ombudsman has been granted virtually plenary investigatory powers Financial Institutions from the SSL. These are: RA No 7907 (1995) – LBP, RA No 8282 (1997) –
by the Constitution and by law. Thus, as a rule, the Office of the Ombudsman may, for every SSS, RA No 8289 (1997) – SBGFC, RA No 8291 – GSIS, RA No 8523 (1998) – DBP, RA No 8763
particular investigation, whether instigated by a complaint or on its own initiative, decide how best (2000) – HGC, and RA No 9302 (2004) – PDIC.
to pursue each investigation. This power gives the Office of the Ombudsman the discretion to
ISSUE:
dismiss without prejudice a preliminary investigation if it finds that the final decision of COA is
necessary for its investigation and the future prosecution of the case. In another case with similar
Whether or not the last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, runs afoul of the Facts: This is a Petition to enjoin and prohibit the public respondent Ruben Torres in his capacity
constitutional mandate that “No person shall be … denied equal protection of the laws” as Executive Secretary from allowing other private respondents to continue with the operation of
tax and duty-free shops located at the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and the Clark Special
HELD: Economic Zone (CSEZ). The petitioner seeks to declare Republic Act No. 7227 as unconstitutional
The last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, is unconstitutional. on the ground that it allowed only tax-free (and duty-free) importation of raw
materials, capital and equipment. It reads:
RULING:
The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a separate customs territory
With the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of the other government financial ensuring free flow or movement of goods and capital within, into and exported out of the Subic
institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last provisio of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653, Special Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives such as tax and duty-free importations of raw
constitutes invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of Banko Sentral ng materials, capital and equipment. However, exportation or removal of goods from the territory of the
Pilipinas. Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs
duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of thePhilippines
The prior view on the constitutionality of RA 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its [RA 7227, Sec 12 (b)].
classification between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable because there
were substantial distinction that made real differences between the 2 classes. Petitioners contend that the wording of Republic Act No. 7227 clearly limits the grant of tax
incentives to the importation of raw materials, capital and equipment only thereby violating the
The subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in circumstance that equal protection clause of the Constitution.
considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last provisio of Sec 15 (c), Art
II of RA No 7653. This relates to the constitutionality of classifications between the rank-and-file of He also assailed the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 97-A for being violative of their right
the BSP and the 7 other GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but must also apply to equal protection. They asserted that private respondents operating inside the SSEZ are not
equally to all members of the class. The provisio may be fair on its face and impartial in different from the retail establishments located outside.
appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make
unjust distinctions between persons who are without differences. Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 7227 is valid on the ground that it violates the equal
protection clause.
The inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each exemption rests on
the policy determination by the legislature. The policy determination argument may support the Decision: The SC ruled in the negative. The phrase ‘tax and duty-free importations of raw
inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it cannot materials, capital and equipment was merely cited as an example of incentives that may be given
justify the inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs who to entities operating within the zone. Public respondent SBMA correctly argued that the
are similarly situated. maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, on which petitioners impliedly rely to support their
restrictive interpretation, does not apply when words are mentioned by way of example.
The issue is not the declared policy of the law per se, but the oppressive results of Congress
inconsistent and unequal policy towards the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs. The The petition with respect to declaration of unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 97-A cannot
challenge to the constitutionality of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653 is premised precisely on the be, likewise, sustained. The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a
irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its treatment of persons similarly situated. legislation based which was based on reasonable classification. A classification, to be valid, must
(1) rest on substantial distinction, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to
In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that “no person shall be denied the equal protection existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. Applying the
of the laws” includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious discrimination, foregoing test to the present case, this Court finds no violation of the right to equal protection of
directly or indirectly. the laws. There is a substantial distinctions lying between the establishments inside and outside
the zone. There are substantial differences in a sense that, investors will be lured to establish and
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons shall operate their industries in the so-called ‘secured area and the present business operators outside
be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to priveleges conferred and the area. There is, then, hardly any reasonable basis to extend to them the benefits and incentives
liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principles is that accorded in R.A. 7227.
equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstance which, if not
identical are analogous.

Coconut Oil Refiners vs Torres GR 132527 29 July 2005 Beltran vs Secretary of Health GR 133640 25 November 2005
Facts: The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the The classification, however, to be reasonable: (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which
people is a primordial governmental concern. The National Blood Services Act was enacted in the make real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to
exercise of the State’s police power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety. existing conditions only; and, (d) must apply equally to each member of the class.

What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always Republic Act No. 7719 or The National Blood Services Act of 1994, was enacted for the promotion of
easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation, public health and welfare. Based on the foregoing, the Legislature never intended for the law to
discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited but classification on a reasonable create a situation in which unjustifiable discrimination and inequality shall be allowed.
basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted.
To effectuate its policy, a classification was made between nonprofit blood banks/centers and
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law on April 2, commercial blood banks. We deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the following
1994. The Act seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood reasons: First, it was based on substantial distinctions. The former operates for purely
donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. It was approved by then President Fidel V. humanitarian reasons and as a medical service while the latter is motivated by profit. Also, while
Ramos on May 15, 1994 and was subsequently published in the Official Gazette on August 18, the former wholly encourages voluntary blood donation, the latter treats blood as a sale of
1994. The law took effect on August 23, 1994. commodity. Second, the classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is
germane to the purpose of the law, that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe
On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or
Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the Department of medical service rather than a commodity. This necessarily involves the phase out of commercial
Health (DOH). Section 7 of R.A. 7719 provides, Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks – All blood banks based on the fact that they operate as a business enterprise, and they source their
commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a period of two (2) years after the effectivity of blood supply from paid blood donors who are considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood donors
this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the Secretary. ” Section 23. Process of as shown by the USAID-sponsored study on the Philippine blood banking system. Third, the
Phasing Out. — The Department shall effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks over a Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment was not solely to address
period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years after the effectivity of R.A. the peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply only to the existing
7719. The decision to extend shall be based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood conditions. Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks
supply and demand and public safety.” without exception.The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The
Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of 1994, petitioners have already health of the people is a primordial governmental concern.
been operating commercial blood banks under Republic Act No. 1517, entitled “An Act Regulating Basically, the National Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the State’s police power in
the Collection, Processing and Sale of Human Blood, and the Establishment and Operation of order to promote and preserve public health and safety. Based on the grounds raised by
Blood Banks and Blood Processing Laboratories.” petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its
The law, which was enacted on June 16, 1956, allowed the establishment and operation by licensed Implementing Rules and Regulations, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to over overcome
physicians of blood banks and blood processing laboratories. the presumption of constitutionality of the law. As to whether the Act constitutes a wise
legislation, considering the issues being raised by petitioners, is for Congress to determine.
On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners, they filed a petition
for certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the constitutionality and validity of British American Tobacco v. Camacho (2008)
the aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. G.R. No. 163583 August 20, 2008
Issue: Whether or not Section 7 of RA 7719 and its implementing rules is valid on the ground that YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
it violates the equal protection clause.
Lessons Applicable: Court of Tax Appeals Jurisdiction, Regional Trial Court Jurisdiction, Equal
Decision: Petition granted. The assailed law and its implementing rules are constitutional and Protection and Uniformity of Taxation (constitutional issue), BIR Power to Conduct Resurvey and
valid. What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not Reclassification (delegated by express legislation)
always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation,
discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited but classification on a reasonable Laws Applicable:

basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. FACTS:


 June 2001, petitioner British American Tobacco introduced and sold Lucky Strike, Lucky resolve tax disputes in general. BUT does NOT include cases where the constitutionality of a law
Strike Lights and Lucky Strike Menthol Lights cigarettes w/ SRP P 9.90/pack - Initial assessed or rule is challenged which is a judicial power belonging to regular courts.
excise tax: P 8.96/pack (Sec. 145 [c])
2. No. In Sison Jr. v. Ancheta, the court held that "xxx It suffices then that the laws operate
 February 17, 2003: RR 9-2003: Periodic review every 2 years or earlier of the current net retail equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be
price of new brands and variants thereof for the purpose of the establishing and updating treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and
their tax classification the liabilities imposed. If the law be looked upon in tems of burden on charges, those that fall
 March 11, 2003: RMO 6-2003: Guidelines and procedures in establishing current net retail within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the
group equally binding on the rest. xxx" Thus, classification if rational in character is allowable. In
prices of new brands of cigarettes and alcohol products
Lutz v. Araneta: "it is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of
 August 8, 2003: RR 22-2003: Implement the revised tax classification of certain new brands taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that 'inequalities which result from a singling out of one
introduced in the market after January 1, 1997 based on the survey of their current net retail particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation" SC previously
prices. This increased the excise tax to P13.44 since the average net retail price is above P held: "Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of
10/pack. This cause petitioner to file before the RTC of Makati a petition for injunction with the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make
prayer for issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation"
sought to enjoin the implementation of Sec. 145 of the NIRC, RR No. 1-97, 9-2003, 22-2003 and
6-2003 on the ground that they discriminate against new brands of cigarettes in violation of Under the the rational basis test, a legislative classification, to survive an equal protection
the equal protection and uniformity provisions of the Constitution challenge, must be shown to rationally further a legitimate state interest . The classifications must
be reasonable and rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
 RTC: Dismissed object of the legislation
 While petitioner's appeal was pending, RA 9334 amending Sec. 145 of the 1997 NIRC among
A legislative classification that is reasonable does not offend the constitutional guaranty of the
other took effect on January 1, 2005 which in effect increased petitioners excise tax to
equal protection of the laws. The classification is considered valid and reasonable provided that: (1)
P25/pack
it rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it applies, all
 Petitioner filed a Motion to Admit attached supplement and a supplement to the petition for things being equal, to both present and future conditions; and (4) it applies equally to all those
review assailing the constitutionality of RA 9334 and praying a downward classification of belonging to the same class.
Lucky Strike products at the bracket taxable at P 8.96/pack since existing brands are still
taxed based on their price as of October 1996 eventhough they are equal or higher than Moreover, petitioner failed to clearly demonstrate the exact extent of such impact as the price is
petitioner's product price. not the only factor that affects competition.

 Philip Morris Philippines Manufacturing Incorporated, Fortune Tobacco Corp., Mighty Corp. 3. NO. Unless expressly granted to the BIR, the power to reclassify cigarette brands remains a
and JT International Intervened. prerogative of the legislature which cannot be usurped by the former. These are however modified
by RA 9334.
 Fortune Tobacco claimed that the CTA should have the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
the decision of the BIR in tax disputes

ISSUE:

1. W/N the RTC rather than the CTA has jurisdiction.

2. W/N RA 9334 of the classification freeze provision is unconstitutional for violating


the equal protection and uniformity provisions of the Constitution

3. W/N RR Nos. 1-97, 9-2003, 22-2003 and RA 8243 even prior to its amendment by RA 9334
can authorize the BIR to conduct resurvey and reclassification.

HELD:
1. Yes. The jurisdiction of the CTA id defined in RA 1125 which confers on the CTA jurisdiction to

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