G.R. No.

204603 September 24, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE G.R. No. 204603 PHILIPPINES, represented by THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF
NATIONALDEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT THE
SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE CHIEFOF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Petitioners,
vs.
HERMINIO HARRY ROQUE, MORO CHRISTIAN PEOPLE'S ALLIANCE, FR. JOE DIZON, RODINIE
SORIANO, STEPHANIE ABIERA, MARIA LOURDES ALCAIN, VOLTAIRE ALFEREZ, CZARINA
MAYALTEZ, SHERYL BALOT, RENIZZA BATACAN, EDAN MARRI CAÑETE, LEANA CARAMOAN,
ALDWIN CAMANCE, RENE DELORINO, PAULYN MAY DUMAN, RODRIGO FAJARDO III,
ANNAMARIE GO, ANNA ARMINDA JIMENEZ, MARY ANN LEE,LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL
MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO, NORMAN ROLAND OCANA III, WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR
RAMOS, CHERRY LOU REYES, MELISSA ANN SICAT, CRISTINE MAE TABING, VANESSA TORNO,
and HON. JUDGE ELEUTERIO L. BATHAN, as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch 92, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari1 are the April 23, 20122 and July 31, 20123 Orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92(RTC) in Special Civil Action (SCA) No. Q-07-
60778, denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss (subject motion to dismiss) based on the
following grounds: (a) that the Court had yet to pass upon the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. (RA) 9372,4 otherwise known as the "Human Security Act of 2007," in the consolidated
cases of Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council5 (Southern
Hemisphere); and (b) that private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief was proper.

The Facts

On July 17, 2007, private respondents filed a Petition6 for declaratory relief before the RTC,
assailing the constitutionality of the following sections of RA 9372: (a) Section 3,7 for being void
for vagueness;8 (b) Section 7,9for violating the right to privacy of communication and due
process and the privileged nature of priest-penitent relationships;10 (c)Section 18,11 for
violating due process, the prohibition against ex post facto laws or bills of attainder, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, as well as for contradicting Article 12512 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;13 (d)
Section 26,14 for violating the right to travel;15 and (e) Section 27,16 for violating the
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.17

Petitioners moved to suspend the proceedings,18 averring that certain petitions (SC petitions)
raising the issue of RA 9372’s constitutionality have been lodged before the Court.19 The said
motion was granted in an Order dated October 19, 2007.20

On October 5, 2010, the Court promulgated its Decision21 in the Southern Hemisphere cases
and thereby dismissed the SC petitions.

On February 27, 2012, petitioners filed the subject motion to dismiss,22 contending that private
respondents failed to satisfy the requisites for declaratory relief. Likewise, they averred that the
constitutionality of RA 9372 had already been upheld by the Court in the Southern Hemisphere
cases.

In their Comment/Opposition,23 private respondents countered that: (a) the Court did not
resolve the issue of RA 9372’s constitutionality in Southern Hemisphere as the SC petitions
were dismissed based purely on technical grounds; and (b) the requisites for declaratory relief
were met.

The RTC Ruling

On April 23, 2012, the RTC issued an Order24 which denied the subject motion to dismiss,
finding that the Court did not pass upon the constitutionality of RA 9372 and that private
respondents’ petition for declaratory relief was properly filed.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration25 which was, however, denied by the RTC in an Order
dated July 31, 2012.26The RTC observed that private respondents have personal and
substantial interests in the case and that it would be illogical to await the adverse
consequences of the aforesaid law’s implementation considering that the case is of paramount
impact to the Filipino people.27

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues Before the Court

The present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the RTC gravely abused its
discretion when it denied the subject motion to dismiss.

Asserting the affirmative, petitioners argue that private respondents failed to satisfy the
requirements for declaratory relief and that the Court had already sustained with finality the
constitutionality of RA 9372.
On the contrary, private respondents maintain that the requirements for declaratory relief have
been satisfied and that the Court has yet to resolve the constitutionality of RA 9372, negating
any grave abuse of discretion on the RTC’s part.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such
act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.28 It is well-settled that the abuse of discretion to be qualified as "grave" must be
so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law.29 In this relation, case law states that not
every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.30The degree of gravity, as above-described, must be met.

Applying these principles, the Court observes that while no grave abuse of discretion could be
ascribed on the part of the RTC when it found that the Court did not pass upon the
constitutionality of RA 9372 in the Southern Hemisphere cases, it, however, exceeded its
jurisdiction when it ruled that private respondents’ petition had met all the requisites for an
action for declaratory relief. Consequently, its denial of the subject motion to dismiss was
altogether improper.

To elucidate, it is clear that the Court, in Southern Hemisphere, did not make any definitive
ruling on the constitutionality of RA 9372. The certiorari petitions in those consolidated cases
were dismissed based solely on procedural grounds, namely: (a) the remedy of certiorari was
improper;31 (b) petitioners therein lack locus standi;32and (c) petitioners therein failed to
present an actual case or controversy.33 Therefore, there was no grave abuse of discretion.

The same conclusion cannot, however, be reached with regard to the RTC’s ruling on the
sufficiency of private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief.

Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action for declaratory relief:

first , the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; second , the terms of said
documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; third , there
must have been no breach of the documents in question; fourth , there must be an actual
justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are
adverse; fifth , the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and sixth , adequate relief is
not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.34
Based on a judicious review of the records, the Court observes that while the
first,35 second,36 and third37requirements appear to exist in this case, the fourth, fifth, and
sixth requirements, however, remain wanting.

As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an actual justiciable controversy or the
"ripening seeds" of one exists in this case.

Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is

appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely
anticipatory.38 Corollary thereto, by "ripening seeds" it is meant, not that sufficient accrued
facts may be dispensed with, but that a dispute may be tried at its inception before it has
accumulated the asperity, distemper, animosity, passion, and violence of a full blown battle
that looms ahead. The concept describes a state of facts indicating imminent and inevitable
litigation provided that the issue is not settled and stabilized by tranquilizing declaration.39

A perusal of private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief would show that they have
failed to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some
direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Not far
removed from the factual milieu in the Southern Hemisphere cases, private respondents only
assert general interests as citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which the government could
prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law would remain untrammeled. As their
petition would disclose, private respondents’ fear of prosecution was solely based on remarks
of certain government officials which were addressed to the general public.40 They, however,
failed to show how these remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or governmental action
geared towards the implementation of RA 9372 against them. In other words, there was no
particular, real or imminent threat to any of them. As held in Southern Hemisphere:

Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief,
over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized
by "double contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the
anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for
lack of ripeness.1âwphi1

The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372does not avail to take the present
petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to
RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be abused. Allegations of abuse
must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.41 (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted)
Thus, in the same light that the Court dismissed the SC petitions in the Southern Hemisphere
cases on the basis of, among others, lack of actual justiciable controversy (or the ripening seeds
of one), the RTC should have dismissed private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief all
the same.

It is well to note that private respondents also lack the required locus standi to mount their
constitutional challenge against the implementation of the above-stated provisions of RA 9372
since they have not shown any direct and personal interest in the case.42 While it has been
previously held that transcendental public importance dispenses with the requirement that the
petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury,43 it
must be stressed that cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an
altogether different genus of constitutional litigation.44 Towards this end, compelling State and
societal interests in the proscription of harmful conduct necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of
locus standi,45 as in this case. To rule otherwise, would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of
locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general public.46

As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief, neither can it be inferred that the
controversy at hand is ripe for adjudication since the possibility of abuse, based on the above-
discussed allegations in private respondents’ petition, remain highly-speculative and merely
theorized.1âwphi1 It is well-settled that a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.47 This private
respondents failed to demonstrate in the case at bar.

Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it irrelevant to proceed with a discussion
on the availability of adequate reliefs since no impending threat or injury to the private
respondents exists in the first place.

All told, in view of the absence of the fourth and fifth requisites for an action for declaratory
relief, as well as the irrelevance of the sixth requisite, private respondents’ petition for
declaratory relief should have been dismissed. Thus, by giving due course to the same, it cannot
be gainsaid that the RTC gravely abused its discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the April23, 2012 and July 31, 2012 Orders
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92 in SCA No. Q-07-60778 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the petition for declaratory relief before the said court is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-58986 April 17, 1989

DANTE Y. GO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. FERNANDO CRUZ, Judge, etc., CITY SHERIFF OF CALOOCAN CITY, and CALIFORNIA
MANUFACTURING CO., INC., respondents.

De Santos, Balgos & Perez for petitioner.

Francisco N. Carreon, Jr. for respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

The dismissal of civil actions is always addressed to the sound judgment and discretion of the
court; this, whether the dismissal is sought after a trial has been completed or otherwise, 1 or
whether it is prayed for by a defending party 2 or by a plaintiff or claimant. 3 There is one
instance however where the dismissal of an action rests exclusively on the will of a plaintiff or
claimant, to prevent which the defending party and even the court itself is powerless, requiring
in fact no action whatever on the part of the court except the acceptance and recording of the
causative document. This is dealt with in Section 1, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, which reads as
follows:

SECTION 1. Dismissal by the plaintiff. — An action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without
order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a
motion for summary judgment. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without
prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a
plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the same
claim. A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without approval of the court.

It is this provision with which the proceedings at bar are chiefly concerned.

On October 26, 1981, California Manufacturing Co., Inc. (hereinafter, simply, California) brought
an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Dante Go, accusing him of unfair
competition. 4 The gravamen of California's complaint was that Dante Go, doing business under
the name and style of "Sugarland International Products," and engaged like California in the
manufacture of spaghetti, macaroni, and other pasta was selling his products in the open
market under the brand name, "Great Italian," in packages which were in colorable and
deceitful limitation of California's containers bearing its own brand, "Royal." Its complaint
contained an application for preliminary injunction commanding Dante Go to immediately
cease and desist from the further manufacture, sale and distribution of said products, and to
retrieve those already being offered for sale. 5

About two weeks later, however, or on November 12, 1981, California filed a notice of dismissal
with the Court reading as follows: 6

COMES NOW the plaintiff in the above-entitled case, through undersigned counsel, and unto
this Honorable Court most respectfully gives notice of dismissal without prejudice pursuant to
Sec. 1, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the above-entitled case be considered dismissed

without prejudice conformably with Sec. 1, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.

Four days afterwards, or on November 16, 1981, California received by registered mail a copy of
Dante Go's answer with counterclaim dated November 6, 1981, which had been filed with the
Court on November 9, 1981. 7

On November 19, 1981 a fire broke out at the Manila City Hall destroying among others
the sala of Judge Tengco and the records of cases therein kept, including that filed by California
against Dante Go. 8

On December 1, 1981, California filed another complaint asserting the same cause of action
against Dante Go, this time with the Court of First Instance at Caloocan City. 9 This second suit
was docketed as Civil Case No. C-9702 and was assigned to the branch presided over by Judge
Fernando A. Cruz.

On December 3, 1981, Judge Cruz issued an ex parte restraining order directing "the defendant
... to immediately cease and desist from the further manufacture, sale, promotion and
distribution of spaghetti, macaroni and other pasta products contained in packaging boxes and
labels under the name 'GREAT ITALIAN,' which are similar to or copies of those of the plaintiff,
and ... recall ... all his spaghetti, macaroni and other pasta products using the brand, 'GREAT
ITALIAN.'" 10

On the day following the rendition of the restraining order, Dante Go filed the present petition
for certiorari, etc. with this Court praying for its nullification and perpetual inhibition. On
December 11, 1981, this Court, in turn issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining
California, Judge Cruz and the City Sheriff from enforcing or implementing the restraining order
of December 3, 1981, and from continuing with the hearing on the application for preliminary
injunction in said Civil Case No. C-9702. The scope of the injunction was subsequently enlarged
by this Court's Resolution of April 14,1982 to include the City Fiscal of Manila, who was thereby
restrained from proceeding with the case of unfair competition filed in his office by California
against Dante Go. 11

Dante Go's thesis is that the case filed against him by California in the Manila Court remained
pending despite California's notice of dismissal. According to him, since he had already filed his
answer to the complaint before California sought dismissal of the action three (3) days
afterwards, such dismissal was no longer a matter of right and could no longer be effected by
mere notice in accordance with Section 1, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, but only on plaintiff s
motion, and by order of the Court; hence, the Caloocan Court acted without jurisdiction over
the second action based on the same cause. He also accused California of forum shopping, of
selecting a sympathetic court for a relief which it had failed to obtain from another. 12

The petitioner is in error. What marks the loss by a plaintiff of the right to cause dismissal of the
action by mere notice is not the filing of the defendant's answer with the Court (either
personally or by mail) but the service on the plaintiff of said answer or of a motion for summary
judgment. This is the plain and explicit message of the Rules. 13 "The filing of pleadings,
appearances, motions, notices, orders and other papers with the court," according to Section 1,
Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, means the delivery thereof to the clerk of the court either
personally or by registered mail. Service, on the other hand, signifies delivery of the pleading or
other paper to the parties affected thereby through their counsel of record, unless delivery to
the party himself is ordered by the court, 14 by any of the modes set forth in the Rules, i.e., by
personal service, 15 service by mail, 16 or substituted service. 17

Here, California filed its notice of dismissal of its action in the Manila Court after the filing of
Dante Go's answer but before service thereof. Thus having acted well within the letter and
contemplation of the afore-quoted Section 1 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, its notice ipso
facto brought about the dismissal of the action then pending in the Manila Court, without need
of any order or other action by the Presiding Judge. The dismissal was effected without regard
to whatever reasons or motives California might have had for bringing it about, and was, as the
same Section 1, Rule 17 points out, "without prejudice," the contrary not being otherwise
"stated in the notice" and it being the first time the action was being so dismissed.

There was therefore no legal obstacle to the institution of the second action in the Caloocan
Court of First Instance based on the same claim. The filing of the complaint invested it with
jurisdiction of the subject matter or nature of the action. In truth, and contrary to what
petitioner Dante Go obviously believes, even if the first action were still pending in the Manila
Court, this circumstance would not affect the jurisdiction of the Caloocan Court over the second
suit. The pendency of the first action would merely give the defendant the right to move to
dismiss the second action on the ground of auter action pendant or litis pendentia. 18
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against petitioner. The temporary
restraining order of December 11, 1981, and the amendatory Resolution of April 14, 1982 are
SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. 170026 June 20, 2012

SHIMIZU PHILIPPINES CONTRACTORS, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
MRS. LETICIA B. MAGSALIN, doing business under the trade name "KAREN'S TRADING," FGU
INSURANCE CORPORATION, GODOFREDO GARCIA, CONCORDIA GARCIA, and REYNALDO
BAETIONG, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by Shimizu Philippines Contractors, Inc.
(petitioner) to challenge the twin resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA)2 in CA-G.R. CV No.
83096 which dismissed the appeal of the petitioner on the ground of lack of jurisdiction3 and
denied the petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration.4The appeal in CA-G.R. CV No.
83096 had sought to nullify the December 16, 2003 order5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
dismissing the petitioner’s complaint for sum of money and damages on the ground of non
prosequitur.

The Antecedents

The antecedent facts of the petition before us are not disputed.

An alleged breach of contract was the initial event that led to the present petition. The
petitioner claims that one Leticia Magsalin, doing business as "Karen’s Trading," had breached
their subcontract agreement for the supply, delivery, installation, and finishing of parquet tiles
for certain floors in the petitioner’s Makati City condominium project called "The Regency at
Salcedo." The breach triggered the agreement’s termination. When Magsalin also refused to
return the petitioner’s unliquidated advance payment and to account for other monetary
liabilities despite demand, the petitioner sent a notice to respondent FGU Insurance
Corporation (FGU Insurance) demanding damages pursuant to the surety and performance
bonds the former had issued for the subcontract.

On April 30, 2002, the petitioner filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 02-488 against
both Magsalin and FGU Insurance. It was raffled to Branch 61 of the RTC of Makati City. The
complaint sought Two Million Three Hundred Twenty-Nine Thousand One Hundred Twenty
Four Pesos and Sixty Centavos (₱2,329,124.60) as actual damages for the breach of contract.

FGU Insurance was duly served with summons. With respect to Magsalin, however, the
corresponding officer’s return declared that both she and "Karen’s Trading" could not be
located at their given addresses, and that despite further efforts, their new addresses could not
be determined.

In August 2002, FGU Insurance filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The petitioner filed its
opposition to the motion. The motion to dismiss was denied as well as the ensuing motion for
reconsideration, and FGU Insurance was obliged to file an answer.

In October 2002, in an effort to assist the RTC in acquiring jurisdiction over Magsalin, the
petitioner filed a motion for leave to serve summons on respondent Magsalin by way of
publication. In January 2003, the petitioner filed its reply to FGU Insurance’s answer.

In February 2003, FGU Insurance filed a motion for leave of court to file a third-party complaint.
Attached to the motion was the subject complaint,6 with Reynaldo Baetiong, Godofredo Garcia
and Concordia Garcia named as third-party defendants. FGU Insurance claims that the three
had executed counter-guaranties over the surety and performance bonds it executed for the
subcontract with Magsalin and, hence, should be held jointly and severally liable in the event it
is held liable in Civil Case No. 02-488.

The RTC admitted the third-party complaint and denied the motion to serve summons by
publication on the ground that the action against respondent Magsalin was in personam.

In May 2003, the RTC issued a notice setting the case for hearing on June 20, 2003. FGU
Insurance filed a motion to cancel the hearing on the ground that the third-party defendants
had not yet filed their answer. The motion was granted.

In June 2003, Baetiong filed his answer to the third-party complaint. He denied any personal
knowledge about the surety and performance bonds for the subcontract with Magsalin.7 Of the
three (3) persons named as third-party defendants, only Baetiong filed an answer to the third-
party complaint; the officer’s returns on the summons to the Garcias state that both could not
be located at their given addresses. Incidentally, the petitioner claims, and Baetiong does not
dispute, that it was not served with a copy of Baetiong’s answer. The petitioner now argues
before us that FGU Insurance, which is the plaintiff in the third-party complaint, had failed to
exert efforts to serve summons on the Garcias. It suggests that a motion to serve summons by
publication should have been filed for this purpose. The petitioner also asserts that the RTC
should have scheduled a hearing to determine the status of the summons to the third-party
defendants.8

The Order Of Dismissal

With the above procedural events presented by both parties as the only backdrop, on
December 16, 2003 the RTC issued a tersely worded order9 dismissing Civil Case No. 02-488.
For clarity, we quote the dismissal order in full:

ORDER

For failure of [petitioner] to prosecute, the case is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

The RTC denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,10 prompting the latter to elevate
its case to the CA via a Rule 41 petition for review.11

The Ruling of the Appellate Court

FGU Insurance moved for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It
argued that the appeal raised a pure question of law as it did not dispute the proceedings
before the issuance of the December 16, 2003 dismissal order.

The petitioner, on the other hand, insisted that it had raised questions of fact in the
appeal.12 Thus -

While, the instant appeal does not involve the merits of the case, the same involves questions
of fact based on the records of the case. It must be emphasized that the lower court’s dismissal
of the case based on alleged failure to prosecute on the part of plaintiff-appellant was too
sudden and precipitate. This being the case, the facts [sic] to be determined is whether based
on the records of the case, was there a definite inaction on the part of plaintiff-appellant? A
careful examination of all pleadings filed as well as the orders of the lower court vis-à-vis the
rules should now be made in order to determine whether there was indeed a "failure to
prosecute" on the part of plaintiff-appellant[.]13 (emphases supplied)

The CA agreed with FGU Insurance and dismissed the appeal, and denied as well the
subsequent motion for reconsideration.14 The petitioner thus filed the present petition for
review on certiorari.

The Present Petition

The petitioner pleads five (5) grounds to reverse the CA’s resolutions and to reinstate Civil Case
No. 02-488. In an effort perhaps to make sense of the dismissal of the case (considering that
the trial court had not stated the facts that justify it), the petitioner draws this Court’s attention
to certain facts and issues that we find to be of little materiality to the disposition of this
petition:
Grounds/ Statement of Matters Involved

I. The Appellate Court has jurisdiction to determine the merits of the Appeal as the matters
therein involve both questions of law and fact.

II. The lower court erred in declaring that petitioner failed to prosecute the case despite the
fact that petitioner never received a copy of the Answer of Third-party defendant-respondent
Reynaldo Baetiong.

III. The lower court erred in declaring that petitioner failed to prosecute the case despite the
fact that there is no joinder of indispensable parties and issues yet because defendant-
respondent Leticia B. Magsalin as well as third-party defendant-respondents Godofredo and
Concordia Garcia’s whereabouts were unknown, hence no service yet on them of the copy of
the summons and complaint with annexes[.]

IV. The lower court erred in declaring that Petitioner failed to prosecute the case despite the
fact that it was party respondent FGU which caused the cancellation of the hearing.

V. It is evident that the lower court’s dismissal of the case is a clear denial of due process.15

In our Resolution dated February 13, 2006,16 we required the respondents to comment. FGU
Insurance’s comment17alleges that the present petition is "fatally defective" for being
unaccompanied by material portions of the record. It reiterates that the appeal in CA-G.R. CV
No. 83096 was improperly filed under Rule 41 and should have been filed directly with this
Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Baetiong, in his comment,18 asserts that the
dismissal of the appeal was in accord with existing laws and applicable jurisprudence.

The Ruling Of The Court

Preliminarily, we resolve the claim that the petition violates Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on the
attachment of material portions of the record. We note that FGU Insurance fails to discharge its
burden of proving this claim by not specifying the material portions of the record the petitioner
should have attached to the petition. At any rate, after a careful perusal of the petition and its
attachments, the Court finds the petition to be sufficient. In other words, we can judiciously
assess and resolve the present petition on the basis of its allegations and attachments.

After due consideration, we resolve to grant the petition on the ground that the December 16,
2003 dismissal orderis null and void for violation of due process. We are also convinced that the
appeal to challenge the dismissal order was properly filed under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
We further find that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 for failure to prosecute is not
supported by facts, as shown by the records of the case.
The Dismissal Order is Void

The nullity of the dismissal order is patent on its face. It simply states its conclusion that the
case should be dismissed for non prosequitur, a legal conclusion, but does not state the facts on
which this conclusion is based.

Dismissals of actions for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute is authorized under Section 3, Rule
17 of the Rules of Court. A plain examination of the December 16, 2003 dismissal order shows
that it is an unqualified order and, as such, is deemed to be a dismissal with prejudice.
"Dismissals of actions (under Section 3) which do not expressly state whether they are with or
without prejudice are held to be with prejudice[.]"19 As a prejudicial dismissal, the December
16, 2003 dismissal order is also deemed to be a judgment on the merits so that the petitioner’s
complaint in Civil Case No. 02-488 can no longer be refiled on the principle of res judicata.
Procedurally, when a complaint is dismissed for failure to prosecute and the dismissal is
unqualified, the dismissal has the effect of an adjudication on the merits.20

As an adjudication on the merits, it is imperative that the dismissal order conform with Section
1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court on the writing of valid judgments and final orders. The rule
states:

RULE 36
Judgments, Final Orders and Entry Thereof

Section 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. — A judgment or final order determining
the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the
clerk of the court.

The December 16, 2003 dismissal order clearly violates this rule for its failure to disclose how
and why the petitioner failed to prosecute its complaint. Thus, neither the petitioner nor the
reviewing court is able to know the particular facts that had prompted the prejudicial dismissal.
Had the petitioner perhaps failed to appear at a scheduled trial date? Had it failed to take
appropriate actions for the active prosecution of its complaint for an unreasonable length of
time? Had it failed to comply with the rules or any order of the trial court? The December 16,
2003 dismissal orderdoes not say.

We have in the past admonished trial courts against issuing dismissal orders similar to that
appealed in CA-G.R. CV No. 83096. A trial court should always specify the reasons for a
complaint’s dismissal so that on appeal, the reviewing court can readily determine the prima
facie justification for the dismissal.21 A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the
facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark and is especially prejudicial
to the losing party who is unable to point the assigned error in seeking a review by a higher
tribunal.22

We thus agree with the petitioner that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 constituted a
denial of due process. Elementary due process demands that the parties to a litigation be given
information on how the case was decided, as well as an explanation of the factual and legal
reasons that led to the conclusions of the court.23 Where the reasons are absent, a decision
(such as the December 16, 2003 dismissal order) has absolutely nothing to support it and is thus
a nullity.24

For this same reason, we are not moved by respondent FGU Insurance’s statement that the
disposition of the present petition must be limited to the issue of whether the CA had correctly
dismissed the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 83096.25 This statement implies that we cannot
properly look into the validity of the December 16, 2003 dismissal order in this Rule 45 petition.
A void decision, however, is open to collateral attack. While we note that the validity of the
dismissal order with respect to Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court was never raised by the
petitioner as an issue in the present petition, the Supreme Court is vested with ample authority
to review an unassigned error if it finds that consideration and resolution are indispensable or
necessary in arriving at a just decision in an appeal.26 In this case, the interests of substantial
justice warrant the review of an obviously void dismissal order.

The appeal was properly filed

under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court

While the nullity of the December 16, 2003 dismissal order constitutes the ratio decidendi for
this petition, we nevertheless rule on the contention that the appeal was erroneously filed.27

In dismissing the appeal, the CA relied on the premise that since the facts presented in the
petitioner’s appeal were admitted and not disputed, the appeal must thereby raise a pure
question of law proscribed in an ordinary appeal. This premise was effectively the legal
principle articulated in the case of Joaquin v. Navarro,28 cited by the CA in its April 8, 2005
resolution. Respondent FGU Insurance thus contends that the proper remedy to assail the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 was an appeal filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The reliance on Joaquin is misplaced as it is based on the conclusion the appellate court made
in its April 8, 2005 resolution — i.e., that the pleading of undisputed facts is equivalent to a
prohibited appeal. The reliance is inattentive to both the averments of the subject appeal and
to the text of the cited case. The operative legal principle in Joaquin is this: "[W]here a case is
submitted upon an agreement of facts, or where all the facts are stated in the judgment and
the issue is the correctness of the conclusions drawn therefrom, the question is one of law
which [is properly subject to the review of this Court.]"29 In this case, as already pointed out
above, the facts supposedly supporting the trial court’s conclusion of non prosequitur were not
stated in the judgment. This defeats the application of Joaquin.

At any rate, we believe that the filing of the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 83096 under Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court was proper as it necessarily involved questions of fact.

An authority material to this case is the case of Olave v. Mistas.30 Directly addressed
in Olave was the CA’s jurisdiction over an ordinary appeal supported by undisputed facts and
seeking the review of a prejudicial order of dismissal. In this case, a complaint was filed before
the RTC in Lipa City to nullify an instrument titled "Affidavit of Adjudication By The Heirs of the
Estate of Deceased Persons With Sale." The RTC dismissed the complaint, with prejudice, after
the plaintiffs had moved to set the case for pre-trial only after more than three (3) months had
lapsed from the service and filing of the last pleading in the case. The plaintiffs thereafter went
to the CA on a Rule 41 petition, contending, among others, that the trial court had erred and
abused its discretion. As in the present case, the defendants moved to dismiss the appeal on
the ground that the issues therein were legal; they pointed out that the circumstances on
record were admitted.31 They argued that the proper remedy was a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The CA denied the motion and entertained the appeal. It rendered a decision reinstating the
complaint on the ground that there was no evidence on record that the plaintiffs had
deliberately failed to prosecute their complaint.

When the case was elevated to this court on a Rule 45 petition, we squarely addressed the
propriety of the plaintiffs’ appeal. Though mindful that the circumstances pleaded in the appeal
were all admitted, we categorically held in Olave that the appeal was correctly filed. We
observed that despite undisputed records, the CA, in its review, still had to respond to factual
questions such as the length of time between the plaintiffs’ receipt of the last pleading filed up
to the time they moved to set the case for pre-trial, whether there had been any manifest
intention on the plaintiffs’ part not to comply with the Rules of Court, and whether the
plaintiffs’ counsel was negligent.

Significantly, in Olave, we agreed with the plaintiffs that among the critical factual questions
was whether, based on the records, there had been factual basis for the dismissal of the subject
complaint. This same question is particularly significant in the present case given that the order
appealed from in CA-G.R. CV No. 83096 does not even indicate the factual basis for the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488. Due to the absence of any stated factual basis, and despite
the admissions of the parties, the CA, in CA-G.R. CV No. 83096, still had to delve into the
records to check whether facts to justify the prejudicial dismissal even exist. Since the dismissal
of Civil Case No. 02-488 appears to have been rendered motu proprio (as the December 16,
2003 dismissal order does not state if it was issued upon the respondents’ or the trial court’s
motion), the facts to be determined by the CA should include the grounds specified under
Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. A court could only issue a motu proprio dismissal
pursuant to the grounds mentioned in this rule and for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter.32 These grounds are matters of facts. Thus, given that the dismissal order does not
disclose its factual basis, we are thus persuaded that the petitioner had properly filed its appeal
from the dismissal order under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

The Dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 is not Supported by the Facts of the Case

We also find that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 is not warranted. Based on available
records and on the averments of the parties, the following events were chronologically
proximate to the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488: (a) on March 24, 2003, the court admitted
FGU Insurance’s third-party complaint; (b) the trial court cancelled the June 20, 2003 hearing
upon FGU Insurance’s motion; and (c) on June 16, 2003, Baetiong filed his Answer to the third-
party complaint but did not serve it upon the petitioner.

None of these events square with the grounds specified by Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of
Court for the motu proprio dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute. These grounds are as
follows:

(a) Failure of the plaintiff, without justifiable reasons, to appear on the date of the presentation
of his evidence in chief;

(b) Failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time;

(c) Failure of the plaintiff to comply with the Rules of Court; or

(d) Failure of the plaintiff to obey any order of the court.

In our view, the developments in the present case do not satisfy the stringent standards set in
law and jurisprudence for a non prosequitur.33 The fundamental test for non prosequitur is
whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in
failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude.34 There must be unwillingness on the part of
the plaintiff to prosecute.35

In this case, the parties’ own narrations of facts demonstrate the petitioner’s willingness to
prosecute its complaint.1âwphi1Indeed, neither respondents FGU Insurance nor Baetiong was
able to point to any specific act committed by the petitioner to justify the dismissal of their
case.
While it is discretionary on the trial court to dismiss cases, dismissals of actions should be made
with care. The repressive or restraining effect of the rule amounting to adjudication upon the
merits may cut short a case even before it is fully litigated; a ruling of dismissal may forever bar
a litigant from pursuing judicial relief under the same cause of action. Hence, sound discretion
demands vigilance in duly recognizing the circumstances surrounding the case to the end that
technicality shall not prevail over substantial justice.36

This court is thus of the opinion that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 is not warranted.
Neither facts, law or jurisprudence supports the RTC’s finding of failure to prosecute on the part
of the petitioner.

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant petition is Granted. The resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated April 8, 2005 and October 4, 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The order dated
December 16, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati City, in Civil Case No. 02-488
is declared NULL and VOID, and the petitioner’s complaint therein is ordered REINSTATED for
further proceedings. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G .R. No. 193857 : November 28, 2012

MA. MERCEDES L. BARBA, Petitioner, v. LICEO DE CAGAYAN UNIVERSITY, Respondent.

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Dr. Ma. Mercedes L. Barba (Barba) was the Dean of the College of Physical Therapy of
respondent Liceo de Cagayan University, Inc. (Liceo).

In the school year 2003 to 2004, the College of Physical Therapy suffered a dramatic decline in
the number of enrollees from a total of 1,121 students in the school year 1995 to 1996 to only
29 students in the first semester of school year 2003 to 2004. Due to the low number of
enrollees, Liceo decided to freeze the operation of the College of Physical Therapy indefinitely.
Thereafter, the College of Physical Therapy ceased operations and Barba went on leave without
pay starting. Subsequently, Liceo sent Barba a letter dated April 27, 2005 instructing Barba to
return to work on and report to Ma. Chona Palomares, the Acting Dean of the College of
Nursing, to receive her teaching load and assignment as a full-time faculty member in that
department. Barba did not report to Palomares and requested for the processing of her
separation benefits in view of the closure of the College of Physical Therapy.

Another letter was sent to Barba but the latter still refused to return to work. Hence, Liceo sent
Barba a notice terminating her services on the ground of abandonment.

Barba filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, payment of separation pay
and retirement benefits againstLiceo. She alleged that her transfer to the College of Nursing as
a faculty member is a demotion amounting to constructive dismissal.

The LA ruled that Barba was not constructively dismissed. The NLRC reversed the LA. Liceo went
to the CA and filed a Supplemental Petition raising for the first time the issue of lack of
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC over the case. Liceo claimed that a College Dean
is a corporate officer under its by-laws and Barba was a corporate officer of Liceo since her
appointment was approved by the board of directors. Thus, Liceo maintained that the
jurisdiction over the case is with the regular courts and not with the labor tribunals.

In its original Decision, the CA reversed the NLRC resolutions. The CA did not find merit in Liceos
assertion in its Supplemental Petition that the position of Barba as College Dean was a
corporate office. The CA further found that no constructive dismissal occurred nor has Barba
abandoned her work.

Unsatisfied, both Barba and Liceo sought reconsideration of the CA decision. Thereafter, the CA
reversed its earlier ruling. Hence,Barba filed the present petition.

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not the labor tribunals have jurisdiction over Barbas complaint for constructive
dismissal?
II. Whether or not Barba was constructively dismissed?

HELD: The petition is granted.

MERCANTILE LAW: corporate officers

FIRST ISSUE: Labor tribunals have jurisdiction over Barbas complaint.

Corporate officers are elected or appointed by the directors or stockholders, and are those who
are given that character either by the Corporation Code or by the corporations by-laws. Section
25 of the Corporation Code enumerates corporate officers as the president, the secretary, the
treasurer and such other officers as may be provided for in the by-laws. In Matling Industrial
and Commercial Corporation v. Coros, the phrase "such other officers as may be provided for in
the by-laws" has been clarified, thus: "Conformably with Section 25, a position must be
expressly mentioned in the By-Laws in order to be considered as a corporate office. The rest of
the corporate officers could be considered only as employees of subordinate officials."

However, an assiduous perusal of these documents does not convince us that Barba occupies a
corporate office position in the university. In Liceos by-laws, there are four officers specifically
mentioned, namely, a president, a vice president, a secretary and a treasurer. In addition, it is
provided that there shall be other appointive officials, a College Director and heads of
departments whose appointments, compensations, powers and duties shall be determined by
the board of directors. It is worthy to note that a College Dean is not among the corporate
officers mentioned in Liceos by-laws. Barba was not directly elected nor appointed by the board
of directors to any corporate office but her appointment was merely approved by the board
together with the other academic deans of respondent university in accordance with the
procedure prescribed in Liceos Administrative Manual. Though the board of directors may
create appointive positions other than the positions of corporate officers, the persons
occupying such positions cannot be deemed as corporate officers as contemplated by Section
25 of the Corporation Code. Thus, petitioner, being an employee of respondent, her complaint
for illegal/constructive dismissal against respondent was properly within the jurisdiction of the
LaborArbiter and the NLRC.

LABOR LAW: constructive dismissal

On the issue of constructive dismissal, we agree with the Labor Arbiter and the appellate courts
earlier ruling that Barba was not constructively dismissed.Barbas letter of appointment
specifically appointed her as Dean of the College of Physical Therapy and Doctor-in-Charge of
the Rehabilitation Clinic "for a period of three years effective July 1, 2002 unless sooner
revoked for valid cause or causes." Evidently, Barbas appointment as College Dean was for a
fixed term, subject to reappointment and revocation or termination for a valid cause. When
Liceo decided to close its College of Physical Therapy due to drastic decrease in
enrollees,Barbas appointment as its College Dean was validly revoked and her subsequent
assignment to teach in the College of Nursing was justified as it is still related to her scholarship
studies in Physical Therapy. Particularly, for a transfer not to be considered a constructive
dismissal, the employer must be able to show that such transfer is not unreasonable,
inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee.
G.R. No. 190810 July 18, 2012

LORENZA C. ONGCO, PETITIONER,

vs.
VALERIANA UNGCO DALISAY, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure asking the Court to rule whether petitioner may intervene in a land registration case.

The Petition seeks to annul and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Resolutions 1 dated 30
September 2009 and 11 November 2009 (assailed Resolutions), which denied petitioner's
Motion for Leave to Intervene dated 23 June 2009.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

On 15 October 2007, respondent Valeriana Ungco Dalisay (Dalisay) applied for registration of a
parcel of land designated as Lot 1792, Cad-609-D, by filing an Application for Land Registration
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Binangonan, Branch 2.2 At the hearings, no oppositor
aside from the Republic of the Philippines (the Republic) came. Neither was there any written
opposition filed in court. Thus, an Order of General Default was issued against the whole world
except the Republic. Consequently, on 15 October 2008, the court found respondent Dalisay to
have clearly shown a registrable right over the subject property and ordered that a decree of
registration be issued by the Land Registration Authority once the Decision had become
final.3 Herein petitioner Lorenza C. Ongco (Ongco) never intervened in the proceedings in the
trial court.

The Republic filed an appeal with the CA docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 92046.4 While the case
was pending appeal, petitioner Ongco filed a "Motion for Leave to Intervene" dated 23 June
2009 with an attached Answer-in-Intervention.5

The Answer-in-Intervention sought the dismissal of respondent Dalisay's Application for Land
Registration on the ground that, contrary to the allegations of Dalisay, the subject property was
not free from any adverse claim. In fact, petitioner Ongco had allegedly been previously found
to be in actual possession of the subject land in an earlier case filed before the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) when she applied for a free patent on the land.6

In her Comment/Objection to the Motion for Leave to Intervene, Dalisay contended that Ongco
did not have a legal interest over the property.7 Moreover, the intervention would unduly delay
the registration proceeding, which was now on appeal. Besides, petitioner's interest, if any,
may be fully protected in a separate and direct proceeding. Additionally, Dalisay pointed out
that Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court was clear that intervention may be filed at any time
before rendition of judgment by the trial court, but not at any other time. The Republic, on the
other hand, said that it was interposing no objection to the Motion for Leave to Intervene. 8

On 30 September 2009, the CA issued its first assailed Resolution9 denying the Motion for
Intervention for having been filed beyond the period allowed by law. It said:

Lorenza C. Ongco's prayer to be allowed to intervene in the instant "MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
INTERVENE XXX" is DENIED[,] said motion having been filed beyond the period allowed by law.

Manalo vs. Court of Appeals is emphatic:

Intervention is not a matter of right but may be permitted by the courts only when the
statutory conditions for the right to intervene [are] shown. Thus, the allowance or disallowance
of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. In determining the
propriety of letting a party intervene in a case, the tribunal should not limit itself to inquiring
whether "a person (1) has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; (2) or in the success of
either of the parties; (3) or an interest against both; (4) or when is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an
officer thereof." Just as important, as (the Supreme Court had) stated in Big Country Ranch
Corporation v. Court of Appeals [227 SCRA 161{1993}], is the function to consider whether or
not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate
proceeding.

The period within which a person may intervene is also restricted. Section 2, Rule 19 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires:

"SECTION 2. Time to intervene. — The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before the
rendition of judgment by the trial court, x x x."

After the lapse of this period, it will not be warranted anymore. This is because, basically,
intervention is not an independent action but is ancillary and supplemental to an existing
litigation.

Here, the subject motion was filed only on June 23, 2009, way beyond the rendition of the
Decision dated October 15, 2008 (subject of the instant appeal by the Office of the Solicitor
General) by the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Branch 2. As a necessary consequence, the
prayed for admission of the instant "ANSWER-IN-INTERVENTION could only be denied, x x x.
(Emphases in the original)

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,10 which was also denied in a Resolution dated 11
November 2009.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45.

In her three-page Comment11 on the Petition, respondent Dalisay briefly argues that the CA did
not commit any error, because it properly applied the technical rules of procedure in denying
the Motion for Intervention. She also argues that the issues being presented are factual and, as
such, not reviewable in a Petition for Review under Rule 45.

In her Reply,12 petitioner asserts that the issues to be resolved in her Petition are questions of
law: whether the requisites for intervention are present, and whether the intervention she is
seeking is an exception to the general rule that intervention must be filed before judgment is
rendered by the trial court.

Issue for Resolution and the Ruling of the Court

The issue for resolution in the instant case is whether the CA committed reversible error in
denying the Motion for Intervention of petitioner.

We rule to deny the Petition.

DISCUSSION

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings,
becomes a litigant therein for a certain purpose: to enable the third party to protect or
preserve a right or interest that may be affected by those proceedings.13 This remedy, however,
is not a right. The rules on intervention are set forth clearly in Rule 19 of the Rules of Court,
which reads:

Sec. 1. Who may intervene. - A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in
the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court
or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The
court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may
be fully protected in a separate proceeding.

Sec. 2. Time to intervene. - The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the
motion and served on the original parties. (Emphasis supplied)

It can be readily seen that intervention is not a matter of right, but is left to the trial court's
sound discretion. The trial court must not only determine if the requisite legal interest is
present, but also take into consideration the delay and the consequent prejudice to the original
parties that the intervention will cause. Both requirements must concur, as the first
requirement on legal interest is not more important than the second requirement that no delay
and prejudice should result.14 To help ensure that delay does not result from the granting of a
motion to intervene, the Rules also explicitly say that intervention may be allowed only before
rendition of judgment by the trial court.

In Executive Secretary v. Northeast Freight,15 this Court explained intervention in this wise:

Intervention is not a matter of absolute right but may be permitted by the court when the
applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the statute authorizing intervention.
Under our Rules of Court, what qualifies a person to intervene is his possession of a legal
interest in the matter in litigation or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both; or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition
of property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof. As regards the legal interest as
qualifying factor, this Court has ruled that such interest must be of a direct and immediate
character so that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the
judgment. The interest must be actual and material, a concern which is more than mere
curiosity, or academic or sentimental desire; it must not be indirect and contingent, indirect
and remote, conjectural, consequential or collateral. However, notwithstanding the presence of
a legal interest, permission to intervene is subject to the sound discretion of the court, the
exercise of which is limited by considering "whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the
intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding." (Emphasis supplied)

Applying the foregoing points to the case at bar, Ongco may not be allowed to intervene.

Petitioner has not shown any legal interest of such nature that she "will either gain or lose by
the direct legal operation of the judgment." On the contrary, her interest is indirect and
contingent. She has not been granted a free patent over the subject land, as she in fact admits
being only in the process of applying for one.16 Her interest is at best inchoate. In Firestone
Ceramics v. CA,17 the Court held that the petitioner who anchored his motion to intervene on
his legal interest arising from his pending application for a free patent over a portion of the
subject land merely had a collateral interest in the subject matter of the litigation. His collateral
interest could not have justified intervention.

In any event, the Motion for Intervention was filed only with the CA after the MTC had
rendered judgment. By itself, this inexcusable delay is a sufficient ground for denying the
motion. To recall, the motion should be filed "any time before rendition of judgment." The
history and rationale of this rule has been explained thusly:

1. The former rule as to when intervention may be allowed was expressed in Sec. 2, Rule
12 as "before or during a trial," and this ambiguity also gave rise to indecisive doctrines.
Thus, inceptively it was held that a motion for leave to intervene may be filed "before or
during a trial" even on the day when the case is submitted for decision (Falcasantos vs.
Falcasantos, L-4627, May 13, 1952) as long as it will not unduly delay the disposition of
the case. The term "trial" was used in its restricted sense, i.e., the period for the
 introduction for intervention was filed after the case had already been submitted for
decision, the denial thereof is proper (Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Arciaga, L-29207
and L-29222, July 31, 1974). However, it has also been held that intervention may be
allowed at any time before the rendition of final judgment (Linchauco vs. CA, et al, L-
23842, Mar. 13, 1975). Further, in the exceptional case of Director of Lands vs. CA, et al.
(L-45168, Sept. 25, 1979), the Supreme Court permitted intervention in a case pending
before it on appeal in order to avoid injustice and in consideration of the number of
parties who may be affected by the dispute involving overlapping of numerous land
titles.

2. The uncertainty in these ruling has been eliminated by the present Sec. 2 of this
amended Rule which permits the filing of the motion to intervene at any time before
the rendition of the judgment in the case, in line with the doctrine in Lichauco above
cited. The justification advanced for this is that before judgment is rendered, the court,
for good cause shown, may still allow the introduction of additional evidence and that is
still within a liberal interpretation of the period for trial. Also, since no judgment has yet
been rendered, the matter subject of the intervention may still be readily resolved and
integrated in the judgment disposing of all claims in the case, and would not require an
overall reassessment of said claims as would be the case if the judgment had already
been rendered.18 (Emphases supplied)

Indeed, in Manalo v. CA,19 the Court said:

The period within which a person may intervene is also restricted. Section 2, Rule 19 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires:

"SECTION 2. Time to intervene. — The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before the
rendition of judgment by the trial court x x x."

After the lapse of this period, it will not be warranted anymore. This is because, basically,
intervention is not an independent action but is ancillary and supplemental to an existing
litigation. (Emphases supplied)

There is wisdom in strictly enforcing the period set by Rule 19 of the Rules of Court for the filing
of a motion for intervention. Otherwise, undue delay would result from many belated filings of
motions for intervention after judgment has already been rendered, because a reassessment of
claims would have to be done. Thus, those who slept on their lawfully granted privilege to
intervene will be rewarded, while the original parties will be unduly prejudiced. This rule should
apply more strictly to land registration cases, in which there is a possibility that a great number
of claimant-oppositors may cause a delay in the proceedings by filing motions to intervene after
the trial court — sitting as a land registration court — has rendered judgment.

Also, it must be noted that a land registration proceeding is an action in rem.1âwphi1 Thus,
only a general notice to the public is required, and not a personal one. Its publication already
binds the whole world, including those who will be adversely affected. This, according to this
Court, is the only way to give meaning to the finality and indefeasibility of the Torrens title to
be issued as against the argument that the said rule could result in actual injustice. 20 In the
present case, the MTC found that the required publication was made by respondent Dalisay
when she applied for land registration. That publication was sufficient notice to petitioner
Ongco. Thus, petitioner only had herself to blame when she failed to intervene as soon as she
could before the rendition of judgment.

We also note that, had petitioner learned of the trial court proceedings in time, and had she
wanted to oppose the application, the proper procedure would have been to ask for the lifting
of the order of default and then to file the opposition.21 It would be an error of procedure to file
a motion to intervene. This is because, as discussed above, proceedings in land registration are
in rem and not in personam.22

Aware of her fatal shortcoming, petitioner Ongco would now like the Court to exceptionally
allow intervention even after judgment has been rendered by the MTC in the land registration
case. She cites instances in which this Court allowed intervention on appeal. However, the
cases she cited are inapplicable to the present case, because the movants therein who wanted
to intervene were found by the Court to be indispensable parties. Thus, under Section 7, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court, they had to be joined because, without them, there could be no final
determination of the actions. Indeed, if indispensable parties are not impleaded, any judgment
would have no effect.

In Galicia v. Manliquez,23 the first case cited by petitioner, the Court found that the defendant-
intervenors were indispensable parties, being the indisputable compulsory co-heirs of the
original defendants in the case for recovery of possession and ownership, and annulment of
title. Thus, without them, there could be no final determination of the action. Moreover, they
certainly stood to be affected by any judgment in the case, considering their "ostensible
ownership of the property."

In Mago v. CA,24 the intervenor was the rightful awardee of a piece of land that was mistakenly
awarded by the NHA to another awardee. Thus, the latter was given title to land with an area
that was more than that intended to be awarded to him. The NHA then cancelled the title
mistakenly awarded and ordered the subdivision of the lot into two. The recipient of the
mistakenly awarded title filed a Petition for injunction to enjoin the NHA from cancelling the
title awarded. The Petition was granted and the judgment became final. The other awardee
filed a Motion to Intervene, as well as a Petition for Relief from Judgment, which were both
denied by the trial court. The CA affirmed the Decision of the court a quo. This Court, however,
found that the intervention should have been granted, considering the indisputable admission
of the NHA, the grantor-agency itself, that the intervenor was the rightful awardee of half of
the lot mistakenly awarded. Thus, the intervenor stood to be deprived of his rightful award
when the trial court enjoined the cancellation of the mistakenly awarded title and the
subdivision of the lot covered by the title. The intervenor's legal interest, in other words, was
directly affected.
In the present case, petitioner Ongco is not an indispensable party. As already noted, her
interests are inchoate and merely collateral, as she is only in the process of applying for a free
patent. Also, the action for land registration may proceed and be carried to judgment without
joining her. This is because the issues to be threshed out in a land registration proceeding —
such as whether the subject land is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and
whether the applicant or her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of the said land under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June
1945, or earlier — can be threshed out without joining petitioner.

True, the evidence to be adduced by petitioner Ongco - to prove that she, not Dalisay, has been
in possession of the land subject of the application for registration of respondent — has a
bearing on the determination of the latter's right to register her title to the land. In particular,
this evidence will help debunk the claim of respondent that she has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject parcel of land. In fact, this same evidence
must have been the reason why the Republic did not interpose any objection to the Motion for
Intervention. None of these facts, however, makes petitioner an indispensable party; for there
are many other ways of establishing the fact of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject parcel of land or the lack thereof.

If any, the only indispensable party to a land registration case is the Republic. Against it, no
order of default would be effective, because the Regalian doctrine presumes that all lands not
otherwise appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State.25

In any case, we note that petitioner is not left without any remedy in case respondent succeeds
in getting a decree of registration. Under Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, or the
Property Registration Decree, there is a remedy available to any person deprived of land — or
of any estate or interest therein - through an adjudication or a confirmation of title obtained by
actual fraud. The person may file, in the proper court, a petition for reopening and reviewing
the decree of registration within one year from the date of entry thereof. This Court has ruled
that actual fraud is committed by a registration applicant's failure or intentional omission to
disclose the fact of actual physical possession of the premises by the party seeking a review of
the decree. It is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact from which benefit is obtained, to the
prejudice of a third person.26 Thus, if he is so minded, petitioner can still file for a petition to
review the decree of registration.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals
Resolutions dated 30 September 2009 and 11 November 2009, which denied petitioner's
Motion for Leave to Intervene in CA-G.R. CV No. 92046, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.