LEONORA PERIDO, joined by husband MANUEL PIROTE, INOCENCIA

PERIDO, ALBENIO PERIDO, PAULINO PERIDO, LETIA PERIDO, joined by

husband BIENVENIDO BALYAO, LETICIA PERIDO, joined by husband
FELIX VILLARUZ, EUFEMIA PERIDO, CONSOLACION PERIDO, ALFREDO
PERIDO, GEORGE PERIDO, AMPARO PERIDO, WILFREDO PERIDO,
MARGARITA PERIDO, ROLANDO SALDE and EDUARDO SALDE,
petitioners,
vs.
MARIA PERIDO, SOFRONIO PERIDO, JUAN A. PERIDO, GONZALO
PERIDO, PACITA PERIDO, MAGDALENA PERIDO, ALICIA PERIDO,
JOSEFINA PERIDO, FE PERIDO, TERESA PERIDO and LUZ PERIDO,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-28248 | 1975-03-12
FIRST DIVISION
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals

in its CA-G.R. No. 37034-R, affirming the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 6529.

Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during

his lifetime. His first wife was Benita Talorong, with whom he begot
three (3) children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita. After Benita died Lucio
married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had five (5) children: Eusebio,
Juan, Maria, Sofronia and Gonzalo. Lucio himself died in 1942, while his
second wife died in 1943.

Of the three (3) children belonging to the first marriage only Margarita
Perido is still living. Her deceased brother, Felix Perido, is survived by his
children Inocencia, Leonora, Albinio, Paulino, Letia, Leticia, and Eufemia,
all surnamed Perido. Nicanora Perido, another daughter of Felix, is also
deceased, but is survived by two (2) sons, Rolando and Eduardo Salde.

Margarita's other deceased brother, Ismael Perido, is survived by his

children, namely: Consolacion, Alfredo, Wilfredo, and Amparo. Susano
Perido, another son of Ismael, is dead, but survived by his own son
George Perido.
Of Lucio Perido's five (5) children by his second wife, two are already
dead, namely: Eusebio and Juan. Eusebio is survived by his children
Magdalena Perido, Pacita Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe
Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido, while Juan is survived by his only
child, Juan A. Perido.

On August 15, 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first and
second marriages of Lucio Perido executed a document denominated as
"Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition," whereby they
partitioned among themselves Lots Nos. 458, 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-B,
807, and 808, all of the Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Occidental
Negros.

Evidently the children belonging to the first marriage of Lucio Perido had
second thoughts about the partition. On March 8, 1962 they filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, which
complaint was later amended on February 22, 1963, against the children
of the second marriage, praying for the annulment of the so-called
"Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition" and for another
partition of the lots mentioned therein among the plaintiffs alone. They
alleged, among other things, that they had been induced by the
defendants to execute the document in question through
misrepresentation, false promises and fraudulent means; that the lots
which were partitioned in said document belonged to the conjugal
partnership of the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, and that
the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat were all
illegitimate and therefore had no successional rights to the estate of
Lucio Perido, who died in 1942. The defendants denied the foregoing
allegations.

After trial the lower court rendered its decision dated July 31, 1965,
annulling the "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition."
However, it did not order the partition of the lots involved among the
plaintiffs exclusively in view of its findings that the five children of Lucio
Perido with his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, were legitimate; that all
the lots, except Lot No. 458, were the exclusive properties of Lucio
Perido; and that 11/12 of Lot No. 458 belonged to the conjugal
partnership of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment as
follows: declaring the following as the legitimate children and
grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong: Felix
Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Inocencia Perido, Leonora Perido,
Albinio Perido, Paulino Perido, Letia Perido, Leticia Perido, Eufemia
Perido; Nicanora Perido, deceased; great grandchildren: Rolando Salde
and Eduardo Salde; Ismael Perido, deceased; grandchildren:
Consolacion Perido, Alfredo Perido, Susano Perido, deceased; great
grandson: George Perido; Amparo Perido and Wilfredo Perido; and,
Margarita Perido; (2) declaring the following as the legitimate children
and grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat:
Eusebio Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Pacita Perido, Magdalena
Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz
Perido; Juan B. Perido, deceased; grandson, Juan A. Perido; Maria
Perido; Sofronia Perido; and Gonzalo Perido; (3) declaring all lots (471,
506, 511, 509, 513-part, 807, and 808) except Lot No. 458 as exclusive
properties of Lucio Perido so that each of them should be divided into
eight (8) equal parts: 1/8 belongs to Felix Perido, but because of his
death leaving eight (8) children, the same should be divided and alloted
as follows: 1/64 to Inocencia Perido of age, widow; 1/64 to Leonora
Perido, of age, married to Manuel Pirote; 1/64 to Albinio Perido, of age,
married to Honorata Villasana; 1/64 to Paulino Perido, of age, married to
Norma Villalba 1/64 to Letia Perido, of age, married to Bienvenido Balyac;
1/64 to Leticia Perido, of age, married to Felix Villaruz; 1/64 to Eufemia
Perido, of age, single; 1/64 to Nicanora Perido, but because she is now
dead the same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/128 to Rolando
Salde, of age, single; and 1/128 to Eduardo Salde, of age, single; 1/8
belongs to Ismael Perido, but because he is already dead leaving five
children, the same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/40 to
Consolacion Perido, of age, widow; 1/40 to Alfredo Perido, of age
married to Trinidad Tamargo; 1/40 to Susano Perido, but he is already
dead with one son, the same goes to George Perido, of age, single; 1/40
to Wilfredo Perido, of age, single; 1/8 belongs to Margarita Perido, of
age, widow; 1/8 belongs to Eusebio Perido, but because he is already
dead with seven children, the same should be divided and alloted as
follows: 1/56 goes to Pacita Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to
Magdalena Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to Alicia Perido, of age,
married to Isaias Ruiz; 1/56 goes to Josefina Perido, of age, married to
Leopoldo Doloroso; 1/56 goes to Fe Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to
Teresa Perido, of are single; 1/56 goes to Luz Perido, of age, married to
Fidel de la Cruz; 1/8 belongs to Juan B. Perido, but because he is already
dead with one child, the same 1/8 goes to Juan A. Perido, of age, married
to Salud Salgado 1/8 goes to Maria Perido. of age, married to Julio Pirote;
1/8 goes to Sofronia Perido, of age, widow; and, 1/8 goes to Gonzalo
Perido, of age, married to Lacomemoracion Estiller; (4) declaring the
11/12 shares in Lot No. 458 as conjugal partnership property of Lucio
Perido and Marcelina Baliguat, which should be divided and alloted as
follows: 11/24 goes to Lucio Perido to be divided into eight (8) equal
shares and 11/24 goes to Marcelina Baliguat to be divided into five (5)
equal shares or 11/120 for each of the children and again to be divided by
the children of each child now deceased; (6) declaring Fidel Perido
owner of 1/12 share in Lot 458 to be divided among his heirs to be
determined accordingly later; and (6) declaring null and void Exhibit "J"
of the plaintiffs which is Exhibit "10" for the defendants, without costs
and without adjudication with respect to the counterclaim and
damages, they being members of the same family, for equity and justice.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial
court erred: (1) in declaring that Eusebio Perido, Juan Perido, Maria
Perido, Sofronia Perido and Gonzalo Perido, were the legitimate
children of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat; (2) in
declaring that Lucio Perido was the exclusive owner of Lots Nos. 471,
506, 511, 509, 513-Part, 807, and 808 of Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan,
Negros Occidental, and in not declaring that said lots were the conjugal
partnership property of Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita Talorong;
and (3) in holding that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership
property of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat.

Finding no reversible error in the decision of the lower court, the Court
of Appeals affirmed it in toto. The appellants moved to reconsider but
were turned down. Thereupon they instituted he instant petition for
review reiterating in effect the assignments of error and the arguments
in the brief they submitted to the appellate court.

The first issue pertains to the legitimacy of the five children of Lucio
Perido with Marcelina Baliguat. The petitioners insist that said children
were illegitimate on the theory that the first three were born out of
wedlock even before the death of Lucio Perido's first wife, while the last
two were also born out of wedlock and were not recognized by their
parents before or after their marriage. In support of their contention
they allege that Benita Talorong died in 1905, after the first three
children were born, as testified to by petitioner Margarita Perido and
corroborated by petitioner Leonora Perido; that as late as 1923 Lucio
Perido was still a widower, as shown on the face of the certificates of
title issued to him in said year; and Lucio Perido married his second wife,
Marcelina Baliguat, only in 1925, as allegedly established through the
testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido.

The petition cannot be sustained. The Court of Appeals found that there
was evidence to show that Lucio Perido's wife, Benita Talorong, died
during the Spanish regime. This finding conclusive upon us and beyond
our power of review. Under the circumstance, Lucio Perido had no legal
impediment to marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of their first
child in 1900.

With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the

certificates of title issued to him in 1923, the Court of Appeals correctly
held that the statement was not conclusive to show that he was not
actually married to Marcelina Baliguat. Furthermore, it is weak and
insufficient to rebut the presumption that persons living together
husband and wife are married to each other. This presumption,
especially where legitimacy of the issue is involved, as in this case, may
be overcome only by cogent proof on the part of those who allege the
illegitimacy. In the case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee 1 this Court
explained the rationale behind this presumption, thus: "The basis of
human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new
relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony
are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus
hold themselves out as being, they would he living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code
of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Sec.
334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume
marriage."

While the alleged marriage ceremony in 1925, if true, might tend to rebut
the presumption of marriage arising from previous cohabitation, it is to
be noted that both the trial court and the appellate court did not even
pass upon the uncorroborated testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido
on the matter. The reason is obvious. Said witness, when asked why she
knew that Marcelina Baliguat was married to Lucio Perido only in 1925,
merely replied that she knew it because "during the celebration of the
marriage by the Aglipayan priest (they) got flowers from (their) garden
and placed in the altar." Evidently she was not even an eyewitness to
the ceremony.

In view of the foregoing the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding
that the five children of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat were born
during their marriage and, therefore, legitimate.

The second assignment of error refers to the determination of whether

or not Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509-513-Part, 807 and 808 were the
exclusive properties of Lucio Perido. In disposing of the contention of
the petitioners that said lots belong to the conjugal partnership of
spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, the Court of Appeals said:

... We cannot agree again with them on this point. It is to be noted that
the lands covered by the certificates of title (Exhs. B to G) were all
declared in the name of Lucio Perido. Then there is evidence showing
that the lands were inherited by Lucio Perido from his grandmother
(t.s.n., p. 21, Feb. 20, 1964). In other words, they were the exclusive
properties of the late Lucio Perido which he brought into the first and
second marriages. By fiat of law said Properties should be divided
accordingly among his legal heirs.
The petitioners take exception to the finding of the appellate court that
the aforementioned lots were inherited by Lucio Perido from his
grandmother and contend that they were able to establish through the
testimonies of their witnesses that the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita
Talorong acquired them during their lifetime. Again, the petitioners
cannot be sustained. The question involves appreciation of the
evidence, which is within the domain of the Court of Appeals, the factual
findings of which are not reviewable by this Court.

The third assignment of error is with regard to the ruling of the Court of
Appeals sustaining the finding of the trial court that 11/12 of Lot 458 was
the conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and his second wife,
Marcelina Baliguat. Said the appellate court:

With respect to Lot No. 458 which is now covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. 21769 issued in 1925 the same should be considered
conjugally owned by Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina
Baliguat. The finding of the lower court on this point need not be
disturbed. It is expressly stated in the certificate of title (Exh. L) that
Lucio Perido, the registered owner, was married to Marcelina Baliguat
unlike in the previous land titles. If the law presumes a property
registered in the name of only one of the spouses to be conjugal
(Guinguing vs. Abutin, 48 Phil. 144; Flores vs. Flores, 48 Phil. 288, Escutin
vs. Escutin, 60 Phil. 922), the presumption becomes stronger when the
document recites that the spouse in whose name the land is registered
is married to somebody else, like in the case at bar. It appearing that the
legal presumption that the No. 458 belonged to the conjugal
partnership had not been overcome by clear proofs to the contrary, we
are constrained to rule, that the same is the conjugal property of the
deceased spouses Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat.

In impugning the foregoing ruling, the petitioners maintain that they

were able to prove that 6/12 of said Lot 458 was the conjugal property
of spouses Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita Talorong, and that the
purchase price of the additional 5/12 of said lot came from the proceeds
of sale of a lot allegedly belonging to Lucio Perido and his three children
of the first marriage. As in the second assignment of error, the issue
raised here also involves appreciation of the evidence and,
consequently, the finding of the appellate court on the matter is binding
on this Court. Indeed, a review of that finding would require an
examination of all the evidence introduced before the trial court, a
consideration of the credibility of witnesses and of the circumstances
surrounding the case, their relevancy or relation to one another and to
the whole, as well as an appraisal of the probabilities of the entire
situation. It would thus abolish the distinction between an ordinary
appeal on the one hand and review on certiorari on the other, and thus
defeat the purpose for which the latter procedure has been established.
2

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed,

with costs against the petitioners.

Perido v.Perido, 63 SCRA 97

FACTS: Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married twice

during his lifetime. His first wife was Benita Talorong, with whom he
begot 3 children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita. After Benita died Lucio
married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had 5 children: Eusebio, Juan,
Maria, Sofronia and Gonzalo. Lucio died in 1942, while his second wife
died in 1943. Margarita is the only living child of the first marriage. The
children and grandchildren of the first marriage and second marriage
filed a case regarding the partition of the properties of Lucio Perido.
Margarita et al asserted that the children and grandchildren of the
second marriage were illegitimate.

ISSUE: W/N the children and grandchildren of the second marriage of

Lucio Perido were legitimate, entitling them for the partition of lands

HELD: Yes. A person who was not at the marriage ceremony cannot
testify as an eyewitness that the marriage did not take place. In the
absence of proof that marriage did not take place a man and a woman
living together as husband and wife are presumed married.
FELICIDAD BARINAN TAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. GALILEO J. TROCIO,
respondent.
A.C. No. 2115 | 1990-11-27

DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

In a verified complaint, filed on 9 November 1979, complainant Felicidad

Bariñan Tan seeks the disbarment of respondent Atty. Galileo J. Trocio
for immorality and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.

Complainant, owner and directress of Harlyn Vocational School in Baroy,

Lanao del Norte, declares that sometime in April, 1971, at about 8:30 PM,
after classes were dismissed, respondent, who is the legal counsel of the
school, overpowered her inside the office and, against her will,
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. As a result, she begot a
son on 5 February 1972 whom she named and registered as Jewel Tan.
She avers that respondent used to support Jewel but subsequently lost
interest in doing so thereby neglecting to defray the needed expenses
for Jewel's well-being.

Complainant also alleges that the respondent threatened her with the
deportation of her alien husband if she complained to the authorities
since she was violating the Anti-Dummy Law in operating the vocational
school. This threat, aside from the fact that Complainant is a married
woman with eight children and a school directress at the time of the
sexual assault, made her desist from filing a charge against the
respondent. However, after eight years and thorough soul-searching,
she decided to file this administrative complaint.

Respondent, in his Answer, admits having acted as a lawyer of the

vocational school. In fact, he contends that he had also served as the
lawyer of the Complainant, her family and her parents-in-law. Thus, in
1971, he helped prosecute a case for robbery committed against
Complainant's mother and sisters. Also, in March of 1976, when a fire of
unknown origin gutted the school, he assisted the complainant in
collecting P10,000.00 from FGU Insurance Group, and P40,000.00 from
Fortune Insurance Corporation as indemnities. With regard to the same
case, he also represented complainant in a suit involving a P130,000.00
claim against the Workmen's Insurance Corporation before the then
Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte. Then in 1978, he was retained
as a collaborating attorney by Complainant's family in an inheritance
case. Further, her father-in-law had always consulted him in matters
affecting the former's store.

But respondent vehemently denies that he had sexually assaulted the

Complainant. He argues that her motivation in filing this charge was to
get even with him after having been humiliated when he declined her
request to commit a "breach of trust." He states that in the inheritance
case he handled for her family, Complainant insisted that he report to
her mother and sisters that he had charged a fee of P15,000.00 instead
of the P2,500.00 he actually received so that she could pocket the
difference. He refused and told the Complainant to look for another
lawyer. She tried twice to make peace with him but was unsuccessful.
Rebuffed, she promised to get even with him.

Thus, this complaint.

Another reason why Complainant filed the present case, respondent

claims, is to escape her indebtedness to him representing his services as
legal counsel of the school which were unpaid since 1974 and the
accumulated honoraria from her fire insurance claims. These obligations
were left unpaid despite demand made when respondent learned that
Complainant had sold a piece of land in Agusan.

On 2 June 1980, the Court, acting upon the Complaint and the Answer
already filed, referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.

On 19 August 1980, said Office, upon the request of the Complainant

that the investigation be held in Lanao del Norte as she and her
witnesses could not afford to come to Manila, referred the case to the
Provincial Fiscal of said province for the necessary proceedings.

Between September and October of 1980, hearings were conducted on

the case. In a Report and Recommendation, dated 16 January 1981, the
Provincial Fiscal stated that respondent failed to attend the hearing
despite the issuance of subpoena; that there was prima facie evidence
showing that respondent had committed acts violative of his
professional decorum; and, that he was recommending disciplinary
action against him. The records of the case were then forwarded to the
Office of the Solicitor General.

On 1 September 1982, the Office of the Solicitor General returned the

records to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Norte for re-investigation on
the ground that the investigation was conducted in the absence of
respondent, who did not appear despite subpoenas sent to him. Thus,
further proceedings were conducted by the Provincial Fiscal wherein
Respondent was allowed to submit a sworn letter, dated 13 December
1985, amplifying on the defenses contained in his Answer.

On 13 February 1986, the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Norte issued a

Resolution adopting his previous Report and Recommendation of 16
January 1981, which found prima facie evidence to hold Respondent
administratively liable. On the same day, the records of the case were
referred back to the Office the Solicitor General.

On 16 May 1986, the Office of the Solicitor General came up with its own
Report recommending that Respondent be disbarred for gross immoral
conduct. On 17 July 1986, as directed by the Court, the Solicitor General
filed a formal Complaint for disbarment against Respondent. On 29 May
1990, the case was raffled to this Second Division and was included in
the latter's agenda on 13 June 1990.

Respondent has filed an Answer, Complainant her Reply, while

Respondent's Rejoinder, as required by the Court, was received on 3
October 1990. The required pleadings being complete, this case is now
ripe for resolution.

The issue for determination is whether or not Respondent should be

disbarred for immoral conduct. This, in turn, hinges on the question of
whether he had, in fact, sexually assault the Complainant, as a
consequence of which the latter begot a child by him.

We find insufficient basis to sustain Complainant's charge.

The outrage allegedly took place during the last week of April, 1971. Yet,
no criminal charge was filed, and it was only about eight years later, on
5 November 1979, that an administrative complaint was presented
before this Court. Complainant's explanation that Respondent's threat
to cause the deportation of her alien husband should she report to
anyone made her desist from filing a charge is not credible as she had
admitted having lost contact with her husband when he learned of
respondent's transgression that very same evening (p. 3, TSN, 16
October 1980, p. 46, Rollo). The fear that she speaks of, therefore, had
become inexistent.

Another factor that engenders doubt in the mind of the Court is the fact
that after the alleged incident, she continued having dealings with the
Respondent as if nothing had happened. Thus, by Respondent's own
account, which was left uncontroverted by the Complainant, the former
assisted her mother and sisters prosecute a robbery case. Then in
March, 1976, she secured respondent's services in claiming indemnity
from three insurance companies when a fire burned the school down.
Finally, respondent was retained as a collaborating attorney by
complainant's family in an inheritance case. These subsequent dealings
are far from being the normal reaction of a woman who has been
wronged.

Complainant's contention that Respondent continued supporting the

child for several years for which reason she desisted from charging him
criminally, has not been substantiated. Truth to tell, the fact that she
kept her peace for so many years can even be construed as a
condonation of his alleged "immoral conduct." It is likewise strange that
an unwanted son, as the child would normally have been, should, of all
names, be called "Jewel."

During the investigation before the Provincial Fiscal, the complainant,

aside from herself, presented two other witnesses, Eleuteria Garcia and
Marilou Pangandaman, both her domestic help, to testify. Among the
three, it was Eleuteria who tried to establish the manner in which the
sexual assault took place. Thus:
"xxx xxx xxx

"Q You stated in your affidavit marked Annex A that you heard Felicidad
Bariñan Tan shouted (sic) for help on the evening of last week of April,
1971, can you tell me or do you know why Mrs. Tan shouted for help?

"A Yes sir. When I responded to the shout for help of Tan I noticed that
Atty. Galileo Trocio, hurriedly left the office leaving behind Mrs. Felicidad
Bariñan Tan.

"Q Did you ask Mrs. Felicidad Bariñan Tan why she was shouting for
help?

"A Before I could ask her the reason why she shouted for help, she told
me and Marilou Pangandaman that she was sexually abused by Atty.
Galileo J. Trocio.

"Q What did you notice of Mrs. Felicidad Bariñan Tan when you
responded to her shout for help?

"A She was crying and trying to fix her dress.". . . (p. 52-53, Rollo)."
However, how near to the crime scene said witness was, considering
that it allegedly happened in school premises, has not been shown. Her
credibility is thus also put in issue.

The testimonies of Complainant and witness Marilou Pangandaman,

another maid, to show unusual closeness between Respondent and
Jewel, like playing with him and giving him toys, are not convincing
enough to prove paternity, as Complainant would want us to believe.
The same must be said of Exhibits A, A1, B and B1, which are pictures of
Jewel and the Respondent showing allegedly their physical likeness to
each other. Such evidence is inconclusive to prove paternity, and much
less would it prove violation of Complainant's person and honor.

More importantly, Jewel Tan was born in 1972, during wedlock of

Complainant and her husband and the presumption should be in favor
of legitimacy unless physical access between the couple was impossible.
From the evidence on hand, the presumption has not been overcome by
adequate and convincing proof. In fact, Jewel was registered in his birth
certificate the legitimate child of the Complainant and her husband, Tan
Le Pok.

WHEREFORE, this Complaint for disbarment must be, and is hereby

DISMISSED, for lack of convincing substantiation.

SO ORDERED.

Tan vs. Trocio (1990)

A.C. No. 2115 | 1990-11-27

Subject:
The Court Found Insufficient Basis to Sustain the Charges against
Atty. Trecio; Continuous Support of the Child for Several Years as the
Reason for Desisting from Charging has not been Substantiated; The
Credibility of the Witness of Tan is in Issue; Testimonies showing
Unusual Closeness between Trocio and Jewel are not Convincing to
Prove Paternity; Child Born During Wedlock is Presumed to be
Legitimate

Facts:
Complainant Felicidad Tan sought the disbarment of respondent
Atty. Galileo Trocio for immorality and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.
Tan alleged that she was married, with eight children and the owner of
a vocational school in Lanao del Norte and Trocio was its legal counsel.
In 1971, Trocio succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her and as a
result, a child was born named Jewel.

At first, Trocio supported Jewel but subsequently lost interest in

doing so. Because of threats, Tan remained quiet. After several years,
Tan finally had the courage to file the administrative complaint. Trocio
vehemently denied that he had sexually assaulted Tan and argued that
the charge was made just to get even with him after he declined her
request to commit a breach of trust.
The Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Norte, who conducted the
investigation, found prima facie evidence to hold Trocio administratively
liable. The Solicitor General recommended the disbarment of Trocio for
gross immoral conduct. A formal complaint was thereafter filed before
the Supreme Court.

Held:
The Court Found Insufficient Basis to Sustain the Charges against
Trecio
1. The outrage allegedly took place during the last week of April 1971.
Yet, no criminal charge was filed. It was only about eight years later that
an administrative complaint was presented before the Supreme Court.

2. The complainant's explanation that Trocio’s threat to cause the

deportation of her alien husband should she report to anyone made her
desist from filing a charge is not credible as she had admitted having lost
contact with her husband when he learned of respondent's
transgression that very same evening.

3. Another factor that engenders doubt in the mind of the Supreme

Court is the fact that after the alleged incident, she continued having
dealings with Trocio as if nothing had happened.

Continuous Support of the Child for Several Years as the Reason for
Desisting from Charging has not been Substantiated
4. Complainant's contention that Trocio’s continued supporting the
child for several years for which reason she desisted from charging him
criminally, has not been substantiated.

5. The fact that she kept her peace for so many years can even be
construed as a condonation of his alleged immoral conduct.

6. The Court found it strange that an unwanted son, as the child would
normally have been, should, of all names, be called "Jewel."

The Credibility of the Witness of Tan is in Issue

7. Eleuteria Garcia testified that she heard Tan shouting for help and that
Trocio came out from the office. Thereafter, she saw her crying and
trying to fix her dress after telling to her that she was sexually abused
by Trocio.
8. The court doubted the credibility of Garcia because her distance to
the crime scene, considering that such happened in the school premises,
was not established.

Testimonies showing Unusual Closeness between Trocio and Jewel are

not Convincing to Prove Paternity
9. The testimonies of Tan and witness Marilou Pangandaman, another
maid, to show unusual closeness between Respondent and Jewel, like
playing with him and giving him toys, are not convincing enough to
prove paternity

10. Pictures submitted by Tan showing allegedly their physical likeness

to each other are also not convincing evidence of paternity. Such
evidence is inconclusive to prove paternity, and much less would it
prove violation of Complainant's person and honor.

Child Born During Wedlock is Presumed to be Legitimate

11. Jewel was born during wedlock of Tan and her husband and
the presumption should be in favor of legitimacy unless physical access
between the couple was impossible.

12. From the evidence on hand, the presumption has not been overcome
by adequate and convincing proof. In fact, Jewel was registered in his
birth certificate the legitimate child of the Tan and her husband

FACTS:
Tan filed a disbarment case against Atty. Trocio for allegedly raping her and
as a result, she bore a son named Jewel. She gave birth to Jewel during her
marriage with Tal Lee Pok.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Jewel is the illegitimate son of Atty. Trocio.

RULING:
Jewel Tan was born during the wedlock of Complainant and her husband
and the presumption should be in favor of legitimacy unless physical access
between the couple was impossible. From the evidence on hand, the
presumption has not been overcome by adequate and convincing proof. In
fact, Jewel was registered in his birth certificate as the legitimate child of the
Felicidad and her husband, Tan Le Pok.
EDNA PADILLA MANGULABNAN as guardian ad litem for
minor ALFIE ANGELO ACERO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
AND AMBROCIO TAN CHEW ACERO, respondents.
G.R. No. 71994 | 1990-05-31
FIRST DIVISION

GANCAYCO, J.:

This is a case of an illegitimate child who was denied

support pendente lite by the appellate court. The child is
confused as to what he is supposed to do. Petitioner
pictured a big man eating a small child which will not fail to
repel and horrify all decent men. She contends that this
very image readily forms itself in the mind when we
consider this case.

Petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City

an action for actual, compensatory and moral damages and
support for her child Alfie Angelo. Pending the litigation an
application for support pendente lite was filed to which an
opposition was filed by private respondent. On November
2, 1984 the trial court ordered private respondent to pay
monthly support in the amount of P1,500.00 to the minor
child, Alfie. Private respondent moved for a
reconsideration but his motion was denied on December 5,
1984.
Hence, a petition for certiorari was filed in the Court of
Appeals questioning the said order of the trial court.

In a decision dated March 29, 1984 1 the petition was

granted and the orders of the trial court dated November
2, 1984 were annulled without pronouncement as to costs.
A motion for reconsideration thereof filed by petitioner
was denied on September 12, 1985.

Hence, the herein appeal by way of certiorari wherein

petitioner raises the following issues:

THE QUESTIONED JUDGMENT INSISTED IN IGNORING THE

STATUTORY DISTINCTION BETWEEN A NATURAL CHILD
AND OTHER ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN;

II

THE APPELLATE COURT REFUSED TO ACCEPT THAT THE

BIRTH CERTIFICATE IN THIS CASE CONSTITUTED
VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION;

III

THE APPELLATE COURT IN ONE STROKE PUT TO NAUGHT

THE REMEDY OR RELIEF PROVIDED BY SUPPORT
PENDENTE LITE. 2
The petition is impressed with merit.
In the questioned decision of the appellate court, the
following disquisitions were made:

The petitioner's contention is well taken. While the child's

paternity appears to have been established by the
affidavits of the respondent Edna Padilla Mangulabnan as
well as by the affidavits of her two witnesses, this fact
alone would not be sufficient to order the petitioner to pay
support to the child. In addition, it is necessary to prove
that the petitioner has recognized the child. For these are
two distinct questions. (Crisolo v. Macadaeg, 94 Phil. 862
[1954]; Cruz v. Castillo, 28 SCRA 719 [1969]).

As the civil status of the child is the source from which the
right to support is derived, there must be a declaration to
that effect before support can be ordered. Such a
declaration may be provisional, it being sufficient that
affidavits are considered. (Crisolo v. Macadaeg, supra;
Mangoma v. Macadaeg, 90 Phil. 508 [1951]; Sanchez v.
Francisco, 68 Phil. 110 [1939]). But the question must
nevertheless be squarely resolved. It may be that the birth
certificate is prima facie evidence of acknowledgment of
the child, so that until it is finally shown to be spurious it
must be upheld. (Civil Code, Art. 410; Art. No. 3753, sec. 13).
On the other hand, it may be that its probative value is
impaired by the verified opposition of the petitioner. These
are, however questions for the trial court to resolve in
passing on the application for support pendente lite

In the subsequent resolution dated September 12, 1985,

the appellate court also made the following observations:
The contention has no merit. Although Art. 291, in
enumerating those entitled to support, refers in paragraph
3 to 'acknowledged natural children,' and in paragraph 5
simply to 'illegitimate children who are not natural'
nonetheless there is a need for the latter class of children
(spurious) to be recognized either voluntarily or by judicial
decree, otherwise they cannot demand support. The
private respondent contends that the cases cited in the
decision (Crisolo v. Macadaeg, 94 Phil. 862 [1954]; Cruz v.
Castillo, 28 SCRA 719 [l969]) refer to the right of natural
children to support. The principle, however, is the same.
Thus in Paulino v. Paulino, 113 Phil. 697 [1961], which
involves a claim to inheritance by a spurious child, it was
held:

An illegitimate (spurious) child to be entitled to support

and successional rights from his putative or presumed
parents must prove his filiation to them. Filiation may be
established by the voluntary or compulsory recognition of
the illegitimate (spurious) child. Recognition is voluntary
when made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before
a court of record, or in any authentic writing.' It is
compulsory when by court action the child brings about his
recognition.

Article 291 of the Civil Code provides as follows:

ART 291. The following are obliged to support each other

to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article:

(1) The spouses;

(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;

(3) Parents and acknowledged natural children and the

legitimate descendants of the latter;

(4) Parents and natural children by legal fiction and the

legitimate and illegitimate descendants of the latter;

(5) Parents and illegitimate children who are not natural.

Brothers and sisters owe their legitimate and natural

brothers and sisters, although they are only of the half
blood, the necessaries of life when by a physical or mental
defect, or any other cause not imputable to the recipients,
the latter cannot secure their subsistence. This assistance
includes, in a proper case, expenses necessary for
elementary education and for professional or vocational
training.
From the foregoing provision it is clear that parents and
illegitimate children who are not natural children are also
obliged to support each other as specified in paragraph No.
5 abovecited. It is to be distinguished from the obligation
to support each other as between the parents and
acknowledged natural children and the legitimate or
illegitimate children of the latter; and that between
parents and natural children by legal fiction and the
legitimate and illegitimate descendants of the latter under
paragraphs (3) and (4) abovecited.

Under Article 287 of the Civil Code it is provided:

ART. 287. Illegitimate children other than natural in
accordance with Article 269 and other than natural
children by legal fiction are entitled to support and such
successional rights as are granted in this Code.

In this case petitioner established the paternity of the child,

Alfie not only by her own affidavit but also by the affidavits
of two (2) witnesses. In addition thereto petitioner
submitted a birth certificate of the child. The private
respondent claims that the same is spurious as it was
sworn before a notary public in Manila when the child was
born in Cavite Maternity Clinic in Las Pinas Rizal.

There must be a declaration of the status of the child from

which the right to support is derived and before support
can be ordered. Such a declaration may be provisional, that
is, by affidavits. 3

While the appellate court claims that the birth certificate is

prima facie evidence of acknowledgment of the child, and
that until it is finally proved to be spurious it must be
upheld, 4 it nevertheless observed that its probative value
is impaired by the verified opposition of the private
respondent.

Petitioner contends, however, that the child is entitled to

support upon proof of filiation to private respondent
without need of acknowledgment.

The appellate court disagrees and holds that even as to

illegitimate children who are not natural children, there is a
need for the latter class of children (spurious children) to
be recognized either voluntarily or by judicial decree,
otherwise they cannot demand support, as in the case of
an acknowledged natural child.

The Court disagrees. The requirement for recognition by

the father or mother jointly or by only one of them as
provided by law refers in particular to a natural child under
Article 276 of the Civil Code. Such a child is presumed to be
the natural child of the parents recognizing it who had the
legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of
conception. 5 Thus, an illegitimate child like the minor Alfie
in this case whose father, the private respondent herein, is
married and had no legal capacity to contract marriage at
the time of his conception is not a natural child but an
illegitimate child or spurious child in which case recognition
is not required before support may be granted. 6

However, under Article 887 of the Civil Code, in all cases of

illegitimate children, their filiation must be proved. Such
filiation may be proved by the voluntary or compulsory
recognition of the illegitimate (spurious child). Recognition
is voluntary when made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or in any authentic
writing. 7 It is compulsory when by court action the child
brings out his recognition. 8

As above related the affidavits of petitioner and the two

(2) witnesses were presented to prove the paternity of the
child, and a birth certificate was also presented to
corroborate the same. The Court agrees with the court a
quo that the status of the minor child had been
provisionally established.
Indeed, in response to the resolution of this Court dated
February 14, 1989, if the parties are still interested in
prosecuting this case, petitioner in a manifestation filed on
March 22, 1990, asserted that she is still interested and that
in fact the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. A-39985 has
rendered a decision dated April 9, 1987 granting to
petitioner-appellant minor a monthly support of P5,000.00
to be paid on or before the fifth day of every month. 9

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned

decision of the appellate court dated March 29, 1985 and
its resolution dated September 12, 1985 are hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and the order of the trial court
dated November 2, 1984 granting a monthly support
pendente lite in favor of the minor child, Alfie in the
amount of P1,500.00 is reinstated and AFFIRMED with
costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.
MARIANO ANDAL, assisted by his mother Maria Dueñas as
guardian ad litem, and MARIA DUEÑAS, plaintiffs, vs. EDUVIGIS
MACARAIG, defendant.
G.R. No. L-2474 | 1951-05-30
EN BANC
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Dueñas, as

guardian ad litem, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur for the recovery of the ownership and possession of
a parcel of land situated in the barrio of Talacop, Calabanga,
Camarines Sur.

The complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of

Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueñas; that Emiliano Andal died on
September 24, 1942; that Emiliano Andal was the owner of the parcel
of land in question having acquired it from his mother Eduvigis
Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter nuptias executed by the
latter in favor of the former; that Emiliano Andal had been in
possession of the land from 1938 up to 1942, when Eduvigis
Macaraig, taking advantage of the abnormal situation then
prevailing, entered the land in question.

The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (a)

declaring Mariano Andal the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and as
such entitled to inherit the land in question; (b) declaring Mariano
Andal owner of said land; and (c) ordering the defendant to pay the
costs of suit. Defendant took the case to this Court upon the plea
that only questions of law are involved.

It appears undisputed that the land in question was given by

Eduvigis Macaraig to her son Emiliano Andal by virtue of a
donation propter nuptias she has executed in his favor on the
occasion of his marriage to Maria Dueñas. If the son born to the
couple is deemed legitimate, then he is entitled to inherit the land in
question. If otherwise, then the land should revert back to Eduvigis
Macaraig as the next of kin entitled to succeed him under the law.
The main issue, therefore, to be determined hinges on the legitimacy
of Mariano Andal in so far as his relation to Emiliano Andal is
concerned. The determination of this issue much depends upon the
relationship that had existed between Emiliano Andal and his wife
during the period of conception of the child up to the date of his
birth in connection with the death of the alleged father Emiliano
Andal.

The following facts appear to have been proven: Emiliano Andal

became sick of tuberculosis in January 1941. Sometime thereafter,
his brother, Felix, went to live in his house to help him work his farm.
His sickness became worse that on or about September 10, 1942, he
became so weak that he could hardly move and get up from his bed.
On September 10, 1942, Maria Dueñas, his wife, eloped with Felix,
and both went to live in the house of Maria's father, until the middle
of 1943. Since May, 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and
treated each other as husband and wife. On January 1, 1943, Emiliano
died without the presence of his wife, who did not even attend his
funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria Dueñas gave birth to a boy, who was
given the name of Mariano Andal. Under these facts, can the child
be considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano?

Article 108 of the Civil Code provides:

"Children born after the one hundred and eighty days next following
that of the celebration of marriage or within the three hundred days
next following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall
be presumed to be legitimate.

"This presumption may be rebutted only by proof that it was

physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife
during the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred
next preceding the birth of the child."
Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on
January 1, 1943, that boy is presumed to be the legitimate son of
Emiliano and his wife, he having been born within three hundred
(300) days following the dissolution of the marriage. This
presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically
impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the
first 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child. Is there
any evidence to prove that it was physically impossible for Emiliano
to have such access? Is the fact that Emiliano was sick of tuberculosis
and was so weak that he could hardly move and get up from his bed
sufficient to overcome this presumption?

Manresa on this point says:

"Impossibility of access by husband to wife would include (1)

absence during the initial period of conception, (2) impotence which
is patent, continuing and incurable, and (3) imprisonment, unless it
can be shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation
of prison regulations." Manresa, 492-500, Vol. I, cited by Dr. Arturo
Tolentino in his book "Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code, Vol. 1, p. 90)."

There was no evidence presented that Emiliano Andal was absent

during the initial period of conception, specially during the period
comprised between August 21, 1942 and September 10, 1942, which
is included in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the
child Mariano Andal. On the contrary, there is enough evidence to
show that during that initial period, Emiliano Andal and his wife were
still living under the marital roof. Even if Felix, the brother, was living
in the same house, and he and the wife were indulging in illicit
intercourse since May, 1942, that does not preclude cohabitation
between Emiliano and his wife. We admit that Emiliano was already
suffering from tuberculosis and his condition then was so serious
that he could hardly move and get up from his bed, his feet were
swollen and his voice hoarse. But experience shows that this does
not prevent carnal intercourse. There are cases where persons
suffering from this sickness can do the carnal act even in the most
crucial stage because they are more inclined to sexual intercourse.
As an author has said, "the reputation of the tuberculous towards
eroticism (sexual propensity) is probably dependent more upon
confinement to bed than the consequences of the disease." (An
Integrated Practice of Medicine, by Hyman, Vol. 3, p. 2202). There is
neither evidence to show that Emiliano was suffering from
impotency, patent, continuous and incurable, nor was there
evidence that he was imprisoned. The presumption of legitimacy
under the Civil Code in favor of the child has not, therefore, been
overcome.

We can obtain the same result viewing this case under section 68,
par. (c) of Rule 123, of the Rules of Court, which is practically based
upon the same rai'son d'etre underlying the Civil Code. Said section
provides:

"The issue of a wife cohabiting with the husband who is not

impotent, is indisputably presumed to be legitimate, if not born
within one hundred eighty days immediately succeeding the
marriage, or after the expiration of three hundred days following its
dissolution."

We have already seen that Emiliano and his wife were living
together, or at least had access one to the other, and Emiliano was
not impotent, and the child was born within three hundred (300)
days following the dissolution of the marriage. Under these facts no
other presumption can be drawn than that the issue is legitimate.
We have also seen that this presumption can only be rebutted by
clear proof that it was physically or naturally impossible for them to
indulge in carnal intercourse. And here there is no such proof. The
fact that Maria Dueñas has committed adultery can not also
overcome this presumption (Tolentino's Commentaries on the Civil
Code, Vol. I, p. 92).

In view of all the foregoing, we are constrained to hold that the

lower court did not err in declaring Mariano Andal as the legitimate
son of the spouses Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueñas.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs.

Andal vs. Macaraig (1951)

G.R. No. L-2474 | 1951-05-30

Subject:
Presumption of Legitimacy according to the Law; Mariano is Presumed to be
the Legitimate Son of Emiliano; What Constitutes Impossibility of Access;
There was no Evidence Presented to Rebut the Presumption of Legitimacy

Facts:
Eduvigis Macaraig gave a parcel of land in Camarines Sur to her son,
Emiliano Andal by virtue of a donation proper nuptias she has executed in
his favor on the occasion of his marriage to Maria Dueñas. It was stated that
if the son born to the couple was deemed legitimate, then he would be
entitled to inherit the land in question. Otherwise, the land should revert to
Eduvigis as the next of kin entitled to succeed him under the law.

Emiliano died in 1942. Eduvigis then entered the land in question.

Thereafter, Mariano Andal, the surviving son of Emiliano and Maria Duenas
brought an action in the Court of First Instance for the recovery of the
ownership and possession of the parcel of land.

It was proven in court that Emiliano became sick of tuberculosis in 1941.

His brother, Felix, went to live with him to help him work in the farm. Months
later, Maria eloped with Felix and both went to live in the house of Maria’s
father. Since May 1942, Maria and Felix had sexual intercourse. Emiliano then
died on January 1, 1943. On June 17, 1943, Mariano was born.

The lower court declared Mariano the legitimate son of Emiliano and as
such entitled to inherit the land in question. It also declared Mariano as the
owner of said land. The defendant went before the Supreme Court. The main
issue to be determined hinged on the legitimacy of Mariano in so far as his
relation to Emiliano was concerned.

Held:
Presumption of Legitimacy according to the Law
1. Children born after the one hundred and eighty days next following that
of the celebration of marriage or within the three hundred days next
following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed
to be legitimate. (par.1, Article 108, Civil Code)

2. The presumption may be rebutted only by proof that it was physically

impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first
one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred next preceding the birth
of the child. (par. 2, id)

Mariano is Presumed to be the Legitimate Son of Emiliano

3. Mariano was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano died on January 1, 1943.
The boy then is presumed to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his wife,
he having been born within 300 days following the dissolution of the
marriage.

4. The presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically

impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120
days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child.

What Constitutes Impossibility of Access

5. Impossibility of access by husband to wife would include (1) absence
during the initial period of conception, (2) impotence which is patent,
continuing and incurable, and (3) imprisonment, unless it can be shown that
cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulations.
(Manresa)

There was no Evidence Presented to Rebut the Presumption of Legitimacy

6. There was no evidence presented that Emiliano was absent during the
initial period of conception. On the contrary, there is enough evidence to
show that during that initial period, Emiliano and his wife were still living
under the marital roof.

7. Even if Felix was living in the same house, and he and the wife were
indulging in illicit intercourse, such does not preclude cohabitation between
Emiliano and his wife.

8. The Supreme Court admitted that Emiliano was already suffering from
tuberculosis and his condition then was so serious that he could hardly move
and get up from his bed. However, the Court ruled that such does not
prevent carnal intercourse.
9. There is neither evidence to show that Emiliano was suffering from
impotency, patent, continuous and incurable, nor was there evidence that
he was imprisoned. The presumption of legitimacy under the Civil Code in
favor of the child has not been overcome.

10. The fact that Maria has committed adultery cannot overcome the
presumption.

Andal vs. Macaraig

GR No. 2474, May 30, 1951

FACTS:
Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Duenas, filed a
complaint for the recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel of
land owned by Emiliano Andal and Maria Duenas. Eduvigis Macaraig, herein
defendant, donated the land by virtue of donation propter nuptias in favor
of Emiliano. The latter was suffering from tuberculosis in January 1941. His
brother, Felix, then lived with them to work his house and farm. Emiliano
became so weak that he can hardly move and get up from his bed.
Sometime in September 1942, the wife eloped with Felix and lived at the
house of Maria’s father until 1943. Emiliano died in January 1, 1943 where the
wife did not attend the funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria gave birth to a boy
who was, herein petitioner.

ISSUE: WON Mariano Andal is a legitimate child of the deceased.

HELD:
Considering that Mariano was born on June 17, 1943 and Emiliano died
on January 1, 1943, the former is presumed to be a legitimate son of the latter
because he was born within 300 days following the dissolution of the
marriage. The fact that the husband was seriously sick is not sufficient to
overcome the presumption of legitimacy. This presumption can only be
rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have
had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 days next
preceding the birth of the child. Impossibility of access by husband to wife
includes absence during the initial period of conception, impotence which is
patent, and incurable; and imprisonment unless it can be shown that
cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulations.
Maria’s illicit intercourse with a man other than the husband during the initial
period does not preclude cohabitation between husband and wife.
Hence, Mariano Andal was considered a legitimate son of the deceased
making him the owner of the parcel land.

Andal vs. Macaraig 89 Phil 165

Facts: Mariano Andal, assisted by his mother Maria Dueñas, as guardian ad

litem, brought an action in the CIF of Camarines Sur for the recovery of the
ownership and possession of a parcel of land situated in Camarines Sur. The
complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal
and Maria Dueñas and that Emiliano was the owner of the parcel of land in
question having acquired it from his mother Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a
donation propter nuptias executed by the latter in favor of the former.

The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (a) declaring
Mariano Andal the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and such entitled to
inherit the land in question; (b) declaring Mariano Andal owner of said land;
and (c) ordering the defendant to pay the costs of suit. Defendant took the
case to this Court upon the plea that only question of law are involved.

Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis. Sometime thereafter, his

brother, Felix, went to live in his house to help him work his house to help
him work his farm. His sickness became worse, he became so weak that he
could hardly move and get up from his bed. Maria Dueñas, his wife, eloped
with Felix, and both went to live in the house of Maria's father. Felix and
Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other as husband and wife.
Emiliano died without the presence of his wife, who did not even attend his
funeral. Maria Dueñas gave birth to a boy, who was given the name of
Mariano Andal.

Issue: Whether or not the child is considered as the legitimate son of

Emiliano.

Ruling: Mariano is the legitimate son of Emiliano. It is already seen that

Emiliano and his wife were living together, or at least had access one to the
other, and Emiliano was not impotent, and the child was born within 300
days following the dissolution of the marriage. Under these facts no other
presumption can be drawn than that the issue is legitimate. It is also seen
that this presumption can only be rebutted by clear proof that it was
physically or naturally impossible for them to indulge in carnal intercourse.
And here there is no such proof.
JANICE MARIE JAO, represented by her mother and guardian ad
litem, ARLENE S. SALGADO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-49162 | 1987-07-28
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:

Appeal by certiorari from the decision * of the Court of Appeals in CA-

G.R. No. 51078-R, dated 29 August 1978, which dismissed petitioner's
action for recognition and support against private respondent, and
from the respondent Court's resolution, dated 11 October 1978,
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said decision.

On 28 October 1968, petitioner Janice Marie Jao, then a minor,

represented by her mother and guardian-ad-litem Arlene Salgado,
filed a case for recognition and support with the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court against private respondent Perico V. Jao.
The latter denied paternity so the parties agreed to a blood grouping
test which was in due course conducted by the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) upon order of the trial court. The result of the
blood grouping test, held 21 January 1969, indicated that Janice could
not have been the possible offspring of Perico V. Jao and Arlene S.
Salgado. 1

The trial court initially found the result of the tests legally conclusive
but upon plaintiff's (herein petitioner's) second motion for
reconsideration, it ordered a trial on the merits, after which, Janice
was declared the child of Jao, thus entitling her to his monthly
support.

Jao appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial court's

failure to appreciate the result of the blood grouping tests. As there
was no showing whatsoever that there was any irregularity or mistake
in the conduct of the tests, Jao argued that the result of the tests
should have been conclusive and indisputable evidence of his non-
paternity.
The Court of Appeals upheld Jao's contentions and reversed the trial
court's decision. In its decision, the Court of Appeals held:

"From the evidence of the contending parties, it appears undisputed

that JAO was introduced to ARLENE at the Saddle and Sirloin, Bay Side
Club, by Melvin Yabut. After this meeting, JAO dated and courted
ARLENE. Not long thereafter, they had their first sexual intercourse
and subsequently, they lived together as husband and wife . . .

It further appears undisputed that in April 1968, JAO accompanied

ARLENE to the Marian General Hospital for medical checkup and her
confinement was with JAO's consent. JAO paid the rentals where they
lived, the salaries of the maids, and other household expenses . . .

The record discloses that ARLENE gave birth to JANICE on August 16,
1968, after completing 36 weeks of pregnancy, which indicates that
ARLENE must have conceived JANICE on or about the first week of
December, 1967. Thus, one issue to be resolved in this appeal is
whether on or about that time, JAO and ARLENE had sexual
intercourse and were already living with one another as husband and
wife.

In this connection, ARLENE contends that she first met JAO sometime
in the third or fourth week of November, 1967 at the Saddle and
Sirloin, Bayside Club; that after several dates, she had carnal
knowledge with him at her house at 30 Longbeach, Merville,
Parañaque, Rizal in the evening of November 30, 1967, and that he
started to live with her at her dwelling after December 16, 1967, the
date they finished their cruise to Mindoro Island.

On the other hand, JAO, albeit admitting that he met ARLENE at the
Saddle and Sirloin, Bayside Club, however, maintains that this was on
December 14, 1967 because the day following, he and his guests:
ARLENE, Melvin Yabut, Didi Crescini and Charlie Litonjua went to
Mindoro by boat. He dated ARLENE four times in January, 1968. He
remembered he had carnal knowledge of her for the first time on
January 18, 1968, because that was a week after his birthday and it was
only in May, 1968 that he started cohabiting with her at the Excelsior
Apartments on Roxas Boulevard.

These conflicting versions of the parties emphasize, in resolving the

paternity of JANICE, the role of the blood grouping tests conducted
by the NBI and which resulted in the negative finding that in a union
with ARLENE, JAO could not be the father of JANICE.

We cannot sustain the conclusion of the trial court that the NBI is not
in a position to determine with mathematical precision the issue of
parentage by blood grouping test, considering the rulings of this Court
. . . where the blood grouping tests of the NBI were admitted;
especially where, in the latter case, it was Dr. Lorenzo Sunico who
conducted the test and it appears that in the present case, the same
Dr. Sunico approved the findings and report . . . In Co Tao vs. Court of
Appeals, 101 Phil. 188, the Supreme Court had given weight to the
findings of the NBI in its blood grouping test. Thus, it cannot be
gainsaid that the competency of the NBI to conduct blood grouping
tests has been recognized as early as the 1950's.

The views of the Court on blood grouping tests may be stated as

follows:

"Paternity---- Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood

samples of the mother, the child, and the alleged father, it can be
established conclusively that the man is not the father of the child. But
group blood testing cannot show that a man is the father of a
particular child, but at least can show only a possibility that he is.
Statutes in many states, and courts in others, have recognized the
value and the limitations of such tests. Some of the decisions have
recognized the conclusive presumption of non-paternity where the
results of the test, made in the prescribed manner, show the
impossibility of the alleged paternity. This is one of the few cases in
which the judgment of the Court may scientifically, be completely
accurate, and intolerable results avoided, such as have occurred
where the finding is allowed to turn on oral testimony conflicting with
the results of the test.
"The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove the fact
of paternity as they show only a possibility that the alleged father or
any one of many others with the same blood type may have been the
father of the child. But the Uniform Act recognizes that the tests may
have some probative value to establish paternity where the blood
type and the combination in the child is shown to be rare, in which
case the judge is given discretion to let it in" (I Jones on Evidence, 5th
Ed., pp. 193-194).

"In one specific biological trait, viz, blood groups, scientific opinion is
now in accord in accepting the fact that there is a causative relation
between the trait of the progenitor and the trait of the progeny. In
other words, the blood composition of a child may be some evidence
as to the child's paternity. But thus far this trait (in the present state
of scientific discovery as generally accepted) can be used only
negatively i.e. to evidence that a particular man F is not the father of a
particular child C." (I Wigmore on Evidence 3rd Ed., pp. 610-611).

In a last ditch effort to bar the admissibility and competency of the

blood test, JANICE claims that probative value was given to blood
tests only in cases where they tended to establish paternity; and that
there has been no case where the blood test was invoked to establish
non-paternity, thereby implying that blood tests have probative value
only when the result is a possible affirmative and not when in the
negative. This contention is fallacious and must be rejected. To sustain
her contention, in effect, would be recognizing only the possible
affirmative finding but not the blood grouping test itself for if the
result were negative, the test is regarded worthless. Indeed, this is
illogical . . . As an admitted test, it is admissible in subsequent similar
proceedings whether the result be in the negative or in the affirmative
. . ."

The Court of Appeals also found other facts that ran contrary to
petitioner's contention that JAO's actions before and after JANICE
was born were tantamount to recognition. Said the respondent
appellate court:
"On the contrary, after JANICE was born, JAO did not recognize her as
his own. In fact, he filed a petition that his name as father of JANICE in
the latter's certificate of live birth be deleted, evidencing his
repudiation, rather than recognition. The mere acts of JAO in
cohabiting with ARLENE, the attention given to her during her
pregnancy and the financial assistance extended to her cannot
overcome the result of the blood grouping test. These acts of JAO
cannot be evaluated as recognizing the unborn JANICE as his own as
the possession of such status cannot be founded on conjectures and
presumptions, especially so that, We have earlier said, JAO refused to
acknowledge JANICE after the latter's birth.

JAO cannot be compelled to recognize JANICE based on paragraph 2

of Article 283 in relation to Article 289 of the New Civil Code which
provides: "When the child is in continuous possession of status of a
child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter."

Nor can there be compulsory recognition under paragraphs 3 or 4 of

said article which states:

"(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother
cohabited with the supposed father;

(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the
defendant is his father."

As aptly appreciated by the court below, JANICE could have been

conceived from November 20, 1967 to December 4, 1967. Indeed,
ARLENE claims that her first sexual intercourse with JAO was on
November 30, 1967 while the latter avers it was one week after
January 18, 1968. However, to satisfy paragraph 3 as above-quoted,
JANICE must have been conceived when ARLENE and JAO started to
cohabit with one another. Since ARLENE herself testified that their
cohabitation started only after December 16, 1967, then it cannot be
gainsaid that JANICE was not conceived during this cohabitation.
Hence, no recognition will lie. Necessarily, recognition cannot be had
under paragraph 4 as JANICE has no other evidence or proof of her
alleged paternity.
Apart from these, there is the claim of JAO that, at the critical time of
conception, ARLENE had carnal knowledge with two other men:
"Oying" Fernandez and Melvin Yabut, which was not even rebutted;
and considering that it was Melvin Yabut, who introduced ARLENE to
JAO at the Bayside Club. Moreover, the testimony of ARLENE is not
wholly reliable. When the trial court said that "the Court is further
convinced of plaintiff's cause by ARLENE's manner of testifying in a
most straight-forward and candid manner," the fact that ARLENE was
admittedly a movie actress may have been overlooked so that not
even the trial court could detect, by her acts, whether she was lying or
not.

"WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and a

new one entered dismissing plaintiff-appellee's complaint. Without
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED."

The petitioner now brings before this Court the issue of admissibility
and conclusiveness of the result of blood grouping tests to prove non-
paternity.

In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence,

to affirm paternity was dealt with in Co Tao v. Court of Appeals, 2 an
action for declaration of filiation, support and damages. In said case,
the NBI expert's report of the blood tests stated that "from their
blood groups and types, the defendant Co Tao is a possible father of
the child." From this statement, the defendant contended that the
child must have been the child of another man. The Court noted: "For
obvious reasons, the NBI expert cannot give assurance that the
appellant was the father of the child; he can only give his opinion that
he is a `possible father.' This possibility, coupled with the other facts
and circumstances brought out during the trial, tends to definitely
establish that appellant Co Tao is the father of the child Manuel." 3

Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping

tests to disprove paternity, rulings have been much more definite in
their conclusions. For the past three decades, the use of blood typing
in cases of disputed parentage has already become an important legal
procedure. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that
blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although
inconclusive as to paternity ---- that is, the fact that the blood type of
the child is a possible product of the mother and alleged father does
not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if the
blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the blood
of the mother and that of the alleged father are crossmatched, then
the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father. 4

In jurisdictions like the United States, the admissibility of blood tests

results to prove non-paternity has already been passed upon in several
cases. In Gilpin v. Gilpin 5 the positive results of blood tests excluding
paternity, in a case in which it was shown that proper safeguards were
drawn around the testing procedures, were recognized as final on the
question of paternity. In Cuneo v. Cuneo 6 evidence of non-paternity
consisting of the result of blood grouping tests was admitted despite
a finding that the alleged father had cohabited with the mother within
the period of gestation. The Court said that the competent medical
testimony was overwhelmingly in favor of the plaintiff, and to reject
such testimony would be tantamount to rejecting scientific fact.
Courts, it was stated, should apply the results of science when
competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject
said result was to deny progress. 7 This ruling was also echoed in Clark
v. Rysedorph, 8 a filiation proceeding where an uncontradicted blood
grouping test evidence, excluding paternity, was held conclusive. 9
Legislation expressly recognizing the use of blood tests is also in force
in several states. 10 Tolentino, 11 affirms this rule on blood tests as
proof of non-paternity, thus

"Medical science has shown that there are four types of blood in man
which can be transmitted through heredity. Although the presence of
the same type of blood in two persons does not indicate that one was
begotten by the other, yet the fact that they are of different types will
indicate the impossibility of one being the child of the other. Thus,
when the supposed father and the alleged child are not in the same
blood group, they cannot be father and child by consanguinity. The
Courts of Europe today regard a blood test exclusion as an
unanswerable and indisputable proof of non-paternity." 12
Moreover,

"The cohabitation between the mother and the supposed father

cannot be a ground for compulsory recognition if such cohabitation
could not have produced the conception of the child. This would be
the case, for instance, if the cohabitation took place outside of the
period of conception of the child. Likewise, if it can be proved by blood
tests that the child and the supposed father belong to different blood
groups, the cohabitation by itself cannot be a ground for recognition."
13

Petitioner has attempted to discredit the result of the blood grouping

tests in the instant case by impugning the qualifications of the NBI
personnel who performed the tests and the conduct of the tests
themselves. Her allegations, in this regard, appear to be without
merit. The NBI's forensic chemist who conducted the tests is also a
serologist, and has had extensive practice in this area for several years.
The blood tests were conducted six (6) times using two (2)
scientifically recognized blood grouping systems, the MN Test and the
ABO System, 14 under witness and supervision. 15

Even the allegation that Janice was too young at five months to have
been a proper subject for accurate blood tests must fall, since nearly
two years after the first blood test, she, represented by her mother,
declined to undergo the same blood test to prove or disprove their
allegations, even as Jao was willing to undergo such a test again. 16

Accordingly, the Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals and
holds that the result of the blood grouping tests involved in the case
at bar, are admissible and conclusive on the non-paternity of
respondent Jao vis-a-vis petitioner Janice. No evidence has been
presented showing any defect in the testing methods employed or
failure to provide adequate safeguards for the proper conduct of the
tests. The result of such tests is to be accepted therefore as accurately
reflecting a scientific fact.
In view of the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals, as
heretofore quoted, which are binding on this Court, we do not find it
necessary to further pass upon the issue of recognition raised by
petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby denied. Without

pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Jao vs. Court of Appeals and Jao (1987)

G.R. No. L-49162 | 1987-07-28

Subject:
Results of Blood Tests to Affirm Paternity are Not Conclusive on their
Own; Results of Blood Tests to Disprove Paternity are Conclusive;
Blood Test Exclusion Regarded as Indisputable Proof of Non-Paternity

Facts:
Petitioner Janice Jao filed a case for recognition and support with
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court against private respondent
Perico Jao. The latter denied paternity so the parties agreed to a blood
grouping test, which was in due course conducted by the National
Bureau of Investigation upon order of the trial court. The result of the
blood grouping test indicated that Janice could not have been the
possible offspring of Perico and Arlene.

The trial court initially found the result of the tests legally
conclusive but upon Janice’s second motion for reconsideration, it
ordered a trial on the merits. Thereafter, Janice was declared the child
of Perico, thus entitling her to monthly support.

Perico appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial

court's failure to appreciate the result of the blood grouping tests. As
there was no showing that there was any irregularity or mistake in the
conduct of the tests, Perico argued that the result of the tests should
have been conclusive and indisputable evidence of his non-paternity.
The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court.

Held:
Results of Blood Tests to Affirm Paternity are Not Conclusive on their
Own
1. The Court explained that the issue on the result of blood tests,
among other evidence, to affirm paternity was dealt with in Co Tao v.
Court of Appeals.

2. In that case, the Court noted that the NBI expert cannot give
assurance that the appellant was the father of the child and that he
can only give his opinion that he is a possible father.

Results of Blood Tests to Disprove Paternity are Conclusive

3. Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood
grouping tests to disprove paternity, rulings have been much more
definite in their conclusions.

4. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood

grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although
inconclusive as to paternity ---- that is, the fact that the blood type of
the child is a possible product of the mother and alleged father does
not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if the
blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the blood
of the mother and that of the alleged father are crossmatched, then
the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.
Blood Test Exclusion Regarded as Indisputable Proof of Non-
Paternity
5. Medical science has shown that there are four types of blood in man
which can be transmitted through heredity. Although the presence of
the same type of blood in two persons does not indicate that one was
begotten by the other, yet the fact that they are of different types will
indicate the impossibility of one being the child of the other.

6. When the supposed father and the alleged child are not in the same
blood group, they cannot be father and child by consanguinity. The
Courts of Europe regard a blood test exclusion as an unanswerable
and indisputable proof of non-paternity.

7. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals

and held that the result of the blood grouping tests involved in the
case are admissible and conclusive on the non-paternity of Perico vis-
a-vis petitioner. No evidence has been presented showing any defect
in the testing methods employed or failure to provide adequate
safeguards for the proper conduct of the tests.

G.R. No. L-49162 July 28 1987

FACTS:
Arlene Salgado, Janice Marie's mother, filed a case for recognition and
support against Perico V. Jao. Jao denied the paternity so they agreed
to a blood grouping test which was in due course conducted by the
NBI. The test came out indicating that Janice could not have been the
possible offspring of Jao and Arlene. Upon Arlene's motion for
reconsideration, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court declared
the child the offspring of Jao. Jao appealed to the CA, arguing that the
blood grouping test could have been conclusive and disputable
evidence of his non-paternity, because there was no showing of
irregularity or mistake in the conduct of the tests. CA upheld Jao's
contention and reversed the trial court decision.

ISSUE:Whether or not the result of blood grouping test is admissible

and conclusive to prove paternity.

RULING:
Yes. SC denied the petition for review.

Supreme Court had given weight to the findings of the NBI in its blood
grouping test. Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that the competency of the
NBI to conduct blood grouping tests has been recognized as early as
the 1950's. (Co Tao vs. CA, 101 Phil. 188)
In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence, to,
affirm paternity was dealt with in Co Tao v. CA. In said case, the NBI
expert"s report of the blood tests stated that "from their blood
groups and types, the defendant Co Tao is a possible father of the
child." From this statement the defendant contended that the child
must have been the child of another man. The Court noted: "For
obvious reasons, the NBI expert cannot give assurance that the
appellant was the father of the child; he can only give his opinion that
he is a "possible father." This possibility, coupled with the other facts
and circumstances brought out during the trial, tends to definitely
establish that appellant is the father of the child."

Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping

tests to disprove paternity, rulings have been much more definite in
their conclusions. For the past three decades, the use of blood typing
in cases of disputed parentage has already become an important legal
procedure. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that
blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although
inconclusive as to paternity — that is, the fact that the blood type of
the child is a possible product of the mother and alleged father does
not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if the
blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the blood
of the mother and that of the alleged father are crossmatched, then
the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.

In the United States jurisdiction, the admissibility of blood tests results

to prove non-paternity has already been passed upon in several cases.
The positive results of blood tests excluding paternity, in a case in
which it was shown that proper safeguards were drawn around the
testing procedures, were recognized as final on the question of
paternity (Gilpin v. Gilpin). Evidence of non-paternity consisting of the
result of blood grouping tests was admitted despite a finding that the
alleged father had cohabited with the mother within the period of
gestation (Cuneo v. Cuneo). The Court said that the competent
medical testimony was overwhelmingly in favor of the plaintiff, and to
reject such testimony would be tantamount to rejecting scientific fact.
CHUA KENG GIAP, petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT and CHUA LIAN KING, respondents.
G.R. No. 75377 | 1988-02-17
D E C I S I O N
CRUZ, J.:

We are faced once again with still another bid by petitioner for
the status of a legitimate heir. He has failed before, and he will
fail again.

In this case, the petitioner insists that he is the son of the

deceased Sy Kao and that it was error for the respondent court
to reject his claim. He also says his motion for reconsideration
should not have been denied for tardiness because it was in fact
filed on time under the Habaluyas ruling. 1

This case arose when Chua Keng Giap filed on May 19, 1983, a
petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Sy Kao in the
regional trial court of Quezon City. The private respondent
moved to dismiss for lack of a cause of action and of the
petitioner's capacity to file the petition. The latter, it was
claimed, had been declared as not the son of the spouses Chua
Bing Guan and Sy Kao in S.P. No. Q-12592, for the settlement of
the estate of the late Chua Bing Guan. The decision in that case
had long become final and executory. 2

The motion was denied by Judge Jose P. Castro, who held that
the case invoked decided the paternity and not the maternity of
the petitioner. 3 Holding that this was mere quibbling, the
respondent court reversed the trial judge in a petition for
certiorari filed by the private respondent. 4 The motion for
reconsideration was denied for late filing. 5 The petitioner then
came to this Court to challenge these rulings.
The petitioner argues at length that the question to be settled in
a motion to dismiss based on lack of a cause of action is the
sufficiency of the allegation itself and not whether these
allegations are true or not, for their truth is hypothetically
admitted. 6 That is correct. He also submits that an order denying
a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and therefore
reversible not in a petition for certiorari but on appeal. 7 That is
also correct. Even so, the petition must be and is hereby denied.

The petitioner is beating a dead horse. The issue of his claimed

filiation has long been settled, and with finality, by no less than
this Court. That issue cannot be resurrected now because it has
been laid to rest in Sy Kao v. Court of Appeals, 8 decided on
September 28, 1984. In that case, Sy Kao flatly and unequivocally
declared that she was not the petitioner's mother.

The Court observed through Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.:

"Petitioner Sy Kao denies that respondent Chua Keng Giap is her

son by the deceased Chua Bing Guan. Thus, petitioner's
opposition filed on December 19, 1968, is based principally on the
ground that the respondent was not the son of Sy Kao and the
deceased but of a certain Chua Eng Kun and his wife Tan Kuy.

"After hearing on the merits which lasted for ten years, the court
dismissed the respondent's petition or March 2, 1979 on a finding
that be it not a son of petitioner Sy Kao and the deceased, and
therefore, had no lawful interest in the estate of the latter and
no right to institute the intestacy proceedings.

"The respondent tried to appeal the court's resolution but his

appeal was denied by the lower court for having been filed out
of time. He then filed a mandamus case with the Court of Appeals
but the same was dismissed. Respondent, therefore, sought
relief by filing a petition for certiorari, G.R. No. 54992, before this
Court but his petition was likewise dismissed on January 30, 1982,
for lack of merit. His subsequent motions for reconsideration
met a similar fate.

xxx xxx xxx

"To allow the parties to go on with the trial on the merits would
not only subject the petitioners to the expense and ordeal of
litigation which might take them another ten years, only to prove
a point already decided in Special Proceeding No. Q-12592, but
more importantly, such would violate the doctrine of res judicata
which is expressly provided for in Section 49, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court."

There is no point in prolonging these proceedings with an

examination of the procedural objections to the grant of the
motion to dismiss. In the end, assuming denial of the motion, the
resolution of the merits would have to be the same anyway as in
the aforesaid case. The petitioner's claim of filiation would still
have to be rejected.

Discussion of the seasonableness of the motion for

reconsideration is also unnecessary as the motion would have
been validly denied just the same even if filed on time.

Who better than Sy Kao herself would know of Chua Keng Giap
was really her son? More than any one else, it was Sy Kao who
could say ---- as indeed she has said these many years ---- that Chua
Keng Giap was not begotten of her womb.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the

petitioner. It is so ordered.
1. Chua Keng Giap filed on May 19, 1983, a petition for the
settlement of the estate of the late Sy Kao in the regional trial
court of Quezon City. He claims that he is the son of Chua Bing
Guan and Sy Kao.
2. The private respondent, moved to dismiss for lack of a cause
of action and of the petitioner's capacity to file the petition. No
cause of action because he is not the son of the abovementioned
couple as testified by the mother herself.

CONTENTIONS:
Respondent:
a. Res judicata: The latter, it was claimed, had been declared
as not the son of the spouses Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao in S.P.
No. Q-12592, for the settlement of the estate of the late Chua
Bing Guan.
b. Mother‘s testimonials: SY Kua herself testified that she is not
her son.

Petitioner:
a. paternity and not the maternity of the petitioner is to
be decided. Therefore, the testimony of themother should not
be credited.

ISSUE:W/N Chua Keng Giap is the son of Chua Bing and Sy Kua.

HELD:No he isn’t
Who better than Sy Kao herself would know of Chua Keng Giap
was really her son? More than any one else, it was Sy Kao who
could say ---- as indeed she has said these many years ---- that
Chua Keng Giap was not begotten of her womb.

Petition Denied
VIOLETA CABATBAT LIM, LIM BIAK CHIAO and CALASIAO BIJON
FACTORY, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
CONSORCIA FRIANEZA GOLEA MARIA FRIANEZA VERGARA,
BENEDICTA FRIANEZA MAYUGBA, BONIFACIA FRIANEZA HEIRS
OF DOMINGO FRIANEZA namely, DECIDERIA Q. VDA. DE
FRIANEZA FRANCISCO, DONA VILMA and DECIDERIA all
surnamed FRIANEZA HEIRS OF DANIEL FRIANEZA namely,
ADELA V. VDA. DE FRIANEZA, in her behalf and as Guardian ad
litem of Minors, DARLENE, DANIEL JR., DUSSEL and DAISY
GLEN, all surnamed FRIANEZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-69679 | 1988-10-18
D E C I S I O N
GRINO-AQUINO, J.:

This case involves a contest over the estate of the late Dra.
Esperanza Cabatbat wherein the protagonists are her sisters and
the children of her deceased brothers on one hand, and the
petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim who claims to be her only child.

Petitioners Violeta Cabatbat Lim, her husband Lim Biak Chiao,

and the Calasiao Bijon Factory assail the decision dated October
25, 1984 of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of
Appeals (AC-G.R. No. CV-67055), which affirmed the trial court's
decision finding that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is not the
offspring, hence, not a legal heir of the late Esperanza Cabatbat.

The private respondents, sisters of the late Esperanza Frianeza-

Cabatbat, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan (Civil Case No. D-3841), praying for the partition of
the estate of Esperanza Frianeza Cabatbat, who died without
issue on April 23, 1977. Part of her estate was her interest in the
business partnership known as Calasiao Bijon Factory, now in the
possession of Violeta Cabatbat Lim who claims to be the child of
the spouses Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat.
Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbat was survived by her husband,
Proceso Cabatbat, her sisters, Consorcia, Maria, Benedicta,
Bonifacia, all surnamed Frianeza and the children of her
deceased brothers Daniel and Domingo.

In their complaint, the private respondents alleged that Violeta

Cabatbat Lim is not a child of Esperanza, but was only a ward
(ampon) of the spouses Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat who
sheltered and supported her from childhood, without benefit of
formal adoption proceedings.

Private respondents' evidence on the non-filiation of Violeta to

Esperanza Cabatbat were: 1) the absence of any record that
Esperanza Cabatbat was admitted in the hospital where Violeta
was born and that she gave birth to Violeta on the day the latter
was born; 2) the absence of the birth certificate of Violeta
Cabatbat in the files of certificates of live births of the
Pangasinan Provincial Hospital for the years 1947 and 1948, when
Violeta was supposedly born; 3) certification dated March 9,
1977, of the Civil Registry coordinator Eugenio Venal of the Office
of the Civil Registrar General, that his office has no birth record
of Violeta Cabatbat alleged to have been born on May 26, 1948
or 1949 in Calasiao, Pangasinan; 4) certification dated June 16,
1977 of Romeo Gabriana, Principal II, that when Violeta studied in
the Calasiao Pilot Central School, Proceso Cabatbat and
Esperanza Cabatbat were listed as her guardians only, not as her
parents; 5) testimony of Amparo Reside that she was in the
Pangasinan Provincial Hospital on May 21, 1948 to watch a cousin
who delivered a child there and that she became acquainted with
a patient named Benita Lastimosa who gave birth on May 26,
1948 to a baby girl who grew up to be known as Violeta
Cabatbat.

Pitted against the evidence of the plaintiffs are the evidence of

herein petitioners consisting of: 1) Violeta Cabatbat's birth record
which was filed on June 15, 1948 showing that she was born on
May 26, 1948 at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital and that she
is a legitimate child of the spouses Proceso and Esperanza
Cabatbat; 2) testimony of Proceso Cabatbat that Violeta is his
child with the deceased Esperanza Frianeza; 3) testimony of
Benita Lastimosa denying that she delivered a child in the
Pangasinan Provincial Hospital and that Violeta Cabatbat Lim is
that child; 4) the marriage contract of Violeta and Lim Biak Chiao
where Esperanza appeared as the mother of the bride; 5) Deed
of Sale dated May 14, 1960, wherein the vendee Violeta Cabatbat,
then a minor, was represented and assisted by her "mother,"
Dra. Esperanza Cabatbat; and 6) another Deed of Absolute Sale
dated April 21, 1961, wherein Violeta Cabatbat was assisted and
represented by her "father," Proceso Cabatbat.

Upon the evidence, the trial court held on August 10, 1979 that
Violeta Cabatbat is not a child by nature of the spouses
Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat and that hence, she is not a
legal heir of the deceased Esperanza Cabatbat. The dispositive
portion of the trial court's decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

"(1) Finding that defendant VIOLETA CABATBAT LIM is not a child

by nature of the spouses, decedent Esperanza Frianeza and
defendant Proceso Cabatbat, and not a compulsory heir of the
said decedent;

"(2) Declaring that the heirs of the decedent are her surviving
husband, defendant Proceso Cabatbat and her sisters, plaintiffs
CONSORCIA, MARIA, BENEDICTA alias JOVITA, and BONIFACIA
alias ANASTACIA, all surnamed FRIANEZA, her brothers
deceased DANIEL FRIANEZA represented by his surviving
spouse, Adela Vda. de Frianeza, and their children, Darlene,
Daniel, Jr., Dussel and Daisy Glen, all surnamed FRIANEZA, and
deceased DOMINGO FRIANEZA, represented by his surviving
spouse Desideria Q. Vda. de Frianeza and their children,
Francisco, Dona, Vilma and Decideria, all surnamed FRIANEZA;

"(3) Finding that the estate left by the decedent are the thirty
properties enumerated and described at pages 13 to 19 supra and
an equity in the Calasiao Bijon Factory in the sum of P37,961.69
of which P13,221.69 remains after advances obtained by the
deceased during her lifetime and lawful deductions made after
her death;

"(4) That of the real properties adverted to above, three-fourths

(3/4) pro-indiviso is the share of defendant Proceso Cabatbat, as
the surviving spouse, one-half (1/2) as his share of the conjugal
estate and one-half (1/2) of the remaining one-half as share as
heir from his wife (decedent's) estate, while the remaining one-
half (1/2) of the other half is the group share of the heirs of the
brothers and sisters of his wife and of the children of the latter if
deceased, whose names are already enumerated hereinbefore in
the following proportions: one-sixth (1/6) each pro-indiviso to
Consorcia, Maria, Benedicta alias Jovita, and Bonifacia alias
Anastacia; one-sixth (1/6) to Adela B. Vda. de Fraineza, Darlene,
Daniel, Jr., Dussel and Daisy Glen, as a group in representation of
deceased brother DANIEL FRIANEZA, and one-sixth (1/6) to
Decideria Q. Vda. de Frianeza, Francisco, Dona, Vilma and
Decideria as a group in representation of deceased brother
DOMINGO FRIANEZA;

"(5) That of the balance of the equity of the deceased in the

CALASIAO BIJON FACTORY in the sum of P13,221.69, three-
fourths (3/4) or P9,916.29 is the share of Proceso Cabatbat ac
surviving spouse and as heir of his deceased wife, and the
remaining one-fourth (1/4) to the plaintiffs under the sharing
already stated in the preceding paragraph; (a) but because
defendant Proceso Cabatbat has overdrawn his share he is
ordered to return to the estate the sum of P796.34 by depositing
the same with the Clerk of Court; and (b) defendant Violeta
Cabatbat Lim, not being an heir, is ordered to return to the estate
the sum of P2,931.13 half of what she and her co-defendant
Proceso Cabatbat withdrew from the equity of the deceased
under Exhibit 29, receipt dated April 30, 1977;

"(6) Ordering jointly defendants Proceso Cabatbat and Violeta

Cabatbat Lim to pay attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00, the
sum of P4,000.00 from defendant Proceso Cabatbat and
P1,000.00 from defendant Violeta Cabatbat Lim, and litigation
expenses in the sum of P1,000.00 from defendant Proceso
Cabatbat and P200.00 from defendant Violeta Cabatbat Lim, to
the plaintiffs, and to pay the costs.

"SO ORDERED." (pp. 236-239, Record on Appeal.)

Petitioners appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which
affirmed the decision of the trial court on October 25, 1984.

A motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied

by the Intermediate Appellate Court.

Petitioners have elevated the decision to Us for review on

certiorari, alleging that the Intermediate Appellate Court erred:

1. In finding that petitioner is not the child of Prospero and

Esperanza Cabatbat;

2. In ignoring the provisions of Section 22 of Rule 132, Rules of

Court;

3. In not considering the provision of Article 263 of the New Civil

Code;

4. In disregarding Exhibits 8,9,10, and 11 of petitioner Violeta

Cabatbat Lim.
Petitioners' first and fourth assignments of error raise factual
issues. The finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
Violeta Cabatbat was not born of Esperanza Cabatbat is a factual
finding based on the evidence presented at the trial, hence, it is
conclusive upon Us. Well entrenched is the rule that "factual
findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are entitled to
great respect" (Vda. de Roxas vs. IAC, 143 SCRA 77; Republic vs.
IAC, 144 SCRA 705).

Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which provides that:
"Where a private writing is more than thirty years old, is
produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if
genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances
of suspicion, no other evidence of its execution and authenticity
need be given" does not apply to petitioners' Exhibit "5," the
supposed birth registry record of defendant Violeta Cabatbat
showing that she was born on May 26, 1948, at the Pangasinan
Provincial Hospital in Dagupan City, and that her father and
mother are Proceso Cabatbat and Esperanza Frianeza,
respectively. In rejecting that document, the trial court pointedly
observed:

"This is very strange and odd because the Registry Book of

admission of the hospital does not show that Esperanza Frianeza
was ever a patient on May 26, 1948. Indeed, Esperanza Frianeza
was never admitted in the hospital as an obstetrics case before
or after May 26, 1948, that is from December 1, 1947 to June 15,
1948 (Stipulation of Facts, Pre-Trial Order of May 23, 1977, Record
on Appeal, p. 117).
"On May 26, 1948, the day defendant Violeta Cabatbat was
alleged to have been delivered by Esperanza Frianeza in the
Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, the records of the hospital show
that only one woman by the same of the Benita Lastimosa of
Tagudin, Ilocos Sur, not Esperanza Frianeza, gave birth to an
illegitimate child who was named by her mother Benita
Lastimosa as Baby Girl Lastimosa (Exhibit S. Plaintiffs' Folder of
Exhibits, p. 39, Record on Appeal, pp. 117-118). Furthermore, the
record of birth certificates of Pangasinan Provincial Hospital for
the years 1947 and 1943 does not carry the birth certificate of
defendant Violeta Cabatbat and the only birth certificate in the
file of birth certificates of the hospital for May 26, 1948 is that of
Baby Girl Lastimosa whose mother's name is Benita Lastimosa."
(pp. 3-4, CA Decision, pp. 13-14, Record on Appeal.)
Furthermore, the absence of a record of the birth of petitioner
Violeta Cabatbat in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, puts
a cloud on the genuineness of her Exhibit 5.

Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code is not

well-taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn
legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an
action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the
private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of
their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner
Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but
that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither a legally
adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by
legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of
the deceased.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The

appealed decision is affirmed, but with modification of
paragraphs 2 and 4 of the dispositive portion thereof, by
excluding the widows Adela B. Vda. de Frianeza and Decideria Q.
Vda. de Frianeza, who are not legal heirs of Esperanza Frianeza
Cabatbat from participating with their children and the surviving
sisters of the deceased in the one-fourth share of the estate
pertaining to the latter under Article 1001 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.

Lim v. IAC GR L-69679, October 18, 1988

FACTS:
This is a contest over the estate of the late Dra Esperanza
Cabatbat. The petitioner Violeta who claims to be her only
child and respondents are the sisters of the doctor and the
children of her deceased brothers. The IAC found Violeta not to
be the offspring of Dra and hence, not a legal heir. Respondents
allege that Violeta is merely a ward (ampon) of the Spouses
Esperanza and Proceso, without benefit of the
adoption proceedings.
ISSUE:
Can Violeta inherit from the Dra Esperanza?
RULING:
NO. She is not the decedent’s child. Being
neither legally adopted, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor
a child by legal fiction of Esperanza, Violeta is not a legal heir of
the deceased because there was no record that Esperanza was
admitted to the hospital where Violeta was born on the day of
her birth; no certificate of live birth in the hospital and in the civil
registrar; certification from Violeta’s school that the
spouses were listed as guardians and not as parents; and there
was a testimony of a person who met
a patient named Benita Lastimosa who gave birth to a baby girl
who grew up to be Violeta. The following are proof of her non-
filiation thus not entitled to inherit at all.
WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon Garcia,
petitioner, vs. JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL MARGARET L.
TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND LINDA CHRISTINA LIYAO,
respondents.
G.R. No. 138961 | 2002-03-07
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision

dated June 4, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.V. No.
45394[1] which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 167 in declaring William Liyao,
Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao
and ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose
L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao to recognize and acknowledge
William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao
and entitled to all successional rights as such and to pay the costs of
the suit.

On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother

Corazon G. Garcia, filed Civil Case No. 24943 before the RTC of Pasig,
Branch 167 which is an action for compulsory recognition as "the
illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao" against herein
respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose
L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao.[2] The complaint was later
amended to include the allegation that petitioner "was in continuous
possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William
Liyao," petitioner having been "recognized and acknowledged as such
child by the decedent during his lifetime."[3]

The facts as alleged by petitioner are as follows:

Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from

Ramon M. Yulo for more than ten (10) years at the time of the
institution of the said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late
William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of William's untimely demise
on December 2, 1975. They lived together in the company of
Corazon's two (2) children from her subsisting marriage, namely:

Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo, in a succession of

rented houses in Quezon City and Manila. This was with the
knowledge of William Liyao's legitimate children, Tita Rose L. Tan
and Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga, from his subsisting marriage with
Juanita Tanhoti Liyao. Tita Rose and Christina were both employed
at the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. of which Corazon and William
were then vice president and president, respectively.

Sometime in 1974, Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas and Co. which
required the signature of her husband, Ramon Yulo, to show his
consent to the aforesaid sale. She failed to secure his signature and,
had never been in touch with him despite the necessity to meet him.
Upon the advice of William Liyao, the sale of the parcel of land
located at the Valle Verde Subdivision was registered under the
name of Far East Realty Investment, Inc.

On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the

Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital. During her three (3) day stay at
the hospital, William Liyao visited and stayed with her and the new
born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and hospital expenses,
food and clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao.
William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia
Rodriguez, to secure a copy of Billy's birth certificate. He likewise
instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with the
Consolidated Bank and Trust Company[4] and gave weekly amounts
to be deposited therein.[5] William Liyao would bring Billy to the
office, introduce him as his good looking son and had their pictures
taken together.[6]

During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures were taken

showing, among others, William Liyao and Corazon together with
Billy's godfather, Fr. Julian Ruiz, William Liyao's legal staff and their
wives while on vacation in Baguio.[7] Corazon also presented
pictures in court to prove that that she usually accompanied William
Liyao while attending various social gatherings and other important
meetings.[8] During the occasion of William Liyao's last birthday on
November 22, 1975 held at the Republic Supermarket, William Liyao
expressly acknowledged Billy as his son in the presence of Fr. Ruiz,
Maurita Pasion and other friends and said, "Hey, look I am still young,
I can still make a good looking son."[9] Since birth, Billy had been in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a recognized
and/or acknowledged child of William Liyao by the latter's direct and
overt acts. William Liyao supported Billy and paid for his food,
clothing and other material needs. However, after William Liyao's
death, it was Corazon who provided sole support to Billy and took
care of his tuition fees at La Salle, Greenhills. William Liyao left his
personal belongings, collections, clothing, old newspaper clippings
and laminations at the house in White Plains where he shared his last
moments with Corazon.

Testifying for the petitioner, Maurita Pasion declared that she knew
both Corazon G. Garcia and William Liyao who were godparents to
her children. She used to visit Corazon and William Liyao from 1965-
1975. The two children of Corazon from her marriage to Ramon Yulo,
namely, Bernadette and Enrique (Ike), together with some
housemaids lived with Corazon and William Liyao as one family. On
some occasions like birthdays or some other celebrations, Maurita
would sleep in the couple's residence and cook for the family. During
these occasions, she would usually see William Liyao in sleeping
clothes. When Corazon, during the latter part of 1974, was pregnant
with her child Billy, Maurita often visited her three (3) to four (4)
times a week in Greenhills and later on in White Plains where she
would often see William Liyao. Being a close friend of Corazon, she
was at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital during the birth of
Billy. She continuously visited them at White Plains and knew that
William Liyao, while living with her friend Corazon, gave support by
way of grocery supplies, money for household expenses and
matriculation fees for the two (2) older children, Bernadette and
Enrique. During William Liyao's birthday on November 22, 1975 held
at the Republic Supermarket Office, he was carrying Billy and told
everybody present, including his two (2) daughters from his legal
marriage, "Look, this is my son, very guapo and healthy."[10] He then
talked about his plan for the baptism of Billy before Christmas. He
intended to make it "engrande" and "make the bells of San Sebastian
Church ring."[11] Unfortunately, this did not happen since William
Liyao passed away on December 2, 1975. Maurita attended Mr.
Liyao's funeral and helped Corazon pack his clothes. She even
recognized a short sleeved shirt of blue and gray[12] which Mr. Liyao
wore in a photograph[13] as well as another shirt of lime green[14]
as belonging to the deceased. A note was also presented with the
following inscriptions: "To Cora, Love From William."[15] Maurita
remembered having invited the couple during her mother's birthday
where the couple had their pictures taken while exhibiting
affectionate poses with one another. Maurita knew that Corazon is
still married to Ramon Yulo since her marriage has not been annulled
nor is Corazon legally separated from her said husband. However,
during the entire cohabitation of William Liyao with Corazon Garcia,
Maurita had not seen Ramon Yulo or any other man in the house
when she usually visited Corazon.

Gloria Panopio testified that she is the owner of a beauty parlor and
that she knew that Billy is the son of her neighbors, William Liyao
and Corazon Garcia, the latter being one of her customers. Gloria
met Mr. Liyao at Corazon's house in Scout Delgado, Quezon City in
the Christmas of 1965. Gloria had numerous occasions to see Mr.
Liyao from 1966 to 1974 and even more so when the couple
transferred to White Plains, Quezon City from 1974-1975. At the time
Corazon was conceiving, Mr. Liyao was worried that Corazon might
have another miscarriage so he insisted that she just stay in the
house, play mahjong and not be bored. Gloria taught Corazon how
to play mahjong and together with Atty. Brillantes' wife and sister-
in-law, had mahjong sessions among themselves. Gloria knew that
Mr. Liyao provided Corazon with a rented house, paid the salary of
the maids and food for Billy. He also gave Corazon financial support.
Gloria knew that Corazon is married but is separated from Ramon
Yulo although Gloria never had any occasion to see Mr. Yulo with
Corazon in the house where Mr. Liyao and Corazon lived.
Enrique Garcia Yulo testified that he had not heard from his father,
Ramon Yulo, from the time that the latter abandoned and separated
from his family. Enrique was about six (6) years old when William
Liyao started to live with them up to the time of the latter's death
on December 2, 1975. Mr. Liyao was very supportive and fond of
Enrique's half brother, Billy. He identified several pictures showing
Mr. Liyao carrying Billy at the house as well as in the office. Enrique's
testimony was corroborated by his sister, Bernadette Yulo, who
testified that the various pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy
could not have been superimposed and that the negatives were in
the possession of her mother, Corazon Garcia.

Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the

story.

Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga stated that her parents, William Liyao

and Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married.[16] Linda grew up
and lived with her parents at San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro
Manila until she got married; that her parents were not separated
legally or in fact and that there was no reason why any of her parents
would institute legal separation proceedings in court. Her father
lived at their house in San Lorenzo Village and came home regularly.
Even during out of town business trips or for conferences with the
lawyers at the office, her father would change his clothes at home
because of his personal hygiene and habits. Her father reportedly
had trouble sleeping in other people's homes. Linda described him
as very conservative and a strict disciplinarian. He believed that no
amount of success would compensate for failure of a home. As a
businessman, he was very tough, strong, fought for what he
believed in and did not give up easily. He suffered two strokes
before the fatal attack which led to his death on December 2, 1975.
He suffered a stroke at the office sometime in April-May 1974 and
was attended by Dr. Santiago Co. He then stayed in the house for
two (2) to three (3) months for his therapy and acupuncture
treatment. He could not talk, move, walk, write or sign his name. In
the meantime, Linda and her sister, Tita Rose Liyao-Tan, ran the
office. She handled the collection of rents while her sister referred
legal matters to their lawyers. William Liyao was bedridden and had
personally changed. He was not active in business and had dietary
restrictions. Mr. Liyao also suffered a milder stroke during the latter
part of September to October 1974. He stayed home for two (2) to
three (3) days and went back to work. He felt depressed, however,
and was easily bored. He did not put in long hours in the office unlike
before and tried to spend more time with his family.

Linda testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still married to

Ramon Yulo. Corazon was not legally separated from her husband
and the records from the Local Civil Registrar do not indicate that
the couple obtained any annulment[17] of their marriage. Once in
1973, Linda chanced upon Ramon Yulo picking up Corazon Garcia at
the company garage. Immediately after the death of Linda's father,
Corazon went to Linda's office for the return of the former's alleged
investments with the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. including a
parcel of land sold by Ortigas and Company. Linda added that
Corazon, while still a Vice-President of the company, was able to
take out documents, clothes and several laminated pictures of
William Liyao from the office. There was one instance when she was
told by the guards, "Mrs. Yulo is leaving and taking out things
again."[18] Linda then instructed the guards to bring Mrs. Yulo to the
office upstairs but her sister, Tita Rose, decided to let Corazon Garcia
go. Linda did not recognize any article of clothing which belonged
to her father after having been shown three (3) large suit cases full
of men's clothes, underwear, sweaters, shorts and pajamas.

Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testified that her parents were legally married
and had never been separated. They resided at No. 21 Hernandez
Street, San Lorenzo Village, Makati up to the time of her father's
death on December 2, 1975.[19] Her father suffered two (2) minor
cardio-vascular arrests (CVA) prior to his death. During the first heart
attack sometime between April and May 1974, his speech and hands
were affected and he had to stay home for two (2) to three (3)
months under strict medication, taking aldomet, serpadil and
cifromet which were prescribed by Dr. Bonifacio Yap, for high blood
pressure and cholesterol level control.[20] Tita Rose testified that
after the death of Mr. Liyao, Corazon Garcia was paid the amount of
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) representing her
investment in the Far East Realty Investment Inc. Tita Rose also
stated that her family never received any formal demand that they
recognize a certain William Liyao, Jr. as an illegitimate son of her
father, William Liyao. After assuming the position of President of the
company, Tita Rose did not come across any check signed by her late
father representing payment to lessors as rentals for the house
occupied by Corazon Garcia. Tita Rose added that the laminated
photographs presented by Corazon Garcia are the personal
collection of the deceased which were displayed at the latter's
office.

The last witness who testified for the respondents was Ramon
Pineda, driver and bodyguard of William Liyao from 1962 to 1974,
who said that he usually reported for work at San Lorenzo Village,
Makati to pick up his boss at 8:00 o'clock in the morning. At past
7:00 o'clock in the evening, either Carlos Palamigan or Serafin
Villacillo took over as night shift driver. Sometime between April and
May 1974, Mr. Liyao got sick. It was only after a month that he was
able to report to the office. Thereafter, Mr. Liyao was not able to
report to the office regularly. Sometime in September 1974, Mr.
Liyao suffered from another heart attack. Mr. Pineda added that as
a driver and bodyguard of Mr. Liyao, he ran errands for the latter
among which was buying medicine for him like capasid and aldomet.
On December 2, 1975, Mr. Pineda was called inside the office of Mr.
Liyao. Mr. Pineda saw his employer leaning on the table. He tried to
massage Mr. Liyao's breast and decided later to carry and bring him
to the hospital but Mr. Liyao died upon arrival thereat. Mrs. Liyao
and her daughter, Linda Liyao-Ortiga were the first to arrive at the
hospital.

Mr. Pineda also declared that he knew Corazon Garcia to be one of

the employees of the Republic Supermarket. People in the office
knew that she was married. Her husband, Ramon Yulo, would
sometimes go to the office. One time, in 1974, Mr. Pineda saw
Ramon Yulo at the office garage as if to fetch Corazon Garcia. Mr.
Yulo who was also asking about cars for sale, represented himself as
car dealer.

Witness Pineda declared that he did not know anything about the
claim of Corazon. He freely relayed the information that he saw Mr.
Yulo in the garage of Republic Supermarket once in 1973 and then in
1974 to Atty. Quisumbing when he went to the latter's law office.
Being the driver of Mr. Liyao for a number of years, Pineda said that
he remembered having driven the group of Mr. Liyao, Atty.
Astraquillo, Atty. Brillantes, Atty. Magno and Atty. Laguio to Baguio
for a vacation together with the lawyers' wives. During his
employment, as driver of Mr. Liyao, he does not remember driving
for Corazon Garcia on a trip to Baguio or for activities like shopping.

On August 31, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, the

dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff

and against the defendants as follows:

(a) Confirming the appointment of Corazon G. Garcia as the guardian

ad litem of the minor William Liyao, Jr.;

(b) Declaring the minor William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate

(spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao;

(c) Ordering the defendants Juanita Tanhoti Liyao, Pearl Margaret L.

Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Christian Liyao, to recognize, and
acknowledge the minor William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir of the
deceased William Liyao, entitled to all succesional rights as such;
and

(d) Costs of suit.[21]

In ruling for herein petitioner, the trial court said it was convinced by
preponderance of evidence that the deceased William Liyao sired
William Liyao, Jr. since the latter was conceived at the time when
Corazon Garcia cohabited with the deceased. The trial court
observed that herein petitioner had been in continuous possession
and enjoyment of the status of a child of the deceased by direct and
overt acts of the latter such as securing the birth certificate of
petitioner through his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia
Rodriguez; openly and publicly acknowledging petitioner as his son;
providing sustenance and even introducing herein petitioner to his
legitimate children.

The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the ruling of the trial court
saying that the law favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy
of the child and "the presumption of legitimacy is thwarted only on
ethnic ground and by proof that marital intimacy between husband
and wife was physically impossible at the period cited in Article 257
in relation to Article 255 of the Civil Code." The appellate court gave
weight to the testimonies of some witnesses for the respondents
that Corazon Garcia and Ramon Yulo who were still legally married
and have not secured legal separation, were seen in each other's
company during the supposed time that Corazon cohabited with the
deceased William Liyao. The appellate court further noted that the
birth certificate and the baptismal certificate of William Liyao, Jr.
which were presented by petitioner are not sufficient to establish
proof of paternity in the absence of any evidence that the deceased,
William Liyao, had a hand in the preparation of said certificates and
considering that his signature does not appear thereon. The Court
of Appeals stated that neither do family pictures constitute
competent proof of filiation. With regard to the passbook which was
presented as evidence for petitioner, the appellate court observed
that there was nothing in it to prove that the same was opened by
William Liyao for either petitioner or Corazon Garcia since William
Liyao's signature and name do not appear thereon.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed

the present petition.
It must be stated at the outset that both petitioner and respondents
have raised a number of issues which relate solely to the sufficiency
of evidence presented by petitioner to establish his claim of filiation
with the late William Liyao. Unfortunately, both parties have
consistently overlooked the real crux of this litigation: May
petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the
estate of his supposed father, William Liyao?

We deny the present petition.

Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid
marriage is presumed to be legitimate.[22] The presumption of
legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration
contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of
natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The
presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring
from the odium of illegitimacy.[23]

The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not

conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the
contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code[24] provides:

Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following
the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days
following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be
presumed to be legitimate.

Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than

that of the physical impossibility of the husband having access to his
wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three
hundred which preceded the birth of the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:

1) By the impotence of the husband;

2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a
way that access was not possible;

3) By the serious illness of the husband.

Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living
separately for ten (10) years from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the
time that she cohabited with the late William Liyao and it was
physically impossible for her to have sexual relations with Ramon
Yulo when petitioner was conceived and born. To bolster his claim,
petitioner presented a document entitled, "Contract of
Separation,"[25] executed and signed by Ramon Yulo indicating a
waiver of rights to any and all claims on any property that Corazon
Garcia might acquire in the future.[26]

The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her
husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and
born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband
to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for
impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the
grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in
Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or
in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article
262 of the Civil Code.[27] Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a
strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his
heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted
with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces
and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity
or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved.[28]
It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest
such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can
impugn legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to his
memory.[29]

It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G.

Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to
compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr,
as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is
settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed
legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.[30] We
cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert
the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional
circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born
in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose
his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not
impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is
fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother's
alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of
legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the
husband who successfully defeated the presumption.[31]

Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children

of Corazon Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein
petitioner amount to impugnation of the legitimacy of the latter?

We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the

heirs of the husband are allowed to contest the legitimacy of the
child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo
has already passed away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor
at the time of the initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the case at
bar was initiated by petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon
Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled
that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct
action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within
the period limited by law.

Considering the foregoing, we find no reason to discuss the

sufficiency of the evidence presented by both parties on the
petitioner's claim of alleged filiation with the late William Liyao. In
any event, there is no clear, competent and positive evidence
presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or
recognized his paternity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45394 is hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Liyao vs. Liyao GR No. 138961, March 7, 2002

FACTS:
William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the deceased, as
represented by her mother (Corazon), filed a petition ordering Juanita
Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita L. Tan and Linda Liyao to recognize and
acknowledge the former as a compulsory heir of the deceased and to be
entitled to all successional rights. Liyao Jr. was in continuous possession
and enjoyment of the status as the child of the deceased having been
recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his
lifetime. There were two sides of the story. Corazon maintained that
she and the deceased were legally married but living separately for more
than 10 years and that they cohabited from 1965 until the death of the
deceased. On the other hand, one of the chidren of the deceased stated
that her mom and the deceased were legally married and that her
parents were not separated legally or in fact.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner can impugn his own legitimacy to be able to
claim from the estate of the deceased.

HELD:
Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the
husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the reason that he was the
one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity
of his wife produced and he should be the one to decide whether to
conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic
interest involved. Hence, it was then settled that the legitimacy of the
child can only be impugned in a direct action brought for that purpose,
by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.
Furthermore, the court held that there was no clear, competent and
positive evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had
admitted or recognized his paternity.

Liyao vs Liyao GR No 138961 Mar 7 2002

FACTS: Petitioner, represented by his mother Corazon, filed an action

for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the late
William Liyao against herein respondents, the legitimate wife and
children of the deceased.
Corazon is legally married but living separately from her
husband allegedly for more than ten years at the time of the institution
of this civil case. She cohabited with the late William until his death.
Petitioner alleged that he “was in continuous possession and enjoyment
of the status of the child of said William Liyao,” having been “recognized
and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime and
presented witnesses and evidence to prove his allegations. On the other
hand, respondents painted a different picture of the story.
RTC rendered judgment in favour of petitioner.
CA reversed the ruling of RTC, favoured the presumption of legitimacy
of the child and gave weight to the testimonies of the witnesses of the
respondents that Corazon and her husband were seen together during
the period she cohabited with the deceased.

ISSUE: WON the petition initiated by Corazon to compel recognition by

respondents can prosper.
WON petitioner’s action to impugn his legitimacy is proper.

RULING: No. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is

presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.(Art
167,FC)
No. We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition
and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in
exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a
child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot
choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does
not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is
fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother’s
alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy
is overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who
successfully defeated the presumption. (Art 170-171, FC)

Liyao v. Liyao G.R. No. 138961, 7 March 2002

FACTS:

William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the deceased, as represented by

her mother (Corazon), filed a petition ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao,
Pearl L. Tan, Tita L. Tan and Linda Liyao to recognize and acknowledge
the former as a compulsory heir of the deceased and to be entitled to all
successional rights. Liyao Jr. was in continuous possession and
enjoyment of the status as the child of the deceased having been
recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his
lifetime. There were two sides of the story. Corazon G. Garcia is legally
married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more than ten
(10) years at the time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon
cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of
William’s untimely demise on December 2, 1975. They lived together in
the company of Corazon’s two (2) children from her subsisting marriage.
On the other hand, one of the children of the deceased stated that her
mom and the deceased were legally married and that her parents were
not separated legally or in fact.

ISSUE:
WON the petitioner can impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim
from the estate of the deceased.

RULING:
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid
marriage is presumed to be legitimate. The presumption of legitimacy
of children does not only flow out from a declaration contained in the
statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the
supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy
to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.The
presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and
consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence,
Article 255 of the New Civil Code provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following
the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days
following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be
presumed to be legitimate.

Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that

of the physical impossibility of the husband having access to his wife
within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred
which preceded the birth of the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:

1)By the impotence of the husband;

2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way
that access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.

The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her
husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is
of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to have
sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the
legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning
the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may
only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the
conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning the
legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in
exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one
directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of
his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to
conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic
interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed
to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none – even his heirs
– can impugn legitimacy; that would amount of an insult to his memory.

Furthermore, the court held that there was no clear, competent and
positive evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had
admitted or recognized his paternity.