I.

General Principle of Criminal Law

What is Criminal Law?
Branch or division of law that defines crime, treats their nature and provides
punishment
are set of laws that regulates socially harmful behaviors

What is crime- crimes are those which are defined under the revised penal code.
Purpose of criminal law:
1. Retribution- a. civil- to person wronged
b. criminal- to people of ph (imprisonment etc)
2. Prevention- penalties that prevents criminal from committing wrongs punishable
under rpc. Penalties are designed to rehabilitate or reform criminal.

A. Nature

Title: Griffith v Court of Appeals, GR no. 129764, March 12, 2002

GEOFFREY F. GRIFFITH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RTC JUDGE EDWIN A. VILLASOR, MTC
JUDGE MANUEL D.L. VILLAMAYOR and PHELPS DODGE PHILS., INC., respondents
Ponente: Justice Quisumbing
Petition: in the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Regional Trial Court's decision finding
petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith guilty on two counts for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing
Checks Law), and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for a period of six months on each count, to be
served consecutively.
Provisions and Doctrine:
Batas Pambansa 22: (the Bouncing Checks Law)
Art. III, Sec. 20 of the 1987 Constitution: No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a
poll tax.
Doctrine: When the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases. It is not the letter alone but the spirit of
the law also that gives it life.
Facts:
 1985, Phelps Dodge Philippines, Inc. leased lot and factory building to Lincoln Gerard, Inc. for a
term of two years at a monthly rental of Php75,000.
 Geoffrey F. Griffith, in his capacity as president of Lincoln Gerard, Inc., issued two checks
amounting to Php215, 442.65 to Phelps Dodge Phils. (not to be presented w/o approval)
  May 20 1986, Phelphs informed Griffith that he will be transferring his properties since a new
tenant is moving and taking it into custody
 May 29, 1986, Griffith wrote Phelps Dodge not to present the said checks for payment on May
30, 1986 because they could not be funded due to a four-week labor strike that affected their
company.
 June 2, 1986, when no further communication was received from Lincoln Gerard, Phelps Dodge
presented the two checks for payment but these were dishonored by the bank for having been
drawn against insufficient funds. Three days later, Phelps Dodge sent a demand letter to Lincoln
Gerard.
 June 19, 1986, Phelps Dodge notified Lincoln Gerard that its properties would be foreclosed.
Phelps Dodge went ahead with the foreclosure and auction sale on June 20, 1986.
 May 10, 1988, two information for violation of B.P. 22 were filed against the petitioner. The
motion for reconsideration filed by Griffith was dismissed, and so were his petition for review
filed before the Department of Justice and later on his motion to quash filed before the RTC.
Griffith then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals that was likewise denied.
 Lincoln Gerard lodged a complaint for damages before the RTC of Pasig, against Phelps Dodge
and the notary public who conducted the auction sale.
 July 19, 1991, the trial court ruled that the foreclosure and auction sale were invalid, but applied
the proceeds thereof to Lincoln Gerard's arrearages. It also ordered Phelps Dodge to return to
Lincoln Gerard the P1,072,586.88 as excess.
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision, and this became final and executory.
 August 25, 1994, the criminal cases against Griffith pending before the RTC were remanded to
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC).
 July 25, 1995, the MeTC, in Criminal Cases Nos. 41678 and 41679, found Griffith guilty on both
counts for violation of B.P. 22.
 On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto the lower court's decision. Petitioner then appealed his
conviction to the Court of Appeals which was denied. An MR was also denied.
Issues and Holdings:
1. Whether or not Geoffrey F. Griffith, has been erroneously convicted and sentenced for violation
of the BP 22.
The conviction was erroneous. We should not apply penal laws mechanically. We must
find if the application of the law is consistent with the purpose of and reason for the
law. The creditor having collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover the
value of the checks for payment of rentals, via auction sale, we find that holding the
debtor's president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. 22 two years after said
collection, is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations
Ruling: The petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Geoffrey F. Griffith is ACQUITTED of the charges of violation of
B.P. 22.

B. Purposes
a. Identifying wrongful behaviours
 b. Prescribe punishment
i. Retribution
ii. Preventions

De Joya vs Jail Warden of Batangas City

PETITIONER: NORMA DE JOYA
RESPONDENT: THE JAIL WARDEN OF BATANGAS CITY AND HON. RUBEN A. GALVEZ AS PRESIDING JUDGE
OF BATANGAS CITY MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, BRANCH 1
PONENTE: CALLEJO, SR., J
G.R. Nos. 159418-19 December 10, 2003

This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Norma de Joya praying for her release from the
Batangas City Jail on the claim that her detention was illegal.
FACTS:

The petitioner was charged with two separate criminal cases (docketed as Criminal Case No. 25484 and
Criminal Case No. 25773) with violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Municipal Trial Court In
Cities in Batangas City. Two Informations were charged against her.

When arraigned in both cases, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. While trial was going
on, the petitioner jumped bail. No evidence was thereby adduced in her defense in any of the two cases.
December 14, 1995: Trial court promulgated its decision in Criminal Case No. 25484 and found the
petitioner guilty. The petitioner and her counsel failed to appear despite due notice.
March 21, 1997: Trial Court decided on Criminal Case No. 25773 in absentia and likewise found the
petitioner guilty.
The petitioner remained at large and no appeal was filed from any of the said decisions.
November 21, 2001: During the pendency of the case, the Court issued Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 12-2000 enjoining all courts and judges concerned to take notice of the ruling and policy of
the Court with regard to the imposition of the penalty for violations of B.P. Blg. 22.
After five years, the petitioner was finally arrested while she was applying for an NBI clearance.
December 3, 2002. She was forthwith detained at the Batangas City Jail.
July 28, 2003: Petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Municipal Trial Court of Batangas City asking the
court to apply SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 retroactively pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code and to order her release from detention. The public prosecutor opposed the motion.
August 15, 2003: The trial court denied the motion on three grounds: (a) its decision convicting the
petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 had long become final and executory; hence, could no longer be
amended to change the penalty imposed therein; (b) the SC Circular should be applied prospectively; and
(c) the SC Circular did not amend B.P. Blg. 22, a substantive law, but merely encourages trial court judges
to have a uniform imposition of fine.
ISSUE:

1: WON the petitioner can avail writ of habeas corpus.

The petitioner is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, provides that the writ of habeas corpus is not allowed if the person alleged to be restrained of
Jurisprudence: decisions/ rulings made by SC. Considered part of the law of the land. Evolves since new
cases introduces themselves that warrant new ruling from SC
his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment
or order of a court of record.

In this case, the petitioner was arrested and detained pursuant to the final judgment of the Municipal
Trial Court of Batangas City, convicting her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

2. WON SC Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 shall apply to her retroactively.

Petitioner posits that SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 deleted the penalty of imprisonment for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 and allows only the imposition of a fine. The trial court was mandated to apply SC Admin.
Circular No. 12-2000 retroactively conformably with Article 22 of the Revised Penal. Thus, the Court
should declare her detention illegal and order her release from the Batangas City Jail.

HELD: No, this does not apply retroactively. It is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code is not applicable. The circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of its effectivity and
not to cases already terminated by final judgment.

And even if it applies to her, the punishment of imprisonment is not absolved by the circular. The circular
merely lays down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It
does not amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative intent behind the law.

The courts are given the discretion to choose whether to impose a single penalty or conjunctive penalties;
that is, whether to impose a penalty of fine, or a penalty of imprisonment only, or a penalty of both fine
and imprisonment. This is depending on the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the
imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice or whether forbearing to impose
imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense.

AFTER discussing the issues the Court went on to discuss the following:

Philippine penal law has adopted features of the positivist theory of criminal law. The positivist theory
states that the basis for criminal liability is the sum total of the social and economic phenomena to which
the offense is expressed.

Factors in determining Penalty:

(1) His relationship towards his dependents, family and their relationship with him; and

(2) His relationship towards society at large and the State.

The penalties imposed must not only be retributive but must also be reformative, to give the convict an
opportunity to live a new life and rejoin society as a productive and civic-spirited member of the
community.

Primary elements of punishments

a. the moral responsibility of the convict,
b. the relation of the convict to the private complainant,
c. the intention of the convict, the temptation to the act or the excuse for the crime - was it done by a rich
man in the insolence of his wealth or by a poor man in the extremity of his need?

Secondary elements of punishment

a. The reformation of the offender,

b. The prevention of further offenses by the offender, the repression of offenses in others.

As Rousseau said, crimes can be thoroughly repressed only by a system of penalties which, from the
benignity they breathe, serve rather than to soften than to inflame those on whom they are imposed.
There is also merit in the view that punishment inflicted beyond the merit of the offense is so much
punishment of innocence.

C. Characteristics
a. Statutory-
i. Article 3:
ii. Article 5 par 1

People v Sultan

331 SCRA 216

Facts:
 Fernando Sultan appeals decision of trial court that found him guilty of a complex crime- robbery
(wristwatch 1600, ring 850, earing 500 and necklace 2100 and cash 130) plus rape. Ordered to
pay 50,000 for damages
 2 June 1997 9:00 pm, Juditha Bautista on her way home from cousins house in Nova, QC was
accosted by Sultan in a dark alley, pointed a sharp (ice pick) instrument at her neck and said “hold-
up”
o Sultan then dragged her to his house and divested her of her valuables and the proceeded
to rape her twice. (prior to rape, defendant threatened her with ice pick as he ordered
her to undress) Bautista acceded due to fear. After 2nd rape, Sultan cuddled Bautista and
comforted her by saying he will take responsibility for what he did by eloping w/ her.
o Bautista took the opportunity offered and used her agreement to eloping with Sultan as
a means to escape his clutches.
o Upon returning home she recounted harrowing events that transpired and with the help
of a brother police officer (stationed in bulacan) the had staged the arrest of Sultan by
requiring his sister to go back to the house for the planned elopement
o Police Bautista together with 2 other police tailed Juditha Bautista in a van, waiting for an
opportunity to arrest. When the bus carrying Sultan and Bautista slowed down due to
traffic along Gulod, Police Bautista and companions boarded the bus, boxed Sultan and
with the help of some policemen from the local brgy.
 Bautista underwent physical examination to determine signs of sexual abuse. Dr. Dennis Belin
found no external signs of violence but there was a deep fresh laceration in her vagina. Bautista
was no longer a virgin before the rape transpired
 5 June 1997 case of robbery with rape filed against Sultan who brushed it off claiming it was with
consent
 5 June 1998- Sultan found guilty, ordered to return Bautistas properties and to pay 50000 for
moral damages
 Sultan appealed, arguing that the sex was consensual (some form of consent given by not fighting
back) and there was no evidence to support Bautista’s claim that he robbed her and upon
agreement to elope, bautista did not demand her properties returned.
Jurisprudence: decisions/ rulings made by SC. Considered part of the law of the land. Evolves since new
cases introduces themselves that warrant new ruling from SC
  Court found Sultan’s argument unpersuasive
ISSUE and HOLDING:
Whether multiple rape can be considered as an aggravating circumstance
No. the court holds that there are no laws that says additional rape or homicide is an aggravating
circumstance.
o It further observed that the enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Art. 14 of the
Revised Penal Code is exclusive, unlike in Art. 13 of the same Code which enumerates the
mitigating circumstances where analogous circumstances may be considered, hence, the remedy
lies with the legislature.
o Unless and until a law is passed providing that the additional rape/s or homicide/s may be
considered aggravating, the Court must construe the penal law in favor of the offender as no
person may be brought within its terms if he is not clearly made so by the statute.
o Under this view, the additional rape committed by accused-appellant is not considered an
aggravating circumstance.
o Applying Art. 63, par. (2), of the Revised Penal Code which provides that “(i)n all cases in which
the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be
observed in the application thereof x x x x 2. (w)hen there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied,” the lower
penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed on accused-appellant.

b. General- Article 2
c. Territorial- Article 2
i. Military vessels are extensions of ph territory
1. French rule- crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant
vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country
within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed,
unless their commission affects the peace and security of the
territory
2. English Rule-crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are
in general triable in the courts of the country within territory
they were committed
a. Ph courts will have jurisdiction unless crime affects
purely internal matters
b. Ex foreign fishing vessel entered etc Philippine
territory
c. Defendant needs to convince the court not to take
jurisdiction by submitting proof that crime committed
does not affect ph

People v Tulin

G.R. No. 111709 August 30, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs. ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O.
CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, and JOHN DOES, accused-appellants.
 PONENTE: MELO, J.

TOPIC
Characteristics of Criminal Law--Territorial

DOCTRINE/PROVISIONS
 RPC 2
 Right to Counsel and Waiver
 Miranda Rights
 Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine

FACTS
Mar 2, 1991 1. M/T Tabangao, a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation, loaded with 2,000 barrels of kerosene, 2,600 barrels of regular gasoline,
and 40,000 barrels of diesel oil, with a total value of P40,426,793,87 was sailing off
the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.
2. The vessel whose crew included Capt. Edilberto Liboon and 2nd Mate Christian
Torralba, was suddenly boarded, […] by seven fully armed pirates led by Emilio
Changco. The pirates, including Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. were armed. They
detained the crew and took control of the vessel.
3. The crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all the while sending misleading radio
messages to PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs.
4. PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of
the vessel to the Philippine Coast Guard and secured the assistance of the Philippine
Air Force and the Philippine Navy.

Mar 9, 1991 the ship arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and cruised around the area. The pirates
were thus forced to return to the Philippines on March 14, 1991, arriving at
Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991 where it remained at sea

Mar 28, 1991 1. “M/T Tabangao” again sailed to and anchored about 10 to 18 nautical miles from
Singapore’s shoreline where another vessel called “Navi Pride” anchored beside it.
2. Emilio Changco ordered the crew of “M/T Tabangao” to transfer the vessel’s cargo
to the hold of “Navi Pride.” Cheong San Hiong supervised the crew of “Navi Pride” in
receiving the cargo. The transfer was completed on March 30, 1991.

Apr 10, 1991 The members of the crew were released in 3 batches w/ the stern warning not to
report the incident to government authorities for a period of 2 days or until April 12,
1991, otherwise they would be killed.

On April 29 or Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he had four vessels and wanted to offer its
30, 1991, cargo to cargo operators. (Before the seizure of the MT Tabangon, Navi Marine was
dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker who offered to sell
bunker oil to the former). Hiong was asked to act as a broker or ship agent for the
transaction. He was assigned to supervise a ship to ship transfer. Transaction was
successful and Paul Gan received the payment. Upon arrival in Singapore, Hiong was

Jurisprudence: decisions/ rulings made by SC. Considered part of the law of the land. Evolves since new
cases introduces themselves that warrant new ruling from SC
 asked again to transact another transfer of oil. The same procedure was followed.
Hiong then went to the Philippines to arrange another transfer with Changc.
Thereafter, he got arrested.

Series of a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the pirates were
arrests present at U.K. Beach, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. After three days of
surveillance, accused-appellant Tulin was arrested and brought to the NBI
headquarters in Manila.
b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at Aguinaldo
Hi-way by NBI agents as the latter were pursuing the mastermind, who managed to
evade arrest.
c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were arrested at the
lobby of Alpha Hotel in Batangas City.

Oct 24, 1991 Information charging qualified piracy or violation of PD No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine
Waters) was filed against accused-appellants, before the RTC Manila. They pleaded
not guilty to the charge. Trial thereupon ensued.

Tulin, Infante, notwithstanding some inconsistencies in their testimony as to where they were on
Jr., and Loyola, March 1, 1991, maintained the defense of denial, and disputed the charge, as well as
the transfer of any cargo from “M/T Tabangao” to the “Navi Pride.” All of them
claimed having their own respective sources of livelihood. Their story is to the effect
that on March 2, 1991, while they were conversing by the beach, a red speedboat
with Captain Edilberto Liboon and Second Mate Christian Torralba on board,
approached the seashore. Captain Liboon asked them if they wanted to work in a
vessel. They agreed even though they had no sea-going experience.

C. Changco categorically denied the charge, averring that he was at home sleeping on April 10,
1991. He testified that he is the younger brother of Emilio Changco, Jr.

Cheong San adduced evidence that he studied in Sydney, Australia, obtaining the “Certificate” as
Hiong, also Chief Officer, and later completed the course as a “Master” of a vessel, working as
known as such for two years on board a vessel. He was employed at Navi Marine Services,
Ramzan Ali Pte., Ltd. as Port Captain. The company was engaged in the business of trading
petroleum.

The arguments of accused-appellants may be summarized as follows: (Only Hiong’s case involves
territoriality)
Tulin, Loyola, the trial court erred in allowing them to adopt the proceedings taken during the
Infante, Jr., and time they were being represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer, thereby
Cecilio Changco depriving them of their constitutional right to procedural due process.

that Mr. Posadas entered his appearance as counsel for all of them. However, in
the course of the proceedings, the trial court discovered that Mr. Posadas was not
a member of the Philippine Bar.
 that during the custodial investigation, they were subjected to physical violence;
were forced to sign statements without being given the opportunity to read the
contents of the same; were denied assistance of counsel, and were not informed of
their rights, in violation of their constitutional rights.

that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable
doubt that they committed the crime of qualified piracy. They allege that the
pirates were outnumbered by the crew who totaled 22 and who were not guarded
at all times. The crew, so these accused-appellants conclude, could have
overpowered the alleged pirates.

Cheong San (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in effect obliterated the crime committed by him;
Hiong (2) the trial court erred in declaring that the burden is lodged on him to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that he had no knowledge that Emilio Changco and
his cohorts attacked and seized the “M/T Tabangao” and/or that the cargo of the
vessel was stolen or the subject of theft or robbery or piracy;
(3) the trial court erred in finding him guilty as an accomplice to the crime of
qualified piracy under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and
Anti-Robbery Law of 1974);
(4) the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him as an accomplice when the
acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside of Philippine
waters and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him for
trial, to convict, and sentence;
(5) the trial court erred in making factual conclusions without evidence on record
to prove the same and which in fact are contrary to the evidence adduced during
trial;
(6) the trial court erred in convicting him as an accomplice under Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 532 when he was charged as a principal by direct
participation under said decree, thus violating his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

that evidence against the other accused-appellants do not prove any participation
on his part in the commission of the crime of qualified piracy. He further argues
that he had not in any way participated in the seajacking of “M/T Tabangao” and in
committing the crime of qualified piracy, and that he was not aware that the vessel
and its cargo were pirated.

As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the information
with qualified piracy as principal under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532
which refers to Philippine waters. In the case at bar, he argues that he was
convicted for acts done outside Philippine waters or territory. For the State to have
criminal jurisdiction, the act must have been committed within its territory.

ISSUE: Can the Philippine State try a crime committed outside its waters and territory? Yes, in relation
to the provisions contained in RPC 2.

Jurisprudence: decisions/ rulings made by SC. Considered part of the law of the land. Evolves since new
cases introduces themselves that warrant new ruling from SC
In the case: Can accused-appellant Hiong be convicted as accomplice when he was not charged as
such and when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside Philippine
waters and territory?

YES.
Territoriality and Jurisdiction
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused-
appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state that
unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of “M/T Tabangao” (renamed “M/T Galilee” by the pirates)
and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by
the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was
done under accused-appellant Hiong’s direct supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532
requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters,
the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence,
the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.

Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy must be committed
on the high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its
amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to include
offenses committed “in Philippine waters.” On the other hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532
(issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embraces any person including “a passenger or
member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters.” Hence, passenger or not, a member of
the complement or not, any person is covered by the law.

No conflict exists among the mentioned laws, they exist harmoniously as separate laws. The attack on
and the seizure of MT Tabangao and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although the
captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore, where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred
and sold. Such transfer was done under Hiong’s supervision. Although the disposition by the pirates of
the vessel and its cargo was not done in Philippine waters, it is still deemed part of the same act.

Piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to the
rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were
charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law,
Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No.
532 should be applied with more force here since its purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent
piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that
regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world
(People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).
Notably, the alleged order of Hiong’s superior Chua Kim Leng Timothy, is a patent violation not only
of Philippine, but of international law.

Other Issues (not re: territoriality):

1. What are the legal effects and implications of the fact that a non-lawyer represented
accused-appellants during the trial?
2. What are the legal effects and implications of the absence of counsel during the custodial
investigation?
 3. Did the trial court err in finding that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that accused-appellants committed the crime of qualified piracy?

RULING
The SC affirmed the judgement of the trial court in toto.

* Ra 9372, Human Security Act of 2007

d. Prospective- Art 3, 21 & 22

e. Moral Disapprobation
4. Sources
5. Constitutional Limitations – art III, Bill of Rights
a. Due process and equal protection- Section 1

States vs Metzger

Case Name: State V. Metzger

Citation: 319 N.W. 2d 459
Rule of Law:
Sec 9.52.100 of the Lincoln Municipal Code
It shall be unlawful for any person within the City of Lincoln… to commit any indecent,
immodest or filthy act in the presence of any person, on in such a situation that persons passing by
might ordinarily see the same.
Doctrine:
A criminal statute cannot rest on uncertain foundations. The crime and the elements
constituting it must be so clearly expressed that the ordinary person can intelligently choose in advance
what course it is lawful for him to pursue.
Facts:
 Metzger lived in an apartment in Lincoln Nebraska.
 The apartment had a large window facing a parking lot.
 At around 7:45 am of April 30 1981 another resident of the apartment building saw Metzger
standing naked in his apartment window.
 The resident called the police, who testified that Metzger was standing 1 foot away from the
window when the crime occurred.
Issue/Holding:
 W/N the assailed provision of law violates the Constitution? Yes, it is a requirement of due
process that a criminal ordinance be reasonably clear and definite. The terms “indecent”
“immodest” and “filthy” are too broad to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process.
Ruling:
We declare the question provision invalid the conviction is reversed and set aside.
Separate Opinions:
Boslaugh; Dissent;
Jurisprudence: decisions/ rulings made by SC. Considered part of the law of the land. Evolves since new
cases introduces themselves that warrant new ruling from SC
 The Ordinance prevents any one from committing any indecent acts and the act of Metzger, the
showing of genitals, is such an indecent act.

White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila

GR No. 122846 20 January 2009

Petitioner(s): WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST
& DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

Respondent(s): CITY OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM

Doctrine:

Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it
deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.

Substantive due process inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving
a person of life, liberty, or property.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

Facts:

 On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law an Ordinance
entitled, “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and
Wash-Up Rate Schemes”
 prohibits motels and inns from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or
“wash up” rates for such abbreviated stays.
 On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a
complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order (TRO) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
 MTDC prayed that the Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC claimed
that as owner and operator of the Victoria Court in Malate, Manila it was authorized by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time basis as well as to
charge customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours.
 December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and
Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit
attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their
business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila. RTC granted motion to
intervene.
 MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff. RTC approved withdrawal.
 The RTC issued a TRO on January 14, 1993, directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing
the Ordinance. The City filed an Answer dated January 22, 1993 alleging that the Ordinance is a
legitimate exercise of police power.
 On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to desist
from the enforcement of the Ordinance. On March 8, 1993, the Solicitor General filed his
Comment arguing that the Ordinance is constitutional.
  On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void.
 The ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously
guarded by the Constitution.
 The Constitution encourages private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment,
as well as the right to operate economic enterprises.
 City filed petition for review on certiorari before the SC. SC referred it to the CA.
 Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since (1) it violates the right to
privacy and the freedom of movement; (2) it is an invalid exercise of police power; and (3) it is an
unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
 CA reversed the ruling of RTC
 The Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only
penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time
stays.
 The virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object
obtained through a lawful method.
 The adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents
in general.

Issue(s)/Holding:

Whether or not the ordinance is valid.

For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or
any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4)
must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy;
and (6) must not be unreasonable.

The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as

guaranteed under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition.
The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life,
liberty and property of individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a protection against
arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty
insofar as their property is concerned.

The primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. The
subject establishments “have gained notoriety as venue of prostitution, adultery and
fornications”. Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be
denied that legitimate sexual behavior among consenting married or consenting single adults
which is constitutionally protected will be curtailed as well. Adults have a right to choose to
forge such relationships with others in the confines of their own private lives and still retain their
dignity as free persons. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows persons the right to make
this choice.

We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or
impair. The Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged in
illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. It prevents legitimate use of places
where illicit activities are rare or even unheard of.
Jurisprudence: decisions/ rulings made by SC. Considered part of the law of the land. Evolves since new
cases introduces themselves that warrant new ruling from SC
 The ordinance is unconstitutional, therefore not valid.

Decision:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 4467774 is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

b. Freedom of Expression – section 4

Barnes vs Glen Theatre Inc

Criminal Law
Consti Limitations: Freedom of Expression
501 US 560, June 21, 1991

Facts in the District Court:

1. Kitty Kat Lounge, Inc (Kitty Kat) in South Bend sells alcoholic beverages and presents “go-go
dancing”. Proprietor wishes to present “totally nude dancing,” but Indiana statute regulating public
nudity requires the dancers to wear pasties and G-strings when they dance.
2. Dancers are not paid an hourly wage, only commission. 100% commission on the first $60 in drink
sales during their performance.
3. Darlene (respondent) worked in Kitty Kat for two years during this action was brought. She wishes to
dance nude believing this would make her more money.
4. Respondent Glen Theatre, Inc (Indiana Corporation) has place of business in South Bend. Their
primary business is supplying so-called adult entertainment through written and printed materials,
movie showing, and live entertainment at an enclosed “bookstore.” Live entertainment includes
nude and seminude performances by females through glass panels.
5. Gayle Ann Marie Sutro has been a performer for 15 years, in Glen Theatre and pornos.
6. Respondents sued to enjoin the enforcement of the Indiana public indecency statute asserting that
its prohibition against complete nudity in public places violated the First Amendment.

What happened:
7. District Court granted injunction, finding statute was facially overbroad.
8. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, deciding that previous litigation (Glen
Theatre, Inc. v. Pearson) with respect to the statute in the Supreme Court of Indiana and this Court
precluded the possibility of such a challenge, and remanded to the District Court in order for the
plaintiffs to pursue their claim that the statute violated the First Amendment as applied to their dancing.
9. District Court concluded that "the type of dancing these plaintiffs wish to perform is not
expressive activity protected by the Constitution of the United States," and rendered judgment in favor
of the defendants.
10. The case was again appealed to the Seventh Circuit, and a panel of that court reversed the
District Court, holding that the nude dancing involved here was expressive conduct (symbolic speech,
O’Brien) protected by the First Amendment.
11. The Court of Appeals then heard the case en banc, and the court rendered a series of
comprehensive and thoughtful opinions. The majority concluded that nonobscene nude dancing
performed for entertainment is expression protected by the First Amendment, and that the public
indecency statute was an improper infringement of that expressive activity because its purpose was to
prevent the message of eroticism and sexuality conveyed by the dancers.
12. Certiorari. HOLD: Indiana statutory requirement that the dancers in the establishments involved
in this case must wear pasties and a G-string (public indecency statute) does not violate the First
Amendment.

Issue:
1. Determine the level of protection to be afforded to the expressive conduct at issue
2. Determine whether the Indiana statute is an impermissible infringement of that protected activity

Holding:
Indiana has not banned nude dancing as such, but has proscribed public nudity across the board. Indiana
statute precludes nudity in essentially places of public accommodation. In such places, respondents
point out, minors are excluded and there are no nonconsenting viewers. Respondents contend that,
while the state may license establishments such as the ones involved here and limit the geographical
area in which they do business, it may not in any way limit the performance of the dances within them
without violating the First Amendment. The petitioner contends, on the other hand, that Indiana's
restriction on nude dancing is a valid "time, place or manner" restriction. (The test was developed for
evaluating restrictions on expression taking place on public property which had been dedicated as a
"public forum.”)

O’Brien: This Court has held that, when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined
in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating
the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.

Test: “We think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.”

c. Freedom of Relig ion- Sec 5

Estrada v Escritor

FACTS:

 Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an
investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter, is living with a
man not her husband.
 They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old.

Jurisprudence: decisions/ rulings made by SC. Considered part of the law of the land. Evolves since new
cases introduces themselves that warrant new ruling from SC
  Estrada is not personally related either to Escritor or her partner.
o Nevertheless, he filed the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is
committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should
not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court
condones her act.
 Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a
widow, her husband having died in 1998.
 She admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. (who is still legally married
to another) without the benefit of marriage for twenty years and that they have a son.
 But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch
Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their
religious beliefs.
 In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a "Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness," insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral
about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members
in good standing in the congregation.
 Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses since 1985 and has been a
presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of and procedures for
executing the declaration which was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapio’s in
Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central
Office.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of "gross and immoral
conduct."

HELD:

Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the
same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional
limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow
for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
It still remains to be seen if respondent is entitled to such doctrine as the state has not been afforded
the chance has demonstrate the compelling state interest of prohibiting the act of respondent, thus the
case is remanded to the RTC.

Benevolent neutrality is inconsistent with the Free Exercise Clause as far as it prohibits such exercise
given a compelling state interest. It is the respondent’s stance that the respondent’s conjugal
arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection.
Should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the
Court’s action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. The Court
cannot therefore simply take a passing look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom, but must instead
apply the “compelling state interest” test. The government must be heard on the issue as it has not
been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the state’s compelling interest
which can override respondent’s religious belief and practice.
 d. No excessive fines nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment- sec 19 par 1 ra 7659

People v De la Cruz 92 phil 906

Facts:

 There is a law regulating price of can of milk

 Defendant sold milk 15 centavos more
 Defendant sold a few cartons to someone he doesn’t like for a higher price
 After war law enacted- preventing profiteering by preventing merchants from inflating
their prices

Doctrine:

Issue: won the law, penalizing violation of the act with 2 yrs in jail + 5000 php fine, unconstitutional
since it is excessive

The sc said the punishment prescribed was not unconstitutional. The law prohibits
overpricing because it might case breakdown of law and order. The law provided range for the penalties.
Had mr. dela cruzsold a truckload of milk, the penalty is not excessive. The law per se is not
unconstitutional. An unscrupulous merchant might make taje advantage of the current situation and
might cause negative effect in the fragile balance of the current society

Issue 2: WON Dela cruz (defendant)

The constitutionality of the law does not prevent us from treating the defendants case
fairly. The court said within the law we can deliver fair justice to mr dela cruz, his penalties were reduced
significantly. They said that looking at the defendants bg, he was just a modest store owner working to
provide for his family… etc alam mo nay an inna

Echagaray v Sec of Justice 267 scra 682 Commented [E1]: Mutilation (cutting off parts or
dismembering someone else, mutilation of penis) carries
Facts: penalty higher than homicide. Preventing someone from
creating another life (our purpose on earth) is a graver act
 Leo Echagaray was the first one to be executed by the new death penalty law than taking life.
 Echegaray raped his 10 year old daughter Commented [E2R1]:

Doctrine:

 Issue: WON death penalty is constitutional?

o SC reviewed US jurisprudence, findings stated that the act of death penalty was not cruel
but the mode in which it might be carried on might be. Taking a defendant’s life in
commission of a particular crime is in on itself not cruel. The most human form of carrying
out the death penalty must be chosen
Commented [E3]: We should take a position with re to
death penalty. And what is your essential notion of what is
right or wrong and which punishments are acceptable.

e. Non-imprisonment for debt or non-payment of a poll tax- sec 19 par 1

Jurisprudence: decisions/ rulings made by SC. Considered part of the law of the land. Evolves since new
cases introduces themselves that warrant new ruling from SC
 o Criminal penalty of 10k php in which If you cannot pay it, then you will go to prison.

f. Bill of attainder
 No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be adopted- (no judicial determination
of guilt)

People v Ferrer

Facts:

 Anti subversion act allegedly singles out the leftist movement (communist party of the
Philippines) since it is against the action of overthrowing the gov’t
 Defendants of the case went to court for subversion
 Law states that members of communist party is guilty of subversion. It’s a bill of
attainder since the mere fact that you are a member of the party makes you guilty
immediately
 (law does not say without benefit of trial) defendants were charged naman in court so
may trial
 Judge ferrer is not the defendant, he was the judge who dismissed case

Doctrine:

WON BILL is constitutional

The law does not give the accuse the benefit of the doubt, they are mmediately found
guilty thus it goes against “innocent until proven guilty” so the law is a bill of attainder renders the trial
futile since they lost their vlaim to innocence. Law defined their guilt by their mere membership

State argued why ilaw was not bill of attainder

The accused were to be given trial naman so its not a bill of attainder. And there is a
difference between a nominal member and a mere member.

Dissenting:

g. Ex post facto law- sec 22

 Law should be prospective

US v Diaz-Conde 42 phil 766

Facts:

 Usury law provided maximum interest on loans

 Loan- 5% interest
 Defendants did not commit the crime upon contracting the loan as there was no law yet when it
was contracted.
 What was it about the contract that was being questioned and charged. It was the continued
charging of the interest that was against the law

Doctrine:
 Ruling: contract was acquired prior to passing of law. Di sya sakop mamahh huhu

F. Construction/ Interpretation

1. Liberality should be in favour of the accused- will apply only if the premise of the rule is
present (there is doubt) if the statue is clear and there is no amount of favorability to be given, then the
law is just to be acted out.

2. Spanish text of the RPC prevails over its English translation.- all provisions in RPC was based
on Spanish Penis Code

3. Retroactive application if favourable to accused-

People v valdez

Facts:

 Accused killed someone using unlicensed firearm ( state of law atm: commits 2 crimes, murder
and possession of illegal firearm). After his act a law was passed against illegal firearm.(law now:
law with aggravating circumstance of possessing unlicensed firearm)


Doctrine:

 SC: it will not be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Since the law is unfavourable to the
accused as it incresease the gravity of the penalty then the

4. prescribed but underserved penalties (art 5 2nd paragraph

People v Formigones

Facts:

 There is a law on insanity for crimes committed under tis mental

 accused out of jealously tooki his bolo and killed his wife

Doctrine:

 accused knew what was right or wrong so he is not insane. Convicted of crime

People v Veneracion

Fact: Judge: defendant found guilty on capital offense the law provides for penalty of death but because
of my beliefs my religion prevents me to impose death penalty.

Doctrine: SC returned case, because of art 5 wherein it says, if you believe that the law should be changed,
fine, but you have to apply it first. But if you want to stay in office, you have to apply the law, if you do
not believe the death penalty, the you should resign if you annot do your job sissy

Jurisprudence: decisions/ rulings made by SC. Considered part of the law of the land. Evolves since new
cases introduces themselves that warrant new ruling from SC
5.Offenses punished under special laws – RPC are not applied to special laws. It will only have
suppletory effect to special laws.