Festejo v Fernando 94 Ph 504

FACTS: Carmen Festejo filed a suit against Isaias Fernando, Director of the Bureau of Public Works, for taking possession of three parcels
of land she owned and causing an irrigation canal to be constructed thereon without obtaining first a right of way, without her consent
and knowledge , and against her express objection. Festejo demanded the return of the land and its restoration to its former condition.
ISSUE:

Is the Fernando immune from suit for being a public officer?

HELD:

Defendant committed acts outside the scope of his authority. When he went outside the boundaries of the right of way upon plaintiff's
land and damaged it or destroyed its former condition and usefulness, he must be held to have designedly departed from the duties
imposed on him by law. There can be no claim that he thus invaded plaintiff's land southeasterly of the right of way innocently. Surveys
clearly marked the limits of the land appropriated for the right of way of this trunk highway before construction began.

Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort is personally liable therefor, and may be sued as any other citizen and held
answerable for whatever injury or damage results from his tortious act.

If an officer, even while acting under color of his office, exceeds the power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself under
the plea that he is a public agent.

It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasi-judicial, ministerial, or otherwise who acts outside the scope of his
jurisdiction and without authorization of law may thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit. If he exceed the
power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office, and
not personally. In the eye of the law, his acts then are wholly without authority.

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxx
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law

American Tobacco v Director of Patents (1975)

FACTS:
 Under RA No. 166 the Director of Patents is vested with jurisdiction over cases involving the determination of the “question of
priority of adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade name or service-mark, and cancellation of registration of a trade-mark or
trade name pending at the Patent Office.” A similar provision is found in the Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases.
 The Director of Patents issued the Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark cases, Rule 168 of
which is being assailed by petitioner in the case at bar.
 The assailed provision authorizes the Director to designate any ranking official to hear inter partes proceedings. The Rule
reads:
o Such inter partes proceedings in the Philippine Patent Office under this Title shall be heard before the Director of
Patents, any hearing officer, or any ranking official of the office designated by the Director, but all judgments
determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed by him.
 The Director delegated the hearing of petitioner’s cases to several hearing officers. Petitioner alleged that such is illegal and
void because the Director must personally hear and decide inter partes cases.

ISSUES + RULING:
WoN the amended Rule is valid. YES.
 §3 of RA 165 empowers the Director to “obtain the assistance of technical, scientific or other qualified officers or employees
of other departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including corporations owned,
controlled or operated by the Government, when deemed necessary in the consideration of any matter submitted to the
Office relative to the enforcement of the provisions” of the Act.
 §78 of the same also empowers the Director to promulgate necessary rules and regulations.
 Under these provisions, the amendment to the Rules issued by the Director is clearly within the ambit of the law. To support the
contention of the petitioner is to take a narrow reading of the provisions of the law.
 The legal principle is that unless there is an express provision of the law or by implication, a power is withheld from the
administrative agency, it may issue necessary rules and orders to carry out its purpose.
 On a practical note, the Director cannot be expected to attend to all cases personally and perform his other duties.
Delegation ensures reduction in delays and elimination of needless work in top levels.
o Subdelegation of power has been justified by “sound principles of organization” which demand that “those at the
top be able to concentrate their attention upon the larger and more important questions of policy and practice,
and their time be freed, so far as possible, from the consideration of the smaller and far less important matters of
detail.
 Moreover, due process does not raking the actual taking of testimony to be made before the same officer who will decide
the case. It is sufficient that a party is afforded the right to present his case.

DISPOSITION: Petition dismissed.

SANTOS
In this petition for review on certiorari petitioner assails the decision of 19 August 1999 of the Court of Appeals[1] in CA-G.R. SP No.
48301, which held that petitioners separation pay under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924 should be limited to the number of years of his
service in the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA) only, excluding his years of service as judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
of Quezon City for which he has already been given retirement gratuity and pension.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
On 18 January 1983, petitioner was appointed Judge of the MeTC of Quezon City, and he thereafter assumed office. After the
military-backed EDSA revolt, petitioner was reappointed to the same position.
 On 1 April 1992, petitioner optionally retired from the Judiciary under R.A. No. 910, [2] as amended, and received his retirement
gratuity under the law for his entire years in the government service; and five years thereafter he has been regularly receiving a
monthly pension.
On 2 December 1993, petitioner re-entered the government service. He was appointed Director III of the Traffic Operation Center
of the MMA. His appointment was approved by the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
On 1 March 1995, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7924, which reorganized the MMA and renamed it as Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA). Section 11 thereof reads:
Section 11. Transitory Provisions. To prevent disruption in the delivery of basic urban services pending the full implementation of the
MMDAs organizational structure and staffing pattern, all officials and employees of the interim MMA shall continue to exercise their
duties and functions and receive their salaries and allowances until they shall have been given notice of change of duties and
functions, and of being transferred to another office or position.
...
The civil service laws, rules and regulations pertinent to the displacement of personnel affected by this Act shall be strictly
enforced. The national government shall provide such amounts as may be necessary to pay the benefits accruing to displaced
employees at the rate of one and one-fourth (1) months salary for every year of service: Provided, That, if qualified for retirement under
existing retirement laws, said employees may opt to receive the benefits thereunder.
On 16 May 1996, the President of the Philippines issued Memorandum Order No. 372 approving the Rules and Regulations
Implementing R.A. No. 7924. Pursuant thereto, the MMDA issued Resolution No. 16, series of 1996, which, inter alia, authorized the
payment of separation benefits to the officials and employees of the former MMA who would be separated as a result of the
implementation of R.A. No. 7924.
On 30 August 1996, the MMDA issued a Memorandum to petitioner informing him that in view of his voluntary option to be
separated from the service his services would automatically cease effective at the close of office hours on 15 September 1996, and
that he would be entitled to separation benefits equivalent to one and one-fourth (1) monthly salary for every year of service as
provided under Section 11 of the MMDA Law.
In view of some doubt or confusion as to the extent of his separation benefits, petitioner submitted a Position Paper wherein he
asserted that since the retirement gratuity he received under R.A. No. 910, as amended, is not an additional or double compensation,
all the years of his government service, including those years in the Judiciary, should be credited in the computation of his separation
benefits under R.A. No. 7924. The Assistant Manager for Finance of the MMDA referred the Position Paper to the Regional Office of the
CSC-NCR.
On 7 October 1996, Director IV Nelson Acebedo of the CSC-NCR handed down an opinion that the payment of petitioners
separation pay must be in accordance with Civil Service Resolution No. 92-063, pertinent portions of which read:
[T]he payment of separation/[retirement] benefits cannot be subject to the prohibition against the [sic] double compensation in cases
when officers and employees who were previously granted said benefits are rehired or reemployed in another government Agency or
Office.Thus, there is no need for separated employees to refund the separation/retirement benefits they received when subsequently
reemployed in another government agency or office.
This being so, while an employee who was paid separation/retirement benefits is not required to refund the same once reemployed in
the government service, as aforestated, for reasons of equity however, it would be proper and logical that said separation/retirement
benefits should nevertheless be deducted from the retirement/[separation] pay to be received by the employee
concerned. Moreover, in this instance, the employee concerned has the option either to refund his separation/retirement benefits and
claim his gross retirement/separation pay without any deduction corresponding to his separation pay received, or not [to] refund his
separation/retirement pay but suffer a deduction of his retirement/separation gratuity for the total amount representing his previous
separation/retirement pay received.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner elevated the opinion of Director Acebedo to the CSC.
On 21 October 1997, the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 97-4266 affirming the opinion of Director Acebedo and dismissing
petitioners appeal. Citing Chaves v. Mathay,[3] it held that petitioner cannot be paid retirement benefits twice one under R.A. No. 910,
as amended, and another under R.A. No. 7924 for the same services he rendered as MeTC Judge. He can only exercise one of two
options in the computation of his separation pay under R.A. 7924. These options are (1) to refund the gratuity he received under R.A.
No. 910, as amended, after he retired from the MeTC and get the full separation pay for his entire years in the government, that is 9
years and 2 months with the MeTC plus two (2) years and eight (8) months for his services as Director III in the defunct MMA, at the rate
of one and one-fourth salary for every year of service pursuant to MMDA Memorandum dated 30 August 1996; or (2) to retain the
gratuity pay he received for his services as MeTC Judge but an equivalent amount shall be deducted from the separation benefits due
from the former MMA for his entire government service.
On 9 June 1998, the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 98-1422 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. Accordingly,
petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to set aside these Resolutions.
On 19 August 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, now challenged in this case. It held that the CSC was correct
in dismissing petitioners appeal from the opinion of Director Acebedo. It ratiocinated as follows:
There is no specific rule of law which applies to petitioners case. Nevertheless, the Court finds it equitable to deny his claim for payment
of separation pay at the rate of one and one-fourth (1) months salary for every year of his service in government, that is, inclusive of the
number of years he served as Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila [sic].
Petitioner already received and is continually receiving gratuity for his years of service as a Metropolitan Trial Court Judge. Equity
dictates that he should no longer be allowed to receive further gratuity for said years of service in the guise of separation pay.
Suffice it to state that upon his retirement from his office as a Judge, petitioner has already closed a chapter of his government
service. The State has already shown its gratitude for his services when he was paid retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 901
[sic]. For that is what retirement benefits are for. Rewards [are] given to an employee who has given up the best years of his life to the
service of his country (Govt. Service Insurance System v. Civil Service Commission, 245 SCRA 179, 188).
Now, the state again wishes to show its gratitude to petitioner by awarding him separation pay for his services as a director of the
Metro Manila Authority (MMA), another chapter of petitioners government service which has come to a close by the reorganization of
the MMA into the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority.
The Court, in limiting the computation of petitioners separation pay to the number of years of his service at the MMA, merely is
implementing the ruling in Chavez, Sr. vs. Mathay (37 SCRA 776), which ruling, if not actually in point, is nevertheless applicable owing
to its common-sense consideration. Said ruling reads:
The common-sense consideration stated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes for the Court in Espejo, that if a retiree is being credited with his
years of service under his first retirement in computing his gratuity under his second retirement, it is but just that the retirement gratuity
received by him under his first retirement should also be charged to his account, manifestly govern the case at bar. It is but in
accordance with the rule consistently enunciated by the Court as in Anciano v. Otadoy, affirming Borromeo, that claims for double
retirement or pension such as petitioners, would run roughshod over the well-settled rule that in the absence of an express legal
exception, pension and gratuity laws should be so construed as to preclude any person from receiving double pension. (p. 780,
underscoring supplied)
The case at bench is not, strictly speaking, about double pension. It is, however, about the interpretation of a gratuity law, viz., Section
11 of Republic Act No. 7924 which awards separation pay to those government employees who were displaced by the reorganization
of the MMA into the MMDA, which should be construed to preclude a government employee from receiving double gratuity for the
same years of service.
We affirm the assailed judgment. We agree with the Court of Appeals and the Civil Service Commission that for the purpose of
computing or determining petitioners separation pay under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924, his years of service in the Judiciary should be
excluded and that his separation pay should be solely confined to his services in the MMA.
In the first place, the last paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924 on the grant of separation pay at the rate of one and one-
fourth (1) months of salary for every year of service cannot by any stretch of logic or imagination be interpreted to refer to the total
length of service of an MMA employee in the government, i.e., to include such service in the government outside the MMA. Since it
allows the grant of separation pay to employees who were to be displaced thereby the separation pay can be based only on the
length of service in the MMA. The displacement amounted to an abolition of the office or position of the displaced employees, such as
that of petitioner. The rule is settled that Congress may abolish public offices. Such a power is a consequent prerogative of its power to
create public offices.[4] However, the power to abolish is subject to the condition that it be exercised in good faith.[5] The separation
partook of the nature of a disturbance of compensation; hence, the separation pay must relate only to the employment thus affected.
Second, petitioner himself must have realized that Section 11 does not allow the tacking in of his previous government service. If
he were convinced that it does he could have instead applied for retirement benefits, since by adding his years of service in the MMA
to his previous years of service in the Government he could have retired under the third paragraph of Section 11, which pertinently
reads:
Provided, That, if qualified for retirement under existing retirement laws, said employee may opt to receive the benefits thereunder.
Third, after the approval of his optional retirement on 1 April 1992, petitioner was fully paid of his retirement gratuity under R.A. No.
910, as amended; and five years thereafter he has been receiving a monthly pension.
The petitioner cannot take refuge under the second paragraph of Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution, which provides:
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.
This provision simply means that a retiree receiving pension or gratuity can continue to receive such pension or gratuity even if he
accepts another government position to which another compensation is attached.[6]
Indeed, the retirement benefits which petitioner had received or has been receiving under R.A. No. 910, as amended, do not
constitute double compensation. He could continue receiving the same even if after his retirement he had been receiving salary from
the defunct MMA as Director III thereof. This is but just because said retirement benefits are rewards for his services as MeTC Judge,
while his salary was his compensation for his services as Director III of the MMA.
However, to credit his years of service in the Judiciary in the computation of his separation pay under R.A. No. 7924
notwithstanding the fact that he had received or has been receiving the retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910, as amended, would
be to countenance double compensation for exactly the same services, i.e., his services as MeTC Judge. Such would run counter to
the policy of this Court against double compensation for exactly the same services.[7] More important, it would be in violation of the first
paragraph of Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution, which proscribes additional, double, or indirect compensation. Said provision
reads:
No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically
authorized by law .
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924 does not specifically authorize payment of additional compensation for years of government service
outside of the MMA.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the judgment appealed from, the petition in this case is DENIED for want of merit, and
the decision of 19 August 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48301 is AFFIRMED.
Fact:
Santos, an appointed judge of the MeTC of Quezon City, retired in 1992 and acquired his retirement gratuity under RA 910. In 1993, he
was appointed Director III of the Traffic Operation Center of the MMA. In 1995, the MMA was reorganized and renamed as MMDA.
Santos, in 1996, was voluntarily separated from the service and was entitled to separation benefits equivalent to 1 ¼ monthly salary for
every year of service as provided under Sec. 11 of the MMDA Law.”
Issue:
w/n Santiago is entitled to a separation benefit computed from the years of service as Metc judge to Director III because the
retirement gratuity he received under RA 910 is not considered as double compensation?
Held:
The retirement benefits which Santiago had received or has been receiving, under RA 910, do not constitute double compensation.
But, to credit his years of service in the Judiciary in the computation of his separation pay under RA 7924 would be to countenance
double compensation for exactly the same services.
Laurel vs CSC 203 scra 195

Petitioner, the duly elected Governor of the Province of Batangas, appointed his brother, Benjamin Laurel, as Senior Executive Assistant
in the Office of the Governor, a non-career service position which belongs to the personal and confidential staff of an elective official.
Upon the vacancy of the position of Provincial Administrator of Batangas, petitioner designated his brother as Acting Provincial
Administrator. Then, he issued Benjamin Laurel a promotional appointment as Civil Security Officer which is a position which the Civil
Service Commission classifies as "primarily confidential" pursuant to P.D. No. 868.
ISSUE: Does nepotism apply to designation?
RULING: Yes. The court ruled that petitioner could not legally and validly appoint his brother Benjamin Laurel to said position because of
the prohibition on nepotism under Section 49 of P.D. No. 807. They are related within the third degree of consanguinity and the case
does not fall within any of the exemptions provided therein. The exemption in the said section covering confidential positions cannot
be considered since the said position is not primarily confidential for it belongs to the career service.
Petitioner’s contention that the designation of his brother is not covered by the prohibition cannot be accepted for by legal
contemplation, the prohibitive mantle on nepotism would include designation, because what cannot be done directly cannot be
done indirectly. His specious and tenuous distinction between appointment and designation is nothing more than either a ploy
ingeniously conceived to circumvent the rigid rule on nepotism or a last-ditch maneuver to cushion the impact of its violation. Section
49 of P.D. No. 807 does not suggest that designation should be differentiated from appointment. Reading the section with Section 25 of
said decree, career service positions may be filled up only by appointment, either permanent or temporary; hence a designation of a
person to fill it up because it is vacant, is necessarily included in the term appointment, for it precisely accomplishes
the same purpose.

Petitioner: Laurel V (provincial governor of Batangas) vs Respondent: CSC; Sangalang

FACTS:
 Laurel V (governor of Batangas) did the following:
 1. Appointed his brother Benjamin as “Senior Executive Assistant in the Office of the Governor” (non-career service position
which belongs to the personal and confidential staff of an elective official).
2. Designated his brother as “Acting Provincial Administrator”
3. Promoted his brother to “Civil Security Officer” (CSC classified as primarily confidential)
 Sangalang wrote to CSC:
1. Provincial Admin is a career position.
2. Appointment violates CSC
 Defense of Laurel:
1. No violation of nepotism rule on Senior Exec Assistant and Civil Service Officer since both are confidential.
2. Re: position of Provincial Admin, no violation also since it was a mere designation, not appointment.
 CSC: The designation of Benjamin as “Acting Provincial Admin” is nepotic.

ISSUE:
(1) Is the position of Provincial Administrator primarily confidential? NO!
(2) Does the rule on nepotism apply to designation? YES!
(3) May a private citizen who does not claim any better right to a position file a verified complaint with the Civil Service Commission to
denounce a violation by an appointing authority of the Civil Service Law and rules? YES!

RATIO:
 (Note this case said that if a position is primarily confidential, Sec 49 of PD 807 on Nepotic appointments does not apply).

(1) Provincial Admin is NOT PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL.

 In his letter to CSC, he said that the position is not primarily confidential since it belongs to career service (note: seems like primarily
confidential is automatically non-career).
 Even assuming there is no estoppel, the position of provincial admin is CAREER SERVICE.
 QUALIFICATIONS:
1. Bachelors degree in Law or Public/Business admin
2. 6 yeas of responsible experience in planning, of government operations.
3. Eligibility exam RA 1080 (BAR)/Personnel Management Officer/Career Service (Professional)/First Grade/Supervisor).
 DEFINITION: responsible for the overall coordination of the activities of the various national and local agencies in the province;
and general planning, direction and control of the personnel functions and the administrative services of the Governor's
Office.
 It is an OPEN CAREER POSITION for appointment to it requires prior qualification in an appropriate examination.
 It is SECOND LEVEL (shall include professional, technical, and scientific positions which involve professional, technical, or
scientific work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring at least four years of college work up to Division Chief
level)
 Not being primarily confidential, appointment thereto must, inter alia, be subject to the rule on nepotism.
 Also, Laurel cannot designate his brother as Acting Provincial Admin (a career position) since at that time, Benjamin was “Senior
Exec Ass” and “Civil Security Officer” both primarily confidential positions in non-career service. Section 24(f) of R.A. No. 2260
provides that no person appointed to a position in the non- competitive service (now non-career) shall perform the duties properly
belonging to any position in the competitive service (now career service).

 His specious and tenuous distinction between appointment and designation is nothing more than either a ploy ingeniously
conceived to circumvent the rigid rule on nepotism or a last-ditch maneuver to cushion the impact of its violation. The rule admits
of no distinction between appointment and designation. Designation is also defined as "an appointment or assignment to a
particular office"; and "to designate" means "to indicate, select, appoint or set apart for a purpose or duty.
 Section 49 of P.D. No. 807 does not suggest that designation should be differentiated from appointment. Reading this section with
Section 25 of said decree, career service positions may be filled up only by appointment, either permanent or temporary; hence a
designation of a person to fill it up because it is vacant, is necessarily included in the term appointment, for it precisely
accomplishes the same purpose. Moreover, if a designation is not to be deemed included in the term appointment under Section
49 of P.D. No. 807, then the prohibition on nepotism would be meaningless and toothless. Any appointing authority may circumvent
it by merely designating, and not appointing, a relative within the prohibited degree to a vacant position in the career service

The letter-complaint of Sangalang was validly given due course by public respondent. Undoubtedly, as shown above, there was a
violation of law committed by petitioner in designating his brother as Acting Provincial Administrator. Any citizen of the Philippines may
bring that matter to the attention of the Civil Service Commission for appropriate action conformably with its role as the central
personnel agency to set standards and to enforce the laws and rules governing the selection, utilization, training and discipline of civil
servants, with the power and function to administer and enforce the Constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system.
Moreover, Section 37 of the decree expressly allows a private citizen to directly file with the Civil Service Commission a complaint
against a government official or employee, in which case it may hear and decide the case or may deputize any department or
agency or official or group of officials to conduct an investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission
with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken. This provision gives teeth to the Constitutional
exhortation that a public office is a public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be, inter alia, accountable to the
people. An ordinary citizen who brings to the attention of the appropriate office any act or conduct of a government official or
employee which betrays the public interest deserves nothing less than the praises, support and encouragement of society. The
vigilance of the citizenry is vital in a democracy.
CSC vs DACOYCOY
To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree
of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.

In 1995, George P. Suan, Citizens Crime Watch Vice-President, Allen Chapter, Northern Samar, filed with the Civil Service Commission
(CSC), Quezon City, a complaint for habitual drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism against respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy. After a
formal investigation, the CSC promulgated its resolution on January 28, 1997 finding no substantial evidence to support the charge of
habitual drunkenness and misconduct. However, the CSC found Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of the
appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under his
immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, and imposed on him
the penalty of dismissal from the service.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the CSC’s resolution was reversed ruling that the respondent did not appoint his two sons; hence,
respondent was not guilty of nepotism. The Court further held that it is “the person who recommends or appoints who should be
sanctioned, as it is he who performs the prohibited act.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Dacoycoy is guilty of nepotism.

2. Who may take an appeal from an adverse decision of the appellate court in anadministrative civil service disciplinary case

Held: Yes. The law defines nepotism as all appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal governments or in any branch or
instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or
recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are
hereby prohibited. The word “relative” and members of the family referred to are those related within the third degree either of
consanguinity or of affinity.

The following are exempted from the operations of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons employed in a
confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and (d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines: Provided, however, That
in each particular instance full report of such appointment shall be made to the Commission.”

Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity of any of the following:

a) appointing authority;
b) recommending authority;
c) chief of the bureau or office, and
d) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.

Clearly, there are four situations covered. In the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial who the appointing or recommending
authority is. To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the
third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision over
the appointee.

It is true that Dacoycoy did not appoint or recommend his two sons to the positions of driver and utility worker in the Balicuatro College
of Arts and Trades. In fact, it was Mr. Jaime Daclag, Head of the Vocational Department of the BCAT, who recommended to DECS
Region VIII the appointment of Rito Dacoycoy as driver and appointed Ped Dacoycoy as casual utility worker. However, it was the
respondent who recommended Mr. Daclag’s authority to appoint first level positions. It was also the respondent who certified that
“funds are available for the proposed appointment of Rito and even rated his performance as “very satisfactory”. Further, Ped, listed
him in his job description as his “next higher supervisor.” Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O.
Dacoycoy, who was the school administrator. Mr. Daclag recommended the appointment of respondent's two sons and placed them
under respondent's immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school. Both positions are career positions. Clearly
he is guilty of nepotism.

Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel. In Debulgado, we stressed that “The basic
purpose or objective of the prohibition against nepotism also strongly indicates that the prohibition was intended to be a
comprehensive one.” “The Court was unwilling to restrict and limit the scope of the prohibition which is textually very broad and
comprehensive.” If not within the exceptions, it is a form of corruption that must be nipped in the bud or bated whenever or wherever it
raises its ugly head. As we said in an earlier case “what we need now is not only to punish the wrongdoers or reward the ‘outstanding’
civil servants, but also to plug the hidden gaps and potholes of corruption as well as to insist on strict compliance with existing legal
procedures in order to abate any occasion for graft or circumvention of the law.

2. There is no question that respondent Dacoycoy may appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Civil Service
Commission adverse to him. He was the respondent official meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service. Onappeal to the
Court of Appeals, the court required the petitioner therein, here respondent Dacoycoy, to implead the Civil Service Commission as
public respondent as the government agency tasked with the duty to enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the civil
service. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission and held respondent not guilty of
nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the respondent, who was
declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the government.
Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil
service system. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.

The Court REVIVES and AFFIRMS the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission dated January 28, 1998 and September 30, 1998,
dismissing respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy from the service.

Luis A. Tabuena, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan (268 SCRA 332, February 17, 1997)
Then Pres. Ferdinand Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena, General Manager of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), over the
phone to pay directly to the president’s office and in cash what the MIAA owes the Phil. National Construction Corp. The verbal
instruction was reiterated in a Presidential memorandum.
In obedience to Pres. Marcos’ instruction, Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, the Asst. Gen. Mgr. and the
Acting Finance Services Mgr. of MIAA, respectively, caused the release of P55M of MIAA funds of three (3) withdrawals and delivered
the money to Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, private secretary of Marcos. Gimenez issued a receipt for all the amounts she received from
Tabuena. Later, it turned out that PNCC never received the money.
The case involves two (2) separate petitions for review by Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta. They appeal the Sandiganbayan decision
convicting them of malversation of MIAA funds in the amount of P55M.
Further, petitioners claimed that they were charged with intentional malversation, as alleged in the amended information, but it would
appear that they were convicted for malversation with negligence. Hence, their conviction of a crime different from that charged
violated their constitutional right to be informed of the accusation.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan convicted them of a crime not charged in the amended information; and
(2) Whether or not Tabuena and Peralta acted in good faith.
HELD:
(1) No. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa present in the offense is only a
modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of
malversation is involved.
(2) Yes. Tabuena acted in strict compliance with the MARCOS Memorandum. The order emanated from the Office of the President
and bears the signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land. It carries with it the presumption that it was
regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the payment of an obligation illegal. This
fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution constrains one to act swiftly without question.
However, a more compelling reason for the ACQUITTAL is the violation of the accused's basic constitutional right to due process.
Records show that the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a defense witness and of the accused themselves. The
questions of the court were in the nature of cross examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation. Tabuena and
Peralta may not have raised the issue as an error, there is nevertheless no impediment for the court to consider such matter as
additional basis for a reversal since the settled doctrine is that an appeal throws the whole case open to review, and it becomes the
duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from whether they are made the subject
of assignments of error or not.
The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge" requirement of due process was certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta when the court, with
its overzealousness, assumed the dual role of magistrate and advocate. Time and again the Court has declared that due process
requires no less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. That the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be
impartial, to give added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The parties are entitled to no less than this, as a minimum
guaranty of due process.
HENCE, Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta are acquitted of the crime of malversation.

Correa vs. CFI Bulacan

On December 13, 1968, respondent Court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 3621-M in favor of therein plaintiffs (private respondents
herein) and adversely against therein defendants Eufemio T. Correa (petitioner herein).

The pertinent portions of the decision read as follows:

"This Court finds that defendants Eufemio T. Correa and Virgilio Sarmiento,
municipal mayor and municipal treasurer of Norzagaray, Bulacan respectively,
should be ordered personally to pay the salaries which the plaintiffs failed to
receive by reason of their illegal removal from office until they are actually
reinstated.

The aforesaid decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on March 22, 1976, and the motion for reconsideration of the Appellate
Court's decision was denied on May 11, 1976. On August 24, 1976, the decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory. It
is in connection with the efforts of the petitioner to quash the writ of execution issued to enforce the aforestated final judgment that
the present proceedings arose.

Bulacan. Petitioner invoked the principle that when judgment is rendered against an officer of the municipal corporation who is sued in
his official capacity for the payment of back salaries of officers illegally removed, the judgment is binding upon the corporation,
whether or not the same is included as party to the action. Petitioner contends that it is the municipality of Norzagaray that is liable.

Issue: The issue is whether or not respondent Court in denying the Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution acted with grave abuse of
discretion or with lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Held: In the discharge of governmental functions, "municipal corporations are responsible for the acts of its officers, except if and
when, and only to the extent that, they have acted by authority of the law, and in conformity with the requirements thereof." A public
officer who commits a tort or other wrongful act, done in excess or beyond the scope of his duty, is not protected by his office and is
personally liable therefor like any private individual.This principle of personal liability has been applied to cases where a public officer
removes another officer or discharges an employee wrongfully, thereported cases saying that by reason of non-compliance with the
requirements of law in respect to removal from office, the officials were acting outside their official authority.

Respondent Court, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to quash writ of execution. The
writ was strictly in accordance with the terms of the judgment.

OCAMPO vs OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

FACTS:
 Jesus Ocampo is the Training Coordinator of NIACONSULT, a subsidiary of the National Irrigation Administration.
 The Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal (ADBN) requested NIACONSULT for training of small-scale community irrigation
development, and Ocampo attended to the request.
o Ocampo requested an advance of 30% of training fees to the amount of US $9600 = PhP 204,960.
 o He also accepted two instalments of the training fee for P61,488 and P143,472.
 NIACONSULT demanded Ocampo to turn-over the total training fee paid by ADBN which Ocampo personally received, but failed
to remit the amount.
 This prompted NIACONSULT to file an administrative case before the OMBUDSMAN.
o Ocampo failed to present a counter-affidavit amid being ordered twice by the OMBUDSMAN to do so.
o The decretal portion of the Resolution stated that Ocampo was to be discharged from the service, with forfeiture of
special benefits and special perpetual disqualification to hold office in government; without prejudice to any civil action
NIACONSULT may institute to recover the amount retained by Ocampo.
o Ocampo now assails lack of due process for not having been given the opportunity to file a counter-affidavit and to
present his evidence. [Bulk issue of the case, but not our concern in this topic. The decision just says that he waived his
right to due process when he failed to produce a counter-affidavit amid being ordered twice to present his side]
 While the case is pending, a criminal complaint for estafa and falsification was filed against Ocampo based on the same facts or
incidents. The Regional Trial Court DISMISSED the case.
 OCAMPO’S CONTENTION: RTC’s dismissal of the criminal case serves as a bar to the administrative case that can no longer stand
on its own and therefore should be dismissed.
ISSUE/HELD:
Whether or not the dismissal of the criminal case affect the validity of the administrative case’s resolution? NO.

RATIONALE:
 The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action filed against petitioner or give him a clean bill of health in
all aspects.
 On quantum of evidence: The RTC’s dismissal simply means that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of petitioner
beyond reasonable doubt. The lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean absence of any evidence
whatsoever. The rule in administrative proceedings is substantial evidence which merely requires such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Considering this difference, one decision cannot be binding
on the other.

OCA V ENRIQUEZ
In a letter dated 19 January 1987, one Eliodoro C. Cruz of Compania Maritima, Inc. informed this Court that the company's lawyer filed
with the Tanodbayan on 12 December 1986 a complaint for falsification of a public document, use of falsified documents, robbery
and the violation of R.A. No. 3019 against herein respondent Ramon G. Enriquez, Deputy Sheriff of Branch XXXI of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila and others. The said company lawyer requested that an investigation be conducted on the administrative
aspect of the case.
In his 20 January 1987 letter to Mr. Cruz, then Court Administrator Leo D. Medialdea, who later became a member of this Court,
informed the latter that as a matter of policy, the administrative aspect of the case "will be undertaken by this Office upon the filing of
a corresponding information by the Tanodbayan before the Sandiganbayan."
Consequently, an Information for falsification of a public document was filed against the respondent with the Sandiganbayan on 6
October 1988. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 12987 and was assigned to the Second Division. A copy of the Information
was furnished the Office of the Court Administrator on 17 October 1988.
On 1 February 1989, then Court Administrator Meynardo A. Tiro, pursuant to this Court's en banc resolution of 12 March 1981 and on the
basis of the Information filed with the Sandiganbayan, administratively charged the herein respondent with the crime of falsification of
a public document and with conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service committed in the manner alleged in the said
Information
Instead of filing the answer/explanation as ordered, the respondent forwarded to the Court Administrator a letter on 20 February 1989
informing the latter that Criminal Case No. 12987 was still pending resolution before the Sandiganbayan and that therefore, he
(respondent) should not be held administratively liable.
On 15 May 1989, the Sandiganbayan, acting on a demurrer to evidence, promulgated a Resolution granting the same and dismissing
the case against the respondent "for insufficiency of evidence."
On 10 April 1991, respondent filed a Manifestation informing this Court of the promulgation of the above resolution and praying that "by
virtue of the dismissal of the Criminal Case filed against the respondent before the Sandiganbayan, the Administrative Case . . . be
likewise dismissed."
ISSUE
W/N dismissal of criminal action forecloses institution of administrative action
RULING
Be that as it may, its dismissal of the criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence was never meant, as respondent
doggedly believed and arrogantly asserted, to foreclose administrative action against him or to give him a clean bill of health in all
respects. The Sandiganbayan, in dismissing the same, was simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of the
respondent beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction 2 because of the presumption of innocence which the
Constitution guarantee an accused. 3 Lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any
evidence whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which, though insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is
adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of evidence. 4 Then too, there is the "substantial evidence" rule in administrative
proceedings which merely requires in these cases such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion. 5
Going back to Our findings, there is no doubt in Our minds that the respondent (a) falsified the Minutes of Sale and the Sheriff's
Certificate of Sale; (b) violated Sections 22 and 25, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court by not conducting another bidding — assuming one
was held on 12 May 1986 — after the alleged highest bidder, Patriarca, failed to pay the bid price, by executing in the latter's favor a
certificate of Sheriff's Sale and by delivering the auctioned vessels despite the failure to pay: (c) illegally sold the vessels to Cailian on 23
May 1986 without a public bidding; and (d) maliciously connived and conspired with Patriarca, Cailian and others to cover up such
illegal acts by making it appear, by means of an antedated deed of sale, that Patriarca sold the vessels to Cailian.
Respondent is therefore guilty of gross dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He not
only deliberately violated the integrity of official acts of an employee of the court, but also undermined the faith and trust of the public
in the Judiciary. He has transgressed the constitutional command that as a public office is a public trust, all public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act
with patriotism and justice and lead modest lives. 6 In Jereos vs. Reblando, 7 We laid down the rule that the conduct and behavior of
every one connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, such as the court of which the herein respondent is the
assigned sheriff, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be
characterized with propriety and decorum, but above all else must be beyond suspicion.
While it is but proper that the respondent should not be kept a minute longer in the Judiciary, his dismissal from the service should not
end this case. In the light of the above findings of conspiracy with other parties, including a certain Judge Luz who prepared the
alleged deed of sale in favor of Cailian, there is a need to dig deeper, in a manner of speaking, in this case. This could open the door
to the secret chambers of a rumored syndicate which is in the business of fixing attachments and execution sales.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DISMISS from the service, effective immediately, respondent RAMON G. ENRIQUEZ, for gross
dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, with forfeiture of all benefits, except the
monetary value of his leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to his re-employment in any branch or service of the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Doctrine: To hold public officers personally liable for moral and exemplary damages and for attorney’s fees for acts done in the
performance of official functions, the plaintiff must prove that these officers exhibited acts characterized by evident bad faith, malice,
or gross negligence. But even if their acts had not been so tainted, public officers may still be held liable for nominal damages if they
had violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

CHAVEZ VS SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
On July 31, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) with the
assistance of Solicitor General Francisco Chavez filed with the respondent Sandiganbayan a complaint against Eduardo Cojuangco,
Jr. and Juan Ponce Enrile for reconveyance, reversion and accounting, restitution and damages.
After the denial of his motion to dismiss, respondent Enrile filed his answer with compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim with
damages.
Respondent Enrile then requested leave from the Sandiganbayan to implead the petitioner and the PCGG officials as party
defendants for lodging this alleged "harassment suit" against him. The motion was granted in a resolution dated June 8, 1989
In the case, the counterclaim was filed against the lawyer, not against the party plaintiff itself.
Thereafter, all the PCGG officials filed their answer to the counterclaims invoking their immunity from suits as provided in Section 4 of
Executive Order No. 1. The petitioner comes to the Court assailing the resolutions as rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
WON Sol. Gen. Chavez can be made liable for damages in filing the suit against Enrile.
WON the petitioner is immune from being impleaded as additional party defendant in the counterclaim filed by respondent Enrile
HELD:
Yes. The court held that the grounds for allowing the compulsory counter-claim of Enrile was based on the malice or bad faith of
Chavez in filing the suit.
It was further stated by the court that immunity from suit is granted only because of the fact that the Commission has a multitude of
task. Immunity for suit on members of the PCGG and other public officers is available only if such officers are acting in good faith and
in the performance of their duty.
If the acts done are tainted with bad faith or in excess of authority they can be held liable personally for damages.
In the case at bar the Sol. Gen. exceeded his authority and his act is tainted with bad faith by filing baseless suit against Enrile. His office
does not give him the license to prosecute recklessly to the injury of another. Thus he is made liable fro his actions in the opinion of the
court.
Yes, it is not suggested that a lawyer enjoys a special immunity from damage suits. However, when he acts in the name of a client, he
should not be sued on a counterclaim in the very same case he has filed only as counsel and not as a party.
Any claim for alleged damages or other causes of action should be filed in an entirely separate and distinct civil action. Under the
circumstances of the case, it was ruled that the charges pressed by respondent Enrile for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code
arising from the filing of an alleged harassment suit with malice and evident bad faith do not constitute a compulsory counterclaim.
To vindicate his rights, Senator Enrile has to file a separate and distinct civil action for damages against the Solicitor General. To allow a
counterclaim against a lawyer who files a complaint for his clients, who is merely their representative in court and not a plaintiff or
complainant in the case would lead to mischievous consequences