G.R. No.

L-69866 April 15, 1988

ROGELIO ABERCA, RODOLFO BENOSA, NESTOR BODINO NOEL ETABAG DANILO DE LA

FUENTE, BELEN DIAZ-FLORES, MANUEL MARIO GUZMAN, ALAN JAZMINEZ, EDWIN LOPEZ,
ALFREDO MANSOS, ALEX MARCELINO, ELIZABETH PROTACIO-MARCELINO, JOSEPH
OLAYER, CARLOS PALMA, MARCO PALO, ROLANDO SALUTIN, BENJAMIN SESGUNDO,
ARTURO TABARA, EDWIN TULALIAN and REBECCA TULALIAN petitioners,
vs.
MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, COL. FIDEL SINGSON, COL. ROLANDO ABADILLA, COL. GERARDO
B. LANTORIA, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, 1ST LT. COL. PANFILO M. LACSON, MAJ.
RODOLFO AGUINALDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, 1ST LT. PEDRO TANGO, 1ST LT. ROMEO
RICARDO, 1ST LT. RAUL BACALSO, MSGT BIENVENIDO BALABA and REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XCV (95), Quezon City, respondents.

YAP, J.:

This petition for certiorari presents vital issues not heretofore passed upon by this Court. It poses the question whether the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations
of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. If such action for damages may be maintained, who can be held liable for such
violations: only the military personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as well.

This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and
liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as
Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes
against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT
plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila," Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said
order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued
judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a
number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper
warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of
relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and
counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of
violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish
them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan
to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass
and punish them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.

Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages amounting to P39,030.00; moral damages in the

amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount
of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; and attorney's fees amounting to not less
than P200,000.00.

A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Solicitor-General Estelito
Mendoza, alleging that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their
detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can entertain the present action, defendants are
immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties; and (3) the complaint
states no cause of action against the defendants. Opposition to said motion to dismiss was filed by
plaintiffs Marco Palo, Danilo de la Fuente, Benjamin Sesgundo, Nel Etabag, Alfredo Mansos and
Rolando Salutin on July 8, 1983, and by plaintiffs Edwin Lopez, Manuel Mario Guzman, Alan
Jasminez, Nestor Bodino, Carlos Palma, Arturo Tabara, Joseph Olayer, Rodolfo Benosa, Belen
Diaz, Flores, Rogelio Aberca, Alex Marcelino and Elizabeth Marcelino on July 21, 1983. On
November 7, 1983, a Consolidated Reply was filed by defendants' counsel.

Then, on November 8, 1983, the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 95, Judge
Willelmo C. Fortun, Presiding, 1 issued a resolution granting the motion to dismiss. I sustained, lock,
stock and barrel, the defendants' contention (1) the plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the
circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) that assuming that the court can entertain the present
action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties;
and (3) that the complaint states no cause of action against defendants, since there is no allegation
that the defendants named in the complaint confiscated plaintiffs' purely personal properties in
violation of their constitutional rights, and with the possible exception of Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo
and Sergeant Bienvenido Balabo committed acts of torture and maltreatment, or that the defendants
had the duty to exercise direct supervision and control of their subordinates or that they had
vicarious liability as employers under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court stated, "After a
careful study of defendants' arguments, the court finds the same to be meritorious and must,
therefore, be granted. On the other hand, plaintiffs' arguments in their opposition are lacking in
merit."

A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint and a supplemental motion for
reconsideration was filed by the plaintiffs on November 18, 1983, and November 24, 1983,
respectively. On December 9, 1983, the defendants filed a comment on the aforesaid motion of
plaintiffs, furnishing a copy thereof to the attorneys of all the plaintiffs, namely, Attys. Jose W.
Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Auguso Sanchez, Antonio L. Rosales,
Pedro B. Ella Jr., Arno V. Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene Saguisag, Ramon
Esguerra and Felicitas Aquino.

On December 15, 1983, Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily inhibiting himself from further
proceeding in the case and leaving the resolution of the motion to set aside the order of dismissal to
Judge Lising, "to preclude any suspicion that he (Judge Fortun) cannot resolve [the] aforesaid
pending motion with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge and to put an end to plaintiffs assertion
that the undersigned has no authority or jurisdiction to resolve said pending motion." This order
prompted plaintiffs to reesolve an amplificatory motion for reconsideration signed in the name of the
Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) of Mabini Legal Aid Committee, by Attys. Joker P. Arroyo,
Felicitas Aquino and Arno Sanidad on April 12, 1984. On May 2,1984, the defendants filed a
comment on said amplificatory motion for reconsideration.

In an order dated May 11, 1984, the trial court, Judge Esteban Lising, Presiding, without acting on
the motion to set aside order of November 8, 1983, issued an order, as follows:

It appearing from the records that, indeed, the following plaintiffs, Rogelio Aberca,
Danilo de la Fuente and Marco Palo, represented by counsel, Atty. Jose W. Diokno,
Alan Jasminez represented by counsel, Atty. Augusta Sanchez, Spouses Alex
Marcelino and Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, represented by counsel, Atty. Procopio
Beltran, Alfredo Mansos represented by counsel, Atty. Rene Sarmiento, and Rolando
Salutin, represented by counsel, Atty. Efren Mercado, failed to file a motion to
reconsider the Order of November 8, 1983, dismissing the complaint, nor interposed
an appeal therefrom within the reglementary period, as prayed for by the defendants,
said Order is now final against said plaintiffs.

Assailing the said order of May 11, 1984, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on May
28,1984, alleging that it was not true that plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente, Marco Palo,
Alan Jasminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin
failed to file a motion to reconsider the order of November 8, 1983 dismissing the complaint, within
the reglementary period. Plaintiffs claimed that the motion to set aside the order of November 8,
1983 and the amplificatory motion for reconsideration was filed for all the plaintiffs, although signed
by only some of the lawyers.

In its resolution of September 21, 1984, the respondent court dealt with both motions (1) to
reconsider its order of May 11, 1984 declaring that with respect to certain plaintiffs, the resolution of
November 8, 1983 had already become final, and (2) to set aside its resolution of November 8, 1983
granting the defendants' motion to dismiss. In the dispositive portion of the order of September 21,
1984, the respondent court resolved:

(1) That the motion to set aside the order of finality, dated May 11, 1984, of the
Resolution of dismissal of the complaint of plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la
Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan Jasminez Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino,
Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin is deed for lack of merit;

(2) For lack of cause of action as against the following defendants, to wit:

1. Gen Fabian Ver

2. Col. Fidel Singson

3. Col. Rolando Abadilla

4. Lt. Col. Conrado Lantoria, Jr.

5. Col. Galileo Montanar

6. Col. Panfilo Lacson

7. Capt. Danilo Pizaro

8. 1 Lt Pedro Tango

9. Lt. Romeo Ricardo

10. Lt. Raul Bacalso

the motion to set aside and reconsider the Resolution of dismissal of the present
action or complaint, dated November 8, 1983, is also denied but in so far as it affects
and refers to defendants, to wit:

1. Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo, and

2. Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba

the motion to reconsider and set aside the Resolution of dismissal dated November
3, 1983 is granted and the Resolution of dismissal is, in this respect, reconsidered
and modified.
Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on March 15, 1985 seeking to annul and set
aside the respondent court's resolution of November 8, 1983, its order of May 11, 1984, and its
resolution dated September 21, 1984. Respondents were required to comment on the petition, which
it did on November 9, 1985. A reply was filed by petitioners on August 26, 1986.

We find the petition meritorious and decide to give it due course.

At the heart of petitioners' complaint is Article 32 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages:

(1) Freedom of religion;

(2) Freedom of speech;

(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;

(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;

(5) Freedom of suffrage;

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process

(7) of law;

(8) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;

(9) The right to the equal protection of the laws;

(10) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;

(11) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;

(12) The privacy of cmmunication and correspondence;

(13) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law;

(14) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for
redress of grievances;

(15) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;

(16) The rigth of the accused against excessive bail;

 (17) The rigth of the aaccused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure
the attendance of witness in behalf;

(18) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against ones self, or from being
forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to
make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State
witness;

(19) Freedom from excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the
same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been
judicially declared unconstitutional; and

(20) Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or
omission constitutes a criminal offense, the against grieved party has a right to
commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other
relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the
latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated.

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or
omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply
cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek
to violate those sacred rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and political
stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield — borrowing the words of Chief Justice Claudio
Teehankee — to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is necessary to remind ourselves that
certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or
imperious demands of the ruling power. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Our
commitment to democratic principles and to the rule of law compels us to reject the view which
reduces law to nothing but the expression of the will of the predominant power in the community.
"Democracy cannot be a reign of progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the law is respected by him
who makes it and by him for whom it is made. Now this respect implies a maximum of faith, a
minimum of Idealism. On going to the bottom of the matter, we discover that life demands of us a
certain residuum of sentiment which is not derived from reason, but which reason nevertheless
controls. 2

Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents postulate the view that as
public officers they are covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done in the
performance of official duties or function In support of said contention, respondents maintain that —

Respondents are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Their primary
duty is to safeguard public safety and order. The Constitution no less provides that
the President may call them "to prevent or supress lawless violence, invasion,
insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof." (Constitution, Article VII,
Section 9).
 On January 17, 1981, the President issued Proclamation No. 2045 lifting martial law
but providing for the continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in view of the remaining dangers to the security of the nation. The
proclamation also provided "that the call to the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, insuitection rebellion and subversion shall
continue to be in force and effect."

Petitioners allege in their complaint that their causes of action proceed from
respondent General Ver's order to Task Force Makabansa to launch pre-emptive
strikes against communist terrorist underground houses in Metro Manila. Petitioners
claim that this order and its subsequent implementation by elements of the task force
resulted in the violation of their constitutional rights against unlawful searches,
seizures and arrest, rights to counsel and to silence, and the right to property and
that, therefore, respondents Ver and the named members of the task force should be
held liable for damages.

But, by launching a pre-emptive strike against communist terrorists, respondent

members of the armed forces merely performed their official and constitutional
duties. To allow petitioners to recover from respondents by way of damages for acts
performed in the exercise of such duties run contrary to the policy considerations to
shield respondents as public officers from undue interference with their duties and
from potentially disabling threats of hability (Aarlon v. Fitzgerald 102 S. Ct. 2731-1
Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 634), and upon the necessity of protecting the
performance of governmental and public functions from being harassed unduly or
constantly interrupted by private suits (McCallan v. State, 35 Cal. App. 605; Metran v.
Paredes, 79 Phil. 819).

xxx xxx xxx

The immunity of public officers from liability arising from the performance of their
duties is now a settled jurisprudence Alzua v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308; Zulueta v.
Nicolas, 102 Phil. 944; Spalding v. Vilas, 161 US 483; 40 L. Ed. 780, 16 S. Ct. 631;
Barr v. Mateo, 360; Butz v. Economon, 438 US 478; 57 L. Ed. 2d 895, 98 S. Ct.
2894; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US 232; Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, supra; Miller v. de
Leune, 602 F. 2d 198; Sami v. US, 617 F. 2d 755).

Respondents-defendants who merely obeyed the lawful orders of the President and
his call for the suppression of the rebellion involving petitioners enjoy such immunity
from Suit.3

We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. The
cases invoked by respondents actually involved acts done by officers in the performance of official
duties written the ambit of their powers. As held in Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield: 4

No one can be held legally responsible in damages or otherwise for doing in a legal
manner what he had authority, under the law, to do. Therefore, if the Governor-
General had authority, under the law to deport or expel the defendants, and
circumstances justifying the deportation and the method of carrying it out are left to
him, then he cannot be held liable in damages for the exercise of this power.
Moreover, if the courts are without authority to interfere in any manner, for the
purpose of controlling or interferring with the exercise of the political powers vested in
the chief executive authority of the Government, then it must follow that the courts
 cannot intervene for the purpose of declaring that he is liable in damages for the
exeercise of this authority.

It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely
responding to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection,
rebellion and subversion" in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite
the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre-
emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be
construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to
disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and
protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all
officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.

Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual
liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated
therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability
under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal
Code or other penal statute.

This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their assigned task or carrying
out their mission with vigor. We have no quarrel with their duty to protect the Republic from its
enemies, whether of the left or of the right, or from within or without, seeking to destroy or subvert
our democratic institutions and imperil their very existence. What we are merely trying to say is that
in carrying out this task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed,
otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start to unravel. In the battle of competing Ideologies, the
struggle for the mind is just as vital as the struggle of arms. The linchpin in that psychological
struggle is faith in the rule of law. Once that faith is lost or compromised, the struggle may well be
abandoned.

We do not find merit in respondents' suggestion that plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Respondents contend that "Petitioners
cannot circumvent the suspension of the privilege of the writ by resorting to a damage suit aimed at
the same purpose-judicial inquiry into the alleged illegality of their detention. While the main relief
they ask by the present action is indemnification for alleged damages they suffered, their causes of
action are inextricably based on the same claim of violations of their constitutional rights that they
invoked in the habeas corpus case as grounds for release from detention. Were the petitioners
allowed the present suit, the judicial inquiry barred by the suspension of the privilege of the writ will
take place. The net result is that what the courts cannot do, i.e. override the suspension ordered by
the President, petitioners will be able to do by the mere expedient of altering the title of their action."

We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal
arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not
render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the
individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of
obtaining his liberty.

Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for damages are explicitly
recognized in P.D. No. 1755 which amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following to
its text:
 However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-delict)
arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the
exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest,
detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year.

Petitioners have a point in contending that even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus suspends petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and
detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered
because of respondents' confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain
silent and to counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and
against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.

However, we find it unnecessary to address the constitutional issue pressed upon us. On March 25,
1986, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 2, revoking Proclamation Nos. 2045
and 2045-A and lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The question
therefore has become moot and academic.

This brings us to the crucial issue raised in this petition. May a superior officer under the notion of
respondent superior be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the
person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated?

Respondents contend that the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case. We agree.
The doctrine of respondent superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and
agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship
exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates.

Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32.
The law speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the
violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the
one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.

By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution 5 acquires
added meaning and asgilrnes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his
vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not
have to answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected
rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986
was the widely held perception that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually
responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it would certainly be go naive to
expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage
suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no ones terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes
the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.

In the case at bar, the trial court dropped defendants General Fabian Ver, Col. Fidel Singson, Col.
Rolando Abadilla, Col. Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col. Panfilo Lacson, Capt. Danilo
Pizarro, lst Lt. Pedro Tango, Lt. Romeo Ricardo and Lt. Ricardo Bacalso from the acts of their
subordinates. Only Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba were kept as
defendants on the ground that they alone 'have been specifically mentioned and Identified to have
allegedly caused injuries on the persons of some of the plaintiff which acts of alleged physical
violence constitute a delict or wrong that gave rise to a cause of action. But such finding is not
supported by the record, nor is it in accord with law and jurisprudence.
Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5 Section 1, Article 19. to 'acts of alleged
physical violence" which constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act
of violating or in any manner impeding or impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties
enumerated therein, among others —

1. Freedom from arbitrary arrest or illegal detention;

2. The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

3. The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;

4. The privacy of communication and correspondence;

5. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being
forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to
make a confession, except when the person confessing becomes a state witness.

The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and details, how plaintiffs'
constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and impaired
by defendants. The complaint speaks of, among others, searches made without search warrants or
based on irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants; seizures and confiscation, without
proper receipts, of cash and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and other items of property which
were not subversive and illegal nor covered by the search warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs
without warrant or under irregular, improper and illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at
several undisclosed places of 'safehouses" where they were kept incommunicado and subjected to
physical and psychological torture and other inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for the
purpose of extracting incriminatory statements. The complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses
perpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative of their constitutional rights.

Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be held
liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as
well as indirectly, responsible for its violation.

The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the complaint. It
is well established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint states no cause of action must be based on what appears on the face of the
complaint. 6 To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the
complaint, and no others, should be considered. 7 For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must
hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. 8

Applying this test, it is difficult to justify the trial court's ruling, dismissing for lack of cause of action
the complaint against all the defendants, except Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt.
Bienvenido Balaba. The complaint contained allegations against all the defendants which, if admitted
hypothetically, would be sufficient to establish a cause or causes of action against all of them under
Article 32 of the Civil Code.

This brings us to the last issue. Was the trial court correct in dismissing the complaint with respect to
plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Puente, Marco Palo, Alan Jazminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth
Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin, on the basis of the alleged failure of said
plaintiffs to file a motion for reconsideration of the court's resolution of November 8, 1983, granting
the respondent's motion to dismiss?
It is undisputed that a timely motion to set aside said order of November 8, 1983 was filed by
'plaintiffs, through counsel. True, the motion was signed only by Atty. Joker P. Arroyo, counsel for
Benjamin Sesgulido; Atty. Antonio Rosales, counsel for Edwin Lopez and Manuel Martin Guzman;
Atty. Pedro B. Ella, Jr., counsel for Nestor Bodino and Carlos Palma; Atty. Arno V. Sanidad, counsel
for Arturo Tabara; Atty. Felicitas S. Aquino, counsel for Joseph Olayer; and Atty. Alexander Padilla,
counsel for Rodolfo Benosa.

But the body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was filed on behalf of all the
plaintiffs. And this must have been also the understanding of defendants' counsel himself for when
he filed his comment on the motion, he furnished copies thereof, not just to the lawyers who signed
the motion, but to all the lawyers of plaintiffs, to wit: Attys. Jose Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene
Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Augusto Sanchez, Antonio Rosales, Pedro Efla Jr., Arno Sanidad,
Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas S. Aquino.

In filing the motion to set aside the resolution of November 8, 1983, the signing attorneys did so on
behalf of all the plaintiff. They needed no specific authority to do that. The authority of an attorney to
appear for and in behalf of a party can be assumed, unless questioned or challenged by the adverse
party or the party concerned, which was never done in this case. Thus, it was grave abuse on the
part of respondent judge to take it upon himself to rule that the motion to set aside the order of
November 8, 1953 dismissing the complaint was filed only by some of the plaintiffs, when by its very
language it was clearly intended to be filed by and for the benefit of all of them. It is obvious that the
respondent judge took umbrage under a contrived technicality to declare that the dismissal of the
complaint had already become final with respect to some of the plaintiffs whose lawyers did not sign
the motion for reconsideration. Such action tainted with legal infirmity cannot be sanctioned.

Accordingly, we grant the petition and annul and set aside the resolution of the respondent court,
dated November 8, 1983, its order dated May 11, 1984 and its resolution dated September 21, 1984.
Let the case be remanded to the respondent court for further proceedings. With costs against private
respondents.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 86720 September 2, 1994

MHP GARMENTS, INC., and LARRY C. DE GUZMAN, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AGNES VILLA CRUZ, MIRASOL LUGATIMAN, and
GERTRUDES GONZALES, respondents.

Benjamin M. Dacanay for petitioners.

Emmanuel O. Tansingco for private respondents.

PUNO, J.:

The constitutional protection of our people against unreasonable search and seizure is not merely a
pleasing platitude. It vouchsafes our right to privacy and dignity against undesirable intrusions
committed by any public officer or private individual. An infringement of this right justifies an award
for damages.
On February 22, 1983, petitioner MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines, the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies,
badges, and insignias. In their Memorandum Agreement, petitioner corporation was given the
authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of
scout uniforms and other scouting supplies." 1

Sometime in October 1983, petitioner corporation received information that private respondents
Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and
paraphernalia without any authority. Petitioner de Guzman, an employee of petitioner corporation,
was tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and to make a report to the Philippine
Constabulary (PC).

On October 25, 1983, at about 10:30 A.M., petitioner de Guzman, Captain Renato M. Peñafiel, and
two (2) other constabulary men of the Reaction Force Battalion, Sikatuna Village, Diliman, Quezon
City went to the stores of respondents at the Marikina Public Market. Without any warrant, they
seized the boy and girl scouts pants, dresses, and suits on display at respondents' stalls. The
seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed private respondents. Receipts were issued for the
seized items. The items were then turned over by Captain Peñafiel to petitioner corporation for
safekeeping.

A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against private respondents. 2 During its
pendency, petitioner de Guzman exacted from private respondent Lugatiman the sum of THREE
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED PESOS (P3,100.00) in order to be dropped from the complaint. On
December 6, 1983, after a preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the
complaint against all the private respondents. On February 6, 1984, he also ordered the return of the
seized items. The seized items were not immediately returned despite demands. 3 Private
respondents had to go personally to petitioners' place of business to recover their goods. Even then,
not all the seized items were returned. The other items returned were of inferior quality.

Private respondents then filed Civil Case No. 51144 against the petitioners for sums of money and
damages. 4 In its Decision dated January 9, 1987, the trial court ruled for the private respondents,
thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against

defendants, ordering the latter jointly and severally:

1. To return the amount of P3,100.00 to plaintiff Mirasol Lugatiman with interest at

12% per annum from January 12, 1984, the date of the last receipt issued, until fully
paid;

2. To pay plaintiff Agnes Villa Cruz the sum of P2,000.00 for the 26 pieces of girl
scout items not returned;

3. To pay plaintiffs the amount of P50,000.00 for and as moral damages and
P15,000.00 for and as exemplary damages; and

4. P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

Costs against the defendants.

SO ORDERED.
The decision was appealed to the respondent court. On January 18, 1989, its Fifth
Division, 5 affirmed the Decision with modification, thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION; and,

as modified, the dispositive portion thereof now reads as follows:

Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs (private respondents) and against

defendants (petitioners), ordering the latter jointly and severally;

1. To return the amount of P3,100.00 to plaintiff (respondent) Mirasol Lugatiman and

cancel her application for distributor's license;

2. To pay plaintiff (respondent) Agnes Villa Cruz the sum of P2,000.00 for the
unreturned 26 pieces of girl scouts items with interest at 12% per annum from June
4, 1984 (date the complaint was filed) until it is fully paid;

3. To pay plaintiffs (respondents) the amount of P10,000.00 each, or a total of

P30,000.00, for and as moral damages; and P5,000.00 each, or a total of
P15,000.00, for and as exemplary damages; and

4. To pay plaintiffs (respondents) P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees and litigation
expenses.

Costs of the case a quo and the instant appeal are assessed jointly and severally
against defendants-appellants (petitioners) MHP Garments, Inc. and Larry de
Guzman.

SO ORDERED.

In this petition for certiorari, petitioners contend:

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IMPUTING LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES TO

THE PETITIONERS WHO DID NOT EFFECT THE SEIZURE OF THE SUBJECT
MERCHANDISE.

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT MADE A FINDING THAT THE

MANNER WITH WHICH THE CONFISCATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WAS
TORTIOUS BUT PENALIZED INSTEAD THE PETITIONERS WHO DID NOT
COMMIT THE ACT OF CONFISCATION.

THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND FOR THE PRIVATE

RESPONDENTS AND AGAINST THE PETITIONERS.

We affirm.
Article III, section 2, of the Constitution protects our people from unreasonable search and seizure. It
provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.

This provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who appear to be
guilty but are nevertheless to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. 6 In the case at
bench, the seizure was made without any warrant. Under the Rules of Court, 7 a warrantless search
can only be undertaken under the following circumstance:

Sec. 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. - A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.

We hold that the evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of private respondents'
goods. Petitioner corporation received information that private respondents were illegally selling Boy
Scouts items and paraphernalia in October 1983. The specific date and time are not established in
the evidence adduced by the parties. Petitioner de Guzman then made a surveillance of the stores
of private respondents. They reported to the Philippine Constabulary and on October 25, 1983, the
raid was made on the stores of private respondents and the supposed illicit goods were seized. The
progression of time between the receipt of the information and the raid of the stores of private
respondents shows there was sufficient time for petitioners and the PC raiding party to apply for a
judicial warrant. Despite the sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a warrant and seized the
goods of private respondents. In doing so, they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the
seizure would be proved to violate the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and
seizure. In the case at bench, the search and seizure were clearly illegal. There was no probable
cause for the seizure. Probable cause for a search has been defined as "such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched." 8 These facts and circumstances were not in any way shown by the
petitioners to justify their warrantless search and seizure. Indeed, after a preliminary investigation,
the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed their complaint for unfair competition and later ordered the
return of the seized goods.

Petitioners would deflect their liability with the argument that it was the Philippine Constabulary that
conducted the raid and their participation was only to report the alleged illegal activity of private
respondents.

While undoubtedly, the members of the PC raiding team should have been included in the complaint
for violation of the private respondents' constitutional rights, still, the omission will not exculpate
petitioners.

In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, 9 we ruled for the recovery of damages for violation of
constitutional rights and liberties from public officer or private individual, thus:
 Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages.

xxx xxx xxx

(9) The rights to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

xxx xxx xxx

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudged.

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

xxx xxx xxx

(6) Illegal search;

(1) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights have been
violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer
or employee responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also be
awarded.

xxx xxx xxx

The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not
necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a
requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection
of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the
pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties.
Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by plea of the
good faith. In the United States this remedy is in the nature of a tort. (emphasis
supplied)

In the subsequent case of Aberca vs. Ver, 10 the Court En Banc explained the liability of persons
indirectly responsible, viz:

[T]he decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law
speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the
violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor
alone (i.e., the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article
32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury
caused to the aggrieved party.

xxx xxx xxx

 While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would
easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damages suits, it should nonetheless be
made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons
who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint
tortfeasors.

xxx xxx xxx

[N]either can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be
held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions
those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violations. (emphasis supplied)

Applying the aforecited provisions and leading cases, the respondent court correctly granted
damages to private respondents. Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of
private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly, they instigated the raid
pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of
all illegal sources of scouting supplies. 11 As correctly observed by respondent court:

Indeed, the acts committed by the PC soldiers of unlawfully seizing appellees'

(respondents') merchandise and of filing the criminal complaint for unfair competition
against appellees (respondents) were for the protection and benefit of appellant
(petitioner) corporation. Such being the case, it is, thus, reasonably fair to infer from
those acts that it was upon appellant (petitioner) corporation's instance that the PC
soldiers conducted the raid and effected the illegal seizure. These circumstances
should answer the trial court's query — posed in its decision now under consideration
— as to why the PC soldiers immediately turned over the seized merchandise to
appellant (petitioner) corporation. 12

The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman did not lift a
finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. By standing by and apparently assenting
thereto, he was liable to the same extent as the officers themselves. 13 So with the petitioner
corporation which even received for safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized by the PC raiding
team and de Guzman, and refused to surrender them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its
complaint for unfair competition.

Secondly, Letter of Instruction No. 1299 was precisely crafted on March 9, 1983 to safeguard not
only the privilege of franchise holder of scouting items but also the citizen's constitutional rights,
to wit:

TITLE: APPREHENSION OF UNAUTHORIZED

MANUFACTURERS AND DISTRIBUTORS OF SCOUT
PARAPHERNALIA AND IMPOUNDING OF SAID
PARAPHERNALIA.

ABSTRACT:

Directs all law enforcement agencies of the Republic of the Philippines, to apprehend
immediately unauthorized manufacturers and distributors of Scout
paraphernalia, upon proper application by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines and/or
Girl Scouts of the Philippines for warrant of arrest and/or search warrant with a judge,
or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law; and to impound the
said paraphernalia to be used as evidence in court or other appropriate
 administrative body. Orders the immediate and strict compliance with the
Instructions. 14

Under the above provision and as aforediscussed, petitioners miserably failed to report the unlawful
peddling of scouting goods to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines for the proper application of a
warrant. Private respondents' rights are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to transient
needs. 15 Petitioners did not have the unbridled license to cause the seizure of respondents' goods
without any warrant.

And thirdly, if petitioners did not have a hand in the raid, they should have filed a third-party
complaint against the raiding team for contribution or any other relief, 16 in respect of respondents'
claim for Recovery of Sum of Money with Damages. Again, they did not.

We have consistently ruled that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant but to
compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he may have suffered. 17 Conformably with our ruling in Lim
vs. Ponce de Leon, op. cit., moral damages can be awarded in the case at bench. There can be no
doubt that petitioners must have suffered sleepless nights, serious anxiety, and wounded feelings
due the tortious raid caused by petitioners. Private respondents' avowals of embarrassment and
humiliation during the seizure of their merchandise were supported by their testimonies. Respondent
Cruz declared:

I felt very nervous. I was crying to loss (sic) my goods and capital because I am
doing business with borrowed money only, there was commotion created by the
raiding team and they even stepped on some of the pants and dresses on display for
sale. All passersby stopped to watch and stared at me with accusing expressions. I
was trembling and terribly ashamed, sir. 18

Respondent Lugatiman testified:

I felt very nervous. I was crying and I was very much ashamed because many people
have been watching the PC soldiers hauling my items, and many/I (sic) heard say
"nakaw pala ang mga iyan" for which I am claiming P25,000.00 for damages.19

While respondent Gonzalez stated thus:

I do not like the way the raid was conducted by the team sir because it looked like
that what I have been selling were stolen items that they should be confiscated by
uniformed soldiers. Many people were around and the more the confiscation was
made in a scandalous manner; every clothes, T-shirts, pants and dresses even those
not wrapped dropped to the ground. I was terribly shamed in the presence of market
goers that morning.20

Needles to state, the wantonness of the wrongful seizure justifies the award of exemplary
damages. 21 It will also serve as a stern reminder to all and sundry that the constitutional protection
against unreasonable search and seizure is a virile reality and not a mere burst of rhetoric. The all
encompassing protection extends against intrusions directly done both by government and indirectly
by private entities.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. We impose a SIX
PERCENT (6%) interest from January 9, 1987 on the TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) for the
unreturned twenty-six (26) pieces of girl scouts items and a TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest, in
lieu of SIX PERCENT (6%), on the said amount upon finality of this Decision until the payment
thereof. 22 Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-34529 January 27, 1983

MAXIMO MARCIA, AMALIA MOJICA, TIRSO YAP, DAMIANA MARCIA, EDGAR MARCIA, and
RENATO YAP, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FELARDO PAJE, and VICTORY LINER, INC., respondents.

Ricardo J. Francisco, for petitioners.

Flors, Macapagal, Ocampo & Dizon for private respondents.

RELOVA, J.:

Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, which dismissed the complaint filed by tile petitioners against private
respondents in the concept of an independent civil action for damages for physical injuries resulting
from reckless imprudence.

On December 23, 1956, in the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, a passenger bus operated by
private respondent Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by its employee. private respondent Felardo Paje,
collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries
to herein petitioners, Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. Thereupon, an information for homicide and
serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against Felardo Paje in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga (Criminal Case No. 2745).

On January 23, 1957, an action for damages (Civil Case No. 4425) was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap, together with their respective parents. against
the Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje, alleging that, the mishap was due to the reckless
imprudence and negligence of the latter in driving the passenger bus.

While said Civil Case No. 4425 was in progress in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the criminal
action proceeded in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Criminal Case No. 2745). The
accused Felardo Paje was convicted of the offense charged. However, on appeal to the Court of
Appeals, he was acquitted in a decision promulgated on November 3, 1982, based on the findings,
to wit:

1 That the Victory Liner bus left its post, kilometer post no. 156, in San Marcelino,
Zambales, at about 2:00 AM

2 That on the highway at Lubao, Pampanga, between Posts Nos. 83 and 84, the
appellant driver thereof, saw a cargo truck parked in the middle of the right lane of
the road to Manila, without
 3 That appellant slackened the speed of his truck from 60 km. p.h. to 35 or 40 km. p.
h. in order to pass said truck;

4 That the appellant did not see the oncoming jeep until it swerved to the left.

5 That the jeep was still far so appellant attempted to pass the truck but before he
could do so, the jeep came very fast at the center of the road and out of its lane.

6 That the passengers of the bus shouted at the appellant to bring the bus to the side
so as to avoid a frontal collision with he jeep, and appellant brought his bus to the
right shoulder of the road going to Bataan;

7 That the jeep driven by the deceased Clemente Marcia was running at a fast pace
for which reason the driver lost control and veered sharply to the right shoulder of the
road and crashed into the bus, parked thereat a few seconds before.

8 That appellant was not speeding, was diligent, and hence, not liable for the
collision which at the least, was a fortuitous event for which no one was responsible.

and the conclusion that "CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE is WANTING in this case, and that appellant was
NOT even guilty of CIVIL NEGLIGENCE, Insofar as appellant was concerned, it was a case of
PURE ACCIDENT."

As a consequence, herein private respondents, defendants in Civil Case No. 4425 of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, moved for the dismissal of the complaint invoking the decision of the Court of
Appeals acquitting Felardo Paje and citing Section I (d), Rule 107 of the Rules of Court now Section
3 (c), Rule I I I of the New Rules of Court), which reads:

SECTION 1. Rules governing civil actions arising from offenses. — Except as

otherwise provided by law, the following rules shall be observed:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless
the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil might arise did not exist. In the other cases, the persons entitled to the civil
action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against
the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity
for the damages suffered.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and, thereafter, continued to hear defendants' (herein
private respondents) evidence. The following were presented as defendants' evidence in chief:

(a) the whole record of Criminal Case No. 2745 of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga in which defendant Felardo Paje was by reason of the occurrence
prosecuted criminally and convicted of homicide with serious physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence;

(b) the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 01691 Cr, acquitting the
accused; and
 (c) copy of the brief of the said defendant as accused-appellant in the said Court of
Appeals case.

On August 10, 1966, the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision dismissing plaintiffs'
complaint against the defendants Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje, without pronouncement as to
costs.

Petitioners appealed the case to the (Court of Appeals CA-G.R. No. 38964-R) alleging that the
acquittal of Paje in the criminal action for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence "is not a ground for dismissing the complaint in the instant civil action; that the instant
civil action is entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action and shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution, so that whatever may have been the result of the criminal action is
irrelevant to this civil action; that Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and not Section 3,
paragraph (c) of the said rule applies; that the statement in the decision of the Court of Appeals in
the criminal action that defendant Paje as accused therein was not guilty of civil negligence is
without the jurisdiction of the said Court to make and is to be completely disregarded as an
extraneous, officious and void statement which cannot affect in any way the instant civil action; that
the records of the criminal action against defendant Paje are inadmissible evidence; that it has been
established in the case at bar, not only by preponderance of evidence but by uncontradicted,
conclusive evidence that petitioners suffered damages as a proximate result of the negligence of
respondent Paje and that it has been established, not only by preponderance of evidence but by
uncontradicted, conclusive evidence, that the damages suffered by petitioners as a result of the
negligence of private respondents is in the amount of P250,817.96, and that the latter should be
sentenced, jointly and severally, to pay the same to petitioner.

In the meantime, the heirs of Clemente Marcia who, as aforesaid, died as a result of the collision,
instituted a separate civil action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 6880) for
damages based on the alleged reckless imprudence of bus driver Felardo Paje, praying that the
driver and the Victory Liner, Inc. be ordered to pay jointly and severally the amount of damages
claimed. The complaint of the heirs of Clemente Marcia was dismissed by the trial court. Appeal on
questions of law was taken to this Court (Laura Corpus et al vs. Felardo Paje at al, 28 SCRA 1062)
which, however, affirmed the order for the reason, among others, that "(1) The acquittal of the
defendant Felardo Paje by the Court of Appeals in the criminal action on the ground that the reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence charged against him did not exist and that the collision was a
case of pure accident, was a bar to the civil action for damages for the death of Clemente Marcia,
which action was based upon the same criminal negligence of which the defendant Felardo Paje
was acquitted in the criminal action."

Following the ruling of this Court in the Corpus vs. Paje decision, respondent Court of Appeals held
that the private respondents Cannot be held civilly liable after it had ruled in the criminal action that
negligence was wanting and that the collision was a case of pure accident.

Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioners have come to US alleging that the Court of Appeals erred:

I.

IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES

AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR PHYSICAL INJURIES RESULTING
FROM NEGLIGENCE IS AN INDEPENDENT ONE, ENTIRELY SEPARATE AND
DISTINCT FROM THE CRIMINAL ACTION, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF
ARTICLES 33, 2176 AND 2177 OF THE NEW (CIVIL CODE AND SECTION 2 OF
RULE 111 OF THE RULES OF COURT. AND IN INSTEAD HOLDING THAT THE
 INSTANT ACTION IS NOT AMONG THE INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS
AUTHORIZED BY THE SAID PROVISIONS.

II.

IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ACQUITTAL OF RESPONDENT FELARDO PAJE,

DRIVER OF RESPONDENT VICTORY LINER, INC., IN THE CRIMINAL ACTION
BASED ON THE SAID PHYSICAL INJURIES AND NEGLIGENCE IS ENTIRELY
IRRELEVANT TO THE INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES BY VIRTUE OF
THE AFORECITED PROVISIONS OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND THE RULES OF
COURT, AND IN INSTEAD HOLDING THAT THE SAID ACQUITTAL IS A BAR TO
THE INSTANT CIVIL ACTION UNDER SECTION 3 (c) OF RULE I I I AND SECTION
49 (c) OF RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT.

III.

IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY PRIVATE

RESPONDENTS IN THE INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES, CONSISTING
OF THE RECORDS OF THE CRIMINAL ACTION IN THE TRIAL COURT, THE
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ACQUITTING RESPONDENT PAJE
AND THE COPY OF THE BRIEF OF THE SAID RESPONDENT AS ACCUSED-
APPELLANT, ARE INADMISSIBLE IN THE INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR
DAMAGES.

IV.

IN NOT HOLDING THAT IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE CASE AT BAR,

NOT ONLY BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE BUT BY UNCONTRADICTED,
CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE, THAT PETITIONERS SUFFERED DAMAGES AS A
PROXIMATE RESULT OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF RESPONDENT PAJE.

V.

IN NOT HOLDING THAT IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, NOT ONLY BY

PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE BUT BY UNCONTRADICTED, CONCLUSIVE
EVIDENCE, THAT THE DAMAGES SUFFERED BY PETITIONERS AS A RESULT
OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANTS IS IN THE AMOUNT OF P250,817.96,
AND IN NOT SENTENCING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY TO PAY THE SAME TO PETITIONERS.

It is the stand of herein petitioners that Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, not Section 3 (c)
thereof, should apply in the case at bar.

Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34
and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party
during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required
in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
We do not agree, Section 2 of Rule 111 merely refers to the institution of an independent civil action
without waiting for the filing or termination of the criminal action and requires only preponderance of
evidence to prosper and not proof beyond reasonable doubt as required for conviction in criminal
cases. However, an acquittal based on the finding that the facts upon which civil liability did not exist,
bars the filing of an independent civil action if it is based on the crime. As early as 1952, We have
held in the case of Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Company 91 Phil. 672, that "the acquittal of the
accused from the criminal charge will not necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the court
declares in the judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Where the
court states 'that the evidence throws no light on the cause of fire and that it was an unfortunate
accident for which the accused cannot be held responsible,' this declaration fits well into the
exception of the rule which exempts the accused, from civil liability. " Likewise, in Albornoz vs.
Albornoz, 98 Phil. 785, it was the ruling that "where the judgment in a criminal action contains an
express declaration that the basis of claimant's action did not exist, the latter's action for civil liability
is barred under section 1 (d) Rule 107 of the Rules of Court." And, in De Mesa vs. Priela 24 SCRA
582, this Court, speaking through then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, ruled that extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other
cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner
provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or
indemnity for the damage suffered (Sec. 3 [c], Rule 111, Rules of Court.)"

As held in Corpus vs. Paje, supra, reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three
crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by
the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

The above article speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical injuries. The injuries suffered by
herein petitioners were alleged to be the result of criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with
malice. Hence, no independent civil action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith.
Further, Section 3 (c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that "(c) Extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist." Otherwise stated, unless
the act from which the civil liability arises is declared to be nonexistent in the final judgment, the
extinction of the criminal liability will not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability. Thus, if a
person is charged with homicide and successfully pleaded self-defense, his acquittal by reason
thereof will extinguish his civil liability. He has not incurred any criminal liability. On the other hand, if
his acquittal is, for instance, due to the fact that he was not sufficiently Identified to be the assailant,
a civil action for damages may be maintained. His acquittal is not due to non-existence of the crime
from which civil liability might arise, but because he was not, in the eyes of the court, sufficiently
Identified as the perpetrator of the crime.

In People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, said that
"the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony. The law penalizes the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The
gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty; it does not qualify the
substance of the offense.
The charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide and physical injuries but for reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence resulting in homicide (death of Clemente Marcia) and physical
injuries suffered by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. They are not one of the three (3) crimes
mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code and, therefore, no civil action shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution.

The case of Laura Corpus vs. Felardo Paje (supra) is the same as the case at bar, the only
difference being the party-plaintiffs or petitioners. Clemente Marcia died, while Edgar Marcia and
Renato Yap suffered physical injuries in the same accident. The heirs of Clemente Marcia filed Civil
Case No. 6880 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against herein respondents. The case was
dismissed and appealed directly to this Court. The order appealed from was affirmed, as recorded in
1äw phï1.ñët

Laura Corpus vs. Felardo Paje, 28 SCRA 1062.

The case at bar (Civil Case No. 4425) was filed by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap against the same
defendants in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. After trial, the case was dismissed and affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. It is now before Us on appeal by certiorari from the said decision.

Relative to the admissibility of the documents, to wit; (a) the records of the criminal case against
Paje, (b) the decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting the latter; and (c) copy of the brief of the
respondent Paje as accused-appellant, suffice it to say that since petitioners' cause of action is
based on the alleged recklessness and imprudence of respondent Paje it necessarily follows that his
acquittal by the Court of Appeals and its declaration that the mishap was "pure accident" are relevant
and material evidence. In fact, the lower court may even take judicial notice of the decision of the
Court of Appeals in said criminal case.

Finally, with respect to the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, well settled is the rule that the
same are final and cannot be disturbed by Us, particularly where they are based, as they are in the
case at bar, upon substantial evidence.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against the
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-51183 December 21, 1983

CARMEN L. MADEJA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. FELIX T. CARO and EVA ARELLANO-JAPZON, respondents.

Ernesto P. Miel for petitioner.

Gorgonio T. Alvarez for respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.: ñé+.£ª wph!1

In Criminal Case No. 75-88 of the defunct Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar, DR. EVA A.
JAPZON is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an
appendectomy. The complaining witness is the widow of the deceased, Carmen L. Madeja. The
information states that: "The offended party Carmen L. Madeja reserving her right to file a separate
civil action for damages." (Rollo, p. 36.)

The criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for damages in Civil
Case No. 141 of the same court. She alleged that her husband died because of the gross
negligence of Dr. Japzon. The respondent judge granted the defendant's motion to dismiss which
motion invoked Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which reads: têñ.£îhqw â£

Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases not included in the
preceding section the following rules shall be observed:

(a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted
separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not
be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. ...

According to the respondent judge, "under the foregoing Sec. 3 (a), Rule 111, New Rules of Court,
the instant civil action may be instituted only after final judgment has been rendered in the criminal
action." (Rollo, p. 33.)

The instant petition which seeks to set aside the order of the respondent judge granting the
defendant's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 141 is highly impressed with merit.

Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable
provision. The two enactments are quoted hereinbelow: têñ.£îhqw â£

Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31,32, 33, 34
and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party
during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required
in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." (Rule 111, Rules
of Court.)

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Civil Code,)

There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting, namely:

1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. This is manifest from the
provision which uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution." This conclusion is
supported by the comment of the Code Commission, thus: têñ.£îhqw â£

The underlying purpose of the principle under consideration is to allow the citizen to
enforce his rights in a private action brought by him, regardless of the action of the
State attorney. It is not conducive to civic spirit and to individual self-reliance and
initiative to habituate the citizens to depend upon the government for the vindication
of their own private rights. It is true that in many of the cases referred to in the
provision cited, a criminal prosecution is proper, but it should be remembered that
while the State is the complainant in the criminal case, the injured individual is the
 one most concerned because it is he who has suffered directly. He should be
permitted to demand reparation for the wrong which peculiarly affects him. (Report,
p. 46.)

And Tolentino says: têñ.£îhqwâ£

The general rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, unless the offended party reserves his right to institute it
separately; and after a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising
from the same offense can be prosecuted. The present articles creates an exception
to this rule when the offense is defamation, fraud, or physical injuries, In these cases,
a civil action may be filed independently of the criminal action, even if there has been
no reservation made by the injured party; the law itself in this article makes such
reservation; but the claimant is not given the right to determine whether the civil
action should be scheduled or suspended until the criminal action has been
terminated. The result of the civil action is thus independent of the result of the civil
action." (I Civil Code, p. 144 [1974.])

2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries
defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but consummated,
frustrated and attempted homicide. têñ.£îhqwâ£

The Article in question uses the words 'defamation', 'fraud' and 'physical injuries.'
Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific
provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses
defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used
not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their
generic sense. With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the terms
'physical injuries' could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in
the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would
have used terms in the same article-some in their general and another in its technical
sense. In other words, the term 'physical injuries' should be understood to mean
bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, bacause the terms used with the latter
are general terms. In any case the Code Commission recommended that the civil
action for physical injuries be similar to the civil action for assault and battery in
American Law, and this recommendation must hove been accepted by the
Legislature when it approved the article intact as recommended. If the intent has
been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm received by the complainant
similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as the Code Commission states, the
civil action should lie whether the offense committed is that of physical injuries, or
frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death," (Carandang vs.
Santiago, 97 Phil. 94, 96-97 [1955].)

Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, which states that reckless imprudence or
criminal negligence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code is not authoritative. Of eleven
justices only nine took part in the decision and four of them merely concurred in the result.

In the light of the foregoing, it is apparent that the civil action against Dr. Japzon may proceed
independently of the criminal action against her.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the order dismissing Civil Case No. 141 is hereby set
aside; no special pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED

[G.R. No. 135306. January 28, 2003]

MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA C. AGUJA

and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., petitioners, vs. ISLAMIC
DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., ABDUL-RAHMAN
R.T. LINZAG, IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID DE
GUZMAN, AL-FARED DA SILVA and IBRAHIM B.A.
JUNIO, respondents.

DECISION

I may utterly detest what you write, but I shall fight

to the death to make it possible for you to
continue writing it. - Voltaire
BELLOSILLO, J.:

VOLTAIRE'S PONTIFICAL VERSE bestirs once again the basic liberties to

free speech and free press - liberties that belong as well, if not more, to those
who question, who do not conform, who differ. For the ultimate good which we
all strive to achieve for ourselves and our posterity can better be reached by a
free exchange of ideas, where the best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the free market - not just the ideas
we desire, but including those thoughts we despise. [1]

ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., a local

federation of more than seventy (70) Muslim religious organizations, and
individual Muslims ABDULRAHMAN R.T. LINZAG, IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA,
ABDUL RASHID DE GUZMAN, AL-FARED DA SILVA and IBRAHIM B.A.
JUNIO, filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for damages in
their own behalf and as a class suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide
against MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA C. AGUJA
and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., arising from an article published in the 1
August 1992 issue of Bulgar, a daily tabloid. The article reads:
"ALAM BA NINYO?

Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng
mga Muslim?

Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang
kainin kahit na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain.
Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang
pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw na tinatawag nilang Ramadan."

The complaint alleged that the libelous statement was insulting and
damaging to the Muslims; that these words alluding to the pig as the God of the
Muslims was not only published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt
the feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam, as a religion in
this country, in violation of law, public policy, good morals and human relations;
that on account of these libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in
the Philippines but the entire Muslim world, especially every Muslim individual
in non-Muslim countries.
MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., in their
defense, contended that the article did not mention respondents as the object
of the article and therefore were not entitled to damages; and, that the article
was merely an expression of belief or opinion and was published without malice
nor intention to cause damage, prejudice or injury to Muslims. [2]

On 30 June 1995 the trial court dismissed the complaint holding that the
plaintiffs failed to establish their cause of action since the persons allegedly
defamed by the article were not specifically identified -

It must be noted that the persons allegedly defamed, the herein plaintiffs, were not
identified with specificity. The subject article was directed at the Muslims without
mentioning or identifying the herein plaintiffs x x x xIt is thus apparent that the
alleged libelous article refers to the larger collectivity of Muslims for which the
readers of the libel could not readily identify the personalities of the persons
defamed. Hence, it is difficult for an individual Muslim member to prove that the
defamatory remarks apply to him. The evidence presented in this case failed to
convince this court that, indeed, the defamatory remarks really applied to the herein
plaintiffs.
[3]

On 27 August 1998 the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court. It opined that it was "clear from the disputed article that the defamation
was directed to all adherents of the Islamic faith. It stated that pigs were sacred
and idolized as god by members of the Muslim religion. This libelous imputation
undeniably applied to the plaintiff-appellants who are Muslims sharing the same
religious beliefs." It added that the suit for damages was a "class suit" and that
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.'s religious status as
a Muslim umbrella organization gave it the requisite personality to sue and
protect the interests of all Muslims. [4]

Hence, the instant petition for review assailing the findings of the appellate
court (a) on the existence of the elements of libel, (b) the right of respondents
to institute the class suit, and, (c) the liability of petitioners for moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.
Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring
a person's character, fame or reputation through false and malicious
statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish the esteem,
[5]

respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings

or opinions about the plaintiff. It is the publication of anything which is injurious
[6]

to the good name or reputation of another or tends to bring him into

disrepute. Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the
[7]

opinion which others in the community may have, or tend to have, of the
plaintiff.
[8]

It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are not actionable
as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however
opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not
constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation
for special damages. The fact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does
[9]

not make it actionable by itself. [10]

Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to

advert to an identified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances
specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no member of
such class has a right of action without at all impairing the equally demanding
[11]

right of free speech and expression, as well as of the press, under the Bill of
Rights. Thus, in Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we
[12] [13]

dismissed a complaint for libel against Newsweek, Inc., on the ground that
private respondents failed to state a cause of action since they made no
allegation in the complaint that anything contained in the article complained of
specifically referred to any of them. Private respondents, incorporated
associations of sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental claiming to have 8,500
members and several individual members, filed a class action suit for damages
in behalf of all sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental. The complaint filed in
the Court of First Instance of Bacolod City alleged that Newsweek, Inc.,
committed libel against them by the publication of the article "Island of Fear" in
its weekly newsmagazine allegedly depicting Negros Province as a place
dominated by wealthy landowners and sugar planters who not only exploited
the impoverished and underpaid sugarcane workers but also brutalized and
killed them with impunity. Private respondents alleged that the article showed a
deliberate and malicious use of falsehood, slanted presentation and/or
misrepresentation of facts intended to put the sugarcane planters in a bad light,
expose them to public ridicule, discredit and humiliation in the Philippines and
abroad, and make them the objects of hatred, contempt and hostility of their
agricultural workers and of the public in general. We ratiocinated -

x x x where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is

essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every
individual in that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the
class or group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so
that he can bring the action separately, if need be x x x x The case at bar is not a class
suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all, or where the
representation of class interest affected by the judgment or decree is indispensable to
make each member of the class an actual party. We have here a case where each of
the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct reputation in the community. They do not
have a common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.

In the present case, there was no fairly identifiable person who was
allegedly injured by the Bulgar article. Since the persons allegedly defamed
could not be identifiable, private respondents have no individual causes of
action; hence, they cannot sue for a class allegedly disparaged.Private
respondents must have a cause of action in common with the class to which
they belong to in order for the case to prosper.
An individual Muslim has a reputation that is personal, separate and distinct
in the community.Each Muslim, as part of the larger Muslim community in the
Philippines of over five (5) million people, belongs to a different trade and
profession; each has a varying interest and a divergent political and religious
view -some may be conservative, others liberal. A Muslim may find the article
dishonorable, even blasphemous; others may find it as an opportunity to
strengthen their faith and educate the non-believers and the "infidels." There is
no injury to the reputation of the individual Muslims who constitute this
community that can give rise to an action for group libel. Each reputation is
personal in character to every person. Together, the Muslims do not have a
single common reputation that will give them a common or general interest in
the subject matter of the controversy.
In Arcand v. The Evening Call Publishing Company, the United States
[14]

Court of Appeals held that one guiding principle of group libel is that defamation
of a large group does not give rise to a cause of action on the part of an
individual unless it can be shown that he is the target of the defamatory matter.
The rule on libel has been restrictive. In an American case, a person had
[15]

allegedly committed libel against all persons of the Jewish religion. The Court
held that there could be no libel against an extensive community in common
law. In an English case, where libel consisted of allegations of immorality in a
Catholic nunnery, the Court considered that if the libel were on the whole
Roman Catholic Church generally, then the defendant must be absolved. With [16]

regard to the largest sectors in society, including religious groups, it may be

generally concluded that no criminal action at the behest of the state, or civil
action on behalf of the individual, will lie.
In another case, the plaintiffs claimed that all Muslims, numbering more than
600 million, were defamed by the airing of a national television broadcast of a
film depicting the public execution of a Saudi Arabian princess accused of
adultery, and alleging that such film was "insulting and defamatory" to the
Islamic religion. The United States District Court of the Northern District of
[17]

California concluded that the plaintiffs' prayer for $20 Billion in damages arising
from "an international conspiracy to insult, ridicule, discredit and abuse
followers of Islam throughout the world, Arabs and the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia" bordered on the "frivolous," ruling that the plaintiffs had failed to
demonstrate an actionable claim for defamation. The California Court stressed
that the aim of the law on defamation was to protect individuals; a group may
be sufficiently large that a statement concerning it could not defame individual
group members. [18]

Philip Wittenberg, in his book "Dangerous Words: A Guide to the Law of

Libel," discusses the inappropriateness of any action for tortious libel involving
[19]

large groups, and provides a succinct illustration:

There are groupings which may be finite enough so that a description of the body is a
description of the members. Here the problem is merely one of evaluation. Is the
description of the member implicit in the description of the body, or is there a
possibility that a description of the body may consist of a variety of persons, those
included within the charge, and those excluded from it?

A general charge that the lawyers in the city are shysters would obviously not be a
charge that all of the lawyers were shysters. A charge that the lawyers in a local point
in a great city, such as Times Square in New York City, were shysters would obviously
not include all of the lawyers who practiced in that district; but a statement that all of
the lawyers who practiced in a particular building in that district were shysters would
be a specific charge, so that any lawyer having an office within that building could
sue.

If the group is a very large one, then the alleged libelous statement is
considered to have no application to anyone in particular, since one might as
well defame all mankind. Not only does the group as such have no action; the
plaintiff does not establish any personal reference to himself. At present,
[20]

modern societal groups are both numerous and complex. The same principle
follows with these groups: as the size of these groups increases, the chances
for members of such groups to recover damages on tortious libel become
elusive. This principle is said to embrace two (2) important public policies: first,
where the group referred to is large, the courts presume that no reasonable
reader would take the statements as so literally applying to each individual
member; and second, the limitation on liability would satisfactorily safeguard
freedom of speech and expression, as well as of the press, effecting a sound
compromise between the conflicting fundamental interests involved in libel
cases. [21]

In the instant case, the Muslim community is too vast as to readily ascertain
who among the Muslims were particularly defamed. The size of the group
renders the reference as indeterminate and generic as a similar attack on
Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists or Mormons would do. The word "Muslim" is
descriptive of those who are believers of Islam, a religion divided into varying
sects, such as the Sunnites, the Shiites, the Kharijites, the Sufis and others
based upon political and theological distinctions. "Muslim" is a name which
describes only a general segment of the Philippine population, comprising a
heterogeneous body whose construction is not so well defined as to render it
impossible for any representative identification.
The Christian religion in the Philippines is likewise divided into different
sects: Catholic, Baptist, Episcopalian, Presbyterian, Lutheran, and other groups
the essence of which may lie in an inspired charlatan, whose temple may be a
corner house in the fringes of the countryside. As with the Christian religion, so
it is with other religions that represent the nation's culturally diverse people and
minister to each one's spiritual needs. The Muslim population may be divided
into smaller groups with varying agenda, from the prayerful conservative to the
passionately radical. These divisions in the Muslim population may still be too
large and ambiguous to provide a reasonable inference to any personality who
can bring a case in an action for libel.
The foregoing are in essence the same view scholarly expressed by Mr.
Justice Reynato S. Puno in the course of the deliberations in this case. We
extensively reproduce hereunder his comprehensive and penetrating
discussion on group libel -

Defamation is made up of the twin torts of libel and slander the one being, in general,
written, while the other in general is oral. In either form, defamation is an invasion of
the interest in reputation and good name. This is a relational interest since it involves
the opinion others in the community may have, or tend to have of the plaintiff.

The law of defamation protects the interest in reputation the interest in acquiring,
retaining and enjoying ones reputation as good as ones character and conduct
warrant. The mere fact that the plaintiffs feelings and sensibilities have been offended
is not enough to create a cause of action for defamation. Defamation requires that
something be communicated to a third person that may affect the opinion others may
have of the plaintiff. The unprivileged communication must be shown of a statement
that would tend to hurt plaintiffs reputation, to impair plaintiffs standing in the
community.

Although the gist of an action for defamation is an injury to reputation, the focus of a
defamation action is upon the allegedly defamatory statement itself and its predictable
effect upon third persons. A statement is ordinarily considered defamatory if it tend[s]
to expose one to public hatred, shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt, ridicule,
aversion, ostracism, degradation or disgrace The Restatement of Torts defines a
defamatory statement as one that tends to so harm the reputation of another as to
lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from
associating or dealing with him.

Consequently as a prerequisite to recovery, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove as

part of his prima facie case that the defendant (1) published a statement that was (2)
defamatory (3) of and concerning the plaintiff.

The rule in libel is that the action must be brought by the person against whom the
defamatory charge has been made. In the American jurisdiction, no action lies by a
third person for damages suffered by reason of defamation of another person, even
though the plaintiff suffers some injury therefrom. For recovery in defamation cases,
it is necessary that the publication be of and concerning the plaintiff. Even when a
publication may be clearly defamatory as to somebody, if the words have no personal
application to the plaintiff, they are not actionable by him. If no one is identified,
there can be no libel because no ones reputation has been injured x x x x

In fine, in order for one to maintain an action for an alleged defamatory statement, it
must appear that the plaintiff is the person with reference to whom the statement was
made. This principle is of vital importance in cases where a group or class is defamed
since, usually, the larger the collective, the more difficult it is for an individual
member to show that he was the person at whom the defamation was directed.

If the defamatory statements were directed at a small, restricted group of persons,

they applied to any member of the group, and an individual member could maintain
an action for defamation. When the defamatory language was used toward a small
group or class, including every member, it has been held that the defamatory
language referred to each member so that each could maintain an action. This small
group or class may be a jury, persons engaged in certain businesses, professions or
employments, a restricted subdivision of a particular class, a society, a football team,
a family, small groups of union officials, a board of public officers, or engineers of a
particular company.

In contrast, if defamatory words are used broadly in respect to a large class or group
of persons, and there is nothing that points, or by proper colloquium or innuendo can
be made to apply, to a particular member of the class or group, no member has a
right of action for libel or slander. Where the defamatory matter had no special,
personal application and was so general that no individual damages could be
presumed, and where the class referred to was so numerous that great vexation and
oppression might grow out of the multiplicity of suits, no private action could be
maintained. This rule has been applied to defamatory publications concerning groups
or classes of persons engaged in a particular business, profession or employment,
directed at associations or groups of association officials, and to those directed at
miscellaneous groups or classes of persons.

Distinguishing a small group-which if defamed entitles all its members to sue from a
large group which if defamed entitles no one to sue is not always so simple. Some
authorities have noted that in cases permitting recovery, the group generally has
twenty five (25) or fewer members. However, there is usually no articulated limit on
size. Suits have been permitted by members of fairly large groups when some
distinguishing characteristic of the individual or group increases the likelihood that
the statement could be interpreted to apply individually. For example, a single player
on the 60 to 70 man Oklahoma University football team was permitted to sue when a
writer accused the entire team of taking amphetamines to hop up its performance; the
individual was a fullback, i.e., a significant position on the team and had played in all
but two of the teams games.

A prime consideration, therefore, is the public perception of the size of the group and
whether a statement will be interpreted to refer to every member. The more organized
and cohesive a group, the easier it is to tar all its members with the same brush and
the more likely a court will permit a suit from an individual even if the group includes
more than twenty five (25) members. At some point, however, increasing size may be
seen todilute the harm to individuals and any resulting injury will fall beneath the
threshold for a viable lawsuit.

x x x x There are many other groupings of men than those that are contained within
the foregoing group classifications. There are all the religions of the world, there are
all the political and ideological beliefs; there are the many colors of the human race.
Group defamation has been a fertile and dangerous weapon of attack on various
racial, religious and political minorities. Some states, therefore, have passed statutes
to prevent concerted efforts to harass minority groups in the United States by making
it a crime to circulate insidious rumors against racial and religious groups. Thus far,
any civil remedy for such broadside defamation has been lacking.

There have been numerous attempts by individual members to seek redress in the
courts for libel on these groups, but very few have succeeded because it felt that the
groups are too large and poorly defined to support a finding that the plaintiff was
singled out for personal attack x x x x (citations omitted).

Our conclusion therefore is that the statements published by petitioners in

the instant case did not specifically identify nor refer to any particular individuals
who were purportedly the subject of the alleged libelous
publication. Respondents can scarcely claim to having been singled out for
social censure pointedly resulting in damages.
A contrary view is expressed that what is involved in the present case is an
intentional tortious act causing mental distress and not an action for libel. That
opinion invokes Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire where the U.S. Supreme Court
[22]

held that words heaping extreme profanity, intended merely to incite hostility,
hatred or violence, have no social value and do not enjoy constitutional
protection; and Beauharnais v. Illinois where it was also ruled that hate speech
[23]

which denigrates a group of persons identified by their religion, race or ethnic

origin defames that group and the law may validly prohibit such speech on the
same ground as defamation of an individual.
We do not agree to the contrary view articulated in the immediately
preceeding paragraph.Primarily, an "emotional distress" tort action is personal
in nature, i.e., it is a civil action filed by an individual to assuage the injuries to
[24]

his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his character. It has no

application in the instant case since no particular individual was identified in the
disputed article of Bulgar. Also, the purported damage caused by the article,
assuming there was any, falls under the principle of relational harm - which
includes harm to social relationships in the community in the form of
defamation; as distinguished from the principle of reactive harm - which
includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction of
emotional distress. In their complaint, respondents clearly asserted an alleged
harm to the standing of Muslims in the community, especially to their activities
in propagating their faith in Metro Manila and in other non-Muslim communities
in the country. It is thus beyond cavil that the present case falls within the
[25]

application of the relational harm principle of tort actions for defamation, rather
than the reactive harm principle on which the concept of emotional
distress properly belongs.
Moreover, under the Second Restatement of the Law, to recover for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress the plaintiff must show that: (a) The
conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff;
(b) The conduct was extreme and outrageous; (c) There was a causal
connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's mental distress;
and, (d) The plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and severe. [26]

"Extreme and outrageous conduct" means conduct that is so outrageous in

character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized
society. The defendant's actions must have been so terrifying as naturally to
humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff. Generally, conduct will be found
[27]

to be actionable where the recitation of the facts to an average member of the

community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him or her
to exclaim, "Outrageous!" as his or her reaction. [28]

"Emotional distress" means any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as

extreme grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, disappointment,
worry, nausea, mental suffering and anguish, shock, fright, horror, and
chagrin. "Severe emotional distress," in some jurisdictions, refers to any type
[29]

of severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally

recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so, including
posttraumatic stress disorder, neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, or
phobia. The plaintiff is required to show, among other things, that he or she
[30]

has suffered emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could be

expected to endure it; severity of the distress is an element of the cause of
action, not simply a matter of damages. [31]

Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more than mere
worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger. Liability does not arise from
mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty expressions, or other
trivialities. In determining whether the tort of outrage had been committed, a
plaintiff is necessarily expected and required to be hardened to a certain
amount of criticism, rough language, and to occasional acts and words that are
definitely inconsiderate and unkind; the mere fact that the actor knows that the
other will regard the conduct as insulting, or will have his feelings hurt, is not
enough. [32]

Hustler Magazine v. Falwell illustrates the test case of a civil action for
[33]

damages on intentional infliction of emotional distress. A parody appeared in

Hustler magazine featuring the American fundamentalist preacher and
evangelist Reverend Jerry Falwell depicting him in an inebriated state having
an incestuous sexual liaison with his mother in an outhouse. Falwell sued
Hustler and its publisher Larry Flynt for damages. The United States District
Court for the Western District of Virginia ruled that the parody was not libelous,
because no reasonable reader would have understood it as a factual assertion
that Falwell engaged in the act described. The jury, however, awarded
$200,000 in damages on a separate count of "intentional infliction of emotional
distress," a cause of action that did not require a false statement of fact to be
made. The United States Supreme Court in a unanimous decision overturned
the jury verdict of the Virginia Court and held that Reverend Falwell may not
recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress. It was argued that the
material might be deemed outrageous and may have been intended to cause
severe emotional distress, but these circumstances were not sufficient to
overcome the free speech rights guaranteed under the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution. Simply stated, an intentional tort causing emotional
distress must necessarily give way to the fundamental right to free speech.
It must be observed that although Falwell was regarded by the U.S. High
Court as a "public figure," he was an individual particularly singled out or
identified in the parody appearing on Hustler magazine. Also, the emotional
distress allegedly suffered by Reverend Falwell involved a reactive interest - an
emotional response to the parody which supposedly injured his psychological
well-being.
Verily, our position is clear that the conduct of petitioners was not extreme
or outrageous.Neither was the emotional distress allegedly suffered by
respondents so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure
it. There is no evidence on record that points to that result.
Professor William Prosser, views tort actions on intentional infliction of
emotional distress in this manner - [34]

There is virtually unanimous agreement that such ordinary defendants are not liable
for mere insult, indignity, annoyance, or even threats, where the case is lacking in
other circumstances of aggravation. The reasons are not far to seek. Our manners,
and with them our law, have not yet progressed to the point where we are able to
afford a remedy in the form of tort damages for all intended mental disturbance.
Liability of course cannot be extended to every trivial indignity x x x x The plaintiff
must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of
rough language, and to acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind x x x The
plaintiff cannot recover merely because of hurt feelings.

Professor Calvert Magruder reinforces Prosser with this succinct

observation, viz: [35]

There is no occasion for the law to intervene in every case where someones feelings
are hurt. There must still be freedom to express an unflattering opinion, and some
safety valve must be left through which irascible tempers may blow off relatively
harmless steam.

Thus, it is evident that even American courts are reluctant to adopt a rule of
recovery for emotional harm that would "open up a wide vista of litigation in the
field of bad manners," an area in which a "toughening of the mental hide" was
thought to be a more appropriate remedy. Perhaps of greater concern were
[36]

the questions of causation, proof, and the ability to accurately assess damages
for emotional harm, each of which continues to concern courts today. [37]

In this connection, the doctrines in Chaplinsky and Beauharnais had largely

been superseded by subsequent First Amendment doctrines. Back in simpler
times in the history of free expression the Supreme Court appeared to espouse
a theory, known as the Two-Class Theory, that treated certain types of
expression as taboo forms of speech, beneath the dignity of the First
Amendment.The most celebrated statement of this view was expressed
in Chaplinsky:

There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or fighting words those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.

Today, however, the theory is no longer viable; modern First Amendment

principles have passed it by. American courts no longer accept the view that
speech may be proscribed merely because it is "lewd," "profane,"
"insulting" or otherwise vulgar or offensive. Cohen v. California is
[38] [39]

illustrative: Paul Robert Cohen wore a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft"
in a Los Angeles courthouse in April 1968, which caused his eventual
arrest. Cohen was convicted for violating a California statute prohibiting any
person from "disturb[ing] the peace x x x by offensive conduct." The U.S.
Supreme Court conceded that Cohen's expletive contained in his jacket was
"vulgar," but it concluded that his speech was nonetheless protected by the right
to free speech. It was neither considered an "incitement" to illegal action nor
"obscenity." It did not constitute insulting or "fighting" words for it had not been
directed at a person who was likely to retaliate or at someone who could not
avoid the message. In other words, no one was present in the Los Angeles
courthouse who would have regarded Cohen's speech as a direct personal
insult, nor was there any danger of reactive violence against him.
No specific individual was targeted in the allegedly defamatory words
printed on Cohen's jacket.The conviction could only be justified by Californias
desire to exercise the broad power in preserving the cleanliness of discourse in
the public sphere, which the U.S. Supreme Court refused to grant to the State,
holding that no objective distinctions can be made between vulgar and
nonvulgar speech, and that the emotive elements of speech are just as
essential in the exercise of this right as the purely cognitive. As Mr. Justice
Harlan so eloquently wrote: "[O]ne mans vulgarity is another mans lyric x x x
words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive
force." With Cohen, the U.S. Supreme Court finally laid the constitutional
[40]

foundation for judicial protection of provocative and potentially offensive

speech.
Similarly, libelous speech is no longer outside the First Amendment
protection. Only one small piece of the Two-Class
Theory in Chaplinsky survives - U.S. courts continue to treat "obscene"
speech as not within the protection of the First Amendment at all. With
respect to the "fighting words" doctrine, while it remains alive it was
modified by the current rigorous clear and present danger test. Thus, [41]

in Cohen the U.S. Supreme Court in applying the test held that there was no
showing that Cohen's jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" had threatened
to provoke imminent violence; and that protecting the sensibilities of onlookers
was not sufficiently compelling interest to restrain Cohen's speech.
Beauharnais, which closely followed the Chaplinsky doctrine, suffered the
same fate as Chaplinsky. Indeed, when Beauharnais was decided in 1952,
the Two-Class Theory was still flourishing. While concededly the U.S. High
Tribunal did not formally abandon Beauharnais, the seminal shifts in U.S.
constitutional jurisprudence substantially undercut Beauharnais and seriously
undermined what is left of its vitality as a precedent. Among the cases that dealt
a crushing impact on Beauharnais and rendered it almost certainly a dead letter
case law are Brandenburg v. Ohio, and, again, Cohen v. California. These
[42] [43]

decisions recognize a much narrower set of permissible grounds for restricting

speech than did Beauharnais. [44]

In Brandenburg, appellant who was a leader of the Ku Klux Klan was

convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Statute for advocating the
necessity, duty and propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods
of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reforms; and for
voluntarily assembling with a group formed to teach or advocate the doctrines
of criminal syndicalism. Appellant challenged the statute and was sustained by
the U.S. Supreme Court, holding that the advocacy of illegal action becomes
punishable only if such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. Except in unusual
[45]

instances, Brandenburg protects the advocacy of lawlessness as long as such

speech is not translated into action.
The importance of the Brandenburg ruling cannot be overemphasized. Prof.
Smolla affirmed that "Brandenburg must be understood as
overruling Beauharnais and eliminating the possibility of treating group
libel under the same First Amendment standards as individual libel." It [46]

may well be considered as one of the lynchpins of the modern doctrine of free
speech, which seeks to give special protection to politically relevant speech.
In any case, respondents' lack of cause of action cannot be cured by the
filing of a class suit.As correctly pointed out by Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug during
the deliberations, "an element of a class suit is the adequacy of
representation. In determining the question of fair and adequate representation
of members of a class, the court must consider (a) whether the interest of the
named party is coextensive with the interest of the other members of the class;
(b) the proportion of those made parties as it so bears to the total membership
of the class; and, (c) any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party
to speak for the rest of the class. [47]

The rules require that courts must make sure that the persons intervening
should be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned. In
the present controversy, Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc., seeks
in effect to assert the interests not only of the Muslims in the Philippines but of
the whole Muslim world as well. Private respondents obviously lack the
sufficiency of numbers to represent such a global group; neither have they been
able to demonstrate the identity of their interests with those they seek to
represent. Unless it can be shown that there can be a safe guaranty that those
absent will be adequately represented by those present, a class suit, given its
magnitude in this instance, would be unavailing." [48]
 Likewise on the matter of damages, we agree that "moral damages may be
recovered only if the plaintiff is able to satisfactorily prove the existence of the
factual basis for the damages and its causal connection with the acts
complained of, and so it must be, as moral damages although incapable of
[49]

pecuniary estimation are designed not to impose a penalty but to compensate

for injury sustained and actual damages suffered. Exemplary damages, on the
[50]

other hand, may only be awarded if claimant is able to establish his right to
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Unfortunately,
[51]

neither of the requirements to sustain an award for either of these damages

would appear to have been adequately established by respondents."
In a pluralistic society like the Philippines where misinformation about
another individual's religion is as commonplace as self-appointed critics of
government, it would be more appropriate to respect the fair criticism of
religious principles, including those which may be outrageously appalling,
immensely erroneous, or those couched as fairly informative comments. The
greater danger in our society is the possibility that it may encourage the
frequency of suits among religious fundamentalists, whether Christian, Muslim,
Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, or others. This would unnecessarily make the civil
courts a battleground to assert their spiritual ideas, and advance their
respective religious agenda.
It need not be stressed that this Court has no power to determine which is
proper religious conduct or belief; neither does it have the authority to rule on
the merits of one religion over another, nor declare which belief to uphold or
cast asunder, for the validity of religious beliefs or values are outside the sphere
of the judiciary. Such matters are better left for the religious authorities to
address what is rightfully within their doctrine and realm of influence. Courts
must be viewpoint-neutral when it comes to religious matters if only to affirm the
neutrality principle of free speech rights under modern jurisprudence
where "[a]ll ideas are treated equal in the eyes of the First Amendment - even
those ideas that are universally condemned and run counter to constitutional
principles." Under the right to free speech, "there is no such thing as a false
[52]

idea.However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not
on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other
ideas." Denying certiorari and affirming the appellate court decision would
[53]

surely create a chilling effect on the constitutional guarantees of freedom of

speech, of expression, and of the press.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 27 August 1998 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
the Decision of the RTC-Br. 4, Manila, dismissing the complaint for lack of merit,
is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
 SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-37733 September 30, 1982

ALMARIO T. SALTA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUDGE JESUS DE VEYRA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the CFI of Manila,
Branch XIV and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondents.

G.R. No. L-38035 September 30, 1982

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,

vs.
HON. AMANTE P. PURISIMA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII and
ALMARIO SALTA, respondents.

Dakila F. Castro & Associates for petitioner.

Nestor L. Kalaw, Edgardo M. Magtalas and Juan C. Gatmaitan for respondents,

DE CASTRO, J.:

In these two cases, the only issue to be resolved is whether a decision of acquittal in a criminal case
operates to dismiss a separate civil action filed on the basis of the same facts as alleged in the
criminal case, which is for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.

The petitioner, Almario T. Salta, in G.R. No. L-37733, takes the affirmative stand on the issue as
above indicated, as he made manifest in his motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 79583, of the CFI of
Manila, Branch XIV, which was, however, denied by Hon. Jesus de Veyra, presiding. In a similar
motion, aforementioned petitioner sought to dismiss another civil case (Civil Case No. 88343),
pending before Branch VII of the same CFI of Manila, presided over by Hon. Amante Purisima who
granted the motion to dismiss.

We have, therefore, the unedifying spectacle of two cases involving the same issue disposed of by
two judges in a manner directly in opposition of each other. For a uniform ruling that would
authoritatively settle this regrettable conflict of opinion, the two cases have been consolidated for a
single decision. For purposes of convenience, however, although the petitioner in G.R. No. L-37733,
Almario T. Salta, is the private respondent in the other case, G.R. No. L-38035, in which the
petitioner is the Philippine National Bank, We shall refer in this decision to Salta as "petitioner," and
the PNB, as respondent bank."

Petitioner was an employee of the PNB assigned as Manager of the Malolos' branch. As such, his
duty was, among others, to himself grant loans, or only to recommend the granting of loans,
depending on the amount of the loan applied for. In the performance of this particular duty, he is
supposed to exercise care and prudence, and with utmost diligence, observe the policies, rules and
regulations of the bank.
In disregard of the pertinent rules, regulations and policies of the respondent bank, petitioner
indiscriminately granted certain loans mentioned in the complaints filed by PNB, in a manner
characterized by negligence, fraud and manifest partiality, and upon securities not commensurate
with the amount of the loans. This is how the respondent bank found petitioner to have discharged
his duties as branch manager of the bank, and so it filed a civil action in the CFI of Manila (Civil
Case No. 79583, Branch XIV) on April 22, 1970, and another case (Civil Case No. 88343, Branch
VII) on September 23, 1972, to recover losses the bank suffered. At the same time the bank caused
to be filed, based on the same acts, a criminal case with the Circuit Criminal Court of the Fifth
Judicial District at San Fernando, Pampanga, Criminal Case No. CCCV-668, for violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

In the criminal case, the Court, on motion to dismiss filed by the defense, after the prosecution has
rested, granted the motion in a 64-page Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:

CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, therefore, the Motion to Dismiss

(Demurrer) to Evidence) should be as it is hereby granted and accused ALMARIO T.
SALTA ACQUITTED of the offense charged in the Information the prosecution
having failed to prove the essential ingredience and/or elements of the crime
charged,. with costs de oficio. 1

With his acquittal in the criminal case, petitioner filed Motions to Dismiss in each of the two civil cases,
based on Section 3(c), Rule I I I of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:

(c) extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless
the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil might arise did not exist. ... 2

It is in the resolution of the motions to dismiss that Judges de Veyra and Purisima of the CFI of Manila
took diametrically opposing views, the former denying the motion, the latter granting it.

We sustain the order denying the motion to dismiss as issued by Judge de Veyra, which, for its
brevity, but clear and convincing, We quote as follows:

Having been acquitted by the Circuit Court of the charges of violation of the Anti-
Graft Law, Defendant now seeks the dismissal of the civil case which arose from the
same set of facts. The motion to dismiss must be denied for the reason that acquittal
in the criminal case will not be an obstacle for the civil case to prosper unless in the
criminal case the Court makes a finding that even civilly the accused would not be
liable-there is no such a finding. Apart from this, Plaintiff in this present civil case
bases its case either on fraud or negligence-evidence that only requires a
preponderance, unlike beyond reasonable doubt which is the requisite in criminal
cases.

The motion to dismiss is, therefore, denied for lack of merit. 3

To begin with, the filing in this case of a civil action separate from the criminal action is fully warranted
under the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code. 4 The criminal case is for the prosecution of an
offense the main element of which is fraud, one of the kinds of crime mentioned in the aforecited
provision. Based on the same acts for which the criminal action was filed, the civil actions very clearly
alleged fraud and negligence as having given rise to the cause of action averred in the complaints. It
needs hardly any showing to demonstrate this fact, which petitioner disputes, particularly as to the
sufficiency of the allegation of fraud in the civil complaints. Definitely, We hold that the following allegation
in the complaints unmistakably shows that the complaints do contain sufficient averment of fraud:

13. That there was fraud committed by the defendant in granting the aforesaid loans
which rendered him liable for his acts, which fraud is positively and easily Identifiable
in the manner and scheme aforementioned. 5

That there is allegation of negligence is also unmistakably shown when the complaint states that "the
defendant as manager of Malolos Branch, in gross violation of the bank rules and regulations, and without
exercising necessary prudence, ... extended a number of credit accommodations . . ." 6 On this allegation
of negligence alone, the civil case may be maintained as an entirely independent action from the criminal
case. Consequently, Section 3(c), Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court has no application thereto.

The ruling in the case of PNB vs. Bagamaspad, 7 involving the same respondent herein, and also
against its branch manager, unherringly charts the course to be followed in the final resolution of these
cases. Thus -

The trial court based in the civil liability the appellants herein on the provisions of
Article 1718 and 1719 of the Civil Code, defining and enumerating the duties and
obligations of an agent and his liability for failure to comply with such duty.. . . A
careful study and consideration of the record, however, convinces us and we agree
with the trial court that the defendants-appellants have not only violated instructions
of the plaintiff Bank, including things which the bank wanted done or not done, all of
which were fully understood by them but they (appellants) also violated standing
regulations regarding the granting of loans; and what is more, thru their
carelessness, laxity and negligence, they allowed bans to be granted to persons who
were not entitled to secure loans. 8

If petitioner's civil liability is, as alleged in the complaint, based on negligence, apart from the averment of
fraud, then on the strength of the aforesaid ruling, the civil action can be maintained regardless of the
outcome of the criminal action.

The opinion of former Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Dionisio vs. Alvendia 9 is not only enlightening, but
authoritative. Thus —

. . . in the case of an independent civil actions under the Civil Code, the result of the
criminal case, whether acquittal or conviction, would be entirety irrelevant to the civil
action. This seems to be the spirit of the law when it decided to make these actions
'entirely separate and distinct' from the criminal action (Articles 22, 33, 34 and 2177).
Hence in these cases, I think Rule 107 Sec. l(d) does not apply. 10

It is significant to note that under Article 31 11 of the New Civil Code, it is made clear that the civil action
permitted therein to be filed separately from the criminal action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings "regardless of the result of the latter." It seems perfectly reasonable to conclude that the civil
actions mentioned in Article 33, permitted in the same manner to be filed separately from the criminal
case, may proceed similarly regardless of the result of the criminal case.

Indeed, when the law has allowed a civil case related to a criminal case, to be filed separately and to
proceed independently even during the pendency of the latter case, the intention is patent to make
the court's disposition of the criminal case of no effect whatsoever on the separate civil case. This
must be so because the offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a nature, unlike other offenses
not mentioned, that they may be made the subject of a separate civil action because of the distinct
separability of their respective juridical cause or basis of action. This is clearly illustrated in the case
of swindling, a specie of an offense committed by means of fraud, where the civil case may be filed
separately and proceed independently of the criminal case, regardless of the result of the latter.

The wisdom of the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code is to be found in the fact that when
the civil action is reserved to be filed separately, the criminal case is prosecuted by the prosecuting
officer alone without intervention from a private counsel representing the interest of the offended
party. It is but just that when, as in the present instance, the prosecution of the criminal case is left to
the government prosecutor to undertake, any mistake or mishanding of the case committed by the
latter should not work to the prejudice of the offended party whose interest would thus be protected
by the measure contemplated by Article 33 and Article 2177 12 of the New Civil Code.

Prescinding from the foregoing, it should be stated with emphasis, for its decisive effect on how the
issue raised in this case should be disposed of, that in no manner may the resolution of the Circuit
Criminal Court be read as positively stating that the fact from which the civil action might arise did
not exist, as required in the provision relied upon by petitioner, Section 3(c), Rule III of the Revised
Rules of Court. As Judge de Veyra put it, "acquittal in the criminal case will not be an obstacle for the
civil case to prosper unless in the criminal case the Court makes a finding that even civilly, the
accused would not be liable-there is no such finding." There, indeed, could not be such finding
because the criminal court, aware that the civil case is not before it, would be acting in excess of
jurisdiction if it were to make any pronouncement in effect disposing of a case pending before
another court, over which it had not acquired jurisdiction. Even if this were authorized by the Rules of
Court, the validity of such rule would be open to serious doubt as it would be affecting a matter of
jurisdiction, which is substantive in character, considering the constitutional limitation of the rule-
making power of the Supreme Court, that said rules should not increase or diminish substantive
rights.

WHEREFORE, the order denying the motion to dismiss issued in Civil Case No. 79583 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila (G. R. No. L-37733) is affirmed, while the order granting a similar motion
in Civil Case No. 88343 of the same court (G. R. No. L-38035) is reversed. Let the records of these
two (2) cases be remanded to their respective courts of origin for proper further proceedings. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995

MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and in behalf of the minor children KRIZTEEN
ELIZABETH, BEVERLY MARIE and NAPOLEON II, all surnamed DULAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Eighth Division, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court National Capital Region, Quezon City,
Br. 84, SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., and SUPERGUARD
SECURITY CORPORATION, respondents.

BIDIN, J.:

This petition for certiorari prays for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October
29, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 24646 which affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court dismissing
Civil Case No. Q-89-1751, and its resolution dated November 17, 1991 denying herein, petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred
at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela,
the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.

Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf
and in behalf of her minor children, filed on February 8, 1989 an action for damages against Benigno
Torzuela and herein private respondents Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc.,
("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"), alleged employers of
defendant Torzuela. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 among others alleges
the following:

1. . . .

Defendants SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., (Defendant

Safeguard) and SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION (Defendant
Superguard) are corporations duly organized and existing in accordance with
Philippine laws, with offices at 10th Floor, Manufacturers Building, Inc., Plaza Santa
Cruz, Manila. They are impleaded as alternative defendants for, while the former
appears to be the employer of defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA (defendant
TORZUELA), the latter impliedly acknowledged responsibility for the acts of
defendant TORZUELA by extending its sympathies to plaintiffs.

Defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA is of legal age, an employee of defendant

SAFEGUARD and/or defendant SUPERGUARD and, at the time of the incident
complained of, was under their control and supervision. . . .

3. On December 7, 1988 at around 8:00 a.m., defendant TORZUELA, while he was

on duty as security guard at the "Big Bang sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila shot and killed NAPOLEON V. DULAY with a .38 caliber revolver
belonging to defendant SAFEGUARD, and/or SUPERGUARD (per Police Report
dated January 7, 1989, copy attached as Annex A);

4. The incident resulting in the death of NAPOLEON V. DULAY was due to the
concurring negligence of the defendants. Defendant TORZUELA'S wanton and
reckless discharge of the firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or
SUPERGUARD was the immediate and proximate cause of the injury, while the
negligence of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its having
failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision and
control of its employee to avoid the injury.

xxx xxx xxx

(Rollo, pp. 117-118)

Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
The said Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 was raffled to Branch 84 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, presided by respondent Judge Teodoro Regino.
On March 2, 1989, private respondent SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
the complaint does not state a valid cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuela's act of
shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was
committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, which states:

Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. — Every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable.

Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint for damages based on negligence
under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the
civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code. In addition, the private respondent argued that petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature
considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the
employer's subsidiary liability (Rollo, p. 55-59).

Respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the
ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees (Rollo, p. 96).

Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against the private respondents
is based on their liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xxx xxx xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or an industry.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners contended that a suit against alternative defendants is allowed under Rule 3, Section 13
of the Rules of Court. Therefore, the inclusion of private respondents as alternative defendants in the
complaint is justified by the following: the Initial Investigation Report prepared by Pat. Mario Tubon
showing that Torzuela is an employee of SAFEGUARD; and through overt acts, SUPERGUARD
extended its sympathies to petitioners (Rollo, pp. 64 and 98).

Meanwhile, an Information dated March 21, 1989 charging Benigno Torzuela with homicide was filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 89-1896.

On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge Regino issued an order granting SUPERGUARD'S motion to
dismiss and SAFEGUARD'S motion for exclusion as defendant. The respondent judge held that the
complaint did not state facts necessary or sufficient to constitute a quasi-delict since it does not
mention any negligence on the part of Torzuela in shooting Napoleon Dulay or that the same was
done in the performance of his duties. Respondent judge ruled that mere allegations of the
concurring negligence of the defendants (private respondents herein) without stating the facts
showing such negligence are mere conclusions of law (Rollo, p. 106). Respondent judge also
declared that the complaint was one for damages founded on crimes punishable under Articles 100
and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as distinguished from those arising from, quasi-delict. The
dispositive portion of the order dated April 13, 1989 states:

WHEREFORE, this Court holds that in view of the material and ultimate facts alleged
in the verified complaint and in accordance with the applicable law on the matter as
well as precedents laid down by the Supreme Court, the complaint against the
alternative defendants Superguard Security Corporation and Safeguard Investigation
and Security Co., Inc., must be and (sic) it is hereby dismissed. (Rollo, p. 110)

The above order was affirmed by the respondent court and petitioners' motion for reconsideration
thereof was denied.

Petitioners take exception to the assailed decision and insist that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts
of negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary, citing Andamo v. IAC (191
SCRA 195 [1990]). Thus, petitioners insist that Torzuela' s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay
constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.

Petitioners further contend that under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, private respondents are
primarily liable for their negligence either in the selection or supervision of their employees. This
liability is independent of the employee's own liability for fault or negligence and is distinct from the
subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The civil action against the
employer may therefore proceed independently of the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111 Section 3
of the Rules of Court. Petitioners submit that the question of whether Torzuela is an employee of
respondent SUPERGUARD or SAFEGUARD would be better resolved after trial.

Moreover, petitioners argue that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under Article 33
of the New Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis
supplied)

In the same vein, petitioners cite Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Rule 111. . . . .

Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently — In the cases provided for in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil
action which has been reserved may be brought by the offended party, shall proceed
independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. (Emphasis supplied)

The term "physical injuries" under Article 33 has been held to include consummated, frustrated and
attempted homicide. Thus, petitioners maintain that Torzuela's prior conviction is unnecessary since
the civil action can proceed independently of the criminal action. On the other hand, it is the private
respondents' argument that since the act was not committed with negligence, the petitioners have no
cause of action under Articles 2116 and 2177 of the New Civil Code. The civil action contemplated in
Article 2177 is not applicable to acts committed with deliberate intent, but only applies to quasi-
offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Torzuela's act of shooting Atty. Dulay to
death, aside from being purely personal, was done with deliberate intent and could not have been
part of his duties as security guard. And since Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers only: acts
done within the scope of the employee's assigned tasks, the private respondents cannot be held
liable for damages.

We find for petitioners.

It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted for homicide for the fatal shooting of
Napoleon Dulay. Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party waives the civil action , reserves his right to institute
it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission of the accused. (Emphasis supplied)

It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal
action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of express
reservation (Yakult Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990]). This is precisely what
the petitioners opted to do in this case. However, the private respondents opposed the civil action on
the ground that the same is founded on a delict and not on a quasi-delict as the shooting was not
attended by negligence. What is in dispute therefore is the nature of the petitioner's cause of action.

The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting
the cause of action (Republic v. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]). The purpose of an action or suit
and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his
argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. (De Tavera v.
Philippine Tuberculosis Society, 112 SCRA 243 [1982]). An examination of the complaint in the
present case would show that the plaintiffs, petitioners herein, are invoking their right to recover
damages against the private respondents for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by
Benigno Torzuela's act of shooting and killing Napoleon Dulay, as stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of
the complaint.

Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article
2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the
doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are
voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]),
this Court already held that:

. . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character; whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action against the offender in a
 criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of
Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-
delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia,
that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable
by law. (Emphasis supplied)

The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court (191 SCRA
195 [1990]), wherein the Court held:

Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts criminal
in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a civil
action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is prosecuted or
found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the
tortfeasor is actually also charged criminally), to recover damages on both scores,
and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. [citing Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA
472] (Emphasis supplied)

Private respondents submit that the word "intentional" in the Andamo case is inaccurate obiter, and
should be read as "voluntary" since intent cannot be coupled with negligence as defined by Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of more substantial reasons, this Court will not
disturb the above doctrine on the coverage of Article 2176.

Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries
intentionally committed pursuant to the ruling in Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA 193 [1983]), and that the
actions for damages allowed thereunder are ex-delicto. However, the term "physical injuries" in
Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Co. of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 638 [1965); Carandang v. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is
not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical
injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293
[1983]). Although in the Marcia case (supra), it was held that no independent civil action may be filed
under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted however, that
Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence,
whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a
civil action based on Article 33 lies.

Private respondents also contend that their liability is subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code; and
that they are not liable for Torzuela's act which is beyond the scope of his duties as a security guard.
It having been established that the instant action is not ex-delicto, petitioners may proceed directly
against Torzuela and the private respondents. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as
aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both (Layugan v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 [1988]). The liability of the employer under Article 2180
is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and
a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado, 176 SCRA
792 [1989]). Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.

Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are intentional and
voluntary, it was therefore erroneous on the part of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's complaint
simply because it failed to make allegations of attendant negligence attributable to private
respondents.

With respect to the issue of whether the complaint at hand states a sufficient cause of action, the
general rule is that the allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against
the defendants if, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same
in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exist if the following elements are present,
namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right;
and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, 210 SCRA 33
[1992]); Development Bank of the Philippines v. Pundogar, 218 SCRA 118 [1993])

This Court finds, under the foregoing premises, that the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable
breach on the part of the defendant Torzuela and respondents SUPERGUARD and/or
SAFEGUARD. It is enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay
resulting in the latter's death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either
SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and responsible for his acts. This
does not operate however, to establish that the defendants below are liable. Whether or not the
shooting was actually reckless and wanton or attended by negligence and whether it was actually
done within the scope of Torzuela's duties; whether the private respondents SUPERGUARD and/or
SAFEGUARD failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family; and whether the
defendants are actually liable, are questions which can be better resolved after trial on the merits
where each party can present evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses. In
determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must
be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts proving the
existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the
case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a
sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed
regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants (Rava Dev't. Corp. v. CA, 211
SCRA 152 [1992] citing Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663
[1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the
claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, is ambiguous,
indefinite or uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]). Since the petitioners clearly
sustained an injury to their rights under the law, it would be more just to allow them to present
evidence of such injury.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals as well as the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated April 13, 1989 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 is remanded to the Regional Trial Court for
trial on the merits. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS, respondents.

Atencia & Arias Law Offices for petitioners.

Romulo C. Felizmena for private respondent.

CORTES, J.:

Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio
Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative
assistant to the engineering operations manager. In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious
purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos.

According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and reported them
on November 10, 1972 to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C.
Hendry who was then the Executive Vice-President and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY.

On November 11, 1972, one day after private respondent Tobias made the report, petitioner Hendry
confronted him by stating that he was the number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one week
forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave the
office keys.

On November 20, 1972, when private respondent Tobias returned to work after the forced leave,
petitioner Hendry went up to him and called him a "crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was then ordered
to take a lie detector test. He was also instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature,
and initials for examination by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies.

On December 6,1972, the Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report (Exh. "A")
clearing private respondent of participation in the anomalies.

Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator, retired Col. Jose G.
Fernandez, who on December 10, 1972, submitted a report (Exh. "2") finding Tobias guilty. This
report however expressly stated that further investigation was still to be conducted.

Nevertheless, on December 12, 1972, petitioner Hendry issued a memorandum suspending Tobias
from work preparatory to the filing of criminal charges against him.

On December 19,1972, Lt. Dioscoro V. Tagle, Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner, after
investigating other documents pertaining to the alleged anomalous transactions, submitted a second
laboratory crime report (Exh. "B") reiterating his previous finding that the handwritings, signatures,
and initials appearing in the checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions
were not those of Tobias. The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results.

Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the anomalies and the fact that the
report of the private investigator, was, by its own terms, not yet complete, petitioners filed with the
City Fiscal of Manila a complaint for estafa through falsification of commercial documents, later
amended to just estafa. Subsequently five other criminal complaints were filed against Tobias, four
of which were for estafa through Falsification of commercial document while the fifth was for of
Article 290 of' the Revised Penal Code (Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of
Correspondence). Two of these complaints were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office,
lâwphî1.ñèt

which however, remanded them to the fiscal's office. All of the six criminal complaints were
dismissed by the fiscal. Petitioners appealed four of the fiscal's resolutions dismissing the criminal
complaints with the Secretary of Justice, who, however, affirmed their dismissal.

In the meantime, on January 17, 1973, Tobias received a notice (Exh. "F") from petitioners that his
employment has been terminated effective December 13, 1972. Whereupon, Tobias filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the labor arbiter's decision. However, the Secretary
of Labor, acting on petitioners' appeal from the NLRC ruling, reinstated the labor arbiter's decision.
Tobias appealed the Secretary of Labor's order with the Office of the President. During the pendency
of the appeal with said office, petitioners and private respondent Tobias entered into a compromise
agreement regarding the latter's complaint for illegal dismissal.

Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO).
However, petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating
that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.

Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious,
oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness, did not testify during
the hearings. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes
rendered judgment in favor of private respondent by ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand
pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral
damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the Court of
Appeals. On the other hand, Tobias appealed as to the amount of damages. However, the Court of
Appeals, an a decision dated August 31, 1987 affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Petitioners' motion
for reconsideration having been denied, the instant petition for review on certiorari was filed.

The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private
respondent.

Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their
right to dismiss private respondent.

On the other hand, private respondent contends that because of petitioners' abusive manner in
dismissing him as well as for the inhuman treatment he got from them, the Petitioners must
indemnify him for the damage that he had suffered.

One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic
principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the
old Code which merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated
certain fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the
fountain of good conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides for human conduct
[that] should run as golden threads through society, to the end that law may approach its supreme
ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice" (Id.) Foremost among these principles is that
pronounced in Article 19 which provides:
 Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets
certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone
his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation
on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be
observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which
does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19
lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social
order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either
Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.

Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides that:

Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since they
were merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent. This does not, however, leave
private respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that:

Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of
moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury" [Id.]
should "vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is
impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes" [Id. it p. 40; See also PNB v.
CA, G.R. No. L-27155, May 18,1978, 83 SCRA 237, 247].

In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test
which can be applied. While the Court has not hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the legal and
factual circumstances called for its application [See for e.g., Velayo v. Shell Co. of the Phil., Ltd., 100
Phil. 186 (1956); PNB v. CA, supra; Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. v. Espino, Jr., G.R. No. L-
48250, December 28, 1979, 94 SCRA 953; PAL v. CA, G.R. No. L-46558, July 31,1981,106 SCRA
391; United General Industries, Inc, v. Paler G.R. No. L-30205, March 15,1982,112 SCRA 404;
Rubio v. CA, G.R. No. 50911, August 21, 1987, 153 SCRA 183] the question of whether or not the
principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or
other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. And in the instant
case, the Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds
that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private
respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified.

The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the fact that it was private respondent Tobias who
reported the possible existence of anomalous transactions, petitioner Hendry "showed belligerence
and told plaintiff (private respondent herein) that he was the number one suspect and to take a one
week vacation leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to
leave his keys to said defendant (petitioner Hendry)" [RTC Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 232]. This,
petitioners do not dispute. But regardless of whether or not it was private respondent Tobias who
reported the anomalies to petitioners, the latter's reaction towards the former upon uncovering the
anomalies was less than civil. An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed
dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an investigation and
directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be
expected from such employer. But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was
certainly uncalled for. And this reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to continue when private
respondent returned to work on November 20, 1972 after his one week forced leave. Upon reporting
for work, Tobias was confronted by Hendry who said. "Tobby, you are the crook and swindler in this
company." Considering that the first report made by the police investigators was submitted only on
December 10, 1972 [See Exh. A] the statement made by petitioner Hendry was baseless. The
imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias
transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has
already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the
manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done
abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee [Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale
Veneer and Plywood Inc., G.R. No. L-38088, August 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 771; See also Philippine
Refining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-21871, September 27,1966, 18 SCRA 107] Under the
circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner
their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation
to Article 21 of the Civil Code.

But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. Several other tortious acts were
committed by petitioners against Tobias after the latter's termination from work. Towards the latter
part of January, 1973, after the filing of the first of six criminal complaints against Tobias, the latter
talked to Hendry to protest the actions taken against him. In response, Hendry cut short Tobias'
protestations by telling him to just confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases
against him until he landed in jail. Hendry added that, "You Filipinos cannot be trusted." The threat
unmasked petitioner's bad faith in the various actions taken against Tobias. On the other hand, the
scornful remark about Filipinos as well as Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias being a "crook"
and "swindler" are clear violations of 'Tobias' personal dignity [See Article 26, Civil Code].

The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in
October 1974, stating that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.
Because of the letter, Tobias failed to gain employment with RETELCO and as a result of which,
Tobias remained unemployed for a longer period of time. For this further damage suffered by
Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable for damages consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. Petitioners, however, contend that they have a "moral, if not legal, duty to forewarn other
employers of the kind of employee the plaintiff (private respondent herein) was." [Petition, p. 14;
Rollo, p. 15]. Petitioners further claim that "it is the accepted moral and societal obligation of every
man to advise or warn his fellowmen of any threat or danger to the latter's life, honor or property.
And this includes warning one's brethren of the possible dangers involved in dealing with, or
accepting into confidence, a man whose honesty and integrity is suspect" [Id.]. These arguments,
rather than justify petitioners' act, reveal a seeming obsession to prevent Tobias from getting a job,
even after almost two years from the time Tobias was dismissed.

Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against Tobias.
Petitioners contend that there is no case against them for malicious prosecution and that they cannot
be "penalized for exercising their right and prerogative of seeking justice by filing criminal complaints
against an employee who was their principal suspect in the commission of forgeries and in the
perpetration of anomalous transactions which defrauded them of substantial sums of money"
[Petition, p. 10, Rollo, p. 11].
While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to the
courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights [Buenaventura v. Sto. Domingo, 103 Phil.
239 (1958)], the right to institute criminal prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in bad
faith [Ventura v. Bernabe, G.R. No. L-26760, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 5871.] Hence, in Yutuk V.
Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. L-13016, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 337, the Court held that the right to
file criminal complaints should not be used as a weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay an
indebtedness. To do so would be a clear perversion of the function of the criminal processes and of
the courts of justice. And in Hawpia CA, G.R. No. L-20047, June 30, 1967. 20 SCRA 536 the Court
upheld the judgment against the petitioner for actual and moral damages and attorney's fees after
making a finding that petitioner, with persistence, filed at least six criminal complaints against
respondent, all of which were dismissed.

To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a
design to vex and humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing
that the charges were false and groundless [Manila Gas Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. L-44190,
October 30,1980, 100 SCRA 602]. Concededly, the filing of a suit by itself, does not render a person
liable for malicious prosecution [Inhelder Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 52358, May 301983122 SCRA
576]. The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of
damages for malicious prosecution if there is no competent evidence to show that the complainant
had acted in bad faith [Sison v. David, G.R. No. L-11268, January 28,1961, 1 SCRA 60].

In the instant case, however, the trial court made a finding that petitioners acted in bad faith in filing
the criminal complaints against Tobias, observing that:

xxx

Defendants (petitioners herein) filed with the Fiscal's Office of Manila a total of six (6)
criminal cases, five (5) of which were for estafa thru falsification of commercial
document and one for violation of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code "discovering
secrets thru seizure of correspondence," and all were dismissed for insufficiency or
lack of evidence." The dismissal of four (4) of the cases was appealed to the Ministry
of Justice, but said Ministry invariably sustained the dismissal of the cases. As above
adverted to, two of these cases were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's
Office of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to railroad plaintiffs arrest and detention
in the military stockade, but this was frustrated by a presidential decree transferring
criminal cases involving civilians to the civil courts.

xxx

To be sure, when despite the two (2) police reports embodying the findings of Lt.
Dioscoro Tagle, Chief Document Examiner of the Manila Police Department, clearing
plaintiff of participation or involvement in the fraudulent transactions complained of,
despite the negative results of the lie detector tests which defendants compelled
plaintiff to undergo, and although the police investigation was "still under follow-up
and a supplementary report will be submitted after all the evidence has been
gathered," defendants hastily filed six (6) criminal cases with the city Fiscal's Office
of Manila, five (5) for estafa thru falsification of commercial document and one (1) for
violation of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code, so much so that as was to be
expected, all six (6) cases were dismissed, with one of the investigating fiscals, Asst.
Fiscal de Guia, commenting in one case that, "Indeed, the haphazard way this case
was investigated is evident. Evident likewise is the flurry and haste in the filing of this
case against respondent Tobias," there can be no mistaking that defendants would
 not but be motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause
damage to plaintiff.

xxx

[RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 235-236].

In addition to the observations made by the trial court, the Court finds it significant that the criminal
complaints were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case filed by Tobias against
petitioners. This explains the haste in which the complaints were filed, which the trial court earlier
noted. But petitioners, to prove their good faith, point to the fact that only six complaints were filed
against Tobias when they could have allegedly filed one hundred cases, considering the number of
anomalous transactions committed against GLOBE MACKAY. However, petitioners' good faith is
belied by the threat made by Hendry after the filing of the first complaint that one hundred more
cases would be filed against Tobias. In effect, the possible filing of one hundred more cases was
made to hang like the sword of Damocles over the head of Tobias. In fine, considering the haste in
which the criminal complaints were filed, the fact that they were filed during the pendency of the
illegal dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by Hendry, the fact that the cases were
filed notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from involvement in the anomalies
committed against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is
led into no other conclusion than that petitioners were motivated by malicious intent in filing the six
criminal complaints against Tobias.

Petitioners next contend that the award of damages was excessive. In the complaint filed against
petitioners, Tobias prayed for the following: one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) as actual
damages; fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages; eight hundred thousand pesos
(P800,000.00) as moral damages; fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees; and costs.
The trial court, after making a computation of the damages incurred by Tobias [See RTC Decision,
pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 154-1551, awarded him the following: eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as
actual damages; two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages; twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages; thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees;
and, costs. It must be underscored that petitioners have been guilty of committing several actionable
tortious acts, i.e., the abusive manner in which they dismissed Tobias from work including the
baseless imputation of guilt and the harassment during the investigations; the defamatory language
heaped on Tobias as well as the scornful remark on Filipinos; the poison letter sent to RETELCO
which resulted in Tobias' loss of possible employment; and, the malicious filing of the criminal
complaints. Considering the extent of the damage wrought on Tobias, the Court finds that, contrary
to petitioners' contention, the amount of damages awarded to Tobias was reasonable under the
circumstances.

Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper, invoking the principle of damnum
absque injuria. It is argued that "[t]he only probable actual damage that plaintiff (private respondent
herein) could have suffered was a direct result of his having been dismissed from his employment,
which was a valid and legal act of the defendants-appellants (petitioners herein). " [Petition, p. 17;
lâwphî1.ñèt

Rollo, p. 18].

According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute a
violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable [Escano v. CA, G.R. No. L-
47207, September 25, 1980, 100 SCRA 197; See also Gilchrist v. Cuddy 29 Phil, 542 (1915); The
Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, G.R. No. L-18805, August 14, 1967, 20 SCRA 987]. This principle
finds no application in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners might have had
the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised
amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage
incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed
but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners.

Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However, the Court has already ruled
in Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964, 12 SCRA 648, 653, that [p]er express
provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases
mentioned in Article 21 of said Code." Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no error in awarding
moral damages to Tobias.

Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners. Although Article 2231 of the
Civil Code provides that "[i]n quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant
acted with gross negligence," the Court, in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., G.R. No. L-
28589, January 8, 1973, 49 SCRA 1, ruled that if gross negligence warrants the award of exemplary
damages, with more reason is its imposition justified when the act performed is deliberate, malicious
and tainted with bad faith. As in the Zulueta case, the nature of the wrongful acts shown to have
been committed by petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages
to the latter.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 09055 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.