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[G.R. No. 132266. December 21, 1999] Hospital, the sum of P50,927.

Hospital, the sum of P50,927.83 for unpaid medical and hospital bills at 3% monthly
CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. VICENTE VASQUEZ, JR. interest from 27 July 1989 until fully paid, plus the costs of litigation. [2]
and LUISA SO VASQUEZ, and CEBU DOCTORS HOSPITAL,
INC., respondents. CASTILEX and ABAD separately appealed the decision.
DECISION
In its decision[3] of 21 May 1997, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: trial court holding ABAD and CASTILEX liable but held that the liability of the latter is
only vicarious and not solidary with the former. It reduced the award of damages
representing loss of earning capacity from P778,752.00 to P214,156.80; and the interest
The pivotal issue in this petition is whether an employer may be held vicariously
on the hospital and medical bills, from 3% per month to 12% per annum from 5
liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of
September 1988 until fully paid.
a company-issued vehicle.
Upon CASTILEXs motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals modified its
The antecedents, as succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
decision by (1) reducing the award of moral damages from P50,000 to P30,000 in view of
the deceaseds contributory negligence; (b) deleting the award of attorneys fees for lack
On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez, was of evidence; and (c) reducing the interest on hospital and medical bills to 6% per annum
driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmea Rotunda. He was traveling counter- from 5 September 1988 until fully paid.[4]
clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or
goggles. He was also only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the Hence, CASTILEX filed the instant petition contending that the Court of Appeals
other hand, Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial erred in (1) applying to the case the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
Corporation, registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794. On instead of the fourth paragraph thereof; (2) that as a managerial employee, ABAD was
the same date and time, Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but deemed to have been always acting within the scope of his assigned task even outside
instead of going around the Osmea rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the office hours because he was using a vehicle issued to him by petitioner; and (3) ruling
traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St. that petitioner had the burden to prove that the employee was not acting within the
scope of his assigned task.
In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each Jose Benjamin ABAD merely adopted the statement of facts of petitioner which
other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought holds fast on the theory of negligence on the part of the deceased.
Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital.
On the other hand, respondents Spouses Vasquez argue that their sons death was
On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital. It was there that caused by the negligence of petitioners employee who was driving a vehicle issued by
Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to petitioner and who was on his way home from overtime work for petitioner; and that
pay whatever hospital bills, professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may petitioner is thus liable for the resulting injury and subsequent death of their son on the
incur. basis of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180. Even if the fourth paragraph of Article 2180
were applied, petitioner cannot escape liability therefor. They moreover argue that the
Court of Appeals erred in reducing the amount of compensatory damages when the
After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident, a Criminal
award made by the trial court was borne both by evidence adduced during the trial
Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to
regarding deceaseds wages and by jurisprudence on life expectancy. Moreover, they
prosecute. So, the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr.
point out that the petition is procedurally not acceptable on the following grounds: (1)
and Luisa So Vasquez, parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose
lack of an explanation for serving the petition upon the Court of Appeals by registered
Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation. In the same action, Cebu Doctors
mail, as required under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) lack
Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo
of a statement of the dates of the expiration of the original reglementary period and of
So Vasquez.[1]
the filing of the motion for extension of time to file a petition for review.

The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents Vicente and Luisa Vasquez For its part, respondent Cebu Doctors Hospital maintains that petitioner
and ordered Jose Benjamin Abad (hereafter ABAD) and petitioner Castilex Industrial CASTILEX is indeed vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death of Romeo
Corporation (hereafter CASTILEX) to pay jointly and solidarily (1) Spouses Vasquez, the Vasquez caused by ABAD, who was on his way home from taking snacks after doing
amounts of P8,000.00 for burial expenses; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00 as overtime work for petitioner. Although the incident occurred when ABAD was not
attorneys fees; and P778,752.00 for loss of earning capacity; and (2) Cebu Doctors working anymore the inescapable fact remains that said employee would not have been
situated at such time and place had he not been required by petitioner to do overtime
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work. Moreover, since petitioner adopted the evidence adduced by ABAD, it cannot, as engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who
the latters employer, inveigle itself from the ambit of liability, and is thus estopped by is acting within the scope of his assigned task.[5]
the records of the case, which it failed to refute.
A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is
We shall first address the issue raised by the private respondents regarding applicable. Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to owners and
some alleged procedural lapses in the petition. managers of an establishment or enterprise; and the fifth paragraph, to employers in
general, whether or not engaged in any business or industry. The fourth paragraph
Private respondents contention of petitioners violation of Section 11 of Rule covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on
13 and Section 4 of Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure holds no water. the occasion of their functions, while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of
Section 11 of Rule 13 provides: employees acting within the scope of their assigned task. The latter is an expansion of
the former in both employer coverage and acts included. Negligent acts of employees,
whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry, are covered so long
SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. -- Whenever practicable, the service
as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task, even though committed
and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with
neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions. For,
respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be
admittedly, employees oftentimes wear different hats. They perform functions which
accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done
are beyond their office, title or designation but which, nevertheless, are still within the
personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not
call of duty.
filed.
This court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was
The explanation why service of a copy of the petition upon the Court of engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators [6] and banks.[7] The Court of
Appeals was done by registered mail is found on Page 28 of the petition. Thus, Appeals cannot, therefore, be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of
there has been compliance with the aforequoted provision. the Civil Code to this case.

As regards the allegation of violation of the material data rule under Section Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business
4 of Rule 45, the same is unfounded. The material dates required to be stated in the or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope
petition are the following: (1) the date of receipt of the judgment or final order or of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship;
resolution subject of the petition; (2) the date of filing of a motion for new trial or once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee
reconsideration, if any; and (3) the date of receipt of the notice of the denial of the was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was
motion. Contrary to private respondents claim, the petition need not indicate the committed. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the
dates of the expiration of the original reglementary period and the filing of a motion defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.[8]
for extension of time to file the petition. At any rate, aside from the material dates
It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at
required under Section 4 of Rule 45, petitioner CASTILEX also stated in the first
the time of the tort occurrence. As to whether he was acting within the scope of his
page of the petition the date it filed the motion for extension of time to file the
assigned task is a question of fact, which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals
petition.
resolved in the affirmative.
Now on the merits of the case.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the
The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance. Petitioner CASTILEX Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect, and even finality at times. This rule is,
presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries however, subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations,
and subsequent death caused by ABAD. surmises, or conjectures.[9] Such exception obtain in the present case to warrant review
by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving
Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code petitioners vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager.
should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or
industry. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture Before we pass upon the issue of whether ABAD was performing acts within the
it is therefore not covered by said provision. Instead, the fourth paragraph should range of his employment, we shall first take up the other reason invoked by the Court
apply. of Appeals in holding petitioner CASTILEX vicariously liable for ABADs negligence, i.e.,
that the petitioner did not present evidence that ABAD was not acting within the scope
Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The phrase even of his assigned tasks at the time of the motor vehicle mishap. Contrary to the ruling of
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry found in the fifth the Court of Appeals, it was not incumbent upon the petitioner to prove the same. It was
paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be
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enough for petitioner CASTILEX to deny that ABAD was acting within the scope of his II. Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work
duties; petitioner was not under obligation to prove this negative averment. Ei incumbit
probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). The In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal
Court has consistently applied the ancient rule that if the plaintiff, upon whom rests the problem or concern of the employee, and not a part of his services to his
burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner facts which employer. Hence, in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the
he bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed, the employee
defense.[10] is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employers
motor vehicle.[14]
Now on the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently
established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks. The employer may, however, be liable where he derives some special benefit from
having the employee drive home in the employers vehicle as when the employer benefits
ABAD, who was presented as a hostile witness, testified that at the time of from having the employee at work earlier and, presumably, spending more time at his
the incident, he was driving a company-issued vehicle, registered under the name actual duties. Where the employees duties require him to circulate in a general area with
of petitioner. He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and no fixed place or hours of work, or to go to and from his home to various outside places
had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner. of work, and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work, the courts
have frequently applied what has been called the special errand or roving commission
No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete rule, under which it can be found that the employee continues in the service of his
answer to the problem of whether at a given moment, an employee is engaged in employer until he actually reaches home. However, even if the employee be deemed to
his employers business in the operation of a motor vehicle, so as to fix liability upon be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employers
the employer because of the employees action or inaction; but rather, the result vehicle, the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident,
varies with each state of facts.[11] the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a
In Filamer Christian Institute v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[12] this Court had personal errand of his own.
the occasion to hold that acts done within the scope of the employees assigned tasks III. Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours
includes any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the
employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters personal
or damages. use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent
operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use, even where the employer
The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for
by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the
regardless of the time and circumstances. employer. Even where the employees personal purpose in using the vehicle has been
We do not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is
time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with normally kept, it has been held that he has not resumed his employment, and the
liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was employer is not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the
operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment. return trip.[15]

The following are principles in American Jurisprudence on the employers The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit
liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, not on the principle of bonus pater familias as
employers motor vehicle: in ours. Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer
as in American law or jurisprudence, or merely gives rise to the presumption juris
I. Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours, it is indispensable that the
employee was acting in his employers business or within the scope of his assigned
It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going from task.[16]
his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not
ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the
special business benefit to the employer. Evidence that by using the employers vehicle petitioners office, which was located in Cabangcalan, Mandaue City. Thereafter, he
to go to and from meals, an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote went to Goldies Restaurant in Fuente Osmea, Cebu City, which is about seven
more time to the performance of his duties supports the finding that an employee is kilometers away from petitioners place of business.[17] A witness for the private
acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle. [13] respondents, a sidewalk vendor, testified that Fuente Osmea is a lively place even
at dawn because Goldies Restaurant and Back Street were still open and people
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were drinking thereat.Moreover, prostitutes, pimps, and drug addicts littered the Statement of the Case
place.[18] Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the May
12, 2000 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55474. The decretal
At the Goldies Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with portion of the Decision reads as follows:
friends. It was when ABAD was leaving the restaurant that the incident in question
occurred. That same witness for the private respondents testified that at the time
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of the vehicular accident, ABAD was with a woman in his car, who then
of merit. The assailed decision, dated May 5, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
shouted: Daddy, Daddy![19] This woman could not have been ABADs daughter, for
Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 95-73522, is
ABAD was only 29 years old at the time.
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award of attorneys fees
To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was is DELETED.[3]
carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in
a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond On the other hand, in Civil Case No. 95-73522, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
the normal working hours. ABADs working day had ended; his overtime work had Manila (Branch 14) had earlier disposed in this wise:
already been completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was known
as a haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts, had no connection
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
to petitioners business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a
defendant Equitable Leasing Corporation ordering said defendant to pay to the
manager. Rather, using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form
plaintiffs the following:
of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position.

Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of A. TO MYRNA TAMAYO
the functions entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to show that it 1. the sum of P50,000.00 for the death of Reniel Tamayo;
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in providing ABAD with a 2. P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity require that petitioner be relieved of 3. P56,000.00 for the damage to the store and its contents, and funeral expenses.
vicarious liability for the consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its B. TO FELIX OLEDAN
vehicle.[20] 1. the sum of P50,000.00 for the death of Felmarie Oledan;
2. P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the appealed decision and 3. P30,000.00 for medical expenses, and funeral expenses.
resolution of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification that C. TO MARISSA ENANO
petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation be absolved of any liability for the 1. P7,000.00 as actual damages
damages caused by its employee, Jose Benjamin Abad.
D. TO LUCITA SUYOM
SO ORDERED. 1. The sum of P5,000.00 for the medical treatment of her two sons.
The sum of P120,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.[4]
[G.R. No. 143360. September 5, 2002]
EQUITABLE LEASING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. LUCITA SUYOM, MARISSA
ENANO, MYRNA TAMAYO and FELIX OLEDAN, respondents.
DECISION The Facts
PANGANIBAN, J.:

In an action based on quasi delict, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is On July 17, 1994, a Fuso Road Tractor driven by Raul Tutor rammed into the house
solidarily liable for the injuries and damages caused by the negligence of the driver, in cum store of Myrna Tamayo located at Pier 18, Vitas, Tondo, Manila. A portion of the
spite of the fact that the vehicle may have already been the subject of an unregistered house was destroyed.Pinned to death under the engine of the tractor were Respondent
Deed of Sale in favor of another person. Unless registered with the Land Transportation Myrna Tamayos son, Reniel Tamayo, and Respondent Felix Oledans daughter, Felmarie
Office, the sale -- while valid and binding between the parties -- does not affect third Oledan. Injured were Respondent Oledan himself, Respondent Marissa Enano, and two
parties, especially the victims of accidents involving the said transport equipment. Thus, sons of Respondent Lucita Suyom.
in the present case, petitioner, which is the registered owner, is liable for the acts of the
driver employed by its former lessee who has become the owner of that vehicle by virtue Tutor was charged with and later convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in
of an unregistered Deed of Sale. multiple homicide and multiple physical injuries in Criminal Case No. 296094-SA,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 12.[5]

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Upon verification with the Land Transportation Office, respondents were furnished The Petition has no merit.
a copy of Official Receipt No. 62204139[6] and Certificate of Registration No. First Issue:
08262797,[7] showing that the registered owner of the tractor was Equitable Leasing Liability for Wrongful Acts
Corporation/leased to Edwin Lim. On April 15, 1995, respondents filed against Raul
Petitioner contends that it should not be held liable for the damages sustained by
Tutor, Ecatine Corporation (Ecatine) and Equitable Leasing Corporation (Equitable) a
respondents and that arose from the negligence of the driver of the Fuso Road Tractor,
Complaint[8] for damages docketed as Civil Case No. 95-73522 in the RTC of Manila,
which it had already sold to Ecatine at the time of the accident. Not having employed
Branch 14.
Raul Tutor, the driver of the vehicle, it could not have controlled or supervised him. [18]
The trial court, upon motion of plaintiffs counsel, issued an Order dropping Raul
We are not persuaded. In negligence cases, the aggrieved party may sue the
Tutor, Ecatine and Edwin Lim from the Complaint, because they could not be located and
negligent party under (1) Article 100[19] of the Revised Penal Code, for civil liability ex
served with summonses.[9] On the other hand, in its Answer with
delicto; or (2) under Article 2176[20] of the Civil Code, for civil liability ex quasi delicto.[21]
Counterclaim,[10] petitioner alleged that the vehicle had already been sold to Ecatine and
that the former was no longer in possession and control thereof at the time of the Furthermore, under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers may be
incident. It also claimed that Tutor was an employee, not of Equitable, but of Ecatine. held subsidiarily liable for felonies committed by their employees in the discharge of the
latters duties.[22] This liability attaches when the employees who are convicted of crimes
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision ordering petitioner to pay
committed in the performance of their work are found to be insolvent and are thus unable
actual and moral damages and attorneys fees to respondents. It held that since the Deed
to satisfy the civil liability adjudged.[23]
of Sale between petitioner and Ecatine had not been registered with the Land
Transportation Office (LTO), the legal owner was still Equitable. [11] Thus, petitioner was On the other hand, under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 [24] of the Civil Code,
liable to respondents.[12] an action predicated on quasi delict may be instituted against the employer for an
Ruling of the Court of Appeals employees act or omission. The liability for the negligent conduct of the subordinate
is direct and primary, but is subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and
Sustaining the RTC, the CA held that petitioner was still to be legally deemed the supervision of the employee.[25] The enforcement of the judgment against the employer
owner/operator of the tractor, even if that vehicle had been the subject of a Deed of Sale for an action based on Article 2176 does not require the employee to be insolvent, since
in favor of Ecatine on December 9, 1992. The reason cited by the CA was that the the liability of the former is solidary -- the latter being statutorily considered a joint
Certificate of Registration on file with the LTO still remained in petitioners name.[13] In tortfeasor.[26] To sustain a claim based on quasi delict, the following requisites must be
order that a transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle can bind third persons, it must be proven: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, and
duly recorded in the LTO.[14] (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and
the damage incurred by the plaintiff.[27]
The CA likewise upheld respondents claim for moral damages against petitioner
because the appellate court considered Tutor, the driver of the tractor, to be an agent of These two causes of action (ex delicto or ex quasi delicto) may be availed of, subject to
the registered owner/operator.[15] the caveat[28] that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission or under both causes.[29] Since these two civil liabilities are distinct and
Hence, this Petition.[16] independent of each other, the failure to recover in one will not necessarily preclude
Issues recovery in the other.[30]

In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Courts In the instant case, respondents -- having failed to recover anything in the criminal
consideration: case -- elected to file a separate civil action for damages, based on quasi delict under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code.[31] The evidence is clear that the deaths and the injuries
I Whether or not the Court of Appeals and the trial court gravely erred when they suffered by respondents and their kins were due to the fault of the driver of the Fuso
decided and held that petitioner [was] liable for damages suffered by private tractor.
respondents in an action based on quasi delict for the negligent acts of a driver who
[was] not the employee of the petitioner. Dated June 4, 1991, the Lease Agreement[32] between petitioner and Edwin Lim
stipulated that it is the intention of the parties to enter into a FINANCE LEASE
II Whether or not the Court of Appeals and the trial court gravely erred when they AGREEMENT.[33] Under such scheme, ownership of the subject tractor was to be
awarded moral damages to private respondents despite their failure to prove that the registered in the name of petitioner, until the value of the vehicle has been fully paid by
injuries they suffered were brought by petitioners wrongful act. [17] Edwin Lim.[34] Further, in the Lease Schedule,[35] the monthly rental for the tractor was
stipulated, and the term of the Lease was scheduled to expire on December 4, 1992. After
This Courts Ruling
a few months, Lim completed the payments to cover the full price of the tractor.[36] Thus,
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on December 9, 1992, a Deed of Sale[37] over the tractor was executed by petitioner in favor True, the LTO Certificate of Registration, dated 5/31/91, qualifies the name of the
of Ecatine represented by Edwin Lim. However, the Deed was not registered with the registered owner as EQUITABLE LEASING CORPORATION/Leased to Edwin Lim. But
LTO. the lease agreement between Equitable and Lim has been overtaken by the Deed of Sale
on December 9, 1992, between petitioner and Ecatine. While this Deed does not affect
We hold petitioner liable for the deaths and the injuries complained of, because it respondents in this quasi delictsuit, it definitely binds petitioner because, unlike them, it
was the registered owner of the tractor at the time of the accident on July 17, 1994.[38] The is a party to it.
Court has consistently ruled that, regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the
registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are We must stress that the failure of Equitable and/or Ecatine to register the sale with
concerned; consequently, it is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences of the LTO should not prejudice respondents, who have the legal right to rely on the legal
its operation.[39] In contemplation of law, the owner/operator of record is the employer principle that the registered vehicle owner is liable for the damages caused by the
of the driver, the actual operator and employer being considered as merely negligence of the driver. Petitioner cannot hide behind its allegation that Tutor was the
its agent.[40] The same principle applies even if the registered owner of any vehicle does employee of Ecatine. This will effectively prevent respondents from recovering their
not use it for public service.[41] losses on the basis of the inaction or fault of petitioner in failing to register the sale. The
non-registration is the fault of petitioner, which should thus face the legal consequences
Since Equitable remained the registered owner of the tractor, it could not escape thereof.
primary liability for the deaths and the injuries arising from the negligence of the
driver.[42] Second Issue:
Moral Damages
The finance-lease agreement between Equitable on the one hand and Lim or Ecatine
on the other has already been superseded by the sale. In any event, it does not bind third
persons. The rationale for this rule has been aptly explained in Erezo v. Jepte,[43] which we Petitioner further claims that it is not liable for moral damages, because respondents
quote hereunder: failed to establish or show the causal connection or relation between the factual basis of
their claim and their wrongful act or omission, if any. [49]
x x x. The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any
accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public
highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate [50] and
owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of identification. It is to forestall these injury unjustly caused a person.[51]Although incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle damages must nevertheless be somehow proportional to and in approximation of the
registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons suffering inflicted.[52] This is so because moral damages are in the category of an award
responsible for damages or injuries caused on public highways. [44] designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered, not to impose a penalty
on the wrongdoer.[53]
Further, petitioners insistence on FGU Insurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals is Viewed as an action for quasi delict, the present case falls squarely within the
misplaced.[45]First, in FGU Insurance, the registered vehicle owner, which was engaged in purview of Article 2219 (2),[54] which provides for the payment of moral damages in cases
a rent-a-car business, rented out the car. In this case, the registered owner of the truck, of quasi delict.[55] Having established the liability of petitioner as the registered owner of
which is engaged in the business of financing motor vehicle acquisitions, has actually sold the vehicle,[56] respondents have satisfactorily shown the existence of the factual basis for
the truck to Ecatine, which in turn employed Tutor. Second, in FGU Insurance, the the award[57] and its causal connection to the acts of Raul Tutor, who is deemed as
registered owner of the vehicle was not held responsible for the negligent acts of the petitioners employee.[58] Indeed, the damages and injuries suffered by respondents were
person who rented one of its cars, because Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not the proximate result of petitioners tortious act or omission. [59]
applicable. We held that no vinculum juris as employer and employee existed between the
owner and the driver.[46] In this case, the registered owner of the tractor is considered Further, no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may
under the law to be the employer of the driver, while the actual operator is deemed to be be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court. [60] The
its agent.[47] Thus, Equitable, the registered owner of the tractor, is -- for purposes of the evidence gives no ground for doubt that such discretion was properly and judiciously
law on quasi delict -- the employer of Raul Tutor, the driver of the tractor. Ecatine, Tutors exercised by the trial court.[61] The award is in fact consistent with the rule that moral
actual employer, is deemed as merely an agent of Equitable.[48] damages are not intended to enrich the injured party, but to alleviate the moral suffering
undergone by that party by reason of the defendants culpable action. [62]

6
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23. In a Decision dated March 13, 1997, said court
against petitioner. declared Allan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.[4]

SO ORDERED. During the pendency of said criminal case, Emilias father, Geronimo Bacoy (Geronimo),
FIRST DIVISION in behalf of the six minor children[5] of the Monsaluds, filed Civil Case No. 96-20219,[6] an
independent civil action for damages based on culpa aquiliana. Aside from Allan, also impleaded
OSCAR DEL CARMEN, JR., G.R. No. 173870 therein were his alleged employers, namely, the spouses Oscar del Carmen, Sr. (Oscar Sr.) and
Norma del Carmen (Spouses del Carmen) and the registered owner of the jeep, their son Oscar
Petitioner, Jr. Geronimo prayed for the reimbursement of funeral and burial expenses, as well as the award of
attorneys fees, moral and exemplary damages resulting from the death of the three victims, and
loss of net income earnings of Emilia who was employed as a public school teacher at the time of
- versus - Present:
her death.[7]

GERONIMO BACOY, Guardian and Defendants refused to assume civil liability for the victims deaths. Oscar Sr. averred that
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
the Monsaluds have no cause of action against them because he and his wife do not own the jeep
representing the children, namely: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and that they were never the employers of Allan.[8] For his part, Oscar Jr. claimed to be a victim
MARY MARJORIE B. MONSALUD, BERSAMIN, himself. He alleged that Allan and his friends[9] stole his jeep while it was parked beside his drivers
rented house to take it for a joyride. Both he and a vehicle mechanic testified that the subject jeep
ERIC B. MONSALUD, METZIE ANN DEL CASTILLO, and can easily be started by mere pushing sans the ignition key. The vehicles engine shall then run but
B. MONSALUD, KAREEN B. VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. without any headlights on.[10] And implying that this was the manner by which the vehicle was
illegally taken, Oscar Jr. submitted as part of his documentary evidence the statements[11] of Jemar
MONSALUD, LEONARDO B. Alarcon (Jemar) and Benjamin Andujar (Benjamin). The two, who were with Allan in the jeep at
MONSALUD, JR., and CRISTINA B.
the time of the accident, declared before the investigating officer that during said time, the vehicles
MONSALUD, Promulgated: headlights were off. Because of this allegation, Oscar Jr. even filed before the same trial court a
Respondents. April 25, 2012 carnapping case against Allan and his companions docketed as Criminal Case No. 93-10380.[12] The
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x case was, however, dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.[13]
DECISION
Oscar Jr. clarified that Allan was his jeep conductor and that it was the latters brother,
DEL CASTILLO, J.: Rodrigo Maglasang (Rodrigo), who was employed as the driver.[14] In any event, Allans
employment as conductor was already severed before the mishap occurred on January 1, 1993 since
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari,[1] the registered owner of a motor vehicle challenges the he served as such conductor only from the first week of December until December 14, 1992.[15] In
Decision[2] dated July 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67764 which held support of this, Oscar Jr. presented as witnesses Faustino Sismundo (Faustino) and Cresencio Junior
him liable for damages to the heirs of the victims who were run over by the said vehicle. Baobao (Cresencio). Faustino, a resident of Molave, testified that when he boarded the jeep heading
to Sominot on December 31, 1992, it was Cresencio who was the conductor. He also believed that
Factual Antecedents Crecencio started to work as such at around December 15 or 16, 1992.[16] Cresencio, for his part,
testified that he worked as Oscar Jr.s conductor from December 15, 1992 to January 1, 1993 and that
At dawn on New Years Day of 1993, Emilia Bacoy Monsalud (Emilia), along with her spouse Rodrigo was his driver.[17] He stated that upon learning that the jeep figured in an accident, he never
Leonardo Monsalud, Sr. and their daughter Glenda Monsalud, were on their way home from a bothered to verify the news. Instead, he went to Midsalip to work there as a conductor for his
Christmas party they attended in Poblacion, Sominot, Zamboanga Del Sur. Upon brothers vehicle, thereby terminating his employment with Oscar Jr.[18]
reaching PurokPaglaom in Sominot, they were run over by a Fuso passenger jeep bearing plate
number UV-PEK-600 that was being driven by Allan Maglasang (Allan). The jeep was registered Oscar Jr. likewise testified that it was routinary that after a days trip, the jeep would be
in the name of petitioner Oscar del Carmen, Jr. (Oscar Jr.) and used as a public utility vehicle plying parked beside Rodrigos rented house[19] for the next early-morning operation.
the Molave, Zamboanga del Sur to Sominot, Zamboanga del Sur and vice versa route.
Geronimo, on the other hand, averred that Allan was still Oscar Jr.s employee subsequent
Because of the unfortunate incident, Criminal Case No. 93-10347[3] for Reckless to December 14, 1992. To prove this, he presented as witnesses Saturnino Jumawan (Saturnino) and
Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide was filed against Allan before the Regional Trial Jose Navarro (Jose). Saturnino testified that he would pay his fare to Allan every time he would
board the jeep in going to Molave and that the last time he rode the subject vehicle was on December
7
23, 1992. He also claimed that immediately before January 1, 1993, Rodrigo and Allan used to park Oscar Jr. moved for reconsideration[24] contending that the provision on vicarious liability
the jeep at the yard of his house.[20] Jose likewise attested that Allan was still the jeep conductor of the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code[25] requires the existence of employer-
during the said period as he had ridden the jeep many times in mid-December of 1992.[21] employee relationship and that the employee was acting within the scope of his employment when
the tort occurred. He stressed that even assuming that Allan was his employee, he was hired not as
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court a driver but as a conductor. Hence, Allan acted beyond the scope of his employment when he drove
the jeep.
In its Decision[22] dated April 17, 2000, the RTC exculpated the spouses del Carmen from
civil liability for insufficiency of evidence. However, their son Oscar Jr. was held civilly liable in a Oscar Jr. also stressed that the fact that the jeep was running without its headlights on at
subsidiary capacity. The RTC anchored its ruling primarily on the principle of res ipsa loquitur, i.e., the time of the accident indubitably shows that the same was stolen. He further alleged that the jeep
that a presumption of negligence on the part of a defendant may be inferred if the thing that caused could not have been taken by only one person. As Rodrigo declared in Criminal Case No. 93-10380
an injury is shown to be under his management and that in the ordinary course of things, the (carnapping case), based on his experience, the jeep cannot be pushed by only one person but by at
accident would not have happened had there been an exercise of care. Said court ratiocinated that least five people in order for it to start. This was due to the vehicles mass and the deep canal which
Oscar Jr., as the registered owner of the jeep, managed and controlled the same through his driver separates the parking area from the curved road that was obstructed by a house.[26]
Rodrigo, in whose house the jeep was usually parked. Since both Oscar Jr. and Rodrigo were well
aware that the jeep could easily be started by a mere push even without the ignition key, they Setting aside its earlier decision, the lower court in its Order[27] dated June 21, 2000 granted
should have taken the necessary precaution to prevent the vehicle from being used by the Motion for Reconsideration and absolved Oscar Jr. from civil liability. It cited Article 103 of the
unauthorized persons like Allan. The RTC thus concluded that such lack of proper precaution, due Revised Penal Code which provides that for an employer to be subsidiarily liable for the criminal
care and foresight constitute negligence making the registered owner of the vehicle civilly liable for acts of his employee, the latter should have committed the same in the discharge of his duties. The
the damage caused by the same. court agreed with Oscar Jr. that this condition is wanting in Allans case as he was not acting in the
discharge of his duties as a conductor when he drove the jeep.
The RTC disposed of the case as follows: The court also declared the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inapplicable since the property
owner cannot be made responsible for the damages caused by his property by reason of the
Wherefore, judgment is hereby entered in favor of the plaintiffs and criminal acts of another. It then adjudged that only Allan should bear the consequences of his
against the defendants Allan Maglasang and Oscar del Carmen, Jr. ordering criminal acts. Thus:

1. Defendant ALLAN MAGLASANG to pay the plaintiffs, and in case WHEREFORE, premises considered, the MOTION FOR
of insolvency, for defendant OSCAR DEL CARMEN, JR., to pay the RECONSIDERATION is granted, and defendant OSCAR DEL CARMEN JR.
plaintiffs, the following sums: is hereby absolved from all civil liability arising from the felonious acts of
convicted accused ALLAN MAGLASANG.
a. P73,112.00 for their funeral and burial expenses;
b. P1,000,000.00 moral damages for the death of the late Emilia IT IS SO ORDERED.[28]
Monsalud;
c. P250,000.00 moral damages for the death of the late Leonardo
Monsalud, Sr.; Geronimo appealed.
d. P250,000.00 moral damages for the death of the late Glenda
Monsalud; Ruling of the Court of Appeals
e. P40, 000.00, for exemplary damages; In its July 11, 2006 Decision,[29] the CA granted the appeal.
f. P20,000.00 attorneys fees; and
g. The cost of this proceedings. In resolving the case, the CA first determined the preliminary issue of whether there was
an employer-employee relationship between Oscar Jr. and Allan at the time of the accident. It ruled
2. The dismissal of the complaint as against the spouses OSCAR DEL in the affirmative and gave more credence to the testimonies of Geronimos witnesses than to those
CARMEN SR. and NORMA DEL CARMEN. of Oscar Jr.s witnesses, Faustino and Cresencio. The CA ratiocinated that unlike the witness
presented by Geronimo, Faustino never resided in Poblacion and thus has limited knowledge of the
SO ORDERED.[23] place. His testimony was also unreliable considering that he only rode the subject jeep
twice[30] during the last two weeks of December 1992. As regards Cresencios testimony, the
appellate court found it puzzling why he appeared to have acted uninterested upon learning that
the jeep was the subject of an accident when it was his bread and butter. Said court likewise

8
considered questionable Oscar Jr.s asseveration that Cresencio replaced Allan as conductor when Issues
Cresencio testified that he replaced a certain Sumagang Jr.[31]
As a result of the adverse judgment, Oscar Jr. filed this Petition for Review
With regard to the main issue, the CA adjudged Oscar Jr. liable to the heirs of the victims on Certiorarialleging that the CA erred in:
based on the principle that the registered owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily responsible
for the injuries or death of third parties caused by the operation of such vehicle. It disbelieved Oscar 1. x x x basing its conclusions and findings on speculations,
Jr.s defense that the jeep was stolen not only because the carnapping case filed against Allan and surmises and conjectures; misapprehension of facts which are in
his companions was dismissed but also because, given the circumstances, Oscar Jr. is deemed to conflict with the findings of the trial court;
have given Allan the implied permission to use the subject vehicle. To support its conclusion, the
CA cited the following circumstances: siblings Rodrigo and Allan were both employees assigned 2. x x x declaring a question of substance not in accord with law and
to the said jeep; after a days work, said vehicle would be parked just beside Rodrigos house where with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;
Allan also lived; the jeep could easily be started even without the use of an ignition key; the said
parking area was not fenced or secured to prevent the unauthorized use of the vehicle which can 3. x x x departing from the regular course of the judicial
be started even without the ignition key. proceedings in the disposition of the appeal and [in going] beyond
the issues of the case.[33]
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is Oscar Jr. points out that the CA failed to consider the RTCs ruling in its June 21, 2000
GRANTED. The assailed Order dated 21 June 2000 of the Regional Trial Court Order which was in accord with Article 2180 of the Civil Code, i.e., that the tort committed by an
(Branch 23), Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, in Civil Case No. 96-20,219 is SET employee should have been done within the scope of his assigned tasks for an employer to be held
ASIDE and a new one is hereby entered. OSCAR DEL CARMEN, Jr. and liable under culpa aquiliana. However, the CA never touched upon this matter even if it was glaring
ALLAN MAGLASANG are held primarily liable, jointly and severally, to pay that Allans driving the subject vehicle was not within the scope of his previous employment as
plaintiffs-appellants: conductor.Moreover, Oscar Jr. insists that his jeep was stolen and stresses that the liability of a
registered owner of a vehicle as to third persons, as well as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, should
1. Civil indemnity for the death of Emilia Bacoy Monsalud, not apply to him.He asserts that although Allan and his companions were not found to have
Leonardo Monsalud Sr., and Glenda Monsalud in the amount of Fifty committed the crime of carnapping beyond reasonable doubt, it was nevertheless established that
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) each or for the total amount of One hundred fifty the jeep was illicitly taken by them from a well secured area. This is considering that the vehicle was
thousand pesos (P150,000.00); running without its headlights on at the time of the accident, a proof that it was started without the
ignition key.
2. Temperate damages in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand
Pesos (P25,000.00) each for the death of Emilia Monsalud, Leonardo Monsalud Our Ruling
Sr., and Glenda Monsalud (collectively the Monsaluds) or for the total amount
of Seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00); Petitioners own evidence casts doubt on
his claim that his jeep was stolen by Allan
3. Moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos and his alleged cohorts.Negligence is
(P50,000.00) each for the death of the Monsaluds or for a total amount of One presumed under the doctrine of res ipsa
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00); loquitur.

4. Exemplary damages of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00).


Oscar Jr.s core defense to release him from responsibility for the death of the Monsaluds is that his
No pronouncement as to costs. jeep was stolen. He highlights that the unauthorized taking of the jeep from the parking area was
indeed carried out by the clandestine and concerted efforts of Allan and his five companions,
SO ORDERED. [32] notwithstanding the obstacles surrounding the parking area and the weight of the jeep.

Notably, the carnapping case filed against Allan and his group was already dismissed by
the RTC for insufficiency of evidence. But even in this civil case and as correctly concluded by the
CA, the evidentiary standard of preponderance of evidence required was likewise not met to
support Oscar Jr.s claim that his jeep was unlawfully taken.
9
have also returned the key to the operator together with the Official Receipt and Certificate of
Two of Allans co-accused in the carnapping case, Jemar and Benjamin, declared before Registration.Notably, Rodrigo did not do so and instead, the key was allegedly handed over to the
the police that when Allan invited them to ride with him, he was already driving the jeep: police for reasons unexplained and not available from the records. Interestingly, Oscar Jr. never
presented Rodrigo as his witness. Neither was he able to attest on cross-examination that Allan
04. Q- On that night, on or about 11:30 oclock on December 31, 1992, where really stole the jeep by pushing or that the key was handed over to him by Rodrigo:
were you?
A- I went to the disco near [the] Public Market[,] Sominot, Zamboanga del Sur. Q: On December 31, 1992, you did not know that it was Rodrigo Maglasang
who gave the key to Allan Maglasang. Is that correct?
05. Q- While you were in disco place, do you know if there was an incident A: I was not there. So, I do not know but he had an affidavit to show that he
[that] happened? turned it over to the police.
A- No sir but when I was in the disco place, at about 3:30 at dawn more or less[,] Q: What I was asking you is that, [o]n the night of December 31, 1992, when it
January 1, 1993, Allan Maglasang arrived driving the jeep and he was driven by Allan Maglasang, you did not know that the key was
invited me to ride together with Benjamin Andujar, Dioscoro Sol, voluntarily given by Rodrigo Maglasang to Allan Maglasang?
Arniel Rezada and Joven Orot.[34] A: I was not there.

xxxx Q: So, you could not testify on that, is that correct?


A: Yes Sir, I was not there.[38]
04. Q- On that night, on or about 9:00 oclock in the evening more or less on
December 31, 1992, where were you?
A- I went to the disco at [the] Public Market[,] Sominot, Zamboanga del Sur. Furthermore, Oscar Jr. acknowledged the dismissal of the carnapping case, thus:
05. Q- While you were in the disco place, do you know if there was an incident
[that] happened? Q: Now, there was a case filed against Allan Maglasang and [his] x x x co-
A- No, sir, but when I was in the disco place, at about 3:30 at dawn more or accused x x x [n]amely: Benjamin Andojar, Dioscoro Sol, Joven Orot,
less[,] January 1, 1993, Allan Maglasang arrive[d] driving the jeep [Jemar Azarcon] and [Arniel] Rizada, for carnapping. Is that correct?
and he invited me to ride together with Jemar Alarcon, Dioscoro Sol, A: Yes Sir.
Arniel Rizada and Joven Orot.[35]
Q: That case was filed by you because you alleged that on December 31, 1992,
your jeep was carnapped by Allan Maglasang and his co-accused,
There were six accused in the carnapping case. If Jemar and Benjamin were fetched by Allan who the said mentioned, is that correct?
was driving the jeep, this would mean that only three men pushed the jeep contrary to Rodrigos A: Yes Sir.
testimony in Criminal Case No. 93-10380 that it has to be pushed by at least five people so that it
could start without the ignition key. Q: You testified on the case in Aurora, is that correct?
A: Yes, Sir.
On direct examination,[36] Oscar Jr. was asked as to what Rodrigo, his driver who had informed him
about the accident on January 1, 1993 at around 7:00 a.m., turned over to him after the incident, viz: Q: And you could well remember that this representation is the counsel of the
co-accused of Allan Maglasang, is that correct?
Q: When Rodrigo Maglasang, your driver informed you about the accident, A: Yes Sir.
what did he carry with him if any and turned over to you?
A: The OR (Official Receipt) and the CR (Certificate of Registration) Sir. Q: And that case for carnapping was dismissed, is that correct?
A: Yes Sir.
Q: How about the key of the vehicle?
A: It was not turned over, Sir.[37] Q: Even the case of Allan Maglasang, was also dismissed, is that correct
A: Yes Sir.

Assuming arguendo that Allan stole the jeep by having the same pushed by a group, the ignition Q: Because there was no sufficient evidence to establish that the jeep was
key should then be with Rodrigo as he was entrusted with the jeeps possession. Thus, at the time carnapped, is that correct?
Rodrigo faced his employer hours after the incident, it is reasonable to expect that the driver should A: Yes Sir.[39]

10
The above requisites are all present in this case. First, no person just
While Oscar Jr. highlights that the headlights were not on to support his claim that his walking along the road would suddenly be sideswiped and run over by an on-rushing vehicle
jeep was stolen, this circumstance by itself will not prove that it really was stolen. The reason why unless the one in charge of the said vehicle had been negligent. Second, the jeep which caused the
the headlights were not on at the time of the accident was not sufficiently established during the injury was under the exclusive control of Oscar Jr. as its owner. When Oscar Jr. entrusted the
trial.Besides, the fact that the headlights were not on cannot be exclusively attributed to the lack of ignition key to Rodrigo, he had the power to instruct him with regard to the specific restrictions of
ignition key in starting the jeep as there may be other possibilities such as electrical problems, the jeeps use, including who or who may not drive it. As he is aware that the jeep may run without
broken headlights, or that they were simply turned off. the ignition key, he also has the responsibility to park it safely and securely and to instruct his driver
Rodrigo to observe the same precaution. Lastly, there was no showing that the death of the victims
Hence, sans the testimony of witnesses and other relevant evidence to support the was due to any voluntary action or contribution on their part.
defense of unauthorized taking, we cannot subscribe to Oscar Jr.s claim that his jeep was stolen. The The aforementioned requisites having been met, there now arises a presumption of
evidence on record brings forth more questions than clear-cut answers. negligence against Oscar Jr. which he could have overcome by evidence that he exercised due care
and diligence in preventing strangers from using his jeep. Unfortunately, he failed to do so.
Oscar Jr. alleges that the presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (literally,
the thing speaks for itself) should not have been applied because he was vigilant in securing his What this Court instead finds worthy of credence is the CAs conclusion that Oscar Jr.
vehicle. He claims that the jeep was parked in a well secured area not remote to the watchful senses gave his implied permission for Allan to use the jeep. This is in view of Oscar Jr.s failure to provide
of its driver Rodrigo. solid proof that he ensured that the parking area is well secured and that he had expressly imposed
restrictions as to the use of the jeep when he entrusted the same to his driver Rodrigo. As fittingly
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, [w]here the thing that caused the injury complained inferred by the CA, the jeep could have been endorsed to Allan by his brother Rodrigo since as
of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants; and the accident, in the already mentioned, Oscar Jr. did not give Rodrigo any specific and strict instructions on matters
ordinary course of things, would not happen if those who had management or control used proper regarding its use. Rodrigo therefore is deemed to have been given the absolute discretion as to the
care, it affords reasonable evidence in the absence of a sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation vehicles operation, including the discretion to allow his brother Allan to use it.
by defendant that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendants want of care.[40] Res ipsa
loquitur is merely evidentiary, a mode of proof, or a mere procedural convenience, since it furnishes The operator on record of a vehicle is
a substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing a specific proof of primarily responsible to third persons for
negligence.[41] It recognizes that parties may establish prima facie negligence without direct proof, the deaths or injuries consequent to its
thus, it allows the principle to substitute for specific proof of negligence. It permits the plaintiff to operation, regardless of whether the
present along with proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the employee drove the registered owners
doctrine, create an inference or presumption of negligence and thereby place on the defendant the vehicle in connection with his
burden of proving that there was no negligence on his part.[42] The doctrine is based partly on the employment.
theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the
cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it while the plaintiff has no such
knowledge, and is therefore compelled to allege negligence in general terms.[43] Without disputing the factual finding of the CA that Allan was still his
employee at the time of the accident, a finding which we see no reason to disturb, Oscar Jr. contends
The requisites of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as established by jurisprudence are as that Allan drove the jeep in his private capacity and thus, an employers vicarious liability for the
follows: employees fault under Article 2180 of the Civil Code cannot apply to him.

1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless The contention is no longer novel. In Aguilar Sr. v. Commercial Savings Bank,[45] the car of
someone is negligent; therein respondent bank caused the death of Conrado Aguilar, Jr. while being driven by its assistant
vice president. Despite Article 2180, we still held the bank liable for damages for the accident as said
2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the provision should defer to the settled doctrine concerning accidents involving registered motor
person in charge and vehicles, i.e., that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would
primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the
3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.[46] We have already ratiocinated that:
or contribution on the part of the person injured.[44]
The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if
any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on
the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite
individual, the registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles
11
running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or
other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with
very scant means of identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so
inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle registration is
primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons responsible
for damages or injuries caused on public highways.[47]

Absent the circumstance of unauthorized use[48] or that the subject vehicle was
stolen[49]which are valid defenses available to a registered owner, Oscar Jr. cannot escape liability
for quasi-delict resulting from his jeeps use.

All told and considering that the amounts of damages awarded are in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence, the Court concurs with the findings of the CA and sustains the awards
made. In addition, pursuant to Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[50] an interest of six
percent (6%) per annum on the amounts awarded shall be imposed, computed from the time the
judgment of the RTC is rendered on April 17, 2000 and twelve percent (12%) per annum on such
amount upon finality of this Decision until the payment thereof.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision


dated July 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67764 is hereby AFFIRMED with
further MODIFICATION that an interest of six percent (6%) per annum on the amounts awarded
shall be imposed, computed from the time the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23,
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur is rendered on April 17, 2000 and twelve percent (12%) per annum on
such amount upon finality of this Decision until the payment thereof.

SO ORDERED.

12

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