ATTY. RONALDO P. LEDESMA, G.R. No.

161629

Petitioner,

Present:

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman),

- versus - Quisumbing,

Ynares-Santiago,

Carpio, and

Azcuna, JJ.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his

capacity as Ombudsman, HON.

ABELARDO L. APORTADERA, in

his capacity as Assistant Ombudsman,

and Ombudsmans Fact Finding and

Intelligence Bureau, represented by Promulgated:

Director AGAPITO ROSALES,

Respondents. July 29, 2005

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision[1] dated August 28, 2003 and the
resolution[2] dated January 15, 2004 of the Court of Appeals[3] in CA-G.R. SP No. 58264 which affirmed with modification
public respondents (1) Joint Resolution dated January 22, 1999, which ordered, among other things, petitioners suspension
for one (1) year for conduct prejudicial to the service; and (2) Order dated February 8, 2000, as reiterated in a Memorandum
dated March 17, 2000, which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration but reduced his suspension to nine (9) months
without pay. The Court of Appeals modified the above issuances by further reducing petitioners suspension from nine (9)
months to six (6) months and one (1) day without pay.[4]
Petitioner Atty. Ronaldo P. Ledesma is the Chairman of the First Division of the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID). In a letter-complaint filed by Augusto Somalio with the Fact Finding and Intelligence
Bureau (FIIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman, an investigation was requested on alleged anomalies surrounding the
extension of the Temporary Resident Visas (TRVs) of two (2) foreign nationals. The FIIB investigation revealed seven (7) other
cases of TRV extensions tainted with similar irregularities.

As a result, the FIIB, as nominal complainant, filed before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of the Office of the
Ombudsman a formal complaint against herein petitioner. Also charged administratively were Atty. Arthel Caronongan and
Ma. Elena P. Ang, Board Member and Executive Assistant, respectively, in petitioners division. With respect to petitioner, the
complaint was treated as both a criminal and an administrative charge and docketed as OMB-0-98-0214 (criminal aspect), for
nine (9) counts of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and for falsification of public documents, and OMB-
ADM-0-98-0038 (administrative aspect), for nine (9) counts of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Falsification of Public
Documents and Gross Neglect of Duty.

The complaint against petitioner, Caronongan and Ang alleged the following illegal acts: (a) irregularly granting TRVs beyond
the prescribed period; and (b) using recycled or photocopied applications for a TRV extension without the applicants affixing
their signatures anew to validate the correctness and truthfulness of the information previously stated therein. Specifically,
petitioner and Caronongan allegedly signed the Memorandum of Transmittal to the Board of Commission (BOC) of the BID,
forwarding the applications for TRV extension of several aliens whose papers were questionable.

In a Joint Resolution[5] dated January 22, 1999, Graft Investigation Officer Marlyn M. Reyes resolved the administrative cases
filed against petitioner, Caronongan and Ang, as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, it is respectfully recommended that:

1. Respondent ATTY. RONALDO P. LEDESMA be SUSPENDED from the service for one (1) year for Conduct Prejudicial to the
Interest of the Service;

2. The instant case against ATTY. ARTHEL B. CARONONGAN be DISMISSED, the same having been rendered moot and
academic; and

3. The instant case against respondent MA. ELENA P. ANG be DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence.

SO RESOLVED.[6]

Respondent Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. reviewed the Joint Resolution which was approved by
respondent Ombudsman Desierto on December 29, 1999.[7]
In the meantime, on July 9, 1999, respondent Ombudsman approved a Resolution[8] dated June 22, 1999 of Graft
Investigation Officer Marilou B. Ancheta-Mejica, dismissing the criminal charges against petitioner for insufficiency of
evidence.[9]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[10] in the administrative case alleging that the BOC which reviews all applications
for TRVs extension, approved the TRVs in question, hence, petitioner argued that it effectively declared the applications for
extension regular and in order and waived any infirmity thereon.

In an Order[11] dated February 8, 2000, Graft Officer Reyes recommended the denial of the motion for reconsideration which
was approved by respondent Ombudsman on March 24, 2000 but reduced the period of suspension from one (1) year to nine
(9) months without pay.

On April 13, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which included a prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary prohibitory mandatory injunction and/or temporary restraining order to enjoin public respondents from
implementing the order of suspension. The Court of Appeals issued the TRO on April 19, 2000.

In its Decision dated August 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed petitioners suspension but reduced the period from nine
(9) months to six (6) months and one (1) day without pay.[12]

With the denial of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on the following grounds:

I.

IN PROMULGATING ITS ASSAILED DECISION, RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE FOLLOWING
RELEVANT FACTS AND MATTERS WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD HAVE JUSTIFIED A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION IN
FAVOR OF PETITIONER:

...

II.

THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE FINDING OF THE OMBUDSMAN IS NOT MERELY
ADVISORY ON THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION (BI) IS CONTRARY TO THE PERTINENT PROVISION OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT.
III.

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ALSO FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE OMBUDSMANS RESOLUTION FINDING PETITIONER
ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE CONSTITUTES AN INDIRECT ENCROACHMENT INTO THE POWER OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION
OVER IMMIGRATION MATTERS.[13]

The petition lacks merit.

Petitioner insists that it was the BOC which approved the questioned applications for the extension of the TRVs. He denies
that he misled or deceived the BOC into approving these applications and argues that the BOC effectively ratified his actions
and sanctioned his conduct when it approved the subject applications. Petitioner adds that he acted in good faith and the
government did not suffer any damage as a result of his alleged administrative lapse.

We are not persuaded. In his attempt to escape liability, petitioner undermines his position in the BID and his role in the
processing of the subject applications. But by his own admission,[14] it appears that the BSI not only transmits the
applications for TRV extension and its supporting documents, but more importantly, it interviews the applicants and evaluates
their papers before making a recommendation to the BOC. The BSI reviews the applications and when it finds them in order, it
executes a Memorandum of Transmittal to the BOC certifying to the regularity and propriety of the applications.

In Arias v. Sandiganbayan,[15] we stated that all heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates.
Practicality and efficiency in the conduct of government business dictate that the gritty details be sifted and reviewed by the
time it reaches the final approving authority. In the case at bar, it is not unreasonable for the BOC to rely on the evaluation
and recommendation of the BSI as it cannot be expected to review every detail of each application transmitted for its
approval. Petitioner being the Chairman of the First Division of the BSI has direct supervision over its proceedings. Thus, he
cannot feign ignorance or good faith when the irregularities in the TRV extension applications are so patently clear on its face.
He is principally accountable for certifying the regularity and propriety of the applications which he knew were defective.

Petitioner could not validly claim that he was singled out for prosecution. It is of record that administrative cases were also
filed against Caronongan and Ang, but extraneous circumstances rendered the case against Caronongan moot while the case
against Ang was dismissed because it was proven that she merely implemented the approved decision of the BOC.

Equally untenable is the contention that the BOCs approval of the defective applications for TRV extension cured any
infirmities therein and effectively absolved petitioners administrative lapse. The instant administrative case pertains to the
acts of petitioner as Chairman of the First Division of the BSI in processing nine (9) defective applications, independent of and
without regard to the action taken by the BOC. It does not impugn the validity of the TRV extensions as to encroach upon the
authority of the BID on immigration matters. The main thrust of the case is to determine whether petitioner committed any
misconduct, nonfeasance, misfeasance or malfeasance in the performance of his duties.
Anent the second and third grounds, petitioner essentially puts in issue the import of the Ombudsmans findings. Petitioner
questions the Court of Appeals pronouncement that the findings of the Ombudsman may not be said to be merely
recommendatory upon the Immigration Commissioner. He argues that to uphold the appellate courts ruling expands the
authority granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman and runs counter to prevailing jurisprudence on the
matter, particularly Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman.[16] Petitioner submits that the Ombudsmans findings that the TRV
applications were illegal constitutes an indirect interference by the Ombudsman into the powers of the BOC over immigration
matters.

We do not agree. The creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique feature of the 1987 Constitution.[17] The
Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, are mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.[18] Foremost among its powers is the authority to investigate and prosecute
cases involving public officers and employees, thus:

Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:

(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, was passed into law on November 17, 1989 and
provided for the structural and functional organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. RA 6770 mandated the Ombudsman
and his deputies not only to act promptly on complaints but also to enforce the administrative, civil and criminal liability of
government officers and employees in every case where the evidence warrants to promote efficient service by the
Government to the people.[19]

The authority of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations as in the present case is settled.[20] Section 19 of
RA 6770 provides:

SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints. The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited to acts or omissions
which:

(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;

(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;

(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agencys functions, though in accordance with law;

(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;

(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.

The point of contention is the binding power of any decision or order that emanates from the Office of the Ombudsman after
it has conducted its investigation. Under Section 13(3) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, it is provided:

Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:

...

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner insists that the word recommend be given its literal meaning; that is, that the Ombudsmans action is only advisory
in nature rather than one having any binding effect, citing Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman,[21] thus:

... Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority to directly
dismiss the petitioner from the government service, more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section 13,
subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only recommend the removal of the public
official or employee found to be at fault, to the public official concerned.[22]

For their part, the Solicitor General and the Office of the Ombudsman argue that the word recommend must be taken in
conjunction with the phrase and ensure compliance therewith. The proper interpretation of the Courts statement in Tapiador
should be that the Ombudsman has the authority to determine the administrative liability of a public official or employee at
fault, and direct and compel the head of the office or agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed. In other words, it
merely concerns the procedural aspect of the Ombudsmans functions and not its jurisdiction.

We agree with the ratiocination of public respondents. Several reasons militate against a literal interpretation of the subject
constitutional provision. Firstly, a cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the case was the failure of the
complainant therein to present substantial evidence to prove the charges of the administrative case. The statement that
made reference to the power of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum and, as it is unsupported by sufficient
explanation, is susceptible to varying interpretations, as what precisely is before us in this case. Hence, it cannot be cited as a
doctrinal declaration of this Court nor is it safe from judicial examination.

The provisions of RA 6770 support public respondents theory. Section 15 is substantially the same as Section 13, Article XI of
the Constitution which provides for the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman. We draw attention to subparagraph
3, to wit:
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:

...

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault or who neglects to
perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act:
Provided, That the refusal by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend,
demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a
duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer; (Emphasis supplied)

We note that the proviso above qualifies the order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or
employee akin to the questioned issuances in the case at bar. That the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply
with such an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong
indication that the Ombudsmans recommendation is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the
bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority of the head of office or any
officer concerned. It has long been settled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or
omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense
charged.[23] By stating therefore that the Ombudsman recommends the action to be taken against an erring officer or
employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in RA 6770 intended that the implementation of the order be coursed
through the proper officer, which in this case would be the head of the BID.

It is likewise apparent that under RA 6770, the lawmakers intended to provide the Office of the Ombudsman with sufficient
muscle to ensure that it can effectively carry out its mandate as protector of the people against inept and corrupt government
officers and employees. The Office was granted the power to punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court.[24]
It was given disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies (with the exception only of impeachable officers, members of Congress and the Judiciary).[25]
Also, it can preventively suspend any officer under its authority pending an investigation when the case so warrants.[26]

The foregoing interpretation is consistent with the wisdom and spirit behind the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission[27] reveal the following:

MR. MONSOD:

Madam President, perhaps it might be helpful if we give the spirit and intendment of the Committee. What we wanted to
avoid is the situation where it deteriorates into a prosecution arm. We wanted to give the idea of the Ombudsman a chance,
with prestige and persuasive powers, and also a chance to really function as a champion of the citizen.
However, we do not want to foreclose the possibility that in the future, The Assembly, as it may see fit, may have to give
additional powers to the Ombudsman; we want to give the concept of a pure Ombudsman a chance under the Constitution.

MR. RODRIGO:

Madam President, what I am worried about is if we create a constitutional body which has neither punitive nor prosecutory
powers but only persuasive powers, we might be raising the hopes of our people too much and then disappoint them.

MR. MONSOD:

I agree with the Commissioner.

MR. RODRIGO:

Anyway, since we state that the powers of the Ombudsman can later on be implemented by the legislature, why not leave this
to the legislature?[28]

MR. MONSOD:

Yes, because we want to avoid what happened in 1973. I read the committee report which recommended the approval of the
27 resolutions for the creation of the office of the Ombudsman, but notwithstanding the explicit purpose enunciated in that
report, the implementing law the last one, P.D. No. 1630did not follow the main thrust; instead it created the Tanodbayan, ...

...

MR. MONSOD: (reacting to statements of Commissioner Blas Ople):

May we just state that perhaps the honorable Commissioner has looked at it in too much of an absolutist position, The
Ombudsman is seen as a civil advocate or a champion of the citizens against the bureaucracy, not against the President. On
one hand, we are told he has no teeth and he lacks other things. On the other hand, there is the interpretation that he is a
competitor to the President, as if he is being brought up to the same level as the President.
With respect to the argument that he is a toothless animal, we would like to say that we are promoting the concept in its form
at the present, but we are also saying that he can exercise such powers and functions as may be provided by law in
accordance with the direction of the thinking of Commissioner Rodrigo. We did not think that at this time we should prescribe
this, but we leave it up to Congress at some future time if it feels that it may need to designate what powers the Ombudsman
need in order that he be more effective. This is not foreclosed.

So, his is a reversible disability, unlike that of a eunuch; it is not an irreversible disability. (Emphasis supplied)[29]

It is thus clear that the framers of our Constitution intended to create a stronger and more effective Ombudsman,
independent and beyond the reach of political influences and vested with powers that are not merely persuasive in character.
The Constitutional Commission left to Congress to empower the Ombudsman with prosecutorial functions which it did when
RA 6770 was enacted. In the case of Uy v. Sandiganbayan,[30] it was held:

Clearly, the Philippine Ombudsman departs from the classical Ombudsman model whose function is merely to receive and
process the peoples complaints against corrupt and abusive government personnel. The Philippine Ombudsman, as protector
of the people, is armed with the power to prosecute erring public officers and employees, giving him an active role in the
enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses that may be committed by such officers and
employees. The legislature has vested him with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions. ...[31]

In light of the foregoing, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not commit any error in finding the petitioner guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the interest of the service and reducing petitioners period of suspension to six (6) months and one (1) day
without pay, taking into account the education and length of service of petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 28, 2003 and the Resolution dated January 15, 2004 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58264 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

EDGARDO V. ESTARIJA,

Petitioner,
- versus -

G. R. No. 159314

Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.,

PUNO,

QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,

CALLEJO, SR.,

AZCUNA,

TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

GARCIA, and

VELASCO, JR., JJ.

EDWARD F. RANADA and the Honorable OMBUDSMAN Aniano A. Desierto (now succeeded by Hon. Simeon Marcelo), and his
Deputy OMBUDSMAN for Mindanao, Hon. Antonio E. Valenzuela,

Respondents.

Promulgated:
June 26, 2006

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the February 12, 2003 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62557
which affirmed the October 2, 2000 Decision[2] of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao in OMB-MIN-ADM-98-183.

The facts are as follows:

On August 10, 1998, respondent Edward F. Ranada, a member of the Davao Pilots Association, Inc. (DPAI) and Davao Tugboat
and Allied Services, Inc., (DTASI) filed an administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct before the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao, against petitioner Captain Edgardo V. Estarija, Harbor Master of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), Port of
Davao, Sasa, Davao City.[3]

The complaint alleged that Estarija, who as Harbor Master issues the necessary berthing permit for all ships that dock in the
Davao Port, had been demanding monies ranging from P200 to P2000 for the approval and issuance of berthing permits, and
P5000 as monthly contribution from the DPAI. The complaint alleged that prior to August 6, 1998, in order to stop the
mulcting and extortion activities of Estarija, the association reported Estarijas activities to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI). On August 6, 1998, the NBI caught Estarija in possession of the P5,000 marked money used by the NBI to entrap
Estarija.

Consequently, the Ombudsman ordered petitioners preventive suspension[4] and directed him to answer the complaint. The
Ombudsman filed a criminal case docketed as Criminal Case No. 41,464-98, against Estarija for violation of Republic Act No.
3019, The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch No. 8.[5]

In his counter-affidavit[6] and supplemental counter-affidavit,[7] petitioner vehemently denied demanding sums of money for
the approval of berthing permits. He claimed that Adrian Cagata, an employee of the DPAI, called to inform him that the DPAI
had payables to the PPA, and although he went to the associations office, he was hesitant to get the P5,000 from Cagata
because the association had no pending transaction with the PPA. Estarija claimed that Cagata made him believe that the
money was a partial remittance to the PPA of the pilotage fee for July 1998 representing 10% of the monthly gross revenue of
their association. Nonetheless, he received the money but assured Cagata that he would send an official receipt the following
day. He claimed that the entrapment and the subsequent filing of the complaint were part of a conspiracy to exact personal
vengeance against him on account of Ranadas business losses occasioned by the cancellation of the latters sub-agency
agreement with Asia Pacific Chartering Phil., Inc., which was eventually awarded to a shipping agency managed by Estarijas
son.

On August 31, 2000, the Ombudsman rendered a decision[8] in the administrative case, finding Estarija guilty of dishonesty
and grave misconduct. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being substantial evidence, respondent EDGARDO V. ESTARIJA is hereby found guilty
of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct and is hereby DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave credits and
retirement benefits, pursuant to Section 23(a) and (c) of Rule XIV, Book V, in relation to Section 9 of Rule XIV both of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292). He is disqualified from re-
employment in the national and local governments, as well as in any government instrumentality or agency, including
government owned or controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory after it attains finality. Let a copy of this
decision be entered in the personal records of respondent EDGARDO V. ESTARIJA.

PPA Manager Manuel C. Albarracin is hereby directed to implement this Office Decision after it attains finality.
SO DECREED.[9]

Estarija seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration.[10] Estarija claimed that dismissal was unconstitutional since the
Ombudsman did not have direct and immediate power to remove government officials, whether elective or appointive, who
are not removable by impeachment. He maintains that under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsmans administrative
authority is merely recommendatory, and that Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, is
unconstitutional because it gives the Office of the Ombudsman additional powers that are not provided for in the
Constitution.

The Ombudsman denied the motion for reconsideration in an Order[11] dated October 31, 2000. Thus, Estarija filed a Petition
for Review with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction
before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, on February 12, 2003, dismissed the petition and affirmed the
Ombudsmans decision.

The Court of Appeals held that the attack on the constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 6770 was procedurally and substantially
flawed. First, the constitutionality issue was belatedly raised in the motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
Ombudsman. Second, the petitioner was unable to prove the constitutional breach and failed to overcome the presumption
of constitutionality in favor of the questioned statute.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Ombudsman, holding that receiving extortion money constituted dishonesty
and grave misconduct. According to the Court of Appeals, petitioner failed to refute the convincing evidence offered by the
complainant. Petitioner presented affidavits executed by the high-ranking officials of various shipping agencies which were
found by the Court of Appeals to be couched in general and loose terms, and according to the appellate court, could not be
given more evidentiary weight than the sworn testimonies of complainant and other witnesses that were subjected to cross-
examination.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied the same for lack of merit. Hence, the instant
petition assigning the following errors:

(A) That certain basic factual findings of the Court of Appeals as hereunder specified, are not borne by any substantial
evidence, or are contrary to the evidence on record, or that the Court of Appeals has drawn a conclusion or inference which is
manifestly mistaken or is based on a misappreciation of the facts as to call for a corrective review by this Honorable Supreme
Court;

(B) That Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsmans Act of 1989, is unconstitutional, or that the
Honorable OMBUDSMAN does not have any constitutional direct and immediate power, authority or jurisdiction to remove,
suspend, demote, fine or censure, herein Petitioner and all other government officials, elective or appointive, not removable
by impeachment, consistent with Sec. 13, par. No. (3), Art XI, of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

(C) That corollary to, or consistent with, the aforecited Second Reason, said REPUBLIC ACT No. 6770, as amended, is
constitutionally impaired and invalid insofar as it is inconsistent with, or violative of, the aforecited constitutional provisions
(Sec 13, No. 3, Art XI).

(D) That the issue of jurisdiction or constitutionality or validity of a law, statute, rule or regulation can be raised at any
stage of the case, even by way of a motion for reconsideration after a decision has been rendered by the court or judicial
arbiter concerned.

(E) That the DECISION of the Court of Appeals is contrary to jurisprudential law, specifically to the ruling of this
Honorable SUPREME COURT in the case of Renato A. Tapiador, Petitioner versus Office of the Ombudsman and Atty. Ronaldo
P. Ledesma, Respondents, G.R No. 129124 decided on March 15, 2002.

(F) That assuming arguendo that the Honorable OMBUDSMAN does have such direct constitutional power to remove,
suspend, etc. government officials not removable by impeachment, the DECISION rendered in said case OMB-MIN-ADM-98-
[183], finding Petitioner guilty of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct and directing his dismissal from the service, with forfeiture
of all leave credits and retirement benefits xxx, is still contrary to law and the evidence on record, or, at the very least, the
charge of Dishonesty is not included in RANADAs administrative complaint and absolutely no evidence was presented to prove
Dishonesty and the complaint which was limited to [Grave] Misconduct only;

(G) That further assuming arguendo that Petitioner is subject to direct administrative disciplinary authority by the
Honorable OMBUDSMAN whether under the Constitution or RA 6770, and assuming that he is guilty of Dishonesty and Grave
Misconduct, the Court of Appeals violated Sec. 25 of R.A. 6770 for not considering and applying, several mitigating
circumstances in favor of Petitioner and that the penalty (of dismissal with loss of benefits) imposed by OMBUDSMAN is
violative of Sec. 25, of R.A. 6770 and is too harsh, inhumane, violative of his human dignity, human rights and his other
constitutional right not to be deprived of his property and/or property rights without due process, is manifestly
unproportionate to the offense for which Petitioner is being penalized, and, should, therefore, be substantially modified or
reduced to make it fair, reasonable, just, humane and proportionate to the offense committed. (Emphasis supplied).[12]

Essentially, the issues for our resolution are: First, Is there substantial evidence to hold petitioner liable for dishonesty and
grave misconduct? Second, Is the power of the Ombudsman to directly remove, suspend, demote, fine or censure erring
officials unconstitutional?

On the first issue, petitioner claims that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are not supported by substantial evidence,
and that the Court of Appeals misappreciated the facts of the case.

Petitioner contends that he cannot be liable for grave misconduct as he did not commit extortion. He insists that he was
merely prodded by Adrian Cagata to receive the money. He claims that as a bonded official it was not wrong for him to receive
the money and he had authority to assist the agency in the collection of money due to the agency, e.g. payment for berthing
permits. Moreover, he argues that the signing of berthing permits is only ministerial on his part and he does not have
influence on their approval, which is the function of the berthing committee. Consequently, he avers, it makes no sense why
he would extort money in consideration of the issuance of berthing permits.

We note that indeed petitioner has no hand in the approval of berthing permits. But, it is undisputed that he does decide on
the berthing space to be occupied by the vessels. The berthing committee likewise consults him on technical matters. We
note, too, that he claims he was only instructed to receive the money from Cagata, yet he admits that there was no pending
transaction between the PPA and the DPAI.

In his Comment, the Ombudsman, through the Solicitor General, counters that petitioner raised questions of facts which are
not reviewable by this Court. He argued that contrary to the petitioners claim, the judgment of guilt for dishonesty and grave
misconduct was based on the evidence presented. Petitioner was caught red-handed in an entrapment operation by the NBI.
According to the Ombudsman, the entrapment of the petitioner met the test for a valid entrapment i.e. the conduct of the
law enforcement agent was not likely to induce a normally law-abiding person, other than one who is ready and willing to
commit the offense. The presumption in entrapment is that a law abiding person would normally resist the temptation to
commit a crime that is presented by the simple opportunity to act unlawfully. Entrapment is contingent on the accuseds
predisposition to commit the offense charged, his state of mind, and his inclination before his exposure to government
agents. Thus, entrapment is not made ineffectual by the conduct of the entrapping officers. When Estarija went to the office
of Adrian Cagata to pick up the money, his doing so was indicative of his willingness to commit the crime.

In an administrative proceeding, the quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt is only substantial evidence, that amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[13] Further, precedents tell us
that the factual findings of the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive,[14] and
such findings made by an administrative body which has acquired expertise are accorded not only respect but even
finality.[15]

As shown on the records, Estarija called the office of the DPAI and demanded the payment of the monthly contribution from
Captain Zamora. Captain Zamora conveyed the demand to Ranada who in turn reported the matter to the NBI. Thereafter, an
entrapment operation was staged. Adrian Cagata called Estarija to confirm the payment, and that the money was already
available at their office. Accordingly, Estarija went to the DPAI office and collected the P5,000 marked money. Upon departure
of Estarija from the office, the NBI operatives frisked him and recovered the P5,000 marked money.

We are unconvinced by Estarijas explanation of his conduct. He does not deny that he went to the DPAI office to collect the
money and that he actually received the money. Since there was no pending transaction between the PPA and the DPAI, he
had no reason to go to the latters office to collect any money. Even if he was authorized to assist in the collection of money
due the agency, he should have issued an official receipt for the transaction, but he did not do so. All told, we are convinced
that there is substantial evidence to hold petitioner liable for grave misconduct.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by a public officer. And when the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of
established rule are manifest, the public officer shall be liable for grave misconduct.[16] We are convinced that the decision of
the Ombudsman finding petitioner administratively liable for grave misconduct is based on substantial evidence. When there
is substantial evidence in support of the Ombudsmans decision, that decision will not be overturned.[17]

The same findings sustain the conclusion that Estarija is guilty of dishonesty. The term dishonesty implies disposition to lie,
cheat, deceive, or defraud, untrustworthiness, lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle, lack of fairness
and straightforwardness, disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.[18] Patently, petitioner had been dishonest about
accepting money from DPAI.

Now, the issue pending before us is: Does the Ombudsman have the constitutional power to directly remove from
government service an erring public official?

At the outset, the Court of Appeals held that the constitutional question on the Ombudsmans power cannot be entertained
because it was not pleaded at the earliest opportunity. The Court of Appeals said that petitioner had every opportunity to
raise the same in his pleadings and during the course of the trial. Instead, it was only after the adverse decision of the
Ombudsman that he was prompted to assail the power of the Ombudsman in his motion for reconsideration. The Court of
Appeals held that the constitutional issue was belatedly raised in the proceedings before the Ombudsman, thus, it cannot be
considered on appeal.

When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, the Court may exercise its power of judicial review only if
the following requisites are present: (1) an actual and appropriate case and controversy; (2) a personal and substantial
interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised is the very lis mota of the case.[19]

For our purpose, only the third requisite is in question. Unequivocally, the law requires that the question of constitutionality
of a statute must be raised at the earliest opportunity. In Matibag v. Benipayo,[20] we held that the earliest opportunity to
raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same, such that, if it
was not raised in the pleadings before a competent court, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not considered in the
trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.

In Matibag, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Alfredo L. Benipayo as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). Ma. J. Angelina G. Matibag was the Director IV of the Education and Information Department (EID) but
Benipayo reassigned her to the Law Department. Matibag sought reconsideration of her relief as Director of the EID and her
reassignment to the Law Department. Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration. Consequently, Matibag appealed the
denial of her request to the COMELEC en banc. In addition, Matibag filed a complaint against Benipayo before the Law
Department for violation of the Civil Service Rules and election laws. During the pendency of her complaint before the Law
Department, Matibag filed a petition before this Court assailing the constitutionality of the ad interim appointment of
Benipayo and the other COMELEC Commissioners. We held that the constitutional issue was raised on time because it was the
earliest opportunity for pleading the constitutional issue before a competent body.

In the case of Umali v. Guingona, Jr.,[21] the question of the constitutionality of the creation of the Presidential Commission
on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) was raised in the motion for reconsideration after the Regional Trial Court of Makati
rendered a decision. When appealed, the Court did not entertain the constitutional issue because it was not raised in the
pleadings in the trial court. In that case, the Court did not exercise judicial review on the constitutional question because it
was belatedly raised and not properly pleaded, thus, it cannot be considered by the Court on appeal.
In this case, petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 6770 in his motion for the reconsideration of the
Ombudsmans decision. Verily, the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to entertain questions on the constitutionality of a law.
Thus, when petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 6770 before the Court of Appeals, which is the
competent court, the constitutional question was raised at the earliest opportune time. Furthermore, this Court may
determine, in the exercise of sound discretion, the time when a constitutional issue may be passed upon.[22]

In assailing the constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 6770, petitioner contends that the Ombudsman has only the powers
enumerated under Section 13,[23] Article XI of the Constitution; and that such powers do not include the power to directly
remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure a government official. Its power is merely to recommend the action to the officer
concerned. Moreover, petitioner, citing Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman,[24] insists that although the Constitution
provides that the Ombudsman can promulgate its own rules of procedure and exercise other powers or perform such
functions or duties as may be provided by law,

Sections 15,[25] 21,[26] 22[27] and 25[28] of Rep. Act No. 6770 are inconsistent with Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution
because the power of the Ombudsman is merely to recommend appropriate actions to the officer concerned.

For the State, the Solicitor General maintains that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not intend to spell out,
restrictively, each act which the Ombudsman may or may not do, since the purpose of the Constitution is to provide simply a
framework within which to build the institution. In addition, the Solicitor General avers that what petitioner invoked was
merely an obiter dictum in the case of Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman.

We find petitioners contentions without merit. Among the powers of the Ombudsman enumerated in Section 13, Article XI of
the Constitution are:

Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:

1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

2. Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to
perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the
performance of duties.

3. Direct the Officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

4. Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to
furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement
or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.

5. Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to
examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.

6. Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.

7. Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government and make
recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.

8. Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided
by law.
Rep. Act No. 6770 provides for the functional and structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. In passing Rep. Act
No. 6770, Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with the power to prosecute offenses committed by public officers
and employees to make him a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public office.[29]
Moreover, the legislature has vested the Ombudsman with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions.[30]

In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,[31] we held that Rep. Act No. 6770 is consistent with the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution. They gave Congress the discretion to give the Ombudsman powers that are not merely persuasive in character.
Thus, in addition to the power of the Ombudsman to prosecute and conduct investigations, the lawmakers intended to
provide the Ombudsman with the power to punish for contempt and preventively suspend any officer under his authority
pending an investigation when the case so warrants. He was likewise given disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies except members of Congress and
the Judiciary.

We also held in Ledesma that the statement in Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman that made reference to the power of the
Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum and cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of this Court.[32]

Lastly, the Constitution gave Congress the discretion to give the Ombudsman other powers and functions. Expounding on this
power of Congress to prescribe other powers, functions, and duties to the Ombudsman, we quote Commissioners Colayco and
Monsod during the interpellation by Commissioner Rodrigo in the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the debates relative
to the power of the Ombudsman:

MR. RODRIGO: Let us go back to the division between the powers of the Tanodbayan and the Ombudsman which says that:

The Tanodbayan . . . shall continue to function and exercise its powers as provided by law, except those conferred on the
office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution.

The powers of the Ombudsman are enumerated in Section 12.

MR. COLAYCO: They are not exclusive.

MR. RODRIGO: So, these powers can also be exercised by the Tanodbayan?

MR. COLAYCO: No, I was saying that the powers enumerated here for the Ombudsman are not exclusive.

MR. RODRIGO: Precisely, I am coming to that. The last of the enumerated functions of the Ombudsman is: to exercise such
powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law. So, the legislature may vest him with powers taken
away from the Tanodbayan, may it not?

MR. COLAYCO: Yes.

MR. MONSOD: Yes.

xxxx

MR. RODRIGO: And precisely, Section 12(6) says that among the functions that can be performed by the Ombudsman are such
functions or duties as may be provided by law. x x x

MR. COLAYCO: Madam President, that is correct.

MR. MONSOD: Madam President, perhaps it might be helpful if we give the spirit and intendment of the Committee. What we
wanted to avoid is the situation where it deteriorates into a prosecution arm. We wanted to give the idea of the Ombudsman
a chance, with prestige and persuasive powers, and also a chance to really function as a champion of the citizen.

However, we do not want to foreclose the possibility that in the future, the Assembly, as it may see fit, may have to give
additional powers to the Ombudsman; we want to give the concept of a pure Ombudsman a chance under the Constitution.
MR. RODRIGO: Madam President, what I am worried about is, if we create a constitutional body which has neither punitive
nor prosecutory powers but only persuasive powers, we might be raising the hopes of our people too much and then
disappoint them.

MR. MONSOD: I agree with the Commissioner.

MR. RODRIGO: Anyway, since we state that the powers of the Ombudsman can later on be implemented by the legislature,
why not leave this to the legislature?

MR. MONSOD: Yes, because we want to avoid what happened in 1973. I read the committee report which recommended the
approval of the 27 resolutions for the creation of the office of the Ombudsman, but notwithstanding the explicit purpose
enunciated in that report, the implementing law the last one, P.D. No. 1630 did not follow the main thrust; instead it created
the Tanodbayan (2 record, 270-271). (emphasis supplied)

xxxx

MR. MONSOD (reacting to statements of Commissioner Blas Ople): May we just state that perhaps the [H]onorable
Commissioner has looked at it in too much of an absolutist position. The Ombudsman is seen as a civil advocate or a champion
of the citizens against the bureaucracy, not against the President. On one hand, we are told he has no teeth and he lacks other
things. On the other hand, there is the interpretation that he is a competitor to the President, as if he is being brought up to
the same level as the President.

With respect to the argument that he is a toothless animal, we would like to say that we are promoting the concept in its form
at the present, but we are also saying that he can exercise such powers and functions as may be provided by law in
accordance with the direction of the thinking of Commissioner Rodrigo. We did not think that at this time we should prescribe
this, but we leave it up to Congress at some future time if it feels that it may need to designate what powers the Ombudsman
need in order that he be more effective. This is not foreclosed.

So, this is a reversible disability, unlike that of a eunuch; it is not an irreversible disability (emphasis supplied).[33]

Thus, the Constitution does not restrict the powers of the Ombudsman in Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, but
allows the Legislature to enact a law that would spell out the powers of the Ombudsman. Through the enactment of Rep. Act
No. 6770, specifically Section 15, par. 3, the lawmakers gave the Ombudsman such powers to sanction erring officials and
employees, except members of Congress, and the Judiciary.[34] To conclude, we hold that Sections 15, 21, 22 and 25 of
Republic Act No. 6770 are constitutionally sound. The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. His office
was given teeth to render this constitutional body not merely functional but also effective. Thus, we hold that under Republic
Act No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from government
service an erring public official other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated February 12, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
62557 and Resolution dated July 28, 2003 are hereby AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 165416

Petitioner,

-versus-
FLORITA A. MASING and
JOCELYN A. TAYACTAC,

Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 165584

Petitioner,

-versus-

FLORITA A. MASING,

Respondent.

x------------------------x

PAUL L. CANSINO, FELICIDAD G.R. No. 165731

MOJICA, VENERANDO MOJICA

and RICARTE L. MAMPARO, Present:

Petitioners,

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CORONA,

-versus- AZCUNA, and

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

FLORITA A. MASING and Promulgated:

JOCELYN A. TAYACTAC,

Respondents. January 22, 2008

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

These cases involve the issue of whether the Ombudsman may directly discipline public school teachers and employees, or
merely recommend appropriate disciplinary action to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS).

In G.R. Nos. 165416 and 165731, respondent Florita A. Masing was the former Principal of the Davao City Integrated Special
School (DCISS) in Bangkal, Davao City. Respondent Jocelyn A. Tayactac was an office clerk in the same school. In 1997,
respondents were administratively charged before the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao for allegedly collecting
unauthorized fees, failing to remit authorized fees, and to account for public funds. The cases were docketed as follows:

1. OMB-MIN-ADM-97-193 for grave misconduct and neglect of duty, against respondent Masing only;

2. OMB-MIN-ADM-97-249 for violation of Republic Act No. 6713, against respondent Masing and a schoolteacher;

3. OMB-MIN-ADM-97-253 for violation of Republic Act No. 6713, against respondents Masing and Tayactac, and several
schoolteachers;

4. OMB-MIN-ADM-97-254 for violation of Republic Act No. 6713, against respondent Masing and several schoolteachers.

The complainants were parents of children studying at the DCISS, among whom were the petitioners in G.R. No. 165731,
namely, Paul L. Cansino, Felicidad Mojica, Venerando Mojica, and Ricarte L. Mamparo.

On July 2, 1998, respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over them.
Respondents alleged that the DECS has jurisdiction over them which shall exercise the same through a committee to be
constituted under Section 9 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4670, otherwise known as the The Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers. The motion was denied, as well as respondents motion for reconsideration.
On June 30, 2000, the Ombudsman for Mindanao rendered a joint decision finding respondents Masing and Tayactac guilty,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds substantial evidence that:

1. Respondent Florita Masing is guilty of gross misconduct, neglect of duty and violation of Section 4, paragraphs (a), (b), and
(c) of RA 6713 in relation to the collection of unauthorized fees, non-remittance of authorized fees and failure to account for
public funds; and of misconduct in relation to the complaint of Felicidad Mojica, and she is hereby DISMISSED FROM [THE]
SERVICE with all the accessory penalties including forfeiture of retirement benefits and disqualification from holding public
office; and

2. Respondent Jocelyn Tayactac is guilty of simple neglect of duty, and is hereby suspended for a period of six (6) months. A
repetition of the same offense will be met with stiffer penalty. x x x x[1]

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which the Ombudsman denied in an Order dated September 26, 2000.
Respondents sought recourse to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 61993. On February 27, 2004, the Court of Appeals granted the petition, viz:

WHEREFORE, the joint decision of June 30, 2000 and the Order of September 26, 2000 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and
Administrative Cases Nos. OMB-MIN-ADM-97-193, OMB-MIN-ADM-97-249, OMB-MIN-ADM-97-253, and OMB-MIN-ADM-97-
254 of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao are hereby DISMISSED.

The IMMEDIATE REINSTATEMENT of the petitioners with full backwages and other benefits is further ORDERED in the interest
of justice.[2]

On April 13, 2004, the Office of the Ombudsman, which was not impleaded as respondent in the cases, filed an Omnibus
Motion to Intervene and for Reconsideration.[3] The Court of Appeals denied the omnibus motion on the grounds that (1)
intervention is not proper because it is sought by the quasi-judicial body whose judgment is on appeal, and (2) intervention,
even if permissible, is belated under Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court.[4] Hence, the petition before us by the Office of
the Ombudsman, docketed as G.R. No. 165416.

The complainant-parents filed their own petition for review of the Court of Appeals decision dated February 27, 2004,
docketed as G.R. No. 165731.

In G.R. No. 165584, respondent Florita A. Masing faced yet another administrative case before the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao filed by Erlinda P. Tan.[5] The charges were oppression, serious misconduct, discourtesy in the conduct of official
duties, and physical or mental incapacity or disability due to immoral or vicious habits.

As in the other administrative cases, respondent Masing filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Office of the
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case. The motion was denied, as well as respondents motion for reconsideration.
On December 27, 1999, the Ombudsman for Mindanao found respondent Masing guilty as charged and ordered her
suspension for six (6) months without pay. The DECS Regional Director, Regional Office No. XI, was ordered to implement the
decision upon its finality.

Respondent Masing filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 58735. On July 31, 2003,
the Court of Appeals set aside the assailed Ombudsman decision, viz:

WHEREFORE, finding merit in the herein petition, the same is hereby given due course and the decision of the agency a quo in
Case No. OMB-MIN-ADM-97-282 is hereby SET ASIDE, and petitioner is further declared as entitled to her salary which she
failed to receive during the period of her flawed suspension.[6]

The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion to Intervene and for Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals
denied in its Resolution dated September 30, 2004.[7] Hence, this petition by the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed as G.R.
No. 165584.

We consolidated G.R. Nos. 165416 and 165584 in our Resolution dated November 9, 2005. G.R. No. 165731 was consolidated
per Resolution dated June 21, 2006.

The Office of the Ombudsman contends[8]

I.

THE x x x COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IGNORED THE CLEAR LANGUAGE OF THE
CONSTITUTION, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS NO
AUTHORITY TO DISCIPLINE ERRING MEMBERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS), THIS
CONSIDERING THAT:

(A) THE TAPIADOR [TAPIADOR VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, 379 SCRA 322 (2002)] CASE CITED BY THE APPELLATE COURT
A QUO IS NOT APPLICABLE, AS THE TAPIADOR OBITER DICTUM CAN NEVER BE CITED AS A VALID RATIO DECIDENDI;

(B) THE FABELLA [FABELLA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 282 SCRA 256 (1997)] CASE, WHICH INVOLVED AN ILLEGAL CONSTITUTION
OF AN INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE IN THE DECS, IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE DISCIPLINARY CASE AGAINST PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS PUBLIC SCHOOL PRINCIPAL AND OFFICE CLERK OF THE DECS;

(C) SECTION 9 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4670 (MAGNA CARTA FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS) HAS NOT ADDED PUBLIC SCHOOL
PRINCIPALS, TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES, LIKE HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, TO THE LIST OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGED CLASSES
OF PUBLIC SERVANTS EXEMPTED FROM THE OMBUDSMANS ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY UNDER THE
SUBSEQUENT 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND ANY SUCH INTERPRETATION SUFFERS FROM THE VICE OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY;

(D) THE CONCEDED ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION OF THE PETITIONER OMBUDSMAN OVER PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS, A PUBLIC SCHOOL PRINCIPAL AND AN OFFICE CLERK OF THE DECS, WHICH IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6770 (THE OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1989) AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE, CANNOT BE
SUPPLANTED BY SECTION 9 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4670 (MAGNA CARTA FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS); AND

(E) THE POWER OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO DISCIPLINE PUBLIC SERVANTS NOT EXEMPTED FROM ITS JURISDICTION AND TO
IMPLEMENT ITS JUDGMENTS HAS BEEN AFFIRMED IN LEDESMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 161629, 29 JULY 2005.[9]

(F) THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS CONCURRENT INVESTIGATIVE AND DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY WITH THE DECS OVER
PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS, INCLUDING HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENT MASING, AS THERE IS SIMPLY NO REPUGNANCE
BETWEEN THE LAWS CONFERRING INVESTIGATIVE AND DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION ON THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
(ART. XI, 1987 CONSTITUTION AND R.A. 6770) AND THE LAWS CONFERRING THE SAME INVESTIGATIVE AND DISCIPLINARY
JURISDICTION TO DECS (R.A. 4670 [MAGNA CARTA FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS] AND P.D. 807, NOW BOOK V OF E.O. 292
[CIVIL SERVICE LAW]).[10]

II.

CONTRARY TO THE APPELLATE COURT A QUOS RULING, THE PETITIONER OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN TIMELY AND
RIGHTFULLY FILED ITS OMNIBUS MOTION TO INTERVENE AND FOR RECONSIDERATION ON A PATENTLY ERRONEOUS DECISION
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS WHICH HAS NOT YET ATTAINED FINALITY.[11]

The petitioners in G.R. No. 165731 contend

I.

TAPIADOR V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (379 SCRA 322) CITED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT APPLICABLE, AS THE
TAPIADOR OBITER DICTUM CAN NEVER BE CITED AS A VALID RATIO DECIDENDI. MOREOVER, THE TAPIADOR RULING HAS
EFFECTIVELY BEEN ABANDONED BY THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY OF
THE OMBUDSMAN IN SUBSEQUENT CASES EVEN AS TAPIADOR FAILED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE PROPER
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY BASES OF THE OMBUDSMANS DISCIPLINARY POWER OVER ALL APPOINTIVE AND ELECTIVE
PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES.

II.

TO INSIST THAT PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS PURSUANT TO THE RULING IN FABELLA V. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. NO. 110379,
28 NOVEMBER 1997) CAN ONLY BE PROCEEDED AGAINST ADMINISTRATIVELY THROUGH THE COMMITTEE UNDER SECTION 9
OF R.A. NO. 4670 WOULD BE AN UNDUE, UNWARRANTED AND INVALID CLASSIFICATION BY JUDICIAL FIAT OF A CERTAIN
GROUP OF PUBLIC SERVANTS WHICH IS VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION. MOREOVER,
THE SAID LAW DOES NOT CONFER JURISDICTION ON THE COMMITTEE.

III.

SECTION 9 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4670 HAS NOT ADDED PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS TO THE LIST OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGED
CLASSES OF PUBLIC SERVANTS EXEMPTED FROM THE OMBUDSMANS ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY UNDER THE
1987 CONSTITUTION, AND ANY SUCH INTERPRETATION SUFFERS FROM THE VICE OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY.

IV.

THE CONCEDED ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION OF THE OMBUDSMAN OVER THE HEREIN RESPONDENTS,
WHICH IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6770 AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE CANNOT
BE SUPPLANTED BY SECTION 9 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4670.

In sum, the pivotal issues are (1) whether the Office of the Ombudsman may intervene and seek reconsideration of the
adverse decisions rendered by the Court of Appeals, and (2) whether the Office of the Ombudsman may directly discipline
public school teachers and employees.

First, the procedural issue. The Office of the Ombudsman was not allowed by the Court of Appeals to intervene because (1)
the motions to intervene were filed after the decisions have already been rendered in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 58735 and 61993, and
(2) the Office of the Ombudsman was the quasi-judicial body which rendered the impugned decisions.

Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion for intervention may be filed before rendition of judgment, viz:

SECTION 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial
court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties. (emphasis
ours)

We have ruled however that allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of the
court[12] after consideration of the appropriate circumstances.[13] Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose
object is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice.[14] Its purpose is not to hinder or delay
but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.[15] Thus, interventions have been allowed even beyond the
prescribed period in the Rule in the higher interest of justice. Interventions have been granted to afford indispensable parties,
who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the trial court,[16] when the
petition for review of the judgment was already submitted for decision before the Supreme Court,[17] and even where the
assailed order has already become final and executory.[18] In Lim v. Pacquing,[19] the motion for intervention filed by the
Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the
substantive issues raised by the parties.
In the cases at bar, the rulings of the Court of Appeals adversely affected the all-important jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman. The rulings aggrieved the Office of the Ombudsman for they have serious consequences on its effectiveness as
the body charged by the Constitution with the prosecution of officials and employees of the government suspected of
violating our laws on graft and corruption.

In Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy,[20] we recognized the standing of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) to appeal a
decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed its decision finding Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism and ordering his dismissal
from the service. Although the CSC was the quasi-judicial body which rendered the decision appealed to the Court of Appeals,
it became the party aggrieved or adversely affected by its decision which seriously prejudices the civil service system.[21] In
Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania,[22] we likewise ruled that the CSC may seek a review of decisions of the Court of
Appeals that are detrimental to its constitutional mandate as the central personnel agency of the government.[23]

However, rather than remand the cases at bar to the Court of Appeals for a ruling on the merits of the Ombudsmans motions
for reconsideration, we shall resolve the legal issues involved in the interest of speedy justice.

The authority of the Ombudsman to act on complaints filed against public officers and employees is explicit in Article XI,
Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken
and the result thereof. (emphasis ours)

Article XI, Section 13 of the same Constitution delineates the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman as follows:

(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to
perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the
performance of duties.

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to
furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts and transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement
or use of public funds or properties, to the Commission on Audit for appropriate and report any irregularity action.
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to
examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.

(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.

(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government and make
recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.

(8) Promulgate its rules and procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be
provided by law.

The enumeration of these powers is non-exclusive.[24] Congress enacted R.A. No. 6770,[25] otherwise known as The
Ombudsman Act of 1989, on November 17, 1989 giving the Office such other powers that it may need to efficiently perform
the task given by the Constitution,[26] viz:

Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties.- The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and
duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction
over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage,
from any investigatory agency of the Government, the investigation of such cases;

(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer or employee of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter, to perform and
expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of
duties;

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault or who neglects to
perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act;
Provided, That the refusal by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend,
demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a
duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer;

(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as it may provide in its rules of
procedure, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the
disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate
action;
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to
examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents;

(6) Publicize matters covered by is investigation of the matters mentioned in paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4) hereof, when
circumstances so warrant and with due prudence: Provided, That the Ombudsman under its rules and regulations may
determine what cases may not be made public: Provided, further, That any publicity issued by the Ombudsman shall be
balanced, fair and true;

(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud and corruption in the Government, and make
recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency;

(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take testimony in any investigation or inquiry, including
the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and records;

(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties
provided therein;

(10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such authority or duty as shall ensure the effective
exercise or performance of the powers, functions, and duties herein or hereinafter provided;

(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after February
25, 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein. x x x x[27]

In fine, the manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary
authority in accord with the constitutional deliberations.[28] Unlike the Ombudsman-like agencies of the past the powers of
which extend to no more than making findings of fact and recommendations, and the Ombudsman or Tanodbayan under the
1973 Constitution who may file and prosecute criminal, civil or administrative cases against public officials and employees only
in cases of failure of justice, the Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 is intended to play a more active
role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and other offenses committed by public officers and
employees.[29] The Ombudsman is to be an activist watchman, not merely a passive one.[30] He is vested with broad powers
to enable him to implement his own actions.[31]

Respondents, however, insist that the findings of the Ombudsman are mere recommendations, and that he may not directly
impose administrative sanctions on public officials and employees, citing Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman[32] where the
following statement is found, viz:
x x x x Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner was administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority to directly
dismiss the petitioner from the government service, more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section 13,
subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only recommend the removal of the public
official or employee found to be at fault, to the public official concerned.

The foregoing is now a settled issue. In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,[33] we explained Tapiador and ruled categorically that:

x x x x Under Section 13(3) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, it is provided:

Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:

...

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner insists that the word recommend be given its literal meaning; that is, that the Ombudsmans action is only advisory
in nature rather than one having any binding effect, citing Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman, thus:

. . . Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority to directly
dismiss the petitioner from the government service, more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section 13,
subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only recommend the removal of the public
official or employee found to be at fault, to the public official concerned.

For their part, the Solicitor General and the Office of the Ombudsman argue that the word recommend must be taken in
conjunction with the phrase and ensure compliance therewith. The proper interpretation of the Courts statement in Tapiador
should be that the Ombudsman has the authority to determine the administrative liability of a public official or employee at
fault, and direct and compel the head of the office or agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed. In other words, it
merely concerns the procedural aspect of the Ombudsmans functions and not its jurisdiction.

We agree with the ratiocination of public respondents. Several reasons militate against a literal interpretation of the subject
Constitutional provision. Firstly, a cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the case was the failure of the
complainant therein to present substantial evidence to prove the charges of the administrative case. The statement that
made reference to the power of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum and, as it is unsupported by sufficient
explanation, is susceptible to varying interpretations x x x x [h]ence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of this Court
nor is it safe from judicial examination. (emphases ours)

We reiterated this ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja,[34] where we emphasized that the Ombudsmans order to
remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee is not merely advisory or recommendatory but
is actually mandatory.[35] Implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper
officer.[36] Recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals,[37] we also held

While Section 15(3) of RA 6770 states that the Ombudsman has the power to recommend x x x removal, suspension,
demotion x x x of government officials and employees, the same Section 15(3) also states that the Ombudsman in the
alternative may enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of RA 6770. (emphasis supplied)

Finally, respondent Masing contends that she may be administratively dealt with only by following the procedure prescribed
in Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670 or the The Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. She cites Fabella v. Court of Appeals.[38]

Section 9, R.A. No. 4670 provides

Section 9. Administrative Charges.- Administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed
of the corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who should at least have the
rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any
existing provincial or national teachers organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be designated by the
Director of Public Schools. The Committee shall submit its findings, and recommendations to the Director of Public Schools
within thirty days from the termination of the hearings; Provided, however, That where the school superintendent is the
complainant or an interested party, all the members of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education.

In Fabella, several public schoolteachers were administratively charged by then DECS Secretary Isidro Cario for taking part in
mass actions in violation of civil service laws and regulations. A committee was constituted to hear the charges. The teachers
assailed the procedure adopted by the committee in a petition for certiorari filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. In affirming the regional trial courts decision which declared illegal the constitution of the committee, we ruled

x x x x Section 9 of RA 4670 x x x reflects the legislative intent to impose a standard and a separate set of procedural
requirements in connection with administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. x x x [R]ight to due process of
law requires compliance with these requirements laid down by RA 4670.[39]

Fabella, however, does not apply to the cases at bar. The public schoolteachers in Fabella were charged with violations of civil
service laws, rules and regulations in administrative proceedings initiated by the DECS Secretary. In contrast, herein
respondents Masing and Tayactac were administratively charged in letter-complaints duly filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao. The charges were for violations of R.A. No.
6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, collecting
unauthorized fees, failure to remit authorized fees, failure to account for public funds, oppression, serious misconduct,
discourtesy in the conduct of official duties, and physical or mental incapacity or disability due to immoral or vicious habits. In
short, the acts and omissions complained of relate to respondents conduct as public official and employee, if not to outright
graft and corruption.

The authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations is beyond cavil.[40] As the principal
and primary complaints and action center[41] against erring public officers and employees, it is mandated by no less than
Section 13(1), Article XI of the Constitution.[42] In conjunction therewith, Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770 grants to the
Ombudsman the authority to act on all administrative complaints,[43] viz:
Sec. 19. Administrative complaints. The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions
which:

(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;

(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;

(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agencys functions, though in accordance with law;

(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;

(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or

(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.

Section 23(1) of the same law provides that administrative investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be
in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with due process.

It is erroneous, therefore, for respondents to contend that R.A. No. 4670 confers an exclusive disciplinary authority on the
DECS over public school teachers and prescribes an exclusive procedure in administrative investigations involving them.[44]
R.A. No. 4670 was approved on June 18, 1966. On the other hand, the 1987 Constitution was ratified by the people in a
plebiscite in 1987 while R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989. It is basic that the 1987 Constitution should not be
restricted in its meaning by a law of earlier enactment. The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 were quite explicit in
conferring authority on the Ombudsman to act on complaints against all public officials and employees, with the exception of
officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over members of Congress and the Judiciary.[45] If an issue should
ever arise, therefore, it should rather be whether the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 have abrogated R.A. No. 4670.
However, repeals by implication are not favored, and courts have the duty to harmonize, so far as it is practicable, apparently
conflicting or inconsistent provisions. Therefore, the statement in Fabella that Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670 reflects the
legislative intent to impose a standard and a separate set of procedural requirements in connection with administrative
proceedings involving public schoolteachers should be construed as referring only to the specific procedure to be followed in
administrative investigations conducted by the DECS.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed Decisions of the Court of Appeals dated February 27, 2004 and
July 31, 2003, as well as its Resolutions dated September 27, 2004 and September 30, 2004, in CA-G.R. SP No. 61993 and CA-
G.R. SP No. 58735, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Joint Decision dated June 30, 2000 of the Office of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao in Administrative Case Nos. OMB-MIN-ADM-97-193, OMB-MIN-ADM-97-249, OMB-MIN-ADM-97-
253 and OMB-MIN-ADM-97-254 and its Decision dated December 27, 1999 in OMB-MIN-ADM-97-282, as well as its orders
denying reconsideration, are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003]

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his official capacity
as Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management,
respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar,
seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)[1] suffer
from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing
to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and
as a lawyer.

The Court upholds the right of petitioner to file the present petition.

R.A. No. 9189, entitled, An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines
Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes, appropriates funds under Section 29 thereof which provides
that a supplemental budget on the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law shall provide for the
necessary amount to carry out its provisions. Taxpayers, such as herein petitioner, have the right to restrain officials from
wasting public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.[2] The Court has held that they may assail the
validity of a law appropriating public funds[3] because expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of
executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds.[4]

The challenged provision of law involves a public right that affects a great number of citizens. The Court has adopted the
policy of taking jurisdiction over cases whenever the petitioner has seriously and convincingly presented an issue of
transcendental significance to the Filipino people. This has been explicitly pronounced in Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa
Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. vs. Tan,[5] where the Court held:

Objections to taxpayers suit for lack of sufficient personality standing, or interest are, however, in the main procedural
matters. Considering the importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Courts duty, under the 1987
Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside
technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions.[6]

Indeed, in this case, the Court may set aside procedural rules as the constitutional right of suffrage of a considerable number
of Filipinos is involved.

The question of propriety of the instant petition which may appear to be visited by the vice of prematurity as there are no
ongoing proceedings in any tribunal, board or before a government official exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions as required by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, dims in light of the importance of the constitutional issues raised by the
petitioner. In Taada vs. Angara,[7] the Court held:

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt
raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The question thus posed is
judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once
a controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant
case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.

In another case of paramount impact to the Filipino people, it has been expressed that it is illogical to await the adverse
consequences of the law in order to consider the controversy actual and ripe for judicial resolution.[8] In yet another case, the
Court said that:

. . . despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional issues, it will not hesitate to declare a
law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be the
Constitution and God as its conscience gives it in the light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives and
political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decisions. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation, for
all the awesome power of the Congress and Executive, the Court will not hesitate to make the hammer fall heavily, where the
acts of these departments, or of any official, betray the peoples will as expressed in the Constitution . . .[9]

The need to consider the constitutional issues raised before the Court is further buttressed by the fact that it is now more
than fifteen years since the ratification of the 1987 Constitution requiring Congress to provide a system for absentee voting by
qualified Filipinos abroad. Thus, strong reasons of public policy demand that the Court resolves the instant petition[10] and
determine whether Congress has acted within the limits of the Constitution or if it had gravely abused the discretion entrusted
to it.[11]

The petitioner raises three principal questions:

A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent residents in
other countries by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violate the
residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution?

B. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national offices and
party list representatives including the President and the Vice-President violate the constitutional mandate under Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners
by Congress?

C. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise
the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections
shall promulgate without violating the independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?

The Court will resolve the questions in seriatim.

A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 violate Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines?

Section 5(d) provides:

Sec. 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act:

.........

d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she executes, upon
registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such
affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the
removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her
permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.

Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which
requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote
for at least six months immediately preceding an election. Petitioner cites the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of
Appeals[12] to support his claim. In that case, the Court held that a green card holder immigrant to the United States is
deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines.

Petitioner further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does not allow provisional registration or a promise by a
voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise;[13] that the legislature should not be allowed to
circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on the right of suffrage by providing a condition thereon which in effect
amends or alters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to vote.[14] He claims that the right of
suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on the date of the election, does not possess the qualifications provided for by
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.

Respondent COMELEC refrained from commenting on this issue.[15]

In compliance with the Resolution of the Court, the Solicitor General filed his comment for all public respondents. He
contraposes that the constitutional challenge to Section 5(d) must fail because of the absence of clear and unmistakable
showing that said provision of law is repugnant to the Constitution. He stresses: All laws are presumed to be constitutional; by
the doctrine of separation of powers, a department of government owes a becoming respect for the acts of the other two
departments; all laws are presumed to have adhered to constitutional limitations; the legislature intended to enact a valid,
sensible, and just law.

In addition, the Solicitor General points out that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution is a verbatim reproduction of those
provided for in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions. Thus, he cites Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives[16] wherein the Court held that the term residence has been understood to be synonymous with domicile
under both Constitutions. He further argues that a person can have only one domicile but he can have two residences, one
permanent (the domicile) and the other temporary;[17] and that the definition and meaning given to the term residence
likewise applies to absentee voters. Invoking Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC[18] which reiterates the Courts ruling in Faypon
vs. Quirino,[19] the Solicitor General maintains that Filipinos who are immigrants or permanent residents abroad may have in
fact never abandoned their Philippine domicile.[20]

Taking issue with the petitioners contention that green card holders are considered to have abandoned their Philippine
domicile, the Solicitor General suggests that the Court may have to discard its ruling in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals[21] in so far
as it relates to immigrants and permanent residents in foreign countries who have executed and submitted their affidavits
conformably with Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189. He maintains that through the execution of the requisite affidavits, the
Congress of the Philippines with the concurrence of the President of the Republic had in fact given these immigrants and
permanent residents the opportunity, pursuant to Section 2, Article V of the Constitution, to manifest that they had in fact
never abandoned their Philippine domicile; that indubitably, they would have formally and categorically expressed the
requisite intentions, i.e., animus manendi and animus revertendi; that Filipino immigrants and permanent residents abroad
possess the unquestionable right to exercise the right of suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution upon approval
of their registration, conformably with R.A. No. 9189.[22]

The seed of the present controversy is the interpretation that is given to the phrase, qualified citizens of the Philippines
abroad as it appears in R.A. No. 9189, to wit:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the prime duty of the State to provide a system of honest and orderly overseas absentee
voting that upholds the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot. Towards this end, the State ensures equal opportunity to all
qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad in the exercise of this fundamental right.

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act:

a) Absentee Voting refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad, exercise their right to vote;

. . . (Emphasis supplied)

f) Overseas Absentee Voter refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and vote under this Act, not
otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of elections. (Emphasis supplied)

SEC. 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years
of age on the day of elections, may vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives. (Emphasis
supplied)

in relation to Sections 1 and 2, Article V of the Constitution which read:

SEC. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen
years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote
for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be
imposed on the exercise of suffrage.

SEC. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee
voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

. . . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution specifically provides that suffrage may be exercised by (1) all citizens of the Philippines,
(2) not otherwise disqualified by law, (3) at least eighteen years of age, (4) who are residents in the Philippines for at least one
year and in the place where they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. Under Section
5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, one of those disqualified from voting is an immigrant or permanent resident who is recognized as such
in the host country unless he/she executes an affidavit declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent
residence in the Philippines not later than three years from approval of his/her registration under said Act.

Petitioner questions the rightness of the mere act of execution of an affidavit to qualify the Filipinos abroad who are
immigrants or permanent residents, to vote. He focuses solely on Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in ascribing
constitutional infirmity to Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, totally ignoring the provisions of Section 2 empowering Congress to
provide a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

A simple, cursory reading of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 may indeed give the impression that it contravenes Section 1, Article
V of the Constitution. Filipino immigrants and permanent residents overseas are perceived as having left and abandoned the
Philippines to live permanently in their host countries and therefore, a provision in the law enfranchising those who do not
possess the residency requirement of the Constitution by the mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intent to
return to the Philippines within a given period, risks a declaration of unconstitutionality. However, the risk is more apparent
than real.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance
with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered.[23] Laws that do not conform to the
Constitution shall be stricken down for being unconstitutional.

Generally, however, all laws are presumed to be constitutional. In Peralta vs. COMELEC, the Court said:

. . . An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The responsibility
of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. The question of the validity of every
statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government itself.[24]

Thus, presumption of constitutionality of a law must be overcome convincingly:

. . . To declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of that law to the Constitution must be clear and unequivocal, for even
if a law is aimed at the attainment of some public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is allowed. To strike down a
law there must be a clear showing that what the fundamental law condemns or prohibits, the statute allows it to be done.[25]

As the essence of R.A. No. 9189 is to enfranchise overseas qualified Filipinos, it behooves the Court to take a holistic view of
the pertinent provisions of both the Constitution and R.A. No. 9189. It is a basic rule in constitutional construction that the
Constitution should be construed as a whole. In Chiongbian vs. De Leon,[26] the Court held that a constitutional provision
should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions
of that great document. Constitutional provisions are mandatory in character unless, either by express statement or by
necessary implication, a different intention is manifest.[27] The intent of the Constitution may be drawn primarily from the
language of the document itself. Should it be ambiguous, the Court may consider the intent of its framers through their
debates in the constitutional convention.[28]

R.A. No. 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the first paragraph of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution that
Congress shall provide a system for voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. It must be stressed that Section 2 does not provide for
the parameters of the exercise of legislative authority in enacting said law. Hence, in the absence of restrictions, Congress is
presumed to have duly exercised its function as defined in Article VI (The Legislative Department) of the Constitution.

To put matters in their right perspective, it is necessary to dwell first on the significance of absentee voting. The concept of
absentee voting is relatively new. It is viewed thus:

The method of absentee voting has been said to be completely separable and distinct from the regular system of voting, and
to be a new and different manner of voting from that previously known, and an exception to the customary and usual manner
of voting. The right of absentee and disabled voters to cast their ballots at an election is purely statutory; absentee voting was
unknown to, and not recognized at, the common law.

Absentee voting is an outgrowth of modern social and economic conditions devised to accommodate those engaged in
military or civil life whose duties make it impracticable for them to attend their polling places on the day of election, and the
privilege of absentee voting may flow from constitutional provisions or be conferred by statutes, existing in some jurisdictions,
which provide in varying terms for the casting and reception of ballots by soldiers and sailors or other qualified voters absent
on election day from the district or precinct of their residence.

Such statutes are regarded as conferring a privilege and not a right, or an absolute right. When the legislature chooses to
grant the right by statute, it must operate with equality among all the class to which it is granted; but statutes of this nature
may be limited in their application to particular types of elections. The statutes should be construed in the light of any
constitutional provisions affecting registration and elections, and with due regard to their texts prior to amendment and to
predecessor statutes and the decisions thereunder; they should also be construed in the light of the circumstances under
which they were enacted; and so as to carry out the objects thereof, if this can be done without doing violence to their
provisions and mandates. Further, in passing on statutes regulating absentee voting, the court should look to the whole and
every part of the election laws, the intent of the entire plan, and reasons and spirit of their adoption, and try to give effect to
every portion thereof.[29] (Emphasis supplied)

Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at the same time, both a resident and an
absentee.[30] However, under our election laws and the countless pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an
absentee remains attached to his residence in the Philippines as residence is considered synonymous with domicile.

In Romualdez-Marcos,[31] the Court enunciated:

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that [f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of
natural persons is their place of habitual residence. In Ong vs. Republic, this court took the concept of domicile to mean an
individuals permanent home, a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and
depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent. Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin
elements of the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there
permanently.

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical
presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is
that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may
seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a persons intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his
intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have
different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he
successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, we laid this distinction
quite clearly:

There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or
temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man
may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with
the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may
have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means
necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.

For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these
concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election
purposes is used synonymously with domicile.[32] (Emphasis supplied)

Aware of the domiciliary legal tie that links an overseas Filipino to his residence in this country, the framers of the Constitution
considered the circumstances that impelled them to require Congress to establish a system for overseas absentee voting,
thus:
MR. OPLE. With respect to Section 1, it is not clear whether the right of suffrage, which here has a residential restriction, is not
denied to citizens temporarily residing or working abroad. Based on the statistics of several government agencies, there ought
to be about two million such Filipinos at this time. Commissioner Bernas had earlier pointed out that these provisions are
really lifted from the two previous Constitutions of 1935 and 1973, with the exception of the last paragraph. They could not
therefore have foreseen at that time the phenomenon now described as the Filipino labor force explosion overseas.

According to government data, there are now about 600,000 contract workers and employees, and although the major
portions of these expatriate communities of workers are to be found in the Middle East, they are scattered in 177 countries in
the world.

In a previous hearing of the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies, the Chairman of the Commission on
Elections, Ramon Felipe, said that there was no insuperable obstacle to making effective the right of suffrage for Filipinos
overseas. Those who have adhered to their Filipino citizenship notwithstanding strong temptations are exposed to embrace a
more convenient foreign citizenship. And those who on their own or under pressure of economic necessity here, find that
they have to detach themselves from their families to work in other countries with definite tenures of employment. Many of
them are on contract employment for one, two, or three years. They have no intention of changing their residence on a
permanent basis, but are technically disqualified from exercising the right of suffrage in their countries of destination by the
residential requirement in Section 1 which says:

Suffrage shall be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or
over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at
least six months preceding the election.

I, therefore, ask the Committee whether at the proper time they might entertain an amendment that will make this exercise
of the right to vote abroad for Filipino citizens an effective, rather than merely a nominal right under this proposed
Constitution.

FR. BERNAS. Certainly, the Committee will consider that. But more than just saying that, I would like to make a comment on
the meaning of residence in the Constitution because I think it is a concept that has been discussed in various decisions of the
Supreme Court, particularly in the case of Faypon vs. Quirino, a 1954 case which dealt precisely with the meaning of residence
in the Election Law. Allow me to quote:

A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for greener pastures, as the saying goes, to improve his lot and that, of
course, includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, reengaging in business. When an election is to be held, the
citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may decide to return to his native town, to cast his ballot, but for professional
or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from the place of his professional or business
activities.

So, they are here registered as voters as he has the qualifications to be one, and is not willing to give up or lose the
opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in national elections. Despite such registration,
the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him.

This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been deemed
sufficient to consider abandonment or loss of such residence of origin.

In other words, residence in this provision refers to two residence qualifications: residence in the Philippines and residence in
the place where he will vote. As far as residence in the Philippines is concerned, the word residence means domicile, but as far
as residence in the place where he will actually cast his ballot is concerned, the meaning seems to be different. He could have
a domicile somewhere else and yet he is a resident of a place for six months and he is allowed to vote there. So that there may
be serious constitutional obstacles to absentee voting, unless the vote of the person who is absent is a vote which will be
considered as cast in the place of his domicile.

MR. OPLE. Thank you for citing the jurisprudence.

It gives me scant comfort thinking of about two million Filipinos who should enjoy the right of suffrage, at least a substantial
segment of these overseas Filipino communities. The Committee, of course, is aware that when this Article of the Constitution
explicitly and unequivocally extends the right of effective suffrage to Filipinos abroad, this will call for a logistical exercise of
global proportions. In effect, this will require budgetary and administrative commitments on the part of the Philippine
government, mainly through the COMELEC and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and perhaps, a more extensive elaboration of
this mechanism that will be put in place to make effective the right to vote. Therefore, seeking shelter in some wise
jurisprudence of the past may not be sufficient to meet the demands of the right of suffrage for Filipinos abroad that I have
mentioned. But I want to thank the Committee for saying that an amendment to this effect may be entertained at the proper
time. . . . . . . . . .

[33] (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the Constitutional Commission recognized the fact that while millions of Filipinos reside abroad principally for economic
reasons and hence they contribute in no small measure to the economic uplift of this country, their voices are marginal insofar
as the choice of this countrys leaders is concerned.

The Constitutional Commission realized that under the laws then existing and considering the novelty of the system of
absentee voting in this jurisdiction, vesting overseas Filipinos with the right to vote would spawn constitutional problems
especially because the Constitution itself provides for the residency requirement of voters:

MR. REGALADO. Before I act on that, may I inquire from Commissioner Monsod if the term absentee voting also includes
transient voting; meaning, those who are, let us say, studying in Manila need not go back to their places of registration, for
instance, in Mindanao, to cast their votes.

MR. MONSOD. I think our provision is for absentee voting by Filipinos abroad.

MR. REGALADO. How about those people who cannot go back to the places where they are registered?

MR. MONSOD. Under the present Election Code, there are provisions for allowing students and military people who are
temporarily in another place to register and vote. I believe that those situations can be covered by the Omnibus Election Code.
The reason we want absentee voting to be in the Constitution as a mandate to the legislature is that there could be
inconsistency on the residence rule if it is just a question of legislation by Congress. So, by allowing it and saying that this is
possible, then legislation can take care of the rest.[34] (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Section 2, Article V of the Constitution came into being to remove any doubt as to the inapplicability of the residency
requirement in Section 1. It is precisely to avoid any problems that could impede the implementation of its pursuit to
enfranchise the largest number of qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines that the Constitutional Commission
explicitly mandated Congress to provide a system for overseas absentee voting.

The discussion of the Constitutional Commission on the effect of the residency requirement prescribed by Section 1, Article V
of the Constitution on the proposed system of absentee voting for qualified Filipinos abroad is enlightening:

MR. SUAREZ. May I just be recognized for a clarification. There are certain qualifications for the exercise of the right of
suffrage like having resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where they propose to vote for at least six
months preceding the elections. What is the effect of these mandatory requirements on the matter of the exercise of the right
of suffrage by the absentee voters like Filipinos abroad?

THE PRESIDENT. Would Commissioner Monsod care to answer?

MR. MONSOD. I believe the answer was already given by Commissioner Bernas, that the domicile requirements as well as the
qualifications and disqualifications would be the same.

THE PRESIDENT. Are we leaving it to the legislature to devise the system?

FR. BERNAS. I think there is a very legitimate problem raised there.

THE PRESIDENT. Yes.

MR. BENGZON. I believe Commissioner Suarez is clarified.

FR. BERNAS. But I think it should be further clarified with regard to the residence requirement or the place where they vote in
practice; the understanding is that it is flexible. For instance, one might be a resident of Naga or domiciled therein, but he
satisfies the requirement of residence in Manila, so he is able to vote in Manila.

MR. TINGSON. Madam President, may I then suggest to the Committee to change the word Filipinos to QUALIFIED FILIPINO
VOTERS. Instead of VOTING BY FILIPINOS ABROAD, it should be QUALIFIED FILIPINO VOTERS. If the Committee wants
QUALIFIED VOTERS LIVING ABROAD, would that not satisfy the requirement?

THE PRESIDENT. What does Commissioner Monsod say?

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I think I would accept the phrase QUALIFIED FILIPINOS ABROAD because QUALIFIED would
assume that he has the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to vote.

MR. TINGSON. That is right. So does the Committee accept?

FR. BERNAS. QUALIFIED FILIPINOS ABROAD?

THE PRESIDENT. Does the Committee accept the amendment?

MR. REGALADO. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Regalado is recognized.

MR. REGALADO. When Commissioner Bengzon asked me to read my proposed amendment, I specifically stated that the
National Assembly shall prescribe a system which will enable qualified citizens, temporarily absent from the Philippines, to
vote. According to Commissioner Monsod, the use of the phrase absentee voting already took that into account as its
meaning. That is referring to qualified Filipino citizens temporarily abroad.

MR. MONSOD. Yes, we accepted that. I would like to say that with respect to registration we will leave it up to the legislative
assembly, for example, to require where the registration is. If it is, say, members of the diplomatic corps who may be
continuously abroad for a long time, perhaps, there can be a system of registration in the embassies. However, we do not like
to preempt the legislative assembly.

THE PRESIDENT. Just to clarify, Commissioner Monsods amendment is only to provide a system.

MR. MONSOD. Yes.

THE PRESIDENT. The Commissioner is not stating here that he wants new qualifications for these absentee voters.

MR. MONSOD. That is right. They must have the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.

THE PRESIDENT. It is just to devise a system by which they can vote.

MR. MONSOD. That is right, Madam President.[35] (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly therefrom, the intent of the Constitutional Commission is to entrust to Congress the responsibility of devising a system
of absentee voting. The qualifications of voters as stated in Section 1 shall remain except for the residency requirement. This is
in fact the reason why the Constitutional Commission opted for the term qualified Filipinos abroad with respect to the system
of absentee voting that Congress should draw up. As stressed by Commissioner Monsod, by the use of the adjective qualified
with respect to Filipinos abroad, the assumption is that they have the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to vote.
In fine-tuning the provision on absentee voting, the Constitutional Commission discussed how the system should work:

MR. SUAREZ. For clarification purposes, we just want to state for the record that in the case of qualified Filipino citizens
residing abroad and exercising their right of suffrage, they can cast their votes for the candidates in the place where they were
registered to vote in the Philippines. So as to avoid any complications, for example, if they are registered in Angeles City, they
could not vote for a mayor in Naga City.

In other words, if that qualified voter is registered in Angeles City, then he can vote only for the local and national candidates
in Angeles City. I just want to make that clear for the record.

MR. REGALADO. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. What does Commissioner Regalado say?

MR. REGALADO. I just want to make a note on the statement of Commissioner Suarez that this envisions Filipinos residing
abroad. The understanding in the amendment is that the Filipino is temporarily abroad. He may not be actually residing
abroad; he may just be there on a business trip. It just so happens that the day before the elections he has to fly to the United
States, so he could not cast his vote. He is temporarily abroad, but not residing there. He stays in a hotel for two days and
comes back. This is not limited only to Filipinos temporarily residing abroad. But as long as he is temporarily abroad on the
date of the elections, then he can fall within the prescription of Congress in that situation.

MR. SUAREZ. I thank the Commissioner for his further clarification. Precisely, we need this clarification on record.

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, to clarify what we mean by temporarily abroad, it need not be on very short trips. One can
be abroad on a treaty traders visa. Therefore, when we talk about registration, it is possible that his residence is in Angeles
and he would be able to vote for the candidates in Angeles, but Congress or the Assembly may provide the procedure for
registration, like listing ones name, in a registry list in the embassy abroad. That is still possible under the system.

FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just one clarification if Commissioner Monsod agrees with this.

Suppose we have a situation of a child of a diplomatic officer who reaches the voting age while living abroad and he has never
registered here. Where will he register? Will he be a registered voter of a certain locality in the Philippines?

MR. MONSOD. Yes, it is possible that the system will enable that child to comply with the registration requirements in an
embassy in the United States and his name is then entered in the official registration book in Angeles City, for instance.

FR. BERNAS. In other words, he is not a registered voter of Los Angeles, but a registered voter of a locality here.

MR. MONSOD. That is right. He does not have to come home to the Philippines to comply with the registration procedure
here.

FR. BERNAS. So, he does not have to come home.

MR. BENGZON. Madam President, the Floor Leader wishes to inquire if there are more clarifications needed from the body.

Also, the Floor Leader is happy to announce that there are no more registered Commissioners to propose amendments. So I
move that we close the period of amendments.

[36] (Emphasis supplied)

It is clear from these discussions of the members of the Constitutional Commission that they intended to enfranchise as much
as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to
extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider
them qualified as voters for the first time.

It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2 immediately after the residency requirement of
Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, which may be applied in construing
constitutional provisions,[37] the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an
exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission
has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not
satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.

That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement found in Section 1 of the same
Article was in fact the subject of debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the
Senate floor, thus:

Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, this bill should be looked into in relation to the constitutional provisions. I think the sponsor
and I would agree that the Constitution is supreme in any statute that we may enact.

Let me read Section 1, Article V, of the Constitution entitled, Suffrage. It says:

Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least
eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they
propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election.

Now, Mr. President, the Constitution says, who shall have resided in the Philippines. They are permanent immigrants. They
have changed residence so they are barred under the Constitution. This is why I asked whether this committee amendment
which in fact does not alter the original text of the bill will have any effect on this?

Senator Angara. Good question, Mr. President. And this has been asked in various fora. This is in compliance with the
Constitution. One, the interpretation here of residence is synonymous with domicile.

As the gentleman and I know, Mr. President, domicile is the intent to return to ones home. And the fact that a Filipino may
have been physically absent from the Philippines and may be physically a resident of the United States, for example, but has a
clear intent to return to the Philippines, will make him qualified as a resident of the Philippines under this law.

This is consistent, Mr. President, with the constitutional mandate that we that Congress must provide a franchise to overseas
Filipinos.

If we read the Constitution and the suffrage principle literally as demanding physical presence, then there is no way we can
provide for offshore voting to our offshore kababayan, Mr. President.

Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, when the Constitution says, in Section 2 of Article V, it reads: The Congress shall provide a
system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

The key to this whole exercise, Mr. President, is qualified. In other words, anything that we may do or say in granting our
compatriots abroad must be anchored on the proposition that they are qualified. Absent the qualification, they cannot vote.
And residents (sic) is a qualification.

I will lose votes here from permanent residents so-called green-card holders, but the Constitution is the Constitution. We
cannot compromise on this. The Senate cannot be a party to something that would affect or impair the Constitution.

Look at what the Constitution says In the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding
the election.

Mr. President, all of us here have run (sic) for office.

I live in Makati. My neighbor is Pateros where Senator Cayetano lives. We are separated only by a creek. But one who votes in
Makati cannot vote in Pateros unless he resides in Pateros for six months. That is how restrictive our Constitution is. I am not
talking even about the Election Code. I am talking about the Constitution.

As I have said, if a voter in Makati would want to vote in Pateros, yes, he may do so. But he must do so, make the transfer six
months before the election, otherwise, he is not qualified to vote.

That is why I am raising this point because I think we have a fundamental difference here.
Senator Angara. It is a good point to raise, Mr. President. But it is a point already well-debated even in the constitutional
commission of 1986. And the reason Section 2 of Article V was placed immediately after the six-month/one-year residency
requirement is to demonstrate unmistakably that Section 2 which authorizes absentee voting is an exception to the six-
month/one-year residency requirement. That is the first principle, Mr. President, that one must remember.

The second reason, Mr. President, is that under our jurisprudence and I think this is so well-entrenched that one need not
argue about it residency has been interpreted as synonymous with domicile.

But the third more practical reason, Mr. President, is, if we follow the interpretation of the gentleman, then it is legally and
constitutionally impossible to give a franchise to vote to overseas Filipinos who do not physically live in the country, which is
quite ridiculous because that is exactly the whole point of this exercise to enfranchise them and empower them to vote.

[38] (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides for the coverage of the absentee voting process, to wit:

SEC. 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years
of age on the day of elections, may vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.

which does not require physical residency in the Philippines; and Section 5 of the assailed law which enumerates those who
are disqualified, to wit:

SEC. 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act:

a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine laws;

b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have pledged allegiance to a foreign country;

c) Those who have committed and are convicted in a final judgment by a court or tribunal of an offense punishable by
imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, including those who have committed and been found guilty of Disloyalty as
defined under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty:
Provided, however, That any person disqualified to vote under this subsection shall automatically acquire the right to vote
upon expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence; Provided, further, That the Commission may take cognizance of
final judgments issued by foreign courts or tribunals only on the basis of reciprocity and subject to the formalities and
processes prescribed by the Rules of Court on execution of judgments;

d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she executes, upon
registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such
affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the
removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her
permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.

e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or incompetent by competent authority in the Philippines
or abroad, as verified by the Philippine embassies, consulates or foreign service establishments concerned, unless such
competent authority subsequently certifies that such person is no longer insane or incompetent.

As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident who is
recognized as such in the host country because immigration or permanent residence in another country implies renunciation
of ones residence in his country of origin. However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to
register as voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance
of the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee
voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the
Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.
Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit
required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume
residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his
domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution
that proscribes provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political
exercise.

To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents abroad because by their status in their host
countries, they are presumed to have relinquished their intent to return to this country; thus, without the affidavit, the
presumption of abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain.

Further perusal of the transcripts of the Senate proceedings discloses another reason why the Senate required the execution
of said affidavit. It wanted the affiant to exercise the option to return or to express his intention to return to his domicile of
origin and not to preempt that choice by legislation. Thus:

Senator Villar. Yes, we are going back.

It states that: For Filipino immigrants and those who have acquired permanent resident status abroad, a requirement for the
registration is the submission of a Sworn Declaration of Intent to Return duly sworn before any Philippine embassy or
consulate official authorized to administer oath

Mr. President, may we know the rationale of this provision? Is the purpose of this Sworn Declaration to include only those
who have the intention of returning to be qualified to exercise the right of suffrage? What if the Filipino immigrant has no
purpose of returning? Is he automatically disbarred from exercising this right to suffrage?

Senator Angara. The rationale for this, Mr. President, is that we want to be expansive and all-inclusive in this law. That as long
as he is a Filipino, no matter whether he is a green-card holder in the U.S. or not, he will be authorized to vote. But if he is
already a green-card holder, that means he has acquired permanent residency in the United States, then he must indicate an
intention to return. This is what makes for the definition of domicile. And to acquire the vote, we thought that we would
require the immigrants and the green-card holders . . . Mr. President, the three administration senators are leaving, maybe we
may ask for a vote [Laughter].

Senator Villar. For a merienda, Mr. President.

Senator Angara. Mr. President, going back to the business at hand. The rationale for the requirement that an immigrant or a
green-card holder should file an affidavit that he will go back to the Philippines is that, if he is already an immigrant or a green-
card holder, that means he may not return to the country any more and that contradicts the definition of domicile under the
law.

But what we are trying to do here, Mr. President, is really provide the choice to the voter. The voter, after consulting his
lawyer or after deliberation within the family, may decide No, I think we are risking our permanent status in the United States
if we file an affidavit that we want to go back. But we want to give him the opportunity to make that decision. We do not want
to make that decision for him. [39] (Emphasis supplied)

The jurisprudential declaration in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals that green card holders are disqualified to run for any elective
office finds no application to the present case because the Caasi case did not, for obvious reasons, consider the absentee
voting rights of Filipinos who are immigrants and permanent residents in their host countries.

In the advent of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 or R.A. 9189, they may still be considered as a qualified citizen of
the Philippines abroad upon fulfillment of the requirements of registration under the new law for the purpose of exercising
their right of suffrage.

It must be emphasized that Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit or a promise to resume actual physical permanent
residence in the Philippines not later than three years from approval of his/her registration, the Filipinos abroad must also
declare that they have not applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, they must return to the Philippines; otherwise,
their failure to return shall be cause for the removal of their names from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her
permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.

Thus, Congress crafted a process of registration by which a Filipino voter permanently residing abroad who is at least eighteen
years old, not otherwise disqualified by law, who has not relinquished Philippine citizenship and who has not actually
abandoned his/her intentions to return to his/her domicile of origin, the Philippines, is allowed to register and vote in the
Philippine embassy, consulate or other foreign service establishments of the place which has jurisdiction over the country
where he/she has indicated his/her address for purposes of the elections, while providing for safeguards to a clean election.

Thus, Section 11 of R.A. No. 9189 provides:

SEC. 11. Procedure for Application to Vote in Absentia.

11.1. Every qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad whose application for registration has been approved, including those
previously registered under Republic Act No. 8189, shall, in every national election, file with the officer of the embassy,
consulate or other foreign service establishment authorized by the Commission, a sworn written application to vote in a form
prescribed by the Commission. The authorized officer of such embassy, consulate or other foreign service establishment shall
transmit to the Commission the said application to vote within five (5) days from receipt thereof. The application form shall be
accomplished in triplicate and submitted together with the photocopy of his/her overseas absentee voter certificate of
registration.

11.2. Every application to vote in absentia may be done personally at, or by mail to, the embassy, consulate or foreign service
establishment, which has jurisdiction over the country where he/she has indicated his/her address for purposes of the
elections.

11.3. Consular and diplomatic services rendered in connection with the overseas absentee voting processes shall be made
available at no cost to the overseas absentee voter.

Contrary to petitioners claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution, Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of
overseas absentee voting in compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that Congress
provide a system of absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad is not
physically present in the country. The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are components of the system of overseas absentee
voting established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed the affidavit is deemed to have retained his
domicile in the Philippines. He is presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. His having
become an immigrant or permanent resident of his host country does not necessarily imply an abandonment of his intention
to return to his domicile of origin, the Philippines. Therefore, under the law, he must be given the opportunity to express that
he has not actually abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by executing the affidavit required by Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of
the law.

Petitioners speculative apprehension that the implementation of Section 5(d) would affect the credibility of the elections is
insignificant as what is important is to ensure that all those who possess the qualifications to vote on the date of the election
are given the opportunity and permitted to freely do so. The COMELEC and the Department of Foreign Affairs have enough
resources and talents to ensure the integrity and credibility of any election conducted pursuant to R.A. No. 9189.

As to the eventuality that the Filipino abroad would renege on his undertaking to return to the Philippines, the penalty of
perpetual disenfranchisement provided for by Section 5(d) would suffice to serve as deterrence to non-compliance with
his/her undertaking under the affidavit.

Petitioner argues that should a sizable number of immigrants renege on their promise to return, the result of the elections
would be affected and could even be a ground to contest the proclamation of the winning candidates and cause further
confusion and doubt on the integrity of the results of the election. Indeed, the probability that after an immigrant has
exercised the right to vote, he shall opt to remain in his host country beyond the third year from the execution of the affidavit,
is not farfetched. However, it is not for this Court to determine the wisdom of a legislative exercise. As expressed in Taada vs.
Tuvera,[40] the Court is not called upon to rule on the wisdom of the law or to repeal it or modify it if we find it impractical.
Congress itself was conscious of said probability and in fact, it has addressed the expected problem. Section 5(d) itself
provides for a deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to return as promised stands to lose his right of suffrage. Under
Section 9, should a registered overseas absentee voter fail to vote for two consecutive national elections, his name may be
ordered removed from the National Registry of Overseas Absentee Voters.

Other serious legal questions that may be raised would be: what happens to the votes cast by the qualified voters abroad who
were not able to return within three years as promised? What is the effect on the votes cast by the non-returnees in favor of
the winning candidates? The votes cast by qualified Filipinos abroad who failed to return within three years shall not be
invalidated because they were qualified to vote on the date of the elections, but their failure to return shall be cause for the
removal of the names of the immigrants or permanent residents from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and their
permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.

In fine, considering the underlying intent of the Constitution, the Court does not find Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 as
constitutionally defective.

B. Is Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in relation to Section 4 of the same Act in contravention of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution?

Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas absentee voter may vote for president, vice-president, senators and
party-list representatives.

Section 18.5 of the same Act provides:

SEC. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing.

.........

18. 5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a winning candidate if the outcome of the election
will not be affected by the results thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is empowered to order the
proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the scheduled election has not taken place in a particular country or
countries, if the holding of elections therein has been rendered impossible by events, factors and circumstances peculiar to
such country or countries, in which events, factors and circumstances are beyond the control or influence of the Commission.
(Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 empowering the COMELEC to order the proclamation of
winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-
president, is unconstitutional because it violates the following provisions of paragraph 4, Section 4 of Article VII of the
Constitution:

SEC. 4 . . .

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or
city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass,
the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the
presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the
authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and
highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses
of the Congress, voting separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.

...

which gives to Congress the duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for president and vice-president.
The Solicitor General asserts that this provision must be harmonized with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution
and should be taken to mean that COMELEC can only proclaim the winning Senators and party-list representatives but not the
President and Vice-President.[41]

Respondent COMELEC has no comment on the matter.

Indeed, the phrase, proclamation of winning candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too sweeping that it necessarily
includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidency and the vice-presidency.

Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution only insofar as said Section
totally disregarded the authority given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of
president and vice-president.

In addition, the Court notes that Section 18.4 of the law, to wit:

18.4. . . . Immediately upon the completion of the canvass, the chairman of the Special Board of Canvassers shall transmit via
facsimile, electronic mail, or any other means of transmission equally safe and reliable the Certificates of Canvass and the
Statements of Votes to the Commission, . . . [Emphasis supplied]

clashes with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution which provides that the returns of every election for
President and Vice-President shall be certified by the board of canvassers to Congress.

Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by
petitioner, to encroach on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-president and the power to
proclaim the winners for the said positions. The provisions of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the land should be
read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the
winning candidates for president and vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.

C. Are Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 in violation of Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?

Petitioner avers that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violate Article IX-A (Common Provisions) of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on
Elections, and the Commission on Audit. (Emphasis supplied)

He submits that the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee with the power to review, revise, amend and
approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC, R.A. No. 9189 intrudes into the
independence of the COMELEC which, as a constitutional body, is not under the control of either the executive or legislative
departments of government; that only the COMELEC itself can promulgate rules and regulations which may be changed or
revised only by the majority of its members; and that should the rules promulgated by the COMELEC violate any law, it is the
Court that has the power to review the same via the petition of any interested party, including the legislators.

It is only on this question that respondent COMELEC submitted its Comment. It agrees with the petitioner that Sections 19 and
25 of R.A. No. 9189 are unconstitutional. Like the petitioner, respondent COMELEC anchors its claim of unconstitutionality of
said Sections upon Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution providing for the independence of the constitutional commissions
such as the COMELEC. It asserts that its power to formulate rules and regulations has been upheld in Gallardo vs. Tabamo,
Jr.[42] where this Court held that the power of the COMELEC to formulate rules and regulations is implicit in its power to
implement regulations under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C[43] of the Constitution. COMELEC joins the petitioner in asserting
that as an independent constitutional body, it may not be subject to interference by any government instrumentality and that
only this Court may review COMELEC rules and only in cases of grave abuse of discretion.

The COMELEC adds, however, that another provision, vis--vis its rule-making power, to wit:

SEC. 17. Voting by Mail.

17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall authorize voting by mail in not more than three (3) countries, subject
to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee. Voting by mail may be allowed in countries that satisfy the
following conditions:

a) Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to prevent occasion for fraud;

b) Where there exists a technically established identification system that would preclude multiple or proxy voting; and

c) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the embassies, consulates and other foreign service
establishments concerned are adequate and well-secured.

Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee.

. . . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)

is likewise unconstitutional as it violates Section 1, Article IX-A mandating the independence of constitutional commissions.

The Solicitor General takes exception to his prefatory statement that the constitutional challenge must fail and agrees with
the petitioner that Sections 19 and 25 are invalid and unconstitutional on the ground that there is nothing in Article VI of the
Constitution on Legislative Department that would as much as imply that Congress has concurrent power to enforce and
administer election laws with the COMELEC; and by the principles of exclusio unius est exclusio alterius and expressum facit
cessare tacitum, the constitutionally enumerated powers of Congress circumscribe its authority to the exclusion of all others.

The parties are unanimous in claiming that Sections 19, 25 and portions of Section 17.1 are unconstitutional. Thus, there is no
actual issue forged on this question raised by petitioner.

However, the Court finds it expedient to expound on the role of Congress through the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee (JCOC) vis--vis the independence of the COMELEC, as a constitutional body.

R.A. No. 9189 created the JCOC, as follows:

SEC. 25. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. A Joint Congressional Oversight Committee is hereby created, composed of
the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws, and seven (7) other
Senators designated by the Senate President, and the Chairman of the House Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms,
and seven (7) other Members of the House of Representatives designated by the Speaker of the House of Representatives:
Provided, That, of the seven (7) members to be designated by each House of Congress, four (4) should come from the majority
and the remaining three (3) from the minority.

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to monitor and evaluate the implementation of this Act. It
shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission. (Emphasis
supplied)

SEC. 19. Authority of the Commission to Promulgate Rules. The Commission shall issue the necessary rules and regulations to
effectively implement the provisions of this Act within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this Act. The Implementing Rules
and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior
approval.

. . . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Composed of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) is
a purely legislative body. There is no question that the authority of Congress to monitor and evaluate the implementation of
R.A. No. 9189 is geared towards possible amendments or revision of the law itself and thus, may be performed in aid of its
legislation.
However, aside from its monitoring and evaluation functions, R.A. No. 9189 gives to the JCOC the following functions: (a) to
review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) promulgated by the COMELEC [Sections 25
and 19]; and (b) subject to the approval of the JCOC [Section 17.1], the voting by mail in not more than three countries for the
May 2004 elections and in any country determined by COMELEC.

The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is circumscribed by other constitutional provisions. One
such provision is Section 1 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution ordaining that constitutional commissions such as the
COMELEC shall be independent.

Interpreting Section 1, Article X of the 1935 Constitution providing that there shall be an independent COMELEC, the Court has
held that [w]hatever may be the nature of the functions of the Commission on Elections, the fact is that the framers of the
Constitution wanted it to be independent from the other departments of the Government.[44] In an earlier case, the Court
elucidated:

The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of
government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the
case of a less responsible organization. The Commission may err, so may this court also. It should be allowed considerable
latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created
free, orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or
constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere. Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must
be dealt with realistically not from the standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding
facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political
controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions.

[45] (Emphasis supplied)

The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body except those specifically
granted by the Constitution, that is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings.[46] In the same vein, it is not correct to hold
that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence
of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority.

By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress has empowered the COMELEC to issue the necessary rules and regulations
to effectively implement the provisions of this Act within sixty days from the effectivity of this Act. This provision of law
follows the usual procedure in drafting rules and regulations to implement a law the legislature grants an administrative
agency the authority to craft the rules and regulations implementing the law it has enacted, in recognition of the
administrative expertise of that agency in its particular field of operation.[47] Once a law is enacted and approved, the
legislative function is deemed accomplished and complete. The legislative function may spring back to Congress relative to the
same law only if that body deems it proper to review, amend and revise the law, but certainly not to approve, review, revise
and amend the IRR of the COMELEC.

By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003,
Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of
independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual
reticence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.

The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19 stating that [t]he Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be
submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval, and the second
sentence of the second paragraph of Section 25 stating that [i]t shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing
Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission, whereby Congress, in both provisions, arrogates unto itself a function
not specifically vested by the Constitution, should be stricken out of the subject statute for constitutional infirmity. Both
provisions brazenly violate the mandate on the independence of the COMELEC.

Similarly, the phrase, subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee in the first sentence of Section 17.1
which empowers the Commission to authorize voting by mail in not more than three countries for the May, 2004 elections;
and the phrase, only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee found in the second
paragraph of the same section are unconstitutional as they require review and approval of voting by mail in any country after
the 2004 elections. Congress may not confer upon itself the authority to approve or disapprove the countries wherein voting
by mail shall be allowed, as determined by the COMELEC pursuant to the conditions provided for in Section 17.1 of R.A. No.
9189.[48] Otherwise, Congress would overstep the bounds of its constitutional mandate and intrude into the independence of
the COMELEC.

During the deliberations, all the members of the Court agreed to adopt the separate opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno as part
of the ponencia on the unconstitutionality of Sections 17.1, 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 insofar as they relate to the creation of
and the powers given to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are declared VOID for being
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: subject to the approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee;

b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee;

c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to wit: The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be
submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval; and

d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25, to wit: It shall review, revise, amend and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission of the same law;

for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating the independence of constitutional commission,
such as COMELEC.

The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is UPHELD with respect only to the authority given to the COMELEC to
proclaim the winning candidates for the Senators and party-list representatives but not as to the power to canvass the votes
and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President which is lodged with Congress under Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution.

The constitutionality of Section 5(d) is UPHELD.

Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of said law continues to be in full force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-11216 March 6, 1916

COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS, petitioner,

vs.
THE BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONERS, respondent.

Gilbert, Cohn and Fisher for petitioner.

Attorney-General Avanceña for respondent.

MORELAND, J.:

This is an appeal from, or a petition for review of, an order of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners of the Philippine
Islands, requiring the petitioner to file a detailed report of its finances and operations in the form set forth in the petition.

The petitioner alleges that it is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Spain and engaged in business in the
Philippine Islands as a common carrier of passengers and merchandise by water; that on or about the 7th day of June, 1915,
the Board of Public Utility Commissioners issued and caused to be served on petitioner an order to show cause why petitioner
should not be required to present detailed annual reports respecting its finances and operations respecting the vessels owned
and operated by it, in the form and containing the matters indicated by the model attached to the petition; that after a
hearing the Board of Public Utility Commissioners dictated an order in the following terms: "The respondent is therefore
ordered to present annually on or before March first of each year a detailed report of finances and operations of such vessels
as are operated by it as a common carrier within the Philippine Islands, in the form and containing the matters indicated in the
model of annual report which accompanied the order to show cause herein." The model referred to is made a part of this
opinion and may be found in an appendix thereto.

On its return to the order to show cause before the Board of Public Utility Commissioners the petitioner denied the authority
of the board to require the report asked for on the ground that the provision of Act No. 2307 relied on by said board as
authority for such requirement was, if construed as conferring such power, invalid as constituting an unlawful attempt on the
part of the Legislature to delegate legislative power to the board. The petitioner also answered that the requirements of the
board with respect to the proposed report were "cumbersome and unnecessarily prolix and that the preparation of the same
would entail an immense amount of clerical work."

The case coming here under the provision of section 37 of said Act No. 2307, the petitioner raises the same questions that it
presented to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners in its answer to the order to show cause.

The section of Act No. 2307 under which the Board of Public Utility Commissioners relies for its authority, so far as pertinent
to the case at hand, reads as follows:

Sec. 16. The Board shall have power, after hearing, upon notice, by order in writing, to require every public utility as herein
defined:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) To furnish annually a detailed report of finances and operations, in such form and containing such matters as the
Board may from time to time by order prescribe.

As is apparent at a glance the provision conferring authority on the board is very general. It is also very comprehensive. It calls
for a detailed report of the finances and operations of the petitioning steamship company. That, it would seem, covers
substantially everything; for there is very little to a steamship company but its finances and operations. It would have been
practically the same if the statute had given the Board of Public Utility Commissioners power "to require every public utility to
furnish annually a detailed report." Such provision would have been but little broader and little less general than the present
provision. It is clear that a statute which authorizes a Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require detailed reports from
public utilities, leaving the nature of the report, the contents thereof, the general lines which it shall follow, the principle upon
which it shall proceed, indeed, all other matters whatsoever, to the exclusive discretion of the board, is not expressing its own
will or the will of the State with respect to the public utilities to which it refers. Such a provision does not declare, or set out,
or indicate what information the State requires, what is valuable to it, what it needs in order to impose correct and just
taxation, supervision or control, or the facts which the State must have in order to deal justly and equitably with such public
utilities and to require them to deal justly and equitably with the State. The Legislature seems simply to have authorized the
Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require what information the board wants. It would seem that the Legislature, by the
provision in question, delegated to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners all of its powers over a given subject-matter in a
manner almost absolute, and without laying down a rule or even making a suggestion by which that power is to be directed,
guided or applied.

In the case of Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. R. Co. vs. Clinton County Comrs. (1 Ohio St. 77), the court, dealing with the question of
whether a power is strictly legislative, or administrative, or merely relates to the execution of the law, said:

The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what
shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.

This principle was applied in the case of Dowling vs. Lancashire Insurance Co. (92 Wis., 63). In that case the statute provided
that the insurance commissioner shall prepare, approve and adopt a printed form of fire insurance policy to conform as nearly
as might be to that used in the State of New York. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that to be a delegation of legislative
power saying:
The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could
be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others, without the determination of the insurance
commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without
which the act could not possibly be put in use, as an act in conformity to which all fire insurance policies were required to be
issued.

The court also said:

The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the
legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate
of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details, in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in
futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

In the case of Birdsall vs. Clark (73 N. Y., 73), the court said:

If discretion and judgment are to be exercised, either as to time or manner, the body or officer intrusted with the duty must
exercise it, and cannot delegate it to any other officer or person.

See also King vs. Concordia Fire Insurance Co. (140 Mich., 258); O'Neil vs. Fire Insurance Co. (166 Pa. St., 72); Anderson vs.
Manchester Fire Assurance Co. (59 Minn., 182).

In the case of State ex rel. Adams vs. Burdge (95 Wis., 390), a statute authorizing the state board of health "to make rules and
regulations, and to take such measures as may in its judgment be necessary for the protection of the people of the state from
Asiatic cholera, or other dangerous contagious diseases," and declaring that the term "dangerous and contagious diseases,"
and used in the act, "shall be construed and understood to mean such diseases as the state board of health shall designate as
contagious and dangerous to the public health," was held to "import and include an absolute delegation of the legislative
power over the entire subject here involved," and was therefore declared unconstitutional.

In the case of Merchants Exchange vs. Knott (212 Mo., 616), in declaring unconstitutional, on the ground of delegation of
legislative power, a statute authorizing the Board of Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners to establish state inspection of
grain "at such places or in such territory ... as in their opinion may be necessary," the court said:

It is obvious that the foregoing grant of power is given without statutory landmark, compass, map, guide-post or corner-stone
in one whit controlling its exercise or prescribing its channel, or indicative of any certain intendment of the legislative mind,
beyond the mere grant. In essence it is the power of pure and simple despotism.

Commenting on the statute, the court further said:

True, the act was passed by the General Assembly, approved by the Chief Executive and stands published as authenticated
law, but to all intents and purposes it is only a barren ideality, having such life as is thereafter breathed into it from an
unconstitutional source. No Missourian may know whether it applies to him or his concerns, as a rule of civil conduct, or will
ever apply until in the `opinion' of the commissioners it `may be' considered `necessary'.

The General Assembly may not clip itself of one iota of its lawmaking power by a voluntary delegation of any element of it —
by putting its constitutional prerogatives, its conscience and wisdom, "into commission".

In the case of Schaezlein vs. Cabaniss (135 Cal., 466), the question before the court was the validity of the following provision
of the state law of California:

If in any factory or workshop any process or work is carried on by which dust, filaments, or injurious gases are generated or
produced that are liable to be inhaled by the persons employed therein, and it appears to the commissioner . . . . that such
inhalation could, to a great extent, be prevented by the use of some mechanical contrivance, he shall direct that such
contrivance shall be provided, and within a reasonable time it shall be so provided and used."
Another section of the same act made it a misdemeanor for any person to violate any of the provisions of the act including
those above quoted. Respecting the validity of the act the court said:

The manifest objection to this law is, that upon the commission has been imposed not the duty to enforce a law of the
legislature, but the power to make a law for the individual, and to enforce such rules of conduct as he may prescribe. It is thus
arbitrary, special legislation, and violative of the constitution.

The decision in the case of Interstate Commerce Commission vs. Goodrich Transit Co. (224 U. S., 194) seems, by implication at
least, to bear out the theory on which we are deciding this case. The question there involved the validity of an act authorizing
the Interstate Commerce Commission to prescribe the form of accounts, records and memorandums to be kept by carriers,
and to require such carriers to make annual reports to the commission with respect to certain information defined in the act.
One of the questions raised by the steamship company was that section 20 constituted an invalid delegation of legislative
power to the commission. The Supreme Court held that there was no delegation of legislative power, it said:

The Congress may not delegate its purely legislative powers to a commission, but, having laid down the general rules of action
under which a commission shall proceed, it may require of that commission the application of such rules to particular
situations and the investigation of facts, with a view to making orders in a particular matter within the rules laid down by the
Congress. . . .

In section 20 (of the Commerce Act), Congress has authorized the commission to require annual reports. The act itself
prescribes in detail what those reports shall contain. . . . In other words, Congress has laid down general rules for the guidance
of the Commission, leaving to it merely the carrying out of details in the exercise of the power so conferred. This, we think, is
not a delegation of legislative authority.

In another part of the same decision the court said with reference to the form of reports called for by the Interstate
Commerce Commission:

But such report is no broader than the annual report of such carriers, as prescribed by section 20 of the Act.

See also Field vs. Clark (143 U. S., 649); State vs. Great Northern Ry. Co. (100 Minn., 445).

The Attorney-General lay great stress on the case of Kansas City So. Ry. Co. vs. United States (231 U. S., 423). That case,
however, so far as it touched the question of delegation of legislative power, was decided on the principles governing the case
of Interstate Commerce Commission vs. Goodrich Transit Co., supra. Section 20 of the Act referred to in that and in the
Goodrich case sets out in detail the form which the accounts shall take and the matters they shall contain, and even goes into
considerable detail with regard to the classification of the carriers' accounts. In that case the court said:

It amounts, after all, to no more than laying down the general rules of action under which the Commission shall proceed, and
leaving it to the Commission to apply those rules to particular situations and circumstances by the establishment and
enforcement of administrative regulations.

In the case at bar the provision complained of does not law "down the general rules of action under which the commission
shall proceed." nor does it itself prescribe in detail what those reports shall contain. Practically everything is left to the
judgment and discretion of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners, which is unrestrained as to when it shall act, why it shall
act, how it shall act, to what extent it shall act, or what it shall act upon.

We believe that the Legislature, by the provision in question, has abdicated its powers and functions in favor of the Board of
Public Utility Commissioners with respect to the matters therein referred to, and that such Act is in violation of the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902. We believe that the Legislature, by the provision referred to, has not asked for the information which
the State wants but has authorized and board to obtain the information which the board wants.

The order appealed from is set aside and the cause is returned to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners with instructions
to dismiss the proceeding. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Carson and Trent, JJ., dissent.
G.R. No. 17122 February 27, 1922

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANG TANG HO, defendant-appellant.

Williams & Ferrier for appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.

JOHNS, J.:

At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and
holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale
thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and
regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose," the material provisions of which are as follows:

Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary
rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Council of State, temporary rules and
emergency measures for carrying out the purpose of this Act, to wit:

(a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice or corn.

(b) To establish and maintain a government control of the distribution or sale of the commodities referred to or have such
distribution or sale made by the Government itself.

(c) To fix, from time to time the quantities of palay rice, or corn that a company or individual may acquire, and the maximum
sale price that the industrial or merchant may demand.

(d) . . .

SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful to destroy, limit, prevent or in any other manner obstruct the production or milling of palay, rice or
corn for the purpose of raising the prices thereof; to corner or hoard said products as defined in section three of this Act; . . .

Section 3 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or hoarding of palay, rice or corn within the meaning of this Act, but does
not specify the price of rice or define any basic for fixing the price.

SEC. 4. The violations of any of the provisions of this Act or of the regulations, orders and decrees promulgated in accordance
therewith shall be punished by a fine of not more than five thousands pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than two years,
or both, in the discretion of the court: Provided, That in the case of companies or corporations the manager or administrator
shall be criminally liable.

SEC. 7. At any time that the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, shall consider that the public interest
requires the application of the provisions of this Act, he shall so declare by proclamation, and any provisions of other laws
inconsistent herewith shall from then on be temporarily suspended.

Upon the cessation of the reasons for which such proclamation was issued, the Governor-General, with the consent of the
Council of State, shall declare the application of this Act to have likewise terminated, and all laws temporarily suspended by
virtue of the same shall again take effect, but such termination shall not prevent the prosecution of any proceedings or cause
begun prior to such termination, nor the filing of any proceedings for an offense committed during the period covered by the
Governor-General's proclamation.

August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold.

August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at an excessive
price as follows:
The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a violation of Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines,
dated the 1st of August, 1919, in relation with the provisions of sections 1, 2 and 4 of Act No. 2868, committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Ang Tang Ho, voluntarily,
illegally and criminally sold to Pedro Trinidad, one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P.80), which is a price greater
than that fixed by Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, under the
authority of section 1 of Act No. 2868. Contrary to law.

Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500, from
which he appealed to this court, claiming that the lower court erred in finding Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any
force and effect, in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and in imposing the sentence.

The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it was approved July 30, 1919; that the
Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919; and that the law was first published on the 13th of
August, 1919; and that the proclamation itself was first published on the 20th of August, 1919.

The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the Governor-General to fix
the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with the consent of the
Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate
temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of
temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Legislature does not
undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation,
but says that it may be issued "for any cause," and leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to the discretion of the
Governor-General. The Act also says: "For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay,
rice or corn." The Legislature does not specify or define what is "an extraordinary rise." That is also left to the discretion of the
Governor-General. The Act also says that the Governor-General, "with the consent of the Council of State," is authorized to
issue and promulgate "temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act." It does not specify
or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall
remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified
or defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgement and discretion of the Governor-General to say what is
or what is not "a cause," and what is or what is not "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as to what is a temporary
rule or an emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is valid and the
Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or
without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not have been any cause, and the price may not have been
extraordinary, and there may not have been an emergency, but, if the Governor-General found the existence of such facts and
issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime.

By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United States all powers are vested in the Legislative,
Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of the Executive to execute the law; and of the
Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the Executive has no authority
to make or construe the law, and the Judiciary has no power to make or execute the law. Subject to the Constitution only, the
power of each branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the Judiciary only to say when any Act of the
Legislature is or is not constitutional. Assuming, without deciding, that the Legislature itself has the power to fix the price at
which rice is to be sold, can it delegate that power to another, and, if so, was that power legally delegated by Act No. 2868? In
other words, does the Act delegate legislative power to the Governor-General? By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is
vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-
General, or any one else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law. If Act no 2868 is a law unto
itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to
carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the
other hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act remains to be done to
make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative
power, is unconstitutional and void.

The Supreme Court of the United States in what is known as the Granger Cases (94 U.S., 183-187; 24 L. ed., 94), first laid down
the rule:
Railroad companies are engaged in a public employment affecting the public interest and, under the decision in Munn vs. Ill.,
ante, 77, are subject to legislative control as to their rates of fare and freight unless protected by their charters.

The Illinois statute of Mar. 23, 1874, to establish reasonable maximum rates of charges for the transportation of freights and
passengers on the different railroads of the State is not void as being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States or to
that of the State.

It was there for the first time held in substance that a railroad was a public utility, and that, being a public utility, the State had
power to establish reasonable maximum freight and passenger rates. This was followed by the State of Minnesota in enacting
a similar law, providing for, and empowering, a railroad commission to hear and determine what was a just and reasonable
rate. The constitutionality of this law was attacked and upheld by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in a learned and
exhaustive opinion by Justice Mitchell, in the case of State vs. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul ry. Co. (38 Minn., 281), in which
the court held:

Regulations of railway tariffs — Conclusiveness of commission's tariffs. — Under Laws 1887, c. 10, sec. 8, the determination of
the railroad and warehouse commission as to what are equal and reasonable fares and rates for the transportation of persons
and property by a railway company is conclusive, and, in proceedings by mandamus to compel compliance with the tariff of
rates recommended and published by them, no issue can be raised or inquiry had on that question.

Same — constitution — Delegation of power to commission. — The authority thus given to the commission to determine, in
the exercise of their discretion and judgement, what are equal and reasonable rates, is not a delegation of legislative power.

It will be noted that the law creating the railroad commission expressly provides —

That all charges by any common carrier for the transportation of passengers and property shall be equal and reasonable.

With that as a basis for the law, power is then given to the railroad commission to investigate all the facts, to hear and
determine what is a just and reasonable rate. Even then that law does not make the violation of the order of the commission a
crime. The only remedy is a civil proceeding. It was there held —

That the legislative itself has the power to regulate railroad charges is now too well settled to require either argument or
citation of authority.

The difference between the power to say what the law shall be, and the power to adopt rules and regulations, or to
investigate and determine the facts, in order to carry into effect a law already passed, is apparent. The true distinction is
between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and the
conferring an authority or discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.

The legislature enacts that all freights rates and passenger fares should be just and reasonable. It had the undoubted power to
fix these rates at whatever it deemed equal and reasonable.

They have not delegated to the commission any authority or discretion as to what the law shall be, — which would not be
allowable, — but have merely conferred upon it an authority and discretion, to be exercised in the execution of the law, and
under and in pursuance of it, which is entirely permissible. The legislature itself has passed upon the expediency of the law,
and what is shall be. The commission is intrusted with no authority or discretion upon these questions. It can neither make
nor unmake a single provision of law. It is merely charged with the administration of the law, and with no other power.

The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Dowling vs. Lancoshire Ins. Co. (92 Wis.,
63). The opinion says:

"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it
shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made."
The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could
be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others, without the determination of the insurance
commissioner in respect to maters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without
which the act could not possibly be put in use as an act in confirmity to which all fire insurance policies were required to be
issued.

The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the
legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgement of the electors or other appointee or
delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take
effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court in United States vs. Grimaud (220 U.S., 506; 55 L. ed., 563),
where it was held that the rules and regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture as to a trespass on government land in a forest
reserve were valid constitutional. The Act there provided that the Secretary of Agriculture ". . . may make such rules and
regulations and establish such service as will insure the object of such reservations; namely, to regulate their occupancy and
use, and to preserve the forests thereon from destruction; and any violation of the provisions of this act or such rules and
regulations shall be punished, . . ."

The brief of the United States Solicitor-General says:

In refusing permits to use a forest reservation for stock grazing, except upon stated terms or in stated ways, the Secretary of
Agriculture merely assert and enforces the proprietary right of the United States over land which it owns. The regulation of
the Secretary, therefore, is not an exercise of legislative, or even of administrative, power; but is an ordinary and legitimate
refusal of the landowner's authorized agent to allow person having no right in the land to use it as they will. The right of
proprietary control is altogether different from governmental authority.

The opinion says:

From the beginning of the government, various acts have been passed conferring upon executive officers power to make rules
and regulations, — not for the government of their departments, but for administering the laws which did govern. None of
these statutes could confer legislative power. But when Congress had legislated power. But when Congress had legislated and
indicated its will, it could give to those who were to act under such general provisions "power to fill up the details" by the
establishment of administrative rules and regulations, the violation of which could be punished by fine or imprisonment fixed
by Congress, or by penalties fixed by Congress, or measured by the injury done.

That "Congress cannot delegate legislative power is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance
of the system of government ordained by the Constitution."

If, after the passage of the act and the promulgation of the rule, the defendants drove and grazed their sheep upon the
reserve, in violation of the regulations, they were making an unlawful use of the government's property. In doing so they
thereby made themselves liable to the penalty imposed by Congress.

The subjects as to which the Secretary can regulate are defined. The lands are set apart as a forest reserve. He is required to
make provisions to protect them from depredations and from harmful uses. He is authorized 'to regulate the occupancy and
use and to preserve the forests from destruction.' A violation of reasonable rules regulating the use and occupancy of the
property is made a crime, not by the Secretary, but by Congress."

The above are leading cases in the United States on the question of delegating legislative power. It will be noted that in the
"Granger Cases," it was held that a railroad company was a public corporation, and that a railroad was a public utility, and
that, for such reasons, the legislature had the power to fix and determine just and reasonable rates for freight and passengers.

The Minnesota case held that, so long as the rates were just and reasonable, the legislature could delegate the power to
ascertain the facts and determine from the facts what were just and reasonable rates,. and that in vesting the commission
with such power was not a delegation of legislative power.
The Wisconsin case was a civil action founded upon a "Wisconsin standard policy of fire insurance," and the court held that
"the act, . . . wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use
as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others, without the determination of the insurance commissioner in
respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated."

The case of the United States Supreme Court, supra dealt with rules and regulations which were promulgated by the Secretary
of Agriculture for Government land in the forest reserve.

These decisions hold that the legislative only can enact a law, and that it cannot delegate it legislative authority.

The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation of legislative power is pointed out and clearly defined. As
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin says:

That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to any other department of the government,
executive or judicial, is a fundamental principle in constitutional law, essential to the integrity and maintenance of the system
of government established by the constitution.

Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of itself, it may be provided that it shall become
operative only upon some certain act or event, or, in like manner, that its operation shall be suspended.

The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or
state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action to depend.

The Village of Little Chute enacted an ordinance which provides:

All saloons in said village shall be closed at 11 o'clock P.M. each day and remain closed until 5 o'clock on the following
morning, unless by special permission of the president.

Construing it in 136 Wis., 526; 128 A. S. R., 1100,1 the Supreme Court of that State says:

We regard the ordinance as void for two reasons; First, because it attempts to confer arbitrary power upon an executive
officer, and allows him, in executing the ordinance, to make unjust and groundless discriminations among persons similarly
situated; second, because the power to regulate saloons is a law-making power vested in the village board, which cannot be
delegated. A legislative body cannot delegate to a mere administrative officer power to make a law, but it can make a law with
provisions that it shall go into effect or be suspended in its operations upon the ascertainment of a fact or state of facts by an
administrative officer or board. In the present case the ordinance by its terms gives power to the president to decide
arbitrary, and in the exercise of his own discretion, when a saloon shall close. This is an attempt to vest legislative discretion in
him, and cannot be sustained.

The legal principle involved there is squarely in point here.

It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. 2868, and before any rules and regulations were promulgated by the
Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price, even at a peso per "ganta," and that he would not commit a crime,
because there would be no law fixing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime. That is to say, in the
absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant committed a
crime, it was because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature making it a crime to
sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to a crime.

The Executive order2 provides:

(5) The maximum selling price of palay, rice or corn is hereby fixed, for the time being as follows:

In Manila —

Palay at P6.75 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 29 centavos per ganta.

Rice at P15 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 63 centavos per ganta.

Corn at P8 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 34 centavos per ganta.

In the provinces producing palay, rice and corn, the maximum price shall be the Manila price less the cost of transportation
from the source of supply and necessary handling expenses to the place of sale, to be determined by the provincial treasurers
or their deputies.

In provinces, obtaining their supplies from Manila or other producing provinces, the maximum price shall be the authorized
price at the place of supply or the Manila price as the case may be, plus the transportation cost, from the place of supply and
the necessary handling expenses, to the place of sale, to be determined by the provincial treasurers or their deputies.

(6) Provincial treasurers and their deputies are hereby directed to communicate with, and execute all instructions emanating
from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for the most effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations in their
respective localities.

The law says that the Governor-General may fix "the maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant may demand." The
law is a general law and not a local or special law.

The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila and other and different prices in other and different provinces
in the Philippine Islands, and delegates the power to determine the other and different prices to provincial treasurers and
their deputies. Here, then, you would have a delegation of legislative power to the Governor-General, and a delegation by him
of that power to provincial treasurers and their deputies, who "are hereby directed to communicate with, and execute all
instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for the most effective and proper enforcement of the
above regulations in their respective localities." The issuance of the proclamation by the Governor-General was the exercise of
the delegation of a delegated power, and was even a sub delegation of that power.

Assuming that it is valid, Act No. 2868 is a general law and does not authorize the Governor-General to fix one price of rice in
Manila and another price in Iloilo. It only purports to authorize him to fix the price of rice in the Philippine Islands under a law,
which is General and uniform, and not local or special. Under the terms of the law, the price of rice fixed in the proclamation
must be the same all over the Islands. There cannot be one price at Manila and another at Iloilo. Again, it is a mater of
common knowledge, and of which this court will take judicial notice, that there are many kinds of rice with different and
corresponding market values, and that there is a wide range in the price, which varies with the grade and quality. Act No. 2868
makes no distinction in price for the grade or quality of the rice, and the proclamation, upon which the defendant was tried
and convicted, fixes the selling price of rice in Manila "at P15 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 63 centavos per ganta," and is uniform
as to all grades of rice, and says nothing about grade or quality. Again, it will be noted that the law is confined to palay, rice
and corn. They are products of the Philippine Islands. Hemp, tobacco, coconut, chickens, eggs, and many other things are also
products. Any law which single out palay, rice or corn from the numerous other products of the Islands is not general or
uniform, but is a local or special law. If such a law is valid, then by the same principle, the Governor-General could be
authorized by proclamation to fix the price of meat, eggs, chickens, coconut, hemp, and tobacco, or any other product of the
Islands. In the very nature of things, all of that class of laws should be general and uniform. Otherwise, there would be an
unjust discrimination of property rights, which, under the law, must be equal and inform. Act No. 2868 is nothing more than a
floating law, which, in the discretion and by a proclamation of the Governor-General, makes it a floating crime to sell rice at a
price in excess of the proclamation, without regard to grade or quality.

When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the crime.
Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion
of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not "any cause" for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not
"an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn," and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice
should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and
whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The
Legislature did not specify or define what was "any cause," or what was "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or
corn," Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the
proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the
proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant
is charged with the sale "of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed by
Executive order No. 53."

We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the Governor-General in his
discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to
make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.

It may be urged that there was an extraordinary rise in the price of rice and profiteering, which worked a severe hardship on
the poorer classes, and that an emergency existed, but the question here presented is the constitutionality of a particular
portion of a statute, and none of such matters is an argument for, or against, its constitutionality.

The Constitution is something solid, permanent an substantial. Its stability protects the life, liberty and property rights of the
rich and the poor alike, and that protection ought not to change with the wind or any emergency condition. The fundamental
question involved in this case is the right of the people of the Philippine Islands to be and live under a republican form of
government. We make the broad statement that no state or nation, living under republican form of government, under the
terms and conditions specified in Act No. 2868, has ever enacted a law delegating the power to any one, to fix the price at
which rice should be sold. That power can never be delegated under a republican form of government.

In the fixing of the price at which the defendant should sell his rice, the law was not dealing with government property. It was
dealing with private property and private rights, which are sacred under the Constitution. If this law should be sustained, upon
the same principle and for the same reason, the Legislature could authorize the Governor-General to fix the price of every
product or commodity in the Philippine Islands, and empower him to make it a crime to sell any product at any other or
different price.

It may be said that this was a war measure, and that for such reason the provision of the Constitution should be suspended.
But the Stubborn fact remains that at all times the judicial power was in full force and effect, and that while that power was in
force and effect, such a provision of the Constitution could not be, and was not, suspended even in times of war. It may be
claimed that during the war, the United States Government undertook to, and did, fix the price at which wheat and flour
should be bought and sold, and that is true. There, the United States had declared war, and at the time was at war with other
nations, and it was a war measure, but it is also true that in doing so, and as a part of the same act, the United States
commandeered all the wheat and flour, and took possession of it, either actual or constructive, and the government itself
became the owner of the wheat and flour, and fixed the price to be paid for it. That is not this case. Here the rice sold was the
personal and private property of the defendant, who sold it to one of his customers. The government had not bought and did
not claim to own the rice, or have any interest in it, and at the time of the alleged sale, it was the personal, private property of
the defendant. It may be that the law was passed in the interest of the public, but the members of this court have taken on
solemn oath to uphold and defend the Constitution, and it ought not to be construed to meet the changing winds or
emergency conditions. Again, we say that no state or nation under a republican form of government ever enacted a law
authorizing any executive, under the conditions states, to fix the price at which a price person would sell his own rice, and
make the broad statement that no decision of any court, on principle or by analogy, will ever be found which sustains the
constitutionality of the particular portion of Act No. 2868 here in question. By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to
constitutional limitations, the power to legislate and enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by a
direct vote of the people of the Philippine Islands. As to the question here involved, the authority of the Governor-General to
fix the maximum price at which palay, rice and corn may be sold in the manner power in violation of the organic law.

This opinion is confined to the particular question here involved, which is the right of the Governor-General, upon the terms
and conditions stated in the Act, to fix the price of rice and make it a crime to sell it at a higher price, and which holds that
portions of the Act unconstitutional. It does not decide or undertake to construe the constitutionality of any of the remaining
portions of the Act.

The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant discharged. So ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Street and Ostrand, JJ., concur.

Romualdez, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., concurring:

I concur in the result for reasons which reach both the facts and the law. In the first place, as to the facts, — one cannot be
convicted ex post facto of a violation of a law and of an executive order issued pursuant to the law, when the alleged violation
thereof occurred on August 6, 1919, while the Act of the Legislature in question was not published until August 13, 1919, and
the order was not published until August 20, 1919. In the second place, as to the law, — one cannot be convicted of a
violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable
standard of guilt. (U.S. vs. Cohen Grocery Company [1921], 255 U.S., 81, holding section 4 of the Federal Food Control Act of
August 10, 1917, as amended, invalid.)

In order that there may not be any misunderstanding of our position, I would respectfully invite attention to the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in German Alliance Ins. Co. vs. Lewis ([1914, 233 U.S., 389), concerning the legislative
regulation of the prices charged by business affected with a public interest, and to another decision of the United States
Supreme Court, that of Marshall Field & Co. vs. Clark ([1892], 143 U.S., 649), which adopts as its own the principles laid down
in the case of Locke's Appeal ([1873], 72 Pa. St., 491), namely; "The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law; but it
can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make,
its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and
useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry
and determination outside of the halls of legislation."

G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General Tuason and City Fiscal Diaz for the Government.
De Witt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile for the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation.
Vicente J. Francisco, Feria and La O, Orense and Belmonte, and Gibbs and McDonough for respondent Cu Unjieng.
No appearance for respondent Judge.

LAUREL, J.:

This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for the issuance of the writ of certiorari and of prohibition
to the Court of First Instance of Manila so that this court may review the actuations of the aforesaid Court of First Instance in
criminal case No. 42649 entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", more particularly the
application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221, and thereafter
prohibit the said Court of First Instance from taking any further action or entertaining further the aforementioned application
for probation, to the end that the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with
the final judgment of conviction rendered by this court in said case (G. R. No. 41200). 1

Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, are respectively the
plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case
entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", criminal case No. 42649 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila and G.R. No. 41200 of this court. Respondent herein, Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the
seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for
probation in the aforesaid criminal case.

The information in the aforesaid criminal case was filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila on October 15, 1931,
petitioner herein Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation intervening in the case as private prosecutor. After a
protracted trial unparalleled in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence both in the length of time spent by the court as well as
in the volume in the testimony and the bulk of the exhibits presented, the Court of First Instance of Manila, on January 8,
1934, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging
from four years and two months of prision correccional to eight years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation
of civil action to the offended party, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Upon appeal, the court, on March 26,
1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from five years and six months of prision correccional to seven
years, six months and twenty-seven days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Mariano Cu
Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were denied on December 17,
1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on December 18, 1935. The defendant thereupon sought to have the case
elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied the petition for certiorari in
November, 1936. This court, on November 24, 1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by the defendant for leave
to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for
execution of the judgment.

The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng on
November 27, 1936, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Herein
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted,
that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The Court of First Instance of Manila,
Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended
denial of the same June 18, 1937. Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera
presiding, set the petition for hearing on April 5, 1937.

On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to the herein respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on April 5, 1937, alleging, among other things, that Act
No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of
section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its
applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with
the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective provinces. The private
prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No.
4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).
The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the private prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning
the constitutionality of Act No. 4221.

On June 28, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution with a finding that "las pruebas no han
establecido de unamanera concluyente la culpabilidad del peticionario y que todos los hechos probados no son inconsistentes
o incongrentes con su inocencia" and concludes that the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda
racional" of the crime of which he stands convicted by this court in G.R. No. 41200, but denying the latter's petition for
probation for the reason that:

. . . Si este Juzgado concediera la poblacion solicitada por las circunstancias y la historia social que se han expuesto en el
cuerpo de esta resolucion, que hacen al peticionario acreedor de la misma, una parte de la opinion publica, atizada por los
recelos y las suspicacias, podria levantarse indignada contra un sistema de probacion que permite atisbar en los
procedimientos ordinarios de una causa criminal perturbando la quietud y la eficacia de las decisiones ya recaidas al traer a la
superficie conclusiones enteramente differentes, en menoscabo del interes publico que demanda el respeto de las leyes y del
veredicto judicial.

On July 3, 1937, counsel for the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng filed an exception to the resolution denying probation
and a notice of intention to file a motion for reconsideration. An alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed
by counsel on July 13, 1937. This was supplemented by an additional motion for reconsideration submitted on July 14, 1937.
The aforesaid motions were set for hearing on July 31, 1937, but said hearing was postponed at the petition of counsel for the
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng because a motion for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by thirty-three
(thirty-four) attorneys had just been filed with the trial court. Attorney Eulalio Chaves whose signature appears in the
aforesaid motion subsequently filed a petition for leave to withdraw his appearance as amicus curiae on the ground that the
motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was circulated at a banquet given by counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng on the
evening of July 30, 1937, and that he signed the same "without mature deliberation and purely as a matter of courtesy to the
person who invited me (him)."

On August 6, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for the issuance of an order of execution
of the judgment of this court in said case and forthwith to commit the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng to jail in
obedience to said judgment.
On August 7, 1937, the private prosecution filed its opposition to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae
aforementioned, asking that a date be set for a hearing of the same and that, at all events, said motion should be denied with
respect to certain attorneys signing the same who were members of the legal staff of the several counsel for Mariano Cu
Unjieng. On August 10, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera issued an order requiring all parties including the movants
for intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on August 14, 1937. On the last-mentioned date, the Fiscal of the
City of Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for execution of judgment in preference to the motion for leave to
intervene as amici curiae but, upon objection of counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng, he moved for the postponement of the
hearing of both motions. The respondent judge thereupon set the hearing of the motion for execution on August 21, 1937,
but proceeded to consider the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the circumstances
under which said motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to court was to have been heard on
August 19, 1937. But at this juncture, herein petitioners came to this court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to
what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Manila which fostered "the campaign of
the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him,
exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a
final judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng."

The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a temporary restraining order by
this court on August 21, 1937.

To support their petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition, herein petitioners allege that
the respondent judge has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of his jurisdiction:

I. Because said respondent judge lacks the power to place respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng under probation for the following
reason:

(1) Under section 11 of Act No. 4221, the said of the Philippine Legislature is made to apply only to the provinces of the
Philippines; it nowhere states that it is to be made applicable to chartered cities like the City of Manila.

(2) While section 37 of the Administrative Code contains a proviso to the effect that in the absence of a special provision, the
term "province" may be construed to include the City of Manila for the purpose of giving effect to laws of general application,
it is also true that Act No. 4221 is not a law of general application because it is made to apply only to those provinces in which
the respective provincial boards shall have provided for the salary of a probation officer.

(3) Even if the City of Manila were considered to be a province, still, Act No. 4221 would not be applicable to it because it has
provided for the salary of a probation officer as required by section 11 thereof; it being immaterial that there is an Insular
Probation Officer willing to act for the City of Manila, said Probation Officer provided for in section 10 of Act No. 4221 being
different and distinct from the Probation Officer provided for in section 11 of the same Act.

II. Because even if the respondent judge originally had jurisdiction to entertain the application for probation of the respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng, he nevertheless acted without jurisdiction or in excess thereof in continuing to entertain the motion for
reconsideration and by failing to commit Mariano Cu Unjieng to prison after he had promulgated his resolution of June 28,
1937, denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's application for probation, for the reason that:

(1) His jurisdiction and power in probation proceedings is limited by Act No. 4221 to the granting or denying of applications for
probation.

(2) After he had issued the order denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's petition for probation on June 28, 1937, it became final and
executory at the moment of its rendition.

(3) No right on appeal exists in such cases.

(4) The respondent judge lacks the power to grant a rehearing of said order or to modify or change the same.
III. Because the respondent judge made a finding that Mariano Cu Unjieng is innocent of the crime for which he was convicted
by final judgment of this court, which finding is not only presumptuous but without foundation in fact and in law, and is
furthermore in contempt of this court and a violation of the respondent's oath of office as ad interim judge of first instance.

IV. Because the respondent judge has violated and continues to violate his duty, which became imperative when he issued his
order of June 28, 1937, denying the application for probation, to commit his co-respondent to jail.

Petitioners also avers that they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In a supplementary petition filed on September 9, 1937, the petitioner Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation further
contends that Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature providing for a system of probation for persons eighteen years of age
or over who are convicted of crime, is unconstitutional because it is violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III, of the
Constitution of the Philippines guaranteeing equal protection of the laws because it confers upon the provincial board of its
province the absolute discretion to make said law operative or otherwise in their respective provinces, because it constitutes
an unlawful and improper delegation to the provincial boards of the several provinces of the legislative power lodged by the
Jones Law (section 8) in the Philippine Legislature and by the Constitution (section 1, Art. VI) in the National Assembly; and for
the further reason that it gives the provincial boards, in contravention of the Constitution (section 2, Art. VIII) and the Jones
Law (section 28), the authority to enlarge the powers of the Court of First Instance of different provinces without uniformity.
In another supplementary petition dated September 14, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila, in behalf of one of the
petitioners, the People of the Philippine Islands, concurs for the first time with the issues raised by other petitioner regarding
the constitutionality of Act No. 4221, and on the oral argument held on October 6, 1937, further elaborated on the theory that
probation is a form of reprieve and therefore Act. No. 4221 is an encroachment on the exclusive power of the Chief Executive
to grant pardons and reprieves. On October 7, 1937, the City Fiscal filed two memorandums in which he contended that Act
No. 4221 not only encroaches upon the pardoning power to the executive, but also constitute an unwarranted delegation of
legislative power and a denial of the equal protection of the laws. On October 9, 1937, two memorandums, signed jointly by
the City Fiscal and the Solicitor-General, acting in behalf of the People of the Philippine Islands, and by counsel for the
petitioner, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, one sustaining the power of the state to impugn the validity of
its own laws and the other contending that Act No. 4221 constitutes an unwarranted delegation of legislative power, were
presented. Another joint memorandum was filed by the same persons on the same day, October 9, 1937, alleging that Act No.
4221 is unconstitutional because it denies the equal protection of the laws and constitutes an unlawful delegation of
legislative power and, further, that the whole Act is void: that the Commonwealth is not estopped from questioning the
validity of its laws; that the private prosecution may intervene in probation proceedings and may attack the probation law as
unconstitutional; and that this court may pass upon the constitutional question in prohibition proceedings.

Respondents in their answer dated August 31, 1937, as well as in their oral argument and memorandums, challenge each and
every one of the foregoing proposition raised by the petitioners.

As special defenses, respondents allege:

(1) That the present petition does not state facts sufficient in law to warrant the issuance of the writ of certiorari or of
prohibition.

(2) That the aforesaid petition is premature because the remedy sought by the petitioners is the very same remedy prayed for
by them before the trial court and was still pending resolution before the trial court when the present petition was filed with
this court.

(3) That the petitioners having themselves raised the question as to the execution of judgment before the trial court, said trial
court has acquired exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the same under the theory that its resolution denying probation is
unappealable.

(4) That upon the hypothesis that this court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance to decide the question
as to whether or not the execution will lie, this court nevertheless cannot exercise said jurisdiction while the Court of First
Instance has assumed jurisdiction over the same upon motion of herein petitioners themselves.
(5) That upon the procedure followed by the herein petitioners in seeking to deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction over the
case and elevate the proceedings to this court, should not be tolerated because it impairs the authority and dignity of the trial
court which court while sitting in the probation cases is "a court of limited jurisdiction but of great dignity."

(6) That under the supposition that this court has jurisdiction to resolve the question submitted to and pending resolution by
the trial court, the present action would not lie because the resolution of the trial court denying probation is appealable; for
although the Probation Law does not specifically provide that an applicant for probation may appeal from a resolution of the
Court of First Instance denying probation, still it is a general rule in this jurisdiction that a final order, resolution or decision of
an inferior court is appealable to the superior court.

(7) That the resolution of the trial court denying probation of herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng being appealable, the
same had not become final and executory for the reason that the said respondent had filed an alternative motion for
reconsideration and new trial within the requisite period of fifteen days, which motion the trial court was able to resolve in
view of the restraining order improvidently and erroneously issued by this court.lawphi1.net

(8) That the Fiscal of the City of Manila had by implication admitted that the resolution of the trial court denying probation is
not final and unappealable when he presented his answer to the motion for reconsideration and agreed to the postponement
of the hearing of the said motion.

(9) That under the supposition that the order of the trial court denying probation is not appealable, it is incumbent upon the
accused to file an action for the issuance of the writ of certiorari with mandamus, it appearing that the trial court, although it
believed that the accused was entitled to probation, nevertheless denied probation for fear of criticism because the accused is
a rich man; and that, before a petition for certiorari grounded on an irregular exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court could
lie, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration specifying the error committed so that the trial
court could have an opportunity to correct or cure the same.

(10) That on hypothesis that the resolution of this court is not appealable, the trial court retains its jurisdiction within a
reasonable time to correct or modify it in accordance with law and justice; that this power to alter or modify an order or
resolution is inherent in the courts and may be exercise either motu proprio or upon petition of the proper party, the petition
in the latter case taking the form of a motion for reconsideration.

(11) That on the hypothesis that the resolution of the trial court is appealable as respondent allege, said court cannot order
execution of the same while it is on appeal, for then the appeal would not be availing because the doors of probation will be
closed from the moment the accused commences to serve his sentence (Act No. 4221, sec. 1; U.S. vs. Cook, 19 Fed. [2d], 827).

In their memorandums filed on October 23, 1937, counsel for the respondents maintain that Act No. 4221 is constitutional
because, contrary to the allegations of the petitioners, it does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power, does
not infringe the equal protection clause of the Constitution, and does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the
Executive. In an additional memorandum filed on the same date, counsel for the respondents reiterate the view that section
11 of Act No. 4221 is free from constitutional objections and contend, in addition, that the private prosecution may not
intervene in probation proceedings, much less question the validity of Act No. 4221; that both the City Fiscal and the Solicitor-
General are estopped from questioning the validity of the Act; that the validity of Act cannot be attacked for the first time
before this court; that probation in unavailable; and that, in any event, section 11 of the Act No. 4221 is separable from the
rest of the Act. The last memorandum for the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng was denied for having been filed out of time
but was admitted by resolution of this court and filed anew on November 5, 1937. This memorandum elaborates on
some of the points raised by the respondents and refutes those brought up by the petitioners.

In the scrutiny of the pleadings and examination of the various aspects of the present case, we noted that the court below, in
passing upon the merits of the application of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng and in denying said application assumed the
task not only of considering the merits of the application, but of passing upon the culpability of the applicant, notwithstanding
the final pronouncement of guilt by this court. (G.R. No. 41200.) Probation implies guilt be final judgment. While a probation
case may look into the circumstances attending the commission of the offense, this does not authorize it to reverse the
findings and conclusive of this court, either directly or indirectly, especially wherefrom its own admission reliance was merely
had on the printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of the parties. As already observed by this court in Shioji vs. Harvey
([1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and reiterated in subsequent cases, "if each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the
privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would result." A
becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and
operation of the intergrated judicial system of the nation.

After threshing carefully the multifarious issues raised by both counsel for the petitioners and the respondents, this court
prefers to cut the Gordian knot and take up at once the two fundamental questions presented, namely, (1) whether or not the
constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised in these proceedings; and (2) in the affirmative, whether or not said
Act is constitutional. Considerations of these issues will involve a discussion of certain incidental questions raised by the
parties.

To arrive at a correct conclusion on the first question, resort to certain guiding principles is necessary. It is a well-settled rule
that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly
raised and presented inappropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota presented. (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu [1915], 30 Phil., 563, 568; 6 R. C. L., pp. 76, 77; 12 C. J.,
pp. 780-782, 783.)

The question of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature is frequently raised in ordinary actions. Nevertheless, resort
may be made to extraordinary legal remedies, particularly where the remedies in the ordinary course of law even if available,
are not plain, speedy and adequate. Thus, in Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone ([1922]), 42 Phil., 818), this court held that the question
of the constitutionality of a statute may be raised by the petitioner in mandamus proceedings (see, also, 12 C. J., p. 783); and
in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927], 50 Phil., 259 [affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands (1928), 277 U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845]), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an
action of quo warranto brought in the name of the Government of the Philippines. It has also been held that the
constitutionality of a statute may be questioned in habeas corpus proceedings (12 C. J., p. 783; Bailey on Habeas Corpus, Vol. I,
pp. 97, 117), although there are authorities to the contrary; on an application for injunction to restrain action under the
challenged statute (mandatory, see Cruz vs. Youngberg [1931], 56 Phil., 234); and even on an application for preliminary
injunction where the determination of the constitutional question is necessary to a decision of the case. (12 C. J., p. 783.) The
same may be said as regards prohibition and certiorari.(Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U. S., 500;
70 Law. ed., 1059; Bell vs. First Judicial District Court [1905], 28 Nev., 280; 81 Pac., 875; 113 A. S. R., 854; 6 Ann. Cas., 982; 1 L.
R. A. [N. S], 843, and cases cited). The case of Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, decided by this court twelve years ago was, like
the present one, an original action for certiorari and prohibition. The constitutionality of Act No. 2972, popularly known as the
Chinese Bookkeeping Law, was there challenged by the petitioners, and the constitutional issue was not met squarely by the
respondent in a demurrer. A point was raised "relating to the propriety of the constitutional question being decided in original
proceedings in prohibition." This court decided to take up the constitutional question and, with two justices dissenting, held
that Act No. 2972 was constitutional. The case was elevated on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States
which reversed the judgment of this court and held that the Act was invalid. (271 U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059.) On the
question of jurisdiction, however, the Federal Supreme Court, though its Chief Justice, said:

By the Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands, section 516, the Philippine supreme court is granted concurrent
jurisdiction in prohibition with courts of first instance over inferior tribunals or persons, and original jurisdiction over courts of
first instance, when such courts are exercising functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction. It has been held by that
court that the question of the validity of the criminal statute must usually be raised by a defendant in the trial court and be
carried regularly in review to the Supreme Court. (Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192). But in this
case where a new act seriously affected numerous persons and extensive property rights, and was likely to cause a multiplicity
of actions, the Supreme Court exercised its discretion to bring the issue to the act's validity promptly before it and decide in
the interest of the orderly administration of justice. The court relied by analogy upon the cases of Ex parte Young (209 U. S.,
123;52 Law ed., 714; 13 L. R. A. [N. S.] 932; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 441; 14 Ann. Ca., 764; Traux vs. Raich, 239 U. S., 33; 60 Law. ed.,
131; L. R. A. 1916D, 545; 36 Sup. Ct. Rep., 7; Ann. Cas., 1917B, 283; and Wilson vs. New, 243 U. S., 332; 61 Law. ed., 755; L. R.
A. 1917E, 938; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 298; Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1024). Although objection to the jurisdiction was raise by demurrer to
the petition, this is now disclaimed on behalf of the respondents, and both parties ask a decision on the merits. In view of the
broad powers in prohibition granted to that court under the Island Code, we acquiesce in the desire of the parties.

The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior
court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (High,
Extraordinary Legal Remedies, p. 705.) The general rule, although there is a conflict in the cases, is that the merit of
prohibition will not lie whether the inferior court has jurisdiction independent of the statute the constitutionality of which is
questioned, because in such cases the interior court having jurisdiction may itself determine the constitutionality of the
statute, and its decision may be subject to review, and consequently the complainant in such cases ordinarily has adequate
remedy by appeal without resort to the writ of prohibition. But where the inferior court or tribunal derives its jurisdiction
exclusively from an unconstitutional statute, it may be prevented by the writ of prohibition from enforcing that statute. (50 C.
J., 670; Ex parte Round tree [1874, 51 Ala., 42; In re Macfarland, 30 App. [D. C.], 365; Curtis vs. Cornish [1912], 109 Me., 384;
84 A., 799; Pennington vs. Woolfolk [1880], 79 Ky., 13; State vs. Godfrey [1903], 54 W. Va., 54; 46 S. E., 185; Arnold vs. Shields
[1837], 5 Dana, 19; 30 Am. Dec., 669.)

Courts of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings derived their jurisdiction solely from Act No. 4221 which prescribes in
detailed manner the procedure for granting probation to accused persons after their conviction has become final and before
they have served their sentence. It is true that at common law the authority of the courts to suspend temporarily the
execution of the sentence is recognized and, according to a number of state courts, including those of Massachusetts,
Michigan, New York, and Ohio, the power is inherent in the courts (Commonwealth vs. Dowdican's Bail [1874], 115 Mass.,
133; People vs. Stickel [1909], 156 Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Session [1894], 141 N. Y.,
288; Weber vs. State [1898], 58 Ohio St., 616). But, in the leading case of Ex parte United States ([1916], 242 U. S., 27; 61 Law.
ed., 129; L. R. A., 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355), the Supreme Court of the United States expressed
the opinion that under the common law the power of the court was limited to temporary suspension, and brushed aside the
contention as to inherent judicial power saying, through Chief Justice White:

Indisputably under our constitutional system the right to try offenses against the criminal laws and upon conviction to impose
the punishment provided by law is judicial, and it is equally to be conceded that, in exerting the powers vested in them on
such subject, courts inherently possess ample right to exercise reasonable, that is, judicial, discretion to enable them to wisely
exert their authority. But these concessions afford no ground for the contention as to power here made, since it must rest
upon the proposition that the power to enforce begets inherently a discretion to permanently refuse to do so. And the effect
of the proposition urged upon the distribution of powers made by the Constitution will become apparent when it is observed
that indisputable also is it that the authority to define and fix the punishment for crime is legislative and includes the right in
advance to bring within judicial discretion, for the purpose of executing the statute, elements of consideration which would be
otherwise beyond the scope of judicial authority, and that the right to relieve from the punishment, fixed by law and
ascertained according to the methods by it provided belongs to the executive department.

Justice Carson, in his illuminating concurring opinion in the case of Director of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite (29
Phil., 265), decided by this court in 1915, also reached the conclusion that the power to suspend the execution of sentences
pronounced in criminal cases is not inherent in the judicial function. "All are agreed", he said, "that in the absence of statutory
authority, it does not lie within the power of the courts to grant such suspensions." (at p. 278.) Both petitioner and
respondents are correct, therefore, when they argue that a Court of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings is a court of
limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in such proceedings is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature.

It is, of course, true that the constitutionality of a statute will not be considered on application for prohibition where the
question has not been properly brought to the attention of the court by objection of some kind (Hill vs. Tarver [1901], 130
Ala., 592; 30 S., 499; State ex rel. Kelly vs. Kirby [1914], 260 Mo., 120; 168 S. W., 746). In the case at bar, it is unquestionable
that the constitutional issue has been squarely presented not only before this court by the petitioners but also before the trial
court by the private prosecution. The respondent, Hon. Jose O Vera, however, acting as judge of the court below, declined to
pass upon the question on the ground that the private prosecutor, not being a party whose rights are affected by the statute,
may not raise said question. The respondent judge cited Cooley on Constitutional Limitations (Vol. I, p. 339; 12 C. J., sec. 177,
pp. 760 and 762), and McGlue vs. Essex County ([1916], 225 Mass., 59; 113 N. E., 742, 743), as authority for the proposition
that a court will not consider any attack made on the constitutionality of a statute by one who has no interest in defeating it
because his rights are not affected by its operation. The respondent judge further stated that it may not motu proprio take up
the constitutional question and, agreeing with Cooley that "the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the
judge, conscious of the fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously
and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility" (Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 332),
proceeded on the assumption that Act No. 4221 is constitutional. While therefore, the court a quo admits that the
constitutional question was raised before it, it refused to consider the question solely because it was not raised by a proper
party. Respondents herein reiterates this view. The argument is advanced that the private prosecution has no personality to
appear in the hearing of the application for probation of defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng in criminal case No. 42648 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, and hence the issue of constitutionality was not properly raised in the lower court. Although,
as a general rule, only those who are parties to a suit may question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial
decision, it has been held that since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, where the jurisdiction of
the court depends on the validity of the statute in question, the issue of the constitutionality will be considered on its being
brought to the attention of the court by persons interested in the effect to be given the statute.(12 C. J., sec. 184, p. 766.)
And, even if we were to concede that the issue was not properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it does not
follow that the issue may not be here raised in an original action of certiorari and prohibitions. It is true that, as a general rule,
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it
may not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not considered on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786. See, also,
Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But we must state that the general rule admits of
exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sounds discretion, may determine the time when a question affecting the
constitutionality of a statute should be presented. (In re Woolsey [1884], 95 N. Y., 135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases, although
there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the first time at any stage of the
proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786.) Even in civil cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a
court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for the first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of
the question is necessary to a decision of the case. (McCabe's Adm'x vs. Maysville & B. S. R. Co., [1910], 136 ky., 674; 124 S.
W., 892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis Cordage Co. [1908], 214 Mo., 685; 113 S. W. 1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co., [1905],
188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.) And it has been held that a constitutional question will be considered by an appellate court at
any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below (State vs. Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561; 57 S., 870.) As to the
power of this court to consider the constitutional question raised for the first time before this court in these proceedings, we
turn again and point with emphasis to the case of Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra. And on the hypotheses that the Hongkong
& Shanghai Banking Corporation, represented by the private prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the constitutional
question here — a point we do not now have to decide — we are of the opinion that the People of the Philippines,
represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a proper party in the present proceedings.
The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if
Act No. 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a
substantial interest in having it set aside. Of grater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is
the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule
that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927]), 50 Phil.,
259 (affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U.S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared
an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action instituted in behalf of the Government of the Philippines. In Attorney
General vs. Perkins ([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41 N. W. 426, 428, 429), the State of Michigan, through its Attorney
General, instituted quo warranto proceedings to test the right of the respondents to renew a mining corporation, alleging that
the statute under which the respondents base their right was unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation of contracts.
The capacity of the chief law officer of the state to question the constitutionality of the statute was though, as a general rule,
only those who are parties to a suit may question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been
held that since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction in void, where the jurisdiction of the court depends on
the validity of the statute in question, the issue of constitutionality will be considered on its being brought to the attention of
the court by persons interested in the effect to begin the statute. (12 C.J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we were to concede
that the issue was not properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it does not follow that the issue may not be here
raised in an original action of certiorari and prohibition. It is true that, as a general rule, the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised a the trial, and if not
raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. (12 C.J., p. 786. See, also, Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del
Rosario, 26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But we must state that the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sound
discretion, may determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented. (In re
Woolsey [19884], 95 N.Y., 135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases, although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that
the question may be raised for the first time at any state of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. (12 C.J., p.
786.) Even in civil cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for
first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the case. (McCabe's Adm'x
vs. Maysville & B. S. R. Co. [1910], 136 Ky., 674; 124 S. W., 892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis, Cordage Co. [1908], 214 Mo. 685; 113
S. W., 1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co. [1905], 188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.) And it has been held that a constitutional
question will be considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below (State vs.
Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561; 57 S., 870.) As to the power of this court to consider the constitutional question raised for the first
time before this court in these proceedings, we turn again and point with emphasis to the case of Yu Cong Eng. vs. Trinidad,
supra. And on the hypothesis that the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, represented by the private prosecution, is
not the proper party to raise the constitutional question here — a point we do not now have to decide — we are of the
opinion that the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a
proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the Constitution, the People of the Philippines, in
whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage
caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement
of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. In Government of
the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927]), 50 Phil., 259 (affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands [1928],
277 U.S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action instituted in behalf
of the Government of the Philippines. In Attorney General vs. Perkings([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41 N.W., 426, 428,
429), the State of Michigan, through its Attorney General, instituted quo warranto proceedings to test the right of the
respondents to renew a mining corporation, alleging that the statute under which the respondents base their right was
unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation of contracts. The capacity of the chief law officer of the state to question
the constitutionality of the statute was itself questioned. Said the Supreme Court of Michigan, through Champlin, J.:

. . . The idea seems to be that the people are estopped from questioning the validity of a law enacted by their representatives;
that to an accusation by the people of Michigan of usurpation their government, a statute enacted by the people of Michigan
is an adequate answer. The last proposition is true, but, if the statute relied on in justification is unconstitutional, it is statute
only in form, and lacks the force of law, and is of no more saving effect to justify action under it than if it had never been
enacted. The constitution is the supreme law, and to its behests the courts, the legislature, and the people must bow . . . The
legislature and the respondents are not the only parties in interest upon such constitutional questions. As was remarked by
Mr. Justice Story, in speaking of an acquiescence by a party affected by an unconstitutional act of the legislature: "The people
have a deep and vested interest in maintaining all the constitutional limitations upon the exercise of legislative powers." (Allen
vs. Mckeen, 1 Sum., 314.)

In State vs. Doane ([1916], 98 Kan., 435; 158 Pac., 38, 40), an original action (mandamus) was brought by the Attorney-General
of Kansas to test the constitutionality of a statute of the state. In disposing of the question whether or not the state may bring
the action, the Supreme Court of Kansas said:

. . . the state is a proper party — indeed, the proper party — to bring this action. The state is always interested where the
integrity of its Constitution or statutes is involved.

"It has an interest in seeing that the will of the Legislature is not disregarded, and need not, as an individual plaintiff must,
show grounds of fearing more specific injury. (State vs. Kansas City 60 Kan., 518 [57 Pac., 118])." (State vs. Lawrence, 80 Kan.,
707; 103 Pac., 839.)

Where the constitutionality of a statute is in doubt the state's law officer, its Attorney-General, or county attorney, may
exercise his bet judgment as to what sort of action he will bring to have the matter determined, either by quo warranto to
challenge its validity (State vs. Johnson, 61 Kan., 803; 60 Pac., 1068; 49 L.R.A., 662), by mandamus to compel obedience to its
terms (State vs. Dolley, 82 Kan., 533; 108 Pac., 846), or by injunction to restrain proceedings under its questionable provisions
(State ex rel. vs. City of Neodesha, 3 Kan. App., 319; 45 Pac., 122).

Other courts have reached the same conclusion (See State vs. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. [1917], 197 S. W., 1006; State vs. S.H.
Kress & Co. [1934], 155 S., 823; State vs. Walmsley [1935], 181 La., 597; 160 S., 91; State vs. Board of County Comr's [1934], 39
Pac. [2d], 286; First Const. Co. of Brooklyn vs. State [1917], 211 N.Y., 295; 116 N.E., 1020; Bush vs. State {1918], 187 Ind., 339;
119 N.E., 417; State vs. Watkins [1933], 176 La., 837; 147 S., 8, 10, 11). In the case last cited, the Supreme Court of Luisiana
said:

It is contended by counsel for Herbert Watkins that a district attorney, being charged with the duty of enforcing the laws, has
no right to plead that a law is unconstitutional. In support of the argument three decisions are cited, viz.: State ex rel. Hall,
District Attorney, vs. Judge of Tenth Judicial District (33 La. Ann., 1222); State ex rel. Nicholls, Governor vs. Shakespeare,
Mayor of New Orleans (41 Ann., 156; 6 So., 592); and State ex rel., Banking Co., etc. vs. Heard, Auditor (47 La. Ann., 1679; 18
So., 746; 47 L. R. A., 512). These decisions do not forbid a district attorney to plead that a statute is unconstitutional if he finds
if in conflict with one which it is his duty to enforce. In State ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge, etc., the ruling was the
judge should not, merely because he believed a certain statute to be unconstitutional forbid the district attorney to file a bill
of information charging a person with a violation of the statute. In other words, a judge should not judicially declare a statute
unconstitutional until the question of constitutionality is tendered for decision, and unless it must be decided in order to
determine the right of a party litigant. State ex rel. Nicholls, Governor, etc., is authority for the proposition merely that an
officer on whom a statute imposes the duty of enforcing its provisions cannot avoid the duty upon the ground that he
considers the statute unconstitutional, and hence in enforcing the statute he is immune from responsibility if the statute be
unconstitutional. State ex rel. Banking Co., etc., is authority for the proposition merely that executive officers, e.g., the state
auditor and state treasurer, should not decline to perform ministerial duties imposed upon them by a statute, on the ground
that they believe the statute is unconstitutional.

It is the duty of a district attorney to enforce the criminal laws of the state, and, above all, to support the Constitution of the
state. If, in the performance of his duty he finds two statutes in conflict with each other, or one which repeals another, and if,
in his judgment, one of the two statutes is unconstitutional, it is his duty to enforce the other; and, in order to do so, he is
compelled to submit to the court, by way of a plea, that one of the statutes is unconstitutional. If it were not so, the power of
the Legislature would be free from constitutional limitations in the enactment of criminal laws.

The respondents do not seem to doubt seriously the correctness of the general proposition that the state may impugn the
validity of its laws. They have not cited any authority running clearly in the opposite direction. In fact, they appear to have
proceeded on the assumption that the rule as stated is sound but that it has no application in the present case, nor may it be
invoked by the City Fiscal in behalf of the People of the Philippines, one of the petitioners herein, the principal reasons being
that the validity before this court, that the City Fiscal is estopped from attacking the validity of the Act and, not authorized
challenge the validity of the Act in its application outside said city. (Additional memorandum of respondents, October 23,
1937, pp. 8,. 10, 17 and 23.)

The mere fact that the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon the past and all that time has not been attacked as
unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the contrary, has been impliedly regarded by him as constitutional, is no
reason for considering the People of the Philippines estopped from nor assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a
constitutional questions only when presented before it in bona fide cases for determination, and the fact that the question
has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. The fiscal and all others are justified
in relying upon the statute and treating it as valid until it is held void by the courts in proper cases.

It remains to consider whether the determination of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is necessary to the resolution of the
instant case. For, ". . . while the court will meet the question with firmness, where its decision is indispensable, it is the part of
wisdom, and just respect for the legislature, renders it proper, to waive it, if the case in which it arises, can be decided on
other points." (Ex parte Randolph [1833], 20 F. Cas. No. 11, 558; 2 Brock., 447. Vide, also Hoover vs. wood [1857], 9 Ind., 286,
287.) It has been held that the determination of a constitutional question is necessary whenever it is essential to the decision
of the case (12 C. J., p. 782, citing Long Sault Dev. Co. vs. Kennedy [1913], 158 App. Div., 398; 143 N. Y. Supp., 454 [aff. 212
N.Y., 1: 105 N. E., 849; Ann. Cas. 1915D, 56; and app dism 242 U.S., 272]; Hesse vs. Ledesma, 7 Porto Rico Fed., 520; Cowan vs.
Doddridge, 22 Gratt [63 Va.], 458; Union Line Co., vs. Wisconsin R. Commn., 146 Wis., 523; 129 N. W., 605), as where the right
of a party is founded solely on a statute the validity of which is attacked. (12 C.J., p. 782, citing Central Glass Co. vs. Niagrara F.
Ins. Co., 131 La., 513; 59 S., 972; Cheney vs. Beverly, 188 Mass., 81; 74 N.E., 306). There is no doubt that the respondent Cu
Unjieng draws his privilege to probation solely from Act No. 4221 now being assailed.

Apart from the foregoing considerations, that court will also take cognizance of the fact that the Probation Act is a new
addition to our statute books and its validity has never before been passed upon by the courts; that may persons accused and
convicted of crime in the City of Manila have applied for probation; that some of them are already on probation; that more
people will likely take advantage of the Probation Act in the future; and that the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng has been at
large for a period of about four years since his first conviction. All wait the decision of this court on the constitutional
question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits,
strong reasons of public policy demand that the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 be now resolved. (Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad
[1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U.S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059. See 6 R.C.L., pp. 77, 78; People vs. Kennedy [1913], 207 N.Y.,
533; 101 N.E., 442, 444; Ann. Cas. 1914C, 616; Borginis vs. Falk Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327; 133 N.W., 209, 211; 37 L.R.A. [N.S.]
489; Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304.) In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, an analogous situation
confronted us. We said: "Inasmuch as the property and personal rights of nearly twelve thousand merchants are affected by
these proceedings, and inasmuch as Act No. 2972 is a new law not yet interpreted by the courts, in the interest of the public
welfare and for the advancement of public policy, we have determined to overrule the defense of want of jurisdiction in order
that we may decide the main issue. We have here an extraordinary situation which calls for a relaxation of the general rule."
Our ruling on this point was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States. A more binding authority in support of the
view we have taken can not be found.
We have reached the conclusion that the question of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised. Now for
the main inquiry: Is the Act unconstitutional?

Under a doctrine peculiarly American, it is the office and duty of the judiciary to enforce the Constitution. This court, by clear
implication from the provisions of section 2, subsection 1, and section 10, of Article VIII of the Constitution, may declare an act
of the national legislature invalid because in conflict with the fundamental lay. It will not shirk from its sworn duty to enforce
the Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to give effect to the supreme law by setting aside a statute in conflict
therewith. This is of the essence of judicial duty.

This court is not unmindful of the fundamental criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in
favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature approved by the executive, is presumed to be within
constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature
as well. "The question of the validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government
itself." (U.S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1, 10; Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser [1913], 24 Phil., 250, 276; U.S. vs. Joson
[1913], 26 Phil., 1.) And a statute finally comes before the courts sustained by the sanction of the executive. The members of
the Legislature and the Chief Executive have taken an oath to support the Constitution and it must be presumed that they
have been true to this oath and that in enacting and sanctioning a particular law they did not intend to violate the
Constitution. The courts cannot but cautiously exercise its power to overturn the solemn declarations of two of the three
grand departments of the governments. (6 R.C.L., p. 101.) Then, there is that peculiar political philosophy which bids the
judiciary to reflect the wisdom of the people as expressed through an elective Legislature and an elective Chief Executive. It
follows, therefore, that the courts will not set aside a law as violative of the Constitution except in a clear case. This is a
proposition too plain to require a citation of authorities.

One of the counsel for respondents, in the course of his impassioned argument, called attention to the fact that the President
of the Philippines had already expressed his opinion against the constitutionality of the Probation Act, adverting that as to the
Executive the resolution of this question was a foregone conclusion. Counsel, however, reiterated his confidence in the
integrity and independence of this court. We take notice of the fact that the President in his message dated September 1,
1937, recommended to the National Assembly the immediate repeal of the Probation Act (No. 4221); that this message
resulted in the approval of Bill No. 2417 of the Nationality Assembly repealing the probation Act, subject to certain conditions
therein mentioned; but that said bill was vetoed by the President on September 13, 1937, much against his wish, "to have
stricken out from the statute books of the Commonwealth a law . . . unfair and very likely unconstitutional." It is sufficient to
observe in this connection that, in vetoing the bill referred to, the President exercised his constitutional prerogative. He may
express the reasons which he may deem proper for taking such a step, but his reasons are not binding upon us in the
determination of actual controversies submitted for our determination. Whether or not the Executive should express or in any
manner insinuate his opinion on a matter encompassed within his broad constitutional power of veto but which happens to
be at the same time pending determination in this court is a question of propriety for him exclusively to decide or determine.
Whatever opinion is expressed by him under these circumstances, however, cannot sway our judgment on way or another
and prevent us from taking what in our opinion is the proper course of action to take in a given case. It if is ever necessary for
us to make any vehement affirmance during this formative period of our political history, it is that we are independent of the
Executive no less than of the Legislative department of our government — independent in the performance of our functions,
undeterred by any consideration, free from politics, indifferent to popularity, and unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment
of our sworn duty as we see it and as we understand it.

The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That said Act encroaches upon the
pardoning power of the Executive; (2) that its constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (3) that it denies the
equal protection of the laws.

1. Section 21 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law, in force at the time of the
approval of Act No. 4221, otherwise known as the Probation Act, vests in the Governor-General of the Philippines "the
exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures". This power is now vested in the President of
the Philippines. (Art. VII, sec. 11, subsec. 6.) The provisions of the Jones Law and the Constitution differ in some respects. The
adjective "exclusive" found in the Jones Law has been omitted from the Constitution. Under the Jones Law, as at common law,
pardon could be granted any time after the commission of the offense, either before or after conviction (Vide Constitution of
the United States, Art. II, sec. 2; In re Lontok [1922], 43 Phil., 293). The Governor-General of the Philippines was thus
empowered, like the President of the United States, to pardon a person before the facts of the case were fully brought to
light. The framers of our Constitution thought this undesirable and, following most of the state constitutions, provided that
the pardoning power can only be exercised "after conviction". So, too, under the new Constitution, the pardoning power does
not extend to "cases of impeachment". This is also the rule generally followed in the United States (Vide Constitution of the
United States, Art. II, sec. 2). The rule in England is different. There, a royal pardon can not be pleaded in bar of an
impeachment; "but," says Blackstone, "after the impeachment has been solemnly heard and determined, it is not understood
that the king's royal grace is further restrained or abridged." (Vide, Ex parte Wells [1856], 18 How., 307; 15 Law. ed., 421;
Com. vs. Lockwood [1872], 109 Mass., 323; 12 Am. Rep., 699; Sterling vs. Drake [1876], 29 Ohio St., 457; 23 am. Rep., 762.)
The reason for the distinction is obvious. In England, Judgment on impeachment is not confined to mere "removal from office
and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the Government" (Art. IX, sec. 4, Constitution
of the Philippines) but extends to the whole punishment attached by law to the offense committed. The House of Lords, on a
conviction may, by its sentence, inflict capital punishment, perpetual banishment, perpetual banishment, fine or
imprisonment, depending upon the gravity of the offense committed, together with removal from office and incapacity to
hold office. (Com. vs. Lockwood, supra.) Our Constitution also makes specific mention of "commutation" and of the power of
the executive to impose, in the pardons he may grant, such conditions, restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper.
Amnesty may be granted by the President under the Constitution but only with the concurrence of the National Assembly. We
need not dwell at length on the significance of these fundamental changes. It is sufficient for our purposes to state that the
pardoning power has remained essentially the same. The question is: Has the pardoning power of the Chief Executive under
the Jones Law been impaired by the Probation Act?

As already stated, the Jones Law vests the pardoning power exclusively in the Chief Executive. The exercise of the power may
not, therefore, be vested in anyone else.
". . . The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in the executive cannot be taken away nor fettered by any legislative
restrictions, nor can like power be given by the legislature to any other officer or authority. The coordinate departments of
government have nothing to do with the pardoning power, since no person properly belonging to one of the departments can
exercise any powers appertaining to either of the others except in cases expressly provided for by the constitution." (20 R.C.L.,
pp., , and cases cited.) " . . . where the pardoning power is conferred on the executive without express or implied limitations,
the grant is exclusive, and the legislature can neither exercise such power itself nor delegate it elsewhere, nor interfere with
or control the proper exercise thereof, . . ." (12 C.J., pp. 838, 839, and cases cited.) If Act No. 4221, then, confers any
pardoning power upon the courts it is for that reason unconstitutional and void. But does it?

In the famous Killitts decision involving an embezzlement case, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in 1916 that an
order indefinitely suspending sentenced was void. (Ex parte United States [1916], 242 U.S., 27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L.R.A. 1917E,
1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355.) Chief Justice White, after an exhaustive review of the authorities, expressed
the opinion of the court that under the common law the power of the court was limited to temporary suspension and that the
right to suspend sentenced absolutely and permanently was vested in the executive branch of the government and not in the
judiciary. But, the right of Congress to establish probation by statute was conceded. Said the court through its Chief Justice: ".
. . and so far as the future is concerned, that is, the causing of the imposition of penalties as fixed to be subject, by probation
legislation or such other means as the legislative mind may devise, to such judicial discretion as may be adequate to enable
courts to meet by the exercise of an enlarged but wise discretion the infinite variations which may be presented to them for
judgment, recourse must be had Congress whose legislative power on the subject is in the very nature of things adequately
complete." (Quoted in Riggs vs. United States [1926], 14 F. [2d], 5, 6.) This decision led the National Probation Association and
others to agitate for the enactment by Congress of a federal probation law. Such action was finally taken on March 4, 1925
(chap. 521, 43 Stat. L. 159, U.S.C. title 18, sec. 724). This was followed by an appropriation to defray the salaries and expenses
of a certain number of probation officers chosen by civil service. (Johnson, Probation for Juveniles and Adults, p. 14.)

In United States vs. Murray ([1925], 275 U.S., 347; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; 72 Law. ed., 309), the Supreme Court of the United
States, through Chief Justice Taft, held that when a person sentenced to imprisonment by a district court has begun to serve
his sentence, that court has no power under the Probation Act of March 4, 1925 to grant him probation even though the term
at which sentence was imposed had not yet expired. In this case of Murray, the constitutionality of the probation Act was not
considered but was assumed. The court traced the history of the Act and quoted from the report of the Committee on the
Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives (Report No. 1377, 68th Congress, 2 Session) the following statement:

Prior to the so-called Killitts case, rendered in December, 1916, the district courts exercised a form of probation either, by
suspending sentence or by placing the defendants under state probation officers or volunteers. In this case, however (Ex parte
United States, 242 U.S., 27; 61 L. Ed., 129; L.R.A., 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72 Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355), the Supreme Court
denied the right of the district courts to suspend sentenced. In the same opinion the court pointed out the necessity for action
by Congress if the courts were to exercise probation powers in the future . . .
Since this decision was rendered, two attempts have been made to enact probation legislation. In 1917, a bill was favorably
reported by the Judiciary Committee and passed the House. In 1920, the judiciary Committee again favorably reported a
probation bill to the House, but it was never reached for definite action.

If this bill is enacted into law, it will bring the policy of the Federal government with reference to its treatment of those
convicted of violations of its criminal laws in harmony with that of the states of the Union. At the present time every state has
a probation law, and in all but twelve states the law applies both to adult and juvenile offenders. (see, also, Johnson,
Probation for Juveniles and Adults [1928], Chap. I.)

The constitutionality of the federal probation law has been sustained by inferior federal courts. In Riggs vs. United States
supra, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit said:

Since the passage of the Probation Act of March 4, 1925, the questions under consideration have been reviewed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit (7 F. [2d], 590), and the constitutionality of the act fully sustained, and the same held in
no manner to encroach upon the pardoning power of the President. This case will be found to contain an able and
comprehensive review of the law applicable here. It arose under the act we have to consider, and to it and the authorities
cited therein special reference is made (Nix vs. James, 7 F. [2d], 590, 594), as is also to a decision of the Circuit Court of
Appeals of the Seventh Circuit (Kriebel vs. U.S., 10 F. [2d], 762), likewise construing the Probation Act.

We have seen that in 1916 the Supreme Court of the United States; in plain and unequivocal language, pointed to Congress as
possessing the requisite power to enact probation laws, that a federal probation law as actually enacted in 1925, and that the
constitutionality of the Act has been assumed by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1928 and consistently sustained
by the inferior federal courts in a number of earlier cases.

We are fully convinced that the Philippine Legislature, like the Congress of the United States, may legally enact a probation
law under its broad power to fix the punishment of any and all penal offenses. This conclusion is supported by other
authorities. In Ex parte Bates ([1915], 20 N. M., 542; L.R.A. 1916A, 1285; 151 Pac., 698, the court said: "It is clearly within the
province of the Legislature to denominate and define all classes of crime, and to prescribe for each a minimum and maximum
punishment." And in State vs. Abbott ([1910], 87 S.C., 466; 33 L.R.A. [N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1189), the court
said: "The legislative power to set punishment for crime is very broad, and in the exercise of this power the general assembly
may confer on trial judges, if it sees fit, the largest discretion as to the sentence to be imposed, as to the beginning and end of
the punishment and whether it should be certain or indeterminate or conditional." (Quoted in State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C.,
455; 95 S. E., 69.) Indeed, the Philippine Legislature has defined all crimes and fixed the penalties for their violation. Invariably,
the legislature has demonstrated the desire to vest in the courts — particularly the trial courts — large discretion in imposing
the penalties which the law prescribes in particular cases. It is believed that justice can best be served by vesting this power in
the courts, they being in a position to best determine the penalties which an individual convict, peculiarly circumstanced,
should suffer. Thus, while courts are not allowed to refrain from imposing a sentence merely because, taking into
consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense, the penalty provided by law is clearly excessive, the
courts being allowed in such case to submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as it
may deem proper (see art. 5, Revised Penal Code), in cases where both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are
attendant in the commission of a crime and the law provides for a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the courts
may allow such circumstances to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, and to apply the
penalty according to the result of such compensation. (Art. 63, rule 4, Revised Penal Code; U.S. vs. Reguera and Asuategui
[1921], 41 Phil., 506.) Again, article 64, paragraph 7, of the Revised Penal Code empowers the courts to determine, within the
limits of each periods, in case the penalty prescribed by law contains three periods, the extent of the evil produced by the
crime. In the imposition of fines, the courts are allowed to fix any amount within the limits established by law, considering not
only the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, but more particularly the wealth or means of the culprit. (Art. 66, Revised
Penal Code.) Article 68, paragraph 1, of the same Code provides that "a discretionary penalty shall be imposed" upon a person
under fifteen but over nine years of age, who has not acted without discernment, but always lower by two degrees at least
than that prescribed by law for the crime which he has committed. Article 69 of the same Code provides that in case of
"incomplete self-defense", i.e., when the crime committed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the
conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in article 11 and 12
of the Code, "the courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and
nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking." And, in case the commission of what are known as "impossible"
crimes, "the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender," shall impose upon
him either arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos. (Art. 59, Revised Penal Code.)

Under our Revised Penal Code, also, one-half of the period of preventive imprisonment is deducted form the entire term of
imprisonment, except in certain cases expressly mentioned (art. 29); the death penalty is not imposed when the guilty person
is more than seventy years of age, or where upon appeal or revision of the case by the Supreme Court, all the members
thereof are not unanimous in their voting as to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty (art. 47, see also, sec. 133,
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3); the death sentence is not to be inflicted upon a
woman within the three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, or upon any person over
seventy years of age (art. 83); and when a convict shall become insane or an imbecile after final sentence has been
pronounced, or while he is serving his sentenced, the execution of said sentence shall be suspended with regard to the
personal penalty during the period of such insanity or imbecility (art. 79).

But the desire of the legislature to relax what might result in the undue harshness of the penal laws is more clearly
demonstrated in various other enactments, including the probation Act. There is the Indeterminate Sentence Law enacted in
1933 as Act No. 4103 and subsequently amended by Act No. 4225, establishing a system of parole (secs. 5 to 100 and granting
the courts large discretion in imposing the penalties of the law. Section 1 of the law as amended provides; "hereafter, in
imposing a prison sentence for an offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence
the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and to a minimum which shall be within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum
fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." Certain classes of
convicts are, by section 2 of the law, excluded from the operation thereof. The Legislature has also enacted the Juvenile
Delinquency Law (Act No. 3203) which was subsequently amended by Act No. 3559. Section 7 of the original Act and section 1
of the amendatory Act have become article 80 of the Revised Penal Code, amended by Act No. 4117 of the Philippine
Legislature and recently reamended by Commonwealth Act No. 99 of the National Assembly. In this Act is again manifested
the intention of the legislature to "humanize" the penal laws. It allows, in effect, the modification in particular cases of the
penalties prescribed by law by permitting the suspension of the execution of the judgment in the discretion of the trial court,
after due hearing and after investigation of the particular circumstances of the offenses, the criminal record, if any, of the
convict, and his social history. The Legislature has in reality decreed that in certain cases no punishment at all shall be suffered
by the convict as long as the conditions of probation are faithfully observed. It this be so, then, it cannot be said that the
Probation Act comes in conflict with the power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and reprieves, because, to use the
language of the Supreme Court of New Mexico, "the element of punishment or the penalty for the commission of a wrong,
while to be declared by the courts as a judicial function under and within the limits of law as announced by legislative acts,
concerns solely the procedure and conduct of criminal causes, with which the executive can have nothing to do." (Ex parte
Bates, supra.) In Williams vs. State ([1926], 162 Ga., 327; 133 S.E., 843), the court upheld the constitutionality of the Georgia
probation statute against the contention that it attempted to delegate to the courts the pardoning power lodged by the
constitution in the governor alone is vested with the power to pardon after final sentence has been imposed by the courts,
the power of the courts to imposed any penalty which may be from time to time prescribed by law and in such manner as may
be defined cannot be questioned."

We realize, of course, the conflict which the American cases disclose. Some cases hold it unlawful for the legislature to vest in
the courts the power to suspend the operation of a sentenced, by probation or otherwise, as to do so would encroach upon
the pardoning power of the executive. (In re Webb [1895], 89 Wis., 354; 27 L.R.A., 356; 46 Am. St. Rep., 846; 62 N.W., 177; 9
Am. Crim., Rep., 702; State ex rel. Summerfield vs. Moran [1919], 43 Nev., 150; 182 Pac., 927; Ex parte Clendenning [1908], 22
Okla., 108; 1 Okla. Crim. Rep., 227; 19 L.R.A. [N.S.], 1041; 132 Am. St. Rep., 628; 97 Pac., 650; People vs. Barrett [1903], 202 Ill,
287; 67 N.E., 23; 63 L.R.A., 82; 95 Am. St. Rep., 230; Snodgrass vs. State [1912], 67 Tex. Crim. Rep., 615; 41 L. R. A. [N. S.],
1144; 150 S. W., 162; Ex parte Shelor [1910], 33 Nev., 361;111 Pac., 291; Neal vs. State [1898], 104 Ga., 509; 42 L. R. A., 190;
69 Am. St. Rep., 175; 30 S. E. 858; State ex rel. Payne vs. Anderson [1921], 43 S. D., 630; 181 N. W., 839; People vs. Brown, 54
Mich., 15; 19 N. W., 571; States vs. Dalton [1903], 109 Tenn., 544; 72 S. W., 456.)

Other cases, however, hold contra. (Nix vs. James [1925; C. C. A., 9th], 7 F. [2d], 590; Archer vs. Snook [1926; D. C.], 10 F. [2d],
567; Riggs. vs. United States [1926; C. C. A. 4th], 14]) [2d], 5; Murphy vs. States [1926], 171 Ark., 620; 286 S. W., 871; 48 A. L.
R., 1189; Re Giannini [1912], 18 Cal. App., 166; 122 Pac., 831; Re Nachnaber [1928], 89 Cal. App., 530; 265 Pac., 392; Ex parte
De Voe [1931], 114 Cal. App., 730; 300 Pac., 874; People vs. Patrick [1897], 118 Cal., 332; 50 Pac., 425; Martin vs. People
[1917], 69 Colo., 60; 168 Pac., 1171; Belden vs. Hugo [1914], 88 Conn., 50; 91 A., 369, 370, 371; Williams vs. State [1926], 162
Ga., 327; 133 S. E., 843; People vs. Heise [1913], 257 Ill., 443; 100 N. E., 1000; Parker vs. State [1893], 135 Ind., 534; 35 N. E.,
179; 23 L. R. A., 859; St. Hillarie, Petitioner [1906], 101 Me., 522; 64 Atl., 882; People vs. Stickle [1909], 156 Mich., 557; 121 N.
W., 497; State vs. Fjolander [1914], 125 Minn., 529; State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court [1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237 Pac.,
525; State vs. Everitt [1913], 164 N. C., 399; 79 S. E., 274; 47 L. R. A. [N. S.], 848; State ex rel. Buckley vs. Drew [1909], 75 N. H.,
402; 74 Atl., 875; State vs. Osborne [1911], 79 N. J. Eq., 430; 82 Atl. 424; Ex parte Bates [1915], 20 N. M., 542; L. R. A., 1916 A.
1285; 151 Pac., 698; People vs. ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Session [1894], 141 N. Y., 288; 23 L. R. A., 856; 36 N. E., 386; 15 Am.
Crim. Rep., 675; People ex rel. Sullivan vs. Flynn [1907], 55 Misc., 639; 106 N. Y. Supp., 928; People vs. Goodrich [1914], 149 N.
Y. Supp., 406; Moore vs. Thorn [1935], 245 App. Div., 180; 281 N. Y. Supp., 49; Re Hart [1914], 29 N. D., 38; L. R. A., 1915C,
1169; 149 N. W., 568; Ex parte Eaton [1925], 29 Okla., Crim. Rep., 275; 233 P., 781; State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455; 95 S.
E., 69; State vs. Abbot [1910], 87 S. C., 466; 33 L.R.A., [N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas., 1912B, 1189; Fults vs. States [1854],34
Tenn., 232; Woods vs. State [1814], 130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W., 558; Baker vs. State [1814], 130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W., 558;
Baker vs. State [1913],70 Tex., Crim. Rep., 618; 158 S. W., 998; Cook vs. State [1914], 73 Tex. Crim. Rep., 548; 165 S. W., 573;
King vs. State [1914], 72 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932], 122 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890;
Clare vs. State [1932], 122 Tex. Crim. Rep., 211; 54 S. W. [2d], 127; Re Hall [1927], 100 Vt., 197; 136 A., 24; Richardson vs. Com.
[1921], 131 Va., 802; 109 S.E., 460; State vs. Mallahan [1911], 65 Wash., 287; 118 Pac., 42; State ex rel. Tingstand vs. Starwich
[1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R., 393; 396.) We elect to follow this long catena of authorities holding that the
courts may be legally authorized by the legislature to suspend sentence by the establishment of a system of probation
however characterized. State ex rel. Tingstand vs. Starwich ([1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R., 393), deserved
particular mention. In that case, a statute enacted in 1921 which provided for the suspension of the execution of a sentence
until otherwise ordered by the court, and required that the convicted person be placed under the charge of a parole or peace
officer during the term of such suspension, on such terms as the court may determine, was held constitutional and as not
giving the court a power in violation of the constitutional provision vesting the pardoning power in the chief executive of the
state. (Vide, also, Re Giannini [1912], 18 Cal App., 166; 122 Pac., 831.)

Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually district and different from each other,
both in origin and in nature. In People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Sessions ([1894], 141 N. Y., 288, 294; 36 N. E., 386, 388; 23 L.
R. A., 856; 15 Am. Crim. Rep., 675), the Court of Appeals of New York said:

. . . The power to suspend sentence and the power to grant reprieves and pardons, as understood when the constitution was
adopted, are totally distinct and different in their nature. The former was always a part of the judicial power; the latter was
always a part of the executive power. The suspension of the sentence simply postpones the judgment of the court temporarily
or indefinitely, but the conviction and liability following it, and the civil disabilities, remain and become operative when
judgment is rendered. A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender. It
releases the punishment, and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law, the offender is as innocent as if he
had never committed the offense. It removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights. It makes
him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. (Ex parte Garland, 71 U. S., 4 Wall., 333; 18 Law. ed., 366;
U. S. vs. Klein, 80 U. S., 13 Wall., 128; 20 Law. ed., 519; Knote vs. U. S., 95 U. S., 149; 24 Law. ed., 442.)

The framers of the federal and the state constitutions were perfectly familiar with the principles governing the power to grant
pardons, and it was conferred by these instruments upon the executive with full knowledge of the law upon the subject, and
the words of the constitution were used to express the authority formerly exercised by the English crown, or by its
representatives in the colonies. (Ex parte Wells, 59 U. S., 18 How., 307; 15 Law. ed., 421.) As this power was understood, it did
not comprehend any part of the judicial functions to suspend sentence, and it was never intended that the authority to grant
reprieves and pardons should abrogate, or in any degree restrict, the exercise of that power in regard to its own judgments,
that criminal courts has so long maintained. The two powers, so distinct and different in their nature and character, were still
left separate and distinct, the one to be exercised by the executive, and the other by the judicial department. We therefore
conclude that a statute which, in terms, authorizes courts of criminal jurisdiction to suspend sentence in certain cases after
conviction, — a power inherent in such courts at common law, which was understood when the constitution was adopted to
be an ordinary judicial function, and which, ever since its adoption, has been exercised of legislative power under the
constitution. It does not encroach, in any just sense, upon the powers of the executive, as they have been understood and
practiced from the earliest times. (Quoted with approval in Directors of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite [1915], 29
Phil., 265, Carson, J., concurring, at pp. 294, 295.)

In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and completely exonerated. He is
not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts. Under the Probation Act, the probationer's case is not
terminated by the mere fact that he is placed on probation. Section 4 of the Act provides that the probation may be definitely
terminated and the probationer finally discharged from supervision only after the period of probation shall have been
terminated and the probation officer shall have submitted a report, and the court shall have found that the probationer has
complied with the conditions of probation. The probationer, then, during the period of probation, remains in legal custody —
subject to the control of the probation officer and of the court; and, he may be rearrested upon the non-fulfillment of the
conditions of probation and, when rearrested, may be committed to prison to serve the sentence originally imposed upon
him. (Secs. 2, 3, 5 and 6, Act No. 4221.)

The probation described in the act is not pardon. It is not complete liberty, and may be far from it. It is really a new mode of
punishment, to be applied by the judge in a proper case, in substitution of the imprisonment and find prescribed by the
criminal laws. For this reason its application is as purely a judicial act as any other sentence carrying out the law deemed
applicable to the offense. The executive act of pardon, on the contrary, is against the criminal law, which binds and directs the
judges, or rather is outside of and above it. There is thus no conflict with the pardoning power, and no possible
unconstitutionality of the Probation Act for this cause. (Archer vs. Snook [1926], 10 F. [2d], 567, 569.)

Probation should also be distinguished from reprieve and from commutation of the sentence. Snodgrass vs. State ([1912], 67
Tex. Crim. Rep., 615;41 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1144; 150 S. W., 162), is relied upon most strongly by the petitioners as authority in
support of their contention that the power to grant pardons and reprieves, having been vested exclusively upon the Chief
Executive by the Jones Law, may not be conferred by the legislature upon the courts by means of probation law authorizing
the indefinite judicial suspension of sentence. We have examined that case and found that although the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas held that the probation statute of the state in terms conferred on the district courts the power to grant
pardons to persons convicted of crime, it also distinguished between suspensions sentence on the one hand, and reprieve and
commutation of sentence on the other. Said the court, through Harper, J.:

That the power to suspend the sentence does not conflict with the power of the Governor to grant reprieves is settled by the
decisions of the various courts; it being held that the distinction between a "reprieve" and a suspension of sentence is that a
reprieve postpones the execution of the sentence to a day certain, whereas a suspension is for an indefinite time. (Carnal vs.
People, 1 Parker, Cr. R., 262; In re Buchanan, 146 N. Y., 264; 40 N. E., 883), and cases cited in 7 Words & Phrases, pp. 6115,
6116. This law cannot be hold in conflict with the power confiding in the Governor to grant commutations of punishment, for
a commutations is not but to change the punishment assessed to a less punishment.

In State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court ([1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237 Pac., 525), the Supreme Court of Montana had under
consideration the validity of the adult probation law of the state enacted in 1913, now found in sections 12078-12086,
Revised Codes of 1921. The court held the law valid as not impinging upon the pardoning power of the executive. In a
unanimous decision penned by Justice Holloway, the court said:

. . . . the term "pardon", "commutation", and "respite" each had a well understood meaning at the time our Constitution was
adopted, and no one of them was intended to comprehend the suspension of the execution of the judgment as that phrase is
employed in sections 12078-12086. A "pardon" is an act of grace, proceeding from the power intrusted with the execution of
the laws which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has
committed (United States vs. Wilson, 7 Pet., 150; 8 Law. ed., 640); It is a remission of guilt (State vs. Lewis, 111 La., 693; 35 So.,
816), a forgiveness of the offense (Cook vs. Middlesex County, 26 N. J. Law, 326; Ex parte Powell, 73 Ala., 517; 49 Am. Rep.,
71). "Commutation" is a remission of a part of the punishment; a substitution of a less penalty for the one originally imposed
(Lee vs. Murphy, 22 Grat. [Va.] 789; 12 Am. Rep., 563; Rich vs. Chamberlain, 107 Mich., 381; 65 N. W., 235). A "reprieve" or
"respite" is the withholding of the sentence for an interval of time (4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 394), a postponement of
execution (Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R. [N. Y.], 272), a temporary suspension of execution (Butler vs. State, 97 Ind., 373).

Few adjudicated cases are to be found in which the validity of a statute similar to our section 12078 has been determined; but
the same objections have been urged against parole statutes which vest the power to parole in persons other than those to
whom the power of pardon is granted, and these statutes have been upheld quite uniformly, as a reference to the numerous
cases cited in the notes to Woods vs. State (130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W.,558, reported in L. R. A., 1915F, 531), will disclose. (See,
also, 20 R. C. L., 524.)

We conclude that the Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive. The pardoning power, in
respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and complete as if the Probation Law had never been
enacted. The President may yet pardon the probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest
and imprisonment. (Riggs vs. United States [1926],
14 F. [2d], 5, 7.)

2. But while the Probation Law does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the executive and is not for that reason void,
does section 11 thereof constitute, as contended, an undue delegation of legislative power?

Under the constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three coordinate and substantially
independent organs: the legislative, the executive and the judicial. Each of these departments of the government derives its
authority from the Constitution which, in turn, is the highest expression of popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.

The power to make laws — the legislative power — is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a
unicamiral National Assembly by the Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1, Constitution of the Philippines). The Philippine Legislature or
the National Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority.
Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non delegare potest.
This principle is said to have originated with the glossators, was introduced into English law through a misreading of Bracton,
there developed as a principle of agency, was established by Lord Coke in the English public law in decisions forbidding the
delegation of judicial power, and found its way into America as an enlightened principle of free government. It has since
become an accepted corollary of the principle of separation of powers. (5 Encyc. of the Social Sciences, p. 66.) The classic
statement of the rule is that of Locke, namely: "The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to
anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people have." (Locke on Civil Government, sec. 142.) Judge Cooley
enunciates the doctrine in the following oft-quoted language: "One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the
power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority.
Where the sovereign power of the state has located the authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency
alone the laws must be made until the Constitution itself is charged. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism
this high prerogative has been intrusted cannot relieve itself of the responsibilities by choosing other agencies upon which the
power shall be devolved, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for those to which
alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust." (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 224.
Quoted with approval in U. S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327.) This court posits the doctrine "on the ethical principle that such
a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own
judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. (U. S. vs.
Barrias, supra, at p. 330.)

The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An
exceptions sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local
authorities. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660; U. S. vs. Salaveria [1918], 39 Phil., 102; Stoutenburgh
vs. Hennick [1889], 129 U. S., 141; 32 Law. ed., 637; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep., 256; State vs. Noyes [1855], 30 N. H., 279.) "It is a cardinal
principle of our system of government, that local affairs shall be managed by local authorities, and general affairs by the
central authorities; and hence while the rule is also fundamental that the power to make laws cannot be delegated, the
creation of the municipalities exercising local self government has never been held to trench upon that rule. Such legislation is
not regarded as a transfer of general legislative power, but rather as the grant of the authority to prescribed local regulations,
according to immemorial practice, subject of course to the interposition of the superior in cases of necessity." (Stoutenburgh
vs. Hennick, supra.) On quite the same principle, Congress is powered to delegate legislative power to such agencies in the
territories of the United States as it may select. A territory stands in the same relation to Congress as a municipality or city to
the state government. (United States vs. Heinszen [1907], 206 U. S., 370; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep., 742; 51 L. ed., 1098; 11 Ann. Cas.,
688; Dorr vs. United States [1904], 195 U.S., 138; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep., 808; 49 Law. ed., 128; 1 Ann. Cas., 697.) Courts have also
sustained the delegation of legislative power to the people at large. Some authorities maintain that this may not be done (12
C. J., pp. 841, 842; 6 R. C. L., p. 164, citing People vs. Kennedy [1913], 207 N. Y., 533; 101 N. E., 442; Ann. Cas., 1914C, 616).
However, the question of whether or not a state has ceased to be republican in form because of its adoption of the initiative
and referendum has been held not to be a judicial but a political question (Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon [1912], 223
U. S., 118; 56 Law. ed., 377; 32 Sup. Cet. Rep., 224), and as the constitutionality of such laws has been looked upon with favor
by certain progressive courts, the sting of the decisions of the more conservative courts has been pretty well drawn. (Opinions
of the Justices [1894], 160 Mass., 586; 36 N. E., 488; 23 L. R. A., 113; Kiernan vs. Portland [1910], 57 Ore., 454; 111 Pac., 379;
1132 Pac., 402; 37 L. R. A. [N. S.], 332; Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon, supra.) Doubtless, also, legislative power may
be delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of article VI of the Constitution of the Philippines provides
that "The National Assembly may by law authorize the President, subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose,
to fix within specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues." And section 16 of the
same article of the Constitution provides that "In times of war or other national emergency, the National Assembly may by law
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribed, to promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out a declared national policy." It is beyond the scope of this decision to determine whether or not, in the
absence of the foregoing constitutional provisions, the President could be authorized to exercise the powers thereby vested in
him. Upon the other hand, whatever doubt may have existed has been removed by the Constitution itself.

The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions hereinabove mentioned.

The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows:

This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a
probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by
the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. (Emphasis ours.)

In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the
statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the
judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. (6 R. C. L., p. 165.) In the United States vs. Ang Tang Ho
([1922], 43 Phil., 1), this court adhered to the foregoing rule when it held an act of the legislature void in so far as it undertook
to authorize the Governor-General, in his discretion, to issue a proclamation fixing the price of rice and to make the sale of it
in violation of the proclamation a crime. (See and cf. Compañia General de Tabacos vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners
[1916], 34 Phil., 136.) The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a certain extent matters of detail may be
left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards. (6 R.
C. L., pp. 177-179.)

For the purpose of Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as administrative bodies endowed with power to
determine when the Act should take effect in their respective provinces. They are the agents or delegates of the legislature in
this respect. The rules governing delegation of legislative power to administrative and executive officers are applicable or are
at least indicative of the rule which should be here adopted. An examination of a variety of cases on delegation of power to
administrative bodies will show that the ratio decidendi is at variance but, it can be broadly asserted that the rationale
revolves around the presence or absence of a standard or rule of action — or the sufficiency thereof — in the statute, to aid
the delegate in exercising the granted discretion. In some cases, it is held that the standard is sufficient; in others that is
insufficient; and in still others that it is entirely lacking. As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it
does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of
the discretionary powers delegated to it. (See Schecter vs. United States [1925], 295 U. S., 495; 79 L. ed., 1570; 55 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 837; 97 A.L.R., 947; People ex rel. Rice vs. Wilson Oil Co. [1936], 364 Ill., 406; 4 N. E. [2d], 847; 107 A.L.R., 1500 and cases
cited. See also R. C. L., title "Constitutional Law", sec 174.) In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial boards in
the exercise of their discretionary power to determine whether or not the Probation Act shall apply in their respective
provinces? What standards are fixed by the Act? We do not find any and none has been pointed to us by the respondents. The
probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide
in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, if we may use the language of Justice Cardozo in the recent case
of Schecter, supra, is a "roving commission" which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11
if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces
but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In other words, the provincial boards of
the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all.
The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial
board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed
amount for the salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation. This,
to our minds, is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards.

"The true distinction", says Judge Ranney, "is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs.
Clinton County Comrs. [1852]; 1 Ohio St., 77, 88. See also, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec 68.) To the same effect
are the decision of this court in Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binangonan ([1917], 36 Phil., 547); Rubi vs.
Provincial Board of Mindoro ([1919],39 Phil., 660) and Cruz vs. Youngberg ([1931], 56 Phil., 234). In the first of these cases, this
court sustained the validity of the law conferring upon the Governor-General authority to adjust provincial and municipal
boundaries. In the second case, this court held it lawful for the legislature to direct non-Christian inhabitants to take up their
habitation on unoccupied lands to be selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. In the third
case, it was held proper for the legislature to vest in the Governor-General authority to suspend or not, at his discretion, the
prohibition of the importation of the foreign cattle, such prohibition to be raised "if the conditions of the country make this
advisable or if deceased among foreign cattle has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and livestock of the lands."

It should be observed that in the case at bar we are not concerned with the simple transference of details of execution or the
promulgation by executive or administrative officials of rules and regulations to carry into effect the provisions of a law. If we
were, recurrence to our own decisions would be sufficient. (U. S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327; U.S. vs. Molina [1914], 29
Phil., 119; Alegre vs. Collector of Customs [1929], 53 Phil., 394; Cebu Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus [1931], 56 Phil., 446; U. S. vs.
Gomez [1915], 31 Phil., 218; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660.)

It is connected, however, that a legislative act may be made to the effect as law after it leaves the hands of the legislature. It is
true that laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the
people of a particular community (6 R. C. L., 116, 170-172; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 227). In
Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat. 1; 6 Law. ed., 253), the Supreme Court of the United State ruled that the legislature
may delegate a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise.(Vide, also, Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co. [1896],
92 Wis., 63; 65 N. W., 738; 31 L. R. A., 112.) The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is
nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law.
That is a mental process common to all branches of the government. (Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co., supra; In re Village of
North Milwaukee [1896], 93 Wis., 616; 97 N.W., 1033; 33 L.R.A., 938; Nash vs. Fries [1906], 129 Wis., 120; 108 N.W., 210; Field
vs. Clark [1892], 143 U.S., 649; 12 Sup. Ct., 495; 36 Law. ed., 294.) Notwithstanding the apparent tendency, however, to relax
the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority on account of the complexity arising from social and economic forces at
work in this modern industrial age (Pfiffner, Public Administration [1936] ch. XX; Laski, "The Mother of Parliaments", foreign
Affairs, July, 1931, Vol. IX, No. 4, pp. 569-579; Beard, "Squirt-Gun Politics", in Harper's Monthly Magazine, July, 1930, Vol. CLXI,
pp. 147, 152), the orthodox pronouncement of Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations finds restatement in
Prof. Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution of the United States in the following language — speaking of declaration of
legislative power to administrative agencies: "The principle which permits the legislature to provide that the administrative
agent may determine when the circumstances are such as require the application of a law is defended upon the ground that
at the time this authority is granted, the rule of public policy, which is the essence of the legislative act, is determined by the
legislature. In other words, the legislature, as it its duty to do, determines that, under given circumstances, certain executive
or administrative action is to be taken, and that, under other circumstances, different of no action at all is to be taken. What is
thus left to the administrative official is not the legislative determination of what public policy demands, but simply the
ascertainment of what the facts of the case require to be done according to the terms of the law by which he is governed."
(Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, 2nd ed., Vol. II, p. 1637.) In Miller vs. Mayer, etc., of New York [1883],
109 U.S., 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 228; 27 Law. ed., 971, 974), it was said: "The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative will
must, of course, come from Congress, but the ascertainment of the contingency upon which the Act shall take effect may be
left to such agencies as it may designate." (See, also, 12 C.J., p. 864; State vs. Parker [1854], 26 Vt., 357; Blanding vs. Burr
[1859], 13 Cal., 343, 258.) The legislature, then may provide that a contingencies leaving to some other person or body the
power to determine when the specified contingencies has arisen. But, in the case at bar, the legislature has not made the
operation of the Prohibition Act contingent upon specified facts or conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board. It
leaves, as we have already said, the entire operation or non-operation of the law upon the provincial board. the discretion
vested is arbitrary because it is absolute and unlimited. A provincial board need not investigate conditions or find any fact, or
await the happening of any specified contingency. It is bound by no rule, — limited by no principle of expendiency announced
by the legislature. It may take into consideration certain facts or conditions; and, again, it may not. It may have any purpose or
no purpose at all. It need not give any reason whatsoever for refusing or failing to appropriate any funds for the salary of a
probation officer. This is a matter which rest entirely at its pleasure. The fact that at some future time — we cannot say when
— the provincial boards may appropriate funds for the salaries of probation officers and thus put the law into operation in the
various provinces will not save the statute. The time of its taking into effect, we reiterate, would yet be based solely upon the
will of the provincial boards and not upon the happening of a certain specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment of
certain facts or conditions by a person or body other than legislature itself.

The various provincial boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the power of suspending the operation of the Probation
Law in their respective provinces. In some jurisdiction, constitutions provided that laws may be suspended only by the
legislature or by its authority. Thus, section 28, article I of the Constitution of Texas provides that "No power of suspending
laws in this state shall be exercised except by the legislature"; and section 26, article I of the Constitution of Indiana provides
"That the operation of the laws shall never be suspended, except by authority of the General Assembly." Yet, even provisions
of this sort do not confer absolute power of suspension upon the legislature. While it may be undoubted that the legislature
may suspend a law, or the execution or operation of a law, a law may not be suspended as to certain individuals only, leaving
the law to be enjoyed by others. The suspension must be general, and cannot be made for individual cases or for particular
localities. In Holden vs. James ([1814], 11 Mass., 396; 6 Am. Dec., 174, 177, 178), it was said:

By the twentieth article of the declaration of rights in the constitution of this commonwealth, it is declared that the power of
suspending the laws, or the execution of the laws, ought never to be exercised but by the legislature, or by authority derived
from it, to be exercised in such particular cases only as the legislature shall expressly provide for. Many of the articles in that
declaration of rights were adopted from the Magna Charta of England, and from the bill of rights passed in the reign of
William and Mary. The bill of rights contains an enumeration of the oppressive acts of James II, tending to subvert and
extirpate the protestant religion, and the laws and liberties of the kingdom; and the first of them is the assuming and
exercising a power of dispensing with and suspending the laws, and the execution of the laws without consent of parliament.
The first article in the claim or declaration of rights contained in the statute is, that the exercise of such power, by legal
authority without consent of parliament, is illegal. In the tenth section of the same statute it is further declared and enacted,
that "No dispensation by non obstante of or to any statute, or part thereof, should be allowed; but the same should be held
void and of no effect, except a dispensation be allowed of in such statute." There is an implied reservation of authority in the
parliament to exercise the power here mentioned; because, according to the theory of the English Constitution, "that absolute
despotic power, which must in all governments reside somewhere," is intrusted to the parliament: 1 Bl. Com., 160.

The principles of our government are widely different in this particular. Here the sovereign and absolute power resides in the
people; and the legislature can only exercise what is delegated to them according to the constitution. It is obvious that the
exercise of the power in question would be equally oppressive to the subject, and subversive of his right to protection,
"according to standing laws," whether exercised by one man or by a number of men. It cannot be supposed that the people
when adopting this general principle from the English bill of rights and inserting it in our constitution, intended to bestow by
implication on the general court one of the most odious and oppressive prerogatives of the ancient kings of England. It is
manifestly contrary to the first principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and to the spirit of our constitution and laws, that
any one citizen should enjoy privileges and advantages which are denied to all others under like circumstances; or that ant
one should be subject to losses, damages, suits, or actions from which all others under like circumstances are exempted.

To illustrate the principle: A section of a statute relative to dogs made the owner of any dog liable to the owner of domestic
animals wounded by it for the damages without proving a knowledge of it vicious disposition. By a provision of the act, power
was given to the board of supervisors to determine whether or not during the current year their county should be governed
by the provisions of the act of which that section constituted a part. It was held that the legislature could not confer that
power. The court observed that it could no more confer such a power than to authorize the board of supervisors of a county
to abolish in such county the days of grace on commercial paper, or to suspend the statute of limitations. (Slinger vs.
Henneman [1875], 38 Wis., 504.) A similar statute in Missouri was held void for the same reason in State vs. Field ([1853, 17
Mo., 529;59 Am. Dec., 275.) In that case a general statute formulating a road system contained a provision that "if the county
court of any county should be of opinion that the provisions of the act should not be enforced, they might, in their discretion,
suspend the operation of the same for any specified length of time, and thereupon the act should become inoperative in such
county for the period specified in such order; and thereupon order the roads to be opened and kept in good repair, under the
laws theretofore in force." Said the court: ". . . this act, by its own provisions, repeals the inconsistent provisions of a former
act, and yet it is left to the county court to say which act shall be enforce in their county. The act does not submit the question
to the county court as an original question, to be decided by that tribunal, whether the act shall commence its operation
within the county; but it became by its own terms a law in every county not excepted by name in the act. It did not, then,
require the county court to do any act in order to give it effect. But being the law in the county, and having by its provisions
superseded and abrogated the inconsistent provisions of previous laws, the county court is . . . empowered, to suspend this
act and revive the repealed provisions of the former act. When the question is before the county court for that tribunal to
determine which law shall be in force, it is urge before us that the power then to be exercised by the court is strictly legislative
power, which under our constitution, cannot be delegated to that tribunal or to any other body of men in the state. In the
present case, the question is not presented in the abstract; for the county court of Saline county, after the act had been for
several months in force in that county, did by order suspend its operation; and during that suspension the offense was
committed which is the subject of the present indictment . . . ." (See Mitchell vs. State [1901], 134 Ala., 392; 32 S., 687.)
True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from those applicable to other localities and, while
recognizing the force of the principle hereinabove expressed, courts in may jurisdiction have sustained the constitutionality of
the submission of option laws to the vote of the people. (6 R.C.L., p. 171.) But option laws thus sustained treat of subjects
purely local in character which should receive different treatment in different localities placed under different circumstances.
"They relate to subjects which, like the retailing of intoxicating drinks, or the running at large of cattle in the highways, may be
differently regarded in different localities, and they are sustained on what seems to us the impregnable ground, that the
subject, though not embraced within the ordinary powers of municipalities to make by-laws and ordinances, is nevertheless
within the class of public regulations, in respect to which it is proper that the local judgment should control." (Cooley on
Constitutional Limitations, 5th ed., p. 148.) So that, while we do not deny the right of local self-government and the propriety
of leaving matters of purely local concern in the hands of local authorities or for the people of small communities to pass
upon, we believe that in matters of general of general legislation like that which treats of criminals in general, and as regards
the general subject of probation, discretion may not be vested in a manner so unqualified and absolute as provided in Act No.
4221. True, the statute does not expressly state that the provincial boards may suspend the operation of the Probation Act in
particular provinces but, considering that, in being vested with the authority to appropriate or not the necessary funds for the
salaries of probation officers, they thereby are given absolute discretion to determine whether or not the law should take
effect or operate in their respective provinces, the provincial boards are in reality empowered by the legislature to suspend
the operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces, the Act to be held in abeyance until the provincial boards should
decide otherwise by appropriating the necessary funds. The validity of a law is not tested by what has been done but by what
may be done under its provisions. (Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad [1922], 43 Phil., 259; 12 C. J., p. 786.)

It in conceded that a great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not only in the expression of what may be
termed legislative policy but in the elaboration and execution thereof. "Without this power, legislation would become
oppressive and yet imbecile." (People vs. Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 1.) It has been said that popular government lives because of
the inexhaustible reservoir of power behind it. It is unquestionable that the mass of powers of government is vested in the
representatives of the people and that these representatives are no further restrained under our system than by the express
language of the instrument imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions which by clear intendment, have that effect.
(Angara vs. Electoral Commission [1936], 35 Off. Ga., 23; Schneckenburger vs. Moran [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., 1317.) But, it should
be borne in mind that a constitution is both a grant and a limitation of power and one of these time-honored limitations is
that, subject to certain exceptions, legislative power shall not be delegated.

We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the
provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.

3. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which prohibits the denial to any
person of the equal protection of the laws (Act. III, sec. 1 subsec. 1. Constitution of the Philippines.)

This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the tree grand departments of our government and
on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivision thereof, and on many constitutional power, like the police power,
taxation and eminent domain. The equal protection of laws, sententiously observes the Supreme Court of the United States,
"is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356; 30 Law. ed., 220; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
10464; Perley vs. North Carolina, 249 U. S., 510; 39 Sup. Ct. Rep., 357; 63 Law. ed., 735.) Of course, what may be regarded as a
denial of the equal protection of the laws in a question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be
formulated. (Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co. [1902], 184, U. S., 540; 22 Sup. Ct., Rep., 431; 46 Law. ed., 679.) Class
legislation discriminating against some and favoring others in prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and nor
made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. (Finely vs. California [1911], 222 U. S., 28; 56 Law. ed., 75; 32 Sup. Ct. Rep., 13;
Gulf. C. & S. F. Ry Co. vs. Ellis [1897], 165 U. S., 150; 41 Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255; Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad
[1919], 40 Phil., 136.) The classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply
equally to each member of the class. (Borgnis vs. Falk. Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327, 353; 133 N. W., 209; 3 N. C. C. A., 649; 37 L. R.
A. [N. S.], 489; State vs. Cooley, 56 Minn., 540; 530-552; 58 N. W., 150; Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.[1911], 220 U. S.,
61, 79, 55 Law. ed., 369, 377; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 337; Ann. Cas., 1912C, 160; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. vs. Clough [1917], 242
U.S., 375; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 144; 61 Law. ed., 374; Southern Ry. Co. vs. Greene [1910], 216 U. S., 400; 30 Sup. Ct. Rep., 287; 54
Law. ed., 536; 17 Ann. Cas., 1247; Truax vs. Corrigan [1921], 257 U. S., 312; 12 C. J., pp. 1148, 1149.)

In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative
power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for
the petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a
probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation
in the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would
be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another province would
be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to
appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no
inequality would result for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and every province by the
affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial boards. On that hypothesis, every person coming within the purview of
the Probation Act would be entitled to avail of the benefits of the Act. Neither will there be any resulting inequality if no
province, through its provincial board, should appropriate any amount for the salary of the probation officer — which is the
situation now — and, also, if we accept the contention that, for the purpose of the Probation Act, the City of Manila should be
considered as a province and that the municipal board of said city has not made any appropriation for the salary of the
probation officer. These different situations suggested show, indeed, that while inequality may result in the application of the
law and in the conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is not in all cases the necessary result. But whatever
may be the case, it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination and inequality are
permitted or allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant authorities requiring actual denial of the equal protection of the law
before court should assume the task of setting aside a law vulnerable on that score, but premises and circumstances
considered, we are of the opinion that section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal protection of the law and
is on that account bad. We see no difference between a law which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its
face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional
prohibitions. (By analogy, Chy Lung vs. Freeman [1876], 292 U. S., 275; 23 Law. ed., 550; Henderson vs. Mayor [1876], 92 U. S.,
259; 23 Law. ed., 543; Ex parte Virginia [1880], 100 U. S., 339; 25 Law. ed., 676; Neal vs. Delaware [1881], 103 U. S., 370; 26
Law. ed., 567; Soon Hing vs. Crowley [1885], 113 U. S., 703; 28 Law. ed., 1145, Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886],118 U. S., 356; 30
Law. ed., 220; Williams vs. Mississippi [1897], 170 U. S., 218; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 583; 42 Law. ed., 1012; Bailey vs. Alabama
[1911], 219 U. S., 219; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 145; 55 Law. ed., Sunday Lake Iron Co. vs. Wakefield [1918], 247 U. S., 450; 38 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 495; 62 Law. ed., 1154.) In other words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation
(General Oil Co. vs. Clain [1907], 209 U. S., 211; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 475; 52 Law. ed., 754; State vs. Clement Nat. Bank [1911], 84
Vt., 167; 78 Atl., 944; Ann. Cas., 1912D, 22). If the law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law it is
unconstitutional. (6 R. C. L. p. 372; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S., 3; 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 18; 27 Law. ed., 835; Yick Wo vs. Hopkins,
supra; State vs. Montgomery, 94 Me., 192; 47 Atl., 165; 80 A. S. R., 386; State vs. Dering, 84 Wis., 585; 54 N. W., 1104; 36 A. S.
R., 948; 19 L. R. A., 858.) Under section 11 of the Probation Act, not only may said Act be in force in one or several provinces
and not be in force in other provinces, but one province may appropriate for the salary of the probation officer of a given year
— and have probation during that year — and thereafter decline to make further appropriation, and have no probation is
subsequent years. While this situation goes rather to the abuse of discretion which delegation implies, it is here indicated to
show that the Probation Act sanctions a situation which is intolerable in a government of laws, and to prove how easy it is,
under the Act, to make the guaranty of the equality clause but "a rope of sand". (Brewer, J. Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. vs. Ellis
[1897], 165 U. S., 150 154; 41 Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255.)lawph!1.net

Great reliance is placed by counsel for the respondents on the case of Ocampo vs. United States ([1914], 234 U. S., 91; 58 Law.
ed., 1231). In that case, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the decision of this court (18 Phil., 1) by declining to
uphold the contention that there was a denial of the equal protection of the laws because, as held in Missouri vs. Lewis
(Bowman vs. Lewis) decided in 1880 (101 U. S., 220; 25 Law. ed., 991), the guaranty of the equality clause does not require
territorial uniformity. It should be observed, however, that this case concerns the right to preliminary investigations in
criminal cases originally granted by General Orders No. 58. No question of legislative authority was involved and the alleged
denial of the equal protection of the laws was the result of the subsequent enactment of Act No. 612, amending the charter of
the City of Manila (Act No. 813) and providing in section 2 thereof that "in cases triable only in the court of first instance of the
City of Manila, the defendant . . . shall not be entitled as of right to a preliminary examination in any case where the
prosecuting attorney, after a due investigation of the facts . . . shall have presented an information against him in proper form
. . . ." Upon the other hand, an analysis of the arguments and the decision indicates that the investigation by the prosecuting
attorney — although not in the form had in the provinces — was considered a reasonable substitute for the City of Manila,
considering the peculiar conditions of the city as found and taken into account by the legislature itself.

Reliance is also placed on the case of Missouri vs. Lewis, supra. That case has reference to a situation where the constitution
of Missouri permits appeals to the Supreme Court of the state from final judgments of any circuit court, except those in
certain counties for which counties the constitution establishes a separate court of appeals called St. Louis Court of Appeals.
The provision complained of, then, is found in the constitution itself and it is the constitution that makes the apportionment
of territorial jurisdiction.

We are of the opinion that section 11 of the Probation Act is unconstitutional and void because it is also repugnant to equal-
protection clause of our Constitution.

Section 11 of the Probation Act being unconstitutional and void for the reasons already stated, the next inquiry is whether or
not the entire Act should be avoided.

In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against any mutilation of a statute, and the courts will resort to
elimination only where an unconstitutional provision is interjected into a statute otherwise valid, and is so independent and
separable that its removal will leave the constitutional features and purposes of the act substantially unaffected by the
process. (Riccio vs. Hoboken, 69 N. J. Law., 649, 662; 63 L. R. A., 485; 55 Atl., 1109, quoted in Williams vs. Standard Oil Co.
[1929], 278 U.S., 235, 240; 73 Law. ed., 287, 309; 49 Sup. Ct. Rep., 115; 60 A. L. R., 596.) In Barrameda vs. Moir ([1913], 25
Phil., 44, 47), this court stated the well-established rule concerning partial invalidity of statutes in the following language:

. . . where part of the a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if
separable from the valid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion must be in so far independent
of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislative would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that
they could not constitutionally enact the other. (Mutual Loan Co. vs. Martell, 200 Mass., 482; 86 N. E., 916; 128 A. S. R., 446;
Supervisors of Holmes Co. vs. Black Creek Drainage District, 99 Miss., 739; 55 Sou., 963.) Enough must remain to make a
complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. (Pearson vs. Bass. 132 Ga., 117; 63 S. E., 798.)
The void provisions must be eliminated without causing results affecting the main purpose of the Act, in a manner contrary to
the intention of the Legislature. (State vs. A. C. L. R., Co., 56 Fla., 617, 642; 47 Sou., 969; Harper vs. Galloway, 58 Fla., 255; 51
Sou., 226; 26 L. R. A., N. S., 794; Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S., 540, 565; People vs. Strassheim, 240 Ill., 279,
300; 88 N. E., 821; 22 L. R. A., N. S., 1135; State vs. Cognevich, 124 La., 414; 50 Sou., 439.) The language used in the invalid part
of a statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the legislative will,
independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate. (State vs. Junkin, 85 Neb., 1; 122 N. W., 473; 23 L. R.
A., N. S., 839; Vide, also,. U. S., vs. Rodriguez [1918], 38 Phil., 759; Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. [1895], 158 U. S.,
601, 635; 39 Law. ed., 1108, 1125; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep., 912; 6 R.C.L., 121.)

It is contended that even if section 11, which makes the Probation Act applicable only in those provinces in which the
respective provincial boards provided for the salaries of probation officers were inoperative on constitutional grounds, the
remainder of the Act would still be valid and may be enforced. We should be inclined to accept the suggestions but for the
fact that said section is, in our opinion, is inseparably linked with the other portions of the Act that with the elimination of the
section what would be left is the bare idealism of the system, devoid of any practical benefit to a large number of people who
may be deserving of the intended beneficial result of that system. The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a
careful examination of the whole context, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative
action of the different provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than
those provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the various boards, no probation officers would be
appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it
needs no argument to show that if not one of the provinces — and this is the actual situation now — appropriate the
necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no
probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer without the probation system.

Section 2 of the Acts provides that the probation officer shall supervise and visit the probationer. Every probation officer is
given, as to the person placed in probation under his care, the powers of the police officer. It is the duty of the probation
officer to see that the conditions which are imposed by the court upon the probationer under his care are complied with.
Among those conditions, the following are enumerated in section 3 of the Act:

That the probationer (a) shall indulge in no injurious or vicious habits;

(b) Shall avoid places or persons of disreputable or harmful character;

(c) Shall report to the probation officer as directed by the court or probation officers;
(d) Shall permit the probation officer to visit him at reasonable times at his place of abode or elsewhere;

(e) Shall truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of the probation officer concerning his conduct or condition;
"(f) Shall endeavor to be employed regularly; "(g) Shall remain or reside within a specified place or locality;

(f) Shall make reparation or restitution to the aggrieved parties for actual damages or losses caused by his offense;

(g) Shall comply with such orders as the court may from time to time make; and

(h) Shall refrain from violating any law, statute, ordinance, or any by-law or regulation, promulgated in accordance with law.

The court is required to notify the probation officer in writing of the period and terms of probation. Under section 4, it is only
after the period of probation, the submission of a report of the probation officer and appropriate finding of the court that the
probationer has complied with the conditions of probation that probation may be definitely terminated and the probationer
finally discharged from supervision. Under section 5, if the court finds that there is non-compliance with said conditions, as
reported by the probation officer, it may issue a warrant for the arrest of the probationer and said probationer may be
committed with or without bail. Upon arraignment and after an opportunity to be heard, the court may revoke, continue or
modify the probation, and if revoked, the court shall order the execution of the sentence originally imposed. Section 6
prescribes the duties of probation officers: "It shall be the duty of every probation officer to furnish to all persons placed on
probation under his supervision a statement of the period and conditions of their probation, and to instruct them concerning
the same; to keep informed concerning their conduct and condition; to aid and encourage them by friendly advice and
admonition, and by such other measures, not inconsistent with the conditions imposed by court as may seem most suitable,
to bring about improvement in their conduct and condition; to report in writing to the court having jurisdiction over said
probationers at least once every two months concerning their conduct and condition; to keep records of their work; make
such report as are necessary for the information of the Secretary of Justice and as the latter may require; and to perform such
other duties as are consistent with the functions of the probation officer and as the court or judge may direct. The probation
officers provided for in this Act may act as parole officers for any penal or reformatory institution for adults when so
requested by the authorities thereof, and, when designated by the Secretary of Justice shall act as parole officer of persons
released on parole under Act Number Forty-one Hundred and Three, without additional compensation."

It is argued, however, that even without section 11 probation officers maybe appointed in the provinces under section 10 of
Act which provides as follows:

There is hereby created in the Department of Justice and subject to its supervision and control, a Probation Office under the
direction of a Chief Probation Officer to be appointed by the Governor-General with the advise and consent of the Senate who
shall receive a salary of four eight hundred pesos per annum. To carry out this Act there is hereby appropriated out of any
funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of fifty thousand pesos to be disbursed by the Secretary of
Justice, who is hereby authorized to appoint probation officers and the administrative personnel of the probation officer
under civil service regulations from among those who possess the qualifications, training and experience prescribed by the
Bureau of Civil Service, and shall fix the compensation of such probation officers and administrative personnel until such
positions shall have been included in the Appropriation Act.

But the probation officers and the administrative personnel referred to in the foregoing section are clearly not those
probation officers required to be appointed for the provinces under section 11. It may be said, reddendo singula singulis, that
the probation officers referred to in section 10 above-quoted are to act as such, not in the various provinces, but in the central
office known as the Probation Office established in the Department of Justice, under the supervision of the Chief Probation
Officer. When the law provides that "the probation officer" shall investigate and make reports to the court (secs. 1 and 4);
that "the probation officer" shall supervise and visit the probationer (sec. 2; sec. 6, par. d); that the probationer shall report to
the "probationer officer" (sec. 3, par. c.), shall allow "the probationer officer" to visit him (sec. 3, par. d), shall truthfully
answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of "the probation officer" concerning his conduct or condition (sec. 3, par. 4); that
the court shall notify "the probation officer" in writing of the period and terms of probation (sec. 3, last par.), it means the
probation officer who is in charge of a particular probationer in a particular province. It never could have been intention of the
legislature, for instance, to require the probationer in Batanes, to report to a probationer officer in the City of Manila, or to
require a probation officer in Manila to visit the probationer in the said province of Batanes, to place him under his care, to
supervise his conduct, to instruct him concerning the conditions of his probation or to perform such other functions as are
assigned to him by law.
That under section 10 the Secretary of Justice may appoint as many probation officers as there are provinces or groups of
provinces is, of course possible. But this would be arguing on what the law may be or should be and not on what the law is.
Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and propriety of legislation is not for us to pass upon. We may think a law
better otherwise than it is. But much as has been said regarding progressive interpretation and judicial legislation we decline
to amend the law. We are not permitted to read into the law matters and provisions which are not there. Not for any purpose
— not even to save a statute from the doom of invalidity.

Upon the other hand, the clear intention and policy of the law is not to make the Insular Government defray the salaries of
probation officers in the provinces but to make the provinces defray them should they desire to have the Probation Act apply
thereto. The sum of P50,000, appropriated "to carry out the purposes of this Act", is to be applied, among other things, for the
salaries of probation officers in the central office at Manila. These probation officers are to receive such compensations as the
Secretary of Justice may fix "until such positions shall have been included in the Appropriation Act". It was the intention of the
legislature to empower the Secretary of Justice to fix the salaries of the probation officers in the provinces or later on to
include said salaries in an appropriation act. Considering, further, that the sum of P50,000 appropriated in section 10 is to
cover, among other things, the salaries of the administrative personnel of the Probation Office, what would be left of the
amount can hardly be said to be sufficient to pay even nominal salaries to probation officers in the provinces. We take judicial
notice of the fact that there are 48 provinces in the Philippines and we do not think it is seriously contended that, with the
fifty thousand pesos appropriated for the central office, there can be in each province, as intended, a probation officer with a
salary not lower than that of a provincial fiscal. If this a correct, the contention that without section 11 of Act No. 4221 said act
is complete is an impracticable thing under the remainder of the Act, unless it is conceded that in our case there can be a
system of probation in the provinces without probation officers.

Probation as a development of a modern penology is a commendable system. Probation laws have been enacted, here and in
other countries, to permit what modern criminologist call the "individualization of the punishment", the adjustment of the
penalty to the character of the criminal and the circumstances of his particular case. It provides a period of grace in order to
aid in the rehabilitation of a penitent offender. It is believed that, in any cases, convicts may be reformed and their
development into hardened criminals aborted. It, therefore, takes advantage of an opportunity for reformation and avoids
imprisonment so long as the convicts gives promise of reform. (United States vs. Murray [1925], 275 U. S., 347 357, 358; 72
Law. ed., 309; 312, 313; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; Kaplan vs. Hecht, 24 F. [2d], 664, 665.) The Welfare of society is its chief end and
aim. The benefit to the individual convict is merely incidental. But while we believe that probation is commendable as a
system and its implantation into the Philippines should be welcomed, we are forced by our inescapable duty to set the law
aside because of the repugnancy to our fundamental law.

In arriving at this conclusion, we have endeavored to consider the different aspects presented by able counsel for both
parties, as well in their memorandums as in their oral argument. We have examined the cases brought to our attention, and
others we have been able to reach in the short time at our command for the study and deliberation of this case. In the
examination of the cases and in then analysis of the legal principles involved we have inclined to adopt the line of action which
in our opinion, is supported better reasoned authorities and is more conducive to the general welfare. (Smith, Bell & Co. vs.
Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136.) Realizing the conflict of authorities, we have declined to be bound by certain adjudicated
cases brought to our attention, except where the point or principle is settled directly or by clear implication by the more
authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States. This line of approach is justified because:

(a) The constitutional relations between the Federal and the State governments of the United States and the dual character of
the American Government is a situation which does not obtain in the Philippines;

(b) The situation of s state of the American Union of the District of Columbia with reference to the Federal Government of the
United States is not the situation of the province with respect to the Insular Government (Art. I, sec. 8 cl. 17 and 10th
Amendment, Constitution of the United States; Sims vs. Rives, 84 Fed. [2d], 871),

(c) The distinct federal and the state judicial organizations of the United States do not embrace the integrated judicial system
of the Philippines (Schneckenburger vs. Moran [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., p. 1317);

(d) "General propositions do not decide concrete cases" (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New York [1904], 198 U. S., 45, 76; 49
Law. ed., 937, 949) and, "to keep pace with . . . new developments of times and circumstances" (Chief Justice Waite in
Pensacola Tel. Co. vs. Western Union Tel. Co. [1899], 96 U. S., 1, 9; 24 Law. ed., 708; Yale Law Journal, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, Dec.
1919, 141, 142), fundamental principles should be interpreted having in view existing local conditions and environment.

Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is, accordingly, granted. Without any
pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965

EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.

Zulueta, Gonzales, Paculdo and Associates for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

CONCEPCION, J.:

During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-
three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin.1 Soon after the date last mentioned, or on November 10, 1964 petitioner
Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of
prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents,
from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by
said municipalities.

Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly
repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Respondent maintains the
contrary view and avers that the present action is premature and that not all proper parties — referring to the officials of the
new political subdivisions in question — have been impleaded. Subsequently, the mayors of several municipalities adversely
affected by the aforementioned executive orders — because the latter have taken away from the former the barrios
composing the new political subdivisions — intervened in the case. Moreover, Attorneys Enrique M. Fernando and Emma
Quisumbing-Fernando were allowed to and did appear as amici curiae.

The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:

Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by
Act of Congress.

Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:

All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the provisions hereof.

Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be created or the name of an existing one
may be changed by the provincial board of the province, upon recommendation of the council of the municipality or
municipalities in which the proposed barrio is stipulated. The recommendation of the municipal council shall be embodied in a
resolution approved by at least two-thirds of the entire membership of the said council: Provided, however, That no new
barrio may be created if its population is less than five hundred persons.

Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created or their boundaries
altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a
majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in
which the proposed barrio is situated." Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even
create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?"

Respondent answers in the affirmative, upon the theory that a new municipality can be created without creating new barrios,
such as, by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main import
of the petitioner's argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a
negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. The cogency and force of this
argument is too obvious to be denied or even questioned. Founded upon logic and experience, it cannot be offset except by a
clear manifestation of the intent of Congress to the contrary, and no such manifestation, subsequent to the passage of
Republic Act No. 2379, has been brought to our attention.

Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed executive orders are based, provides:

The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any
province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the
territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division other than
a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new
subdivision so created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public
welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall first be
obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or
more subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes
necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-
General) President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having executive
control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the new districts
so formed.

Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing authority, an equitable distribution of the
funds and obligations of the divisions thereby affected shall be made in such manner as may be recommended by the (Insular
Auditor) Auditor General and approved by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines.

Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this section does not amount to an undue
delegation of legislative power, relying upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binañgonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he
claims, has settled it. Such claim is untenable, for said case involved, not the creation of a new municipality, but a mere
transfer of territory — from an already existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality (Binañgonan), likewise, existing
at the time of and prior to said transfer (See Gov't of the P.I. ex rel. Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality, of Binañgonan
[34 Phil. 518, 519-5201) — in consequence of the fixing and definition, pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the common boundaries
of two municipalities.

It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of
jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature — involving, as it does, the adoption of
means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities — the authority to create municipal corporations is
essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function" (State ex rel. Higgins vs.
Aicklen, 119 S. 425, January 2, 1959) or "solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power" (Udall vs. Severn, May 29,
1938, 79 P. 2d 347-349). As the Supreme Court of Washington has put it (Territory ex rel. Kelly vs. Stewart, February 13, 1890,
23 Pac. 405, 409), "municipal corporations are purely the creatures of statutes."

Although1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said
law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate2 — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions.2a Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in
effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there
would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of
his authority.2b Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also — and this is
worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus
nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the
very foundation of our Republican system.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the
power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the
President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we
do not overlook the fact that, under the last clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President:

... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require.

It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as the public welfare may require" qualified, not
the clauses preceding the one just quoted, but only the place to which the seat of the government may be transferred. This
fact becomes more apparent when we consider that said Section 68 was originally Section 1 of Act No. 1748,3 which provided
that, "whenever in the judgment of the Governor-General the public welfare requires, he may, by executive order," effect the
changes enumerated therein (as in said section 68), including the change of the seat of the government "to such place ... as
the public interest requires." The opening statement of said Section 1 of Act No. 1748 — which was not included in Section 68
of the Revised Administrative Code — governed the time at which, or the conditions under which, the powers therein
conferred could be exercised; whereas the last part of the first sentence of said section referred exclusively to the place to
which the seat of the government was to be transferred.

At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is concerned, even if we assumed that the phrase "as
the public welfare may require," in said Section 68, qualifies all other clauses thereof. It is true that in Calalang vs. Williams (70
Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had upheld "public welfare" and "public interest," respectively, as
sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the authority to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in these cases — as
all judicial pronouncements — must be construed in relation to the specific facts and issues involved therein, outside of which
they do not constitute precedents and have no binding effect.4 The law construed in the Calalang case conferred upon the
Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the power to issue rules
and regulations to promote safe transit upon national roads and streets. Upon the other hand, the Rosenthal case referred to
the authority of the Insular Treasurer, under Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel certificates or permits for the sale of
speculative securities. Both cases involved grants to administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of their
administrative functions, calling for the determination of questions of fact.

Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section 68. As above indicated, the creation of municipalities, is not an
administrative function, but one which is essentially and eminently legislative in character. The question of whether or not
"public interest" demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact. it is "purely a legislative question "(Carolina-Virginia
Coastal Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310-313, 315-318), or a political question (Udall vs. Severn, 79 P.
2d. 347-349). As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has aptly characterized it, "the question as to whether incorporation is for
the best interest of the community in any case is emphatically a question of public policy and statecraft" (In re Village of North
Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1033, 1035-1037).

For this reason, courts of justice have annulled, as constituting undue delegation of legislative powers, state laws granting the
judicial department, the power to determine whether certain territories should be annexed to a particular municipality (Udall
vs. Severn, supra, 258-359); or vesting in a Commission the right to determine the plan and frame of government of proposed
villages and what functions shall be exercised by the same, although the powers and functions of the village are specifically
limited by statute (In re Municipal Charters, 86 Atl. 307-308); or conferring upon courts the authority to declare a given town
or village incorporated, and designate its metes and bounds, upon petition of a majority of the taxable inhabitants thereof,
setting forth the area desired to be included in such village (Territory ex rel Kelly vs. Stewart, 23 Pac. 405-409); or authorizing
the territory of a town, containing a given area and population, to be incorporated as a town, on certain steps being taken by
the inhabitants thereof and on certain determination by a court and subsequent vote of the inhabitants in favor thereof,
insofar as the court is allowed to determine whether the lands embraced in the petition "ought justly" to be included in the
village, and whether the interest of the inhabitants will be promoted by such incorporation, and to enlarge and diminish the
boundaries of the proposed village "as justice may require" (In re Villages of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1035-1037); or
creating a Municipal Board of Control which shall determine whether or not the laying out, construction or operation of a toll
road is in the "public interest" and whether the requirements of the law had been complied with, in which case the board
shall enter an order creating a municipal corporation and fixing the name of the same (Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs.
Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310).

Insofar as the validity of a delegation of power by Congress to the President is concerned, the case of Schechter Poultry
Corporation vs. U.S. (79 L. Ed. 1570) is quite relevant to the one at bar. The Schechter case involved the constitutionality of
Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act authorizing the President of the United States to approve "codes of fair
competition" submitted to him by one or more trade or industrial associations or corporations which "impose no inequitable
restrictions on admission to membership therein and are truly representative," provided that such codes are not designed "to
promote monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will not operate to discriminate against them, and will
tend to effectuate the policy" of said Act. The Federal Supreme Court held:

To summarize and conclude upon this point: Sec. 3 of the Recovery Act is without precedent. It supplies no standards for any
trade, industry or activity. It does not undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular states of fact
determined by appropriate administrative procedure. Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it authorizes the making of
codes to prescribe them. For that legislative undertaking, Sec. 3 sets up no standards, aside from the statement of the general
aims of rehabilitation, correction and expansion described in Sec. 1. In view of the scope of that broad declaration, and of the
nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus
enacting laws for the government of trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered. We think that the code
making authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.

If the term "unfair competition" is so broad as to vest in the President a discretion that is "virtually unfettered." and,
consequently, tantamount to a delegation of legislative power, it is obvious that "public welfare," which has even a broader
connotation, leads to the same result. In fact, if the validity of the delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld, there
would no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which, in his
opinion, may be required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of the
powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring about a total collapse of the democratic system established by
our Constitution, which it is the special duty and privilege of this Court to uphold.

It may not be amiss to note that the executive orders in question were issued after the legislative bills for the creation of the
municipalities involved in this case had failed to pass Congress. A better proof of the fact that the issuance of said executive
orders entails the exercise of purely legislative functions can hardly be given.

Again, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all
local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as
may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as
to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are
concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking
whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the
President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act Within the scope of their authority.
He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty
imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary
action therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its
jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality
or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board.5

Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its officials, by creating a
new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his office would thereby become
vacant.6 Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he
could compel local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to
him by the Constitution.

Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices implies no more than the
authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the exercise of discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such
control does not include the authority either to abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. As a
consequence, the alleged power of the President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by
him of an authority even greater than that of control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In
other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate
above quoted. Instead of giving the President less power over local governments than that vested in him over the executive
departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power
over municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.

In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said Section 68, as part of the
Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the
Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment.7

There are only two (2) other points left for consideration, namely, respondent's claim (a) that "not all the proper parties" —
referring to the officers of the newly created municipalities — "have been impleaded in this case," and (b) that "the present
petition is premature."

As regards the first point, suffice it to say that the records do not show, and the parties do not claim, that the officers of any of
said municipalities have been appointed or elected and assumed office. At any rate, the Solicitor General, who has appeared
on behalf of respondent Auditor General, is the officer authorized by law "to act and represent the Government of the
Philippines, its offices and agents, in any official investigation, proceeding or matter requiring the services of a lawyer"
(Section 1661, Revised Administrative Code), and, in connection with the creation of the aforementioned municipalities, which
involves a political, not proprietary, function, said local officials, if any, are mere agents or representatives of the national
government. Their interest in the case at bar has, accordingly, been, in effect, duly represented.8

With respect to the second point, respondent alleges that he has not as yet acted on any of the executive order & in question
and has not intimated how he would act in connection therewith. It is, however, a matter of common, public knowledge,
subject to judicial cognizance, that the President has, for many years, issued executive orders creating municipal corporations
and that the same have been organized and in actual operation, thus indicating, without peradventure of doubt, that the
expenditures incidental thereto have been sanctioned, approved or passed in audit by the General Auditing Office and its
officials. There is no reason to believe, therefore, that respondent would adopt a different policy as regards the new
municipalities involved in this case, in the absence of an allegation to such effect, and none has been made by him.

WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently
restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any
disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

BENGZON, J.P., J., concurring and dissenting:

A sign of progress in a developing nation is the rise of new municipalities. Fostering their rapid growth has long been the aim
pursued by all three branches of our Government.

So it was that the Governor-General during the time of the Jones Law was given authority by the Legislature (Act No. 1748) to
act upon certain details with respect to said local governments, such as fixing of boundaries, subdivisions and mergers. And
the Supreme Court, within the framework of the Jones Law, ruled in 1917 that the execution or implementation of such
details, did not entail abdication of legislative power (Government vs. Municipality of Binañgonan, 34 Phil. 518; Municipality of
Cardona vs. Municipality of Binañgonan, 36 Phil. 547). Subsequently, Act No. 1748's aforesaid statutory authorization was
embodied in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. And Chief Executives since then up to the present continued to
avail of said provision, time and again invoking it to issue executive orders providing for the creation of municipalities.

From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued executive orders to create thirty-three
municipalities pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in
implementation of said executive orders.
Suing as private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed in this Court a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction against the Auditor General. It seeks to restrain the respondent or any person acting in his behalf, from
passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the executive orders aforementioned.

Petitioner contends that the President has no power to create a municipality by executive order. It is argued that Section 68 of
the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, so far as it purports to grant any such power, is invalid or, at the least, already
repealed, in light of the Philippine Constitution and Republic Act 2370 (The Barrio Charter).

Section 68 is again reproduced hereunder for convenience:

SEC. 68. General authority of [Governor-General) President of the Philippines to fix boundaries and make new subdivisions. —
The [Governor-General] President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any
province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the
territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division other than
a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new
subdivision so created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public
welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the [Philippine Legislature] Congress of the Philippines shall first be
obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or
more subprovinces. When action by the [Governor-General] President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes
necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the [Governor-
General] President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having executive
control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers to the new districts so formed.

Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing authority, an equitable distribution of the
funds and obligations of the divisions thereby affected shall be made in such manner as may be recommended by the [Insular
Auditor] Auditor General and approved by the [Governor-General] President of the Philippines.

From such working I believe that power to create a municipality is included: to "separate any political division other than a
province, into such portions as may be required, merge any such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new
subdivision so created." The issue, however, is whether the legislature can validly delegate to the Executive such power.

The power to create a municipality is legislative in character. American authorities have therefore favored the view that it
cannot be delegated; that what is delegable is not the power to create municipalities but only the power to determine the
existence of facts under which creation of a municipality will result (37 Am. Jur. 628).

The test is said to lie in whether the statute allows any discretion on the delegate as to whether the municipal corporation
should be created. If so, there is an attempted delegation of legislative power and the statute is invalid (Ibid.). Now Section 68
no doubt gives the President such discretion, since it says that the President "may by executive order" exercise the powers
therein granted. Furthermore, Section 5 of the same Code states:

SEC. 5. Exercise of administrative discretion — The exercise of the permissive powers of all executive or administrative officers
and bodies is based upon discretion, and when such officer or body is given authority to do any act but not required to do
such act, the doing of the same shall be dependent on a sound discretion to be exercised for the good of the service and
benefit of the public, whether so expressed in the statute giving the authority or not.

Under the prevailing rule in the United States — and Section 68 is of American origin — the provision in question would be an
invalid attempt to delegate purely legislative powers, contrary to the principle of separation of powers.

It is very pertinent that Section 68 should be considered with the stream of history in mind. A proper knowledge of the past is
the only adequate background for the present. Section 68 was adopted half a century ago. Political change, two world wars,
the recognition of our independence and rightful place in the family of nations, have since taken place. In 1917 the Philippines
had for its Organic Act the Jones Law. And under the setup ordained therein no strict separation of powers was adhered to.
Consequently, Section 68 was not constitutionally objectionable at the time of its enactment.
The advent of the Philippine Constitution in 1935 however altered the situation. For not only was separation of powers strictly
ordained, except only in specific instances therein provided, but the power of the Chief Executive over local governments
suffered an explicit reduction.

Formerly, Section 21 of the Jones Law provided that the Governor-General "shall have general supervision and control of all
the departments and bureaus of the government in the Philippine Islands." Now Section 10 (1), Article VII of the Philippine
Constitution provides: "The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

In short, the power of control over local governments had now been taken away from the Chief Executive. Again, to fully
understand the significance of this provision, one must trace its development and growth.

As early as April 7, 1900 President McKinley of the United States, in his Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission, laid
down the policy that our municipal governments should be "subject to the least degree of supervision and control" on the
part of the national government. Said supervision and control was to be confined within the "narrowest limits" or so much
only as "may be necessary to secure and enforce faithful and efficient administration by local officers." And the national
government "shall have no direct administration except of matters of purely general concern." (See Hebron v. Reyes, L-9158,
July 28, 1958.)

All this had one aim, to enable the Filipinos to acquire experience in the art of self-government, with the end in view of later
allowing them to assume complete management and control of the administration of their local affairs. Such aim is the policy
now embodied in Section 10 (1), Article VII of the Constitution (Rodriguez v. Montinola, 50 O.G. 4820).

It is the evident decree of the Constitution, therefore, that the President shall have no power of control over local
governments. Accordingly, Congress cannot by law grant him such power (Hebron v. Reyes, supra). And any such power
formerly granted under the Jones Law thereby became unavoidably inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution.

It remains to examine the relation of the power to create and the power to control local governments. Said relationship has
already been passed upon by this Court in Hebron v. Reyes, supra. In said case, it was ruled that the power to control is an
incident of the power to create or abolish municipalities. Respondent's view, therefore, that creating municipalities and
controlling their local governments are "two worlds apart," is untenable. And since as stated, the power to control local
governments can no longer be conferred on or exercised by the President, it follows a fortiori that the power to create them,
all the more cannot be so conferred or exercised.

I am compelled to conclude, therefore, that Section 10 (1), Article VII of the Constitution has repealed Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code as far as the latter empowers the President to create local governments. Repeal by the
Constitution of prior statutes inconsistent with it has already been sustained in De los Santos v. MaIlare, 87 Phil. 289. And it
was there held that such repeal differs from a declaration of unconstitutionality of a posterior legislation, so much so that only
a majority vote of the Court is needed to sustain a finding of repeal.

Since the Constitution repealed Section 68 as far back as 1935, it is academic to ask whether Republic Act 2370 likewise has
provisions in conflict with Section 68 so as to repeal it. Suffice it to state, at any rate, that statutory prohibition on the
President from creating a barrio does not, in my opinion, warrant the inference of statutory prohibition for creating a
municipality. For although municipalities consist of barrios, there is nothing in the statute that would preclude creation of new
municipalities out of pre-existing barrios.

It is not contrary to the logic of local autonomy to be able to create larger political units and unable to create smaller ones. For
as long ago observed in President McKinley's Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission, greater autonomy is to be
imparted to the smaller of the two political units. The smaller the unit of local government, the lesser is the need for the
national government's intervention in its political affairs. Furthermore, for practical reasons, local autonomy cannot be given
from the top downwards. The national government, in such a case, could still exercise power over the supposedly
autonomous unit, e.g., municipalities, by exercising it over the smaller units that comprise them, e.g., the barrios. A realistic
program of decentralization therefore calls for autonomy from the bottom upwards, so that it is not surprising for Congress to
deny the national government some power over barrios without denying it over municipalities. For this reason, I disagree with
the majority view that because the President could not create a barrio under Republic Act 2370, a fortiori he cannot create a
municipality.
It is my view, therefore, that the Constitution, and not Republic Act 2370, repealed Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code's provision giving the President authority to create local governments. And for this reason I agree with the ruling in the
majority opinion that the executive orders in question are null and void.

In thus ruling, the Court is but sustaining the fulfillment of our historic desire to be free and independent under a republican
form of government, and exercising a function derived from the very sovereignty that it upholds. Executive orders declared
null and void.

Makalintal and Regala, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-32096October 24, 1970

ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner, petitioner,

vs.
HON. VICENTE G. ERICTA in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Br. XVIII, Quezon City, and TEDDY C.
GALO respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General Hector C. Fule and Solicitor Vicente A. Torres
for petitioner.

Teddy C. Galo in his own behalf.

Judge Vicente Ericta in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, J.:.

Petitioner Romeo F. Edu, the Land Transportation Commissioner, would have us rule squarely on the constitutionality of the
Reflector Law1 in this proceeding for certiorari and prohibition against respondent Judge, the Honorable Vicente G. Ericta of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, to annul and set aside his order for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction directed against Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner for the enforcement of the aforesaid statute,
in a pending suit in his court for certiorari and prohibition, filed by the other respondent Teddy C. Galo assailing; the validity of
such enactment as well as such administrative order. Respondent Judge, in his answer, would join such a plea asking that the
constitutional and legal questions raised be decided "once and for all." Respondent Teddy C. Galo who was quite categorical in
his assertion that both the challenged legislation and the administrative order transgress the constitutional requirements of
due process and non-delegation, is not averse either to such a definitive ruling. Considering the great public interest involved
and the reliance by respondent Galo and the allegation that the repugnancy to the fundamental law could be discerned on the
face of the statute as enacted and the executive order as promulgated, this Court, sees no obstacle to the determination in
this proceeding of the constitutional questions raised. For reasons to be hereafter stated, we sustain the validity of the
Reflector Law and Administrative Order No. 2 issued in the implementation thereof, the imputation of constitutional infirmity
being at best flimsy and insubstantial.

As noted in the answer of respondent Judge, respondent Galo on his behalf and that of other motorist filed on May 20, 1970 a
suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the challenged Act as an invalid exercise
of the police power, for being violative of the due process clause. This he followed on May 28, 1970 with a manifestation
wherein he sought as an alternative remedy that, in the event that respondent Judge would hold said statute constitutional,
Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land Transportation Commissioner, now petitioner, implementing such legislation be
nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power. There was a hearing on the plea for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction held on May 27. 1970 where both parties were duly represented, but no evidence was presented. The next day, on
May 28, 1970, respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a preliminary injunction directed against the enforcement of such
administrative order. There was the day after, a motion for its reconsideration filed by the Solicitor General representing
petitioner. In the meanwhile, the clerk of court of respondent Judge issued, on June 1, 1970 the writ of preliminary injunction
upon the filing of the required bond. The answer before the lower court was filed by petitioner Edu on June 4, 1970.
Thereafter, on June 9, 1970, respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration of the order of injunction. Hence this
petition for certiorari and prohibition filed with this court on June 18, 1970.
In a resolution of June 22, 1970, this Court required respondents to file an answer to the petition for certiorari and
prohibition. Respondent Judge, the Honorable Vicente G. Ericta, did file his answer on June 30, 1970 explaining why he
restrained the enforcement of Administrative Order No. 2 and, as noted at the outset, joining the Solicitor General in seeking
that the legal questions raised namely the constitutionality of the Reflector Law and secondly the validity of Administrative
Order No. 2 alleged to be in excess of the authority conferred on petitioner and therefore violative of the principle of non-
delegation of legislative power be definitely decided. It was on until July 6, 1970 that respondent Galo filed his answer seeking
the dismissal of this petition concentrating on what he considered to be the patent invalidity of Administrative Order No. 2 as
it went beyond the authority granted by the Reflector Law, even assuming that it is constitutional. In the meanwhile, on July 2,
1970, the petition was called for hearing with Solicitor Vicente Torres appearing for petitioner and respondent Galo for
himself. It was made clear during the course of such argumentation that the matter of the constitutionality of the Reflector
Law was likewise under consideration by this Court. The case is thus ripe for decision.

We repeat that we find for petitioner and sustain the Constitutionality of the Reflector Law as well as the validity of
Administrative Order No. 2.

1. The threshold question is whether on the basis of the petition, the answers, and the oral argument, it would be
proper for this Court to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of the Reflector Law. Our answer, as indicated, is in the
affirmative. It is to be noted that the main thrust of the petition before us is to demonstrate in a rather convincing fashion
that the challenged legislation does not suffer from the alleged constitutional infirmity imputed to it by the respondent Galo.
Since the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed before him before respondent Judge would seek a declaration
of nullity of such enactment by the attribution of the violation the face thereof of the due process guarantee in the
deprivation of property rights, it would follow that there is sufficient basis for us to determine which view should prevail.
Moreover, any further hearing by respondent Judge would likewise to limited to a discussion of the constitutional issues
raised, no allegations of facts having made. This is one case then where the question of validity is ripe for determination. If we
do so, further effort need not be wasted and time is saved moreover, the officials concerned as well as the public, both vitally
concerned with a final resolution of questions of validity, could know the definitive answer and could act accordingly. There is
a great public interest, as was mentioned, to be served by the final disposition of such crucial issue, petitioner praying that
respondent Galo be declared having no cause of action with respondent Judge being accordingly directed to dismiss his suit.

There is another reinforcement to this avenue of approach. We have done so before in a suit, Climaco v. Macadaeg, 2
involving the legality of a presidential directive. That was a petition for the review and reversal of a writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the then Judge Macadaeg. We there announced that we "have decided to pass upon the question of the
validity of the presidential directive ourselves, believing that by doing so we would be putting an end to a dispute, a delay in
the disposition of which has caused considerable damage and injury to the Government and to the tobacco planters
themselves."

There is no principle of constitutional adjudication that bars this Court from similarly passing upon the question of the validity
of a legislative enactment in a proceeding before it to test the propriety of the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The same
felt need for resolving once and for all the vexing question as to the constitutionality of a challenged enactment and thus
serve public interest exists. What we have done in the case of an order proceeding from one of the coordinate branches, the
executive, we can very well do in the matter before us involving the alleged nullity of a legislative act. Accordingly, there is
nothing to preclude the grant of the writs prayed for, the burden of showing the constitutionality of the act having proved to
be as will now be shown too much for respondent Galo.

2. The Reflector Law reads in full: "(g) Lights and reflector when parked or disabled. — Appropriate parking lights or
flares visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed at a corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked on
highways or in places that are not well-lighted or is placed in such manner as to endanger passing traffic. Furthermore, every
motor vehicle shall be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or other similar warning devices either pasted, painted or
attached to its front and back which shall likewise be visible at light at least one hundred meters away. No vehicle not
provided with any of the requirements mentioned in this subsection shall be registered."3 It is thus obvious that the
challenged statute is a legislation enacted under the police power to promote public safety.

Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came to force, Calalang v. Williams,4 identified police power
with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare. Persons and property could thus "be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
comfort, health and prosperity of the state." Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso,5 reiterated the doctrine,
such a competence being referred to as "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety, and general welfare of the people." The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a
pre-Commonwealth decision as "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to
the comfort, safety and welfare of society."6 In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v.
Mutuc7 with the totality of legislative power.

It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is to quote Justice Malcolm anew "the
most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable of powers," 8 extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out "to all the great
public needs." 9 Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be
done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: "Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the
present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the
time." 10 The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception
that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not
intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.

It would then be to overturn a host of decisions impressive for their number and unanimity were this Court to sustain
respondent Galo. 11 That we are not disposed to do, especially so as the attack on the challenged statute ostensibly for
disregarding the due process safeguard is angularly unpersuasive. It would be to close one's eyes to the hazards of traffic in
the evening to condemn a statute of this character. Such an attitude betrays lack of concern for public safety. How can it
plausibly alleged then that there was no observance of due process equated as it has always been with that is reasonable? The
statute assailed is not infected with arbitrariness. It is not the product of whim or caprice. It is far from oppressive. It is a
legitimate response to a felt public need. It can stand the test of the most unsymphatetic appraisal.

Respondent Galo is of a different mind, having been unable to resist the teaching of many American State Court decisions
referred to in the secondary source, American Jurisprudence principally relied upon by him. He ought to have been cautioned
against an indiscriminate acceptance of such doctrines predicated on what was once a fundamental postulate in American
public law, laissez faire.

It is to be admitted that there was a period when such a concept did influence American court decisions on constitutional law.
As was explicitly stated by Justice Cardozo speaking of that era: "Laissez-faire was not only a counsel of caution which would
do well to heed. It was a categorical imperative which statesmen as well as judges must obey." 12 For a long time legislation
tending to reduce economic inequality foundered on the rock that was the due process clause, enshrining as it did the liberty
of contract, based on such a basic assumption.

The New Deal administration of President Roosevelt more responsive to the social and economic forces at work changed
matters greatly. By 1937, there was a greater receptivity by the American Supreme Court to an approach not too reverential
of property rights. Even earlier, in 1935, Professor Coker of Yale, speaking as a historian, could already discern a contrary drift.
He did note the expending range of governmental activity in the United States. 13 What is undeniable is that by 1943, laissez-
faire was no longer the dominant theory. In the language of Justice Jackson in the leading case of West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette: 14 "We must, transplant these rights to a soil in which the laissez-faire concept or non-interference has
withered at least as to economic affairs, and social advancements are increasingly sought through closer integration of society
and through expanded and strengthened governmental controls."

While authoritative precedents from the United States federal and state jurisdictions were deferred to when the Philippines
was still under American rule, it cannot be said that the laissez-faire principle was invariably adhered to by us even then As
early as 1919, in the leading case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 15 Justice Malcolm already had occasion to affirm:
"The doctrines of laissez-faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economic and political theory, are of
the past. The modern period has shown a widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of government activity.
The Courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to trail after the other two branches of the Government in this progressive
march." People v. Pomar, 16 a 1924 decision which held invalid under the due process clause a provision providing for
maternity leave with pay thirty days before and thirty days after confinement could be cited to show that such a principle did
have its day. It is to be remembered though that our Supreme Court had no other choice as the Philippines was then under
the United States, and only recently the year before, the American Supreme Court in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 17 in line
with the laissez-faire theory, did hold that a statute providing for minimum wages was constitutionally infirm.

What is more, to erase any doubts, the Constitutional Convention saw to it that the concept of laissez-faire was rejected. It
entrusted to our government the responsibility of coping with social and economic problems with the commensurate power
of control over economic affairs. Thereby it could live up to its commitment to promote the general welfare through state
action. No constitutional objection to regulatory measures adversely affecting property rights, especially so when public safety
is the aim, is likely to be heeded, unless of course on the clearest and most satisfactory proof of invasion of rights guaranteed
by the Constitution. On such a showing, there may be a declaration of nullity, but not because the laissez-faire principle was
disregarded but because the due process, equal protection, or non-impairment guarantees would call for vindication.

To repeat, our Constitution which took effect in 1935 erased whatever doubts there might be on that score. Its philosophy is a
repudiation of laissez-faire. One of the leading members of the Constitutional Convention, Manuel A. Roxas, later the first
President of the Republic, made it clear when he disposed of the objection of Delegate Jose Reyes of Sorsogon, who noted the
"vast extensions in the sphere of governmental functions" and the "almost unlimited power to interfere in the affairs of
industry and agriculture as well as to compete with existing business" as "reflections of the fascination exerted by [the then]
current tendencies" in other jurisdictions. 18 He spoke thus: "My answer is that this constitution has definite and well defined
philosophy not only political but social and economic. ... If in this Constitution the gentlemen will find declarations of
economic policy they are there because they are necessary to safeguard the interests and welfare of the Filipino people
because we believe that the days have come when in self-defense, a nation may provide in its constitution those safeguards,
the patrimony, the freedom to grow, the freedom to develop national aspirations and national interests, not to be hampered
by the artificial boundaries which a constitutional provision automatically imposes. 19

It was not expected then when in a concurring opinion, Justice Laurel, who likewise sat in the Constitutional Convention and
was one of its leading lights, explicitly affirmed in a concurring opinion, later quoted with approval in the leading case of
Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 20 that the Constitution did away with the laissez-faire
doctrine. In the course of such concurring opinion and after noting the changes that have taken place calling for a more
affirmative role by the government and its undeniable power to curtail property rights, he categorically declared the doctrine
in People v. Pomar no longer retains "its virtuality as a living principle." 21

It is in the light of such rejection of the laissez-faire principle that during the Commonwealth era, no constitutional infirmity
was found to have attached to legislation covering such subjects as collective bargaining, 22 security of tenure, 23 minimum
wages, 24 compulsory arbitration, 25 the regulation of tenancy 26 as well as the issuance of
securities, 27 and control of public services. 28 So it is likewise under the Republic this Court having given the seal of approval
to more favorable tenancy laws, 29 nationalization of the retail trade, 30 limitation of the hours of labor, 31 imposition of
price control, 32 requirement of separation pay for one month, 33 and social security scheme. 34

Respondent Galo thus could have profited by a little more diligence in the scrutiny of Philippine decisions rendered with not
unexpected regularity, during all the while our Constitution has been in force attesting to the demise of such a shibboleth as
laissez-faire. It was one of those fighting faiths that time and circumstances had upset, to paraphrase Holmes. Yet respondent
Galo would seek to vivify and resurrect it. That, it would appear, is a vain quest, a futile undertaking. The Reflector Law is thus
immune from the attack so recklessly hurled against it. It can survive, and quite easily too, the constitutional test.

3. The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the validity of Administrative Order No. 2
issued by petitioner in his official capacity, duly approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, for being
contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. Such administrative order, which took effect on April 17,
1970, has a provision on reflectors in effect reproducing what was set forth in the Act. Thus: "No motor vehicles of whatever
style, kind, make, class or denomination shall be registered if not equipped with reflectors. Such reflectors shall either be
factory built-in-reflector commercial glass reflectors, reflection tape or luminous paint. The luminosity shall have an intensity
to be maintained visible and clean at all times such that if struck by a beam of light shall be visible 100 meters away at night."
35 Then came a section on dimensions, placement and color. As to dimensions the following is provided for: "Glass reflectors
— Not less than 3 inches in diameter or not less than 3 inches square; Reflectorized Tape — At least 3 inches wide and 12
inches long. The painted or taped area may be bigger at the discretion of the vehicle owner." 36 Provision is then made as to
how such reflectors are to be "placed, installed, pasted or painted." 37 There is the further requirement that in addition to
such reflectors there shall be installed, pasted or painted four reflectors on each side of the motor vehicle parallel to those
installed, pasted or painted in front and those in the rear end of the body thereof. 38 The color required of each reflectors,
whether built-in, commercial glass, reflectorized tape or reflectorized paint placed in the front part of any motor vehicle shall
be amber or yellow and those placed on the sides and in the rear shall all be red. 39

Penalties resulting from a violation thereof could be imposed. Thus: "Non-compliance with the requirements contained in this
Order shall be sufficient cause to refuse registration of the motor vehicle affected and if already registered, its registration
maybe suspended in pursuance of the provisions of Section 16 of RA 4136; [Provided], However, that in the case of the
violation of Section 1(a) and (b) and paragraph (8) Section 3 hereof, a fine of not less than ten nor more than fifty pesos shall
be imposed. 40 It is not to be lost sight of that under Republic Act No. 4136, of which the Reflector Law is an amendment,
petitioner, as the Land Transportation Commissioner, may, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, issue rules and regulations for its implementation as long as they do not conflict with its provisions. 41 It is
likewise an express provision of the above statute that for a violation of any of its provisions or regulations promulgated
pursuant thereto a fine of not less than P10 nor not less than P50 could be imposed. 42

It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative
power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs
participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and
repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the
legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the
scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job
must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only
way in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to
make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and
delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid
objection call be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of
flexibility and practicability.

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself
determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard
to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency
to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which
legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the
above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.

The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though
does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole.
In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. That is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is
"safe transit upon the roads." 43

This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not long after the Constitution
came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself the complexities of modern
governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the
United States and England but in practically all modern governments." 44 He continued: "Accordingly, with the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and
toward the approval of the practice by the courts." 45 Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that
what is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of
Congress being assumed.

Our later decisions speak to the same effect. Thus from, Justice J. B. L. Reyes in People vs. Exconde: 46 "It is well establish in
this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress,
nevertheless the latter may constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given
legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to
anticipate and proved for the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law in effect. All that is
required is that the regulation should germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that the law prescribes ... " 47
An even more explicit formulation of the controlling principle comes from the pen of the then Justice, now Chief Justice,
Concepcion: "Lastly, the legality of Circular No. 21 is assailed upon the ground that the grant of authority to issue the same
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. It is true that, under our system of government, said power may not be
delegated except to local governments. However, one thing is to delegate the power to determine what the law shall be, and
another thing to delegate the authority to fix the details in the execution of enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself.
Briefly stated, the rule is that the delegated powers fall under the second category, if the law authorizing the, delegation
furnishes a reasonable standard which "sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to act so that it may be
known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will." (Yakus vs. United States, 88 L. ed.
848) ... It should be noted, furthermore, that these powers must be construed and exercised in relation to the objectives of
the law creating the Central Bank, which are, among others, "to maintain monetary stability in the Philippines," and "to
promote a rising level of production, employment and real income in the Philippines." (Section 2, Rep. Act No. 265). These
standards are sufficiently concrete and definite to vest in the delegated authority, the character of administrative details in
the enforcement of the law and to place the grant said authority beyond the category of a delegation of legislative powers ... "
48

It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land Transportation Code. Republic Act No. 4136, of
which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the prime consideration in
statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation Of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation
Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental purpose. His
power is clear. There has been no abuse. His Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable,
launched against it by respondent Galo.

WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for are granted, the orders of May 28, 1970 of respondent Judge
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the writ of preliminary injunction of June 1, 1970 and his order of June 9,
1970 denying reconsideration are annulled and set aside. Respondent Judge is likewise directed to dismiss the petition for
certiorari and prohibition filed by respondent Teddy C. Galo, there being no cause of action as the Reflector Law and
Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner have not been shown to be tainted by invalidity. Without pronouncement as to costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J. and Villamor, J., took no part.

37 Sec. 3, par. (b) of the order specifies the matter thus: "(1) For two wheeled motorcycles — One in front and another
at the rear which shall be installed, pasted or painted on the lowest tip of both defenders. (2) For three-wheeled motorcycles
one in front to be installed, pasted or painted on the lowest tip of the defender and, two at the rear to be installed, pasted or
painted at the outermost side of the rear end of the body of the vehicle. (3) For Trailers with platform body irrespective of
size, two at the rear to be installed, pasted or painted on the outermost side of the rear end of the body. (4) For Trailers with
Stake or Van Body irrespective of size — Two in front to be installed, pasted or painted 5 inches below the two upper corners
of the body; and four at the rear end of the trailer, two of which shall be installed, pasted or painted 5 inches below the upper
two corners of the rear end of the body and the other two to be installed, pasted or painted 5 inches above the two lower
corners of the rear end of the body. (5) For Four-wheeled motor vehicles 2 ½ meter high or lower irrespective of weight —
Two in front to be installed at the outermost side of the vehicle preferably at the outer-tip of the front bumper or at the lower
tip of the front defender; and two at the rear to be installed, pasted or painted on the outermost side of the rear end of the
body of the vehicle preferably at the outer tip of the rear defender or bumper. (6) For four-wheeled motor vehicles 4 meters
high but not lower than 2 ½ meters irrespective of weight: — Four in front, two of which to be installed, pasted or painted at
the outermost front end of the vehicle preferably on the outer tip of the front bumper or defender and another two to be
installed, pasted or painted, 5 inches below the upper two corners of the front end of the body of the motor vehicles; and four
in the rear, two of which to be installed, pasted or painted 5 inches below the upper two corner of the rear end of the body
and the other two to be installed, pasted or painted 5 inches above the outermost rear end of the body of the motor vehicle."

38 Sec. 3, par. (a), clause 7, Ibid. The next clause reads as follows: "Furthermore, whenever the load of any vehicle is
indivisible such that a portion thereof extends beyond the projected width or length of the vehicle, the owner or driver of
such vehicle is hereby required to place reflectors described in Section 3(a) hereof nailed securely on the outermost tip of
suction load extending beyond both sides of the vehicle and/or two such reflectors likewise nailed securely on the outer-most
rear end of such load.
G.R. No. L-49112February 2, 1979

LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as
Minister of National Defense; HON. ALFREDO L. JUINIO, in his capacity as Minister Of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications; and HON: BALTAZAR AQUINO, in his capacity as Minister of Public Highways, respondents.

Leovillo C. Agustin Law Office for petitioner.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and Solicitor Amado D. Aquino for
respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

The validity of a letter of Instruction 1 providing for an early seaming device for motor vehicles is assailed in this prohibition
proceeding as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due process and, insofar as the rules and regulations for its
implementation are concerned, for transgressing the fundamental principle of non- delegation of legislative power. The Letter
of Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner who is possessed of the requisite standing, as being arbitrary and oppressive. A
temporary restraining order as issued and respondents Romeo F. Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner Juan Ponce Enrile,
Minister of National Defense; Alfredo L. Juinio, Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and Baltazar
Aquino, Minister of Public Highways; were to answer. That they did in a pleading submitted by Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza. 2 Impressed with a highly persuasive quality, it makes devoid clear that the imputation of a constitutional infirmity
is devoid of justification The Letter of Instruction on is a valid police power measure. Nor could the implementing rules and
regulations issued by respondent Edu be considered as amounting to an exercise of legislative power. Accordingly, the
petition must be dismissed.

The facts are undisputed. The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, issued on December 2, 1974, reads in
full: "[Whereas], statistics show that one of the major causes of fatal or serious accidents in land transportation is the
presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles along streets or highways without any appropriate early warning device
to signal approaching motorists of their presence; [Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been
recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and
the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention which was ratified by the Philippine
Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and
devices; [Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos], President of the Philippines, in the interest of safety on all streets and
highways, including expressways or limited access roads, do hereby direct: 1. That all owners, users or drivers of motor
vehicles shall have at all times in their motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of early warning device consisting of triangular,
collapsible reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors at least 15 cms. at the base and 40 cms. at the sides. 2. Whenever any
motor vehicle is stalled or disabled or is parked for thirty (30) minutes or more on any street or highway, including
expressways or limited access roads, the owner, user or driver thereof shall cause the warning device mentioned herein to be
installed at least four meters away to the front and rear of the motor vehicle staged, disabled or parked. 3. The Land
Transportation Commissioner shall cause Reflectorized Triangular Early Warning Devices, as herein described, to be prepared
and issued to registered owners of motor vehicles, except motorcycles and trailers, charging for each piece not more than 15
% of the acquisition cost. He shall also promulgate such rules and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this
order. 4. All hereby concerned shall closely coordinate and take such measures as are necessary or appropriate to carry into
effect then instruction. 3 Thereafter, on November 15, 1976, it was amended by Letter of Instruction No. 479 in this wise.
"Paragraph 3 of Letter of Instruction No. 229 is hereby amended to read as follows: 3. The Land transportation Commissioner
shall require every motor vehicle owner to procure from any and present at the registration of his vehicle, one pair of a
reflectorized early warning device, as d bed of any brand or make chosen by mid motor vehicle . The Land Transportation
Commissioner shall also promulgate such rule and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this order.'" 4 There
was issued accordingly, by respondent Edu, the implementing rules and regulations on December 10, 1976. 5 They were not
enforced as President Marcos on January 25, 1977, ordered a six-month period of suspension insofar as the installation of
early warning device as a pre-registration requirement for motor vehicle was concerned. 6 Then on June 30, 1978, another
Letter of Instruction 7 the lifting of such suspension and directed the immediate implementation of Letter of Instruction No.
229 as amended. 8 It was not until August 29, 1978 that respondent Edu issued Memorandum Circular No. 32, worded thus:
"In pursuance of Letter of Instruction No. 716, dated June 30, 1978, the implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229, as
amended by Letter of Instructions No. 479, requiring the use of Early Warning Devices (EWD) on motor vehicle, the following
rules and regulations are hereby issued: 1. LTC Administrative Order No. 1, dated December 10, 1976; shall now be
implemented provided that the device may come from whatever source and that it shall have substantially complied with the
EWD specifications contained in Section 2 of said administrative order; 2. In order to insure that every motor vehicle , except
motorcycles, is equipped with the device, a pair of serially numbered stickers, to be issued free of charge by this Commission,
shall be attached to each EWD. The EWD. serial number shall be indicated on the registration certificate and official receipt of
payment of current registration fees of the motor vehicle concerned. All Orders, Circulars, and Memoranda in conflict
herewith are hereby superseded, This Order shall take effect immediately. 9 It was for immediate implementation by
respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, as Minister of Public Works, transportation, and Communications. 10

Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already properly equipped
when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well serve as an early warning
device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the implementing rules
and regulations in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation Commission," 11 alleged that said Letter of
Instruction No. 229, as amended, "clearly violates the provisions and delegation of police power, [sic] * * *: " For him they are
"oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate
New Society." 12 He contended that they are "infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the
motoring public;" 13 are "one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral because [they] will make manufacturers and
dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early warning device
at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." 14 are unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a
compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a
practical alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the specified set of EWD's." 15 He therefore prayed for a
judgment both the assailed Letters of Instructions and Memorandum Circular void and unconstitutional and for a restraining
order in the meanwhile.

A resolution to this effect was handed down by this Court on October 19, 1978: "L-49112 (Leovillo C. Agustin v. Hon. Romeo F.
Edu, etc., et al.) — Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for
prohibition with writ of p prohibitory and/or mandatory injunction, the Court Resolved to (require) the respondents to file an
answer thereto within ton (10) days from notice and not to move to dismiss the petition. The Court further Resolved to [issue]
a [temporary restraining order] effective as of this date and continuing until otherwise ordered by this Court.16

Two motions for extension were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and granted. Then on November 15, 1978, he
Answer for respondents was submitted. After admitting the factual allegations and stating that they lacked knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle car," they "specifically deny the allegations
and stating they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle Car,
17 they specifically deny the allegations in paragraphs X and XI (including its subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, 4) of Petition to the effect
that Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended by Letters of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716 as well as Land transportation
Commission Administrative Order No. 1 and its Memorandum Circular No. 32 violates the constitutional provisions on due
process of law, equal protection of law and undue delegation of police power, and that the same are likewise oppressive,
arbitrary, confiscatory, one-sided, onerous, immoral unreasonable and illegal the truth being that said allegations are without
legal and factual basis and for the reasons alleged in the Special and Affirmative Defenses of this Answer."18 Unlike petitioner
who contented himself with a rhetorical recital of his litany of grievances and merely invoked the sacramental phrases of
constitutional litigation, the Answer, in demonstrating that the assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of the police
power and implementing rules and regulations of respondent Edu not susceptible to the charge that there was unlawful
delegation of legislative power, there was in the portion captioned Special and Affirmative Defenses, a citation of what
respondents believed to be the authoritative decisions of this Tribunal calling for application. They are Calalang v. Williams, 19
Morfe v. Mutuc, 20 and Edu v. Ericta. 21 Reference was likewise made to the 1968 Vienna Conventions of the United Nations
on road traffic, road signs, and signals, of which the Philippines was a signatory and which was duly ratified. 22 Solicitor
General Mendoza took pains to refute in detail, in language calm and dispassionate, the vigorous, at times intemperate,
accusation of petitioner that the assailed Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations cannot survive the
test of rigorous scrutiny. To repeat, its highly-persuasive quality cannot be denied.

This Court thus considered the petition submitted for decision, the issues being clearly joined. As noted at the outset, it is far
from meritorious and must be dismissed.
1. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is conceded by petitioner
and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a category,
it has offended against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was
mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally Identified by Chief Justice
Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision as "nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent
in every sovereignty" 23 was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: "Justice Laurel, in the first leading
decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, Identified police power with state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property
could thus 'be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to we the general comfort, health and prosperity of the
state.' Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as
'the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people. The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as
'that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare
of society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of
legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful at. tribute of government. It is, to quote Justice
Malcolm anew, 'the most essential, insistent, and at least table powers, I extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out 'to all
the great public needs.' Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it
could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the
greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: 'Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in
the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time.' The police power is thus a
dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and
imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual
citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to communal
peace, safety, good order, and welfare." 24

2. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the fact that the particular police power
measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to
invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-
existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, 25 an enactment conceived with
the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: "To promote
safe transit upon, and. avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads * * *. 26 As a matter of fact, the
first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, 27 with petitioner
failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.

3. The futility of petitioner's effort to nullify both the Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations
becomes even more apparent considering his failure to lay the necessary factual foundation to rebut the presumption of
validity. So it was held in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila. 28 The rationale
was clearly set forth in an excerpt from a decision of Justice Branders of the American Supreme Court, quoted in the opinion:
"The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void
on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due
process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the
presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record in overthrowing the statute.
29

4. Nor did the Solicitor General as he very well could, rely solely on such rebutted presumption of validity. As was
pointed out in his Answer "The President certainly had in his possession the necessary statistical information and data at the
time he issued said letter of instructions, and such factual foundation cannot be defeated by petitioner's naked assertion that
early warning devices 'are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents' because allegedly only 390 or 1.5
per cent of the supposed 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that in 1976 involved rear-end collisions (p. 12 of petition).
Petitioner's statistics is not backed up by demonstrable data on record. As aptly stated by this Honorable Court: Further: "It
admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable,
unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case here"' * * *. But even as g the verity of petitioner's
statistics, is that not reason enough to require the installation of early warning devices to prevent another 390 rear-end
collisions that could mean the death of 390 or more Filipinos and the deaths that could likewise result from head-on or frontal
collisions with stalled vehicles?" 30 It is quite manifest then that the issuance of such Letter of Instruction is encased in the
armor of prior, careful study by the Executive Department. To set it aside for alleged repugnancy to the due process clause is
to give sanction to conjectural claims that exceeded even the broadest permissible limits of a pleader's well known penchant
for exaggeration.

5. The rather wild and fantastic nature of the charge of oppressiveness of this Letter of Instruction was exposed in the
Answer of the Solicitor General thus: "Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive,
for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,' 2) "battery-
powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles," 3) "built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles,"
or 4) "well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) * * * because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the
said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist
from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early seaming device installed on the
roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road,
highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing
traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built in warning devices or the petroleum
lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it
an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the
motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision. 31

6. Nor did the other extravagant assertions of constitutional deficiency go unrefuted in the Answer of the Solicitor
General "There is nothing in the questioned Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, or in Administrative Order No. 1, which
requires or compels motor vehicle owners to purchase the early warning device prescribed thereby. All that is required is for
motor vehicle owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of this early warning device in
question, procuring or obtaining the same from whatever source. In fact, with a little of industry and practical ingenuity,
motor vehicle owners can even personally make or produce this early warning device so long as the same substantially
conforms with the specifications laid down in said letter of instruction and administrative order. Accordingly the early warning
device requirement can neither be oppressive, onerous, immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does it make manufacturers and
dealers of said devices 'instant millionaires at the expense of car owners' as petitioner so sweepingly concludes * * *.
Petitioner's fear that with the early warning device requirement 'a more subtle racket may be committed by those called upon
to enforce it * * * is an unfounded speculation. Besides, that unscrupulous officials may try to enforce said requirement in an
unreasonable manner or to an unreasonable degree, does not render the same illegal or immoral where, as in the instant
case, the challenged Letter of Instruction No. 229 and implementing order disclose none of the constitutional defects alleged
against it.32

7 It does appear clearly that petitioner's objection to this Letter of Instruction is not premised on lack of power, the
justification for a finding of unconstitutionality, but on the pessimistic, not to say negative, view he entertains as to its
wisdom. That approach, it put it at its mildest, is distinguished, if that is the appropriate word, by its unorthodoxy. It bears
repeating "that this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, 'does not pass upon questions of wisdom justice or expediency of
legislation.' As expressed by Justice Tuason: 'It is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the
bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern.' There can be no possible
objection then to the observation of Justice Montemayor. 'As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the
Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary. For they, according to Justice
Labrador, 'are not supposed to override legitimate policy and * * * never inquire into the wisdom of the law.' It is thus settled,
to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only congressional power or competence,
not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of
separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its
jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the
discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there
ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to
maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision
likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid and cogent on is wisdom cannot be sustained. 33

8. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power is equally without any
support well-settled legal doctrines. Had petitioner taken the trouble to acquaint himself with authoritative pronouncements
from this Tribunal, he would not have the temerity to make such an assertion. An exempt from the aforecited decision of Edu
v. Ericta sheds light on the matter: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the
very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge
of complete abdication may be hard to repel A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It
is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated
may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express
or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out
specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law clearly, the
legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads.'
This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not too long after the
Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself to the complexities
of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only
in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments.' He continued: 'Accordingly, with the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and
toward the approval of the practice by the courts.' Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what
is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress
being assumed." 34

9. The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is reinforced by this consideration. The
petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards posed by such
obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vionna Convention,
which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the
installation of road safety signs and devices; * * * " 35 It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in
the Constitution possesses relevance: "The Philippines * * * adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land * * *." 36 The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a
character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt
servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.

10. That is about all that needs be said. The rather court reference to equal protection did not even elicit any attempt on
the Part of Petitioner to substantiate in a manner clear, positive, and categorical why such a casual observation should be
taken seriously. In no case is there a more appropriate occasion for insistence on what was referred to as "the general rule" in
Santiago v. Far Eastern Broadcasting Co., 37 namely, "that the constitutionality of a law wig not be considered unless the point
is specially pleaded, insisted upon, and adequately argued." 38 "Equal protection" is not a talismanic formula at the mere
invocation of which a party to a lawsuit can rightfully expect that success will crown his efforts. The law is anything but that.

WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.

Castro, C.J., Barredo, Antonio, Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, concur.

Makasiar, J, reserves the right to file a separate opinion.

Aquino J., took no part.

Concepcion J., is on leave.

Castro, C.J., certifies that Justice Concepcion concurs in their decision.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I dissent from the majority's peremptory dismissal of the petition and lifting of the restraining order issued on October 19,
1978 against the blanket enforcement of the requirement that all motor vehicles be equipped with the so-called early warning
device, without even hearing the parties in oral argument as generally required by the Court in original cases of far-reaching
consequence such as the case at bar.

Lack of time presents my filing an extended dissent. I only wish to state that the petition advances grave and serious grounds
of assailing "the rules and regulations issued by the Land Transportation Commission under Administrative Order No. 1 and
Memorandum Circular No. 32 [which] do not reflect the real intent, noble objectives and spirit of Letter of Instructions No.
229, as amended by Letter of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716, because it is oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory,
nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society," because of the following
considerations, inter alia:

1. It is oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory to require owners of motor vehicles with built-in and more effective and
efficient E.W.D.'S such as "a) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles, 1)) battery-powered blinking lights inside
motor vehicles, c) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles....... to purchase the E.W.D.
specified in the challenged administrative order, whose effectivity and utility have yet to be demonstrated.

2. The public necessity for the challenged order has yet to be shown. No valid refutation has been made of petitioner's
assertion that the "E.W.D.'s are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents. Statistics shows that of the
26,000 motor vehicle accidents that occurred in 1976, only 390 or 1.5 per cent involved rear-end collisions," as to require the
purchase and installation of the questioned E.W.D. for almost 900,000 vehicles throughout the country;

3. The big financial burden to be imposed on all motorists is staggering, and petitioner's assertion that "as of 1975, there
were at least 865,037 motor vehicles all over the country requiring E.W.D.'S and at the minimum price of 1156.00 per set, this
would mean a consumer outlay of P 48,451,872.00, or close to P 50 million for the questioned E.W.D.'S "stands unchallenged;

4. No real effort has been made to show that there can be practical and less burdensome alternative road safety devices
for stalled vehicles than the prescribed E.W.D., such as the common petroleum lamps "kinke" which can be placed just as
effectively in front of stalled vehicles on the highways; and

5. There is no imperative need for imposing such a bet requirement on all vehicles. The respondents have not shown
that they have availed of the powers and prerogatives vested in their offices such as ridding the country of dilapidated trucks
and vehicles which are the main cause of the deplorable -highway accidents due to stoned vehicles, establishing an honest
and foolproof system of examination and licensing of motor vehicle drivers so as to ban the reckless and irresponsible and a
sustained education campaign to instill safe driving habits and attitudes that can be carried out for much less than the P 50
million burden that would be imposed by the challenged order.

I do feel that a greater "degree of receptivity and sympathy" could be extended to the petitioner for his civic mindedness in
having filed the present petition g as capricious and unreasonable the "all pervading police power" of the State instead of
throwing the case out of court and leaving the wrong impression that the exercise of police power insofar as it may affect the
life, liberty and property of any person is no longer subject to judicial inquiry.

# Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I dissent from the majority's peremptory dismissal of the petition and lifting of the restraining order issued on October 19,
1978 against the blanket enforcement of the requirement that all motor vehicles be equipped with the so-called early warning
device, without even hearing the parties in oral argument as generally required by the Court in original cases of far-reaching
consequence such as the case at bar.
Lack of time presents my filing an extended dissent. I only wish to state that the petition advances grave and serious grounds
of assailing "the rules and regulations issued by the Land Transportation Commission under Administrative Order No. 1 and
Memorandum Circular No. 32 [which] do not reflect the real intent, noble objectives and spirit of Letter of Instructions No.
229, as amended by Letter of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716, because it is oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory,
nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society," because of the following
considerations, inter alia:

1. It is oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory to require owners of motor vehicles with built-in and more effective and
efficient E.W.D.'S such as "a) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles, 1)) battery-powered blinking lights inside
motor vehicles, c) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles....... to purchase the E.W.D.
specified in the challenged administrative order, whose effectivity and utility have yet to be demonstrated.

2. The public necessity for the challenged order has yet to be shown. No valid refutation has been made of petitioner's
assertion that the "E.W.D.'s are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents. Statistics shows that of the
26,000 motor vehicle accidents that occurred in 1976, only 390 or 1.5 per cent involved rear-end collisions," as to require the
purchase and installation of the questioned E.W.D. for almost 900,000 vehicles throughout the country;

3. The big financial burden to be imposed on all motorists is staggering, and petitioner's assertion that "as of 1975, there
were at least 865,037 motor vehicles all over the country requiring E.W.D.'S and at the minimum price of 1156.00 per set, this
would mean a consumer outlay of P 48,451,872.00, or close to P 50 million for the questioned E.W.D.'S "stands unchallenged;

4. No real effort has been made to show that there can be practical and less burdensome alternative road safety devices
for stalled vehicles than the prescribed E.W.D., such as the common petroleum lamps "kinke" which can be placed just as
effectively in front of stalled vehicles on the highways; and

5. There is no imperative need for imposing such a bet requirement on all vehicles. The respondents have not shown
that they have availed of the powers and prerogatives vested in their offices such as ridding the country of dilapidated trucks
and vehicles which are the main cause of the deplorable -highway accidents due to stoned vehicles, establishing an honest
and foolproof system of examination and licensing of motor vehicle drivers so as to ban the reckless and irresponsible and a
sustained education campaign to instill safe driving habits and attitudes that can be carried out for much less than the P 50
million burden that would be imposed by the challenged order.

I do feel that a greater "degree of receptivity and sympathy" could be extended to the petitioner for his civic mindedness in
having filed the present petition g as capricious and unreasonable the "all pervading police power" of the State instead of
throwing the case out of court and leaving the wrong impression that the exercise of police

G.R. No. L-58184October 30, 1981

FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, and THE
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

The constitutionality of the amendment to the Article of the Labor Code regarding strikes "affecting the national interest" 1 is
assailed in this petition which partakes of the nature of a prohibition proceeding filed by the Free Telephone Workers Union.
As amended, the Article now reads: "In labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the
national interest, such as may occur in but not limited to public utilities, companies engaged in the generation or distribution
of energy, banks, hospitals, and those within export processing zones, the Minister of Labor and Employment may assume
jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption
or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout. If one has already
taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work
and the employers shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Minister may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure
compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same." 2 It is the submission of
petitioner labor union that "Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 in so far as it amends article 264 of the Labor Code delegating to the
Honorable Minister of Labor and Employment the power and discretion to assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for
compulsory arbitration to the National Labor Relations Commission, and in effect make or unmake the law on free collective
bargaining, is an undue delegation of legislative powers. 3 There is likewise the assertion that such conferment of authority
"may also ran (sic) contrary to the assurance of the State to the workers' right to self-organization and collective bargaining. 4

On the CRUCIAL ISSUE PRESENTED; THE Court holds that petitioner was not able to make out a case of an undue delegation of
legislative power. There could be, however, an unconstitutional application. For while the Constitution allows compulsory
arbitration, it must be stressed that the exercise of such competence cannot ignore the basic fundamental principle and state
policy that the state should afford protection to labor. 5 Whenever, therefore, it is resorted to in labor disputes causing or
likely to cause strikes or lockouts affecting national interest, the State still is required to "assure the rights of workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. 6 At this stage of the litigation,
however, in the absence of factual determination by the Ministry of Labor and the National Labor Relations Commission, this
Court is not in a position to rule on whether or not there is an unconstitutional application. There was not even a categorical
assertion to that effect by petitioner's counsel which was indicative of the care in his choice of words. He only assumed that
the conferment of such authority may run counter to the right of the workers to self-organization and collective bargaining.
The petition then cannot prosper.

The facts alleged in the petition relevant for the purpose of determining whether or not there is an undue delegation of
legislative power do not sustain the claim of petitioner union. On September 14, 1981, there was a notice of strike with the
Ministry of Labor for unfair labor practices stating the following grounds " 1) Unilateral and arbitrary implementation of a
Code of Conduct, a copy of which is attached, to the detriment of the interest of our members; 2) Illegal terminations and
suspensions of our officers and members as a result of the implementation of said Code of Conduct; and 3) Unconfirmation
(sic) of call sick leaves and its automatic treatment as Absence Without Official Leave of Absence (AWOL) with corresponding
suspensions, in violation of our Collective Bargaining Agreement." 7 After which came, on September 15, 1981, the
notification to the Ministry that there was compliance with the two-thirds strike vote and other formal requirements of the
law and Implementing Rules. 8 Several conciliation meetings called by the Ministry followed, with petitioner manifesting its
willingness to have a revised Code of Conduct that would be fair to all concerned but with a plea that in the meanwhile the
Code of Conduct being imposed be suspended a position that failed to meet the approval of private respondent.
Subsequently, respondent, 9 on September 25, 1981, certified the labor dispute to the National Labor Relations Commission
for compulsory arbitration and enjoined any strike at the private respondent's establishment. 10 The labor dispute was set for
hearing by respondent National Labor Relations Commission on September 28,
1981. 11 There was in the main an admission of the above relevant facts by public respondents. Private respondent, following
the lead of petitioner labor union, explained its side on the controversy regarding the Code of Conduct, the provisions of
which as alleged in the petition were quite harsh, resulting in what it deemed indefinite preventive suspension apparently the
principal cause of the labor dispute. At this stage, as mentioned, it would be premature to discuss the merits, or lack of it, of
such claim, the matter being properly for the Ministry of Labor to determine.

The very next day after the filing of the petition, to be exact on September 29, 1981, this Court issued the following resolution:
"Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for certiorari with prayer
for a restraining order, the Court Resolved to (a) require the respondents to file an [answer], not a motion to dismiss, on or
before Wednesday, October 7, 1981; and (b) [Set] this case for hearing on Thursday, October 8, 1981 at 11:00 o'clock in the
morning. 12 After the parties were duly heard, Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza 13 appearing for the public respondents,
the case was considered ripe for decision. 14

To repeat, while the unconstitutionality of the amendatory act has not been demonstrated, there is no ruling on the question
of unconstitutional application, especially so as to any alleged infringement in the exercise of the power of compulsory
arbitration of the specific modes provided in the Constitution to assure compliance with the constitutional mandate to "afford
protection to labor" being at this stage premature.

1. The allegation that there is undue delegation of legislative powers cannot stand the test of scrutiny. The power which he
would deny the Minister of Labor by virtue of such principle is for petitioner labor union within the competence of the
President, who in its opinion can best determine national interests, but only when a strike is in progress. 15 Such admission is
qualified by the assumption that the President "can make law," " an assertion which need not be passed upon in this
petition.'What possesses significance for the purpose of this litigation is that it is the President who "Shall have control of the
ministries. 16 It may happen, therefore, that a single person may occupy a dual position of Minister and Assemblyman. To the
extent, however, that what is involved is the execution or enforcement of legislation, the Minister is an official of the
executive branch of the government. The adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary system in the amended Constitution
does not alter its essentially presidential character. Article VII on the presidency starts with this provision: "The President shall
be the head of state and chief executive of the Republic of the Philippines. 17 Its last section is an even more emphatic
affirmation that it is a presidential system that obtains in our government. Thus: "All powers vested in the President of the
Philippines under the 1935 Constitution and the laws of the land which are not herein provided for or conferred upon any
official shall be deemed and are hereby vested in the President unless the Batasang Pambansa provides otherwise. 18 There is
a provision, of course, on the Prime Minister, but the Constitution is explicit that while he shall be the head of the Cabinet, it is
the President who nominates him from among the members of the Batasang Pambansa, thereafter being "elected by a
majority of all the members thereof. 19 He is primarily, therefore, a Presidential choice. He need not even come from its
elected members. He is responsible, along with the Cabinet, to the Batasang Pambansa for the program of government but as
"approved by the
President. 20 His term of office as Prime Minister "shall commence from the date of his election by the Batasang Pambansa
and shall end on the date that the nomination of his successor is submitted by the President to the Batasang Pambansa. Any
other member of the Cabinet or the Executive Committee may be removed at the discretion of the President. 21 Even the
duration of his term then depends on the Presidential pleasure, not on legislative approval or lack of it. During his
incumbency, he exercises supervision over all ministries, 22 a recognition of the important role he plays in the implementation
of the policy of the government, the legislation duly enacted in pursuance thereof, and the decrees and orders of the
President. To the Prime Minister can thus be delegated the performance of the administrative functions of the President, who
can then devote more time and energy in the fulfillment of his exacting role as the national leader. 23 As the only one whose
constituency is national it is the President who, by virtue of his election by the entire electorate, has an indisputable claim to
speak for the country as a whole. Moreover, it is he who is explicitly granted the greater power of control of such ministries.
He continues to be the Executive, the amplitude and scope of the functions entrusted to him in the formulation of policy and
its execution leading to the apt observation by Laski that there is not one aspect of which that does not affect the lives of all.
The Prime Minister can be of valuable assistance indeed to the President in the discharge of his awesome responsibility, but it
is the latter who is vested with powers, aptly characterized by Justice Laurel in Planas v. Gil 24 as "broad and extraordinary
[being] expected to govern with a firm and steady hand without vexation or embarrassing interference and much less
dictation from any source. 25 It may be said that Justice Laurel was referring to his powers under the 1935 Constitution. It
suffices to refer anew to the last section of the article of the present Constitution on the presidency to the effect that all
powers vested in the President of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution remain with him. It cannot be emphasized too
strongly that under the 1935 Constitution. "The Executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. 26

2. A later decision, Villena v. Secretary of Interior 27 greater relevance to this case. The opinion of Justice Laurel, again the
ponente, made clear that under the presidential system, "all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and,
except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively
the acts of the Chief Executive. 28 At the time of the adoption of the present Constitution on January 17, 1973, this Court had
cited with approval the above ruling of Villena in twelve cases. 29 It is particularly noteworthy that the first decision
promulgated under the present Constitution reiterating the above doctrine is Philippine American Management Co. v.
Philippine American Management Employees Association. 30 For the question therein involved, as in this case, is the statutory
grant of authority to the then Secretary of Labor, now Minister of Labor, by the Minimum Wage Law to refer to the then
existing Court of Industrial Relations for arbitration the dispute that led to a strike. It is indisputable, according to the opinion,
that in the very petition, the Secretary of Labor on January 6, 1972, pursuant to the Minimum Wage Law, "endorsed the
controversy on the precise question of whether or not petitioner Philippine American Management Company was complying
with its mandatory terms. What was done by him, as a department head, in the regular course of business and conformably to
a statutory provision is, according to settled jurisprudence that dates back to an authoritative pronouncement by Justice
Laurel in 1939 in Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, presumptively the act of the President, who is the only dignitary who
could, paraphrasing the language of the decision, disapprove or reprobate it. What other response could be legitimately
expected from respondent Court then? It could not just simply fold its hands and refuse to pass on the dispute. 31 The Villena
doctrine was stressed even more in denying a motion for reconsideration by a more extensive citation from the ponencia of
Justice Laurel: "Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but
the projection of that of the President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme
Court of the United States, "each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that
department where the President is required by law to exercise authority." ... Secretaries of departments, of course, exercise
certain powers under the law but the law cannot impair or in any way affect the constitutional power of control and direction
of the President. As a matter of executive policy, they may be granted departmental autonomy as to certain matters but this is
by mere concession of the executive, in the absence of valid legislation in the particular field. If the President, then, is the
authority in the Executive Department, he assumes the corresponding responsibility. The head of a department is a man of his
confidence; he control and directs his acts; he appoints him and can remove him at pleasure; he is the executive, not any of
his secretaries. It is therefore logical that he, the President, should be answerable for the acts of administration of the entire
Executive Department before his own conscience no less than before that undefined power of public opinion which, in the
language of Daniel Webster, is the last repository of popular government. 32 So it should be in this case.

3. Even on the assumption, indulged in solely because of the claim earnestly and vigorously pressed by counsel for petitioner,
that the authority conferred to the Minister of Labor partakes of a legislative character, still no case of an unlawful delegation
of such power may be discerned. That is the teaching from Edu v. Ericta 33 Thus: "What cannot be delegated is the authority
under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term
and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature, To determine whether or riot there is an undue delegation of
legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not
abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a
complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has
rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall
be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under
and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection can be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying
the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability. To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be
a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters principle and lays down fundamental
policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its
limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the
executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and
regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The
standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act
considered as a whole. ... This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision [Pangasinan
Transportation v. Public Service Commission] announced not-too-long after the Constitution came into force and effect that
the principle of non-delegation 'has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modem governments giving rise to the
adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England but in
practically all modern governments He continued: 'Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication
of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly
growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the
courts.' Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-legislative in
character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed. Our later decisions speak to
the same effect. Thus from Justice J.B.L. Reyes in People v. Exconde; 'It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the
making of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may
constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its
policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the
multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation
should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to
the standards that the law prescribes.' 34 Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 cannot be any clearer, the coverage being limited to
"strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest."

4. The strict rule on non-delegation was enunciated by Justice Laurel in People v. Vera, 35 Which declared unconstitutional the
then Probation Act. 36 Such an approach, conceded, by some constitutionalists to be both scholarly and erudite nonetheless
aroused apprehension for being too rigid and inflexible. While no doubt appropriate in that particular case, the institution of a
new mode of treating offenders, it may pose difficulty for social and economic legislation needed by the times. Even prior to
the above-cited Pangasinan Transportation decision, Justice Laurel himself in an earlier decision, People v. Rosenthal in 1939,
promulgated less than two years after Vera, pointed out that such doctrine of non-delegation "has been made to adopt itself
to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of 'subordinate
legislation' not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments. The difficulty lies in the fixing
of the limit and extent of the authority. While courts have undertaken to lay down general principles, the safest is to decide
each case according to its peculiar environment, having in mind the wholesome legislative purpose intended to be achieved.
37 After which, in came the even more explicit formulation in Pangasinan Transportation appearing in the quoted excerpt
from Edu v. Ericta. There is no question therefore that there is a marked drift in the direction of a more liberal approach. It is
partly in recognition of the ever increasing needs for the type of legislation allowing rule-making in accordance with
standards, explicit or implicit, discernible from a perusal of the entire enactment that in Agricultural Credit and Cooperative
Financing Administration v. Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices" 38 the then Justice, now the
retired Chief Justice and presently Speaker, Makalintal had occasion to refer to "the growing complexities of society" as well
as "the increasing social challenges of the times. 39 It would be self-defeating in the extreme if the legislation intended to
cope with the grave social and economic problems of the present and foreseeable future would founder on the rock of an
unduly restrictive and decidedly unrealistic meaning to be affixed to the doctrine of non-delegation. Fortunately with the
retention in the amended Constitution of some features of the 1973 Constitution as originally adopted leading to an
appreciable measure of concord and harmony between the policy-making branches of the government, executive and
legislative, the objection on the grounds of non- delegation would be even less persuasive. It is worth repeating that the Prime
Minister, while the choice of the President, must have the approval of all members of the Batasang Pambansa. 40 At least the
majority of the cabinet members, the Ministers being appointed by the President, if heads of ministries, shall come from its
regional representatives. 41 So, also, while the Prime Minister and the Cabinet are responsible to the Batasang Pambansa for
the program of government, it must be one "approved by the President. 42 While conceptually, there still exists a distinction
between the enactment of legislation and its execution, between formulation and implementation, the fundamental principle
of separation of powers of which non-delegation is a logical corollary becomes even more flexible and malleable. Even in the
case of the United States, with its adherence to the Madisonian concept of separation of powers, President Kennedy could
state that its Constitution did not make "the Presidency and Congress rivals for power but partners for progress [with the two
branches] being trustees for the people, custodians of their
heritage. 43 With the closer relationship provided for by the amended Constitution in our case, there is likely to be even more
promptitude and dispatch in framing the policies and thereafter unity and vigor in their execution. A rigid application of the
non-delegation doctrine, therefore, would be an obstacle to national efforts at development and progress. There is
accordingly more receptivity to laws leaving to administrative and executive agencies the adoption of such means as may be
necessary to effectuate a valid legislative purpose. It is worth noting that a highly-respected legal scholar, Professor Jaffe as
early as 1947, could speak of delegation as the "dynamo of modern government. 44 He then went on to state that "the
occasions for delegating power to administrative offices [could be] compassed by a single generalization. 45 Thus: "Power
should be delegated where there is agreement that a task must be performed and it cannot be effectively performed by the
legislature without the assistance of a delegate or without an expenditure of time so great as to lead to the neglect of equally
important business. Delegation is most commonly indicated where the relations to be regulated are highly technical or where
their regulation requires a course of continuous decision. 46 His perceptive study could rightfully conclude that even in a
strictly presidential system like that of the United States, the doctrine of non-delegation reflects the American "political
philosophy that insofar as possible issues be settled [by legislative bodies], an essentially restrictive approach" may ignore
"deep currents of social force. 47 In plainer terms, and as applied to the Philippines under the amended Constitution with the
close ties that bind the executive and legislative departments, certain features of parliamentarism having been retained, it
may be a deterrent factor to much needed legislation. The spectre of the non-delegation concept need not haunt, therefore,
party caucuses, cabinet sessions or legislative chambers.

5. By way of summary, this Court holds that Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 insofar as it empowers the Minister of Labor to assume
jurisdiction over labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest and
thereafter decide it or certify the same the National Labor Relations Commission is not on its face unconstitutional for being
violative of the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power. To repeat, there is no ruling on the question of whether or not
it has been unconstitutionally applied in this case, for being repugnant to the regime of self-organization and free collective
bargaining, as on the facts alleged, disputed by private respondent, the matter is not ripe for judicial determination. It must be
stressed anew, however, that the power of compulsory arbitration, while allowable under the Constitution and quite
understandable in labor disputes affected with a national interest, to be free from the taint of unconstitutionality, must be
exercised in accordance with the constitutional mandate of protection to labor. The arbiter then is called upon to take due
care that in the decision to be reached, there is no violation of "the rights of workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. 48 It is of course manifest that there is such
unconstitutional application if a law "fair on its face and impartial in appearance (is) applied and administered by public
authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand. 49 It does not even have to go that far. An instance of unconstitutional
application would be discernible if what is ordained by the fundamental law, the protection of labor, is ignored or disregarded.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. During the pendency of the compulsory arbitration proceedings, both
petitioner labor union and private respondent are enjoined to good faith compliance with the provisions of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 130. No costs.

Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, Aquino, JJ., concurs in the result.